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Organizational Culture and Public Administration – the Quality of Customer Operations in Administrative Units in Slovenia

Irena Bačlija and Marjan Brezovšek

Abstract: *The rapid transfiguration of modern society through globalization processes is changing the national state administration's classical regulative and authoritative role into a creative evolutional partnership encompassing all subsystems of society. In fact, the creation and development of a modern administrative system is the main goal not only of ex-socialist countries but nations worldwide. We expect our public administration bodies to have the relevant skills to deal with and be aware of all the political and organizational changes taking place in the globalized world; if they are lacking it will be impossible to move from structural towards material change. In the processes of evolutionary change in public organizations, organizational culture plays a most important role because without it we cannot understand the dynamics of organizational growth and change, and why certain processes cannot be revived. In this paper the authors will analyse organizational cultures and climates and stress their importance for public administration systems. Its goal is to present and evaluate a project in the Slovenian national state administration system that has been ongoing for almost five years. The project involves the comparative research of the organizational climate and satisfaction levels among civil servants and citizens (users). The authors will focus their analysis on levels of awareness of the importance of satisfaction and organizational climate in administrative organizations, given their impacts on organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and analyse the organizational climate's effects on employee motivation.*

Keywords: *Organizational culture, organizational climate, public administration, administrative reform in Slovenia*

Organizational culture and public administration

The transformation of public administration is a process unfolding in both developed countries and those undergoing democratic transition. It is part of the global change in modern states, known as social and political modernization. At the most general level, this means a transition, and distinction between traditional and modern

society, which is seen in the development from an authoritarian to democratic society, from a closed to an open society, and to a pluralistic political system. Societal change is related to and dependent on the processes of political modernization, in which some institutions disintegrate, political participation increases, a modern political culture emerges, etc. The processes and nature of changes in public administration are thus to a large extent contingent upon development processes in individual states and determined by the cultural and politico-administrative environment in which the changes take effect. When reforming public administration the post-socialist countries experience specific problems such as the disintegration or change of social values based on collectivism, egalitarianism and equality. Yet the disintegration of these values has not necessarily led to the creation of new and democratic ones because there is often an absence of political unanimity and consensus on the nature of administrative reforms, and the way that they should proceed: states have an unpleasant experience with bureaucracy and regard it as an unnecessary cost. In addition, privatization, social stratification and a lack of supervisory and control mechanisms (tax surveillance and corruption) also represent a formidable challenge even to consolidated democracies, let alone for the conditions in which public administration has to undergo reforms and contain the situation. The basic directions of the reforms in these states can be represented by a 6D-model: de-statization, democratization, decentralization, deconcentration, deregulation and debureaucratization.

In countries where democracy is consolidated, the substance and problems of structural and legislative public administration reform are retreating from public and political agendas in terms of attracting attention and interest. However, they are being replaced by the issue of modernized public administration in terms of its openness, transparency, efficiency, accessibility and customer (internal and external) focus, topics of perhaps even greater importance to the quality of life of citizens and to the competitive ability of an economy and thus to the efficiency of society itself. Hence, a proper organizational culture and organizational climate is becoming ever more recognized as one of the fundamental aspects that may – even more so than some others – exert a decisive influence on the effectiveness of any given system, especially on public administration. From the standpoint of further public administration development and change, the fundamental issue increasingly revolves around how integrated the institutional arrangement of the administrative function and organization (the latter two certainly were emphasized strongly during the first decade of the consolidation processes) is with the cultural components, recognized as the elements of organizational and administrative culture, with the latter being inseparably linked with the political and administrative culture of the wider environment.

Before proceeding it is worthwhile to also define more accurately the notion of administrative culture. Some definitions of culture as something that an organization has" regard the culture as one of the properties or achievements of the organization. The culture represents the static approach, which presupposes the harmony of the formal and symbolic aspects of an organization. Such views were prevalent until the mid-1970s. One of the most prominent proponents is McKinsey, with his 7-S diagram showing culture in the middle of the "lucky atom" (Peters – Waterman, 1982: 10). The second definition of culture as something that an organization "is" derives from the assumption that the cultural system is independent and does not necessarily develop in harmony with the structures of the societal system and the formal processes within an organization; this definition thus represents the dynamic approach. Definitions of organizational culture differ mainly in accordance with the elements individual scientists have emphasized in their related studies. Hence, Handy (1976: 176) defined the notion of organizational culture as a combination of shared norms and convictions reflected in various organizational structures and systems of operation, whilst Pettigrew (in Schein, 1995: 38) delineated it as a collective will of the members, as "what organization truly needs" or "what really matters on the way forward". Hofstede (1984: 21) defined organizational culture as a collective programming of memory, distinguishing the members of one organization from the members of another and, at the same time, he stressed the fact that culture is not a characteristic of individuals but of an organization, and that it manifests itself through the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of its individual members. Since the definitions of organizational culture are not uniform, we can mention several unified concepts which, according to Hofstede (1990: 286), could be agreed upon by the majority of authors. Thus, organizational culture is:

- integral;
- diachronically determined;
- its concept is related to anthropological concepts;
- socially created;
- "a soft" concept; and
- has a low level of susceptibility to change.

A close connection with the notion of organizational culture can be found in the notion of organizational climate, which comprises a range of characteristics expressing employee satisfaction with the social aspects of work (Možina – Kavčič,

1994: 191). The concept of organizational climate or organizational atmosphere has had a longer history of study in the field of organizational psychology and organizational behaviour.

The starting point, which is based on the (re)formation of organizational culture in order to effectively implement institutional change, is the main mobilizing force behind changes to public administration. Thus, the fundamental assumption is that a suitable organizational culture influences the effectiveness of an organization and can even be more important than some other success factors. In the field of public administration as a service activity, where the human factor is paramount, a suitable and developed system of human resource management is important for the alteration of the organizational culture and climate, and must be capable of detecting and suitably adapting to the demands of the external environment (rationality, openness, responsiveness, customer focus, professionalism and an apolitical stance). With a suitable system of human resource management in place, accompanied by the ability and readiness of the administrative management to (re)form the organizational culture, the possibility and opportunities arise to combine institutional-normative reforms with the long-term reinforcement of habits, conduct and behaviour of the employees, so as to assure that the staff meet the demands and expectations of the challenges posed by the environment.

At the heart of the problem is the question of incongruence and tension, since institutional change in public administration as a consequence of an adaptation to societal and political modernization does is not echoed in the cultural system of the public administration or with the carriers of this change, the civil servants, and in their value systems, convictions, stances, norms and customs. Under the conditions of fast change, organizational culture, which is prone only to a slow course of change, is to a lesser extent an integrative and cohesive element of the administration, and does not help in its ability to adapt to the environment. This manifests itself in a lower level of administrative efficiency and its reduced role as a partner in the process of developing a modern and democratic state. Its dysfunctional character lags behind formal change and can cause tensions, conflicts and frustrations among civil servants and even clients, and hinders the energies needed for efficiency. This is precisely what administrative management has to understand, as a mean for its (trans)formation.

At the most general level, the various aspects of change in Slovenian public administration can be described as a transition from a traditional (closed) administration towards an open one. Its role could be described as classic and regulative and one of power. The system is receding at an ever increasing rate and developing towards a creative, developmental partnership with all other societal subsystems.

Yet the foundation of a transition to an open, modern public administration is civil servants, with their culture, and a suitable system of human resource management. Administration managers encountering these new challenges have to answer some fundamental questions: what is their role in the formation and change of the administration as seen through the lens of organizational culture; how do they educate themselves and what methods do they use for strategies for directing employees towards specific goals? What is their idea of the organization's future and its culture, and what course of action should be taken in order to achieve change? Due to the development of congruence between the public administration culture and the objectives of modern management, identified as the principle of new public management (Osborne in Gaebler, 1992), administration managers can create and implement various strategies of organizational culture change. They can, of course, ignore and avoid it or they can encourage and change it. However, the alteration of convictions, values and collective experience of civil servants and administrative managers alike embodies the condition of organizational culture change, which entails a greater level of the administration's adaptability to the demands of the environment. The managers must, through planning and action, shape a unanimity regarding the changes and confirm as well as maintain with their legitimacy the reformed culture within the administration.

If one considers the reform, modernization or change of the public administration as representing a complex, multi-dimensional developmental process with political, administrative, economic, organizational, technological and civil service dimensions, the reform is undoubtedly related to, dependent on and determined by the contents of political and general societal modernization. With the establishment of a new state legal system and the construction of democratic institutions that have brought about and synthesized a substantial change in the political modernization processes, including the foundation of the nation's own state and the process of acceding to the legal and political structures of the European Union, the 1990s were a turning point for Slovenian society. In the aftermath of the "heroic era", the "grand" topics have been constantly retreating from public attention and mobilizing agendas of both the public and politics, and are tending to be replaced by everyday topics whose importance and decisive influence on the quality of life of the citizens and capabilities of economic development may be even greater. All of the extensive public administration change in the fields of legislation, e-business, education, civil service and establishment of quality systems represent an important part of the public administration's modernization and can, at the most general level, be described as the transition from traditional (closed) towards participative (open) public administration. However, the state of the organizational culture in the administration has gained in importance as a condition for achieving the efficiency and effectiveness of this transition. The culture

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can be said to entail a resistance to change, an attitude of domination towards the citizens and a lack of partnership, etc.

In the socio-cultural sphere, the entire public administration system has been facing a move away from the general Weberian principles of operation and from the functioning of a Keynesian state; however, in the cultural sphere, which is still historically and socially determined, civil society and participative dimensions have yet to be developed; the actors in between the two spheres, i.e., civil servants, represent, with their identification with the relevance of organizational culture and their capability to modify it, the main mobilizing force behind further change within public administration. These changes are to be interpreted as the starting points for reshaping and changing the organizational culture, with the employees identifying it as a decisive element and enabling themselves to reshape and change it. To a large extent, this opportunity has been recognized in the planned remoulding of organizational culture through an elaborate and consistent model of human resource management.

When considering the transition of the public administration from a traditional (closed) to an open (participative) administration, despite some varying characteristics, one can observe the gradual disappearance of differences in public and private sector performances. The leadership and management of both sectors include customer service, whose essence has been intensively altered by standardized information-communication technology. Managers in both sectors will inevitably use, acquire and develop similar or the same knowledge at an ever increasing rate for directing, steering and managing the business and other processes going on in the organizational reality. In so doing, the relevance of a suitable organizational climate and culture has been gaining ever greater recognition as a basic foundation that can decisively affect the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations. Good business clearly depends upon the partnership relations between employees and the leadership of an organization since satisfied employees (with the possibility of professional development and an awareness and acceptance of the goals of their company) tend to be far better motivated to do their jobs well and thus become the key factor of their organization's success. And, although has this approach has led to success for a number of years within the private sector, there is, despite the presence of some fundamental differences, no reason not to regard it as a suitable choice for changing public administration. According to the New Public Management doctrine, public administration as a business system has to begin operating on the basis of business effectiveness and excellence. As Bučar argues, not all problems are to be solved by such a course of action; however, self-regulating mechanisms will thus be included in a public administration, and it is their own dynamics, which will force the administration to become ever more effective (Bučar, 2000).

Administrative reforms in Slovenia as a foundation for changing the organizational culture in public administration

Ideas, principles and objectives of administrative reform

There are different definitions of administrative reform, which is no surprise, since various activities tend to be meant by the term. Some definitions stress the results of administrative reform through which the administrative system should become a more efficient means of societal change and is expected to ensure political equality, societal equity and economic growth. On the other hand, other authors concentrate more on the processes involved and see the reforms in the context of a change to established civil service practice, behaviour and structures. Yet some scholars (Jreisat, 1988: 86) even try to connect both approaches by dealing with the change in the process as part of establishing an efficient and effective public administration. In spite of the differences, these definitions share the following common characteristics:

1. administrative reform means carefully planned changes in public administration;
2. administrative reform is synonymous with innovations;
3. improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are the intended consequence of the reform processes;
4. the necessity of reform is justified by the need for overpowering uncertainties and the fast changes seen in the environment (De Guzman, 1992: 12).

Administrative reforms can be directed towards either individual institutions or the entire administrative (and wider) political subsystem. The disadvantage of this definition lies in its emphasis on instrumental rationality, which narrows administrative reform to a technical problem and neglects the political interactions of the stakeholders (civil servants, politicians, citizens and interest groups). Caiden (1969: 8) long ago dealt with the technical aspect through an emphasis on the political (and cultural) aspects of administrative reforms, which he designated as "an artificial encouragement for administrative alteration against the opposition to change".

Few reforms originate from a single cause, and many are a collection of political circumstances and the development of ideas about how reforms should be undertaken, and economic crises. Yet the roots of reforms and the way they affect the political process can still be a topic of discussion. Apart from costs, efficiency and quality of service, the more relevant factors tend to incorporate civil servants, the structure (reorganization) of public administration, policy change and the transparency of the public administration and politics (political will) (Peters, 2001: 362). Civil servants can be the object and cause of reforms either because of their too limited or too

great influence on politics. The ideas behind the attachment of the sense and flow of individual reforms are the market (public administration should approach the private sector's performance), participation (inclusion in decision-making processes), deregulation (doing away with the rules that hinder initiative) and a flexible public administration. Contrary to the traditional (bureaucratic) model of public administration, the mentioned ideas for public administration reform which might be mutually controversial (the greater stress on individualism in the market model could be at odds with the collective approach in the participation model; the market model is to some extent incompatible with the emphasis of management and activities that take place in the deregulation model), are to a significant extent a result of the salient ideological and intellectual aspects of the current reforms. All such expressed ideas ought to be reasonably co-ordinated and connected with the political and public administration institutions that are involved in the reforms. An integral delineation of principles that make up the process of improving the public administration's performance can be found in the work of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), under the name of *Reinventing Government*, which embodies the methodology of public administration reform, putting stress on direction (management), user orientation, mission, strategic management of efficiency and effectiveness, and being focused on results, efficacy, autonomy, decentralization, competitiveness, preventive action and the market.

The *Strategy of the Further Development of the Slovenian Public Sector 2003-2005* (2003: 14 *et seq*) states that "the Government of the Republic of Slovenia is aware of the fact that good governance, apart from economic growth and social cohesion represents one of the pillars of societal development and welfare. In the context of public governance, public administration plays an important role, as it provides expert knowledge for political decision-making and takes care of direct execution of the approved policy. The quality of public policies and their real social value are therefore to a great extent reliant upon the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration's operation". The *Strategy of the Further Development of the Slovenian Public Sector* puts forward the individual horizontal elements of the operation of different issue areas: status forms; salaries; budget; the rationalization of staff recruitment; human resource management; the organization of administration; e-government; the management of quality, an open administration and such like. The development of Slovenian public administration is thus, as noted by Kovač (2003: 194), directed towards fewer regulative measures or even to virtually normatively neutral activities such as civil service management, management of quality within the administration, optimization of administrative processes and implementation of the principle of administrative openness to citizens or the interested public. Slovenia's public administration should act according to the principles of legality, the rule of law and the predictability of law, political neutrality, customer focus, openness and transparency, quality, effectiveness and efficiency.

The more precise objectives of developing (reforming) the Slovenian public administration refer to (Strategy 2003: 14-15) effectiveness and efficiency, quality and responsiveness, civil service system and modern human resource management, and optimization of business processes and a modern administrative organization. The quality of public administration encompasses the elevation of standards of administrative services and the measurement and improvement of customer satisfaction, the encouragement and promotion of good practice, improvement of the quality of regulations through an improved due legal process, and the greater predictability of the public administration's actions etc. The public administration's responsiveness refers to the criticisms, suggestions, comments and praise of interested subjects, the availability of public information, conduct in the name of the public good, the development of partnership relations within the state administration and co-operation with civil society, and the development of partnership relations with non-governmental organizations. Civil servants are recruited on the basis of professional qualifications, with the civil service system introducing conscious, systematic, planned and rational human resource management, personnel mobility and greater flexibility of transfer and division of labour. The civil service is also introducing rewards and promotions based on work success, promoting staff motivation, civil servant qualification schemes, the development of an organizational culture that will include awareness of the public administration's mission, the responsibility of civil servants, and improved satisfaction, together with the motivation for work in public administration. The modern organization of the administration is founded on the standardization of business processes, flexible project organizing, electronic business and business rationalization.

Normative foundations of Slovenian administrative reform

The main task public administration in Slovenia (in accordance with the Public Administration Act) is to draft bills, executive regulations and other laws, and to prepare other materials for the Government. This means that public administration also provides expert assistance in the policy-making process. Administrative tasks are performed by Ministries, bodies within the Ministries, and Administrative Units. There are 58 Administrative Units located approximately evenly throughout the country. They were established in order to perform the tasks of public administration that should be organized and performed territorially. Since Slovenia does not have regions as a second level of local self-government that could take over the tasks of deregulated public administration, the Administrative Units took over this role and became an extended state administration "in the field". Among others Administrative Units take the ultimate decisions in administrative matters within the state's competence, unless otherwise stated by the laws governing the relevant

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administrative matters. The units also perform other administrative tasks falling within the state's competence, on the basis of the law governing the particular fields of activity. In relation to this, Administrative Units have no authority whatsoever, and when performing tasks falling within their competence they act under the expert guidance provided by the Ministries competent in respect of particular tasks.

Under Article 49 of the Public Administration Act, the relationships between Ministries and Administrative Units are strictly defined. Ministries should provide Administrative Units with guidelines, expert advice and expertise with respect to the performance of tasks falling within their competence; provide Administrative Units with binding instructions in respect of performance of the tasks falling within their administrative departments; monitor working process organization in the Administrative Units and in the respective inner organization units; monitor the qualifications of employees in performing their tasks; monitor efficiency in resolving administrative matters and supervise the performance of administrative tasks in Administrative Units. They are entitled to request the performance of certain tasks or take certain measures which are within the competence of the Administrative Units.

Local self-government administration falls under the public administration legislation in Slovenia, however it is a part of a different "sub"-system within public administration. Local self-government in Slovenia is organized at its first level – the municipality. All administrative assistance to the local self-government bodies (local council and mayor) is enabled by the local administration. However "this" administration is completely separated from the tasks and work of Administrative Units and it is supervised solely by local government.

Slovenia's public administration reform was first directed to establishing institutions in administrative fields and later steered towards adapting the public administration system to the constitutional concept of the division of powers and local self-governance. As far as the institutional arrangement of the Slovenian state and especially its government are concerned, one has to be aware of the dominance of parliament over the government, which is not a typical of a classical parliamentary system. The peculiarity of this arrangement reflects an array of elements in the Slovenian constitution, especially those prescribing the nomination of ministers in Parliament and the exercise of the individual responsibility of ministers to Parliament. As a result the Government's collective responsibility to Parliament is substantially neutralised, as is the institution of a constructive vote of no confidence. Such elements include Article 2 of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia Act, stating that the Government defines, directs and co-ordinates implementation of the state's policy. Therefore, the state's policy is not determined by the Government with support in Parliament, but by the National Assembly. Parliament's (National Assembly's) dominance over the Government is also enabled by the provisions of

Article 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, stating that citizens' rights and obligations can only be prescribed by law, hence the legislative competence of the National Assembly is defined as being far wider than in most other states, where governments' competences over the adoption of their own regulations tend to be far greater and are manifest in the form of "delegated" legislation (the adoption of orders with the power of laws). In addition, the new National Assembly of Slovenia Rules of Procedure strictly limits the Government's role in the legislative procedure. As a result, laws are in fact to a large extent drafted in Parliament instead of acquiring political support first of all. On the other hand, the Government has, since EU accession, acquired legislative decision-making (via decision-making in the Council of the European Union) competences as far as the execution of that part of the sovereign rights transferred to European Union institutions is concerned.

In modern states, the partial domination of the executive branch of government over the legislative branch has occurred mainly due to the greater efficiency, speed and large scope of legal regulation; this is manifest in the even greater scope of the Government's autonomous normative activities and Parliament's status being preserved especially in the area of classical legislative issues and those relating to human rights and protection of fundamental freedoms while, at the same time, its supervisory function has been on the increase. Such a transfer of the centre of state political power from the legislature to the executive has largely been due to the establishment of independent administrative agencies that have virtually become the fourth branch of government and which embody all three classical functions of authority.[1] The rise of the administrative state's power is related to such a course of events. Creating independent public agencies adds to the state's overall administrative strength (this is also true of Slovenia). Even though these agencies formally do not constitute part of the executive, they nevertheless carry out its organizational function and, despite their formal independence, they, albeit to a minimal extent, act as an extended arm of the executive. The executive's tasks and of the administration connected with it have substantially increased and encompassed a whole new range of issue-areas; in the new situation the limitation of the growing power of the administrative state is especially problematic. Administration indeed has grown everywhere; however, the problem is seen especially in discretional rights or authority. Yet the politicization of the administration can also contribute to the growing power of the administrative state; this can be either top-down (a party division of

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[1]   In the USA the growth of public administration from the New Deal to today has had the following three characteristics above all: 1) the transmission of central power from the legislative to the executive branch, especially in the light of the administrative state; 2) the rise of the President's power; and 3) the expansion of the federal authority's activities. Some authors even claim the American post-New-Deal administrative state is against the Constitution since it is claimed the architects of the modern state preferred the administrative state over the Constitution.

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portfolios as political fiefdoms), bottom-up (collective bargaining and such like) or sideways politicization (interest and clientele groups).

In accordance with the practice of European Union member states, the Public Administration Act transfers a substantial proportion of powers regulating the state administration's organizations from Parliament to Government. In so doing, it assures greater flexibility and a reduced legislative burden on Parliament, renews the leadership system in the state administration (a clear line between politicians and senior civil servants) and provides for a clearer arrangement of the status of bodies within ministries.[2] All of this is meant to eradicate the possibility of task duplication, reduce the scope of administrative tasks and enable managers to employ staff and financial resources in a more rational way. The reduction in the number of institution means fewer direct budget consumers, greater integration of the administration and easier co-ordination.

The Civil Servants Act enables the overhaul of the system of personnel planning and recruitment; reinforcement of the strategic centre for administrative human resource management, decentralization of human resource management and the increase in internal mobility and the planning of civil servants' career development. The Act also enables the separation of political functions and official positions, the formation of an administrative élite, a more objective system of recruitment and rewards, the professionalization and stability of the administration, the qualification and professional improvement of civil servants and strengthening of social partnership and such like. The Act also lays out mechanisms for attaining greater flexibility and for the rationalization of business (i.e. project work, reorganization, temporary and permanent transfer). The Salary System in the Public Sector Act, which complements the Civil Servants Act, should provide for a consolidated public sector salary system, transparency, flexibility and manageability of the salary system from the public finance standpoint (Haček, 2005: 121).

A step closer to open administration was taken with the adoption of the Act on Access to Information of a Public Nature. The normative part of the reform has also regulated the complex network of relationships between the administration and the citizens, regarding the protection and exercise of their rights in relation to the administration. This arrangement includes administrative procedures, administrative and constitutional judicial protection of the rights and informal aspects of individuals' rights protection in relation to the administration. The orders that exempt users from

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[2] The Ethical Code of Slovenian Civil Servants was adopted in January 2001 and ceased to be in force as at the first day of application of the new Civil Servants Act because, in accordance with this Act, the Code falls within the jurisdiction of the Council of Officials. The outdated Ethical Code was adopted by the government on the recommendation of the Council of Europe. However, it should be borne in mind that the code is itself insufficient to make civil servants performance ethical.

being obliged to provide various excerpts from official databases, to provide minimum standards of customer treatment, state the obligation to provide information in different ways about administrative services, establish a system of responding to clients' criticisms and comments and introduce the compulsory assessment of customers' satisfaction etc., have also contributed to the quality, service improvement and customer satisfaction. Further development is therefore foremost directed at enhanced public administration efficiency, making it more open and transparent, raising the quality of its services and the increased enjoyment of the citizens and legal subjects as the users of the public administration's services. What one can observe is actually the introduction of the principles and values of new public management.

The Slovenian Public Administration Organizational Culture and Climate Measurement Project

At the start of 2001 a project researching and monitoring the organizational culture and climate in Slovenian businesses, known as SiOK (Organizational Climate in Slovenia), was prepared on the initiative of several Slovenian companies and members of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Slovenia.[3] The aim was to undertake comparative research of the organizational culture, climate and satisfaction among Slovenian enterprises (external benchmarking), together with research into the awareness of the importance of satisfaction and organizational culture in enterprises due to their impact on organizational efficiency, as well as their impact on employees motivation, a key feature of the dynamics of change implementation. The research was based on a questionnaire containing individual statements, and determines the state of employee satisfaction and the prevailing culture in individual areas within four systems of organizational operation: organization (the mode of organization, career development, rewards) leadership (communication, informing, leadership and internal relations), quality (initiative, motivation, devotion, quality), and development (mission, vision, goals, learning, loyalty, adherence). On the initiative of the Administrative Unit, three public administration organizations took part in the project of organization climate research through standardized questionnaires, in 2003. The pilot project for organizational climate and culture measurement by the SiOK methodology is based on the following starting points:

Recognition and verification of organizational climate measurements as the fundamental precondition of successful implementation of the human resource management model within public administration, at the beginning of implementing civil service legislation.

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[3]   *Organizational Climate in Slovenia,* Annual Reports for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Slovenia. Available at: SiOk, Organizational Climate in Slovenia, http://www.rmplus.si/siok/ (March 2007).

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The results of internal environment monitoring by measuring the organizational climate in public administration should serve as a basis of the continuous substance and time planning and verification of elements of the human resource management model (rewards, communication, annual discussion, promotions and careers).

The establishment, through the introduction of organizational climate measurements in public administration, of comparability with the organizational climate monitoring undertaken in the economy (SiOK), as a result the establishment of a comprehensive and consistent analytical model of organizational change within the public and private sectors,

The determination of the internal climate stage is an element of administrative management leadership, which is thus gaining answers for the required strategies of intervention and steering of processes in order for the normative provisions of the civil service system to be put into practice by civil servants.

Together with the Common Assessment Framework for Organizations within the Public Sector (CAF), the organizational climate introduction methodology presents a good analytical framework for improvements and consolidation of the organizational culture, directed at productivity and internal and external clients.

Organizational climate measurements offer periodicity, developmental and quantitative dimensions, interval-based internal comparability with aggregate data, for public administration and the economy, and follow contemporary trends of self-evaluation which state that the leadership ought pay attention to and hence be capable of creating a positive human and social environment in the organization, with the former being the basic condition of efficiency.

The course of the pilot organizational climate measurement project within the three administrative units across the state (2003)[4] included the following phases:

- co-ordination with the organizational leadership;
- informing employees;
- filling in SiOK questionnaires;
- organizational climate analysis;
- workshops for an in-depth organizational culture analysis;
- elaboration of a research report; and
- presentation of conclusions to the leadership of and employees within an organization.

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[4]   In subsequent years even more public sector organizations participated, including a municipality, Krško, two hospitals (General Hospital Celje and General Hospital Novo mesto), one education centre (Centre for Educational and Auxiliary Activities Ljubljana), the Farmland and Forest Fund of the Republic of Slovenia and the Administrative Unit Trebnje (in 2004), the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology and the Administrative unit of Trebnje (in 2005).

The research conducted within the SiOK (Slovenian Organizational Climate) pilot public administration project that was first conducted in April 2003 yielded results according to the individual climate and satisfaction categories as presented in Table 1. The table shows data for all three administrations taking part in the research, as well as the comparison of the data from 2003 to 2005.

Among the individual areas of climate and satisfaction assessment, the area of attitudes to quality (innovativeness, motivation, devotion and quality) is the one with the best rating. Here, the ratings vary between 3.80 and 3.50. The worst ratings were associated with the area of organization (career/rewards) where the ratings vary from 3.00 to 2.82.[5] It is specifically the systems of rewards, career development and internal communication and information, which are the basic building blocks of human resource management or personnel management that decisively affect the Slovenian public administration's effectiveness.

Table 1: Siok 2002 Climate Categories and the Public Administration Pilot Project in 2003–05

	SiOK 2003	SiOK 2004	SiOK 2005
Attitude to quality	3.80	3.73	3.73
Innovativeness, initiative	3.65	3.57	3.56
Motivation & devotion	3.51	3.44	3.47
Adherence to organization	3.50	3.40	3.40
Professional qualification & learning	3.34	3.26	3.31
Internal relations	3.33	3.22	3.25
Acquaintance with the vision & goals	3.32	3.21	3.24
Organization	3.29	3.23	3.25
Leadership	3.29	3.19	3.20
Internal communication & informing	3.00	2.91	2.96
Career development	2.82	2.73	2.72
Rewards	2.82	2.75	2.77
Satisfaction	3.44	3.42	3.45

Source: SiOk, available at: www.rmplus.si/siok (March 2007).

Table 2 shows a comparison of the organizational climate shown by SiOk in the private sector/economy with that of public administration for 2003 and 2004, which is divided into three sections regarding the level of satisfaction. The pattern of

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[5] The questionnaire used in this survey measures the satisfaction of an individual through various aspects of his/her work: the work itself, organizational leadership, co-workers, chances of promotion, payment, status within the organization, working conditions (equipment, premises), possibility of education, permanence of employment and working time. Each of the employees within an organization assessed each characteristic on a scale from 1 (the lowest mark) to 5 (the highest mark).

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marks from the public administration pilot project and the pattern from the private sector are relatively similar as far as those categories with the highest, medium and lowest estimations are concerned. Compared to the private sector, the majority of the public administration categories received better ratings, with only some of them being given lower values. Among these was adherence to organization (2003), acquaintance with the vision & goals (2003), career development (2003) and rewards (2004). The majority of categories received higher marks than in the private sector, while the biggest difference is found in professional qualification & learning, internal relations and internal communication & informing (in 2003 and 2004, respectively). However, the categories of employee satisfaction that scored the lowest marks were career development and the system of rewards, in both the public administration and the private sector.

Table 2: Organizational Climate in Public Administration and Economy (SiOk 2003 and 2004 Surveys)

	ECONOMY 2003	ECONOMY 2004	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2003	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2004
Attitude to quality	3.84	3.73	3.71	3.73
Innovativeness, initiative	3.65	3.57	3.57	3.57
Motivation & devotion	3.54	3.44	3.62	3.45
Adherence to organization	3.52	3.40	3.22	3.44
Professional qualification & learning	3.39	3.22	3.52	3.44
Internal relations	3.37	3.26	3.47	3.32
Acquaintance with the vision & goals	3.35	3.21	3.20	3.30
Organization	3.32	3.19	3.26	3.25
Leadership	3.29	3.23	3.46	3.27
Internal communication & informing	3.02	2.91	3.36	3.12
Career development	2.90	2.73	2.68	2.91
Rewards	2.87	2.75	2.85	2.70
Satisfaction	-	3.42	-	3.58

Source: SiOk, available at: www.rmplus.si/siok (March 2007).

On the basis of research into the internal organizational climate and the in-depth analysis of culture through workshops, the following obstacles and advantages that are important for managerial and staff processes accompanying the modification of organizational culture and thus the alteration of the public administration's performance can be defined (on the basis of the pilot project in the public administration).

The challenges ahead

Reputation of the Organization
−   Low in the environment, low among its users (unrealistic expectations)

Distance from Strategic Orientations
−   Future, dependency on legislation and procedures, fear

Uniform Official Instructions
−   Unclear delegation
−   Delay of clear instructions
−   Variable practice in the field (contradictions)

Qualification and Flow
−   Too few practical qualifications for the operative level
−   Poor education system (lack of goal-oriented qualification)

Management
−   Managers are generally experts
−   Too little knowledge of management
−   Little delegation
−   Inter-level and interdepartmental communication

Advantages

Employees' Focus
−   Clear demands, enthusiasm, responsibility, high level of satisfaction

Service Quality
−   Concentration on customers, permanent service improvements, demanding customers

Internal Communication
−   Good flow of information, good practice, work instructions etc., within the organization

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Positive Elements

- − Salaries
- − Employee participation in management
- − Relatively good mutual relations

Conclusion

With the adoption of area-specific legislation, the contents of the institutional and normative regulation of Slovenian public administration are ever more receding from the everyday public and political agenda. However, they are being replaced by even more important – as far as the quality of life of the citizens and competitive capabilities of the economy are concerned – elements of management: openness, transparency, efficiency, accessibility and an orientation towards internal and external customers. In the course of such events, the importance of a suitable organizational culture and climate as the basic element which can decisively influence organizational success is gaining increasing recognition in public administration and even more so in the private sector. The civil service system reform that identifies the importance of organizational culture and includes the readiness of top civil servants to change the service is the key mobilizing force of any further change in the functioning of the state. The presented pilot project for measuring the organizational climate and satisfaction in public administration aims at contribute to reflections on the advantages and usefulness of organizational culture and climate measurements in public administration as well, and the culture's and climate's connectedness to the processes of human resource management. In order to efficiently implement change and development in administrative organizations, the administrative management will have to define its role even in the organizational formation and alteration through the lens of organizational culture. However, this entails the need for management to qualify itself and become acquainted with the methods and strategies of interference, intervention and direction of the organizational culture's (trans)formation.

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Decentralization Processes in Croatia and Slovenia

Ladislav Cabada

Abstract: *The article analyzes the decentralisation processes in two post-Yugoslavian countries that underwent a distinctively different development after their secession from Yugoslavia. The analyzes verifies two basic hypothesis: 1) the the process of joining the European Union, especially the demand to accept specific criteria of home politics, includes the demand for subsidiarity and decentralization; 2) that the development of democracy encourages the decentralization process more than the development in an authoritative regime, or in a regime with limited, e.g. formal democracy.*

Key words: *European Union, Croatia, Slovenia, democracy, development, home politics*

Introduction

Decentralization has been one of the principal subjects in political research in recent decades. The rise in interest in decentralization processes has been primarily related to the emphasis on the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the evolving European Union (see e.g. Fiala et al., 2002). However, the debates about the possibilities of decentralization also implicitly involve historical issues (see e.g. Tägil 1999, various Czech publications dealing with Central Europe, but also e.g. Moravia). Naturally, "regionalism" and "decentralization" are not synonyms, but the relatively high level of correlation between the question of regional identities and the principle of decentralization, as well as of subsidiarity, is more than obvious.

Even today, there are black and white views still to be found in (not only) Czech politics and political science discourses. These simplistic views reflect, on the one hand postwar development in the western part of Europe as "natural", including the question of "democratic decentralization and the application of the subsidiarity" principle, and the development in the countries of the socialist community as completely centralizing and prohibiting any natural activity on local and regional levels, on the other hand. It is beyond any doubt that the Soviet-controlled countries of real socialism – Stalinist Albania and Tito's Yugoslavia – were to a great extent modelled on the idea of democratic centralism; however, here too, we could observe indications of relatively independent local political and social formations (based especially on historical regional ties), though shaping under continuous – often not very severe – supervision of the central authorities. On the contrary, we can regard

various post-1945 signs of regionalism in Western Europe as "artificial"; the best example are some of the cross-border regions (Greber, 1999: 180-181), the formation of which continues in the new EU Member States.

We have a tendency to forget the fact that after the Second World War – but also in previous periods – the countries of Western Europe did indeed pass through a process of strict centralization, which manifested itself at both cultural-political (liberal nationalist trends towards the unification of citizens) and economic levels (creation of state monopolies and nationalization in certain business sectors). It was only at the end of the first phase of postwar stabilization that the Western European countries approached – with differences in willingness, speed, and intensity – political decentralization.

Similar processes can be observed in the Central European area, which passed through democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and is now passing through a process of reconfiguration of territorial-political relations. Let us remind the reader that in 1991-92 a more or less violent break-up of three post-communist states, which had declared their federative character already in previous periods – the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – took place. The moment that political ties in these multinational formations loosened, individual nations and ethnic groups, or their political representations, tended to the idea of national self-determination, independence and state sovereignty.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the maps of Europe, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia saw the emergence of 20 new state formations with different qualities of statehood. On one hand, we have historical formations which to some extent succeeded in preserving their identity of "succession states" – Russia, the Czech Republic, and Serbia. On the other hand, some states emerged as if "by mistake", and their current position roughly corresponds to that of forgotten or even failed states (Moldova). Croatia and Slovenia, the countries examined in this study, lie somewhere between these two extremes. These two countries do not want to be associated with Milošević's Yugoslavia (they do not seek the position of "succession state"), but at the same time see their development in Royal and Tito's Yugoslavia as an important part of their national evolution. The development is also identified with the idea of federation and with the countries' relatively autonomous existence within Yugoslavia.

In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia decided to leave Yugoslavia and become independent states. While Slovenia went through the process of secession relatively peacefully, the attempt at Croatian secession led to the Croatian-Serbian conflict, which later exhibited the characteristics of civil war, and resulted in the subsequent separation of the Serb-populated regions from Croatia. Hence, it was the very nature of secession that determined some of the differences in the political development of both post-

Yugoslav countries, including the development of decentralization tendencies in both societies (although there is also some correspondence to be found – see below).

This study does not aim at analysing the development and the nature of decentralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia in an exhaustive manner. Such a goal would require much more time and space. Our goal is to present and analyse basic (de)centralization trends in both examined countries and thus provide an introductory contribution for subsequent comparative studies that would set Croatia's and Slovenia's decentralization processes into a broader context of Central-East European countries, or the European Union.

The possibilities for decentralization in Tito's Yugoslavia, and the Second World War and its outcomes represented a radical turning point for the idea of regional development and decentralization in Tito's Yugoslavia. The turning point is reduced by the vast majority of literature to the arrival of the Communist Party and the application of a highly centralized model, with the deciding voice of the Communist nomenclature or the representatives of repressive forces (secret police and the Yugoslav People's Army). It is apparent that – regardless of the democratization efforts from the 1950s to the 1980s, which resulted in a far more tolerable and hospitable régime than in the countries where real socialism applied – Yugoslavia, too, preferred a centralist state model. These trends were no doubt further fuelled by the fact that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had been completely paralysed by nationalist tensions and that one of the fundamental promises made by the AVNOJ (Tito´s) Yugoslavia was to reconcile individual nations.

The Second World War and the arrival of Tito's régime thus also resulted in a territorial-administrative model which considerably differed from interwar Yugoslavia. The régime recognized the autonomous existence of five "state-forming" nations (Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians and Serbs; in the second half of the 1960s, Slavic Muslims – Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims – were recognized as a nation also) living in the six Socialist Republics of the federation (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia), and speaking four languages (Croatian, Macedonian, Slovenian and Serbian; after the 1950s language union, Croatian and Serbian were considered one language – Serbo-Croatian – with two different alphabets).

It is evident that the arrangement was well received, especially by the Slovenian public[6], despite the fact that as early as in 1946 Tito, or the Yugoslav Communists, decided to transform Yugoslavia into an exemplary follower of the Soviet Union and of the model of democratic centralism. As Janko Prunk argues (2002: 155), the

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[6]   It is obvious that the new arrangement of national relations satisfied mainly Macedonians and Montenegrins.

second Yugoslavia was in many aspects more centralized than the pre-war kingdom, but Slovenia lived its autonomous cultural and educational life. It had its own flag, constitution, legislation, parliament, Government and other institutions typical of nation-state (see Cabada, 2005). Postwar Yugoslavia regained the region of what is today the Slovenian Littoral (annexed to Slovenia with the exception of Trieste and its territory) and Istria (the largest part annexed to Croatia; the other, much smaller, part to Slovenia) which were ceded by Italy. The union of the Slovenian historical regions (in the cases of Carinthia and Styria only the southern parts of them) into a single administrative-political unit no doubt represented a good move for Slovenian society.

As for Croatian society, such a positive attitude cannot be talked about, especially regarding the fact that Croats found themselves in an (seemingly) independent state (the Independent State of Croatia) established during the Second World War. While characterized by genocide against Serbian, Jewish and Roma minorities, the Fascist puppet state was perceived by many Croats as the embodiment of their desire for an independent state, which was declared both within the Kingdom of Hungary (mainly in the middle of the 19th century), and in the later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The integration of Croatia into Yugoslavia thus represented a regressive step for many Croats.

After the Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia set out on the path of "constitutional adventurism", which also affected the system of local administration. The 1952 General Act on People's Committees introduced communes (*opstina*, *opština*, *opčina*), districts and cities as units of local and national state administration. Communes were designated as a means of decentralization to reduce the role of the state, combining the functions of both local and public administration (Cabada, 2000b: 121). Gradually, they became the key mediator between collective elements (subunits, e.g. parents or tenants associations) of society and economic-political institutions. In the second half of the 1960s, however, the activities of communes were supplanted by self-autonomizing reformists in the lead of the Leagues of Communists of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The loosening of relations between the central government headed by Tito and the governments of the Republics culminated in 1968, but after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito decided to re-centralize the system.

In an attempt to subdue criticism of intervention against the liberal leaderships in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, Tito decided to reform the Constitution. The result was the Constitution of 1974, which gave the Republics the right to decide independently on their status (it was later used in the debate over the legality of independence), and created among others a new definition of the system of local and national state administration. The powers of communes were further extended to include the right to levy taxes on the inhabitants of communes; this measure is

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clearly at variance with the view of Yugoslavia as a highly centralized state. However, the communal independence was limited by a number of obligations flowing from the Constitution (e.g. civil defence, income security for veterans etc.). "Communes were established by law and could merge. Each commune approved its own status, defined by the Constitution as a social contract of the communal members" (Cabada, 2000b: 127).

In many respects, communes only masked the unlimited rule of local leaders allied with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. However, on the other hand, we must mention the fact that especially in the 1980s, communes in Slovenia, and partly also those in Croatia, were "infiltrated" by the emerging civil society, and were seen by many inhabitants as a positive manifestation of decentralization, or as an attempt to bring politics closer to the people. Notwithstanding these facts, the independence processes and following months and years in both Croatia and Slovenia were marked by a relatively strong prioritization of centralizing tendencies, or rather the suppression of true decentralization political processes. The causes are to be found not only in the "immanent" tendency of the former secessionist movements to centralize new states, but also in the belief (which was partly well-founded) that the political representatives of local units would have a hampering or restricting influence on the processes of democratization, unification and homogenization of society, or over the processes regarding the integration into Western structures, especially the EU.

Differences in (De)Centralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia in the 1990s

As mentioned above, immediately after declaring independence, Croatia became embroiled in a conflict with the "residual" Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia, which also determined, to a certain extent, the separatist tendencies of Croatian Serbs. In this situation, the attitude of the Zagreb political representatives, led by President Tudjman, towards the idea of a stronger decentralization was logically rather reserved. In the first half of the 1990s there was a continuous increase in authoritarian tendencies in the régime; President Tudjman established himself as an "absolute" ruler in the quasi-presidential system, but became more and more dependent on quasi-legal groups engaged in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cabada, 2000; Zakošek, 2002).

On a formal level, after 1991, Croatia decided on a stronger decentralization than in the period of Socialist Yugoslavia. In addition to municipalities, which were preserved, cities emerged as another form of the lowest level of local administration. The 1990 Croatian Constitution ensured the right of municipalities and cities to adopt their own statute. These are headed by the elected mayor (*opčinski načelnik,*

gradonačelnik) (Cabada 2000a: 175). At the turn of the millennium, Croatia was divided into 547 municipalities and 123 cities (Mimica 2003: 2), with a city constituting a population of more than 10,000 inhabitants.

In 1993 the first Chamber of Counties (*Županijski dom)* election was held; the Chamber represented 20 Croatian counties (*županije*) and the capital of Croatia, Zagreb (Hloušek, 2004a: 139). Counties[7] represented the level of local administration standing between the smallest units of local administration – municipalities and cities – and the municipality in Zagreb. However, in practice, counties were significantly limited in their self-governing politics, both by the (in)appropriate setting of financial standards and the significant interference in their affairs by central authorities headed by President Tudjman.

As for the financial conditions of local governments, it is possible to illustrate the progressive centralization by the fact that while in 1990 round total of all local budgets amounted to 120 per cent of the state budget of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, in 2001 Croatia's state budget exceeded the total of local budgets five times (Lašić 2001: 2)! As regards the restrictions placed on the functioning of Croatian local authorities, the best example seems to be the right of the President not to appoint an elected county president. Tudjman took the option several times, provoking among other things, relatively violent protests in Zagreb, which led to the separation of certain groups from the then ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HZD) (Zakošek, 2002: 647). The President's veto was abolished only by the 2001 amendment to the Law on Local Self-government.

Under the Constitution counties were represented by the Upper House in Parliament – Chamber of Counties), the majority of which involved representatives elected in counties. The Constitution ensured each county the same right to elect three representatives, and the first elections took place in 1993 (Hloušek, 2004a: 139). The other five members were appointed by the President; therefore the chamber was not exclusively represented by counties. The Upper Chamber held a veto over legislation, which could be outvoted by the lower chamber – the Chamber of Deputies (*Zastupnički Dom*) – only by a two-thirds majority (Cabada, 2000a: 172). However, there were no fundamental disputes before 2000, since both chambers were dominated by Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union (HZD). The Chamber of Counties was abolished under wider Croatian public administration reforms in March 2001 (Zakošek, 2002: 651).

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7   Croatia is divided into 20 counties and the capital. These are listed in Croatian: Zagrebačka; Krapinsko-zagorska; Sisačko-moslavačka; Karlovačka; Varaždinska; Koprivničko-križevačka; Bjelovarsko-bilogorska; Primorsko-goranska; Ličko-senjska; Virovitičko-podravska; Poreško-slavonska; Brodsko-posavska; Zadarska; Osječko-baranjska; Šibensko-kninska; Vukovarsko-srijemska; Splitsko-dalmatinska; Istarska; Dubrovačko-neretvanska; Medjimurska. Dragan Antulov (2000) presumes that many counties were defined on the principle of gerrymandering.

The aversion to a stronger decentralization of Croatian politics throughout the 1990s was caused by a combination of various factors. We have to mention the impact of the war in the 1990s and secessionist tendencies in regions inhabited by the Serb minority in the first half of the decade, which was manifested in the authoritarization of the régime, including the tendency towards strengthening central institutions, especially the Presidency. This centralization was accompanied by an intensified need to control financial flows, caused by the efforts to efficiently gather resources for militarization and warfare, but also for keeping needed (or chosen) groups of population. Tudjman's régime did not proceed with any radical reform or transformation of economy in the 1990s; the (post) socialist economy was controlled from the centre, which could be considered as not really democratic, on the other hand, we must note that, in this respect, decentralization without the preceding transformation would only worsen the situation.

Ironically, in the first years of democratic and independent existence, Slovenia decided on an even more centralized model of politics and public administration than Croatia. Slovenia has different geographic conditions than Croatia – while Croatia is geographically extremely heterogeneous (in the northwest lies the Istrian Peninsula, jutting towards the west from central Croatia; to the southeast runs a narrow and long coastline of the Dalmatian coast separated from the mainland by Bosnia and Herzegovina) – Slovenia's territory is more homogeneous, with the capital (Ljubljana) and its agglomeration as the geographically natural centre of the country. Its population – which is more than twice as small as Croatia – is ethnically much more homogeneous as well.

We cannot say that Slovenia lacks any regional diversity that could constitute the basis for a decentralized model of public administration. From the very beginning of independence, all the larger political parties spoke about the need for decentralization; however, on the other hand, they linked the need with the lowest units of local self-government – municipalities. Ironically, the process of founding municipalities began with their relatively hasty abolishment in 1991. "The debates on future functioning of public administration involved various suggestions with the common denominator of doubts about the ability of certain villages and cities to self-govern ... This scepticism resulted in the return to the municipal model, which was passed in 1993 as The Act on Local Self-Government" (Cabada, 2005: 217).

The law defined two types of municipalities – "basic" and urban. After the debates provoked by the lack of interest of certain municipalities envisaged in the law to self-establish, in 1994 the Parliament decided to establish 147 municipalities, which could afterwards be divided or merged if so decided in a local referendum. Slovenia is now divided into 193 municipalities varying in terms of size and financial security. Although the law envisages municipalities financing their

operations from their own sources, the majority of them are currently co-financed by the state.[8]

An important factor characteristic of the functioning of municipalities in Slovenia, is the fact that the mayors are eligible to stand for election as Members of Parliament. Many mayors (around one third of 90 MPs) sit on a regular basis in the lower house of the Slovenian Parliament – the National Assembly (*Državni zbor*). These mayors bring local and regional issues, mainly preparation of the state budget law, into parliamentary discourse.

In contrast with Croatia, Slovenia did not establish an intermediate level of public administration between municipalities and central authorities throughout the 1990s – and has not done so, in reality, until now. The discussion over the establishment of self-governing regions was launched in the same period as the debates on the definition of municipalities. In addition, the Constitution adopted in 1991 envisages the creation of "wider self-governing units". In this respect, Article 143 says: "Municipalities may independently decide to join wider self-governing local communities, as well as regions, in order to regulate and manage local affairs of wider importance. In agreement with such communities, the state may transfer specific matters within the state competence into their original competence and determine the participation of such communities in proposing and performing particular matters within the state competence". In this respect, we have to consider the fact that municipalities have 22 representatives in the Upper House of the Slovenian Parliament – National Council (*Državni svet*). Since there are more than 22 municipalities, they have to agree on joint candidacies (Cabada, 2005: 223).

The Slovenian political parties settled on the years 1994-98 as the period dedicated to the stabilization of municipalities, followed by the establishment of regions. As early as 1997, however, the Slovenian political scientist Marjan Brezovšek stated that: "regions may exist in Slovenia, but the constitutional system and political relations inhibit them from establishing themselves as a useful and necessary part of the political system" (Brezovšek 1997: 181). The situation remained almost unchanged even after 1998, when the regionalization of Slovenia was either completely refused by the political parties, or presented as forced upon it by the European Union and in principle unnecessary. Moreover, the main political parties – the ruling Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and the opposition Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDS; today the Slovenian Democratic Party) – proposed projects involving different numbers and definitions of regions; which prevented any consensus on this question.[9]

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[8]   For a detailed analysis of the creation and functioning of Slovenian municipalities, see (Cabada, 2003) and (Cabada, 2005).
[9]   For more information on the discussion on the potential establishment of regions in Slovenia, see (Cabada, 2003) and (Cabada, 2005).

We can conclude that in the 1990s Slovenia was a more democratic system than Croatia; however, as regards decentralization, Slovenian governments behaved in a similar centralizing way as the HZD governments in Croatia.

In contrast with Croatia, in 1996 Slovenia signed the Association Agreement with the EU. The Slovenian border regions were thus able to receive financial support from the EU – INTERREG II Programmes: the total investments in Carinthia and Styria in 1995-99 totalled 282 million Austrian schillings (Roblek, 2000: 107). After 2000, Slovenia received support from INTERREG III Programmes as well.

Developments after 2000

Tudjman's death in 1999, followed by the defeat of the HZD in the 2000 parliamentary elections, represented an important turning point in the development of Croatian political system. As early as the end of January 2000, the new coalition government, headed by Ivica Račan was formed, composed of Social Democrats, Social Liberals, but also the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). The most successful regional political party in Croatia thus joined the government – the IDS won every election for the Istria County Regional Parliament. The party programme , which operates under Croatian, Italian and Slovenian names (*Istarski demokratski sabor – Dieta democratice istriana – Istrski demokratski zbor, IDS-DDI-IDZ*), includes creation of a multicultural Istria, development of regional cooperation, and primarily long-term decentralization (Hloušek, 2004b: 237; Zakošek, 2002: 657). One of the priorities defined by Račan's government was therefore the increased decentralization of the state (Hloušek, 2004a: 147).

At first, the achievement of this goal, which used to be identified with "the highest" objective – the accelerated accession to the European Union – appeared to be the true priority of the Government. In November 2000 the Croatian Government even signed a cooperation agreement with the *Open Society Institute* foundation. Under the agreement, the foundation was authorized to prepare the three-year Decentralization of Public Administration project; the coordination of this project was entrusted to the Croatian Law Centre. "The project covered several specific areas: the electoral system of local elections, the territorial organization of local and regional self-government, the legal status and competences of local self-government, the status of local officials, decentralization in the fields of primary and secondary education, health care, social services and culture, and the financing of local and regional self-government" (Vidačak, undated: 82). Nevertheless, the Government decided not to implement the project.

One of the factors limiting the Government's wish for real decentralization was the effort to meet the EU accession criteria as soon as possible. The Government assumed that it should centralize its activities to meet the Copenhagen criteria and

feared that the transfer of competences to regions or municipalities would slow the process. But what was also important was the fact that in 2000-01, the representatives of the oppositional HZD dominated most of the regions. Igor Vidačak cites other reasons (undated: 85) for the present inability of the regions to play a more important role in Croatian politics – underfunding, reluctance of local political élites and officials to adapt to the new circumstances, ignorance of foreign languages etc. Considering these facts the Government decided to prefer the status quo (stability) over reform, the result of which is very much in doubt (Antulov, 2000: 6), and that despite occasional declarations to the contrary. For example, in October 2002 a big conference was convened in Zagreb, at which several models of reformed public administration were presented to the Croatian public. The conference was not, however, followed up with any significant applications (*Report on Progress in the Implementation ...*). In May 2001, in response to the Government's reluctance to decentralize politics, the IDS minister left Račan's government. Neither it nor the subsequent government led by Ivo Sanader (HZD), which came to power after the autumn 2003 election, still did not and has not found the proper formula for real decentralization. Nevertheless, at the European level, Croatian politicians continue declaring their efforts to decentralize: see for instance the speech given by the Minister of European Integration in May 2003 (Mimica, 2003), in which he envisaged a foundation of the National Agency for Regional Development in 2005 (I have not found any reference to its actual foundation so far). Regardless of the rather declaratory statements by Croatian politicians, the country came to participate in EU INTERREG III B (transnational cooperation) and INTERREG C (interregional cooperation) programmes.

Hence, we could suppose that the Europeanization of Croatian politics regarding the EU accession efforts could also mean decentralization and application of the principles of subsidiarity in Croatian politics. It is, however, the case of Slovenia, becoming a full EU member on 1 May 2004, which shows that this correlation is not evident, and that tendencies for purely limited decentralization could possibly occur in the politics of Croatia and other Southeastern European countries seeking to join the EU.

It was the Slovenian Government or more precisely some of its ministries (mainly the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior) that became key actors of the decentralization process after 1999. The principal reason for this was the EU's criticism of Slovenia's inability or reluctance to establish regional self-governing structures. The creation of regions from above, however, was inhibited by the dispute between individual political parties with different views on the size or number of regions and, naturally, potential regional competences (Cabada, 2005: 225).

The main political parties agreed on the idea that regions, or provinces (*pokrajine*), should be created as self-governing units with competences transferred from the state or municipal level. The major difference lies in different views on the number of regions – while the rightist parties (Slovenian Democratic Party, Slovenian People's Party, New Slovenia) promoted a greater number of regions (23-25); the left-wing and centrist parties (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, Social Democrats) prefer 8-12 regions. However, these positions are not strictly defined – for example, the Vice-president of the ruling SDS and current Minister of Education Milan Zver came up with the idea of mere three regions: "the rich Western Slovenia, Ljubljana and the poor (that is receiving structural funds support) Eastern Slovenia" (Cabada, 2005: 226).[10] These regions vary greatly in economic performance and stability – while the GDP of central Slovenia (Ljubljana and surroundings) reaches almost 90 per cent of the EU average, it is 80 per cent in the case of western Slovenia and only 50 per cent in the case of eastern Slovenia. This has resulted significant migration from the east to the centre and west (Gosar, 2000: 87). Many political scientists – including the author – thought that Slovenia's accession to the EU would conclude the debate on the definition of regions. But at the end of 2007, three and a half years after the accession to the EU, Slovenia was still waiting for the establishment of regions. Slovenia remains divided into 12 statistical units at the NUTS 3 level 3, while the levels 0 and 1 represent the whole country and the level 2 two units "Ljubljana and surroundings" or "the rest of Slovenia" (Roblek, 2000: 105). As the Slovenian political geographer Anton Gosar puts it (2000: 105), the notion of a Europe of the Regions is, in the case of Slovenia, transferred to the state level. In addition, Slovenia refuses to be associated with the Mediterranean and especially the "Balkan" dimension of its existence and declares itself to be a "purely" Central European state.[11]

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, this study does not aim at analysing the development and the nature of decentralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia in an exhaustive manner. Rather, it is a summary of the basic phases and trends

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[10] For more information on the discussion on the potential creation of regions in Slovenia and the analysis of the attempts to establish regions from below – under Article 143 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia – see Cabada, 2005.

[11]   As Gosar (2000: 73) argues, the Slovenian governments, too, refuse other than Central European "state ideology", which provokes certain tensions in relation to the east and southeast of the country (regions bordering with Croatia), but also to the Slovenian Littoral including the Slovenian part of Istria (compare the activities of the Istrian Democratic Assembly in Croatia – see above). The Central European focus is reflected in e.g. the content of schoolbooks, in which the Mediterranean and Balkan influence on Slovenian society and history are ignored.

of the (de)centralizing processes that took place in both countries from 1990 to 2005. As we showed, regardless of the differences in the developments after gaining independence, both countries had significant difficulties in applying the principle of subsidiarity in the form of decentralization of politics and public administration. On the other hand, we also described the variance caused by different political developments including the different approach to and the timing of the accession to the European Union.

We can say that Vjeran Katunarić's finding, which he presented in 2003 on the basis of the analysis of decentralization processes, is still valid. According to him, Croatia and Slovenia dispose of centralized structure, in which municipalities play an important role. Other southeastern European countries, the then most promising EU candidates – Romania and Bulgaria – were directly denoted as centralized (Katunarić, 2003: 6-8).

We may conclude that Croatia and Slovenia are far from fulfilling the principle of subsidiarity and even more the less poetic principle of decentralization and regionalization of politics and public administration. On the other hand, in comparison to other post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet countries in the region, both countries made the greatest progress towards a properly functioning decentralized model. In both countries, the decentralized model is functional primarily at the level of basic administrative units (municipalities), while the creation of regions (Slovenia) or their functionality (Croatia) is still somewhat retarded.

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Austria´s European Policy and its Coordination and Decision-making System at the Turn of the 21st Century[12]

Martin Jeřábek

Abstract: *The study describes Austria's relationship to the EU and the processes the country underwent in the past thirteen years as an EU member state. Due to its EU accession Austria went through a process of Europeanization. This paper analyses the top-down and bottom-up effects of this process. The author begins by asking to what extent Europeanization had an impact on the coordination mechanisms of Austrian politics, in particular, the executive and the legislative, and the specific features of the Austrian political system: federalism and corporatism. The analysis shows that the adaptation of institutions to EU model significantly affected Austrian politics. The second part of the paper analyses the bottom-up effects, how domestic political processes influenced the Austrian European policy. Despite the strong Europeanization of Austria's domestic institutions the research found some problem junctures in the relationship between Austria and the EU. This included the issue of the coalition government that was formed with the participation of the FPÖ in 2000 and the sanctions other EU member states placed on Austria as a response. Another case occurred when Austria threatened to veto EU eastern expansion in 2001. On the basis of these two cases it was found that despite the adaptation of domestic institutions, domestic politics can still have a strong effect on European relations. However, the long-term trend in Austrian European policy indicates that the relationship between strong institutional adaptation and the country's positive pro-European policy is primarily harmonious.*

Keywords: *Austria, political system, European policy, coordination system, European Union, federalism and the EU, corporatism*

Introduction

Austria has been a member of the European Union for over a decade now. Austria's official request for full membership in the EC[13] did not come until 17 July 1989. It was preceded by a domestic political debate over the advantages and disadvantages of membership in the EC, against the background of the changes that were occurring in the East-West relationship and intensifying European integration.

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[12]   This article was not proof-readed by the Politics in Central Europe. The autor holds the full responsibility for the language quality of the article.

[13]   ECSC, EEC and EUROATOM.

Austria feared the negative economic impact of remaining permanently outside the EC common market, a project that the EC tabled in 1985. Austria wanted to belong to the European economic area and the EC, but politically it continued to insist on maintaining its neutrality.[14] The referendum on the Constitutional Act on the Accession of Austria to the EU was held on 12 June 1994 and it was the first mandatory referendum in the country's history.[15] The majority of Austrian voters expressed their agreement (66.58 % voted for membership, 33.4 % voted against) with joining the European Union.[16]

Austria joined the EU at the same time as Finland and Sweden as part of what was called the northern expansion on 1 January 1995. Austria implemented the principles of the Maastricht Treaty[17], became part of the Schengen area, and along with the other eleven member states adopted the Euro as its currency on 1 January 1999. Austria experienced strong economic growth after the Second World War, ranking it among the economically advanced EU states and the countries that are net payers into the EU budget.

The study aims to analyse the ongoing process of the "Europeanization"[18] of Austria's domestic political institutions following Austria's accession to the EU. Robert Ladrech understands Europeanization as an "incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamic become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech 1994: 69). This top-down dynamic and the impact of European integration on the national institutions of Austria will be examined in the first part of this study. Our assumption is that Austria, a small Central European state, is highly Europeanized, despite its relatively late accession to the EU, is highly Europeanised, and we will attempt here to verify/falsify this assumption. Our analysis focuses especially on the main political subjects involved in the country's integration policy and the decision-making system of the executive and legislative authorities and of

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[14] For a legal analysis of "accession to the EC with the exception of neutrality", see Hummer (1996: 25, 28-38).

[15] The necessary constitutional changes assumed the nature of overall changes to the Federal Constitution of the Republic of Austria, and according to Art. 44 Par. 3 of the Austrian Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) (B.-VG.) these must be submitted to a referendum. The Austrian Constitution document that even includes parts of treaties and statutes that are classified as constitutional (e.g. a State Treaty). For the purpose of this paper the abbreviated title of the Austrian Constitution will be used (see Klokočka, Wagnerová 2004: 419-508).

[16] Conditional on the participation of 82.4 % of Austrian voters.

[17] Austria committed itself to the principles of the Maastricht Treaty. While preserving its neutrality, the Austrian government also managed to maintain strong environmental protections (especially in connection with the use of nuclear energy), was granted transitional periods in relation to freight transit, and maintained regulations in the area of agricultural policy, for more see Itzlinger (1996: 52).

[18] For more on the use of the term "Europeanization" in contemporary literature, see Dančák, Fiala and Hloušek (2005: 11).

the Federal States and it also looks at the constitutional requirements for Austria's membership in the European Union.

The top-down dynamic is an important dimension of integration, but the bottom-up dynamic is no less significant. We believe that the relationship between the EU and member state (in our case Austria) institutions is a two-way interaction (for more see Hussein 2005: 287). In the relationship between the EU and Austria, the impact of European structures on Austria's domestic policy is just one side of the coin. The other side is Austria's policy towards the European Union. Another objective of our analysis is therefore to find out how Austria has engaged as an influential actor in the EU and how Austrian policy has been applied within the European Union.

In order to examine these questions we analyse three cases. The first case study is devoted to Austria's EU Presidency, which it first held in the second half of 1998 and then again in 2006. The second study deals with the critical juncture in Austria's relationships with the other EU member states. A critical period occurred after the controversial "black-blue" coalition government was set up in February 2000, formed by the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and Haider's populist right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ). In protest, fourteen EU countries invoked sanctions against Austria, which remained in effect until 12 September of that year. The third case study relates to the important challenge that Austria's European policy faced when the EU began the process of eastern enlargement.

The Europeanization of Austria's domestic decision-making system (the top-down dynamic)

There are several bases for the system of decision-making and coordination that lies behind Austria's European policy and it is possible to distinguish between internal and external factors of the Europeanization of Austria. Internal factors refer to the features and the institutional structure of the political system of Austria and also to some specific characteristics of Austrian politics: the federal structure of the country, social partnerships, corporatism and the consensual orientation of political and official elites that, despite weakening ties, persisted in the "grand coalition" of the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Morass 1996: 35).

In addition to these internal factors, the formation of decision-making mechanisms has been influenced by the external circumstances of Austria's accession to the EU. Austria joined the EU at a time when integration was already well advanced, especially in terms of the common economic and political life of member states. Consequently, it was not possible to integrate the Austrian system of government by sectors on the basis of selected areas of integration, and instead the integrative capacity of the entire system had to be developed at once. This gave rise also to a need to coordinate everything, from the individual steps taken to the country's unified political line towards the European Union. The deepening integration that the Maastricht Treaty set

in motion meant that even Austria was increasingly confronted with the question of democratic legitimacy. Austria was able to draw on the example of Germany, which as part of constitutional amendments after 1990 introduced stronger institutional checks on *Europapolitik* on the part of the national parliament and the Federal States.

The powers of the executive in EU affairs

There are two centres of executive power in Austria – the federal government and the President. The government is usually a coalition of parties and is only rarely formed by just one party. The government *(Ministerrat)* acts as a collective body and comprises the Chancellor (the head of government), the Vice-Chancellor, ministers, and state secretaries. The executive bodies in each of the Federal States are headed by a state governor (*Landeshauptmann*).   The President of Austria is elected to office for a six-year term and derives his legitimacy from direct elections. The President's role is largely ceremonial. Presidential acts are countersigned by the Chancellor or the relevant minister. The President wields the formal powers of naming the government and at the government's recommendation dissolving the National Council, but the parliamentary nature of the political system is respected. Heinz Fischer is currently the President of the Austrian Republic.

The executive authority occupied a central role in the decision-making process pertaining to EU affairs. From the outset, the individual ministries of the Austrian system of government were at the forefront of the process (Pelinka 2003: 527). Representation of the Austrian state in talks in the EU Council of Ministers (Council of the European Union) was regarded as the responsibility of the relevant minister, reserving the alternative possibility for that minister to be represented by another minister or by a state secretary from another ministry.[19] The task of coordinating the country's European policy is divided between the Office of the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry. These two institutions also directly and jointly take part in preparing the agenda for the European Council or the Intergovernmental Conference. In the period of the "grand coalition", this cooperation corresponded well with the coalition policy of tandem responsibility, where the Chancellor was responsible for the overall coordination of government policy (and for representing Austria at meetings of the European Council), and the Foreign Ministry participated in meetings of the General Affairs Council (Morass 1996: 36).

In June 1994 a dispute over competences occurred in connection with who was to represent Austria at a top gathering of government heads at a meeting of the

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[19] From the start there has been a problem with assigning matters dealt with at the EU Council to the relevant minister. The division of specialisations in the EU did not thematically match the division of competences of among individual Austrian ministries. Therefore, the ministry that is to lead the negotiations is regularly designated in advance.

European Council in Corfu, where an Austrian representative was to sign the EU Accession Treaty. Although previous Austrian presidents had not attempted to play an independent role in foreign policy, President Thomas Klestil (1992–2004) insisted on taking part in this European summit, thereby following in the footsteps of the French president. It was his intention to act on the right of the president to represent the state abroad, which is stipulated in Art. 65 of the Austrian Constitution. However, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky asserted the authority of his position in this dispute as the official who determines the country's foreign policy. The Austrian president acknowledged the Chancellor's legal arguments that representation in EU politics is not the same thing as representation of the state abroad as defined in Art. 65 of the Constitution and withdrew from participating in other top meetings of the European Council in Essen and in Madrid (Pelinka 2003: 524).

The role of parliament in decision-making

Legislative power in Austria is vested in the two-chamber Parliament, which is dominated by the directly elected National Council (*Nationalrat*), while the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) represents the interests of the federal states (nine states, including Vienna). The upper chamber – the Federal Council – plays a much weaker role in the legislative process. Usually it just has the right to use a suspensive veto, and it has the right of absolute veto only in the case of constitutional bills and bills directly pertaining to the powers of the Federal States. Members of the Federal Council are elected indirectly by members of the representative bodies of the individual Federal States. The Constitution gives a full description (catalogue) of which legislative areas remain in the competence of the state and which fall within the scope of legislative powers of the elected Federal State legislatures.

In comparison with other EU countries, where European policy has a strong executive character, the Austrian National Council exercises considerable authority over affairs connected with the EU. Members of the government are required without delay to inform the National Council and the Federal Council (more details on the Federal Council in the section on Austrian federalism) about all proposals within the European Union and in doing so provide Parliament with the opportunity to formulate a position on issues. Thanks to the active role it has played in establishing Austria's position in the EU, parliament is able to assume co-responsibility for Austria's European policy. A constitutional amendment introduced before Austria joined the EU gave the National Council extensive rights to intervene in the decisions of the government in matters pertaining to the EU.[20] Article 23e of the Austrian Constitution obliges members of the government who discuss and vote in the

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[20]   Art. 23e, 23f of the Austrian Constitution.

European Union to adhere to the position of the National Council (lower chamber). A member of government can deviate from the National Council's position "only for essential reasons of foreign and integration policy" (Art. 23e, Par. 2 of the Austrian Constitution). In this case the given member is required to submit a report on the reasons that led him or her to deviate from the official position of the National Council. A similar mechanism functions for decisions of the government in matters pertaining to the foreign and security policy of the EU and in areas of cooperation in issues of the justice and interior.

The National Council monitors the steps of the national government in the EU Council through the Executive Committee *(Hauptausschuss)*. This permanent parliamentary committee regularly reviews European legislation. However, it selects for itself which topics it intends to focus its attention on. The agenda for the committee (which usually meets once every two weeks) is compiled by the "preparatory committee", made up of representatives from every parliamentary group (Morass 1996: 38).

The participation of parliament in government decision-making relating to EU issues allows opposition parties in the National Council an opportunity to monitor decisions. It was primarily the opposition parties (Greens) who demanded that the constitutional reform in 1994 incorporate guarantees for the substantial participation of parliament in the decision-making process. The opposition therefore possesses the potential to effectively influence the government's position. In terms of the nature of democratic government in the EU, it warrants praise that every position Austria adopts in the EU Council can potentially be traced right back through to the parliamentary level. This accords the decisions of the Austrian government a democratic legitimacy. However, the practical impact of parliamentary checks on the government in EU affairs is small (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 219). Since joining the EU the National Council has issued only several dozen binding opinions. The problem is that the role of parliament in decision-making slows the process of formulating a definitive political opinion. The cumbersome process of communication between the relevant minister and the Executive Committee has often been criticised. It is difficult for ministers to maintain any continuous consultation with the Executive Committee in the final stage of negotiations in the EU Council.

Austrian federalism and municipalities in EU affairs – the position of the Federal States

Austria is a federal republic. The key principles of its political system are laid out in the Federal Constitution of 1920, which remains in effect to date in the amended form adopted in 1929. In Austria (like in Germany), the Federal States possess an independent identity not derived from the federation. The state's federal character

stems from the relatively autonomous legislative function of the Federal States (Walter − Mayer 1996: 70). The Federal States participate in creating the laws of the federation through the Federal Council *(Bundesrat)*, and in executive action through the Federal Administration. Since the 1970s the federal principle has been asserted with increasing rigour. A constitutional amendment from 1984 expanded the powers of the Federal Council. An important feature of the Austrian federal state is the fact that it is the interests of political parties rather than the interests of the Federal States that are of decisive relevance (Weber 1996: 52).

Judicial power is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Austrian Republic, not the Federal States. In the sphere of public administration the highest judicial instance is the Administrative Court. The Constitutional Court (*Verfassungsgerichtshof*) reviews the constitutionality of laws, and it deals with disputes between the Federal States or between the Federal States and the federal government. The absence of any independent judicial power at the individual state level and the fact that the Federal Council occupies a weak position in the legislative process seem to confirm the theory that Austria is something like a unitary federal state, or in other words, Austrian federalism is weak (Říchová 2002: 131-162).

When Austria joined the EU there was no significant strengthening of federalism, which the Federal States had hoped for from membership. By strengthening their powers in relation to the national political system they had hoped to compensate for the eventual decline of their own influence in the EU's system of "multi-level governance" (MLG) that would result from the primarily executive nature of the formulation of European policy in individual member states.

A constitutional amendment in 1992 established only the principles for the participation of the Federal States in decisions on affairs connected with the EU. The Constitution obliges the national government to inform the States (*Bundesländer*) about proposals relating to the EU and to ensure that the Federal States are able to co-decide on matters that fall under the legislative authority of the Federal States or concern their interests. The Federal States must agree unanimously on an opinion and opinion is binding for the national government in negotiations in Brussels (Art. 23d, Par. 2 Austrian Constitution). The government can only deviate from that opinion if it is necessary for foreign policy reasons or for reasons of political integration. At the practical level, the above rules do not make the participation of the Federal States easy. The need for the consensus of all the Federal States only rarely leads to a united opinion being carried (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 220). Moreover, owing frequently to different interests, the Federal States are unable to react flexibly to EU proposals.

The Federal States can moreover participate directly in talks in the European Union. If any legislative proposal within the EU relates to a matter that falls under

the legislative authority of the Federal States, the federal government can transfer participation in talks in the EU Council to a representative selected by the Federal States.[21] However, practical instances of this practice since Austria joined the EU have illustrated the government's effort to make it difficult for the Federal States to personally take part in joint delegations (Weber 1996: 54). Another method of involving the Federal States is through the person of a joint delegate of the Federal States within the diplomatic structure of Austria's Permanent Representation to the EU *(Ständige Vertretung)*.

The activities of so-called *Eurobüros*, which were set up by the individual Federal States after Austria joined the EU, are evidence of the fact that the Federal States do not feel that they are adequately represented by the government in Brussels. Alongside these information centres of the Federal States in Brussels, representatives of the States are among the participants in the EU's Committee of the Regions, which is made up of members of local and regional bodies, including Federal State governors and even representatives of the Associations of Cities and Municipalities *(Städte- und Gemeindebund)*. Representatives of the Federal States have from the outset of Austria's membership in the EU been very active in the Committee of the Regions and have promoted development of the Union in the direction of a Europe of regions. A prime example of this trend is the cross-border cooperation of the Italian regions of Bolzano and Trento (Southern Tyrol) and the Austrian Federal State of Tyrol.

Austrian municipalities are able to participate in EU affairs at the European (Committee of the Regions) and national levels (Council for Issues of Austrian Integration Policy).[22] They do so through the Austrian Association of Cities and the Austrian Association of Municipalities (Art. 115 of the Austrian Constitution).[23] The Austrian Association of Municipalities became a member of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) at the very start of European integration in the 1950s.[24] The Association selects three delegates out of the twelve Austrian members as representatives in the Committee of the Regions. The rule that applies in the relationship between the centre and local administration is that whenever a particular European bill affects "the sphere of autonomous authority of the municipalities" or municipal interests, the national government is required to inform the municipalities

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[21] Art. 23d, Par. 3 of the Austrian Constitution.

[22] In Czech literature, Miroslava Pitrová's master thesis (which she successfully defended at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts at West Czech University in Pilsen in 2006) is devoted to the subject of Austrian communal politics.

[23] Http://www.sbg.ac.at/pol/regionastudies/dokumente/d-gemeinde/d-gemeinden-2stell.htm#a. (3 August 2007)

[24] In 1993 the Council of European Municipalities and Regions joined up with the IULA (International Union of Local Authorities) and became its European branch. This merging of tow international municipal interest groups made the Austrian Association of Municipalities automatically a member of the IULA; see http://www.iula.org. (2 August 2007)

without delay and provide them with an opportunity to formulate an opinion on it (Art. 23d Par. 1 of the Austrian Constitution). In terms of the administrative structures for drawing on EU Structural Funds, Austria is part of the NUTS II units. Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, and Vienna (each of these Federal States has a population of more than one million) are NUTS II regions, which correspond to the territorial administrative divisions of the Austrian state and to the individual Federal States. The regions and municipalities of Austria each have a share in the funds that are targeted for areas defined under Objective 2 of EU regional policy and they participate in EU programmes such as Interreg III (Pitrová 2006: 56).

Political parties in the process of European integration

The Austrian Constitution documents the legal continuity of the Republic of Austria from its date of origin in 1918 to date. At the start of the Second Republic political parties referred back to the democratic development of the First Republic, interrupted by the establishment of an autocratic regime (1934–38) and subsequently the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich (1938–45). Between the late 1940s and the 1980s the Austrian party system was highly concentrated. At the peak of this trend (1975) 90 % of Austrian voters were voting for one of two large parties: the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) or the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ).[25] A third political party, the Austrian Freedom Party (originally called the Federation of Independents - *VdU*, and renamed the FPÖ in 1956), was much weaker. Thus there was a two-and-a-half party system operating in Austria. When the Greens entered the National Council in 1986 and when preferences for the populist right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) began to grow, changes began to emerge in the party system and in the voting behaviour of Austrian voters. The traditional political camps *(Lager)* of labour, represented by the SPÖ[26], and conservatives, represented by the ÖVP, gradually lost their ability to attract a stable base of voters. However, a fundamental change occurred with the elections to the National Council in October 1999.

Paradoxically, up until the 1980s, the marginal FPÖ was the only party that expressed full support for Austria's integration into the EC. The FPÖ was the first to incorporate the idea that even while maintaining neutrality Austria could still take an active part in the European integration process in their party programme on 1 July 1985 (Hummer 1996: 38). From the mid-1980s the Austrian People's Party also began to profile itself as a "pro-European" party.[27] The Austrian Social-

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[25] On the party and electoral system of the Second Austrian Republic and the "cleavages" influencing the voting behaviour of Austrians, see Hloušek (2006: 24-40).

[26] The Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) was renamed in 1991 as the Austrian Social Democratic Party.

[27] On the positions of Austrian political parties towards European integration, see Pollak; Slominski (2001).

ist Party was the last to show support for the country joining the EC and only began doing so under the leadership of Franz Vranitzky, Chancellor of the "grand coalition" in 1987–1997.

At the start of the 1990s the FPÖ radically altered its position. In 1991 they began to actively campaign against European integration and during the period of accession talks they tried to win the votes of everyone opposed to the pro-integration policy of the grand coalition. Austria's preparation for EU accession required the introduction of the most substantial changes to its Constitution since 1929. In order for Austria to be ready to sign the EU Accession Treaty on 24 June 1994, it had to enact major legislation affecting the Constitution. Voting in the National Council (*Nationalrat*), the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), and the referendum were preceded by an information campaign and discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of Austria's membership. Although there was a consensus among political elites that Austria should have an opportunity to contribute to decision-making within the European Union, the opposition parties, the Austrian Green Party and Haider's FPÖ, campaigned against joining the EU. Jörg Haider in particular took advantage of this issue to mobilise voters against the "pro-European" coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). The only opposition party to support the government camp was Heide Schmidt's Liberal Forum (LIF) (Gehler − Kaiser 2002: 316; Greiderer − Pelinka 1996: 145).

In 1994 the Greens as well as the FPÖ voted against joining the EU. But unlike the FPÖ the Green Party, despite its initial reservations towards Austrian membership in the EU, began to support the integration process and Austria's active participation in it (Hloušek − Sychra 2004: 27). The FPÖ, however, maintained its negative stance towards EU membership, evident, for example, in the (unsuccessful) proposal submitted by the FPÖ functionary Susanne Riess-Passer in 1997 that a referendum be held on adopting or rejecting the Euro as currency.

Austrian politics in 2000-2006 are of interest for the topic of this paper with regard to the effect of party politics on the European policy of a particular state. During this period Austria's positions on current issues of European integration were more than ever before influenced by party conflicts and the tension between the ruling coalition of the ÖVP and Haider's FPÖ. Europe's stances towards Austria were also fundamentally influenced by the participation of the Freedom Party in the government (see above for more on the sanctions against Austria). Particularly in the first term of the coalition and up to the FPÖ's losses in the early elections held on 24 November 2002, Haider's Freedom Party endeavoured to orchestrate problems in connection with the EU's eastern enlargement and deeper European integration and use them for their own short-term political gain. For example, the FPÖ tried to

impose a referendum (January 2002) on the Temelín nuclear power plant and threatened to veto the Czech Republic's accession to the EU (Gehler 2005: 96-98). The Beneš decrees, free movement of labour, and freight transit through the Alp regions of Austria were all topics they raised in direct connection with EU enlargement.

Internal party conflicts and an election loss in the autumn of 2002 (the ÖVP received 42.3 % of the vote, the FPÖ only 10.16 %!) meant that the Freedom Party was no longer able to effectively pursue a negativist EU policy. In the second coalition term (the Schüssel II cabinet) in 2002–2006, the Austrian government set a clear pro-European course and encouraged the successful conclusion of the EU's eastern enlargement and the European Convention negotiations on the draft treaty to establish a constitution for Europe. In the Austrian National Council, members of the ÖVP, in cooperation with the opposition SPÖ and the Green Party, voted in favour of eastern enlargement.

After the victory of the Social Democrats in the 2006 elections, Austria again found itself in the midst of a political turnaround, where the preconditions were even stronger for a "return" to a grand coalition. In 2007 a coalition government was set up and headed by the Social Democratic Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer.

Austrian neo-corporatism and the European Union

The political system of the Second Austrian Republic has a specific political culture characterised by consensual democracy, backed up by a model of social partnership *(Sozialpartnerschaft)* and coordinated links between interest groups and politics.[28] This method of negotiating over fundamental economic and social issues was primarily advanced during the years of the coalition between the Austrian People's Party and the Socialist Party in 1945/47-1966 and 1986/87-1999/2000. The umbrella bodies of the Austrian Trade Union Federation *(Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB)* and the Federation of Austrian Industry *(Vereinigung österreischischer Industrieller, VÖI),* and the economic and agricultural chambers and worker and employee chambers, membership in which is usually mandatory, all create the basis for Austria's neo-corporatism.

Social partnership is an institutionalised form of cooperation and it is a basic feature of corporate relations. The established right of social partners to be involved in the legislative process or to review wage and price policies *(Paritätische Kommission für Lohn- und Preisfragen)* made social partnership an important factor in political decision-making in Austria. The strength of the influence organised interests have had in the political sphere peaked in the 1970s.[29] Despite the gradual decline

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[28]   Some authors write about the formation of neo-corporative structures (Pelinka 2003: 542; Prisching 2002: 299-320).

[29]   In 1973, 51 % of the functionaries in economic unions and economic and working chambers also

in their significance, interest groups were important actors in the accession process, throwing their support behind Austria's EU membership (Tálos − Karlhofer 1996: 69). While supporting Austria's integration into the EU, representatives of interest groups simultaneously strove to acquire for themselves adequate rights to take part in decision-making on European affairs.[30] In the "European agreement" of April 1994, the governing SPÖ and ÖVP committed themselves to ensuring the adequate involvement of the four main interest groups in the domestic political process, in EU committees, and even in the diplomatic representation of the Austrian Republic in Brussels (Tálos − Karlhofer 1996: 70).

The interest group umbrella organisations, the federations, are able to take part in the decision-making process at various levels. Alongside their formal involvement, for example, in the legislative process *(Begutachtungsverfahren)*, their informal contacts are traditionally also a source of significant influence. Interest groups cooperate with the ministries (social affairs, the economy, and agriculture) and take part in preparations for meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives *(Coreper)*, which is the responsibility of the Office of the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry. Through indirect party contacts they can also have an influence on discussions in the Executive Committee *(Hauptausschuss)* of the National Council.

As Austria was drawn into the EC and began to act as a fully fledged EU member, two processes at two levels were unleashed. In one respect, membership in the EU led at the national level to a reduction in the amount of influence organised interest groups wield, because many of the national affairs that the groups were able to participate in directly prior to Austria's EU membership are regularly addressed at the supranational, European level. Despite the joint and very often consensual approach of the state and interest groups, representatives of the national government are still exclusively regarded as the official representatives of Austria in the committees of the EU (according to EU rules). It is always left to the discretion of the relevant minister whether to invite representatives of other organisations in the social partnership to take part in the meetings of European committees and make them a member of the delegation, but they can only participate as observers and have no negotiating powers (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 221). The position of social partners in the political system also depends heavily on the state of national politics, especially considering the centralising efforts of the centre-right coalition government of the ÖVP and the FPÖ in 2000-2006.

However, in another respect, that is, in terms of the manoeuvring room of interest groups, there has also been a positive side to Austria's gravitation towards the

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held a seat in the National Council; in 1995 the figure was only 19 % of active functionaries.
[30]   Österreich und die europäische Integration, Stellungnahme der Sozialpartner, 1 March 1989.

EC/EU. At the level of the EC, Austrian interest groups and federations *(ÖGB, VÖI, Wirtschaftskammer Österreich - WKÖ)* had become members of European organisations even before Austria joined the EU.[31] In these activities they were able to benefit from their monopolistic position in the state in their given branch. In this respect the Austrian model of social partnership is not likely to be exported to the supranational, EU level. Probably the opposite process is to be expected. National corporate structures will increasingly be influenced through organised interest-group lobbying at the European level.

Austria as an EU member – from "ideal pupil" to "difficult child" (the bottom-up dynamic)

In the previous chapters we analysed the impact of the EU on Austrian national political structures and found that the level of Europeanization of Austria is relatively high. Below we will examine whether (and when) Austrian institutions or political leaders have had a significant impact on EU actions or on the actions of the institutions of the other EU member states. Does the Europeanization of the domestic policy of a country like Austria lead it towards becoming a good EU member? How much positive influence did the high level of Europeanization have on the actors in Austrian European diplomacy so that they support "European" solutions in decision-making processes at the level of the EU?

The fact that two-thirds of Austrian voters expressed their support for Austria joining the EU in 1995 put the country in a good starting position. Austria fulfilled all the requirements for becoming an economically and politically successful member of the EU. In the country's thirteen-year history as a member, there have been periods when Austria has genuinely met those expectations (case 1), but there have also critical periods, as will be shown in case 2 and partly also in case 3.

Case 1: The Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 1998 and 2006

When the Presidency of the EU Council passed to Austria in the second half of 1998 the country demonstrated its capability of assuming responsibility for EU policy. However, despite how well organised and prepared Austria was, some external factors (e.g. the national elections in Germany) had a decisive influence on the timeframe of the Presidency (Schallenberg − Thun-Hohenstein 1999). Nonetheless, Austria proved itself as the presiding country, successfully leading the talks with the

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[31] VÖI joined the UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe), the WKÖ joined EUROCHAMBERS (Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry); the ÖGB was a founding member of the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation).

first wave of new candidate countries (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic) and contributing to the introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999.

In the first half of 2006 Austria again held the EU Presidency, and the atmosphere on this occasion was different than during the 1998 Presidency. By 2006 the EU was focusing on more than just internal problems (employment policy) and its attention was also turned to further expansion (and the question of the future membership of Turkey), security threats, and global issues. During its Presidency Austria conducted itself in a very positive and "European" manner. This Presidency was an inspiration for a small Central European country like the Czech Republic, which will be assuming the EU Presidency in the near future.

Case 2: The 1999 Austrian parliamentary elections and sanctions from the "EU14"

After the first five years of Austria's membership in the EU, which was accompanied by its active approach to key integration projects, including preparation for the third stage of economic and monetary union, the relationship between Austria and the EU changed dramatically. The reason was internal political developments within Austria.

In the elections to the Austrian National Council on 3 October 1999 the largest number of votes went to the SPÖ (33.15 %), but the FPÖ became the de facto winner of the elections (26.91 %), beating out the ÖVP by just 415 votes (26.91 %), and became the second strongest parliamentary party. The Greens won 7.4 % of the vote (Gehler 2005: 876). The President called on the head of the Social Democratic Party, Viktor Klima, to pursue coalition talks with members of the Austrian People's Party, and when these fell apart, talks between the ÖVP and FPÖ were next on the agenda. In February 2000 President Thomas Klestil, reluctantly[32], announced the formation of a "black-blue" coalition government of the ÖVP and the FPÖ, headed by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and Vice-Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer from the FPÖ.

The other fourteen EU states opposed the participation of the populist right-wing and xenophobic FPÖ in the Austrian government and imposed bilateral "sanctions" for an indefinite term against Austria, which came into effect immediately after the new Austrian government was sworn in on 4 February 2000 (Gehler 2002: 182).

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[32]   The President did not agree with the participation of the FPÖ in the government, and therefore he did not call on the head of the ÖVP, Schüssel, to form a government. On 2 February 2000, after a coalition agreement was reached between the ÖVP a FPÖ, the proposed list of Cabinet members was submitted to the President, who refused to name some of the ministers, but nonetheless was forced to respect the outcome of the elections and the consequent distribution of mandates in the National Council.

This kind of decisive and rapidly coordinated action taken by member states against one other member state was unprecedented in the history of European integration. It was, however, from the start uncertain whether the fourteen member states had the legal right to agree to the proposal of the Portuguese Presidency on 31 January 2000, which read: "*The governments of the fourteen member states will not support or accept any bilateral official contacts on the political level with an Austrian Government of which the FPÖ is a part; they will not support Austrian candidates for posts in international organisations; Austrian ambassadors in the capitals of EU cities will only be accepted on a technical level.*"[33]

This joint decision of 14 EU states was highly medialized and in the initial months during which it was in effect it resulted in the international isolation of Austria. The fact that the other democratic states were opposed to the participation of a populist right-wing party in the government of another member state was not just the expression of a moral position but also a defence of the EU's common values, as articulated in Art. 6 in the European Union Treaty (Gehler 2002: 187). However, from a legal perspective, Schüssel's government had not actually infringed on any democratic principles, and an especially problematic issue was that sanctions were to apply for an indefinite period. They would only be *de facto* repealed if the "black-blue" Austrian government stepped down. Austria tried to defend itself, but its interpretation of the situation was initially rejected by other states. Controversial was the fact that the "sanctions" were not adopted as a decision of the European Union but "only" its member states. Furthermore, the European Community's founding treaties only explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (Falkner − Laffan 2005: 218). The Austrian government's legal position reflected these facts, and the Federal Government based its defence on the argument that the statement of the Portuguese Presidency from 31 January 2000 was an agreement at the level of international law, it lay outside the legal framework of the European Union (it was not a legal document of any EU body), and it was primarily of political significance.

What kind of impact did the sanctions imposed by the other EU states have on domestic policy in Austria? The public threat of sanctions did nothing to deter W. Schüssel in his decision to set up a coalition government with the FPÖ. Future Chancellor Schüssel used the EU protests to his own advantage in the negotiations with the FPÖ over the distribution of ministerial seats in the government. The ÖVP was, for example, able to continue to position itself as the "European party", as the foreign ministry was headed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Gehler 2002: 197). The opposition expressed satisfaction over the sanctions and made plain their disapproval of the government, but the majority of the Austrian population showed

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[33]   http://www.mzv.cz/_archiv/data_dokumenty/dokumenty92000.html (5 July 2007)

solidarity with the new cabinet.[34] Thanks to this unexpected confrontation, the Austrian government, which had initially not been very united, pulled together in a sense of solidarity, and even the positions of the Austrian Chancellor and the head of the ÖVP Schüssel were strengthened (Gehler 2005: 891). The full force of these circumstances became evident in the early parliamentary elections held in the autumn of 2002, from which the ÖVP emerged as the strongest party.

After five months of sanctions some member states began to call for normalising relationships with Austria (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, and Spain). Austria's policy of quiet diplomacy helped foster this attitude (Gehler 2005: 895). The solution to this stalemate, when even the European public began to feel that the sanctions were counterproductive, was the Report of the "Three Wise Men".[35] This three-member committee recommended ending the sanctions. The justification for the decision was not that the FPÖ in the position of a government party had abandoned its populist statements, but rather fears about a rise in nationalism and negative attitudes towards the EU in Austria (Gehler 2002: 210). Based on this report the sanctions against Austria were terminated unconditionally on 12 September 2000.

Case 3: Austria and eastern EU enlargement

Debate on some of the more problematic chapters of the EU's eastern enlargement (free movement of labour, energy) culminated in 2001. At that time Austria's position in the EU was still weak from the sanctions against it in the first half of 2000. The government hoped to assert its interests in the issues of Temelín and freight transit, but, with the exception of members of the FPÖ, the Austrian position on eastern enlargement was favourable, though eastern enlargement was one issue where the position of the Austrian government (except for the FPÖ) was at odds with the views of the population. Austrians were for the most part sceptical about admitting the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

The foreign ministry assigned the former Vice-Chancellor Erhard Busek with the task of coordinating the enlargement policy and launched a targeted information campaign. In the spring of 2001 Austrians were, next to the Fins and the Danes, the most informed about the issues of eastern enlargement. Over 30 % of respondents in a survey answered that they were "very well or well informed" about the EU enlargement (Eurobarometr 55, April/May 2001). However, the problem was the negative stance of the FPÖ, which (including Vice-Chancellor S. Riess-Passer)

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[34] The sanctions made a domestic policy issue internal to Austria a European issue. Next to Kurt Waldheim (President 1986-1992), Jörg Haider became the best known Austrian figure outside Austria in Europe and the world.

[35] Martti Ahtisaari (former Finnish president), Jochen Frowein (renowned German lawyer), Marcelino Oreja (former Spanish foreign minister).

wanted to veto the Czech Republic's accession over the unresolved issue of the Temelín nuclear power plant. Despite constructive efforts in support of enlargement on the part of the foreign ministry (run by the ÖVP), from 2001 up to the conclusion of negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2002, Austria was viewed by the European Commission and some member states as a country rather more obstructive than supportive of the enlargement process (Gehler 2005: 867). The situation improved somewhat after the elections in 2002, when a stronger ÖVP was able to set a clear pro-European course. Austria then ratified the accession treaty, which was signed on 16 April 2003.

Conclusion

During its thirteen-year membership in the EU Austria has demonstrated that it is capable of taking part in every kind of integration project as a fully fledged member. It has been careful to ensure that its activities in the European Union have not been at odds with its commitments arising from its position of constitutional neutrality. The way in which its status of neutrality has been interpreted has enabled Austria to take an active part in the Common foreign and security policy of the EU (CFSP) and to support these aspects of integration in discussions of the Convention on the Future of Europe (Gehler 2005: 978).[36] However, Austria continues to regard itself as a state that will not take part in defence and military alliances, and for that reason it did not enter NATO.

At the centre of our analysis was the level of Europeanization of Austrian institutions. We can conclude that its adaptation to EU models was effective. In the domestic coordination of European policy, modifications occurred in relation to the demands of effective membership. No radical changes were made to political decision-making. A system where European affairs are dealt with by the relevant ministry, which is typical of Austrian politics, is still in effect. However, the increase in the powers of the Chancellor compared to the Foreign Ministry shows institutionally how important and complex European policy is. Some actors such as the Federal States expected a more pronounced increase in their powers as a result of Austria's participation in the EU. At the formal level their potential influence indeed increased, but in practical terms they rarely have an influence on national decisions.

Successful periods in Austria's EU membership have included its Presidency in 1998 and 2006 (case 1), the adoption of the Euro as official state currency, and the constructive approach taken by Austrian deputies, for example, during negotiations

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[36] Austrian representatives in the Convention, Hannes Farnleitner (ÖVP) and Herbert Bosch (FPÖ), drew on a proposal from the Italian Presidency and called for including in the European Constitution a clause on the military obligation of other member states to come to the aid of any EU member under attack.

on the European Convention. In these cases the high level of Europeanization cor-responded with Austria's positive attitude towards the European affairs and the very positive reflections of Austria in EU institutions and in the other EU member states. Austria's integration policy between 1995 and 2008 shows that even a small member country can become the centre of EU attention, whether in a negative (sanctions) or positive (the Presidency) sense.

In the second part of the study we discussed in detail more problematic issues. Austria's membership in the European Union has also experienced moments of crisis. Austria became even more a target of attention when its relationship with other member states deteriorated after it allowed Jörg Haider's populist right-wing Freedom Party of Austria to take part in forming the government (case 2). The biggest conflict was the sanctions the other member states imposed on Austria in 2000. The impact that crisis had on Austria's European policy was not just a loss of prestige but even a loss of manoeuvring space in the future. Even though rela-tions between Austria and the other member states quickly returned to normal once the sanctions were repealed, the crisis weakened the country's ability to effectively assert its specific national interests within the EU. It also had an impact on actors in domestic policy. On the one hand, public support for European integration de-creased and Austrians realized how important national sovereignty is to them.

Also, Austria's policy towards the EU's eastern enlargement (case 3) was a strong reflection of the country's domestic political constellation. This means that the so-cietal adaptation was not as successful as the Europeanization of Austrian state institutions. During the accession talks with eastern candidate countries, the Fed-eral Government of Wolfgang Schüssel displayed a resistance to some aspects of expansion that Austria saw as negative (e.g. the Temelín nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, free movement of labour from the new candidate countries within the labour market of the EU 15, Alpine transit). In addition to disagreements between Austria and the EU over freight transit through the Austrian Alps, Aus-tria also temporarily threatened to veto eastern enlargement in 2004. The Austrian government's adaptability with regard to EU affairs helped it to defend its position in the EU. However, political trends in domestic politics not only influenced the European policy of the country (case 2), but had a decisive impact on the basic rela-tionship between Austria and other EU member states during the sanctions in 2000. On the other hand, Austria was able to begin looking for new allies in the European Union[37] and given its geographic position it began to make use of the potential that the 2004/2007 eastern expansion into the states of Central and Eastern Europe had

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[37] A proposal put forth by the Austrian foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner in 2001 to create a "strategic partnership" between Austria and the Central European states of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia was made towards this end.

to offer. Despite its reserved attitude towards some points in the process, eastern enlargement brought Austria some positive economic impulses and even came to have a stimulating effect on the development of the City of Vienna.

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Municipalities in the Federal Republic of Germany – Progress and Current Situation

Miroslava Pitrová

Abstract: *Researching the organization and functioning of public administration, especially self-government, is currently not a key topic of interest among most political scientists. This is why we will try to describe the public administration system in the Federal Republic of Germany in the following article. It will consider the principles on which the German public administration is based and how its second subsystem – municipal authorities – function in relation to the national state administration.Politics as a science offers interesting opportunities and resources for analyses of the way public administration functions. Aspects of the political science of public administration are important in understanding all the connections with public administration. The German example is not typical because there are various types and forms of municipal organization. Due to historical experience and evolution, four basic types of municipal organization developed in Germany, and they will be the main focus of our attention. We will deal with the specific features of municipal election systems, look at the variety of municipal political systems and the possibility of citizen involvement in the administration of public affairs. For political scientists public administration in Germany – its organization and function – is an interesting laboratory where we can study a progression which is very noteworthy. This article cannot explain all the subjects which are connected with this political phenomenon, but it will attempt to explain some of them.*

Key words: *The Federal Republic of Germany, public administration, local authorities, municipalities, municipal organization, municipal elections systems.*

History of public administration in Germany

Germany is the classic example of the "mixed model" of public administration. The municipalities are the lowest units, which are a self-governing administration with national state administration as well. All municipalities have an equal level of autonomy, but from the point of view the mixed model of public administration the municipalities are not equal concerning their significance in the system. Municipalities in Germany are not equal and cannot be so in terms of their area, number of inhabitants, financial power, political influence on the public administration system, etc.

Public administration in Germany in its modern form has existed since the be-
ginning of the 19th century, in connection with the name of L. von Stein. The
tradition of local administration has deep roots which go back to medieval times,
and it has always been the local administration which survived difficult periods in
German history and retained at least partial independence. There was a tendency
to limit the autonomy of local Government, and this is why after the end of the
Second World War the restoration of modern public administration became a pri-
ority (Chander, 1997: 134-135).

The organization of public administration was completely the opposite in the
Federal Republic of Germany and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
two states created after the Second World War.[38] Districts became the basis of
function in the GDR. They were not decentralized but deconcentrated units of na-
tional state administration. From 1945 until German reunification, public adminis-
tration in the GDR could not have been called democratic. There were two bases of
democratic public administration in West Germany: national state administration
and self-Government; in the GDR the self-Government component was missing
(Heindenreich, 2001: 13).

The transformation of public administration in the east of the reunified Germany
proceeded in a different way than in other post-Communist countries, which were
looking for a suitable system of public administration organization, and they tried
to restore the principles of modern public administration in various reform waves,
phases and stages (see three reform phases of public administration in the Czech
Republic, etc.). The Reunification Agreement of Germany (1990) stated that the
economic, constitutional, political and institutional system of the Federal Republic
would be implemented in the former GDR.

Since 1990 the system in the former GDR has been distributed, and communal
self-Government is also guaranteed by the Basic Law (BL, *Grundgesetz*) of the
German constitution). The biggest problem of the former GDR and the federal
states was their large debts and the imbalance between the financial power and the
performance towards of old federal states.

Let us go a back a little in time. After the end of the Second World War, munici-
palities (*Gemeinde*) became the basic provincial administrative units. In this period
there were around 30,000 municipalities of various sizes, in Germany. Thanks to a
centralist trend during the 1970s and 80s, the number of municipalities was reduced
by nearly one third, to 9,000.

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[38]   The Federal Republic of Germany was established in May 1949, when three western zones were
     united under one administration. The German Democratic Republic was founded in the autumn of
     the same year (the country was administered by the Soviet Union) (Škaloud, 2005: 200).

These centralist tendencies resulted in more effective administration and self-Government, and it is no accident that in Germany local autonomy does not function in a territory with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants (Chandler, 1997:135). After reunification in 1990 there were 16,121 municipalities in Germany, but the average number of inhabitants in each of them was about 5,000

(http://www.mvcr.cz/casopisy/s/1999/99_25/25konz.html).

In 2001 the average number of inhabitants was decreasing (13,565) and increasing average number of inhabitants (5, 900). From the economic point of view, the centralist tendencies of decentralization in Germany can be seen in a positive way. But in the Federal Republic decentralization is not a consequence of activity from the top but from the bottom, due to pragmatic considerations of local authorities (Local Finance in the Fifteen Countries of the European Union).

Under Article 22 (1) of the BL the Federal Republic is a democratic, social and federal country. It consists of 16 federal states[39] three of which are Free States (*Stadtstaat*), which have a different status: Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin. All 16 federal states, together with the Federal Government (*Bund*), form an integrated state (*Gesamstaat*).

(http://www.gutenachbarschaft.org/downloads/Informationssystem%20 Recht%20und%20Verwaltung/2005_recht_staatsaufbau-deby_cz.pdf).

Public administration is divided into three basic levels, the federal, provincial and municipal. Of course, the highest is the federal level (*Bund*), consisting of the Federal Government, Federal Chancellor, Federal President, German Parliament (*Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*) and other bodies of the national state administration.

The next level, i.e. the provincial level comprises individual federal states (*Länder*). In the German system the federal states have a wide range of powers; for example, they have the right to pass legislation (this does not mean citizens have different rights in different states). For every citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany the rights and duties are the same in each one of the 16 federal states), and "Cooperative Federalism" is exercised in Germany, the principle of mutual dependence and cooperation between the federal states and the *Bund*.

Each federal state (*Land*) is divided into a three-level system of elected administration. The districts (*Landkreis*) stand between the lowest and the highest level of administration (from the provincial point of view). On the district level, active and

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[39] Baden-Württemberg, Freistaat Bayern (Bavaria), Brandenburg, Hessen (Hesse), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania), Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia), Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate), Saarland, Freistaat Sachsen (Saxony), Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt), Schleswig-Holstein, Thüringen (Thuringia).

passive suffrage is also granted to people who have citizenship of another state of the European Union (Art. 28 (1) of the BL).

In the administrative hierarchy, the districts are the provincial administrative units standing between the municipalities and the federal state. The statutory deputy of the district is a district councillor (*Landrat*), who is nominated by the elected district council (*Kreistag*). The districts administer the municipalities. The exceptions are towns, which, because of their size have the unique status of district, the *Stadtkreis*. They, of course, do not constitute district bodies, powers are not duplicated, and the district tasks are therefore assumed by the municipal corporation. In the Free Cities (*Stadtstaat*) – Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin – this structure is adapted to their unique status and position in the system.

Municipal level

In the Federal Republic of Germany, as in other democratic states, municipalities form the basic unit of the system. These are the lowest units of provincial administration. Because the German system of public administration is a classic model of a mixed system, municipalities, apart from the tastes in the sphere of independent scope, implement also tasks in the sphere of transferred scope (i.e. matters of the national state administration). In Germany the basic rights and duties of municipalities are established in the Basic Law, which guarantees the municipalities the right to manage all their own affairs themselves, within the limits set by the law. Also the unions of municipalities have the right to self-Government, within the limits of its legislative scope (Art. 28 (2) of the BL). This constitutional statement of rights in the Basic Law gives considerable powers to municipalities, especially in the spheres where federal law does not have ultimate authority. It is important to say that municipalities make use of their considerable powers.

We do not find a specific reference to municipalities in the Basic Law because individual federal states amend their administrative organization and structure in their own constitution. What is the same for all municipalities is the respect and implementation of the rules of the European Charter of Local Authorities.[40]

When comparing systems of local administration of individual federal states we can see that the defining aspects of the German municipalities are in many ways

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[40] The European Charter of local authorities, is one of the pillars of municipal self-government, which has an international legal character. The document was produced by the member states of the Council of Europe and agreed in 1985 in Strasbourg. The establishment of the Charter was motivated by an attempt to form an integrated European standard of self-government and ensure the protection of rights of local authorities. The preamble of this document already appreciates the fundamental role of local democracy for building a modern democratic society (Http://www.mvcr.cz/odbor/moderniz/mezinaro/rada_evr.html#charta).

different. On the basis of earlier studies carried out we can identify four basic types of municipal organization in Germany. This segmentation results from the different historical development of the federal states, from the geographical position within the limits of existing territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the original allocation within the limits of the occupation laws after the end of the Second World War (Wildmannová – Šelešovský, 2001: 6).

Many commentators, e.g. Stanislav Balík, Uwe, Anderson or Wehling, have put forward a typology of individual types of municipal organization in their work. They use four basic categories: a) South German Council Organization (*Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung*); b) Mayoral organization (*Bürgermeisterverfassung*)*;* c) North German Council Organization (*Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung*) and d) *Magistrat* Municipal System *(Magistratverfassung*).

They are the four basic municipal organizations that could be found at the beginning of the 1990s, immediately after German reunification. The North German Council Organization and Mayoral Organization no longer exist. Even though both lasted for a very a short period of time and were basically transformed into the South German Council Organization, we will introduce them briefly. The Mayoral Organization gives the mayor (as in the South German Council Organization) the highest position and in contrast to the North German Council Organization it is based on a dual administration principle (council and mayor) and the mayor is not elected directly, but indirectly by the municipal council. Nevertheless, the mayor has a strong position in the system; he or she is the chief of the administration, acts on behalf of the municipality and chairs the municipal council. This administration model comes from France and originated in Rhineland-Palatinate, the most important federal state of the French occupational administration. This system was partly used for example in Saarland (Wegener, 2004).

The North German Council Organization is a system where the municipal council and monistic principal of administration apply, which are based on the British model of administration in federal states administered by the British, e.g. in Lower Saxony; and partly also in North Rhine-Westphalia and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The municipal administration has only one authority, the municipal council. The mayorchairs this body and is also elected by it. The supreme "administrator" of the municipal council is the officer (director), who does not have any autonomous position, and is fully subordinate to the council. The North German Municipal Organization can be seen as a competition between the mayor and the town clerk, i.e. there are two posts at the very highest position of the administration. This has not testified. In 1999 the North Rhine-Westphalia Federal country stood aside and since then the South German system has been

exerted, as in Saxony-Anhalt. This model became more and more common in the 1990s. Currently there are two basic models in the German communal municipal system: the South German Council Organization and the *Magistrat* Municipal System, with the strong superiority of the system first mentioned (compare Uwe – Andersen, 2003; Wehlig, 1996).

If we look closer at the two applied models of municipal systems, the South German Council Organization is regarded as the most frequently applied of the municipal organizations in Germany, with the mayor having a strong position. He or she is basically elected directly by the citizens of the municipality. From that the higher legitimacy in the system is dedicated, e.g. in the framework of the municipal structures. He or she chairs for example the municipal (or town) council and all its boards, is the supreme representative of the administration, and the supreme representative of the municipality. Opposite him or her is the municipal (or town council) voted by citizens (the originators of this organization are Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria). The South German Council Organization is applied in Saxony and in the federal states with the former North German Council Organization: Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, as in Schleswig-Holstein with the former Magistrate municipal system. Brandenburg slightly differs as the mayor here is elected by the members of the municipal council. It also elects other members (*Beigeordnete*) who help the mayor to carry out his or her function. In the municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt there are operative and advisory councils, which are made up of the council and chaired by the mayor. The municipalities in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania have been directly electing the mayor since 1999. He or she leads the main council and advisory councils (as is the case in Saxony-Anhalt). In North Rhine-Westphalia the mayor is elected directly too, and there is no difference between the municipalities in states with the former Mayoral and South German Organization.

Hesse is a classic example of the *Magistrat* System. It is based, like the South German Council Organization and the Mayoral Organization, on a dual system of administration. In contrast to the South German Council Organization the statutory body is elected by the council and not by the citizens (*c.f.* the direct elections in Hesse). Citizens elect the town council meeting and the mayor. In contrast to the Mayoral Organization the executive is collegial, i.e. the system of administration operates on a collective basis, where the position of mayor is a member of the *Magistrat* as to the panel compound of the mayor and other members (*Beigeordnete*), who are the elected representatives of the municipal council. To this to the panel belongs the sovereign right of the achievement of the representation on the outside. As was stated, the *Magistrat* System operates also in Hesse and partly in

Schleswig-Holstein. Originally it was extended further, as its principles come from Prussian law (Schubert – Klaus, 2006).

These various types of municipal organization (in the sense of polity) have an impact on the function of the communal politics (politics) and on the actual political result (policy).

Structure and organization of municipality – municipal council

We can see different structures and organizations of the municipalities in the aforementioned division of German communal systems into four (two) basic types. In addition to this division we must consider the *Land* when describing local organization because, as mentioned above, the federal state legislation regulates elections to the municipal council and the mandates of members of municipal councils. However, we can still find features which are common to all local forms of local Government. All the communal institutions (i.e. the law regulations issued by the separate federal state parliaments) know and differ at least between two major bodies – the municipal council and the mayor.

In Germany the municipal council[41] is representative body of the municipality, elected by the voters on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by a secret ballot in the individual territory. Inhabitants of a municipality who are 18 years older (in some of the federal states the age is lowered to 16, e.g. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein) have the right to vote. As for passive suffrage, there are no differences between the individual federal states. All citizens of the age of 18 and older have the right to be elected (http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/index.htp). German citizens and citizens of other European Union member states can take part in communal elections.

The term of office of municipal representatives is, apart from two federal states, the same, i.e. five years. Only in Bavaria and Bremen is the term of office of representatives longer or shorter than in other federal states (Bavaria: six years; Bremen: four years). The municipal council can, according to its needs, exercise its authority with an advisory role, e.g. committees or panels. The municipal directorate (*Gemeindevorstand*) is formed on the basis of the composition of the electoral council. The highest representative of the municipality is usually the mayor.

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[41]　In German politics the terms Municipal Council and Municipal Board are both indicated by the term *Gemeinderat*. Here we use the term Municipal Council for a collective directly elected body. The Municipal Directorate (*Gemeindevorstand*) is similar to a Czech Municipal Council, i. e. a municipal executive body elected by members of a Municipal Council (Municipal Board).

Mayor

Election of the mayor can proceed in two ways. He or she can be elected directly by citizens or indirectly by the municipal council, and in general this can be seen in two ways. The mayor is the highest political representative of the municipality, its statutory deputy. The mayor is elected indirectly by the municipal council has political support, is not in conflict with anyone who has the respect of municipal council. In this sense the mayor plays more the role of a politician, than the role of a representative of the interests of the municipality. Because it is the municipal council and not citizens that decides who will carry out this function this arrangement raises questions about an unsatisfactory situation where a mayor is indirectly elected.

This is why there is a system for electing the mayor directly in the federal states. The mayor is then seen as a person who really represents interests of citizens because it is the public that gives the mayor his or her legitimacy. The mayor is therefore not subject to his or her party's discipline but the electorate. An effort was made to overcome the gap between the electors and the political representatives of the municipalities, and the function of the mayor then was given special significance. A possible negative factor resulting from this could be the abuse of this important position to promote populist views and thoughts. Fears have been expressed that citizens would decide on the basis of publicity and the popularity of the elected person rather than on the basis of his or her real qualities.

In most of the cases these concerns did not materialise because (regarding position of a mayor) focus on the municipal directorate and council is necessary. Even when they are elected directly mayors cannot be seen as an apolitical because they work in a specific political environment, and their opinions and actions are shaped by their surroundings. These are the possible arguments for or against the direct election of a mayor.

On the basis of various relevancy of a mayor in the individual federal states his or her duration in office is different. The terms of offices of mayors do not have to correspond with the term of office of the member of municipal council (in many states it does not correspond). This strengthens the position of mayor in the system even more (http://www.bpb.de/files/IOTZDB.pdf). Because in most of the federal states the mayor is now elected directly, the duration of his or her term of office and the various opportunities for his or her recall are the biggest differences between individual federal states (Balík, 2003: 76).

Even the used terminology is varied (e.g. in towns which are not part of districts the mayor is called supreme mayor. The names for representatives of local

authorities differ also on the basis of the size of the municipality) (Heidenreich, 2001: 9-11).

Municipal election systems

We can describe the municipal electoral system as a proportional representation system, which can be modified in individual federal states. The basic principle of most German municipal elections is proportionality and candidate lists systems (except North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein, where a mixed member proportional electoral system applies). The proportional representation system is the most common type of electoral system in the world. Its basic principle is that no individuals are nominated and the system is first of all a competition between political parties and their lists of representatives, compiled with or without voter involvement (Kubát, 2002: 280-292). These are the unifying elements of the German municipal elections.

Each voter has as many votes as there are seats in the municipality or district. The number of elected representatives depends on the number of inhabitants of the given seat – between eight to 80 councillors. Voters can distribute their votes among candidates on different lists of representatives (in the South German Council Organization). In connection with German municipal elections there is a possibility of ticket-splitting. This means that German voters have the right to up to three preferential votes. They can indicate their preferences for either the candidates (or a candidate) on one list of representatives or on the lists of different political parties (in the North German Council Organization). This principle is called cumulating. By launching the principles of cumulating and ticket-splitting the federal states believe that citizens will be more interested in elections in general, there will be an increase in voter turnout and consequently a greater legitimacy of the elected councillor (http://www.bpb.de/themen/ AJ4EYZ.2.0,Wahlen.html).

In accordance with the technique of seat allocation we can divide the federal states into three basic groups. The basic difference is the mathematical method of seat allocation, which is one of the most important variables that affect proportion-ality and disproportionality of the chosen electoral system.

In general there are two possible methods for calculating seat allocation, either a divisor method or a quota method, and in the German municipal election system we can find both.[42]

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[42]   There are three basic types of divisor methods: d'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë and Imperiali methods. There are five types of quota methods; Hare, Drop, Hagenbach-Bischoff, Hare-Niemeyer and Imperiali (Cabada - Ženíšek, 2003: 19-20).

In the following overview all the German federal states except three municipal states – Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen – are listed. These cities are not typical. The municipal authorities are partners for provincial Governments but they do not have distinct local particular features; therefore we will not include them in the municipal electoral system or systems (in the case of Berlin compare http://www. wahlrecht.de/landtage/berlin.htm;http://www.polixeaportal.de/index.php/Main/ Artikel/Dossier/1/kapitel/133993/Dossierid/133990/n1/Themen/n2/WahlenParteien/id/133982/name/Wahlrecht:+Klassisches+Bundessystem or the reform of the electoral law in Hamburg).[43]

The divisor method

a) For allocating seats in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Saxony the d'Hondt divisor method is used without a closing clause, and the open list proportional representation system (*Verhältniswahl mit freien Listen*).[44]

In Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein the d'Hondt method is used also, but with a closed list proportional representation system. In Saarland a party must receive a minimum level of five per cent of the vote in order to be included in the calculation. In Schleswig-Holstein there is either a limit of five per cent or one constituency seat.

b) In Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia the Sainte-Laguë divisor method is used. The closed list system and five per cent threshold is used in Bremen. The same list system is used inNorth Rhine-Westphalia, although the threshold is set for approximately one constituency seat.

The quota method

In municipal elections in Brandenburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and in Thuringia the proportional representation system with open lists is used, but the Hare-Niemeyer quota method is applied. Only in Thuringia is a five per cent threshold applied; Rhineland-Palatinate 3.03 per cent. The other states in this group have not applied this limit.

See the following table.

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[43]   The latest change to the Hamburg electoral system came into operation on 28 July 2007 and it was initialized in referendum and in 2004 ratified by citizens, who wanted to extend the possibilities to be express their opinions on the structure and form of the candidate lists. The municipal elections in 2008 will be held according to the new electoral system.
(http://www.hamburgischebuergerschaft.de/cms_de.php?templ=mit_sta.tpl&sub1=93&sub2=145&sub3=200&cont=200)

[44]   There are two types of candidate lists in the list proportional representation system: the closed and open lists; i.e. the type of the list indicates to what degree the voter is able to intervene into the structure of the candidate lists. Using closed lists voter decides for the party which formed the list, without the possibility to influence its structure. Open lists (sometimes called flexible lists) give the voter this possibility in various ways (Cabada-Ženíšek, 2003: 19-20).

Table No. 1: Municipal elections systems

Federal State (Bundesland)	Voting period	Suffrage active – passive	Electoral system	Threshold	Electoral methods (quota, divisor)	Mayor (supreme mayor) term of office
Baden-Württemberg	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	d'Hondt	8 years
Bavaria	6 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	d'Hondt	6 years
Brandenburg	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	Hare-Niemeyer	6/8 years
Hesse	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	Hare-Niemeyer	6 years
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	5 years	16/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	Hare-Niemeyer	5/7 years
Lower Saxony	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	Hare-Niemeyer	5 years
North Rhine-Westphalia	5 years	18/18	Mixed Member Proportional Systems (closed list system)	one direct vote	Sainte-Laguë	5 years
Rhineland-Palatinate	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	3.03%	Hare-Niemeyer	5/8 years
Saarland	5 years	18/18	Closed List Proportional Representation System	5%	d´Hondt	8 years
Saxony	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	d´Hondt	5 years
Saxony-Anhalt	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	-	Hare-Niemeyer	7 years
Schleswig-Holstein	5 years	16/18	Mixed Member Proportional Systems (closed list system)	5per cent or one direct vote	d´Hondt	6/8 years
Thuringia	5 years	18/18	Open List Proportional Representation System	5%	Hare-Niemeyer	5/6 years

Sources: http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/index.htm;
   http://www.bpb.de/files/IOTZDB.pdf

The elements of direct democracy in municipalities

Another relevant principle of municipal autonomy and importance is citizens' opportunity to participate on forming municipal opinion in referendum (in Germany it is called a popular initiative or citizens' decision/referendum; i.e. direct participation in municipal decision-making). After the reformatory steps in North Rhine-Westphalia there are currently popular initiatives embedded in the constitutions of nine federal states (Balík, 2002a: 170).

Popular initiative (Volksinitiative)

The popular initiative is one of the tools of direct democracy and is one way citizens can participate directly in the legislation process; i.e. the basis for initiating, abolishing or changing a law or another political decision. In some federal states (e.g. Baden-Württemberg) popular a initiative is formally called A Request for Popular Demand Approval (*Antrag auf Zulassung eines Volksbegehrens*) (http://www.mitentscheiden.de/2117.html). This form of popular initiative in Germany can be used only at the federal state level. Citizens are allowed to initiate a proposal (draft law) or introduce a relevant proposal themselves to the state parliament (*Landesparlament*). In cases where a requested number of signatures is collected within a given time limit the federal state parliament is obliged to deal with the issue or hear the citizens views and make a decision

(http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2006/10/Beilage/003.html).

Volksentscheid und Volksabstimmung (Citizens' decision and referendum)

The second element of direct democracy is the *Volksabstimmung* (translated as a citizens' decision, which is a specific type of referendum), which is a term similar to *Volksentscheid* or *Bürgerentscheid* (at the municipal level). All these terms can be used as synonyms. Article 29 of the BL lists the cases in which the *Bund*, federal state or municipality are obliged to hold a referendum.

At the federal level these issues involve matters of citizenship or the questions of international or interstate character (e.g. a new federal organization or change of constitution). The Basic Law allows local plans changes, which are conditioned by holding a referendum. The voters in the federal state (or states) themselves decide about the possibility of establishing a new state, reducing a state's size, or generally the reorganization of the state's structure And, under certain circumstances, the Federal Council and Federal Parliament. The Basic Law specifies the situations where requests for change can be allowed, to reach the change or, on the other hand, when status quo should be maintained (Art. 29 of the BL).

The principles of popular legislation (*Volksbegehren*) and citizens' decisions (*Volksentscheid*) are legalized in the constitutions of each federal state. On a municipal

level these instruments of direct democracy are called *Bürgerbegehren* or *Bürgerentscheide* (*Bürger* = citizen). Thus, citizens are able to co-determinate in questions connected with their citizenship (in municipal, regional or district questions).

It is within the competence of each federal state to reduce or modify these matters. Citizens are not allowed to express their opinion on all questions. For example, in Baden-Württemberg initiating a referendum in the matters of budgets and economic planning, local building regulations or municipal local planning (http://www.buergerbegehren.de/go/bawue.htm) is not permitted.

Conclusion

Federal states have an important position in the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the political science point of view the specific status of federal states is shown by the possibility of own legislative process and regulation of the state communal structure. It is primarily the federal states which establish the form of the communal system. It is in the competence of each state to modify the conditions under which the basic signs of the communal system – the term of office the municipal council (electoral period) and the supreme municipal representative, the method of electing the municipal council and the mayor; the rights and duties of municipal representatives – will be established. The constitution does not control the sphere of communal politics, so the attributes of the German communal system are exclusively in the competence of the state. The position (strong v weak) of municipalities is not established by the highest state level – the Bund, but by the particular federal state. The article shows that the basic organizational structure of individual federal states is formed by the German municipal system.

At the end of last century (in the 1990s) there was a heated discussion because of the changes in the electoral system of the German federal states (in some of them this discussion continues) and there were big changes made in the communal systems of many federal states. That is why it is possible that the aforementioned typology of the communal systems can be modified with time. In these debates a principle which was enforced and emphasized by the European Union played an important role, i.e. bringing the administration of public affairs closest to the citizen, i.e. to the communal level. There was an aim to strengthen the citizen's feeling of participation in the administration of public affairs, increase the numbers in electoral participation and with that an increase in legitimacy of political leadership on communal level. With this closely relates the question about the way of mayor election. The importance of municipalities and communal politics has been growing since the German reunification; especially in connection with the increasing influence of citizens on forming and influencing politics on communal level (direct elections of mayors or element of direct democracy).

The ways which federal states establish and modify functioning of communal politics inside their political structure then influences their structures. This is why communal politics and its forming is an important topic on German political scene. It is difficult to define the direction which German municipalities and communal politics will precede after all the reformatory steps which they have passed and still are going to pass. Definitely this development should not stay out of political scientists' interest and should remain researched.

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DISCUSSION

National Identity, European Citizenship and European Identity after Entering the European Union – the Case of Slovakia

Dušan Leška

Abstract: *After joining the European Union the citizens of the new member countries acquired a new level of citizenship in the political and judicial senses, which is required for living in the Union. At the same time national citizenship is maintained. A similar process is developing in the formation of EU identity. It demands that all the citizens of the EU identify themselves with the values, principles and norms of the Union. National identity will be retained, but a common identity is being formed at the same time. European identity is being created on a new common base of the western culture, which has its roots in Greek philosophy, Roman laws, Christian morality, and rationalism.*

The mechanisms of the EU political will and consensus development can be moulded only through compliance with the developed degree of "European identity". Otherwise, a sense of suppressed national identity is felt.

Key words: *national citizenship, EU citizenship, national identity, European identity, culture*

The European Union has a double legitimacy: firstly arising from the will of citizens; secondly from the will of states. This is explicitly stated in the preamble of the Constitution of the European Union, which says: "Expressing the will of citizens and states of Europe to build a common future, this constitution is founding the European Union, to which member states have transferred their competences in order to reach common goals" (Constitution of the European Union, 2005: 11). The phenomenon of European integration raises also the question of interest in mutual integration, which touches on two basic problems. The first is the problem individual's integration with the political community and motivation processes through which individuals transfer their loyalty from one political unit to another. The second question touches on the problem of creating the procedure of consent in this political unit. In examining these questions it must be asked whether the sovereign state is still a main source of individual's identity and his or her identification, and a source of political stability of the highest value or whether this lasting national identification should be reconciled with new demands on integration, which disrupts the autarkic of the sovereign states politics.

National and European citizenship

The state creates a basic social framework in which nations and lower units (region, town, social classes and families) develop; it determines the main principles of their coexistence. On the other hand, the state is also a part of a wider community, European or World, which influences its development. For us, the most important fact is that the Slovak Republic has become a member of the European Union as a close group of states and that the integration processes have directly come to our intrastate development.

The basic subjects of integration are the sovereign national states: at their cores are nations, with their own culture and cultural identity. National identity covers the culture-ethnic aspect as well as the political aspect. According to Smith, national identity is formed by mutually related components: "historic region or homeland, common myths and historic reminiscences, common mass public culture, common laws and duties for all members of the society, common economy with an inner mobility for its members" (Smith, 1991: 14).

The nation is a collective community that forms its own identity based on common history, language, a feeling of common sense and solidarity, a picture conditioned by a system of norms, codes, rules, symbols of behaviour as well as system of pictures of relationships with something foreign. Nations are organized in state formations and exist in a form of national or multinational states. The creation of a nation state is the main organizational assumption on which a nation exists and pursues its interests. The state guarantees preservation of national identity; the nation is the logical reason for the existence of the state, and through the state the nation also communicates with other nations. The state creates the basic norms of coexistence based on national traditions. Nations inhabit certain historical regions and have an emotional relationship towards them. This engenders a feeling of patriotism, which also conditions the territorial integrity demands.

Because nations are organized in the form of national states, national identity is a part of a wider range of factors which constitutes citizenship. Citizenship forms a firm basis for establishing an equal relationship of the members of a society with the state, guarantees their freedom and independence and on the other hand creates conditions for their participation in administration, management of society and control of the state executive. When a civic society is formed it is an important factor in expressing and accommodating one's interests as well as the interests of social groups, and it also is an important tool of state control.

After joining the EU every citizen of a member state becomes an EU citizen, and his or her European citizenship starts to develop, but the citizen is still a member of a nation-state community. Formation of European citizenship does not mean refusal

of or the end of nation-state citizenship or the negation of national identity, which means language, culture, traditions and other nationally distinctive features. The Constitutional Treaty states: "Every person, who has citizenship of a member state, is also a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union is altering national citizenship, it is not replacing it" (Constitution of the European Union, 2005: 14). We can say that together with the nation-state citizenship, a new level is being created, the level of European citizenship, which is embodies the fact that citizens of the Union can exercise their civic and human rights not just in their home country but in the EU as a whole. Our citizenship has acquired a new dimension while maintaining its original, national content. Every citizen of the EU has the right to travel, live, work in any country of the EU (with the exception of set periods), which grants him or her same level of civic and human rights as the native-born citizens. Citizenship of the European Union can be created and guaranteed based on legal and political steps. The citizenship itself creates forms the basis of real European identity, which will mean identification of its citizens with this higher level.

Formation of European identity

Firstly, we would like to try to answer the question of one's identification with the political community. Identity is formed on the level of individual consciousness; at the same time a collective identity is formed, the identity of family, nation or a multinational grouping, which expresses a feeling of belonging to these groupings. It is assumed that in the same way as national identity is formed, a new level of European identity will be created. National identity will remain preserved in its deepest sense and its "higher structures" will be changing.

National identity forms the basis of citizenship, and state sovereignty is deeply anchored in the nation's culture, an aspect which changes only gradually. Identity has more levels: cultural, political, (state, sovereignty), economic and social. All these levels dynamically influence the national identity and identity formation a higher level – European identity. "The process of forming the European identity is a sign of a paradox: the real need of integration on one hand and the fact that Europe has constituted itself and still is the Europe of nations on the other hand. European unification can only be done with help of nations, not against them" (Briška, 2002: 59).

The European Union is constituted by sovereign states that differ in terms of their cultures, economies and social structure, which determines also their different nation-state interests. The cultural identity of every European nation forms the fundamental basis of the common European identity, which is rooted in a common history, common culture, and common values of Europe as a cradle of civilization. The main pillars of European culture are considered to be Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian morality, Rationalism and Logocentrism. An important step

forward was mainly in the period of Rationalism and the Age of Reason, when values such as freedom, human and civil rights and freedoms, separation of church and state, democracy, market economy, constitutionalism, tolerance and protection of minorities were upheld and after the victories of the bourgeois revolutions become an established part of life. On these pillars the identity of all European nations is built; it forms the deepest base of its traditions – the culture of nations of the Europe – on which a new level of European identity can be created.

The term "identity" itself has both a positive and a negative aspect. "Cultural identity doesn't only function as tool of differentiation, but also as a tool of inner identification that means unifying a distinct, assorted set of values and principles" (Hajko, 2005: 10). The positive (inner) moment lies in the fact that a human identifies himself with his or her nation, has a feeling of solidarity, belonging to the community, based on sharing its values, norms, traditions, language, myths and symbols. The negative (outer) aspect lies in the fact that national community defines itself, underlines its difference in language and religion so it can demonstrate and restrict its identity based on the nation. This aspect of defining national identity appears stronger in times of war: Europe's history is rich in examples of this. Example could be wars between the Roman Empire and the barbarians, the religious conflicts in Middle Ages, The Thirty Years' War, Napoleonic wars, or the First and Second World Wars.

In the history of Europe, its nations and their national cultures many wars broke out between these states: they were about survival and preserving the identity of the nation, territorial demands, or about absorbing smaller nations. People fought to make a living, to create the best possible living conditions, which meant suppressing the common European identity, although this did not mean it was lost. The interests of the nations were anchored on cultures which helped them, preserve their identity and distinguish them from other nations. This is how the different identities of European nations have been formed and remain today. They manifest signs of distrust, prejudices and feeling of historical trauma in the problems of nations.

These negative aspects of national identity will slowly die though. In today's circumstances they are losing their sense and grounding. The basis for overcoming distrust, and gradual change in national identity, is economic cooperation. The nations of the European Union are slowly becoming convinced about the advantages of working together. But cooperation is not easy and smooth, and every nation, because of its nation-state interests, pursues its own interests and needs, often at the expense of other nations. This is seen for example through restricting the movement of workers from the new members of the Union, fear of the liberalization of the market in services and different attitudes towards solving the problems of the World Trade Organization, etc. These issues are temporary, and in overcoming differences

at the level of economic development and enforcing a common economic policy, they will gradually be overcome.

Even more difficult is finding common interests in the field of foreign and security policy, because they are connected not only to different economic interests, but also national security, and the sovereignty itself and integrity of the states. These processes will be transferred from the economic level to the level of politics – forming the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. It will be easier to search for the common interest of EU countries in the foreign and security policy after there is a truly free market, with the free migration of the workforce, with no constraints and temporary restriction periods. Here it is important that in terms of a joint foreign and security policy the European Union is defines itself as a global player among other world powers. The "negative" definition of the Union as a player is being established, which has a positive effect on forming its internal identity.

Development of European consciousness in Slovakia

In Slovakia an increase in nationalism was observed after the year 1989, which was shown as dissatisfaction with the splitting of competences between Slovakia and the common institutions of the Czechoslovak Republic. It played a role in splitting the federation, and the creation of an independent Slovak Republic in 1993. Nationalists perceived the creation of a separate Slovakia as the achievement of hundreds of years of effort in founding their own national state, where the nation gained its independence and in which all the attributes of the modern nation could be created. Some authors mention the fact that it was basically a historical drift, when issues were resolved that are typical of the national revival stage, i.e. developments that were not resolved at the appropriate historical stage. The Slovak nation gained independence for the first time in history and the opportunity to organize itself at its own state, the reason why state institutions become symbols of independence and state sovereignty. As a result of this it could have been predicted that surrendering some of the national competences to the EU institutions would be difficult, as would be the public's relationship with them. These predictions have however not come true though. The citizens of Slovakia showed a positive attitude towards the EU during the pre-entry negotiations, which also affected the popularity of political parties that supported EU entry and convinced citizens that they were able to guarantee it.

The positive attitude of citizens towards the EU was shown also in the referendum that was held on 16 and 17 May 2003. Even though the turnout was relatively low – only 52.15 per cent, it was sufficient to make the referendum valid. The importance of the validity of the referendum is underlined by the fact

that all previous referendums were invalid because of a low turnout. Most citizens showed their approval of EU entry – 92.46 per cent in favour and only 6.2 per cent against. The opposition parties played an important role in the referendum by asking their voters to vote for EU entry in it. It was one of few situations where coalition and opposition reached consensus in the important question of foreign policy and were able to show unity.

Since entering the EU Slovak citizens have been actively making use of the possibility of to travel and work in foreign countries, and this is, in a certain kind of way, a positive fact. It allows people to get to know foreign countries and to know their culture, which is the basis for convergence and establishing common EU values. Meanwhile migration is helping to resolve the tension in the domestic labour market. Slovak citizens have been very sensitive to and negatively perceived the constraints set by some states on their entering the labour market. Some of the restrictions remain today, for example in Austria or Germany.

Slovakia showed a positive attitude towards ratification of the proposed EU Constitution. The Government of Prime Minister M. Dzurinda decided that the Constitutional Treaty will not be approved in a referendum, but for its approval a constitutional majority (majority of three fifths) is needed in Parliament. The Constitutional Treaty was approved by a sufficient majority – 116 deputies out of 150, on 11 May 2005. The process of Constitutional Treaty ratification was threatened by a complaint submitted by 13 citizens on 8 July 2005, in which they objected at the Constitutional Court breaking their rights for taking part at the political life of the country in the form of referendum. They argued that by approving the Constitutional Treaty Slovakia has joined a new state corporation and such a step according to the Slovak Constitution demands a referendum, which did not take place. The Constitutional Court has accepted the objection and decided on a remedy ad interim, in which it adjourned the enforceability of the act of the Parliament, but has not decided about the objection yet.

Another important means in which citizens expressed their attitude towards the EU and its institutions were the elections to the European Parliament held in the year 2004. The elections were influenced by a very low voter turnout, which was only 16.96 per cent. The figure is very low, compared to average EU turnout, which was 44.2 per cent, and is low also compared to the turnout in old member states. The poor turnout can be qualified by the fact that the elections were the first to the European Parliament, its activities are fairly remote far from everyday life and citizens have no experience of its activities. In addition, some authors point to election fatigue because between the 2002 and 2004 parliamentary elections, communal elections and presidential elections were held in Slovakia, as well as a referendum on entering the EU and a referendum on the pre-term elections.

Voters became tired of elections (Malová et al 2005, p. 111). Because of this the low attendance cannot be interpreted as distrust of the European Parliament, and this is also confirmed by a high level of trust people have shown in the Eurobarometer research.

An important sign of the development of European feeling and European citizenship is citizens' attitudes towards the EU, its enlarging and institutions. Here are interesting some facts from the Eurobarometer research of December 2006. According to it, 61 per cent of Slovak respondents regard membership as positive and 51 per cent are convinced that the development in Slovakia is going the right way. Sixty-nine per cent of citizens support another round of EU enlargement. Surprising also is the high level of trust, citizens have towards the most important organs of the EU – 66 per cent of citizens trust the European Commission and 71 per cent expressed their trust in the European Parliament. It is also important that 74 per cent of Slovaks support the common foreign policy of the member countries towards other states and 86 per cent support the common foreign and security policy of the EU countries (Eurobarometer 66). This means that citizens identify with the "outer" definition of the EU as a global actor towards other powers.

It should also be underlined that citizens develop their attitudes on the basis of advantages and disadvantages which membership brings to their everyday lives. If they feel immediate advantages, a positive attitude towards common institutions is formed, and they are also more willing to admit common European values. In this context it is positive that more than 60 per cent of Slovaks consider membership to be a good thing, and 71 per cent of them are convinced that it has brought advantages to the country. Citizens appreciate being part of the common economic zone; they appreciate the importance and help of European funds, treaty about the financial perspective of the EU from 2007 to 2013. We expect a very positive impact on social feeling after Slovakia enters the Schengen area at the beginning of 2008 and the acceptance of the euro, planned for the beginning of the year 2009. These steps mean a definite reinforcement of the European citizenship and create fair conditions for forming a common European identity.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Klára Bratová[45]

Current Security Threats in the Western Balkans

Although the Balkans does not dominate the news coverage any more, we cannot consider it to be a stable region. On the contrary, the situation in this region is still very dynamic – just to mention the fresh independence of Kosovo. Neither the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the state of affairs in Serbia could be described as stable. The region is just seemingly stabilized thanks to the existing presence of international forces. Yet the stability of the region is of a great importance for the whole Europe. That is why any comprehensive analysis of this region's development is more than welcome and praiseworthy. This may be said about a book "Current security threats of the Western Balkans – Critical analysis of the security concept of the Copenhagen school" written by Věra Stojarová and published in 2007 by the Democracy and Culture Studies Centre from Brno.

Věra Stojarová is an assistant at the Department of Political Sciences at the Masaryk University in Brno. She is a well-established expert specializing in the region of the Western Balkans. She finished her Ph.D. studies in 2006 and in fact her first authorial book represents her Ph.D. thesis.

The book concentrates on the area of so called "Western Balkans" – which the author defines as the states of the former Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and plus Albania. For the theoretical framework, as it is obvious from the title, the author uses the Copenhagen school of Security Studies. Thus she operates with its broader definition of security and division into five main sectors (military, political, societal, economical and environmental).

As assigned in the introduction the main aim of the book is to critically analyse the Copenhagen school theory on the concrete example of the Western Balkans and secondly to examine the recent security threats of the Western Balkans region (p. 7).

The hypotheses of this publication are as follows: Firstly, the societal and political threats are in the case of Western Balkans interdependent and thus require the analysis of these two sectors at once. Secondly, the interpretation of the economical threats by the Copenhagen school is not feasible in the region of the Western Balkans and needs modification. And thirdly, the epicentre of the security threats of the whole region is located in Kosovo (p. 8).

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The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the author provides the reader with a relevant and condensed summary of the historical development of the concept of security including the explanation of the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen school. This chapter also includes the definition of each of the sectors. In the very last subhead of the chapter there is a summary of the main criticism of the Copenhagen school and the author also expresses her own opinion. Although we should probably suppose that a theoretical part of the book would be rather academic, only few concrete examples could help to make the dense theory clearer and thus accessible to broader audience.

The second and shortest chapter of the book offers a very brief summary of the recent history of the former Yugoslavia which was marked by the disintegration. On only six pages the author gives the reader insight into rather complicated issue of the Yugoslavian breakdown. Author demonstrates her knowledge in the field, but one could doubt that such a complex matter can be explained on several pages. The author herself refers already in the heading of the chapter to the specialized literature that covers this topic. Concededly this book requires some kind of informative background. But having on mind the fact that the title of this publication is rather specific, we can already implicitly suppose that a prospective reader is well familiar with the situation and current history of this region. That is also the reason this part could be considered to be rather redundant.

The core analysis is concentrated in the chapter three to six. The structure follows the Copenhagen school approach and the research is divided into several sectors. The threats in the region are thus examined separately according to the sectors defined by the Copenhagen school.

Firstly, the military sector is being examined. At the beginning of this chapter, the author identifies key reference objects as well as securitizing and functional actors. The author focuses on the development and characteristic of state armies and paramilitary groups. The part dedicated to the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as to the Albanian paramilitary groups in the region is especially praiseworthy.

In this part the author comes to a conclusion that an independent Kosovo represents lower security threat than if the Kosovo Albanians remain unsatisfied (p. 96). This argument might as well serve as a clincher in the debate about the future of the Kosovo status, as well as a clue to the decision making process of the main actors of international politics. Beside Kosovo independence the author considers the process of army depoliticization, connections between the military groups and organized crime as well as the Islam radicalism to be the most important challenges to the Balkans security from the military perspective.

In the fourth chapter author in the contrast to the Copenhagen approach combines the political sector with the societal one, as she argues that the societal factors represent

latent political threats (p. 204). A societal threat in itself doesn't represent any problem, only after it is transformed into a political agenda. This chapter offers the reader an analysis of a political development, characteristic of a political system and its main parties, as well as a brief examination of main problems which threaten each state's identity. In this regard the author could not omit the significance of churches in recent Balkans politics. The return of Serbian refugees to Croatia, the failure of state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo status, the Albanian minority in Macedonia and the weak statehood of Albania are identified as the main perils. The complexity of the issue the author considers gives the reader an overview of important problems, but on the other hand does not allow approaching the aspects in a more detailed form.

The fifth part analyses the economical sector. Contrary to the presumption of Copenhagen school, which perceives the breakdown of the world economical system to be the only economical threat, the author operates with the experience of sanctions and embargo that many of the countries of the western Balkans brought to a necessity of criminal activities. As she concludes more than half of the economically active population in this region is involved in illegal business (p. 229). Therefore the author concentrates on the examination of the network of organized crime and makes a very interesting argument, as she connects the bloom of organized crime with the presence of international community (p. 228).

It can be only agreed with the author, that organized crime represents a security threat. But the organized crime could be also considered to be a part of grey economy that endangers the economy of a state. As the author argues "the lowest living standard in Kosovo had an influence on the periodicity of a nationalistic passion" (p. 158). Stabilized economy is generally perceived as one of the crucial factors for political stability. Even though the author herself isn't an economist but rather an expert on Political Science, a very brief summary on the economic development would be a very significant appendix to her analysis. As she has pointed out, any foreign investors only invest their money in political stable countries. Does this imply that nowadays Balkans is found in a vicious circle?

The last chapter deals with the environmental threats, where the author for the first time includes an appreciation of the NGO's activities to her analysis.

In the conclusion the author analyzes the original hypotheses. By examining the security situation in the Western Balkans, the author proved the applicability of the Copenhagen theory although with few modifications especially in the economical sector. The author comes to a conclusion that the biggest threat for the region is represented by the Kosovo issue.

On 17 February 2008 Kosovo promulgated its independence. It is still too early to make any definite conclusions, but it would be very attractive to read some after-analysis once the Kosovo independence has finally been realized.

But last few years brought some positive events as well. At the last NATO summit it was decided to include Albania and Croatia into the alliance. Serbia has finally signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, but declaration of Kosovo independence caused the fall of government and the formation of the new government after the early parliamentary election is still in process.

Despite of any optimistic outcome, the Balkans with its current history and problems will remain a challenge for European politics. The deeper knowledge we have the better we will be prepared to judge objectively. In this regard the reviewed book can be highly recommended not only to students of Political Science, International Relations and Slavic Studies but to all those who are interested or somehow involved in events of this region.

Stojarová, V., Současné bezpečnostní hrozby západního Balkánu. Kritická analýza konceptu bezpečnosti Kodaňské školy [Current security threats of the Western Balkans. Critical analysis of the security concept of the Copenhagen school], Brno: Democracy and Culture Studies Centre 2007, 295 pages.

Pavel Hlaváček[46]

Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

There is little doubt that China's ambition in world politics has been on the rise since at least the end of the Cold War. Chinese diplomats are seen everywhere, Chinese politicians are travelling to countries all around the world and Chinese businessmen are promising more investments and establishing new business enterprises in regions that once were largely disregarded.

The incredible growth of China's economy should not surprise us given that it has the world's largest population and it is a large country geographically. In spite of this, Beijing's remarkable political and economic successes in recent years have somehow not gained much attention until recently. It would be an exaggeration to say that Chinese foreign policy has been totally ignored. However, we can agree with the editors of *China and the developing World* that their work represents "the first book-length treatment of China's role in the developing world since the end of the Cold War" (Introduction, p. XVIII). It provides a general and latest updated summary of Chinese relations with the developing world. One does not need to add that since the last publication of this kind there have been quite significant shifts in Beijing's foreign policy. Just to illustrate this point, China's total trade with developing countries remained constant between 1978 and 1991. Since then, however, it rose from 34 per cent to 47 per cent in 2005 (Heginbotham; 196). Moreover, we can easily expect that the future will only confirm these trends. If so, strategic foreign policy decisions in China will be more and more driven not by relations between the great powers but instead by cooperation among the underdeveloped and/or developing countries ("South-South Cooperation").

The book itself is divided into three basic parts: Analytical Background, Region Profiles and Conclusion. In the appendices we can find various statistics that support the main arguments of the authors, and there are also a number of useful maps, tables and figures throughout the text.

The analytical background consists of only one chapter.[47] It takes us back to the times of Zheng He (1371–1433), the legendary Chinese navy commander who reached the shores of India, Southeastern Asia and Africa. Unfortunately, this period of exploration was ended by the Emperor, who did not make much profit from it. Zheng He's fleet, which once numbered about 300 ships of up to 400 feet in length, was disbanded and was never restored again. It is worth reminding ourselves here

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[47]   *Expanding the "Strategic Periphery"*: A History of China's Interaction with the Developing World, by Derek Mitchell and Carola McGiffert.

that Chinese sailors used to trade but never attempted to occupy foreign lands. Even today, the Beijing authorities like to highlight this fact: China never colonized any tribes and nations for own selfish purposes. Although they fail to mention that China used Africa for its trade with (black) slaves, as Europeans did.

"Region Profiles" – which makes up most of the book – describes specific aspects of China's attitude towards Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Arab World, South Asia and Southeastern Asia. Each contributor attempts to answer four principal questions: firstly, how does China define its interests in the region, and has that definition changed over time? [...] Secondly, what methods or tactics does Beijing employ with nations in the region, to achieve its objectives? [...] Thirdly, how successful has Chinese diplomacy been in these regions? Has the Chinese influence grown and, if so, upon what does its influence rest? [...] Fourthly, what are the implications of China's policies towards other actors…" (Introduction, p. XVIII).

To understand what Beijing wants and how it intends to achieve it, we need to go through three basic stages of Chinese foreign policy since the foundation of People's Republic of China (PRC). The first phase lasted from 1949 until the late 1970s. It was shaped mainly by the ideology of Mao Ze Dong (1893-1976). Chairman Mao presented Chinese foreign policy as the only alternative to Soviet imperialism, Western colonialism and American capitalism. In order to promote solidarity between China and the Third World, Mao supported Chinese involvement in the Non-Alignment Movement. Similarly, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were also declared[48] enabling Beijing to open the door to countries that it had previously refused to cooperate with. Nevertheless, such an approach became largely irrelevant due to Sino-Soviet split, and the subsequent willingness of the United States to recognize the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of Chinese people in the UN Security Council. As a result, China ceased its support to revolutionary movements and lost much of its influence in the developing world (on behalf of the USSR).

The second stage of Chinese foreign policy started shortly after the death of Mao Zhe Dong, or when his followers (the "Gang of Four") were replaced by the pro-reform leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904-97). Deng's foreign policy was less motivated by ideology and more by political pragmatism. Beijing still pressured Third World countries to adhere its Policy of One China; the Principles of Coexistence henceforth did not "expire", but different priorities were set. Deng's first priority was relations with the United States. Therefore, he called for reforms and

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[48] The Five Principles are the following: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

modernization of the economy in accordance with free market principles, sought to attract foreign investment and tourists, and sent Chinese students to capitalist countries. Gradually, the United States (and the West) was slowly willing to accept Chinese membership of financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The second stage is however tainted by the massacre in Tiananmen Square and the collapse of the Communist Bloc. These events let to both, temporary economic difficulties and political criticism from abroad, of violations of basic human rights. Beijing worked hard to avoid international isolation, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Asia but it did not develop a new foreign policy strategy until the mid-1990s. This is exactly where the third part of the book ("Conclusion") starts.[49]

Third stage of Chinese foreign policy has been in place until today. It has become very complex in recent years, and there is no magic formula enabling us to understand it. Each region of the developing world plays a specific role in Chinese foreign policy and has its own history. For instance, while contacts between African nations and China are based on long tradition, cooperation with the newly independent countries of Central Asia did start only until the fall of the Soviet Empire; while trade with Latin American nations has grown remarkably, it still represents only 3.55 per cent of its total trade. China adopted a more active "don't offend anyone policy" towards the Middle East and the Arab World, yet such an approach in Southeastern Asia would not be sustainable because some countries (e.g. The Philippines) prefer closer cooperation with the United States. Similarly, ASEAN countries might be very concerned with the growing military power of China and may seek protection from U.S. forces. But this does not mean that the ASEAN countries warmly welcome closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing.

In spite of all the complexities, there are certain common characteristics that differs current period from those preceding it. One of them is "anti-hegemonism".

In the post Cold War period China has been increasingly concerned with what it calls "U.S. hegemonism". American omnipotence made China renew its policy towards the Third World. Beijing would like to increase its influence in world politics by representing the interests of the "non-have counties" that had been allegedly marginalized for decades. According to its official statements, Beijing's "new diplomacy" relies on multilateralism, confidence building and continuation of peaceful coexistence. Behind these words one needs to understand that Beijing considers issues such as human rights and democracy as secondary to stability and national sovereignty. Such an attitude is often welcomed with gratitude among many developing countries.

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[49]   *Evaluating China's Strategy Towards the Developing World* by Eric Heginbotham.

In addition, Beijing's approach exploits its ever growing economy, which gives it enormous economic potential but also requires guaranteed access to all kind of raw materials. Both a lack of foreign investments and natural resources is met in the developing countries. As for Beijing, only if economic growth and domestic stability is preserved can China can present its political system as a real alternative that the developing world would accept. Until now, it seems that "new diplomacy" is working well. Critics would argue that in the long-term, growing living standards without respect of human rights cannot be sustained.

We might conclude that *China and the developing world* is a must-read book for all those interested in Chinese foreign policy since the end of the bipolar confrontation. It is well written and balanced in its conclusions. It does address the key questions mentioned above. However, any reader from Central Europe must necessarily recognize that the book was written by American authors mainly for an American audience. Almost every author compares Beijing's and Washington's foreign policies for a particular region, potential conflicting interests or the impact of latest development on mutual relations. It says little or nothing about the appropriate role of the EU, let along a small power such as the Czech Republic.

Eisenman, J., Heginbotham, E. and Mitchell D. (eds.), China and the Developing World, Beijing´s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century An East Gate Book, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London 2007, 232 pages.

Helena Hricová[50]

Democratic Practice in Slovenia

Slovenia is a consolidated democracy and is regarded as a state which "escaped" from the Balkans. This helped it successfully enter the European Union and its subsequent development (for example accepting the euro). The Slovenian political system does not pay to attention on the purpose the interest with regard to the character of the transition, democratization and consolidation after the fall of the Communist régime. Last year the social scientists Marjan Brezovšek, Miro Haček and Milan Zve added to our knowledge of the Slovenian political system and reflected on the democratic changes and development in Slovenia in their book *Democratic Practice in Slovenia*.

In the foreword they reflect on the reasons which led them to write the book. They aim at explaining the current behaviour of democratic institutions in Slovenia with regard to the many processes which affected the system (using the theory of modernization and transition). Their intention is to point out fragility and expected future development. As the authors stated, the book is suitable for the general public, both in Slovenia and abroad (p. 7).

The book is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter analyses the political, social and theoretical base of democracy in Slovenia, which has developed in terms of political thinking and political reality. The authors ask what is the historical basis of Slovenian democracy. The description starts at the end of the 19th century, and special attention is paid to the interwar period. The three historical concepts of democracy (Christian, Socialist and Liberalism) are introduced but unfortunately they not broadly interpreted. A deeper analyses and explanation would be helpful because these traditional concepts have been prominent until now.

The second chapter is closely connected with the first and reviews the history of democratic tradition in Slovenia. The very brief historical description starts in the year 1848 and ends in 2004, with special attention paid to progress since 1990. More detailed attention is paid to the concept of modernization and democratization. The chapter reflects on the changes and processes (modernization and transition) which are taking place in the former Eastern Bloc, but there is not enough information about Slovenia. A weakness is that authors cite only the Huntington and Dahl concepts and have not taken into account other theories.

The democratic tradition and history is followed in the third chapter by a description of constitutional institutions. Firstly, the origins of the Slovenian Constitution

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are described, and a comparison is made with the socialist Constitution of Yugoslavia, with mention of the inspiration from the Italian and German constitutions. Unfortunately, a deeper analysis is lacking. The work mentions the weaknesses of the constitution (whether to have a bicameral or unicameral legislative body and there is no strict division of power; Slovenia is not a pure parliamentary system etc.) this should be for future studies very famous. All the constitutional bodies are described functionally from the view of advantages and disadvantages; always in relation to the European Union. Not surprisingly, the president's function is mentioned in the executive power section, and the president is defined in "other state authorities". The authors are aware of the executive position of the president but they do not explain why he is mentioned in a special chapter, together with the constitutional court. Given that the book concentrates on analysis of democratic institutions, the position of the ombudsman and the court system are lacking in the text.

The fourth chapter is an account of political participation in relation to democratization. Participation is shown as a process which is used during the parliamentary, presidential and European Parliament elections. Election turnout is falling and as this stands to reason out of last elections. The authors comprehended this as an indicator of public dissatisfaction with democratic development in Slovenia. Unfortunately, they have not taken into account that the low election turnout could be a sign of satisfaction with democratic development, and this aspect deserves significant attention. In this chapter the political reality is described in the light of formation of political parties, coalition building and the functioning of civil society in Slovenia. Information is repeated in the text. This is good seen to the national minorities. The first mention of minorities in Slovenia is on page 49 and very similar information is on page 150. However, it is not clear what the position is of minorities at the local level, where minorities are concentrated (geographically), and if they have political parties to articulate interests. The section devoted to civil society is more theoretical, and there is a lack of examples from Slovenia.

The short, penultimate chapter concentrates on the political culture in Slovenia from the historical perspective, showing how education and political reality form people's attitudes and the perception of political reality. A notable part is the research which shows that people nostalgically support the Communist régime more than current developments. The public's preferences have changed with regard to the democratic practices; they again supported equality than freedom. For all that: "Democracy perhaps has some bad sides but is better than other forms of régime" (p. 171). The fragility of research is the absence of references – who carried out the research and where was it done.

The conclusion described the "victory" of democracy which happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The authors show the fragility of participatory democracy,

and the conclusion is that democracy is social construct. Every democratic state has had troubles with a lack of popular interest in participating in democratic processes. Democracy is seen in global and historical dimension in three waves, as is explained by Samuel Huntington. In effect, the book does not have a conclusion. Democracy is described globally not using the example of Slovenia. There is no summary of the book, but new theoretical information is presented.

In the book the division between the theoretical and practical parts is not presented proportionately. Most of the chapters included more theory than real political life in Slovenia. One possible way of resolving this could be a theoretical part at the beginning of the book and the second part could include examples, or reality in Slovenia. In spite of the title of the book and the foreword there should be the most suitable version – more examples and less theory. Chapters should be more digestedly articulated (chapters contrast not only graphically but numerically as well). On the other hand, individual chapters are logically arranged – from constitutional to local bodies, civil society etc.

From the formal view some parts go out one source. Citations are in the text from formal view not clear (for example,"Zver, 2000" is cited in text but in the references it is shown as" Zver 2000 a,b"). In addition, there are long paragraphs without citation (for example quotations from the Constitution). Research by the University of Ljubljana is cited (in the fourth chapter) but the year is not mentioned in the references. The book would be more lucid if there is the list of shortcuts and summary of tables with the page where are used.

Brezovšek, M.; Haček, M. And Zver, M., Democratic Praxis in Slovenia, Plzeň, Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk 2007, 207 pages.

Magdeléna Leichtová[51]

Building Capitalism in Russia

Anders Aslund is one of the most important scholars in the area of political economy currently working on the issues associated with the break-up of the former Eastern Bloc. Aslund has been a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics – the Washington think tank – focusing on the area of political economy.

His book *How Capitalism Was Built* is an extended and revised edition of his previous work *Building Capitalism: Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc*, which was published in 2002. As the author states himself, most of the book was rewritten with regard to the fluid conditions within the monitored area. Having compared both of the editions, I must agree with him. The book is, rather, a separate and independent publication than a simple re-issue of the previous work. Although the topics of both books overlap, the five-year gap between their publications provides an interesting picture of the process of development of the researched region and of the ways of interpreting and evaluating them.

The topic of the book is definitely not original. Plenty of political and economic works have been published that deal with the processes of democratic transition, and the rise of the capitalist economy within the former Eastern Bloc countries (Lane, 2007; Mickiewicz, 2006; Havrylyshyn, 2006). However, the attractiveness of the theme does not diminish the contribution of Aslund's work. Interested readers must familiarise themselves with the considerable number of similar titles, whose scope and quality varies.

Semi-legal or even criminal activities accompanying the economic transformation and the mysterious appearance of *nouveaux riches* naturally attract attention of authors working in area ranging from educational literature to novels. After a detailed search there is however an opportunity to choose a number of quality titles, which allows readers to gain a complex picture of these issues. It is much harder to do so in spheres that have not been explored sufficiently or even ignored by the academic community. Aslund's work is therefore very valuable.

His work *How Capitalism Was Built* was awarded The Book of the Year 2007 for Politics and Current Affairs by *The Economist* magazine. Ironically, one of the advantages of the book is the very fact that it is the second edition of already published material which went through restructuring and addition. At the same time, the author gained a good opportunity to rectify the errors and imperfections of his

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publication, and in such a condition the new edition is accessible also to those who had already read its original version.

The book focuses on the processes of economic and political transformation in former socialist countries as it has been going on since 1989 or 1991. In addition to the countries of the Soviet Union, the book also includes Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The countries of former Yugoslavia, Albania, Mongolia and the economically reformed Asian communities in China and Vietnam remain excluded due to the different direction of development during the Cold War.

Still, the author has to cope with many examined subjects in the whole work, which he manages more or less successfully. In addition to the number of included countries, he has to constantly manoeuvre between very diverse types of political and economic systems. As a result, there is a multilayered division of post-socialist countries into easier comprehensible groups. The basic division is the European (the EU member states) and the CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent Nations), whereas both groups may be further divided or regrouped if necessary.

The comparison of 21 countries allows us to see the advantages and disadvantages originating in different starting conditions and in various approaches to transformation, and what results these approaches have led to. On the other hand, the size of the whole examined sample seems to be a problem because of its impalpability. Moreover, considering the range of the book, it is impossible to take into account all the effects that could have influenced the process of transformation in particular countries.

The book therefore inevitably simplifies complex processes which developed within the specific context of each individual state, and emphasizes only the ones that are capable of being generalized within the region or current point of view; thus such processes can be categorized as a "group feature". For example, the reason why only the "weak feeling" is mentioned (p. 108) as a motivation of pro-Russian politics in Tajikistan is that in this way it is possible to incorporate Tajikistan in a sort of "weak" group together with Armenia. The fact that the "weak feeling" originated in the inability of the young republic to deal with the civil war that occurred in Tajikistan is not mentioned at all. Unfortunately, such simplification is unavoidable. As a result, the reader, if he or she is not a specialist, is caught in the role of a "hostage" who trusts the author's objectivity, sensitive selection and examination of included factors, more than usual.

Although the author lays great emphasis on economic transformation within the studied/observed countries, and the political aspects of transition are mentioned rather against a background of economic processes, this book can serve as useful material for scholars of political science who already have previous knowledge of the political aspects of democratic transition.

Aslund pays attention to all fundamental aspects of transformation, which are well divided into several themed chapters. The introductory chapters are chronologically arranged, starting with the fall of communism up to the establishment of market economies. The fundamental dichotomy which the author presents deals with the difference between the radical reform programme or "shock therapy" and a gradual reform programme. The author is explicitly on the side shock therapy sympathizers.

So it is understandable why in the following chapters he devotes a lot of space to searching for causes of failures and to the explanation of negative impacts of this approach within certain countries, in particular Russia. For this reason it might be that there is a special chapter included in the book which deals with the role of modern oligarchs, as the products of transformation. This chapter, however, is relevant only for the limited number of the countries of the examined sample (especially for the Russian Federation and Ukraine).

The main cause of problems which the radical reform programme brought in some of the countries is, Aslund considers, the incapability or the political unwillingness to bring the programme to its end. The hesitation in applying reforms or of their softening for being afraid of social shocks led into slowing the transformation down or deformation of its results. Moreover, the chaotic conditions contributed to the establishment of a new class of rent-seekers who wanted to profit from the economic transformation, and thus, artificially maintained the period of insecurity, instability and legal weakness.

Regardless of other inner subdivision of single groups, in many places in the book the author refers to the different development of the European countries (and of the Baltic Republics), and of the countries that came into being after the break-up of the USSR.

While the European countries set out on a journey of building capitalism, and made progress by the middle of the 1990s, the radical impulse for the post-Soviet Republics was the financial crisis which culminated in 1998, when the Russian rouble collapsed.

At the same time, Aslund points out that while the European economies accepted measures in relation to their attempts to join the European Union, the countries of the former Soviet Union set out on a journey following the Asian market economy model, in the late 1990s. Aslund assumes that this different approach is the main cause that delayed economic progress in Eastern Europe, and on the contrary, its rapid acceleration in the former Soviet Union countries. This evaluation worked best for the Baltic Republics, which have so far managed to combine the basic securities of welfare state and the rapid rate of economic growth.

In the next chapters of the book the chronological approach is replaced by theme delimitation, and focus on the following areas: the mechanisms for establishing

financial markets, analysis of social consequences of the process of transformation, criminal activities accompanying the process, and the impact of the process of democratization of political settings on the process of transformation. These chapters raise the contribution of the book for a common reader. The chapters, arranged thematically, conveniently supplement the information mentioned in the previous parts of the book and outline some basic problems which countries had to struggle with, and which would otherwise have been left overlooked.

The chapter devoted to the foreign influence on the processes of capitalist transition in the countries of former Eastern Bloc deserves special attention. It must be emphasized that these countries have not been a closed laboratory, but appeared unexpectedly and quickly, and so it was necessary to incorporate them into the unprepared, spontaneously emerging new World System. Although the countries of the "winning" part struggled for such end of the superpower conflict, at the end, they were not prepared for such turbulent changes. The author maps both the future visions of Eastern countries in the democratic and capitalist context and the actual efforts (including blunders) of Western countries, which were coping with the new situation only very slowly.

The book *How Capitalism Was Built* fulfils the tasks that the author stated at the beginning of his work. It can serve as an overall summary of the process of economic transformation within the region, not only for political scholars but also for economists or possible investors. However, I suggest to readers that for extending their knowledge they should supplement Aslund's work with other sources of literature that could provide better information on the political, historical and social aspects of given situation in the region, in order to be better more familiar with the data and approaches which, according to Aslund, may be known enough than to pay deeper attention to them within the limited volume of his book.

Aslund, Anders, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2007.

Other sources:

Havrylyshyn, Oleh: 2006. *Divergent Paths in Post-Communist Transformation: Capitalism for All or Capitalism for the Few?* Palgrave Macmillan: London.

Lane, David (ed.): 2007. T*ransformation of State Socialism: System Change, Capitalism, or Something Else?*

Mickiewicz, Marek: 2006. *Economic Transition in Central Europe and the CIS Countries.* Palgrave Macmillan: London.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

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Each issue the *POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE* focuses on one main topic or theme. This theme is indicated in advance, at the latest in the previous issue. Besides essays focused on the current issue, essays with other themes are welcomed too.

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- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
- a brief biographical note about each author, including previous and current institutional affiliation
- a full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about the second author.

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Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994-1998; or the 1990s.

REFERENCES IN THE TEXT

In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

Since Bull (1977) has shown that ... This is in results attained later (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), are states the ....

Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by '–' (not 'and' or '&'). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by '*et al.*', or write all names separated with '–' (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in *International Security* (Summer 1990): 5).' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:
Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia,* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Two or more authors:
Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid. Understanding International Development Cooperation,* Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

EDITED VOLUMES:

Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1993): *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Clarendon Press.

CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:

George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, in Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics. Sixth Edition,* 70–76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5-54.

Online editions of journals:

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632 (15 August 2002).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Excerpts From the Pentagon´s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

Online editions:

Cooper, Robert (2002): 'Why We Still Need Empires', *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2 November, 2003).

RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

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Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced.

Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

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- − Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified
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