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**Dealing with Minorities: Integration, Tolerance
and the Risks of Segregation**

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ESSAYS

Conceptualising European Elections: The Case of the Czech Republic

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Abstract: *This article analyses the 2009 European parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic. Its objective is to verify whether the elections to the European Parliament in the Czech Republic confirm the theory of second-order elections. While this analysis demonstrates the validity of classic second-order elections theory, the Europe matters theory is less applicable and serves only as complementary. It is apparent that Europe matters in the Euro-elections in the Czech Republic. At the same time, according to the election results, the sparse attention Czech political parties paid to European issues – placing low-ranking party figures on the ballot sheets – and the limited exposure of the elections in Czech media indicate that, at best, Europe remains a secondary issue. The results of the European elections were largely perceived in terms of the domestic contest between the two largest parties in the Czech Parliament; the left-wing Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the right-wing Civic Democrats (ODS), which had, over the course of twenty four months, confronted each other in three sets of elections.*

Keywords: *European elections, Czech Republic, theory of Second-order elections, 'Europe Matters' theory, political parties, Czech party system, Czech electoral system, electoral campaign*

Applying the Second-order elections and 'Europe Matters' theories

In order to fully grasp the theoretical framework governing European elections, it is vital to ask whether the elections to the European Parliament in the Czech Republic confirm the theory that these are second-order elections and that the European context of the elections is marginalised.

The classic second-order elections theory (Reif – Schmitt 1980: 3-45) claims that there is a qualitative difference in the significance ascribed to two different types of elections. The first-order national contest is more important, as there is much more at stake: the formation of a government, which directly affects the lives of voters. Conversely, less is at stake in the case of second-order elections, and local and regional elections, but also elections to the European Parliament, fall into this category.

Domestic parliamentary elections are more strongly motivated by strategic or instrumental voting (*voting with one's head*), as the objective is to elect parties that will genuinely have a chance to shape government policy. Consequently, these elections are expected to result in higher turnout and as well as higher gains for government and large parties. Conversely, voters are less animated by, and hence less interested in a second-order contest like the European Parliamentary elections. Parties devote fewer resources to these campaigns and there are fewer incentives for people to vote (Hix – Marsh 2007: 496). So not only is the turnout lower in Euro-elections, but there is volatility in two senses. First, voting behaviour may be affected more by 'sincere voting' (*voting by heart*), where voters choose their preferred party, but it has no impact on government formation in the national arena. Second, there may be more 'protest or expressive voting' (*voting with the boot*), which is directed against and expresses dissatisfaction with the incumbent government in the first-order arena. These two aspects of second-order elections augur higher gains for smaller and protest-based parties and for opposition parties.

It is important to note however, that the two levels of elections are linked and cannot be completely separated. The outcome of second-order elections is significantly determined by the situation in the first-order election arena (Koepke – Ringe 2006: 324). Consequently, turnout and switching effects depend on the timing of European elections relative to the national election cycle (Reif 1984: 244-255). The cyclical approach works with the notion of the government popularity cycle. This means that Euro-elections held shortly after a national election are likely to give higher gains to government parties (honeymoon effect), elections held mid-term will see those same parties suffer losses, and elections held as new national elections approach will see support for government parties rise again.

That the outcome of second-order elections is determined by the situation in the first-order arena does not mean that Euro-elections are in no way influenced by political factors at the European level or issues connected with European integration. Clearly, these factors are significant to some degree, but overall they play a secondary role. In other words, Europe *does* matter in Euro-elections, but in most cases it remains at best a minor factor (Hix – Marsh 2007: 495). In this context, parties emphasising European issues, whether in positive or negative terms, can be expected to do better in the elections.

The case of the Czech Republic and the 2009 European elections

An illustrative account of the character of the historically second elections to the European Parliament in the Czech Republic is provided by statements made high-ranking politicians and in the headlines of the major dailies. President Václav Klaus, a well-known critic of the EU, called the European electoral contest 'two-bit

elections', while the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Jiří Paroubek, described them as of 'tertiary' significance.[1] The day after the elections, *Lidové noviny* printed a large and negative headline on its front page that read 'Czechs Elect 22 Euro-millionaires', followed, on the next page, by the headline 'Winners Can Expect a retirement pension of 94,000'[2]. These were allusions to the inordinately high salaries paid to MEPs, which is significantly higher than what domestic politicians earn.

What was the real political significance of the European elections held on 5–6 June 2009? If we refer to these elections in a European context and from the perspective of a left-right political scale, we find that in the Czech Republic neither the right was victorious, as it was in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, nor the left, as in the cases of Slovakia and Greece. In the Czech Republic the vote was roughly balanced between the left and the right; out of the 22 seats the Czech Republic has in the European Parliament, one-half were won by parties on the left – Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) – and the other half by two parties on the centre-right – the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the more centrist Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL). Unlike in a number of other EU states, none of the extreme right-wing parties in the Czech Republic were successful in the elections, of those, the party that fared best, the Workers' Party, received only 1 per cent of the vote.

Although there was a clear European context to the outcome of the European elections, they played out primarily in relation to the domestic political scene. They were perceived mainly in terms of the contest between the two largest parties in the Czech Parliament – the left-wing Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the right-wing Civic Democrats (ODS), which over the course of twelve months face off in three different elections: first, in the regional and senate elections in the autumn of 2008, second in the European elections in June 2009, and finally, four months later, in the October elections to the Chamber of Deputies[3]. The European elections were thus something like the 'second heat' in an 'election triathlon''.

Electoral campaign

The most visible event in the pre-election contest was the 'egg-blitz', when Jiří Paroubek and other representatives of the Social Democratic Party were assaulted

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[1] Although Paroubek was actually expressing disappointment resulting from his party's electoral defeat, in terms of turnout the statement was not far from reality. While the turnout in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2006 was 64 per cent and in the regional elections in 2008 was 40 per cent, it was only 28 per cent in the European elections.
[2] *Lidové noviny*, 8 June 2009, pp. 1-2.
[3] At the end the Constitutional Court decided in September 2009 to postpone the (then) up-coming elections, which had originally been scheduled for October, by seven months, until May 2010.

with eggs at a number of pre-election gatherings. Part of the reason for its visibility was of course the fact that it was a gratifying media topic, as it was an unusual occurrence accompanied by shock, emotions, and dramatic images.

While, at the outset, the egg assaults were isolated occurrences, conceived of as a kind of practical joke, later, towards the end of the campaign, they took on a mass scale and became exceedingly violent. Things reached a peak nine days before the elections when a pre-election gathering of Social Democrats in Prague was bombarded with eggs. These occurrences spread so widely because there was a group on Facebook, the social networking site, called 'Eggs for Paroubek in Every Town', and within just several days more than fifty thousand people joined the group. This kind of pre-election activity served, first, to activate young people who had until then adopted a passive stance, and they reacted in their own way to public affairs by taking a stand against the fat-cat functionary style of the chair of the Social Democratic Party, Jiří Paroubek, and against the party's empty billboard style of social populism. As the Internet is regarded as a medium to which young people are drawn, in the post-communist Czech Republic an interesting fact is that young people tend to be right leaning[4] unlike their counterparts in Western Europe who tend to lean more to the left.

Although the egg assaults damaged the image of the Social Democratic Party, in the aftermath the opposite effect could also be seen. The Social Democrats tried to turn the negative action taken by these young people to their advantage by putting themselves in the role of victims of violence and the defenders of decent people. The entire country was flooded with posters featuring the faces of Social Democratic leaders with egg all over themselves beneath the heading 'Stand up to Aggression'.[5]

Based on this experience, ČSSD acknowledged weaknesses in their Internet marketing strategy and prepared to do something about it. Right after the elections the party launched a new website and created profiles on Facebook for the party leader and other members. Some parties, particularly ODS and the Green Party, even began experimenting with microblogging on Twitter.

Prior to the European elections ČSSD's main motto was 'Security for the People and Hope for Europe', however this party, like others, essentially gave up on dealing with European topics. For the average left-wing Czech voter, European politics are too remote and sophisticated, and so there was no strong theme with which to

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[4]   Information on young Czech voters is available from the Center of Public Opinion Research (CVVM); cvvm\Archiv CVVM\Archiv vyzkumu\5. Archiv CVVM 2002-2010\Vyzk10\v1006-povolebni vyzkum\Data\NS_1006_DataFile.sav.

[5]   The final pre-election meetings of ČSSD were monitored by the police from adjacent hotels and restaurants. For interest it can also be mentioned that these meetings also included the participation of a group of young people wearing orange T-shirts with 'SOCDEM IS SEXY' on the front and with orange scarves wrapped around their necks – orange is ČSSD's party colour.

mobilise such voters. For the European election campaign, issues that were successfully exploited in the regional elections, like opposition to the payment of fees for health care or to the privatisation of hospitals, were not as readily available to the Social Democratic voters. Moreover, the party had lost its internal enemy in the form of the centre-right government, which ČSSD controversially toppled while the Czech Republic still held the Presidency of the European Union. The no-confidence vote that brought down the government in March 2009 was viewed by the wider public, and even by some supporters of ČSSD, as detrimental to the country's interests. And if we add to this that some ČSSD voters showed a tendency in the European elections to experiment by voting for parties they would not usually vote for, we have the explanation for the party's surprisingly strong defeat.

Although even the right-wing ODS made little use of European themes in the pre-election period, it was still in a better position to mobilise voters, as most of its supporters are strongly pro-European in opinion. ODS's main slogan, 'Solutions not Scare Tactics', was directed against the Social Democrats, whom they blamed for the fall of the government, but also for blocking reform of the health care and pension systems. The economy was a key issue here, as the economic crisis was also affecting the Czech Republic. It seems that, as in the majority of the EU member states, this issue played out to the advantage of centre-right parties, as they came across as the parties that were offering more rational solutions and not merely social populism.

Instead of the parliamentary parties, it was Czech Television, the public service television channel that informed the public about European issues. Among other things, it explained the role the European Parliament had to play, for instance, in addressing the financial and economic crisis or in making decisions in matters pertaining to future subsidies for alternative energy sources. In its special pre-election programmes it also introduced viewers to the work of the incumbent MEPs and to the pre-election programmes of the political parties and their candidates.

For the first time, the head of the Catholic Church, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk, got significantly involved in the European election campaign.[6] In the past, Cardinal Vlk had called on the public to take part in the elections, but he had never actually come out explicitly in favour of or against voting for a specific party. This time, on the day before the elections, through his website he called on voters not to elect the parties that in March had brought down the government during the Czech EU Presidency; by this he was referring mainly to the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Communists (KSČM).

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[6]   Kubita, J.: 'Vlk: Nevolte ty, kdo svrhli vládu' [Don't vote for those who brought down the government], *Hospodářské noviny*, 5–7 June 2009, p. 3.

Cleavages and electoral rules

Altogether 33 parties and political movements ran in the Czech elections to the European Parliament. These political subjects reflected the structure of the political cleavages in the Czech Republic. First, a primary position is occupied by a class cleavage, specifically the division of the party spectrum into left and right. There are two main parties on the left, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Communists (KSČM), and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is the main party on the right. Second, to a lesser extent there is also a religious cleavage on the domestic political scene, represented by the Christian-Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL), and a post-material cleavage, represented by the Green Party.

Third, it is possible to observe a cleavage that directly reflects differences in attitudes towards the degree of European integration. That is why smaller political subjects that defined themselves as pro-European or, conversely, as Euro-sceptic ran against each other in the elections. Pro-European parties include the European Democratic Party,[7] the Party of Independent Candidates–European Democrats,[8] and Liberals.cz.[9] On the other hand, a Euro-sceptic profile has been adopted by these political subjects: the Party of Free Democrats,[10] Libertas.cz,[11] and Sovereignty.[12] This list shows how both supporters and critics of the EU are internally divided into little rival groups headed by ambitious leaders.

It is probably no surprise that President Václav Klaus not only supported all three Euro-sceptic parties, but on his website also recommended that ODS voters give their preferential vote to Hynek Fajmon, who had long been a critic of European integration. Conversely, ex-President Václav Havel backed the 'post-material' and pro-Europe Green Party. Finally, Miloš Zeman, the still influential former leader of the Social Democratic Party, supported a small left-wing party – the Party for a Dignified Life[13].

Last, but not least, at the level of EU member states, during the European elections there emerged a cleavage of opposition versus government. In the Czech Republic however, this cleavage was absent at the time of the European Parliamentary elections, as an interim caretaker government was installed after the government fell in March, with early elections to the Chamber of Deputies scheduled for autumn. As

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[7]   The European Democratic Party (*Evropská demokratická strana*) led by the incumbent MEP, Jana Hybášková.
[8]   Party of Independent Candidates–European Democrats (*Strana nezávislých kandidátů - Evropští demokraté* SNK-ED,) led by Lukáš Macek.
[9]   Liberals.cz (*Liberalove.cz*) led by Milan Hamerník.
[10]   The Party of Free Democrats (*Strana svobodných demokratů*) led by Jiří Payne and founded by Petr Mach.
[11]   Libertas.cz leads by Vlastimil Tlustý.
[12]   Sovereignty (*Suverenita*) led by the incumbent MEP, Jana Bobošíková.
[13]   The Party for a Dignified Life (*Strana důstojného života*).

noted above, voters were mobilised against the parties that had toppled the government while the Czech Republic held the EU Presidency.

Before presenting the analysis of the results, we should go over the basic rules that govern EU parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, as set out in the Act on Elections to the European Parliament. The elections take place over two days, a Friday and a Saturday; this year that was on the 5th and 6th of June respectively.[14] Everyone aged 18 and over is entitled to vote, and the minimum age limit for candidates is 21.[15] Elections to the European Parliament are organised in a single national electoral district, which covers the entire Czech Republic. Votes are converted to seats using the D'Hondt method, a highest averages method. In order to obtain at least one seat it is necessary to pass a 5 per cent national threshold. A partially-closed party list allows for limited preferential voting where each voter disposes of two preferential votes.

Turnout and final results

In the second European Parliamentary elections held in the Czech Republic, 22 MEPs were elected, which is two MEP's less than five years ago. Turnout was relatively low, as only 28.2 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote.[16] The Czech Republic had the fifth-lowest turnout out of the 27 EU member states and ranked in the group of post-communist countries with the lowest turnout.[17]

What were the reasons for such low turnout? As one public opinion poll showed, Czech citizens view the European Parliament as very remote and have no idea of how things operate in Strasbourg and Brussels. Citizens are also critical of the very high salaries and benefits that MEPs are paid.[18] The fact that the political parties themselves, and even the media, had little interest in the elections is another reason for the low turnout. With a few exceptions, the political parties drew little on European issues and also put lower profile party figures on their ballot sheets. The prevailing opinion in the media is that news coverage of EU affairs is less interesting, so they devote less attention to these issues.

Generally, the European elections are 'second-order elections', and as such, those voters who participate tend to be ones with definitely formed ideas who belong to the hard core of their party. In the Czech Republic, parties with a more ideological

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[14] On Friday voting takes place between 2 pm and 10 pm, and on Saturday between 8 am and 2 pm.
[15] Citizens of other EU member states residing in the Czech Republic are also entitled to vote and be elected as long as they are registered residents of the Czech Republic for at least 45 days.
[16] It is interesting that the participation was almost identical in 2004, when it was just 0.1 per cent age point higher.
[17] Slovakia had the lowest participation at 19.6 per cent, followed by Lithuania with 21 per cent, Poland with 24.5 per cent, and Romania with 27.7 per cent, while the EU average on the whole was 43 per cent.
[18] The results of Median, the research agency, are presented in an article by J. Kubík: 'Politici, my vam nerozumime' [We don't understand you politicians], *Mladá fronta DNES*, 8 June 2009, p. 2.

and disciplined support base, like the Communists (KSČM) and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), benefit from this. From the nature of the elections it follows that the more dedicated supporters or opponents of European integration participated more in the elections. It is no coincidence that the biggest turnout, at 36 per cent, was in the capital city, where ODS, 75 per cent of whose supporters are pro-European, won by a large margin.[19]

What was the impact of the European elections on the Czech and on the EU political scenes? As is listed in Table 1, the right-wing ODS had surprisingly swept the elections over the left-wing ČSSD by a wide margin. ODS won 9 seats with 31per cent of the vote, and ČSSD only 7 seats with 22 per cent of the vote. The Communists (KSČM) defended their ranking in third place with 14 per cent of the vote, which won them 4 seats. The last party to pass the 5 per cent national threshold was the Christian-Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL), which obtained 2 seats with 8 per cent of the vote. Conversely, the other parliamentary party, the Green Party, did not pass the 5 per cent threshold, nor however did any of the new and smaller non-parliamentary parties in the European elections. As a result, a large number of votes were wasted, in total 24 per cent.

These are bald figures. It is now necessary to analyse the effect of the European elections on national politics. Immediately after the elections conflict arose over how to interpret the outcome. The problem was which elections the most recent results should be compared to. The question was whether to compare the results to the previous European elections five years earlier or to the most recent domestic elections – which were elections to regional councils and the Senate – that took place in the autumn of the previous year. The leader of the second-place party Jiri Paroubek took pains to purposefully interpret the results as ČSSD's success, as he related them to the results of the European elections five years earlier, when the party was routed in the elections. In an interview he said: 'We had two seats, now we have seven. We gained 320 000 more voters and the Civic Democrats gained 40 000 voters, the Communists and Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) lost support'.[20]

However, the logical step would be to regard the Social Democrats' significant win in the previous autumn elections as the point of comparison and also take into account the long-term public opinion polls that had showed stronger support for the Social Democrats. Just one week before the European elections, preferences for ODS caught up with ČSSD. Therefore, the results constituted a surprisingly high victory for ODS over ČSSD.

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[19]   Information on ODS-EU relations is available from the Center of Public Opinion Research (CVVM); cvvm\Archiv CVVM\Archiv vyzkumu\5. Archiv CVVM 2002-2010\Vyzk10\v1004\ Data\NS_1004_DataFile.sav.
[20]   An interview with Jiří Paroubek, *Právo*, 9 June 2009, p. 2.

In reality, the European elections represented a kind of referendum on the balance of power between the two biggest parties, a kind of dress rehearsal for the much more important parliamentary elections that were scheduled to take place four months later. To some degree the campaign before the elections to the European Parliament was conceived as a introductory or 'soft' stage in the campaign before the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In this respect it is necessary to note a paradox: both ODS and ČSSD were wary of a large marginal win in the European elections, as that could demobilise their voters before the autumn elections. For example, on the day of the elections, the headline emblazoned across the front page of the respected Czech daily *Hospodářské noviny* read 'ODS and ČSSD are Afraid of Winning'.[21] It was also speculated that it might be an advantage to ODS if the Social Democrats and the Communists together won more votes than the right. In that case, before the autumn election ODS would be able to mobilise voters against the 'red menace', and would be doing so right before the 20th anniversary of the fall of the communist regime.[22]

The European elections were of course not just about the contest between the two biggest parties. The decision was also about another three parties with representation in the lower chamber of Parliament. Of these, the Communists (KSČM) re-confirmed their standard third-place position and the average 15 per cent of the vote. However, there were substantial question marks hanging over the fate of the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL) and the Green Party. Both of these parties were experiencing a crisis owing to internal rifts and both were at risk of not passing the 5 per cent threshold. In the end, KDU-ČSL,[23] as a party with an ideologically clear-cut and disciplined support base, and thanks partly to the low turnout, defended the two seats it had won in the first European elections.

Conversely, the elections ended in a great loss for the Green Party. After protracted internal conflicts and a split into two competing green parties, this, the smallest party in the Czech Parliament, did not, as anticipated, pass the 5 per cent threshold.[24] But no one had expected that the party's results would be as low as just

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[21]   Valášková, M.: 'ODS i ČSSD se bojí výhry' [ODS and ČSSD Are Afraid of Winning], *Hospodářské noviny*, 5–7 June 2009, p. 1.

[22]   Elections to the Chamber of Deputies were scheduled to take place on 9–10 October, five weeks before 17 November 2009, the date marking twenty years since the fall of the communist regime.

[23]   KDU-ČSL's party convention took place just a week prior to the elections. While the convention elected a new party leader, Cyril Svoboda, it was not able to heal its internal rift. In protest against the party's shift to the centre-left it was expected that some major party figures would soon leave the party and found a new one. This then happened at the start of July, when the former leader of KDU-ČSL, Miroslav Kalousek, announced the formation of a new political party called 'TOP 09'.

[24]   Several months before the elections the Green Party split. A Green Party MP, Olga Zubová, founded a new party – the Democratic Green Party *(Demokratická strana zelených)*. In addition, a little-known political subject – the Green Movement – also took part in the elections.

2 per cent of the vote. The party's leader, Martin Bursik, resigned as a result of this defeat; he was the only parliamentary party leader to do so.

Unlike the previous European elections, this time not one non-parliamentary party won a seat.[25] But the defeat of the Euro-sceptic and extreme right parties is much more significant. As for the Euro-sceptic parties supported by President Václav Klaus, the Party of Free Citizens obtained only 1.3 per cent of the vote and Libertas.cz just 0.9 per cent (a Czech branch of Declan Ganley's Libertas Party).[26] The only party appealing to Euro-sceptic voters that even approached the 5 per cent threshold was Sovereignty *(Suverenita),* headed by MEP Jana Bobošíková.[27]

As for the defeat of the extreme-right parties, the Workers' Party *(Dělnická strana)* received 1 per cent and the National Party *(Národni strana)* just 0.3 per cent of the vote. Despite this defeat, the media noted that the Workers' Party won 1 per cent of the vote and for the first time that entitled them to receive a state subsidy of three-quarters of a million Crowns.[28] The Workers' Party mobilised themselves and won the most votes in areas where they organised demonstrations against socially excluded minorities, mainly Roma. Petr Uhl, a human rights activist, warned that the extreme right is influential in those areas where the state has given up on the protection of its citizens and on defending the individual and good demeanour. He wrote: 'The extreme right thrives on nationalism and fights … against immigrants, non-adaptive citizens and rent defaulters. It also exploits the justified protest against unemployment, mafias, and criminality.'[29]

From the defeat of the extreme right, it makes sense to turn to the subject of electoral geography. The Workers' Party made its biggest gains in the economically and socially underdeveloped Usti region, where it won 2 per cent of the vote, and in the region's two towns it won almost 8 per cent of the vote.[30] It is no coincidence that it was in this region also that the most successful Euro-sceptic party, Suverenita,

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[25]   Two relatively insignificant parties lost their seats: the Party of Independent Candidates–European Democrats (SNK-ED) and the Independents *(Nezavislí).*

[26]   The Irish millionaire Declan Ganley's Euro-sceptic movement founded a branch in the Czech Republic called Libertas.cz. It was formed by the MEP Vladimír Železný, who previously founded the Independents. He was joined by two other former ODS MPs, Vlastimil Tlustý and Jan Schwippel, both of whom also helped topple the centre-right government in March.

[27]   MEP Jana Bobošíková was originally elected on the Independents' ticket together with Vladimír Železný.

[28]   According to the Act on the Elections to the European Parliament, every electoral subject that gains at least one per cent of the vote is entitled to receive from the state 30 CZK for each vote.

[29]   Uhl, P.: 'Bude krajně pravicové bujení zhoubné?' [Will a virulent spread of the extreme right be malignant?], *Právo*, 9 June 2009, p. 6.

[30]   In Litvínov and Krupka na Teplicku, two towns in North Bohemia, the Workers' Party won almost an 8 per cent of the vote in each town. In both towns, supporters of the Workers' Party organised demonstrations, which were accompanied by a significant display of police presence. The party managed to a degree to convince some local citizens that it, unlike the state, is the only force that will stand up for them against 'Gypsy misfits, thieves and layabouts'. See 'Problemove lokality volily extremisty' [Troubled regions vote for the extreme right], *Právo*, 9 June 2009, p. 5.

won the biggest support, with 6 per cent of the vote. Similarly, even the Communists gained the most votes in this region, taking advantage of social tensions and the high unemployment rate there. The Communists won their most votes in the Sudeten border regions and in rural areas rather than towns. It is consistent, too, that it was in this very region that the Christian Democratic Party on average had its weakest results and received the support of only 2.3 per cent of the electorate. Conversely, KDU-ČSL received the biggest support in areas that traditionally vote for this party, and where the Catholic Church has strong influence, namely Moravia (12-15 per cent) and eastern Bohemia (6-10 per cent). As for the two biggest parties, ODS and ČSSD, the former won in 13 regions and lost in only one.[31] The gap between these parties widened most in the capital, Prague, where ODS won 40 per cent of the vote, while ČSSD received only 15 per cent. It was also in Prague that the candidate from the European Democratic Party (EDS), a pro-European party, won 7 per cent of the vote; an above average result for the party.

Having examined the issue of electoral geography, the structure of the 22 elected MEPs will be classified from several angles. However, it should first be noted that preferential voting had practically no influence on the outcome. As mentioned above, each voter had two preferential votes, but they could only use them on one party list. The way it worked was that voters could assign a rank to two candidates on one party list, and the candidate that obtained at least 5 per cent of these preferential votes automatically moved into first position. If more than one party candidate obtained preferential votes amounting to 5 per cent, the one that obtained the most moved into the first position. Table 2 lists the names of all 22 newly elected MEPs from the Czech Republic grouped by party, and it clearly shows that none of the preferential votes shifted any of the candidates from an unelectable to an electable position. The only change, a marginal one, in the ranking occurred on ODS's ballot list, where, as can be seen, Evžen Tošenovský (first column in the Table) moved from second place in the ranking to first (last column), as a result of receiving 14 per cent of the preferential votes.[32]

When we look at the 22 elected MEPs from a gender perspective, we find that the ratio of elected men to women in the Czech Republic is 82 to 18, as only four

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[31] ČSSD only won in the Olomouc region. For ODS, this was payback for its huge loss to ČSSD in the autumn of 2008, when conversely ČSSD won in 13 regions.

[32] The closest to being elected was the incumbent MEP Jaroslav Zvěrina, who five years earlier was elected for ODS thanks to the preferential votes, which raised him from the tenth position to the first position. This time he was nominated in tenth position again, but he obtained just under 5 per cent of the preferential votes, receiving 34,000 or 4.6 per cent of the preferential votes, as opposed to the 55,000 he obtained in 2004. Some have explained the decrease in preferential votes for Jaroslav Zvěrina by the fact that this time, beside his name, he did not also list his profession, a sexologist. For more, see the article by Dolejší, V.: 'Když není sex, není ani Zvěřina' [No Sex? No Zvěřina], *Mladá fronta DNES*, 9 June 2009, p. 3.

women were elected as MEPs. This is the second-lowest number of women in all 27 EU member states (the lowest being in Malta). As for age, the average age of a Czech MEPs is 50.

As indicated in Table 3 below, of the total of 22 MEPs elected, 14 were incumbents. As for the newly elected MEPs, two were originally MPs in the lower chamber of the Czech Parliament,[33] one was a former deputy chair of the government and a university professor,[34] one was a regional governor,[35] one was chair of the party's regional organisation,[36] one was a former deputy mayor and medical doctor,[37] one was director of the secretariat of the Senate President and one was a lawyer.[38]

To sum up, influential party politicians were put at the top of the national party list, in the first or at the very least second place on the list. Others on the list were low or non-profile politicians. As noted above, more than 60 per cent of the electable positions on the party list were occupied by incumbent MEPs. For his 'service to the party', J. Havel ran in first place on ČSSD's party list. As an influential 'party rebel', Evžen Tošenovský was put in second place on ODS's party list. As a kind of 'celebrity' public figure, the former cosmonaut Vladimír Remek ran for the second time on the Communists' party list.

It is apparent that MEPs elected for the Czech Republic have little influence on the distribution and balance of power within the European Parliament. Their influence is relatively proportional to the number of Czech MEPs out of the total number of MEPs. Given that 736 MEPs are elected in total, and 22 of them are from the Czech Republic, the Czechs hold just 3 per cent of all available seats. Nevertheless, the group of nine MEPs from ODS that were elected will have the biggest impact on the work of the European Parliament. The reason is that this party has arranged, with the British Conservative Party and the Polish Truth and Justice Party, to break away from the largest centre-right party group, the European People's Party (EPP), and form a new party group. The newly formed party group, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR),[39] makes national interests, state sovereignty, and the promotion of conservative values its priorities. As for the other MEPs, the seven of them from ČSSD will strengthen the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the four communist MEPs will again be part of

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[33]   Both were elected for ČSSD – Zuzana Brzobohatá and Robert Dušek.
[34]   Jiří Havel – a university professor and former deputy Prime Minister of Economy in the Social Democratic government under Jiří Paroubek's premiership.
[35]   Evžen Tošenovský – the popular governor of the Moravian-Silesian region.
[36]   Pavel Poc – Chair of the regional organisation of ČSSD in the Karlovy Vary region.
[37]   Olga Sehnalová – former deputy mayor in the town of Kroměříž.
[38]   In order, they were Edvard Kožušník and Andrea Češková. All personal information is taken from a text by Korecký, M. – Macková, M.: 'Středem kupředu pravá' [Right Foot Centre], *Týden*, 15, June 2009, no. 24, pp. 16–22.
[39]   ECRG satisfied the conditions for the formation of a political party group in the European Parliament, which is a minimum number of 25 MEPs from 7 countries.

the radical left-wing party group European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), and the two Christian Democrat MEPs will continue to work with the largest party group, the centre-right EPP.

Conclusion

This work asked whether the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, which occurred in the Czech Republic, confirms the theory that these are second-order elections and that the European context of the elections is marginal.

As for turnout, both Euro-elections that have taken place in the Czech Republic clearly confirmed the validity of the classic second-order elections theory. In the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2002, which was before the first Euro-elections were held in this country, turnout was 58 per cent and in 2006 it had risen to 64 per cent. Conversely, turnout dropped in the Euro-elections in both 2004 and in 2009, at just 28 per cent, which is less than one-half in national elections.

The two Euro-elections in the Czech Republic produced different results in the distribution of votes between parties, and these differences were directly connected to the timing of the elections in the government popularity cycle. In 2004, the centre-left government was in its mid-term period in office. In the Euro-elections, the Social Democratic Party, the biggest Parliamentary party and the party of government, suffered a sweeping defeat and finished the fifth just under 9 per cent of the vote. This led V. Špidla, prime minister and party chair, to resign. In the second Euro-elections (2009) an unusual situation had emerged in domestic politics. Just three months before the Euro-elections the centre-right government was toppled and an interim caretaker government was installed in its place, all this while the Czech Republic still held the EU Presidency. Paradoxically, this served to mobilise voters against the opposition parties that had helped bring down the government. For this reason, there was no opposition versus government cleavage in the Czech Republic at the time of the European elections. It is no surprise then that this time, unlike in 2004, it was the biggest parliamentary party and the main party in the centre-right government (until it was toppled in March 2009), the Civic Democratic Party, that was the biggest winner in the elections.

Small and protest parties fared very differently in each of the European Parliamentary elections. In the 2004 elections they enjoyed enormous success, as two non-parliamentary parties won seats, namely the Association of Independent Candidates - European Democrats, (SNK-ED; 11 per cent and 3 Euro-mandates) and the Independents (8 per cent and 2 Euro-mandates), but in 2009 they did very poorly and none of the non-parliamentary parties passed the 5 per cent threshold and they all failed to gain entry into the European Parliament. Even the smallest national parliamentary party, the Green Party, ended up well below the 5 per cent

threshold with only 2 per cent of the vote. Nevertheless, this does not mean that when compared to domestic elections, voters exhibited less of a tendency to engage in 'sincere voting' (*vote by heart*) or to experiment. Many votes were indeed wasted, in total 24 per cent, while, conversely, in the domestic Parliamentary elections in 2006 only 6 per cent of the votes were wasted. So, there certainly was protest voting, however, it was not concentrated, but rather dispersed among many parties: a total of nine parties which each gained between 1 and 5 per cent of the vote.

It is apparent that Europe matters in the Euro-elections in the Czech Republic. But according the election results and that political parties drew little attention to European issues and put lower profile party figures on their ballot sheets, and the fact that even the media paid little attention to the elections may all indicate that, at best, Europe remains a secondary issue.

In this regard it is worth mentioning that parties that highlighted European issues either positively or negatively had higher gains on the whole. As noted above, in 2004 the pro-European SNK-ED party was very successful, winning 11 per cent of the vote. Conversely, even though none of the smaller parties gained entry into the European Parliament in 2009, three pro-European parties together won 4.5 per cent of the vote, while three Euro-sceptic parties gained a total of 6.5 per cent.

In conclusion, both elections to the European Parliament that have been held in the Czech Republic confirm the validity of the classic second-order elections theory, but the Europe matters theory is less applicable and serves to complement the first theory.

Table 1: European election results 2004 and 2009 – Czech Republic

Parties	2004		2009	
	Votes (%)	Number of Seats	Votes (%)	Number of Seats
ODS	30,04	9	31,45	9
ČSSD	8,78	2	22,38	7
KSČM	20,26	6	14,18	4
KDU-ČSL	9,57	2	7,64	2
SNK-ED	11,02	3	1,66	0
Nezavislí	8,18	2	0,54	0
SZ	3,16	0	2,06	0

Source: www.volby.cz

ODS – Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)

ČSSD – Česká strana socialně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)

KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

KDU-ČSL – Křestaňská a demokratická unie – Československská strana lidová (Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party)

SZ – Strana zelených (Green Party)

SNK-ED – Sdružení nezávislých kandidátů – Evropští demokraté (Association of Independent Candidates – European Democrats)

Nezavislí (Independent)

Table 2: A total of 22 elected MEPs in 2009 according to the preferential votes on the party lists

Initial Order	Candidate	Preferential Votes		Final Order
		absolute	in %	
ODS				
1	Zahradil Jan	65 731	8,85	2
2	Tošenovský Evžen	104 737	14,11	1
3	Vlasák Oldřich	11 744	1,58	3
4	Cabrnoch Milan	7 143	0,96	4
5	Strejček Ivo	6 071	0,81	5
6	Ouzký Miroslav	9 869	1,33	6
7	Kožušník Edvard	11 567	1,55	7
8	Fajmon Hynek	16 041	2,16	8
9	Češková Andrea	14 477	1,95	9
ČSSD				
1	Havel Jiří	59 818	11,32	1
2	Falbr Richard	44 703	8,46	2
3	Rouček Libor	19 771	3,74	3
4	Poc Pavel	4 814	0,91	4
5	Brzobohatá Zuzana	7 736	1,46	5
6	Dušek Robert	4 042	0,76	6
7	Sehnalová Olga	9 386	1,77	7
KSČM				
1	Ransdorf Miloslav	61 453	18,36	1
2	Remek Vladimír	40 650	12,14	2
3	Maštálka Jiří	8 181	2,44	3
4	Kohlíček Jaromír	5 719	1,70	4

KDU-ČSL				
1	Roithová Zuzana	52 503	29,09	1
2	Březina Jan	23 154	12,83	2

Source: www.volby.cz

Table 3: 22 MEPs from the Czech Republic (2009)

Name Surname	National Party	EP Group Affiliation	Committee Membership	Committee Position	Professsional Background	Age	Sex
Jan BŘEZINA	KDU - ČSL	EPP	Industry, Research and Energy	Member	MEP	56	M
Zuzana BRZOBOHATÁ	ČSSD	S&D	Regional Development	Member	Member of the Parliament of the ČR	47	F
Milan CABRNOCH	ODS	ECR	Employment and Social Affairs Environ- ment, Public Health and Food Safety	Member Member	MEP	47	M
Andrea ČEŠKOVÁ	ODS	ECR	Budgetary Control Women's Rights and Gender Equality	Member Member	lawyer	38	F
Robert DUŠEK	ČSSD	S&D	Agriculture and Rural Development	Member	Member of the Parliament of the ČR	43	M
Hynek FAJMON	ODS	ECR	Agriculture and Rural Development	Member	MEP	42	M
Richard FALBR	ČSSD	S&D	Employment and Social Affairs	Member	MEP	69	M
Jiří HAVEL	ČSSD	S&D	Budgets	Member	former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Economy, university professor	52	M

Jaromír KOHLÍČEK	KSČM	GUE/NGL	Transport and Tourism	Member	MEP	57	M
Edvard KOŽUŠNÍK	ODS	ECR	Internal Market and Consumer Protection	Member	Secretariat Director of the Senate President	39	M
Jiří MAŠTÁLKA	KSČM	GUE/NGL	Legal Affairs	Member	MEP	54	M
Miroslav OUZKÝ	ODS	ECR	Environment, Public Health and Food Safety	Member	MEP	51	M
Pavel POC	ČSSD	S&D	Environment, Public Health and Food Safety	Member	Chairman of the Party´s Regional Organization	46	M
Miloslav RANDSDORF	KSČM	GUE/NGL	Industry, Research and Energy	Member	MEP	57	M
Vladimír REMEK	KSČM	GUE/NGL	Budgets	Member	MEP	61	M
Zuzana ROITHOVÁ	KDU - ČSL	EPP	Internal Market and Consumer Protection	Member	MEP	57	F
Libor ROUČEK	ČSSD	S&D	Foreign Affairs	Member	MEP	55	M
Olga SEHNALOVÁ	ČSSD	S&D	Transport and Tourism	Member	former Deputy Mayor, medical doctor	41	F
Ivo STREJČEK	ODS	ECR	Economic and Monetary Affairs	Member	MEP	48	M
Evžen TOŠENOVSKÝ	ODS	ECR	Industry, Research and Energy	Vice-Chair	Governor of the Moravian-Silesian region	54	M
Oldřich VLASÁK	ODS	ECR	Regional Development	Member	MEP	54	M
Jan ZAHRADIL	ODS	ECR	International Trade	Member	MEP	47	M

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'We Lied by Day, We Lied by Night' – The 50th Anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Political Discourse of Lying[1]

Melinda Kovács

Abstract: *The year 2006 not only marked the 50th anniversary of Hungary's attempt to break away from Soviet dominance but it also saw what remains the biggest scandal and series of demonstrations in post-1989 Hungary. In mid-September 2006, an audio recording surfaced in which then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party) admitted to lying at a Socialist Party meeting shortly after the elections in April 2006. Demonstrations and street fighting followed, which was out of the ordinary for the Hungarian politics of the early 21st century. This prolonged incident provides unique opportunities to study the discourse of an anniversary reaction and a genuine political crisis. I analyze newspaper discourses from the fall of 2006 to show what concepts and strategies were vying for primacy in defining what politics is and whether lies are de rigueur in the conceptualization of politics. Hungarian discourses in right-wing authority-centered journalism as well as in left-wing professional journalism were posited on communism / post-communism. The differences in the papers, however, reveal what may be lost by relying on the oversimplifying monolithic perspective of post-communism.*

Keywords: *Hungary, political discourse, lying*

Introduction

The year 2006 not only marked the 50th anniversary of Hungary's attempt to break away from Soviet dominance but it also saw what remains the biggest scandal and series of demonstrations in post-1989 Hungary. In mid-September 2006, an audio recording surfaced in which then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party) was caught admitting to lying at a Socialist Party meeting shortly after the elections in April 2006. He actually quoted a famous/infamous sentence initially used during the events of 1956. Demonstrations ensued in protest over the Prime Minister's speech – towards the end of a year that had brought a highly hostile election campaign season and revealed structural problems in the

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election system (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2007). The contents of the speech understandably led to outrage:

> Apparently the goal of the speech was to convince the party cadres – who sought to continue the tactics of inaction that seemed to work in the past – that things had to change and admitted in very blunt terms that the Government (and the party) constantly lied to be able to remain in power. He also added that reforms are unavoidable and, regardless of what people may say and who may protest, should be implemented, by force if necessary (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2007: 971).

The fact that demonstrations and street fighting followed, however, was out of the ordinary for the Hungarian politics of the early 21st century. Among the groups who took to the streets, radical right-wing elements were as likely to appear as conservative democratic forces and they would clash with an unprepared police force, the members of which occasionally participated in looting (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2007: 971). Moreover, the relationship and overlap between demonstrators and supporters of major opposition party FIDESZ was unclear: "The dividing line between the anti-government forces who kept demonstrating in front the of the Parliament building and the major opposition party was often shaky… FIDESZ did not distance itself from the groups that used extremist slogans, or symbols of inter-war Hungarian Nazism" (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2007: 972). Following on the heels of the demonstrations in September 2006, the 50th anniversary of the Revolution of 1956 in late October created a discursive climate in which it became possible for some to look for parallels between 1956 and 2006.

The impact of the crisis in 2006 was such that analyzing Hungarian politics in 2007 still prominently features the events of 2006 (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2008). Over the course of 2007, street fighting continued to occur and the extreme right put together a paramilitary organization; opposition party FIDESZ increasingly endorsed extra-parliamentary tactics, and the level of support for the Socialist Party fell to the level of 1990, when the issue was to establish credibility as a successor party (Ilonszki – Kurtán 2008).

This prolonged incident and this time in Hungarian politics provide unique opportunities to study the discourse of an anniversary reaction and a genuine political crisis. I analyze newspaper discourses from the fall of 2006 to show what concepts and strategies were vying for primacy in defining what politics is and whether lies are *de rigueur* in the conceptualization of politics.

This work contributes to larger theoretical debates by informing the usefulness of post-communism as a paradigm. While I have been finding in other aspects of my work that Hungarian political discourse tends to be anchored in frames of reference other than communism, this inquiry looks at a series of events that

explicitly reference communism. This provides a novel avenue to assess the plausibility or viability of considering a country like Hungary, first and foremost post-communist.

The theoretical relevance of instances of lying in politics is hardly an innovation: from the time when Socrates wondered if a noble lie was necessary for an ideal regime, a long line stretches to very modern cases where lying has been an issue. In the context of US politics and under the analytic gaze of the international community, the presidency of George W. Bush is intricately tied to his veracity or otherwise when it came to informing the American public about rationales for military engagement in Iraq (Pfiffner 2004; Kellner 2007). It may in fact be the case that modern politics necessitates a parallel universe created by political elites, one not based in the reality of what others experience (Miller 2004).

It has in fact been proposed that there is such a thing as 'professional liars' in Alan Ryan's phrase (Ryan 2004). According to Ryan, the overwhelming priority in communication is to maintain narrative structures and to allow people to author their own stories. This means that doctors, lawyers and politicians are not first and foremost expected to recite facts unaltered by framing but to maintain narrative coherence. The maintenance of narrative coherence requires choice between truthfulness and the occasional lie that promotes the greater good. Politicians offend democratic equality and the autonomy of citizens by lying to the population – and yet, are routinely required to lie to avoid economic catastrophe or to protect national security. The trick is that they need "a background of trust and general honesty in order that intelligent lying can achieve the good it should achieve" (Ryan 2004: 752). Alan Ryan recommends that after achieving some good end, politicians come clean quickly and fully to explain their rationale. It appears that this last step is the one most often missing in a variety of cases worldwide, be it the US or Hungary, in 2003 or 2006.

Truth-telling vs. lying in the media gains a special overtone in the context of post-communism. In the scholarship related to the media landscape of Eastern Europe, a salient trend is to assess whether journalistic practices and media processes have transformed into western European models (Gross 2004; Gulyás 2004; Gulyás 2003). These works engage in a certain level of essentialism (Gross 2004) and may claim that eastern European media have (Gulyás 2004; Gulyás 2003) or have not (Gross 2004) transitioned to "Western" models. In an optimistic reading, with the advent of post-communism, media functions moved away from propaganda and included being watchdogs and "providing a forum for public discussion" (Gulyás 2003:84). This would hint that truthfulness is both de facto on the rise and a consciously adopted value commitment. Therefore it is plausible that the issue of lying and admitting to lying in Hungary in 2006 would be quite explosive. The current

inquiry investigates the role of post-communism and communism as voluntarily chosen frames of reference in dealing with the situation.

The lies of 2006: a timeline

The series of events at the center of my investigation started on Monday, September 18, 2006, when newspapers reported that over the weekend, unknown individuals had sent audio recordings to the major news media. The recordings had been made at the meeting of the governing MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungarian Socialist Party) in May 2006. They contained a speech by Prime Minister Gyurcsány who angrily claimed that the party lied to win the elections in April of that year and in fact had been lying for years, just like politics in general had become full of lies. He exclaimed that the main thrust of the lies was that major reforms and unpleasant austerity measures can be avoided. On Sunday night, demonstrators gathered outside Parliament to demand that the PM resign[2].

Protests grew in Budapest and around the country, demanding resignation[3] and soon socialists across Europe and the political groups of the European Parliament called for the same[4]. There were violent clashes between protesters and police in Budapest on the night of September 20[5]. The reporting talked of 'war' and on September 22, arrests were made[6]. A week after the clashes and riots began Gyurcsány publicly thanked the police for their work[7].

On October 1, municipal elections were held and brought an even more significant opposition victory for FIDESZ than had been expected[8]. On October 2, Gyurcsány announced that he would initiate a vote of confidence and that Parliament would have to vote on his personal leadership and his party's platform on Friday October 6. At the same time, the president of the opposition party FIDESZ (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Alliance of Young Democrats) gave the government an ultimatum: if the PM was not gone by October 5, he, FIDESZ president Orbán would bring one hundred thousand demonstrators to the streets and keep them there until either Gyurcsány resigned or the governing coalition took steps to ensure his departure[9].

The special parliamentary session called for October 6 was labeled a comedy by opposition parties who announced they would not participate in it[10]. The President

[2]   Magyar Nemzet 18 September 2006, pp. 1,3,7; Népszabadság 18 September 2006, pp. 1–3.
[3]   Magyar Nemzet 19 September 2006, p. 1.
[4]   Magyar Nemzet 20 September 2006, p. 9.
[5]   Magyar Nemzet 21 September 2006, p. 1.
[6]   Magyar Nemzet 22 September 2006, p. 3.
[7]   Népszabadság 27 September 2006, p. 3.
[8]   Népszabadság 2 October 2006, p. 1.
[9]   Magyar Hírlap 3 October 2006, pp. 2-3.
[10]   Magyar Nemzet 4 October 2006, p. 1.

of Hungary sent a letter to the opposition parties indicating that they could be expected to be present on October 6[11]. Gyurcsány and the government won the vote of confidence, which conservative Magyar Nemzet announced with the headline "Day of Mourning for Parliamentary Democracy"[12]. The day of the vote, however interpreted, was surrounded by protests and reports started surfacing both about convictions made in the cases of those involved in the riots and about a new FIDESZ rally that drew an estimated 10, 000 people[13].

The Hungarian Commission on Human Rights (chaired by a FIDESZ politician) called for a special session of Parliament to investigate and sanction police brutality[14]. The parliamentary committee met as the demonstrations entered week four[15].

1956 and the anniversary reaction

Over the course of October 2006, demonstrations barely subsided only to pick up with a vengeance as October 23rd approached. That day marked the 50th anniversary of the uprising in 1956 that signaled Hungary's attempt to break with the domination of the Soviet Union. Soviet repression put an end to that uprising in less than two weeks, Hungarian hopes of help from anti-Communist regimes were dashed and the uprising was labeled a counter-revolution by the Soviets. The labeling of 1956 as a revolution in 1989 was the unmistakable sign that Communism had ended in Hungary. And yet, the people spearheading the 1956 uprising were Communists themselves – reform-oriented, anti-Soviet Communists, but Communists nonetheless.

While it is not possible to summarize the history of 1956 here, it is important to note how the act of lying vs. the act of refusing lies was a central motif in the events of 1956. On October 30, 1956, one of the main radio stations of Hungary aired an announcement. The announcement described how state-run radio had been an instrument of propaganda and how it was no longer going to be that. The following is an exerpt from the transcript of the announcement, with my English translation following:

> A rádió hosszú évekig a hazugság szerszáma volt. Hazudott éjjel, hazudott nappal, hazudott minden hullámhosszon, ahogy a minap, hazánk újjászületésének órájában sem bírta abbahagyni a hazugságot.... A jövöben a régi hullámhosszon új hangokat fognak hallani. Ahogy a híressé vált régi esküminta követeli, csakis az igazságot, a teljes igazságot és semmi mást, csak az igazságot akarjuk elmondani (Ómolnár 1989: 319).

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[11]   Magyar Nemzet 5 October 2006.
[12]   Magyar Nemzet 7 October 2006. p. 1.
[13]   Magyar Nemzet 10 October 2006, p. 4.
[14]   Magyar Nemzet 11 October 2006, p. 2.
[15]   Magyar Nemzet 14 October 2006, p. 1.

> Radio has been an instrument of lying for a long number of years. It lied by day, it lied by night, it lied on every frequency, just like the other day, in the hour of our nation's rebirth, it still could not stop lying.… In the future, you will hear new voices on the old frequency. As the famous oath demands, we want to broadcast the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth (Ómolnár 1989: 319).

This announcement, especially the expression 'lying on every frequency', became a powerful trope in Hungarian public discourse in the decades following 1956. A large portion of the fury that surrounded the leaked tape with PM Gyurcsány criticizing his own Socialist party and its dishonesty in politics came from the fact that he quoted this famous announcement and used its terminology verbatim. Fury over being lied to results from what Ryan (2004) describes as being denied autonomy through lies from politicians:

> Autonomy is the capacity to plan one's own life, to form and act on a scheme of one's own. If autonomy is the basis of the right to be told the truth, liars arrogate to themselves a manipulative control over their dupes and so violate the dupes' right to self-government (Ryan 2004:737).

As a result, in the days leading up to the anniversary of the events of 1956, the discourse of Hungarian politicians in domestic and foreign venues centered on 1956, its legacy and appropriate ways of celebrating and commemorating it. Gyurcsány was in London when he made a statement, widely reported in the Hungarian press, that not only Hungary but all of Europe is an heir to 1956, and he said that the fight in 1956 was not for a democratic Hungary but for an undivided Europe[16]. At the same time, FIDESZ announced that they would not share celebrations of 1956 with MSZP. FIDESZ MEP Szájer said their party never agreed to celebrate together with those who repudiated 1956 and pointed out that MSZP and junior coalition partner SZDSZ requested that an EP bill memorializing 1956 be modified: the two parties wanted to strike from the bill language about the Communist regime being based on lies[17]. While lies and lying were at the center of the discursive production in the newspapers, in front of the Parliament, demonstrations had gone on for a whole month and there came the realization that the protests that started up in September because of the Gyurcsány tapes, would simply move into October 23rd protests, without the square ever being cleared[18].

As October 23, 2006 came, demonstrators clashed with police again and in Budapest alone, over 100 people were injured[19] and several charges of police brutality

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[16]   Magyar Nemzet 12 October 2006, p. 1.
[17]   Magyar Nemzet 13 October 2006, p. 2.
[18]   Magyar Nemzet 19 October 2006, p. 1.
[19]   Magyar Hírlap 23 October 2006, p. 3.

were brought[20]. A part of the square in front of Parliament was cordoned off for the official ceremony, which included the promulgation of 'Budapest '56', a proclamation about the events of 1956, the heroism of the participants and the condemnation of the Communist regime of 'toxic lies'. PM Gyurcsány was in attendance at the official ceremony[21].

In the interim, FIDESZ president Orbán was in Strasbourg, making the claim to the European People's Party that the EU needs to sanction governments that refuse to give up their Communist ways and heritage[22]. This statement led to explanations being published by FIDESZ, and then clarifications by the European People's Party[23]. When asked to explain, Orbán said that the Hungarian events of 1956 saved Western nations from having to experience Communism first hand, but that the heritage of Communism was something that the whole of the EU had to combat together[24]. In Hungary, the interpretations of Orbán's Strasbourg speech included the claim that Orbán advocated ending EU subsidies to Hungary[25].

Magyar Nemzet journalists coined the phrase '56 light' to describe what happened and expressed strong concern that 2006 brought clashes between the population and the authorities in a sickening déjà vu: the same streets, with some buildings still showing marks of the 1956 shots, blood on the pavement again. Other commentators suggested that it was nothing short of blasphemy to seek parallels between 1956 and 2006. In fact, the demonstrators of 2006 were led by a sense of freedom of assembly, protesting against a democratically elected government and they clashed with a police force using water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets. Or maybe not exclusively – hence the police brutality trials. The European Commission approached the Hungarian Ministry of Justice for an explanation of police behavior[26]. The Budapest Chief of Police made a statement that police on October 23 acted in ways that broke the laws governing law enforcement[27]. As 2006 ended and 2007 began, the Budapest Police Department lost several lawsuits brought against it for police brutality on October 23, 2006[28]. On the square outside of Parliament, the cordon from October 23 stayed up and got named the 'iron curtain', in a discursive move that solidified the choice of communism and its repudiation as the defining frames of reference.

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[20]   Magyar Hírlap 26 October 2006, p. 1.
[21]   Magyar Nemzet 24 October 2006, p. 4.
[22]   Magyar Hírlap 26 October 2006, p. 1.
[23]   Népszabadság 27 October 2006, p. 1.
[24]   Népszabadság 27 October 2006, p. 2.
[25]   Népszabadság 27 October 2006, p. 2.
[26]   Magyar Nemzet 28 October 2006, p. 4.
[27]   Magyar Nemzet 2 November 2006, p. 4.
[28]   Magyar Nemzet 9 January 2007, p. 1.

The coverage of 2006: discource of breaking news

Monday, September 18, 2006 saw the first reports of what had happened over the weekend. In the analysis that follows, I examine the coverage of events in two major daily newspapers, one left-leaning and one right-leaning: Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet, respectively. While a full presentation of these two newspapers is beyond the scope of this inquiry and would require a proper media sociology study of its own, it is necessary to briefly describe the differences between them. Népszabadság is a privately owned political daily paper today (and also in 2006) but it nonetheless carries with it the legacy of once having been the official publication of the Communist Party. It is an example of the regional trend in which former communist titles survived as titles, with drastic changes in ownership, format and content (Gulyás 2003). In fact, Népszbadság was the most popular quality daily paper in Hungary in the 1990s (Gulyás 2003). Magyar Nemzet, on the other hand, does not have a communist legacy. It started as a publication in the late 1930s, was neither endorsed nor abolished during communism, and continues to this day as a quality daily paper with commitments to civic and conservative values. In the second half of 2006, the time at which the coverage which I analyze here was published, Népszbadság had an average daily circulation of 169 000 while Magyar Nemzet had an average daily circulation of 89 000 (MATESZ).

The coverage from both Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet is analyzed with the help of Atlas.ti, discourse analysis software. The method of analysis is the hybrid that has been used before to combine descriptive counts with emergent categories of analysis to capture meaning-making processes (Kovács 2009). The emergent categories of analysis are codes that iterative readings revealed as regularly re-occurring elements of meaning. This methodology reinforces my allegiance to social constructivist views of language and a discursive conceptualization of human coexistence: "Discursivity means that socio-political meanings come into being, change, are maintained or disappear in language use." (Kovács 2008: 88).

To get a sense of the discursive climate in the fall of 2006, I chose to investigate the onset and to analyze breaking news.[29] Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság are quantitatively comparable enough in their coverage: the coding process yielded 238 quotations in Magyar Nemzet and 266 in Népszabadság. The two newspapers devoted comparable amounts of space to the events and used comparable

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[29] The analysis of the onset of this discourse means that very specific limits are in place: I focus on the meanings that are offered for public uptake. The nature of this inquiry is such that the reception and interpretation of this discourse by the Hungarian public is not a proper object of study at this stage. What the reactions and take-aways were will have to constitute a separate study.

amounts of language. The coding process revealed a total of 22 codes. They are the following:

- admission
- calling for protests
- critique by Gyurcsány
- critique of Gyurcsány
- describing speech
- facts and details
- foretelling protests
- head of government
- issue of resignation
- lying – first person
- lying – third person

- media
- party strategy
- political science
- prime minister
- profanity
- quoting
- recordings
- reporting protests
- scandal
- secrecy
- trying to explain

Table 1: The distribution of these codes in the two newspapers is as follows

code name	number of occur-rences – MAGYAR NEMZET	percentage in MAGYAR NEMZET	number of occurrences – NÉPSZABADSÁG	percentage in NÉPSZABADSÁG
admission	7	2.94	2	0.75
calling for protests	1	0.42	0	0.00
critique by Gyurcsány	20	8.40	57	21.43
critique of Gyurcsány	26	10.92	0	0.00
describing speech	21	8.82	12	4.51
facts and details	3	1.26	18	6.77
foretelling protests	0	0.00	1	0.38
head of government	10	4.20	3	1.13
issue of resignation	8	3.36	6	2.26
lying – first person	5	2.10	6	2.26

lying – third person	17	7.14	10	3.76
media	8	3.36	7	2.63
party strategy	31	13.03	33	12.41
political science	5	2.10	0	0.00
prime minister	16	6.72	5	1.88
profanity	7	2.94	13	4.89
quoting	28	11.76	67	25.19
recordings	14	5.88	4	1.50
reporting protests	0	0.00	19	7.14
scandal	1	0.42	0	0.00
secrecy	7	2.94	3	1.13
trying to explain	3	1.26	0	0.00
total	238	100.00	266	100.00

The dispersion of the discourse in the two papers is not quite the same: there are two empty codes in Magyar Nemzet and five empty codes in Népszabadság – the Népszabadság discourse is less dispersed in that the totality of its language fits into fewer codes. A less dispersed discourse is clearer because elements of meaning and discursive strategies converge in it. Because the difference in dispersion is small, my interpretation is that the Népszabadság discourse is somewhat, though not very significantly, clearer than the Magyar Nemzet discourse.

There are also large strategic differences between the two papers: Magyar Nemzet features expert opinions from political scientists and analysts, while Népszabadság does nothing of the sort. At the same time, Népszabadság ran an interview with PM Gyurcsány, whereas Magyar Nemzet did not. The two papers are different both in terms of what each of them avoids and in terms of what each of them emphasizes.

What each paper avoids can be seen from the codes that are only empty in one but not both papers:

Only empty in Magyar Nemzet
- Foretelling protests
- Reporting protests

Only empty in Népszabadság

- Calling for protests
- Critique of Gyurcsány
- Political science
- Trying to explain
- Scandal

The differences in empty patterns show that the two papers try to avoid different things: Népszabadság wants to avoid criticizing the PM, calling for protests, focusing on/sensationalizing the scandal and claiming expertise. Magyar Nemzet endorses all those strategies but in turn, it focuses away from actually occurring protests.

Where each paper places emphasis, further elucidates their differences. The top five-ranked codes in each paper, where ranking is based on the percentage of total quotations that a given code is responsible for, is as follows:

Top Five Codes in Magyar Nemzet

1. Party strategy – 13.03 % (ranked in both, different ranks)
2. Quoting – 11.76 % (ranked in both, different ranks)
3. Critique of Gyurcsány – 10.92 % (empty in Népszabadság)
4. Describing speech – 8.82 % (not ranked in Népszabadság)
5. Critique by Gyurcsány – 8.40 % (ranked in both, different ranks)

Top Five Codes in Népszabadság

1. Quoting – 25.19 % (ranked in both, different ranks)
2. Critique by Gyurcsány – 21.43% (ranked in both, different ranks)
3. Party strategy – 12.41% (ranked in both, different ranks)
4. Reporting protests – 7.14% (empty in Magyar Nemzet)
5. Facts and details – 6.77% (not ranked in Magyar Nemzet)

The numerically most significant codes show that the two newspapers do in fact share some of their emphasis. Even though the rankings are different by paper, three of the five most significant codes overlap: party strategy, quoting and critique by Gyurcsány. This overlap indicates that basic norms are shared: if the breaking news is about what someone said, lots of quoting will occur. If the news is about

high-level politics, it will be understood in terms of party strategies and maneuvers. Since PM Gyurcsány made the news with a sort of outburst at his own party, the critique he leveled at Hungarian politics, is salient. This is most likely an indication of *de rigueur* professionalism in Hungarian media that some authors would seek as signs of consolidation (Gross 2004; Gulyás 2004; Gulyás 2003).

Nonetheless, the loyalties and orientations of the two newspapers are also evident: while Magyar Nemzet does feature critique **by** Gyurcsány, it does so less frequently than it highlights critiques **of** Gyurcsány by others. All the while Népszabadság does not even feature a single critique **of** Gyurcsány. Both papers reveal loyalties, it is just that their loyalties lie elsewhere. This does not make one better or the other worse (at least not in any way independent from the analyst's own preferences). But quite aside from the issue of left-wing vs. right-wing loyalties, there is a divide where the Népszabadság option is professionalism and the Magyar Nemzet option is deference to authority. Only in Népszabadság does the code for facts and details rank among the most significant, only Népszabadság reports on the protests, while Magyar Nemzet fosters deference to authority including its own authority, by describing speech indirectly rather than quoting it directly, thereby suggesting that readers need not be exposed to direct quotes and paraphrases will suffice.

The differences in day-one coverage, therefore, reveal some features that are to be expected if we accept that journalism creates and does not report, reality (Barnett 2005). Left-leaning Népszabadság does not report criticisms of the Prime Minister, right-leaning Magyar Nemzet reports them more than it reports what actually happened. The striking discovery of this analysis is that the two newspapers practice very different brands of journalism: there is journalism as professionalism and there is journalism as deference to authority. It so happens that professionalism also has a political 'side'. But more importantly, the findings show that journalistic professionalism is not the only paradigm in which newspapers are written in the Hungary of 2006. In other words, how much professionalism one may point to in an effort to find post-communist consolidation indicators, will vary with newspapers and will not yield a clear-cut country-wide answer. This finding informs the inquiry into the relevance of post-communism. As has been shown (Kovács 2009), a perceived relevance of post-communism in a community will co-occur with distinct types of discourse in journalism.

Post-communist relevance?

A paradigm other than journalistic professionalism is one of the guiding principles of reporting in two main daily papers on Monday September 18, 2006 in Hungary. This is significant because it is this alternative paradigm that holds

the key to why an instance of lying or even the possibility of lying is treated in Hungarian discourse so differently from what we would see elsewhere (cf. the works referenced in the Introduction about how George W. Bush was found to have lied to the American public about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, was the subject of journalism and scholarly work documenting this fact, and still held on to the support of at least one third of the population at the time). It is not that Hungarian politics is about morality to an exceptionally large extent. It is not. It is, however, a politics with a specific history and a specific proclivity for referencing that history. It is also a politics with which various newspapers will find different connections. This diversity makes country-wide generalizations about post-communism impossible even at a time when the repudiation of communism was a national leitmotif.

The deferential paradigm of journalism includes deference to history and formational crises of Hungarian consciousness. It is not lying in politics that is a scandal. It is the historical echoes of admitting to lying that are a watershed. Formative, identity-anchoring elements of Hungarian political history made lying significantly different and more unacceptable than in other places and times. Whereas Gyurcsány in another context might have reaped political capital from being a politician who pointed out the existence of a parallel reality that politicians create and which some have called the 'matrix world' (Miller 2004), the context and the history surrounding the revelation led to the ultimate loss of all political capital and even political office.

The question of post-communism in this case is not a luxury of the political analyst – it is the choice of the discourse and the political community in Hungary. Post-communism is the self-appointed frame of reference and lying is the existential essence of the regime that sent in the Soviet tanks and hanged 18-year-olds. The anniversary reaction overrides future-orientedness, moral outrage pushes aside budget issues. Joe Wilson shouting 'you lie' to President Obama will easily be forgotten before 2006 fades because 1956 will not be allowed to fade[30]. Not that is should be. But it certainly will not be.

While history and memory anchor Hungarian identity, they do not do so uniformly. Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet reveal journalistic paradigms and strategies that are dissimilar enough to render moot any attempt at blanket statements.[31] Teleological and/or essentializing claims about media landscapes are

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[30]   For an account of Joe Wilson's outburst, see http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/09/joe. wilson, last accessed July 17, 2010.

[31]   The differences between Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet are such a strong presence in Hungarian imagination that they make their appearance in a variety of venues: Yale history professor emerita Eva Balogh devoted a long and detailed post to the comparison of the two papers on her blog entitled Hungarian Spectrum on October 15, 2010. See http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2010/10/

problematic – just as kindred claims about any political institution in Eastern Europe may turn out to be.

Epilogue

In March 2009, Gyurcsány resigned as Prime Minister[32]. In April 2010, FIDESZ defeated MSZP in a sweeping victory, capturing enough votes in Parliament to have a two-thirds majority that is required to amend the constitution.[33] It is undoubtedly true that the events of 2006 contributed to the events of 2010. The four years between those two elections were a parliamentary cycle during which Hungarian discourse, at the hands of very privileged meaning-makers of high politics, moved in a paradigm of communism and its repudiation. While it remains an essentializing Othering strategy for social science to view Hungary (and other countries of the region) first and foremost (or exclusively) in terms of post-communism, authentic analysis must recognize the over-arching discursive strategy from within. In 2006, in addition to the diversity of journalistic paradigms, Hungarian discourse in right-wing authority-centered journalism as well as in left-wing professional journalism were posited on communism/post-communism. Othering and Orientalism remained self-imposed[34]: two leading daily papers used the communist past of Hungary as a leitmotif. This seems to warrant the essentializing move of understanding and analyzing the whole country and political culture as post-communist. The differences in the discourses of the two papers, however, reveal what may be lost by relying on the oversimplifying monolithic perspective of post-communism.

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[32] HVG, 28 March 2009, pp. 6-10.

[33] For a breakdown of how parliamentary seats were assigned after the run-off elections in April 2010, please see http://electionresources.org/hu - last accessed July 14, 2010.

[34] Self-imposed versions of Othering and Orientalism have been diagnosed in interactions with the European Union prior to accession by applicants (Kovács 2006) but here, they appear without interaction with an outside entity like the EU.

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Spatial Analysis of the Polish Parliament 2007–2010

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Abstract: *The following work presents a comprehensive analysis of the Polish parliamentary elections in 2007 and subsequent formation of coalitional government and it's policy choice from the public choice perspective. The aim of this work is to apply spatial competition approach and public choice research on coalitional bargaining to the case of Polish parliamentary elections. On the basis of valence model equilibrium predictions we find that for two parties the Downsian behavior is not likely. Second part of the empirical study deals with coalitional behavior, and again we find strategic behavior of the LiD party. The uncovered set and Schattschneider set are analyzed in comparison with the pension system reform conducted in 2007–2009. It turns out that theoretical predictions made with the use of cooperative game theoretical concepts correspond well with the actual policy choice.*

Keywords: *spatial competition, Poland, coalition formation*

Introduction

Poland is a very young modern democracy. The first partially free election took place in 1989, when just 35% of the seats in Sejm and all the seats in the Senate were assured to be freely elected. The first entirely free election was conducted in 1991. Up until 2007 only 7 parliamentary elections have taken place. Although historical events still play a major role in determining the shape of the political competition and its differing ideologies, recent literature shows that Central European party systems develop similarly to Western Europe and are in many aspects, such as volatility or longevity of governments, comparable or even better (see e.g. Kubát 2010). The issue of comparison of Central European democracies with more mature democratic European countries has recently gained much attention from political science scholars.

Aim of this paper is to verify whether it is possible to apply modern economic techniques to the case of Poland, which seems still be developing in terms of legal rules concerning election as well as in terms of the actual shape of the political scene (see Kubát 2006) for a further discussion of electoral reforms in Poland). In particular we want to explore if Poland's political structures – which are widely derived from other countries and which use imported constitutional solutions – would develop in a manner similar to other countries' historical development. Moreover, it is often argued that Polish politicians are not yet 'professional', as they don't use modern public relations research and furthermore a political culture in general is

not yet fully established. Use of a Downsian approach can to some extent verify this hypothesis.

A second motivation for this research was the fact that there is little literature on this topic. Known applications of the spatial model include Great Britain, the Netherlands, Israel and Russia. A recent working paper of Schofield et al. (2010) introduced spatial approach for the case of Poland. Authors present results of MNL models with valence applied to elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. There are, however significant differences between their and our approach, besides the obvious fact that we analyze elections in 2007, rather than the previous ones.

First of all, Schofield et al. (2010) do not directly evaluate party positions, but use the average of the positions of the voters for each party. Second of all, we provide a much deeper analysis of strategic behavior of parties, which is an important factor for LiD and PSL on a basis of post–electoral circumstances and particularly important effect of *cohabitation*. Third of all, we provide a formal argumentation for the fact that results of only a sample estimation of vote shares are insufficient for predicting electoral results in Poland, because of the unequal effect of abstentions.

A rare example of game–theoretical approach to modelling coalitional politics in Poland is Sosnowska (2000), which analyzes pre–election polls before 1997 parliamentary election and for each poll uses Shapley values and modified Shapley values to predict post–electoral coalition formation.

The aim of this paper is to begin to fill this gap and apply contemporary public choice research to an interesting new case. The goal of this work is to prove whether the theory of spatial competition is suitable for explaining parliamentary elections in Poland. Specifically, two major spatial competition issues and some auxiliary hypotheses are analyzed. First, we explore whether a multi-party probabilistic model can be used to model the Polish political scene, in particular to model the results of the 2007 election. We evaluate a number of models of spatial competition: a pure probabilistic model, a one, in which we additionally control for social characteristics of voters and two valence models. First we test how many spatial dimensions characterize the political competition. Two dimensions are shown to be sufficient to model Poland's political scene: a one which can be associated with economic policy and the second that captures religious concerns and world–view. These results remain in correspondence with the literature (see e.g. Markowski 2006). The pure probabilistic model turns out to be inferior in Poland's case compared to the one in which we add voters' characteristics. However, neither of these models takes into account the non-spatial characteristics of the competing parties and it is argued that for at least some parties, non-spatial characteristics should be further researched. That is why we estimate spatial models with valence. On a basis of it, it is possible to check, with the use of findings of Schofield (2007) whether

parties are in equilibrium positions. We conclude this section with finding that for one of the analyzed parties, namely LiD non–Downsian behavior is most probable.

In the second part of the study we address the issue of abstentions, which are shown to play a major role in explaining discrepancy between theoretical predictions from spatial models estimated on a basis of only a sample of voters and actual vote shares of parties obtained in 2007 election. The third part of the empirical study concentrates on the post–election behavior of the parties, as well as on the coalitional bargaining that took place and its impact on the post–election positioning using various cooperative game–theoretical concepts. Post–election behavior is also illustrated with a case study of the pension system reform conducted in 2007–2009. By this we show that simple cooperative game theory instruments reasonably well correspond with actually observed political behavior. It is predicted, both on a basis of pre–election and post–election policy choices that for some parties, strategic behavior may play a strong role in choosing their manifested ideal point, whereas for the other parties the pure Downsian approach adequately explains their observed position.

Models of pre-election competition

Data

The data were obtained from the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS – Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej). The research was conducted in 2007 and includes 1385 individual observations. After excluding observations lacking data, and those for which respondents did not plan to vote in the election, the sample was reduced to 579 observations. Respondents were asked questions about their economic and political concerns, electoral preferences and their own characteristics. To map the ideological preferences of the voters, seven questions were asked, each eliciting an opinion about an important social or economic matter. Respondents were asked to place their answers on a scale between 1 and 7. The questions are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Questions about political and economic issues

Question	Answers
A	1) Crime should be fought toughly, even if it hinders civil rights
	7) Crime should be fought in a way that does not hinder civil rights
B	1) Unemployment is harmful to the economy and should be stopped
	7) A little unemployment can be profitable for the economy

C	1) The Catholic Church should be separate from the state and should not influence politics
	7) The Catholic Church should have a major influence on politics
D	1) Public figures should provide statements as to whether they collaborated with the People's Republic of Poland security apparatus
	7) Public figures should not have to provide statements as to whether they collaborated with the People's Republic of Poland security apparatus
E	1) Only select public companies should be privatized
	7) As many as possible public companies should be quickly privatized
F	1) The state should provide high levels of public services, such as health care and education
	7) Citizens should be responsible for providing themselves with education, healthcare etc.
G	1) Richer people should pay higher fraction of their income in taxes
	7) Everyone should pay the same tax rate, regardless of income.
H	1) Abortion should be absolutely forbidden
	7) Abortion should be allowed without restriction.
I	1) Poland should aim towards the highest possible degree of integration into the European Union
	7) Poland should keep a high degree of autonomy within the European Union

Answers to the above questions were then rescaled in such a way that they lie within a (−1;1) scale. On a basis of the answers, a factor analysis was conducted to find the main factors that lie behind the given answers. As expected there was a strong socio–political factor that describes the attitude of the responder towards the church. Table 2 presents the loadings of each answer.

Table 2: Loadings of answers

	Factor 1	Factor 2
A	0.252	0.225
B	0.447	–
C	0.107	-0.614
D	0.223	0.245
E	0.409	–
F	0.579	–
G	0.478	–

H	0.224	0.459
I	-0.291	–
SS loadings	1.105	0.799
Proportion Var	0.123	0.089
Cumulative Var	0.123	0.212
χ^2 – Test	p-value=0.0517	

It may be noted that the first factor may be associated with an economic state control vs. economic liberalism scale, with a high impact of responses to questions B, E, F and G. The second factor describes respondents' world–view as conservative or liberal. In the second factor, we find a particularly high impact of responses to questions C and H, questions that described the views of the respondent on the role of church and abortion. Apart from the economic dimension, these world–view questions turned out to be, as predicted, the main ideological issue and the deciding factor in shaping Polish politics. X^2 test, which null hypothesis is that two factors are enough to describe major part, shows that is hypothesis cannot be rejected. We assume thus in further study that the issue space is spanned in two dimensions. For a deeper analysis of the latter statement a regression was conducted which investigated the impact of each ideological factor on how the voters place their views on the left vs. right scale (1 denoting left–wing, 7 right–wing outlook).

Table 3: Impact of factors on the left/right self–perception

Left/Right	Coef.	SE	t	*P>|t|*	95 % Conf. Interval	
Factor 1**	-.358	.158	-2.26	0.024	-.669	-.047
Factor 2**	-.345	.149	-2.31	0.022	-.639	-.051
Const.***	4.745	.206	23.05	0.000	4.34	5.15
Prob>F=0.0084						
Adjusted R^2=0.016						

*Significance: *** - 0.01, ** - 0.05, * - 0.1*

Both factors have highly significant impacts on the respondents' self–perception. Liberal economic views cause voters to place themselves as left–wing. Similarly, approval of separating church from state, and support for abortion availability places respondents on the left side of the political spectrum.

Political parties and voters

In the 2007 election, three parties and one parliamentary group were able to gain seats in the parliament. The names, abbreviations, votes obtained and seats obtained are presented in the table 4[1]. This paper does not include the German Minority Party which has obtained one or two seats in the parliament since 1991, and which obtains the great majority of their votes in the south–western part of Poland. As the national minority representative it is excluded from having to pass the threshold. Traditionally, the German Minority supports the government regardless of its political stance.

Table 4: Parties in the parliament

Name	Abbreviation	Votes in %	Seats
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic Platform)	PO	41.51	209
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)	PSL	8.91	31
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)	PIS	32.11	166
Lewica i Demokraci (Left and Democrats)	LiD	13.15	53
Mniejszość Niemiecka (German Minority)	*MN*	0.20	1

How to evaluate party positions is an important methodological concern for political studies. We decided to directly survey party representatives, for we believe they are experts with regards to their own party's stances. As mentioned earlier, we used the same set of questions on political and economic issues as was presented to the voters. In cases where no answer was given, the missing values were estimated on the basis of parties' manifestos, by directly comparing sentences in them with our questionnaire.

What is even more important, actual policy choices of parties can be misunderstood by voters, and the perception of positions may differ from the actual ones. Since the perception is what voters will take into account in their electoral choices this might lead to a bias in the results. There is no reason to believe, that this bias should be in a particular direction in case of the analyzed parties. We therefore assume that, even if there exists misperception of voters' assessment of parties' positions, it is random and on average should not affect the results as it will be fully captured by the error term in the probabilistic model.

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[1]   Lewica i Demokraci consists of four social–democratic parties: the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL), the Labour Union (UP) and the Democratic Party (SD).

This work only includes parties that were able to receive seats in Sejm in the election of 2007. Table 5 presents ideological positions of parties.

Table 5: Parties' positions

	PO	PSL	PIS	LiD
A	7	7	1	7
B	5	2	1	3
C	1	2	7	1
D	2	2	1	1
E	2	3	2	1
F	3	1	1	1
G	7	1	1	1
H	3	2	1	7
I	1	2	7	1

We used factors' loadings obtained from the study of voters' positions to transform these, such that they are placed in the same issue space. These will be used in the construction of the spatial model in the next section.

Density and spatial placement of parties

On a basis of factor loadings, ideological scores were obtained for each voter. These were combined to give an ideal point for each voter in two policy dimensions. We call the first dimension "Economic" and the second "Religious". The findings of our factor analysis are in line with less formal political science research on the two dimensional space of competition for Poland, as presented e.g. in Markowski (2010). The lower value of the economic dimension indicates support for a higher level of interventionism in the economy. Low levels along the religious dimension suggest support for secularism, whereas high values mean support for a high degree of involvement for Catholic values in public life. Based on location of ideal points, in order to visualize positions of electors we estimated a two–dimensional kernel density of voters' positions, with an axis–aligned bivariate normal kernel. The graph illustrating the estimated density for the two factors is presented in figure 1.

Figure 1: Density of voters' positions

The majority of voters are concentrated in the quarter of the ideological space representing left–wing economic views, therefore supporting high state control over the economy and a conservative world–view. The latter result suggests that Catholic values are widely held, and that voters expect the church to play a strong role in political life. At first glance, parties' positions presented in table 5 suggest that parties fit into these popular opinions quite well. The scorings for each party serve as the ideal points for parties' positions and are used in further analysis. Figure 2 presents parties' positions estimated on a basis of factor analysis in comparison with the density of voters' positions.

Figure 2: Voters' and parties' positions

From figure 2 it can be at the first glance observed that all the parties are quite well positioned in the ideological space, and as expected all, except for LiD are in support for Catholic Church values. The peak of the distribution is occupied by the PSL, which places itself in the center of the economic dimension. The party

on the left of the religiosity scale is the LiD, whereas the other three competitors are placed in the more conservative part of this ideological space. The LiD need not compete with other parties for the religious left–wing oriented voters and should capture the votes of all electors located at the bottom–left corner of the distribution. The other three parties are almost collinear along the religiosity scale, and they compete primarily in one dimension – the economic one.

The model based on spatial theory

The profile of voters' ideal points $(x_i)_{i \in N}$ and the profile of party positions $(\phi_j)_{j \in K}$ are combined to obtain the distance (in this case a Euclidean norm was calculated) of each voter from every party, producing an array $(\delta_{ij})_{i \in N}^{j \in K}$ The voting intentions of the electors are represented with a matrix $(y_{ij})_N^K$ in which $y_{ij} = 1$ if voter i voted for party j in the 2007 election and 0 otherwise. Probability matrix representing probability that i votes for j must be calculated (the realization of which is obtained by maximum likelihood estimation).

The pure spatial model

The pure spatial theory of electoral competition assumes:

$$(1) \; \chi_{ij} = \Pr(u_{ij} > u_{i1} \text{ for all } 1 \neq j) = \Pr(\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_j < \beta(\delta_{i1}^2 - \delta_{ij}^2 : 1 \neq j)$$

In econometric terms, specification of a pure spatial model is

$$(2) \; u_{ij} = X_{ij}\beta + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where:
u_{ij} – utility of voter i from party j,
X_{ij} – vector of characteristics specific to party j with respect to voter i,
ε_{ij} – the error term.

The difference between alternative specific multinomial probit and conditional logit models is the distribution of the error term. In case of the MNP model we have $\varepsilon_{ij} \sim N(\mu, \sum)$, whereas in the MNL specification ε_{ij} is Type I Extreme Value distributed. The importance of this difference is the IIA hypothesis. Previous studies of electoral competition, such as e.g. Schofield et al. (1998) used the MNP approach as they conjectured the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption of the logit model might influence the results if alternatives are close. However, a recent work by Dow and Endersby (2004) shows that in reality the difference is insignificant for the purpose of electoral studies. We assume that concerning the fact that parties in our case are located reasonably away from each other, the IIA assumption should not play a major role. Another reason in favor

of the MNL approach is that it, unlike the MNP allows for making equilibrium predictions on a basis of estimation results. In case of multinomial probit models this constitutes a highly complex computational task, for which no method has yet been found.

Valence MNL model

$$(3)\ u_{ij} = \lambda_j + X_{ij}\beta + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where:

u_{ij} – utility of voter *i* from party *j*,

λ – valence of a party *j*,

X_{ij} – vector of characteristics specific to party *j* with respect to voter *i*,

ε_{ij} – is Type I Extreme Value distributed.

Constant term in the third specification reflects *valence*, that is non–spatial characteristics of parties, such as the perception of the quality of the political leader, which as first introduced by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000).

Voter–specific valence MNL model

$$(4)\ u_{ij} = \lambda_j + \varphi_j a_i + X_{ij}\beta + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where:

u_{ij} – utility of voter *i* from party *j*,

λ – valence of a party *i*,

a_i – vector of characteristics unique to voter *i*,

X_{ij} – vector of characteristics specific to party *j* with respect to voter *i*,

ε_{ij} – is Type I Extreme Value distributed.

This most general specification captures both valence as well as voter–specific features.

Estimation results

Pure spatial model

First the pure spatial model was estimated. Since some authors argue that independence of irrelevant alternatives might be problematic, for the purpose of comparison we additionally fitted a pure multinomial probit model (MNP) using a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) implemented by the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) algorithm in order to compute the multidimensional integral.

Results of the estimation are presented in table 6. We observe that the sample vote shares fit quite well with the actual election results, except for the case of PIS, for which the actual result turned out to be much worse than in the presented sample. Possible reasons for this are analyzed in the following subsections.

Table 6: The pure MNL model results

Party	Choice	Coef.[2]	S.E.	z	*P>|z|*
	Spatial Distance	-.353***	.056	-6.29	0.000
		Predicted vote share	Sample vote share	Actual vote share	
PO		40.86	39.64	41.51	
PSL		9.31	8.59	8.91	
PIS		37.59	39.14	32.11	
LiD		12.24	12.6	13.15	

Table 7: The pure MNP model results

Party	Choice	Coef.[3]	S.E.	z	*P>|z|*
	Spatial Distance	-.426***	.124	-3.44	0.001
		Predicted vote share	Sample vote share	Actual vote share	
PO		40.86	39.64	41.51	
PSL		9.31	8.59	8.91	
PIS		37.59	39.14	32.11	
LiD		12.24	12.6	13.15	

Voter–specific models

Table 8 presents description of variables used in the voter–specific model. Table 9 present results obtained from the MNL voter–specific model. In addition to the spatial distance, individual characteristics, that is education level and size of town of residence act as independent variables.

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[2] Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
[3] Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent

Table 8: Voter–specific variables

Name		
dist	Spatial distance	
Town	Size of town categorical variable	1 – country ⋮ 6 – city over 500.000 inhabitants
Education	Education categorical variable	1 – incomplete primary education ⋮ 11 – higher education (Master's degree)

In the first step of voter–specific variables selection we compared diverse specifications with the use of information criteria, and concluded that the two above presented should be used in the following regressions.[4]

Table 9: The MNL voter–specific model results

Party	Choice	Coef.[5]	S.E.	Z	*P>|z|*
	Spatial Distance	-.476***	.069	-6.90	0.000
PIS		(base alternative)			
PO	Town	.100**	.048	2.08	0.038
	Education	.056**	.026	2.15	0.032
PSL	Town	-.433***	.102	-4.23	0.000
	Education	-.010	.039	-0.27	0.786
LiD	Town	.012	.064	0.20	0.842
	Education	-.081**	.037	-2.18	0.029
		Predicted vote share	Sample vote share	Actual vote share	
	PO	40.86	39.64	41.51	
	PSL	9.31	8.59	8.91	
	PIS	37.59	39.14	32.11	
	LiD	12.24	12.6	13.15	

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[4]   We expected religiosity to play a role in electoral decisions, but it turned out insignificant in tested specifications. Apparently, religious views are already fully captured by ideological positions of voters.

[5]   Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent

Here we will not report full estimation results of the voter–specific MNP model, which do not differ substantially for the MNL estimates. However, it is worthwhile to present marginal effects calculations obtained from this specification (table 10).

Table 10: The voter–specific MNP model – marginal effects

Alternatives				
Variable Spatial distance	PIS	PO	PSL	LiD
PIS	-.083	.104	.003	.030
PO	.080	-.111	.007	1.e-194
PSL	.003	.007	-.010	.001
LiD	1.2e-12	2.e-194	3.e-195	-.030
Case variables				
Town	-.010	.042	-.027	.006
Education	-.009	.008	.003	.001

The voter–specific model describes the shape of Polish politics well. For the two major parties the highest change in voting probability can be associated with the spatial distance and less with other characteristics. Out of all the candidates, the spatial distance coefficient is highest for these two parties. The factor that distinguishes between the electorate of the PO and the PIS is the town size and education. The electorate of the PO consists of inhabitants of bigger cities with relatively higher education in comparison with those voting for PIS. These two factors seem to determine the opinions of voters in the analyzed dimensions, since the spatial distance term has particularly strong marginal effect for PO and PIS. Negative coefficient on the town size for PSL is associated with this party being considered agrarian.

The conclusive observation that can be made is that for the two biggest parties the marginal effect of spatial distance on voting probability is strong, whereas for the other two parties it is negligible. The latter parties, as already noted, are characterized by non–spatial issues that have a greater impact on their results than their actual spatial positions do. In this sense the "Downsian" hypothesis is not particularly important to the case of the LiD and PSL parties, since big changes in spatial positions lead to only a small loss or gain of votes. With regards to the PSL, it should be noted that the strongest marginal effect exists against the PO party, therefore the potential movements of this party in the political space at most affect the division of votes between the PSL and the PO. As for the PO and the PIS, spatial

movements lead to big differences in predicted vote shares. It would therefore be rational for them to position themselves as close as possible to the equilibrium positions, since losses of votes may outweigh the potential strategic gain for the purposes of further coalitional bargaining.

The two parties for which strategic behavior is probable in the context of coalitional bargaining are LiD and PSL. With regards to the PSL it must be pointed out that members of this party were members of 6 out of 12 cabinets since 1989, with both left as well as right–wing coalitional partners. In this sense, the position of this party may be considered suitable for becoming a member of diverse cabinets. Strategic behavior of the PSL party is therefore highly probable, combined with the weak marginal effect of spatial distance. We shall return to this observation in the post–election analysis.

Valence model

Third model in question is the spatial valence model, as defined by Schofield (2007). Results of the estimation are reported in table 11.

Table 11: The MNL valence model results

Party	Choice	Coef.[6]	S.E.	Z	P>|z|
	Spatial Distance	-.471***	.076	-6.18	0.000
PIS		(base alternative)			
PO	Valence	0.670***	.139	4.79	0.001
PSL	Valence	-1.08***	.163	-6.66	0.000
LiD	Valence	-.619***	.161	-3.83	0.000
		Predicted vote share	Sample vote share	Actual vote share	
	PO	40.86	39.64	41.51	
	PSL	9.31	8.59	8.91	
	PIS	37.59	39.14	32.11	
	LiD	12.24	12.6	13.15	

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[6]   Significance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent

Voter–specific MNL with valence

Table 12: The voter specific MNL with valence results

	Spatial Distance	-.453***	.077	-5.82	0.000
PIS		(base alternative)			
PO	Town	.109**	.053	2.04	0.042
	Education	.064**	.035	1.84	0.066
	Valence	-.098	.297	-0.33	0.740
PSL	Town	-.452***	.116	-3.90	0.000
	Education	-.020	.055	-0.36	0.716
	Valence	.063	.387	0.16	0.870
LiD	Town	.144*	.075	1.92	0.055
	Education	.038	.049	0.78	0.434
	Valence	-1.32***	.383	-3.46	0.001
		Predicted vote share	Sample vote share	Actual vote share	
	PO	40.86	39.64	41.51	
	PSL	9.31	8.59	8.91	
	PIS	37.59	39.14	32.11	
	LiD	12.24	12.6	13.15	

On a basis of the MNL model with valence we estimated vote probabilities for each party based on the economic views of the voters. Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the vote share functions for all parties[7]. We may observe that the probability of voting for the Civic Platform party increases along with increasing economic liberalism, up to over 0.5 for those supporting the minimal interventionism. The vote share remains fairly constant along the second spatial dimension – religiosity – for each of the three parties: PO, PSL and PIS. In fact, these three candidate parties are almost collinear in this dimension. The religious dimension should influence the probability of votes going to LiD, which is also clear from inspection of figure 6. We shall elaborate on the impact of each policy dimension later on.

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[7] Smoothed vote share functions on a basis of predicted probabilities. Smoothing with the use of thin spline regression with diverse smoothing parameters λ for clarity of presentation. Note that the vote share figure for LiD is rotated, in order to better visualize the change in vote share along the religious dimension.

*Figure 3: Estimates of vote shares for the Civic Platform party (PO)*

Figure 4: Estimates of vote shares for the Polish People's Party (PSL)

Figure 5: Estimates of vote shares for the Law and Justice party (PIS)

Figure 6: Estimates of vote shares for the Left and Democrats (LiD)

In the case of the Law and Justice party (PIS) the probability of voting increases along with support for state control up to the maximal value of over 0.5. A possible reason for this is that the PIS is considered a populist party, and therefore aims to be perceived as providing a high amount of social benefits. The probability of voting for the Democratic Left Alliance party (LiD) also slightly increases in the economic dimension; therefore left–wing oriented voters would typically vote for this party. Most clear is the effect of support for secular values on the vote share function for this party. The specificity of the Polish political scene causes a lack of competition between PIS and LiD. LiD is perceived as post–communist, no matter what their actual values are, whereas the PIS is typically associated with traditional values and conservatism. The two parties are placed on far opposite ends of the religiosity scale. However, what is particularly important for the case of LiD is that their probability reaches a local maximum on the liberal end of the economic scale. The latter fact may be associated with the misperception of the party position described in more detail in the appendix.The major problem in predicting vote shares of parties with the use of a small sample of voters who actually took part in the 2007 election, is that is does not account for unequal effect of abstentions for electoral results. In the case of our sample, it is clear that vote share, obtained only on a basis of voters who went to the polls is overestimated for PIS. A major argument that can help explain the result is that the 2007 election was a pre–term election after two years of a coalition formed by the PIS and two minor parties (which did not receive seats in the parliament after 2007) that eventually resigned as a result of not being able to successfully govern. The strong impression of disappointment associated with the PIS after this may have resulted in far lower result than that suggested by the spatial position of the party, which actually seems to be best fitted to the ideal points of the

voters. We conjecture that voters whose ideologies were well represented by this party decided to abstain, because there were dissatisfied with it's past performance. We associate this result with potentially uneven effect of abstentions between the two major parties, and we shall turn back to a more formal analysis of this effect later on.

Table 13: Information crite

	LL	AIC	BIC
Pure spatial MNL model	-784.541	1571.084	1576.833
Pure spatial MNP model	-692.892	1397.785	1432.281
Voter–specific MNL model	-666.4099	1346.82	1387.065
Valence MNL model	-681.8814	1371.763	1394.76
Voter–specific valence MNL model	-658.6313	1337.263	1394.756

On a basis of the AIC information criterion we choose the voter–specific MNL model for the purpose of further analysis. Value of the Schwarz criterion is slightly higher, for it punishes the voter–specific valence model for low increase in likelihood compared to voter–specific pure model and at the same time substantial loss in degrees of freedom. Including valence allows us to make use of findings of Lin et al. (1999) and Schofield (2007) to make predictions about equilibrium positions. Moreover it seems to be a more valid description for the analyzed case, because of already mentioned negative popular image of the PIS party and post–communist view associated with LiD.

Predictions from the valence model

Our choice to concentrate on the valence model is motivated by the possibility of application of results of Schofield (2007) to find a theoretical equilibrium of the model. For the details of the theorem used in the following calculations for the case of Polish parliament 2007-2010, please refer to Schofield (2007). Referring back to table 12 we find that the lowest valence party is LiD and that the β coefficient equals 0.453. Covariance matrix of voters' position is

$$\nabla_0^* = \begin{bmatrix} 0.983 & 0.071 \\ 0.071 & 0.351 \end{bmatrix}.$$

As follows we calculate the characteristic matrix for the LiD party:

$$\rho_{LiD} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(1.32) + \exp(1.32 + 0.098) + \exp(1.32 - 0.063)} \cong 0.08,$$

$$C_{LiD} = (2 \cdot 0.453(1 - 2 \cdot 0.08)) \begin{bmatrix} 0.983 & 0.071 \\ 0.071 & 0.351 \end{bmatrix} - I = \begin{bmatrix} -0.255 & -0.053 \\ -0.053 & 0.734 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Two eigenvalues of the C_{LiD} matrix are equal −0.249 and −0.740 for the economic and religious dimension respectively. Corresponding eigenvectors are $(-0.994, 0.109)^T$ and $(-0.109, 0.994)^T$.

Positions of voters and parties, as visualized in figures, are presented after a varimax rotation of the factor loadings, thus it is not surprising that the eigenvectors are almost parallel to the economic and religious dimension axes. We first tested for whether a covariance matrix is diagonal. $\chi^2(1)$test value of 34.58 shows that the diagonality hypothesis has to be rejected at 1% level. For this case as noted by Schofield (2007) by a transformation of coordinates, we can choose respective variances in each dimension to be the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix for agent with the smallest valence, and let these be the new 'principal components' of the electoral covariance matrix. We shall call the principal electoral axis, the eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue with higher absolute value, so in other words with higher variance of the transformed issue space, whereas the perpendicular axis will be called a minor electoral axis. In order to visualize these results, we present in figure 9 the density of voters' positions, positions of parties and electoral axes crossing the mean of the distribution of preferences. The almost horizontal line corresponds to the main electoral axis along the economic dimension and the vertical is the orthogonal minor axis. Both eigenvalues are negative which means that, if all other parties stay at the electoral origin, than the joint origin fulfills the necessary condition to be a LSNE for the analyzed model. In order to check the sufficient condition we calculate the total electoral variance and the convergence coefficient as follows:

$$c = 2\beta(1 - \rho_{LiD})trace\nabla_0^* \cong 1.01 > 1.$$

Value of the convergence coefficient is slightly over 1, indicating that the sufficient condition for convergence is not fulfilled. It is related to high variance of preferences in the economic dimension, and what follows only a very weakly concave vote share function (eigenvalue equal −0.249). Although this fact does not *sensu stricto* preclude convergence to the joint origin, when we recall vote share functions shape, we must conclude that it is unlikely along the axis associated with the economic dimension.

Figure 7: Density of voters' positions, parties locations and electoral axes

Along both axes, the gradient of parties' vote shares functions points towards the joint origin. However, as can be already inferred from the shape of distribution of preferences, which are more dispersed in the economic dimension, and also from absolute values of eigenvalues of the characteristic matrix, along the blue axis convergence is weaker. High concavity of probability functions aligned with the minor axis implies that parties should be located close to or at the major electoral axis. This is the case for three parties – PO, PSL and PIS, whereas the lowest valence party – LiD is located far away from the major axis. What can be inferred from conditions provided by Schofield (2007), we should have that the lowest valence party in the local equilibrium located closest to the origin and higher valence parties further away. The LiD party, as expected, remains close to the joint origin along the major electoral axis. Other parties' valences are almost equal (for PO and PSL these were not significantly different from zero) so in the local equilibrium they should be located in more or less equal distances from the joint origin. Along the second electoral axis convergence is strong for three parties: PSL, PIS and PO, who place themselves very close to the position of mean religious ideology. The case of LiD, considering the historical context (presented in more detail in section 2) is not surprising. Lack of convergence in the religious dimension is an understandable consequence of being policy–oriented along this dimension. This result (together with analysis of post–electoral behavior in section 5 leads us to the conclusion that LiD is not a vote–maximizing party in the religious dimension of competition.

The problem of abstentions

Voter turn-out in the election of 2007 barely exceeded 50% (53.88%).

There are three potential explanations for low turnout directly arising from the original spatial voting theory. These are alienation, indifference and differences in the cost of voting. Fourth hypothesis is the impact of non–spatial characteristics of parties, which is not directly included in the pure spatial model.

We test hypotheses of non–spatial characteristics of parties and impact of cost of voting on turnout in one specification. As already noted, we observe electoral choices only for individuals that planned to take part in the upcoming election. Ideological positions are, however observed for the whole sample of individuals. To solve this problem, we proceed in a following way. On a basis of a valence voter–specific spatial model we make probability predictions for out–of–sample observations. If we assume that the voter–specific valence model generates electoral choices of voters in the whole population, these out–of–sample predictions will be unbiased. Table 14 presents summary statistics of voting probabilities in the two groups.

Table 14: Probabilities for voters and abstainer

	Voters	Abstainers	Equality of means t-Test
PIS	39.71	44.73	-4.68[8]
PO	39.00	32.28	3.54[9]
PSL	8.85	11.14	-4.18[10]
LiD	12.43	11.83	1.80
No. Obs.	579	259	

The main problem connected with voter abstention is how it actually influences the results of the election. We observed that the probability obtained from the spatial model for the Law and Justice party differs substantially from their actual result. If abstention had on average the same effect for every party, this would not cause the results to differ between the whole population and the sample that actually voted and this was not true in the 2007 election. According to the CBOS report on identification (CBOS Report BS/34/2007) the PO party is perceived by 40% of voters, and the PIS party by 39% of voters, as best "representing their (voter) interests" These two parties are the only ones that are more often than not perceived

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[8]   Rejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PIS are is the abstainers group.
[9]   Rejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PO are is the voters group.
[10] Rejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PSL are is the abstainers group.

as well representing the opinions of voters. However, PO is characterized with a positive average of grades, whereas PIS has a negative average, meaning that for the case of PO we may state that the strength of their support is higher than that of their opponents, whereas in the case of PIS the relation is the opposite. Therefore, we may predict that among the 50% of people who actually go and place their ballot, the fraction of PO–supporters would be higher. Moreover the fraction of PIS opponents has increased by 12 percentage points since 2005, again supporting the hypothesis that this party has disappointed the public with their poor performance in the governing coalition during the 2 years prior to the election. These voters may have augmented the group that refused to take part in the election. This fact may contribute to understanding the lack of correspondence between predicted probabilities and the actual ones. We shall now test this hypothesis in a formal way. As expected, t-Test results presented in table 14 show that the hypothesis of equal probabilities for PO, PIS and PSL between groups of voters and abstainers has to be rejected. For LiD the difference is not statistically significant.

In the second step we run a logit regression of the abstention decision with probabilities, which we obtained in the first step as explanatory variables. Since voting for particular parties has been also related to the size of town, we add interaction terms between probabilities and each level of town size. In the same specification we also include various turnout determinants arising from the rational voter hypothesis and subsequent literature. Average level of income as well as level of education has been found to affect turnout at the polls. Aldrich (1997) states that better educated and wealthier citizens are more likely to vote since they pay more attention to local as well as national politics and this decreases their cost of gathering information about positions of parties. In this, internet access should also affect cost of information, so we add a dummy equaling 1 whenever individual declared she is using internet resources. Impact of age on the probability of going to the polls is a well-established fact in the political science literature (see e.g. Topf 1995), and that the relationship is non–linear, reaching a peak for middle–aged individuals. We control for this by adding age and age squared variables to the regression. Moreover, we add potential effects of sex, religiosity and labor union membership as conjectured in studies of turnout to impact voting behavior. Individuals in the analyzed survey had also a chance to answer two questions directly related to turnout.

1. How would you describe your general level of interest in politics? (in a 1–7 scale, where 1 denotes high interest for politics)

2. Does it make sense to go voting for influencing political outcomes? (1–7 scale; 1 – Voting does not make sense because it does not change anything, 7 – How people vote has a big impact on whether situation of country will change for the better)

These two variables together with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual took part in 2005 elections shall reflect general level of interest of politics. The most interesting variable for the unequal abstentions effect is the one which identifies voter as a potential elector of PIS. Being classified as elector of the Law and Justice party significantly decreases the probability of going to the polls. Table 15 shows marginal effect and elasticity for this variable, and shows that increase in the probability of voting for PIS by 1% is associated with decrease in the probability of going to the polls by 1.58%.

Table 15: Average marginal effect and elasticity – electors of PIS11

	Coeff.	Std. Err.	z.Stat.
dy/dx	-1.5785**	0.732	(-2.15)
$d(\log(y))/d(\log(x))$	-1.2436**	0.591	(-2.10)

Coalitional behavior

In September 2005 after the parliamentary election was held the previous government resigned. The 2005 election was won by the Law and Justice party (PIS), which had a slight advantage over Civic Platform (PO) Results of the election in 2005, the number of seats at the beginning and the end of their term of office and the 2007 results are presented in table 1. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz from the PIS was designated Prime Minister and was expected to form a government within two weeks after the election. His goal was to form a grand coalition of the PIS and PO, but he did not succeed and until May 2006 his cabinet remained a minority government.

Table 16: Results of the election in 2005, the number of seats at the beginning and the end of term of office and the results of the 2007 election

Name	Abbrevia-tion	Seats 2005 start	Seats end	Seats 2007
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic Platform)	PO	133	131	209
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)	PSL	25	27	31

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[11] We do not report here the full estimation results. These are readily accessible from the author on request.

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)	PIS	155	150	166
Samoobrona RP (Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland)	SO	56	41	0
Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)	LPR	34	29	0
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) - 2005, **Lewica i Demokraci** (Left and Democrats) - 2007	SLD, LiD	55	55	53
Mniejszość Niemiecka (German Minority)	MN	2	2	1

In May 2006 a coalition of the PIS, SO and LPR parties was formed and Jarosław Kaczyński – the leader of the PIS – became the prime minister. The SO or Self–Defense party is a left–wing populist party with agrarian roots that maintains a skeptical attitude towards the European Union. The LPR or League of Polish Families party is a nationalist ultra–conservative party, which is often virulently anti–Semitic and associated with neo–Nazi values represented by the "All-Polish Youth" (an ultra-nationalist youth organization whose former leader later became the leader of the LPR party). The only link connecting the three parties' ideologies was their shared skepticism towards the EU and their mutual inability to make an alliance with any other political force. After a substantial number of members of these three governing parties left to become un–associated members or to join other parliamentary parties, the coalition lost its majority (to a sum of 220), was disbanded in 2007 and new election was held. After the two lesser coalition parties failed to obtain seats in the current parliament, the PIS tried to benefit from this fact and moved further along the ideological scale towards conservative values and a left–wing market view.

Table 17: The number of seats in 2007 and 2010

Name	Abbreviation	Seats – 2007	Seats – April 2010
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic Platform)	PO	209	203
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)	PSL	31	28
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)	PIS	166	150
Lewica I Demokraci (Left and Democrats)	LiD	53	-
Lewica (The Left)	Lew	-	40

Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social Democracy of Poland)	SDPL	-	4
Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Democratic Party)	SD	-	3
Polska Plus (Poland Plus)	PP	-	8
Independents	-	-	9
Mniejszość Niemiecka (German Minority)	MN	1	1

In table 17 the sum of seats in April 2010 equals 444 due to the recent death of 14 deputies. Their mandates are to be replaced with candidates who received second–largest number of votes in respective lists. Two additional elected deputies declined to vow affirmation. Poland Plus is a party formed in January 2010 from deputies who crossed the floor from PIS.

The political heart – 2007

Figure 8: The Polish Parliament in 2007 – the uncovered set, the yolk and the heart

Figure 8 presents the location of the heart, the uncovered set, the yolk, winset of the status quo located at the yolk as well as Shapley–Owen power indices of parties (under simple majority rule). The heart is the triangular–shaped area bounded by median lines connecting ideal points of PSL, PO and LiD, marked in the figure with dark–gray lines. A dark—gray round point is the center of the yolk. Yolk, as defined in McKelvey (1986) is the smallest ball in that intersects all median hyperplanes. A formal definition of the uncovered set can be found in McKelvey (1986). Loosely

speaking, it can be said that given points x and y in an issue space and some distribution of ideal points, the point x covers y if and only if x defeats y, x defeats every point y defeats, and x defeats or ties every point y ties. The uncovered set consists of all points that are not covered by any other point. McKelvey (1986) also shows that a circle, centered on the yolk, but with a radius 4 times larger, bounds the uncovered set. Moreover, if the core exists in a particular game it coincides with the uncovered set. Boundaries of the uncovered set are presented with a gray–shaded area in figure 8. Winset of a status–quo located at the center of the yolk consists of three elliptic–shaped areas, marked with thick red lines. We may already observe that winset of the center of the yolk expands beyond boundaries given by median lines, thus it also covers part of the issue space not located within the heart.

Formal definition of Shapley–Owen power indices can be found in Feld and Grofman (1990). Here it is enough to say, that Shapley–Owen value of a particular party is the probability of randomly selecting a line, such that when all other parties are projected on to the line, the party is a median one. High Shapley–Owen power index indicates that a particular party remains close to the political center e.g. defined as a yolk of the coalitional game. Shapley–Owen values indicate a much higher power of PSL than suggested solely by their electoral result. This is due to the central location of their ideal point. Given their position in both dimensions, PIS does not have any power in parliamentary voting. Finally, we observe that the core of the game is empty.

In the case of Poland we observe that the heart is the area within the three median lines crossing the ideal points of the PO, PSL and LiD. We may predict that the government that forms shall include at least one of these parties. Traditionally the party that obtains the highest number of seats is designated to form a coalition; therefore we predict that either a PO/SLD or PO/PSL coalition will form. Of the two, the PO/PSL coalition is the minimum winning coalition. In fact it is also the minimal connected winning coalition along the economic dimension.

The PO and PSL form the actual coalition that has governed Poland since 2007 and this government was able to gain a vote of confidence by a simple majority. It is the one predicted by all the theories cited. However, due to political situation within years 2007-2010 a simple majority was insufficient to pass bills vetoed by the president (a more detailed description of constitutional provisions regarding voting in the parliament is to be found in the appendix), so that in fact a 3/5 majority was be needed. The party that turned out to support the governing coalition is the LiD (with whose votes 289 over the necessary 276 votes can be obtained). Though not formally in the coalition, LiD has turned out to play a pivotal role when it comes to passing acts, since the presidential veto for new bills was almost always assured. Therefore, we may predict that political outcomes that lie not only at the median line for PO and PSL but also in other parts of the heart shall occur. Figure 9 presents 20 randomly

drawn proposals (marked with red crosses), assuming that PO is the agenda setter (which is justified assumption given that the spokesman of the Sejm is a member of this party) based solely on positions of parties and power indices. More precisely, we start the algorithm at PO's ideal point and the next proposal to voted on is a random point chosen form the winset of the previously proposed policy. A substantial number of proposals falls in the proximity of LiD's ideal point, which corresponds well with predictions driven solely from observation of the political rhetoric.

*Figure 9: Randomly drawn proposals with PO as the agenda setter*

Other solution concepts

Economic dimension voting behavior

Figure 10: Voting in the economic dimension

Figure 11: Voting in the economic dimension – 3/5 majority

Figures 10 and 11 present the outcome of one–dimensional deterministic voting on a proposal located at the point equally distant from PO's and PSL's ideal points (marked with a green cross) under simple majority (figure 10) and the 3/5 majority needed to override the presidential veto (figure 11). We believe that strong party discipline present in Polish Sejm allows assuming deterministic voting assumption. The Copeland winner (Copeland 1951), which is a point in the area space with the smallest winset (or in other words Copeland's method is a Condorcet method in which the winner is determined by finding the candidate with the most pairwise victories), is marked with a red point. It can be easily calculated as the weighted average of parties' ideal points with weights being Shapley–Owen values. We conclude that under simple majority rule the Copeland winner along the economic dimension is located exactly at the ideal point of the PSL party which gives it very strong voting power (in terms of the Shapley–Owen index). Whenever the simply majority is insufficient for passing a bill, and a 3/5 majority is needed (i.e. as a result of a presidential veto) the Copeland winner is located more to the right of the economic dimension and voting power is split equally between LiD and PO 15. This again confirms the previously mentioned power of the LiD party to override the veto.

Voting in both dimensions

### *Figure 12: The Schattschneider set*

Figure 12 shows the size and location of the Schattschneider set. A well–known solution concept, which is a dimension–by–dimension median, has a major drawback, that it is not invariant to linear transformation of voter ideal points (see, Shepsle 1979) and Marakulin and Zakharov (2009). This means that the outcome of voting each issue separately may depend on the voting agenda. This also means how one rescales (e.g. by mean of rotating the issues space) factors used to construct ideal points of parties, could result in different predictions. Instead of the dimension–by–dimension median, Feld and Grofman (1988) proposed a solution concept, the Schattschneider set, which consists of all policies that can in some rotation of the issue space represent the median in both dimensions. Moreover, Marakulin and Zakharov (2009) show that a generalized version of the Schattschneider set (formal definition of can be found in Austen-Smith and Banks (2005), which allows for any non–degenerate linear transformations of voters' ideal points for the two–dimensional case coincides with the locally uncovered set of the issue space. We expect the Schattschneider set to be a solution concept, which in a reliable way describes the possible outcome of voting when bills are proposed by both coalitional partners and in both dimensions, since it takes into account the fact that a minor coalitional partner is located centrally, and has a strong impact on proposed policies, and this strength cannot be easily altered by the agenda–setter. Figure 12 shows that the Schattschneider set is located close to the PSL's ideal point, so we expect the bills to be under strong influence of the minor coalitional partner.

Analysis of the pension system reform 2007–2009

Description of the legislative process

To compare findings of the public choice theory as given in section 5 with the actual policy choices we conducted a case–study of the pension system reform. It has been so far the most controversial and one of the most important bills enacted by the current government. Shortly after the election in 2007 government started working on the new law, which would modify rules by which individuals employed in certain industries and types of occupations are allowed to go to early retirement. These occupations include especially difficult and health harming working conditions (such as in heavy industries) and other types of occupations, described in the portrayed act as "of special nature" (air traffic supervisors, emergency and rescue officers etc.). The early retirement bill in force in 2007 enclosed a very broad definition of special working conditions and an extended list of occupations which were entitled to early retirement. The number of workers entitled summed up to roughly 1.2 million (out of total 9.5 million employed).

The key part of the parliamentary debate as well as public consultation was the list of eligible occupations. The government took a position that the list shall be very restricted, to retrench budgetary spending on this issue. The most controversial point of the debate has been abridging most school teachers of the right to go into early retirement. Both opposition parties opted for retaining this right. This as well as other moot points of the described act were subject to public discussion during sittings of the Trilateral Commission for Economic and Social Issues consisting of representatives of the government, labor unions and employers' associations.

Government proposal of the first draft of the amended bill published in May 2008 included a list of 50 occupations eligible for early retirement. The estimated number of entitled individuals was 170,000 employees (Rzeczpospolita 2008). During the next months the list has been elongated and the final draft accepted on 30th of September 2008[12] included the list of occupations, which did not however contain demands of labor unions stipulated during sittings of the Trilateral Commission, which ended in a fiasco. The number of workers entitled rose, however to about 270,000 due to changes in definitions of certain terms and broadening of age qualification (PAP 2008c).

A still unresolved problem was the issue of an early retirement possibility for school–teachers. It has been the most controversial aspect of the proposed bill.

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[12] Available at http://www.premier.gov.pl.

Moreover, it has been particularly important, since by the time the draft was brought up for parliamentary discussion it was clear that Lewica[13] will oppose it unless it contained more privileges for school–teachers (PAP 2008b). It case of a presidential veto, which was almost assured, coalitional government would have to comply with the postulates of the Lewica party to ensure support for the discussed bill.

An additional complication was caused by the fact that the act in force by the end of 2008 would become void at the beginning of 2009, thus in case a new law had not been passed all those eligible for early retirement on the basis of the previous law would have lost their privileges, so the government acted under huge pressure to complete the preparation of the new act by the end of 2008. Nevertheless, the prime minister decided to postpone voting on the the law until the very end of the year, so that if the president had vetoed the new act, political responsibility for a discontinuity of the law would fell on him.

First reading of the new act was held in the parliament on the 17th of October 2008 with immediate motion to dismiss it put forward by Lewica and PIS. According to the press reports on the 20th of October (PAP 2008a), Lewica would oppose the presidential veto provided the government agrees to add school–teachers to the list of occupations, which was however unacceptable for the governing coalition. After the second reading on the 28th of October a total of 71 amendments were proposed. 44 of these were proposed by Lewica party, 21 of which concerned adding additional occupations to the list of eligible for early retirement. Out of these 21 amendments only 3 were accepted by votes of the governing coalition.

Crucial amendments that were added to the bill after negotiations with Lewica concerned school–teachers. The government and opposition party Lewica agreed to compensate teachers for the lost early retirement entitlement in a form of raising the initial capital level used to calculate the level of pension (Sejm 2008a). The exact formula to calculate the level of the compensation is provided in the cited document, and it could be estimated as equaling roughly 80% of what would have been provided in case teachers had been entitled to early retirement under the new law. Roughly 180,000 employees were qualified for the compensation payment (out of around 400,000 who had been eligible for early retirement under the previous act). The bill passed in the Sejm on the 6th of November, however opposition, including Lewica voted against it (Sejm 2008b). Several days later the higher chamber of the Polish Parliament also accepted the new law, without additional amendments.

On the 15th of December the president decided to veto the bill. At first Lewica stated that it would vote to support the veto, so it became clear that definite shape

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[13]   A direct successor of the LiD, which was disbanded in April 2008, therefore by the time the analyzed law has been prepared.

of the bill is still subject to negotiations. Lewica again demanded early retirement for school–teachers and further expanding the catalogue of occupations eligible. It also threatened the coalition with bringing the bill before the Constitutional Court, which would further delay the legislative process. Finally, the coalition gave consent to a proposal of raising the compensation for school–teachers to a value of 100% the prospective early pension, without adding any new occupations to the list. In other words, it in practice agreed to provide school–teachers with pensions of the same amount as scheduled under the early retirement scheme. The presidential veto was overruled on the 20th of December 2008, by votes of PO, PSL and Lewica (a total of 285 over required 267 votes) and on the 18th of March 2009 the Sejm unanimously accepted the amendment concerning compensation scheme for school–teachers.

It is not possible to precisely determine ideal points of each coalitional partner in the particular case of the early retirement bill, however it is clear that at least part of PSL members of parliament opted for enclosing school–teachers in the list of occupations entitled for early retirement. Minister of Labor and Social Policy, Jolanta Fedak, a member of PSL announced on the 18th of November 2008, that she will propound a draft of an early retirement bill, which would include school–teachers. This draft would be proposed as a legislative initiative of a group of deputies and not of a government. According to announcement of PO (PO 2008), government did not take into consideration enclosing school–teachers in the bill, and that the Prime Minister is "taken–aback" with this initiative. These facts let us conclude that PSL's ideal point on the issue was located closer to demands of Lewica and labor unions that to it's coalitional partner bliss point.

Theoretical predictions and the actual policy

As can be observed in figure 14 any economic proposal located between the point equally distant from PO's and PSL's ideal points and the ideal point of Lewica should receive support of roughly 243-265 votes, which is enough to pass the proposed bill under simple majority rule (in case all MPs were present), but not under the qualified majority of 3/5, under which assuming the presence of all members 276 votes are needed.

Figure 13: Voting on a proposal located at the Lewica's ideal point

Figure 14: Voting on a proposal located at the Lewica's ideal point – close–up

It can be seen in figures 13 and 14 that for a proposal to gain the majority required to overrule presidential veto it is necessary that it lies in a close proximity to LiD's ideal point. The process of enaction of the early retirement bill clearly shows that this theoretical prediction coincides with actual policy choice. The first draft of the discussed law was a joint work of both coalitional partners and discussants in the Trilateral Commission, but it is clear that it represented the view of the larger party, which at first was reluctant to back down its view of the shape of the new law. Moreover, as discussed before the Minister of Labor and Social Policy from PSL tried to "push through" her version of the early retirement bill despite objections expressed in official statements of the government.

Final version of the law, includes a list of amendments proposed by both PSL and Lewica, and most importantly it encloses compensation schemes for school–teachers,

size of which equals what this professional group would get, if it had been included in the discussed legal act. In this, the early retirement bill almost completely meets demands of Lewica and the labor unions that it represented. Three important features of the current political situation in Poland shape process of bills enaction, so that it well reflects theoretical predictions on a basis of spatial theory. They are

a) *cohabitation*, which forces the coalitional government to seek support from one of the opposition parties,

b) central location of Lewica's ideal point along the economic dimension, and

c) distribution of seats in the parliament.

A major conclusion from this section is that non–Downsian behavior observed for LiD in section 3 is again confirmed by it's post-electoral impact on policy choice.

Conclusions

According to Lin et al. (1999) for »Downsian« parties, if each expected vote function is concave in each policy dimension, then there will be a strong convergence towards the mean of electoral preferences. This means that all parties will adopt the same position, minimizing the distance between their position and voters' ideal points. However, they also note that if variances are small, concavity conditions may fail and different Nash equilibriums can be found where parties will adopt different policy positions.

On the other hand, a study by Adams (1999) examined the effect of β coefficient in an equation determining utility on the basis of spatial distance on Nash equilibrium under vote maximization. His study shows that for values of β that are close to zero, the Nash equilibrium is strongly convergent and located at the mean of the voter distribution. For $\beta \to \infty$ (the greater the value of β, the more »deterministic« the model becomes) a Nash equilibrium may not be possible in a more than one–dimensional policy space. In between there is a critical value of the spatial parameter for which a non-convergent equilibrium exists. Subsequent theorem of Schofield (2007) finds necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of local Nash equilibria, even if global concavity does not hold.

This paper aimed to determine whether spatial competition models – assuming Downsian behavior of participating political parties – are useful for describing the positions of political parties in Poland in the period preceding election in 2007 and whether theoretical prediction of spatial theory and cooperative game theory help predict formation of cabinet and policy choices during the period 2007–2010. The results are somewhat ambi guous.

We estimated a number of diverse specifications and found a common problem. Predicted probabilities correspond quite well with the actual results for the two

smaller parties, but the model fails to predict vote shares for the PO and PIS parties. Observation of marginal effects suggests that pure spatial models lack some important non–spatial characteristics of Polish political parties. These may include the afore – mentioned impact of corruption scandals in the case of the LiD party or, as another example, the public perception of the PSL as solely an agrarian party. However, it is very difficult to accurately portray these characteristics.

The estimated β coefficient for the MNP model equals 0.426 for the pure spatial model. Since theory for models with normal errors does not predict what exactly a small value of the coefficient means it is useful to compare this result with other studies that estimated pure spatial models. The study by Schofield and Sened (2005) for Israel predicts a value of coefficient equaling 1.739. For this value, the authors find two different non–convergent Nash equilibria. Schofield et al. (1998) conducted a study for Germany and the Netherlands using a multinomial probit. For Germany the estimated coefficient equals 0.239 and for the Netherlands it is 0.456. In case of both countries, the authors found that behavior is non–convergent.

Further on we estimated valence models with conditional logit to be able to compare our empirical findings with theorems of Schofield (2007). We argue that because of high variance of errors in voters' behavior and what follows small value of the β coefficient convergence should be relatively strong. Again we find confirmation for non–Downsian placement of the LiD party. As for LiD, it is observed that it's position is very distant from the electoral axis along the religious dimension. Since no reasonable alternatives exist in secular part of the political space, it would be rational for the LiD to move towards the center in order to try to catch votes of liberal–democratic oriented voters, at least if it did not fear alienation. On the other hand, the LiD is the party that had the most to gain from coalitional bargaining. It was clear even before the election that if the PO and the PSL parties did not obtain at least 3/5 of votes in total, they would need another partner in order to overrule the presidential veto. The LiD party, who may have predicted their potentially pivotal role in the forthcoming parliament, could take advantage of this position of power. Strategically, this would mean moving away from the political center in order to increase the size of the heart and to include in it policy points close to the ideal point of the LiD.

These primary findings are illustrated with the post–electoral coalitional findings and the case study of act on early retirement. Analysis of the actual policy choice as compared to game–theoretical predictions of locations of the heart, the uncovered set and the Schattschneider set, shows that strategic behavior of LiD is most probable. The analysis also confirms that because of *cohabitation* situation in which coalition is forced to seek additional support from Lewica, the actual policy chosen

lies very close to Lewica's ideal point, as predicted by theoretical concepts and what explains non–Downsian positioning that we found.

As already noted spatial models are not entirely useful in predicting actual electoral results, because of the low turnout. In order to address this issue we conducted a formal analysis of turnout determinants to find that potential voters of PIS did not take part in the 2007 election. In this, we conclude that a strong sense of disappointment associated with this party could have resulted in lower valence for PIS, if these electors were included in the analyzed sample.

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The Relation between Romania and Hungary in the Perspective of the European and Euro-Atlantic Membership[1]

Mihai-Romulus Vădean

Abstract: *The article examines the relations between Romania and Hungary after the 1989 events in terms of the two countries integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context, we have identified eight stages establishing a framework for a benefic dialogue in order to develop economic, political and social relations. It was also revealed that there were four main stages in the relations between the two countries in the post-Communist period: two that have strained the relations, and two that have improved them. We refer here to the 'Status Law' stage - 2001 – and the 'dual citizenship' stage – 2005 – (periods of stress), and also to the two key moments in our opinion, in creating a climate of security in Central and Eastern Europe, signing the Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood (1996) and the joint government meetings stage (since 2005).*

Keywords*: Romania, Hungary, Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good neighbourhood relations between Romania and Hungary, bilateral relations, Central and Eastern Europe, dual citizenship, Statute Law, ethnic minorities, nationalism, Trianon, transition, historical reconciliation, European Union, NATO, autonomy, ethnic minority rights, interethnic relations, European integration, Communism, joint meeting of Romanian and Hungarian governments*

The European political environment has experienced a dramatic transformation after the collapse of Communism. The European reconstruction and expansion of its values and principles to the area behind the 'Iron Curtain' became one of the most important landmarks of today's world.

Thus, we were able to see that the changed of the Soviet policy, after the Soviet Communists led by Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power and the perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) actions were started, caused the end of Communist regimes in Central Europe. Moreover, promoting greater openness to the West resulted in an accelerated erosion of the Communist structures, determined

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[1]   This is a summary of the PhD thesis with the same title, written under the coordination of Prof. PhD. Liviu Petru Zăpârţan, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

also by the internal pressure exerted from among their own parties and the civil society.

In this context, the fall of the Communist regimes became imminent, receiving the characteristics of a 'dominoes' game, beginning with the changes in Hungary (February 1989), followed by the free elections in Poland (June 1989), the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in East Germany (October 1989), the peak changes in Bulgaria, the 'velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia (November 1989) and ending with the bloody revolution in Romania (December 1989).

As a reaction to the collapse of the totalitarian ideological system, democracy has entered regions characterized by a high degree of ethno-cultural diversity, regions where until recently stability has been provided by dictatorial methods. In these countries, who regained independence, the transition to democracy has encountered numerous obstacles, many of them being of ethnic, linguistic or cultural nature. In this context, there can be a sensitive gap between some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, characterized by a lower degree of cultural and linguistic diversity and other countries in the region, where diversity has increased, operating sometimes like a brake to democratization, while maintaining the outbreaks of regional instability.

The end of the East-West conflict has brought a new series of open questions concerning the nature and role of human communities, of the independent states, of the activities of 'old' great powers, in which we have to follow the development of the former socialist countries, towards which the Western countries adopt different attitudes (some were received in NATO, others in the European Union – EU, while others were ignored) (Zăpârţan 2007a: 80).

However, in the early '90s, the diplomatic and academic discussions about Central Europe were related to the problem of security in Europe, particularly to the fears caused by the Yugoslav conflicts and the disputes in the Czech-Slovak space, context in which there were a series of historical and political assessments of the soundness of the European construction as it resulted after the Paris Peace Treaties (1919-1920).

The Paris Peace Treaties have established a new organization of Central Europe. Treaty of Versailles, signed on the 28th of June 1919, between the Allies and Germany, established the loss of Eastern Silesia and Breslau (Poznan) area for Poland and the creation of a Polish corridor to the Baltic Sea, which included the Free City of Danzig (Gdansk). The Treaty of Saint-Germain, with Austria, signed on the 10th of September 1919, stated the annexation of Bukovina to Romania, of Bohemia to the new Czechoslovak state, of Carniola (Slovenia) to Serbia, of South Tyrol to Italy and the loss of southern Poland. Moreover, the union of Austria with Germany (Anschluss) was prohibited. A very important issue was the signing of the Treaty

of minorities, which initially granted them the protection of the great powers. As a result of Romania and other winning countries' pressure, the treaty was amended to provide equal rights and freedoms in the states. Thus national sovereignty was complied with and the collective security conditions were created in order to settles ethnic disputes (Titulescu 1994: 265-277).

In this international context, appeared the American concept of Central Europe, a concept that draws a geopolitical representation with several wings: South Central Europe (Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria), Central Middle (Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland), and North Central (the Baltic States) (Holbrooke 1995: 38-51). This form of Central Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea was meant to signal that the U.S. is seeking cooperation in the area, not excluding *ab initio* a member from NATO integration. But due to the way the American concept was introduced, a concept of one of the leading specialists/diplomats used by Washington in Central Europe and in the Balkans, suggested the idea of phasing the region's inclusion into NATO. First the core and then the flanks. As we know, Central and Middle Europe has been covered by the umbrella of Euro-Atlantic security since Madrid (1997), and the flanks since the summit in Prague (2002).

The French concept of 'Central and Eastern Europe' (Chereji 2000: 20) was also developed, an heir of the pre-war concept of 'sanitary cordon', which included in this vast region all the states between the EU's eastern border and Russia. The concept was further developed in order to justify the EU's eastward expansion and at present it is seen in the European Neighbourhood Policy, regarding the relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

The dynamic of the ethno political conflicts, the relative large number of secessionist movements, the autonomist claims and the examples of devolution or tensions among communities speaking different languages show that the system of guaranteeing universal human rights is not enough to provide the ethnic and cultural minorities with a sense of collective security (Salat 2001).

The international community has tried to respond to these issues through the development and enforcement of state behaviour standards that were meant to supplement the existing human rights protection system. In 1991, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe[2] issued a statement about the need to protect minority rights and founded the institution of High Commissioner for National Minorities in 1993. In 1992 the United Nations (UN) signed a declaration regarding the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and the Council of Europe[3] drafted the European Charter for Regional and

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[2]   Currently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE.
[3]   At a time when the European Union had no criteria for monitoring the processes of democratization (until the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997), the Council of Europe was a sufficiently prestigious

Minority Languages, presented to the Member States at the end of the same year. Also under the aegis of the Council of Europe, the Council of Ministers adopted in 1994 the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (an essential document for managing the relations between majority and minority), which was submitted for approval to the Member States in 1995. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities stated that it is part of the international protection of human rights and as such constitutes an area of international cooperation, and that the contracting parties are ready to promote the necessary conditions for the national minorities to preserve and develop their cultural traits, the essential elements of their identity such as religion, traditions, cultural heritage, restraining from any policy or practice that assimilates these people against their will; those persons have the right of freedom of expression (of opinion, communication in their own language, without taking into account borders and without the interference of public authorities, according to art. 9); the Contracting Parties shall restrain from measures that alter the proportions of the population on a geographical area where minorities live, in order to alter their rights and freedoms (Zăpârţan 2001: 232).

After the fall of Communism, relations between Romania and Hungary have developed mainly under the influence of geopolitical considerations, depending on the convergence of common interests. In recent years, these considerations have been seen differently from one side or the other, and from different perspectives.

The presence of ethno cultural diversity in Romania is a reality that can not be ignored. In Romania there is an ethnic Hungarian minority (aprox.7% of the total population) in some places in Transylvania representing over 50% of the total population[4] or even 90%.

Romania's historical past, characterized by numerous conflicts, often extremely bloody, is closely linked to the relations between the majority population and the ethnic Hungarian minority, and to the relations Romania has established over time with its neighbours, especially with Hungary[5].

The Romanian-Hungarian relations problem was, is and probably will be a very important issue for the peace in the Central Europe region and for the European security.

Over the centuries there were numerous examples of cooperation and conflict between the two countries.

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institution so that being its member also meant a guarantee of a democratic journey for the members recently emerged from totalitarianism.

[4] The Hungarian minority in Romania is one of the largest ethnic minorities in Europe. According to official 2002 census, 1,431,807 people, 6.6% of the population, were said to be Hungarians.

[5] Hungary also had a past full of conflicts of this kind.

The history of the Romanian-Hungarian relations in the 20th century proves that present and future problems can't be solved by amplifying conflicts.

The current international context, characterized by the states struggle to avoid conflicts of ethnic nature has made its mark upon the bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary, while solving the disputes between the two countries became a prerequisite for their existence in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

In recent years, Romania and Hungary have proven that they are aware of the need for a peaceful coexistence in this area placed on Europe's borders, which has been for centuries a source of armed conflicts. Moreover, the two countries showed that they are aware of their European vocation and their right to be part of this civilization.

Conclusion

The Romanian-Hungarian relations have always been directly subordinated to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, whose provisions have hampered the relations between the two countries. In addition, the relations were dominated by 'Transylvanian question', the object of the dispute being to whom this space belongs: to Hungary or Romania, and the situation of the Hungarian population in Romania.

After signing the Treaty of Trianon, a part of the population of Hungarian ethnicity remained outside Hungary which led to creation of a new component in the domestic and foreign policies of the neighbouring state, namely the protection of the Hungarian minority outside Hungary, especially since there is a relatively numerically significant Hungarian minority in all seven countries with which Hungary has borders.

> In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon stipulated the annexation of Transylvania, Partium and a part of Banat to Romania. Besides Romanians and Saxons, about 1.3 million Hungarians were living in the newly formed territory, with a surface of 102.200 km2. Moreover, the Treaty was annexed a convention on nationality, signed in Paris in 1919, to stabilize the situation of so many nationalities. Article 11 of the Convention specified that Romania agreed that the Saxons and Szeklers of Transylvania would have autonomy in matters of education and religion under state control, but the Convention was not ratified.

However, considering the number of Hungarians in Romania, about 1.4 million people, none of Hungary's bilateral relations in the late 80s and early 90s attracted such international attention as did the relation with Romania. Remarkable in the relations from the late '80s is that, under its policy aimed at 'protecting Hungarians everywhere', Hungary approached the international organizations and managed in February 1989 to determine the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva to adopt a resolution that condemned Romania's abuses related to the violation of human rights.

Thus, given the past history of the two states, and the 'Trianon shadow' which was (and still is) the center of bilateral relations, we are trying however to distinguish several stages in the Romanian-Hungarian relations in the period after 1989. We must make a clear distinction; for Hungary, the Treaty of Trianon is not a treaty but a 'dictate', after which Hungary has lost territories which are considered as being Hungarian.

The first phase, the '**transitional phase**', in the bilateral relations covers the 1990-1996 period, when between the two countries there were only relations that alternated the periods of optimism with those of strong concern.

Thus, although in the early '90s, there was an optimist climate in the relations with Hungary, recorded in the signing of military and cultural agreements (1990) and in an 'Open Skies' agreement (1991), there were a number of concerns regarding the rise of Romanian nationalist parties, namely 'Romanian Hearth'.

> While Romania and Hungary had strained relations, military cooperation was very good. In fact, Romania had twice as many joint military activities with Hungary than with any other Eastern European country. Military cooperation between the two countries was revealed by the military cooperation treaty signed during the visit of the Defence Minister Gheorghe Tinca, in 1994 in Budapest, when the Romanian official has proposed cooperation in the production of military equipment, mutual exchanges for officers and regular consultation at the Defence Ministers level.

Also, the early 90s were marked by ethnic tensions in Cluj-Napoca and by the violent episode in March 1990 in Târgu Mureş. It is worth mentioning that the events in Târgu Mureş, which escalated into an ethnic conflict, had drawn the attention of the international community, which requested Romania to provide greater respect for minorities.

Moreover, the bilateral relations have been encumbered by an inability to overcome the populist rhetoric, Romanians promoting an intolerant rhetoric regarding the rights of national minorities and Hungarians promoting a revanchist rhetoric, marked by the 'Trianon Syndrome'.

> The Treaty of Trianon is the main axis around which revolves the historiography of the relations between the two countries, namely Romania and Hungary. Generally, the treaty is pulled out of the context of the Versailles Treaties system (1919-1920), which really changed the political geography of the most contentious region of the 20th century Europe – Central and South East Europe. While the Romanian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak historical studies present the positive effects of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungarian historiography is far from accepting its beneficial role, namely the recognition of Hungary as an independent sovereign nation state. Furthermore, a constant number of studies made by the Hungarian researchers in the Treaty of Trianon had a single perspective: the provisions on border changes given to the new political entities which led to the ruin of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Hungarian perspective by which the Treaty of Trianon was a great injustice to Hungary, an idea amplified by historians and by the political environment, made it impossible for the interests of Central European states to be harmonized for a period of 80 years, this being mentioned in the international symposium in Satu Mare in May 1998 – ʿ1918 – The End and the beginning of an eraʾ – by an analyst of this period, a Hungarian historian Tibor Hajdú: ʾIn the periodicals in Hungary there was a period of eight decades of nonsense polemics for the responsibilities of political parties in Hungary on the Treaty of Trianon. It now seems that scientific principles can replace passions...ʿ (Ghişa 2003: 14).

Furthermore, during the period which we refer to, the bilateral relations have been constantly affected by Hungary's concerns in terms of Romanians attitude towards Hungarians, which increased with the inclusion of PRM and Unity Party in the coalition government from 1994 to 1995.

We can see that while Romania and Hungary were arguing about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, two international organizations thought of a plan which included securing Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council, the European Union announced the principle of EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries, but defined the criteria that the candidate countries had to meet to become members of the Community. Previously, in 1989, the PHARE program was launched, which was originally meant to stimulate Poland and Hungary in order to rebuild national economies (PHARE is the acronym in English the word 'Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy').

> The Copenhagen European Council not only endorsed the principle of EU enlargement to the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but it also defined the criteria that candidate countries will have to meet to become members of the Community.
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> These criteria referred to the stability of the institutions which guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities and their protection (political criteria), to a functioning economy market and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union EU (economic criteria), the ability to assume obligations of EU membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (criterion concerning the adoption of the acquis communautaire).

Moreover, both Romania and Hungary were heading towards NATO to ensure the security of this part of Europe, marked by conflicts and ethnic tensions, a relevant aspect being that in January 1994 Romania was the first post-communist country to join the Partnership for Peace, a program designed to enhance stability and security in Europe.

To ensure its security requirements, Romania was the first post-communist country that has signed the Partnership for Peace (Partnership for Peace – PfP) in January 1994[6]. The Partnership for Peace is a program of bilateral cooperation between NATO countries and individual organizations. Moreover, the framework PfP documents established a number of cooperation areas, including 'transparency on defence plans and budgets, ensuring democratic control of defence forces, development of cooperative military relations with NATO, long-term development of armed forces compatible with those of NATO members.'

Given the international context and the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Romania and Hungary, as well as both countries awareness of the importance of establishing bilateral relations to ensure security in the area, we can identify **the second stage**, which most researchers have called the '**historic reconciliation**', marked by the signing of the Treaty of Understanding, cooperation and good neighbourhood relations between Romania and Hungary, on September 16, 1996.

Thus, in the international context of Central Europe marked by the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty in March 1995, Romania was faced with a special situation, risking to be internationally considered as a non democratic country and a potential source of tension in the region. To deal with this situation, the political leaders in Bucharest had to find a way to make a deal with Hungary, through which to please the international community, and both the majority population and the Hungarian community in Romania.

After a period of intense pressure and diplomatic isolation[7], since 1994 the political relations between the two countries have improved[8], Romania and Hungary developing specific political and military relations[9]. The coming to power of a socialist government in Budapest with a moderate political orientation and the more obvious expression of Bucharest's desire to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures led to an obvious change in the relations between the two countries.

The idea of being accepted under the umbrella of the Western security structures and the alternative of isolation led the governments of both countries to try overcoming the divergences. The political leaders of the time were interested in solving the problem of the two countries relations, a relevant fact being that already in 1993, Foreign Minister Meleşcanu said that 'a considerable part of the Romania's roads into Europe pass through Hungary' (Phinnemore 2001: 256).

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[6] Also during that year, it was the second country after Poland, which joined the Individual Partnership Program and entered into a bilateral dialogue with NATO.

[7] During 1994 there have been a number of vindictive statements of some Hungarian officials, one of these speeches was given by the Hungarian Foreign Minister of that time, László Kovács, who stated that 'the border between Romania and Hungary may be modified by peaceful means'.

[8] In 1995 the trade between the two countries exceeded 400 million dollars.

[9] In 1992, Romania and Hungary signed a new bilateral agreement within the cartel 'Open Skies'.

> Also, the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, in a government's political platform presentation delivered to the Parliament said: '... this government will complete the process of accession to the EU and NATO ... the government will subordinate everything else to that purpose' (Atanassova 1999: 50).

> In this context the signing of a bilateral treaty became mandatory; especially the desire for Euro-Atlantic integration of the two countries transferred in an international plan the relations between them. Thus, during 1994 and 1995, Romanian and Hungarian negotiators have completed several meetings to draw up a bilateral treaty of good neighbourliness.

In this context, the power in Bucharest, led by President Ion Iliescu has endorsed the project to achieve a 'historic reconciliation' with Hungary, which meant reconciliation and improved relations between the majority and the ethnic Hungarians in Romania.

The project designed by Romanian leaders was favoured by the coming to power in 1994 in Budapest of Socialists, led by Gyula Horn, aspect that changed the regional climate and ethnic relations, the left government having a more moderate vision. We must point out the optical gap between the new prime minister and his predecessor, József Antall, who declared before his appointment as prime minister that '... in my soul, I think that I will be prime minister for 15 million Hungarians'. In fact, the neo-conservative governments of Hungary (József Antall and Boross Péter during May 1990 – July 1994) led a mainly symbolic policy, arguing that the revival of the Hungarian nation, recently released from Communism, cannot be complete without the reunification, at least spiritually, of The Great Hungary.

Given these issues we can notice the moderate vision of the new government, a framework that made possible the understanding between Budapest and Bratislava in 1995. In the Treaty signed by Hungary and Slovakia almost all the issues on the bilateral agenda were regulated.

Returning to the Romanian-Hungarian relations we can notice that the issue regarding the completion of a political agreement between the two countries was closely linked to the disagreement concerning the Council of Europe Recommendation 1201, the Romanian authorities thinking that it would serve as a framework for legal requests for territorial autonomy coming from the Hungarian ethnics. The fear of the Romanian authorities in this respect had some foundation because Article 11 of the Recommendation stipulates that 'in regions where they are a majority, the persons belonging to national minorities have the right to proper autonomous local governments or a special status, based on the specific historic and territorial situation and in accordance the state's national legislation'.

Also, the Hungarians refused to introduce in the Treaty any reference to the recognition of the borders between Romania and Hungary. The Hungarian refusal was

regarded in Romania as another attempt to revise the borders in the context of the transition of Central and Eastern European states to democracy.

After lengthy internal and interstate debates, Romania and Hungary have reached a consensus on how to prepare a basic treaty that was signed on the 16th of September 1996 in Timişoara.

As we said before, the awareness that the treaty was necessary for both countries in order to have a real chance to accede to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures has led to a specific provision mentioned in art. 7 of the Treaty, which stated the mutual support for joining NATO, the EU and the Western Europe Union.

Article 7 – The Treaty of Understanding, cooperation and good neighbourly relations between Romania and Hungary (Official Gazette no. 250/16 October 1996)

1. The Contracting Parties shall expand relations and cooperation in international organizations, including regional and sub regional. They will support each other in their integration into the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union.

2. The Contracting Parties, together with other interested European countries, will work together to achieve regional and sub regional cooperation projects and other forms of collaboration to accelerate the development of participating countries to encourage them in areas of common interest – economy, industrial agriculture, ecology, transport, telecommunications and others. They will encourage participation of those directly concerned, in accordance with the laws of the Contracting Parties to these projects and forms of cooperation.

The signing of the Treaty was an important signal launched in the West, the historic reconciliation between the two countries was a positive example, contrasting with the Yugoslavian image.

We appreciate that in the 'historical reconciliation' stage we can include the restoring of a positive climate concerning the majority-minority relation, the Romanian-Hungarian relations, since shortly after the normalization of the Romanian-Hungarian relations, the main Hungarian representative party DAHR became part of the ruling coalition.

> To clearly reveal the importance attached by both countries to ethnic minorities it was stated that 'national minorities living in Hungary/Romania ... have the right, exercised individually or jointly with other members of their group, to freely express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. Accordingly, they have the right to establish and maintain their own institutions, educational, cultural and religious organizations and associations, which may use the voluntary financial contributions and other contributions and public support in accordance with the law' (Article 15, section 2). Also, the Treaty recognized 'the right of persons belonging to the Romanian minority in Hungary and the Hungarian minority people in Romania to freely use their mother

tongue in private and in public, orally and in writing. The two countries will take measures to ensure that they can learn their mother tongue and have adequate opportunities to be educated in that language, in the State education system at all levels and forms, according to their needs. The Contracting Parties shall ensure the conditions to enable also the use minority languages in dealings with local, administrative and judicial authorities, in accordance with current national legislation and international commitments made by both Parties. These people have the right to use their full name in their native language and enjoy their official recognition. In areas inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to those minorities, each Party shall allow the display in the minority language of the traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public' (Article 15, section 3).

The Treaty also provided that the persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Romania and to the Romanian minority in Hungary have the right to maintained 'contacts across frontiers, and the right to participate in national and international activities.

Given the past the history and the attempts to assimilate ethnic minorities made both by Romania and Hungary, the Treaty specified that the two states shall refrain from policies or practices aiming at the assimilation of national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation' (Article 15, section 9). Also, as stipulated in the bilateral act, Romania and Hungary will not undertake actions to change the proportion of population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities.

Thus, DAHR's participation in Romania's central government led to a process that tried to diminish the exclusive ethnic content of the relations between Romania and Hungary. Since then we believe that DAHR can be considered an actor able to handle alone the aspirations of the Hungarian communities, with no intervention from the 'parent state.'

As expressed before, we can clearly say that the double reconciliation Romania-Hungary and majority-minority was a passport for the European Union and especially for NATO, for both Romania and for Hungary.

The way in which the two countries tried a historic reconciliation through the Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good neighbourliness can lead to a simple and important conclusion for the future existence of the two countries, namely: the importance of the bilateral Romanian-Hungarian Treaty is primarily its mere existence. Without signing the treaty the chances of Hungary and Romania to be invited to join NATO would be minimal[10]. Thus, the common aspiration to join NATO and the activities of the Partnership for Peace cooperation led to the strengthening of mutual trust, which made both governments need the treaty, the parties being willing to make sacrifices for its adoption.

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[10]   Hungary joined NATO in March 12, 1999, and from May 1, 2004 is a member of the European Union. Romania became a NATO member in March 29, 2004, and in January 1, 2007 became a member of the European Union.

The third stage identified in the analysis of the relations between the two countries and their international situation we called the '**NATO stage**', given the steps which both countries took immediately after signing the basic Treaty for NATO accession.

The change of power in Bucharest in late 1996 meant the start of a NATO 'recovery' race, before the Madrid summit. In the regional policy plan this meant an intense campaign of approaching the Central European states, including Hungary.

> Signing the Treaty on good neighbourly relations and cooperation between Romania and Ukraine and its ratification in July 1997 was another clear signal given by Romania regarding the intention to join NATO – the ratification of the Ukrainian Treaty took place only a few days before the Madrid Summit.
>
> Also, the new Romanian government attempted to bring evidence on Romania's eligibility for membership. This policy was reflected in the country's participation in the UN and NATO forces, in their peacekeeping actions in Bosnia, Albania, the Persian Gulf, Angola and Somalia. Moreover, the new leadership of the country has distanced Romania from the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia. This approach to foreign policy has clearly contributed to its image and has facilitated access to negotiations.
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> Another priority of the new government after the elections in 1996 was the economic reform, given the damaged state of Romania. Thus, active involvement in reform, including price liberalization and privatization released a number of positive signals abroad. In addition, the government firmly stated that one of the main goals of the economic and social measures implemented was to 'create the necessary conditions for Romania to be admitted into NATO and into clear negotiations regarding the EU integration (Phinnemore 2001: 259).

However, before Romania, Hungary 'efforts were successful already in 1997 when at the July summit in Madrid, the country was invited along with the Czech Republic and Poland to join NATO. Even though Romania has not been invited to join Madrid, our country has been nominated among countries that had made significant progress in relation to the criteria for NATO membership.

This step is relevant because, by including Hungary into NATO in 1999, during the March summit in Washington, the western border of Romania became the demarcation line of the Alliance, which predicted our future quality. Also, the quality gained by Hungary offered a new framework for defining the Romanian-Hungarian relations.

Also, the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO in March 1999 created the belief that the project of a united, free and democratic Europe starts to be implemented.

> In 1997, the impact of enlargement was predominantly psychological; it is remarkable that for the first time, NATO co-opted countries that military and ideological former

belonged to The Soviet Bloc. He Integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO[11] created the belief that the project of a united, free and democratic Europe started to be implemented. After the admission of the three states at the Madrid summit, for the NATO states was clear that the transformation process and their assimilation within the organization will not be simple and they estimated that the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary will reach the stage of maturity around the year 2009. Thus, a report issued in 1999, which included a first assessment of the performance of the three countries invited at the Madrid NATO framework, showed that 'only Poland from the three countries lived up to expectations, while the Czech Republic was on the edge, and Hungary was a lost case, being a passenger travelling for free (free-rider) (Paşcu 2007: 143).

One of the most interesting **stages** of the Romanian-Hungarian relations, **the IV**[th], is the analysis phase '**the return to the past**'.

At this stage we refer to the Hungarian approach concerning the 'Statute Law' legislative act that created major conflicts not only between Hungary and Romania but also between Hungary and its neighbouring countries.

The Romanian-Hungarian relations were strongly affected by the adoption of this law which was initially intended to come into force on the 1st of January 2002. The law provided special rights to Hungarian ethnics in neighbouring countries, namely Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Slovenia (originally also Austria was included on the list of neighbouring states). These rights were to be offered through a 'Hungarian certificates', which in fact was the equivalent of a Hungarian identity card.

Generic, the benefits and the various forms of support offered to the 'Hungarian certificate holders, the programs and organizations outside the Hungarian borders meant to preserve their identity, culture and language' can be divided into five main categories (Chiriac 2005: 70-71):

1. Cultural rights. This refers to free access in some public institutions in Hungary like archives, museums and collections, public libraries; the right to receive scholarships or training for teachers of Hungarian language, the latter are entitled to receive training in their country too; the right of the professor card, which grants the holder certain benefits, including the ability to buy educational materials at a reduced price; the right to become a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences or to receive State awards;

2. Educational aids. These include the right to attend university, doctoral, postdoctoral studies at any school in Hungary; the possibility of obtaining scholarships to these institutions, under the law; aid if attending other institutions than the state network; student, teacher or primary school teacher card with some related benefits: discounts on public transport, discounts up to 50% for approx. 200 economic operators (for monographs, etc.); aid for the creation of new departments in universities / colleges in Hungary's neighbouring countries, in collaboration with a partner institution from Hungary; material aid for families who have children enrolled in schools with Hungarian teaching language; financial aid for students.

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[11] Ratify acceptance of the three took place in April 30, 1998.

3. Facilities for public transportation. It is granted free of charge for those under six years and people over 65 years for local public transport across Hungary; offsetting the train price by 90%, four times a year for people aged between 7 and 64 years; facilities for groups containing at least ten children.

4. Funding for the media. TV news programs for the Hungarians outside the borders can receive funding; they may also qualify for partial coverage of costs for office or TV studios.

5. Community Development. It can be financilly sustained a part of the operational costs of the running programs or organizations outside the Hungarian borders.

In our opinion the Hungarian approach was strictly populist and electoral, given that those who passed the law, the Fidesz government led by Viktor Orban had a strong sympathy towards autonomist nationalist movements in Hungary and in the countries of region. We can also notice that Fidesz proposal came in the year preceding the 2002 general elections in Hungary, Viktor Orbán hoping to attract new voters with that law.

Hungary's relatively brutal actions and the violation of the agreements between the two countries, restarted the debate, at the time, on a number of issues from the past like the one referring to Hungary's attempt to Romania's accession to NATO, which entitles us to say that at that stage there were chances that the Romanian-Hungarian relations would go back in time, a phenomenon that would have seriously affected the European interests of Hungary and the European and Euro-Atlantic interests of Romania.

Hungary's approach was not legitimate and it was seen internationally when the European Commission recommended the authorities in Budapest to 'refrain from applying the law which might cause unwanted tension in the region', warning otherwise that 'Hungary's accession negotiations to the EU could be affected'.

We appreciate that this is an interesting phase because, although the 'Statute Law' risked to endanger the whole edifice of relations between Hungary and its neighbouring countries so difficult created, the authorities of both countries have made a deal through a Memorandum in which clear procedures for implementing the 'Status Law' were provided, in order not to create any tensions, has become a landmark of stability and good neighbourliness in Central Europe.

Thus, as we have mentioned throughout this paper, paradoxically, the tensions generated by the project of the authorities in Budapest in respect to bilateral relations led to a rapprochement between the two countries and proved that they have learned a new conciliation lesson in compliance with the international law, and especially with the EU law, an area to which both countries wanted accede.

The fifth step we suggest is the '**confirmation of the European Union and NATO membership**'.

In this stage Romania was invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit in 2002 and Hungary was part of the historic enlargement of the European Union on the 1st of May 2004.

An interesting aspect of this stage is that, since March 2004, when Romania became a formal member of NATO, Romania and Hungary have been allies for the first time, which opened a new chapter in the bilateral relations. Also, the new position obtained by Hungary in the same year that of member of the European Union has defined a new discussion context for the Hungarian-Romanian relations.

Although at the European and Euro-Atlantic levels activities that violate the domestic laws of other Member States are not approved, Hungary took advantage of the new position, returning to the concepts of the '90s, stating again that it was in a position to be a State that must take care of all Hungarians from abroad, who legally are also Hungarian citizens, and that would give the right to be citizens of the European Union even if they live in states which are not part of the EU.

In this context, we reach a new **stage** in the Romanian-Hungarian relations, **the sixth**, in which Hungary has again generated a number of tensions in its relations with Romania, by announcing its intention to offer citizenship to ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary's borders.

Thus, the Hungarian World Federation project aimed at granting Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians living outside Hungary affected the Romanian-Hungarian relations.

> For a 'symbolic reunification of the Hungarian nation', the World Federation of Hungarians – a civic organization founded in 1938 with the intention to defend the interests of Hungarians everywhere[12] - has gathered 200,000 signatures in favour of a dual citizenship, which made the Parliament in Budapest to vote unanimously for a referendum on the 13th of September 2004. The Constitutional Court has rejected several motions in Parliament and approved the referendum. Finally its date was set for the 5th of December, the same year.

At this stage it is important to mention that the Romanian-Hungarian relations had a different dimension, taking into account Hungary's previous accession to the EU in May 2004. In the opinion of many Hungarian political leaders, the Union membership status seemed to be a clear advantage in the relations with Romania, which could mean that Romania could not counteract the project, as it had partially managed to offset the 'Statute Law'.

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[12] The organization is currently campaigning for the revision of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, considering the decisions adopted on that occasion as »unfair« for Hungary. President MVSZ is Patrubány Miklós.

It is also interesting to notice in this stage that the proposal of The World Federation of Hungarians, also adopted by Parliament in Budapest, managed again to create a tension in the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations, but it also managed to divide the Hungarian political environment, creating conflicts between socialists in power and Fidesz, in opposition.

In our opinion this is the first time when an approach aiming at the Hungarian minority in neighbouring countries managed to divide the Hungarian political spectrum, even if this initiative was seen by the Hungarians in diaspora as a measure designed to demonstrate that the 'mother country' strategy to offer belonging guarantees to Hungarians outside Hungary.

We also noticed that Hungary's approach was closely monitored by the European Union, since its success could lead to a series of changes in Hungary's representation in various bodies. We consider here that Hungary had been accepted into the Union as a state with a population of about 10 million people, but by granting citizenship to Hungarian ethnics from neighbouring countries, Hungary's population would grow by 50%.

Moreover, we can see that Hungary's approach has been treated differently by the Hungarian elite in Romania. Thus, although they were aware of the symbolic 'reunification of the Hungarian nation' by granting the Hungarian citizenship of Hungarians outside Hungary, DAHR political leaders have avoided to show an open support for this initiative, being aware that it was possible for many Hungarian ethnics from Romania to emigrate to Hungary, which would have considerably reduced their electoral basis.

What makes this Romanian-Hungarian relations stage interesting is that, although the diplomatic relations were not much affected, Romanian considering it as another stage in Budapest's electoral campaign, the relation between the Hungarian community from Romania and the Hungarian State were significantly affected (a part of the Hungarian community from Romania refused to adhere to 'the great Hungarian nation'). Thus, there were also examples of increased tension between Hungarians and the representatives of the Hungarian state. We should mention that efforts of the Hungarians in Romania have been directed also towards individuals, considering the fact that, after all, not just politicians were to blame for the negative outcome of the 5th of December 2004 referendum.

Moreover, we think that the relatively weak involvement of Romania in the 'dual citizenship' problematic can be explained based on three considerations.

First, the opinion polls in Hungary confirmed that no positive outcome was expected for the 5th of December 2004 referendum. The second and the most important argument was that Romania was waiting for a confirmation, from the European Council Summit in Brussels held on the 16th and 17th of December, that it had

concluded the negotiations with the EU; in this context the leaders in Bucharest did not want to give rise to new tensions in their relations with Hungary. The third reason is the fact that much of the Hungarian approach to a 'dual nationality' overlapped with the election campaign in Romania, a context in which none of the candidates or of the political parties had the courage to express a clear-cut position for or against the Hungarian initiative.

The seventh stage we have identified and presented throughout the paper is '**the return to normality**' stage, characterized by political and diplomatic dialogue and expressed through joint governmental meetings.

Thus, if over time a lot of problems off the Romania-Hungary relation have not been solved, by organizing joint governmental meetings, Romania and Hungary entered a new stage, one characterized by a normalization of relations, relations that in the past had been negatively affected by a number of internal or external factors.

In addition, the representatives of the two countries have shown, at least in statements, that they have realized that the situation of minorities, Hungarian in Romania and Romanian in Hungary, largely depends on the cooperation between the two countries and on the joint efforts to develop international standards on minority rights.

Concerning this phase we have to say that the October 2005 meeting was a first in the bilateral relations. It was also a first in bilateral relations of the Central and Eastern European states.

Referring to the relations between Romania and Hungary in the context of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the two states we should be noted that the November 2007 meeting was a new premiere of the two countries relations, since that was the first time when both countries were members of the two international bodies, under the supervision of which international relations have developed in recent years. Both Hungary and especially Romania were present at the joint meeting of governments in Sibiu in 2007, both being NATO and EU member states.

This brings us to **the eighth stage** of the relations between the two countries, namely a stage in which Romania, since 2007, has acceded to the EU. In this context, it became clear that, under the umbrella of NATO and the EU it was less likely to appear major fractures in the Romanian-Hungarian relations, although there is a constant 'teasing' coming mainly from the Hungarian side.

We should not minimize the importance of Romania's accession to the EU and its impact on the relation with Hungary, as this new context provides a new framework for '*strengthening the unity of peoples and nations that make up the European*

Union' (Zăpârţan 2007b: 31), which obviously reflects on the Romanian-Hungarian relations.

If we review the steps taken by Romania and Hungary in terms of establishing a framework for benefic dialogue in terms of economic, social and political development, we notice that there were **four main stages** in the post-communist period: two which have strained relations, and two that have improved them. We refer here to the 'Status Law' stage and the 'dual citizenship' stage (periods of stress) and to the two key moments in our opinion, in creating a climate of security in Central and Eastern Europe, when signing that Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good neighbourliness and the joint governmental meetings.

Also, if we look carefully at times of tension in the relations between the two countries we see that they were fundamentally influenced by Fidesz, from a position of party in power ('Statute Law') or in Opposition ('Dual Citizenship').

We want to conclude here, not without expressing that in the current global situation dominated by an economic and financial crisis, there is a possibility that several nationalist movements would revive, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, even if the states in the area are now members of the European Union.

> Therefore we arrive in 2010 when, after winning the April elections, Fidesz has come again into power and one of the first laws passed by the new government led by Viktor Orbán referred to granting the Hungarian citizenship to the Hungarians living abroad.
>
> Thus, on the 4th of June 2010, a symbolic moment since it marked the '90 years commemoration' of the 'Trianon dictate', Fidesz passed a law stating that 'the Hungarians and the Hungarian communities under the authority of other states are part of the united Hungarian nation ... their unity across state borders is a reality. 'The law itself has clear provisions regarding the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship; the applicants must prove the Hungarian origins and that they speak Hungarian. The law does not offer applicants the right to vote.
>
> We have to mention that from the beginning the law managed to produce a series of conflicts in the region, particularly in Hungary's relation with Slovakia, when the Prime Minister Robert Fico described the Hungarian approach as a threat to the internal security of Slovakia.

Moreover, while recognizing the importance of some successfully completed stages, we must ask ourselves whether the road in defining the bilateral relations between the two countries is not somehow insufficient, whether the rapprochement between the two countries and between the two nations is not still an open chapter with many opportunities, resources and unexplored requirements.

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The Change of Value Preferences in Czech Society and of Foreign Policy Makers as One of the Prerequisites of the Transformation of the Character of Czech Foreign Policy[1]

Šárka Waisová

Abstract: *The political emancipation of Czechoslovakia after 1989 opened up a space for the fundamental political, societal and economic restructuring. The democratic transition provided for the change of the character of Czech foreign policy. One of the conditions for the change has been the transformation of value preferences in Czech society and of foreign policy makers. The transformation of value preferences which has taken place in the Czech Republic since 1989 is similar to the "silent revolution" that arose in Western European societies in the 1970s. I have based my analysis of Czech foreign policy on the following ideas, that 1) the identity of states is formulated by political representation on the basis of the facts (values), which the society adopts and lives within, and 2) that the values drive and determine activities and attitudes. The transformation of value preferences in Czech society and of foreign policy makers inevitably brings about a change of the character of Czech foreign policy.*

Keywords: *character of Czech foreign policy, social change, materialism, postmaterialism*

The political emancipation of Czechoslovakia after 1989 opened up a space for the fundamental restructuring of political, societal and economic conditions. The political transformation in Czechoslovakia, together with the new geopolitical discourse after the end of the Cold War and with the change of the character of the international system, created the conditions for the (re)construction of the Czech national interest and the character of Czech foreign policy. The source of this (re)construction became particularly the interest of Czech dissent in the creation of foreign policy, the mentioned domestic political, social and economic transformation, the change of value preferences, ideas, and identity of society, particularly of foreign policy makers, and the change of the reference group of the Czech Republic or, in other words, the community into which the Czech Republic is socialised. This text will focus on the analysis of one of the sources of the (re)construction of the character of Czech foreign policy, specifically on the value preferences, ideas and identity of society and foreign policy makers. Naturally, such an approach will

provide us only with a partial answer to the question of how the Czech national interest and the character of Czech foreign policy change and what are the sources of these changes. However, this text does not intend to and – with respect to its scope – cannot offer more (I focus on the remaining three sources separately in different texts, e.g. Waisová – Piknerová 2010).

The presented text is based on two premises: 1. The value preferences, ideas and identity of society and foreign policy makers influence the character of foreign policy and 2. Czech society underwent a significant transformation after 1989, which affected its value preferences (a shift from materialism to post-materialism), ideas (a shift from communism to Western culture) and identities (a return to Europe, or rather to the family of European nations, from which it had been forced out after 1948). Based on these premises, if there has been a change in the value preferences, ideas and identity of Czech society and foreign policy makers, it can be expected that there is or will be a change in the character of foreign policy. The hypothesis about the influence of value preferences, ideas, societal identity and foreign policy makers on the character of foreign policy is based on the facts that:

- Values are a referential methodical framework within whose scope it is possible to understand and explain other social phenomena. Values are a cognitive representation of needs, which have been transformed in such a way that they come to integrate also institutional goals and requirements. They work as intervening variables that lead man to an activity and the change of values *ipso facto* causes the change of the activity. Values "govern and determine the conduct, attitudes towards objects and situations, ideology, presentation of oneself to the others, evaluation, assessment, justification, comparison of oneself with the others, and attempt to influence the others" (Rokeach according to Suchánková 1990: 531). On the supraindividual level, value priorities guide decision making, e.g. about setting the goals of an organisation and formulating new lines of policies (Rokeach according to Suchánková 1990: 533).

- The analysis of any foreign policy cannot be reduced to the research of the goal and devices of foreign policy. An effective foreign policy consists in the shared meaning of national identity, the position of the state in the world, its allies and enemies and its interests and aspirations (Hill – Wallace 1996: 8). The question of the foreign policy of a state is always a question of its identity. The identity itself is formulated by the political representation on the basis of the facts the given society professes and in which it recognises itself (Drulák 2009). The analysis of foreign policy must include, among other things, the analysis of the society and the foreign-political elites, as well as of its interests, aspirations and values. The issue of the value preferences, ideas and identity of society and foreign policy makers is important in the Czech environment particularly because the revolution in

1989 brought in the place of the political elite a group which had been at the edge of society until then (members of the dissent) and had shared evidently different culture and civilisation competences (compare Sztompka 1996) than the rest of the society. The results of the revolution in 1989 and the 'return to Europe' led to the rejection of the old (bloc) culture and to the construction of a new social order based on a mixture of national culture and Western globalisation culture (for the definition of the individual cultures, compare Sztompka 1990). The thesis I would like to verify in the following text is that after 1989, in connection with the 'return to Europe' and the acceptance of Western culture, there is a shift from materialism to post-materialism in Czech society, as happened in Western European societies in the 1970s, with the difference that the shift is more significant in the case of foreign policy makers than in the case of society. If Czech society and the Czech foreign-political elite have experienced a transformation of value preferences, a change can be also expected in the activities, attitudes, presentation of oneself to the others, evaluation, assessment and self-justification.

If I confirmed the change of value preferences towards post-materialism, both in the case of Czech society and foreign political makers, I would open a space for further research: we could suppose on the basis of the method of analogy that the increasing degree of post-materialism will lead, in the Czech case, as it did in the Western European ones (compare Waisová – Cabada 2009), to the weakening of the pragmatic approach towards foreign policy and to the weakening of the relativisation of the value dimension of the foreign-political issue, to the refusal of the policy of selective interest and double standard and to an inclination towards principled foreign policy.

The first part of the text will present the conception of Inglehart's 'silent revolution', in which modern societies are transformed into postmodern societies. The second part of the text will analyse whether the revolution in 1989 and the 'return to Europe' opened the door for the silent revolution in Czech society, even though with a phase shift of twenty years. The third part asks the question of whether the silent revolution has manifested itself among Czech foreign policy makers. In the conclusion, I ponder upon what impact the change of value preferences of Czech society might have on the foreign policy of the Czech Republic.

The silent revolution and the shift from materialism to post-materialism

During the decades following the Second World War, there is an intergenerational shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values in Western societies; this shift has been designated by the author of the mentioned dualistic conception of values – Ronald Inglehart – as the 'silent revolution', in which modern society changes

into postmodern society[2]. The change of value priorities from materialistic to post-materialistic in Western societies influenced, among other things, political decision making and the formulation of new lines of some policies.

Inglehart's main thesis (1997) is that, after WWII, Western societies entered into a new era of their socio-economic existence – into a post-industrial development phase that carried with it a change of value preferences. Ronald Inglehart conceptualised this change as a shift from material values to post-material ones. He understands material values as the orientation of people towards economic prosperity, material security, stable economic growth and the maintaining of the social order; post-material values are seen in the orientation towards the freedom of individuals to realise themselves and in the emphasis on the possibility of more civil participation in important governmental decisions and a possibility to further influence the administration of public affairs in one's immediate environment, in an effort to change the impersonal aspect of the life of a society, to form a more humane society, in which thoughts will be more important than money and to live in a high quality environment (Inglehart according to Rabušic 1990: 506). According to Inglehart (1997), the societies which have accepted post-materialistic values have a greater tendency towards confidence and tolerance. Post-materialists are neither anti-materialists nor non-materialists. "The term 'Post-materialist' denotes a set of goals that are emphasized *after* people have attained material security, and *because* they have attained material security" (Inglehart 1997: 35; emphasis in the original).

The shift to postmodernism makes itself felt both on an institutional level and in the political sphere. While modern society was characterised by hierarchical and bureaucratic order, postmodern society leaves behind the bureaucratic state, the disciplined oligarchy of political parties, mass production and traditional trade unions (Inglehart 1997: 12-28). Politically, the shift to post-material values weakened the respect previously felt towards authorities and the loyalty to hierarchical political parties, at the same time increasing the interest in political participation and self-expression. Po st-material aspirations in combination with expectations of liberty generate a potential for democratic reforms, by means of the increasing emphasis individuals place on democracy and on the democratic process. Postmodern societies want more than the right to vote; they want to influence political institutions and the political decision making process far more actively (Inglehart 1997: 43).

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2   The conclusion of the crucial value change of Western societies was reached by other researchers dealing with the issues of value priorities in post-industrial societies in the course of the 1970's and 1980's. Although there are a number of Inglehart's critics and Inglehart himself admits some drawbacks of his conception of the 'silent revolution', his theses have not been (comprehensively) refuted.

The causes of the intergenerational shifts from material to post-material values consist in a range of socio-economic changes, particularly in the development of a democratic political system and political institutions, in the unprecedented material security, which Western states experience thanks to the prosperity which occurred between the years 1950 and 1970, and in the fact that Western societies have been living virtually in a state of peace since WWII. "Postmodern societies no longer have to fight for their bare existence; they rather dedicate their efforts to maximising their subjective well-being" (Inglehart 1997: 14 and 35). Postmodern societies diverge from the standardised functionalism and enthusiasm for science and economic growth and take greater account of the aesthetic and human elements and one's quality of life, of life as such and its meaning and value. In other words, a new perception of life occurs and attitudes to life change: post-materialists put increasingly less of an emphasis on the importance of material consumption and economic security, and prioritise general human objectives. The shift from material to post-material values manifests itself both on the individual and supraindividual levels, in the case of political elites, for example when deciding about the goals of a state or when formulating policies.

According to sociological surveys focusing, among other things, on the research of value preferences (e.g. European Values Study and World Values Survey), the societies of Western Europe, particularly the Danes, Germans, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedish and the Swiss (ordered alphabetically) rank among the societies with the highest degree of post-material orientation.[3] It was these states which have significantly reformed their foreign policies during the past thirty years, that show the largest divergence from pragmatism in foreign-political matters and an inclination towards principled foreign policy, which is remote from the policy of selective interest and double standards (for the analysis of the character of German, Dutch and Norwegian foreign policies, compare for example Waisová – Cabada 2009).

Is Czech society post-material?[4] Silent revolution in the Czech Republic

After the fall of communism, Czech society attached to the European West and Czechs returned back to a Western conceptual and value approach towards their own identity. The Czech refusal of the 'barbarian' East and the acceptance of the identity of the civilised West was expressed in the Czech "return to Europe", the return to the family of civilised liberal democratic societies. The return to Europe is based on Habermas's thought of the "*nachholende Revolution*", when the return

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[3]   World Values Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_findings, 20th July, 2010.
[4]   This question was first used by Rabušic in 2000 as the headline for his article studying the change of the value preferences of Czech Society.

was partly accompanied by 'catching up', which was supposed to move Czech society on the 'same' development trajectory Western European societies had taken after WWII. That gradually led to the Czech Republic acquiring similar characteristics as the societies among which it belongs (meaning Western European), and only temporarily, had it been excluded from their group.

Although it is clear the development trajectory of Czech society cannot fully copy the development in Western European societies, due to various external factors – the historical experience of Czechs and character of Czech society – some processes that took place in Western societies in the 1970s logically appeared in Czech society in connection to the shift to democracy after 1990. It concerns, among other things, an intergenerational shift in value preferences of individuals and societies or quantitative changes in family, i.e. marriage and reproductive behaviour, or more specifically the return to the European patterns of reproductive and family behaviour (Možný – Rabušic 1998: 92).

The question of whether "Czech society is post-material" was, ten years ago and ten years after the initiation of the shift of the Czech Republic to democracy, asked by the sociologist – an expert in Inglehart's work – Ladislav Rabušic. Rabušic (2000: 13) says that, on the basis of sociological surveys investigating the facts on post-materialism in the Czech population, it is possible to talk about a "tendency towards a trend of certain post-materialisation, although the percentage differences in the numbers of post-materialists between the years 1991 and 1999 are not great and their values are at the edge of sampling error" (compare table 1).

Table 1: Percentage of post-materialists in the Czech Republic in the years 1991, 1993, 1999 and 2008 (in %)

Type/year	1991	1993	1999	2008
Materialists	31	31	24	25
Mixed	64	61	67	65
Post-materialists	5	9	9	10

Source: European Values Study 2008, data were obtained by Inglehart's four-question battery

Rabušic (2000: 14) points out that age is an important sorting criterion when studying the shift in the value orientation of society. If we take age into account in the research, there are significant cohort differences, the ratio of post-materialists being noticeable in the young cohorts (18-29 year olds). These young age cohorts grew up in the period of a relative prosperity at the end of the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s; however, they also acquired secondary and tertiary education and first work experience as early as in 1989. The difference in the ratios

of post-materialists among the youngest generation in 1991 and 1999 is already outside the scope of sampling error and hence it is possible to say (if we accept Inglehart's manner of measuring and creation of typology as valid) that "during the 1990s, Czech society experiences a shift of value preferences in a way which can be designated as a trend of lowering material attitudes and a certain shift towards post-material ones" (Rabušic 2000: 15). European Values Study of 2008 (compare table 2) shows that the intergenerational difference does not exist only between the youngest age cohort and the remaining age cohorts but a decreasing tendency in the number of materialists can be observed in the age cohort of 30-49 years of age. This occurs due to the ageing of the youngest age cohort in the period of time between the individual surveys. Rabušic concluded in 2000 that the post-material dimension is present in the Czech population; it has a tendency to grow and its bearers are particularly the youngest members of the Czech adult population (Rabušic 2000: 19). The results of the EVS of 2008 confirm this trend.

Table 2: The distribution of materialists and post-materialists in the Czech population in individual age cohorts in 2008

Age	Materialists	Mixed	Post-materialists	Total
18-29 yo	16.8	70.8	12.9	100
30-49 yo	25.8	63.5	11	100
50 yo and older	34	58.5	7.37	100

Source: EVS 2008
Note: in %, total number of respondents: 1821, age cohort 18-29 year olds: 350 respondents, 30-49 year olds: 575 respondents and 50 year olds and older: 868 respondents

Even though the presented figures confirm my thesis about the increase in post-materialism in Czech society, the growth of the number of post-materialists, in view of the total figures, is not entirely convincing. This is also reinforced by the fact that the sample of Czech respondents was relatively small (in all EVS, i.e. in EVS of 1991, 1999 and 2008, the question testing the degree of materialism or post-materialism was answered by 5823 respondents; in 1991, the battery of questions testing post-materialism was answered by 2106 respondents, 1903 respondents in 1999, and 1814 respondents in 2008) and hence the influence of momentary factors on the answers of the respondents or the fact that the questions testing the degree of post-materialism were something new for the respondents, something they had not thought of before, may play a far more important role. Furthermore, "statements about reality are not necessarily the reality" (Rabušic 2000: 19). With regard to these facts, I intend to support the thesis on the transformation of the value priorities of Czech society and the fact that this transformation follows a similar

trajectory as it followed in Western societies in the 1970s and the 1980s with further arguments.

As a verifying device, we can use the research of demographic behaviour because it was the significant change of demographic behaviour reflected in the changes of the patterns of birth rates, marriage rates and death rates – that was designated as the second demographic transition – which accompanied the intergenerational shift from materialism to post-materialism in Western societies at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. The economic growth of Western societies related to the development of democracy and the social state, to the growth of education and a massive entrance of women into paid jobs marked the life philosophy and the value orientation of the newly entering generations and, at the beginning of the 1970s, changed the social and reproductive climate of Western societies (Možný – Rabušic 1998: 106).

Demographic statistics reveal that the changes in the patterns of birth rates, marriage rates and death rates which occurred in the Czech Republic after 1989 are similar to and as deep as the changes that had occurred in Western societies in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the mid-1990s, the so-called second demographic transition has been taking place; its causes lie – as well as in the West – in the deep changes of the value priorities and preferences of the youngest age cohorts, cohorts born between the mid-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s (Rabušic 2001; Možný – Rabušic 1998). The new value orientation of these cohorts was latently present even before the political changes in 1989 but it had an opportunity to show itself fully only in the free environment of the new democratic society. Being aware of the fact that I might deliver a sociologically daring statement, I believe that, through the priorities showing themselves via the 'return of the Czech family to Europe', we can generally support the conclusions stated above – hence that Czech society, or its part, is undergoing a similar structural change as Western societies did in the 1970s and the 1980s, so it can be expected that the degree of post-materialism will strengthen in Czech society, as it happened in Western Europe. While changes in the area of birth rates, marriage rates and death rates can be observed quite early and are easily measurable, changes in the political sphere are much slower and the influence of the change of the value preferences of Czechs in this area is measurable only with some difficulty.

The attitudes of Czechs towards some political questions may be a further indicator of value changes: attitude towards democracy, or more specifically towards the character of political systems and regimes and some specific values (peace, human rights, justice, freedom etc.). Although a great part of Czechs (38 %) believe that the economic system works badly in democracy, that (52 %) democracies are indecisive and too quarrelsome and that (54 %[5]) it is difficult to keep order in democracy,

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[5]   For a comparison, according to the research of the EVS of 1999, the figures for the mentioned questions were the following: 35% of Czechs agreed that the economic system works badly in

83 % of Czechs think that democracy, despite its problems, is better than another form of government (EVS 2008) [6]. It is possible to observe a popularity of and an active participation in the public support of democratic values and human rights. In Czech society, particularly with young urban intellectuals, events supporting human rights and human rights defenders have become popular, represented for example by the participation in the international 'Flag for Tibet' campaign in the Czech environment. However, it is necessary to add that the support of some human rights issues (Tibet) is becoming an expression of a political kitsch for certain groups of Czech society rather than a representation of their internal values leading to defending human rights. As an example, let us mention the appendix to the menu of the Petit Cafe in Mikulov: "All Tibetans are served for free, so that they feel at home at least somewhere". Why is it that the Uyghurs, Kurds or Karens do not get to be served for free too?

Also the comparison of the attitudes of Czechs towards some issues with the attitudes of the citizens of other European countries is significant for the determination of the character of Czech society and its value preferences. Among three values[7] that Czechs mentioned as personally the most important, there were respect for human rights, peace, and respect for human life. All these values were chosen from a set of 12 different values by almost 40 % of the population; specifically, respect for human rights was chosen by 40 % of Czechs as their most important value, as well as peace; 38 % of Czechs chose respect for human life as their third most important value (Eurobarometer 69: technical specifications, unpaged appendix). If we compare the results of Czech research with EU 27, in the European union, the number of those that had chosen the mentioned values was also about 40 % (45 % for peace, 42 % for respect for human rights and 41 % for respect for human life), and it is not possible to observe any significant difference between the value preferences of Czech citizens and the citizens of the old member countries of the EU[8] (meaning Western European countries, in which the silent revolution occurred in the 1970s) (Eurobarometer 69: 15-16). In other comparative surveys

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democracy, 51% of Czech agreed that democracies are indecisive and too quarrelsome and 54% agreed that it is difficult to keep order in democracy (EVS 2008).

[6]   In the EVS of 1999, 92% of Czechs believed that democracy, despite its problems, is better than another form of government; in 2008, the same opinion was held by 83% of the citizens of the Czech Republic (EVS 2008).

[7]   The respondents had to choose from the following set of values: human rights, peace, democracy, legal order, respect for other cultures, solidarity and support of others, respect for human life, equality, individual freedom, tolerance, self-fulfilment, and faith and religion (Eurobarometer 69: 22).

[8]   Only randomly, among the old member countries of the EU, peace and respect for human rights and human life were chosen by the Belgians, Germans, French, Dutch or the Swedish as their most important priorities. Peace, among the citizens of the EU, was chosen by the Germans (62 % of the citizens), respect for human rights by the Cyprians and the Swedish (63 %), and the respect for human life by the Irish (53 %) (Eurobarometer 69: 16).

of values and value preferences of the citizens of the EU, Czechs show a greater tolerance towards criminality and accept more moderate criminal sanctions than the member countries of the EU on average (surveys from 2006), which is related to the fact that the Czech public places an above-average emphasis on personal freedom (Eurobarometr 66: 7). Generally speaking, in the questions testing the degree of liberalism of society, Czech society either exceeds the EU 25 level (i.e. it is significantly more liberal[9]) or it is around the average of the EU 25, and the questions of value preferences are closer to the states of the original EU 15 and further from the new member countries (Eurobarometer 69). After another ten years, it is possible to confirm Rabušic's conclusion from 2000 that "Czech society experiences a shift of value preferences in a way which can be designated as a trend of lowering material attitudes and a certain shift towards post-material ones" (Rabušic 2000). This shift is the most significant in the case of the youngest age cohorts. Unfortunately, the data of the EVS show only three age cohorts, but if we took into account the second demographic transition[10] and the fact that, in the age cohort of 30-49 year-olds, it actually concerns only the group of around 30 year-olds (approx. 30-39 year-olds, i.e. people born in 1970 at the latest), it would be probably possible to observe an inclination towards post-materialism also in the case of the cohort of 30-39 year-olds.

Post-modernism among foreign policy makers

If we go back to the thesis about the sources of the transformation of the character of Czech foreign policy and to the argument that the change of the ideas/ideology and the identity regarding Czech society of the foreign policy makers is one of its sources, then it is necessary to investigate, besides the value priorities of Czech society and their changes, also the value priorities of foreign policy makers. I understand foreign policy makers as a group of people who are integrated in foreign-political matters. Foreign policy makers can be divided into formal and informal makers. I consider the formal foreign policy makers as people whose job description tells them to participate in the creation or execution of Czech foreign policy. I consider the president as one of these people, as well as the members of the government, the highest ministry officials, members of the Parliament, and the highest representatives of self-governing units. As the informal foreign policy

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[9] The permission of homosexual marriages or the legalisation of marijuana consumption for personal needs; the tolerance towards criminality has already been mentioned (Eurobarometr 66: 41).

[10] The correctness of this assumption is also signified by the result of the Czech Statistical Office, which states that "already in 2002, the intensity of the fertility rate in the age group older than 30 years exceeded the intensity of the fertility rate in the age group younger than 24 years" … "in the age group of over 30 years of age, the intensity of the fertility rate at the age between 35 and 39 years reaches certain significance" (The Czech Statistical Office 2006: unpaged).

makers, I understand such people and groups which do not hold a position of power but affect foreign-political matters: political parties, NGOs, companies, media, universities, consultants and consultancy companies and trade unions. To analyse the value preferences of formal and informal foreign policy makers is very difficult for we do not have any set of sociological data related to this group at present. There are surveys of Czech political and economic elites (Machonin, Tuček and others). However, these do not take into account subgroups such as foreign-political elites or informal foreign policy makers. To assess the value preferences of the formal and informal makers of Czech foreign policy and the number of post-materialists in this group is possible only implicitly.

I will follow from the findings of sociologists (Machonin – Tuček 2002: 13; Hanley – Matějů – Vlachová – Krejčí 1998: 7-9 and 25) that:

1. members of new Czech political elites have been recruited from the children of the intelligentsia, hence from a group whose income level before 1990 was not much higher than the income level of the rest of the population but whose education, cultural level and character of work was much higher, and

2. the class status in socialist societies was replaced by the ownership of knowledge capital connected to education. This indicates – and it is supported by sociological surveys (e.g. Hanley – Matějů – Vlachová – Krejčí 1998: 34) – that members of political elites have a university education. In 1998, 25 % of civil servants and 19 % of the members of the Parliament did not have tertiary education. The foreign-political service itself has such specifics (e.g. high requirements in the knowledge of languages and communication skills, requirements of general knowledge) that unambiguously presume tertiary education, which is confirmed by, among other things, the fact that at least a master's or an engineering university degree is a prerequisite of the admission to the diplomatic academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic[11].

With respect to the above-mentioned, it is possible to assume that the number of people with tertiary education among foreign policy makers is even higher than in the case of the group referred to as political elites or the elites of power. All ministers of foreign affairs of the Czech Republic have had a university education, as well as all their undersecretaries and most of the members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Czech Republic. Altogether, between 1992 and 2010, there were 109 deputies in the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech

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[11] Selection procedure for the admission to study at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/diplomaticka_akademie/vyberove_rizeni_ke_studiu_na.html, 15th April, 2010.

Republic, out of which 6 did not have a university education (one of these six did not finish his studies successfully and is now registered to study at a university again). Percentually, between 1992 and 2010, 6.5 % of the deputies participating in the activities of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic did not have a university degree. In the individual electoral terms, the distribution of university graduates and the others was as follows: 1992-1996: 17 deputies with a university degree, 1 without; 1996-1998: 23 deputies with a university degree, 2 without; 1998-2000: 18 deputies with a university degree, 2 without; 2002-2006: all the deputies of the Committee had a university degree; 2006-2010: 19 deputies with a university degree, 1 studying. In the case of the Senate in the period between 1996 and 2010 (we do not give figures period by period because a third of the Senate is changed every two years), there were 40 senators, out of which 9 did not have a university degree, in the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. Among these 9, there was one who did not finish university. If we are to express the mentioned figure percentually, 22.5 % of the members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security did not have a university degree[12]. Although the number of university graduates in both chambers of the Parliament in the committees dealing with foreign policy is high, it is significantly lower in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies. This fact can be explained by the manner of elections into the Senate, where the rule of electability includes, among other things, the condition of being at least 40 years of age. In the Senate, where dissidents are significantly represented (about 20 % till 2006 inclusive – compare Waisová – Piknerová 2010), there is a relatively high number of people that could not study before 1989.

We do not have a direct answer to the question of whether Czech political elites are post-material but we believe that it is possible to obtain it implicitly, by means of applying the premise of the higher education level of this group. If the thesis of the education level of foreign-political elites is correct, we can use the replies of the respondents acquired in the EVS, who answered the battery of questions testing the degree of post-materialism (5823 respondents altogether) and use education as the selection criterion for this group. The following tables clearly demonstrate that the number of post-materialists correlates with the education level, or more specifically that, among university graduates, there are fewer materialists and more mixed attitudes and post-materialists. As I have demonstrated above, there are a high number of people with a university degree in the foreign-political elite, hence it is possible to deduce that there are also a higher number of people not thinking materialistically but ranking themselves among post-materialists or mixed types too.

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[12]   For the help with searching and selecting these data, I would like to thank my colleague, Linda Piknerová.

The conclusion made in this way is not without problems. Especially the issue of the character of university education is problematic, i.e. what university education foreign policy makers have/had and whether there is a correlation between the specialisation of the university and post-material orientation. We can assume that people educated in humanities and social sciences have higher post-material orientation, with respect to the direction of their studies, and, simultaneously, that this group, for the same reason, is more interested in foreign policy. However, if we look closely at the Parliament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it shows that people with an education in humanities do not prevail and do not even rank as significant. The differences in income between technically educated individuals and those educated in humanities could be of issue. Surveys of average wages in the Czech Republic and the structural wage statistics of the Czech Statistical Office show that experts educated at technical universities have higher wages than the graduates of humanities and social sciences. With a certain amount of exaggeration, we can say that the post-material orientation of those educated in humanities does not significantly differ from those technically educated, although the source of the post-material orientation is different in each group. In one, it is given by the orientation of their specialisation; the other group has high wages and are materially satisfied (see Ingelhart's thesis above). This hypothesis is, of course, pure speculation, but an acceptable speculation, in consideration of the data I have presented.

Table 3: The distribution of post-materialists in the Czech population in individual educational cohorts in 1991, 1999 and 2008 (in %)

1991

Education	Materialists	Mixed	Post-materialists	Total
Elementary	43	55	3	100
Vocational training	32	63	5	100
Secondary	25	68	7	100
University	19	72	9	100

1999

Education	Materialists	Mixed	Post-materialists	Total
Elementary	38	55	7	100
Vocational training	27	68	5	100
Secondary	18	70	13	100
University	11	71	18	100

2008

Education	Materialists	Mixed	Post-materialists	Total
Elementary	37	57	6	100
Vocational training	31	61	9	100
Secondary	26	64	11	100
University	13	74	14	100

Source: EVS 2008

An objection may be raised against this procedure that the number of post-materialists would, following Ingelhart's logic, rather correlate with the economic position of the respondents than with the education level. Such an objection cannot be rejected but it cannot be confirmed either because not enough data is available which would allow us to verify the validity of this objection. In the European Values Study for 1991, 1999 and 2008, the battery of questions testing post-materialism was answered by 5823 respondents but 3882 of these were not willing to answer the question about their income. The number of those willing to share the information about their income was so small that it is not possible to consider it a representative sample on the basis of which we could judge the validity of the correlation between income level and post-material orientation in Czech society.

It is also possible to object that people with higher education are more successful in the job market and have better-paid jobs and that educated people show post-material orientation because they generally get on better. This objection can be – at least in the Czech case – also disputed because, particularly between 1968 and 1989, there was significant social corruption, from which mainly the less qualified social strata profited (compare Machonin 1996: 177), not university graduates. At the beginning of the 1990s, the economic differences were minimal, even though the results of the EVS of 1991 (see table 4) clearly show that the number of materialists is the lowest in the group of university graduates (who did not get on economically any better than the rest of the society). Put differently, even at times when university graduates shared the average standard of living of Czechoslovak citizens, they showed lower tendencies towards material orientation.

Conclusion

During the twenty years following the fall of communism, Czech society its values, habits and manners of conduct significantly changed – Czech society 'returned to Europe' and its civilisation competences approached Western societies. The change of value preferences of Czech society taking place after 1989 is similar to the so-called silent revolution, which took place in the 1970s in Western

societies, and leads towards the reinforcement of the post-material orientation of Czech population. The presented text shows that Czech society is undergoing the silent revolution, even though the change of value preferences is happening relatively slowly. The change of value preferences from material values towards post-material values is the most significant in the youngest age cohorts. Besides the youngest age cohorts, we can notice more significant post-material orientation (including its increase with time) in people with university education. When analysing Czech foreign policy, we work by the fact that identity is formulated by political representation on the basis of the facts (values) the society professes and in which it recognises itself, and values govern and determine its conduct and attitudes. If it is valid that the value preferences of Czech society and especially of foreign policy makers are undergoing a change, it is possible to expect that this change will cause another change, a change of the character of foreign policy in this case. It is also indicated by the fact that, among foreign policy makers, people with a university education prevail, whose post-material orientation in the past twenty years has been continually growing and is significantly higher than in the whole population and also slightly higher than in the youngest age cohort as such.

Considering the change of the character of Czech foreign policy, the post-material orientation of Czech society and foreign policy makers may influence particularly the goals and procedures of foreign policy. Foreign policies of the countries whose societies show a high degree of post-materialism also show a lower degree of pragmatism, or rather higher degree of principality and refusal of the policy of selective interest and double standard. The decrease of material orientation correlates with higher interest in and defence of human rights including the support of the development of humanitarian law and democratisation, with the willingness to tolerate higher expenses in the protection of national security, provided guns with minimum negative humanitarian impact are used, with the interest in the faith of those living behind our borders and with a higher interest in environmental protection. The states whose societies show a high degree of post-materialism become the defenders, promoters and bearers of such activities as the prohibition of landmines (Ottawa Treaty) and cluster ammunition (Oslo Agreement), the foundation of the International Criminal Court, and the extension of the membership or admission to and the enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect principle. We shall see in the following decades if the Czech Republic will go in this direction. The current progress of Czech foreign policy indicates so far (compare for example Waisová 2010) that the assumption of the influence of the change of value orientation of the Czech population and foreign policy makers on the character of Czech foreign policy was correct.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Martina Ponížilová[1]

Europe and its Others, Europe as the Other

The book, "Europe and its Others" summarizes the outcome of a conference held in 2007 at the University of St. Andrews. As the title directly implies, the text provides the readers with several essays contributing to the understanding of the questions of perception and the construction of both the Others and the self-image. Most of the contributions focus on the concrete examples concerning Europe and its Others, i.e. how Europe created its Others through its history, but also (though to a lesser extent) how Europe was perceived by other entities as their Other. Briefly speaking, it deals with the interperceptions of Europe and its Others. This publication takes into consideration the impact of the perception of Europe's religious, national, racial or ethnic Others on the process of (European) identity formation as well as its definitions.

The topic of one's own identity formation at the background of constructing someone´s Others is not entirely a new concept. There are currently many volumes and articles on this topic. Some of these which are currently in existence are crucial for its understanding, e.g. Edward Said´s *Orientalism*, which became one of the fundamental books concerning the process of „Othering". Another example is *Collective Identity Formation and the International State* by Alexander Wendt, which focuses on the formation of one´s own identity from the constructivists´ perspective. There are also several publications dealing with the same topics as some of the essays from the reviewed book (i.e. gender or racial stereotypes[2], violence, culture), and with the Self-Other concept relevant to Europe.[3]

The book is divided into three major sections. Each of these three parts consists of several contributions that are thematically related to the main topic of the section. Prior to the first section are two introductory contributions. At the end of each essay the authors recommend a list of several publications for readers as well as texts useful for those who are further interested in that particular topic.

The introductory contribution consists of Paul Gifford´s essay, „*Defining ´Others´: how interperceptions shape identities*". This theoretical text deals with the

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[2]   See f. E. Jan Nederveen Pieterse´s book *White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture.*

[3]   For further reading, see *Europe and its Others* by Jan Nederveen Pieterse or *Performing Europe: Identity Formation for a »New« Europe* by Janelle Reinelt.

construction of „Self" and „Other" in context of identity formation, and also with the topic of contemporary Europe and its Others through the lens of postmodernism. Although Gifford´s contribution is rather difficult to read and understand, it is highly beneficial in exploring the importance of the perception and depiction of the Others for the process of constructing self-image as well as forming one´s own identity. "The proximity and presence of the Other acts as a mirror reflecting one's own self: that is, to the collective specificity which ´we ourselves´ embody, but cannot well represent or grasp in isolation" (p. 15). „[T]he Other is indeed, in some sense, the key *to* our (and/ or my) own identity" (p. 18). Gifford´s opinion, which is worth contemplation, is his notice on the idea of *entirely* constructed identity, because, as he puts it, the perception of our Other(s) is based on the real image of the world around us.

The second text, „*Writing Christendom in the English Renaissance: a reappraisal of Denys Hay´s view of the emergence of ´Europe´*" by Jane Pettegree, aims to discover the origin of the concept of Europe which, as she asserts, emerged during the Renaissance and which superseded the concept of Christendom. To contribute to the debate concerning otherness, she „speculates on the capacity of imagined geographies to generate both socio-cultural commonality and feelings of alteration" (p. 39).

The first section of the book, entitled „*Gender and the other*", deals with one of the most fundamental aspects of the human otherness, namely gender or sexual disparity. Kate Marsh, in her essay „*The feminized Indian Other: English and French conceptions of ´womanhood´*", illustrates how feminization of the „Other", concretely India, is as a part of imperialist politics used for depiction of colonized lands. The strategy of feminization (or gender discourse in description of foreign countries) which both female and male writers adopted, aims to create an image of India and other colonized countries as being a feminine, i.e. weak Other which, on the contrary, confirms the self-image of the powerful masculine colonizer.

Patricia Howe in her contribution, „*Appropriation and alienation: women travelers and the construction of identity*", analyzes texts and narratives of several authors from previous centuries concerning their journeys through different countries in Europe. Howe, with regard to her research, argues that „gender is a crucial determinant in the construction of the traveler's narrative identity" (p. 77). She also illustrates that the process of construction of the Other is affected not only by gender, but also by nationality and class.

Wanda Campbell´s essay „*Eden lost and found: early Canadian women poets look back to Europe*" compares the different perspectives of three (originally European) female writers who lived in Canada and wrote about Europe in their books. Campbell analyzes their perceptions of the unknown distant continent and their

original country of birth (England) throughout the course of their lives. The various narratives of these authors have one similar theme in common, which proves to be gendered images of England (either feminized or masculinized) according to their individual relationship to this particular country.

Essays within the second section, entitled „*Including and Excluding: Histories of Violence*", dispute violent encounters, i.e. armed conflicts and wars. Conflicts between two (or more) entities are connected with the „Othering" process and mechanism of exclusion. The formation of the hostile Other by states, nations or societies is crucial for antagonistic encounters or, strictly speaking, for justification of acts of war (eventually states of war or war mobilizations), aggressions and defensive operations.

Judith Froemmer in her essay, „*Crucesignati – signed with the cross: Tasso´s poetics of crusade*", examines several stories and narratives about the Crusades. She specifically focuses on the description of enemies and gender discourse. The main principle of the Crusades was a formation of a hostile Other. The process of constructing the Other included not only gender prejudices, especially feminization - „female oriental Other" (p. 125) -, but also images of chaos, underdevelopment or even barbarism. All of these factors contributed to the creation of the identity of the Church, or West in general.

In his impressive contribution, „*Disciplining the black body: German colonialism and visual violence*", Volker Langbehn examines examples of characters who were created in the era of Wilhelmian Germany, and how the visual depiction of the Others served for (national) interests of German colonial politics. The displayed gender, racial and cultural countertypes such as „civilized Europeans and uncivilized indigenous people" (p. 149) should confirm and/or reinforce the German masculine self-image, because cultural and racial superiority serveed as "a central theme in this process of European ´Othering´" (p. 136).

Another intriguing essay, entitled „*Including and excluding the Holocaust: changing perceptions in German and European identities*" by Sven Kramer, deals with the exclusion and/or inclusion of experience with the Holocaust by the post-war Germans as well as the Europeans. The author argues the Germans pushed the exclusion of the Holocaust from their collective memory, and thereby from their identity, because the Holocaust was, according to their opinion, committed at the hand of the Nazis, not by themselves (ordinary Germans). In Kramer´s words, „it represented the excluded Other from German identity" (p. 158). Following the 1960s the process of inclusion of the Holocaust to their self-image began and it was intensified by the reunification of Germany in 1990. The author further investigates the absence of all-European identity and claims that one of the defining reasons is the division of Europe (due in part because of the Holocaust) into conflicting

states (Germany and partly Austria) as well as the victim states (the whole rest of Europe). These arguments prove the reason why the memories of Holocaust should become a shared experience of the European whole society.

Michaela Peroutkova describes in very appealing way in her contribution, „*Narratives about the expulsion of Germans: a German–Czech comparison*", a quite controversial and delicate topic (especially for the Czechs) from the Czech history and one of the grim aspects of the Czech-German relationship, namely the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from the Czech border region. Peroutkova views the question of expulsion of Germans from the perspective of four different discourses: historical, political, literal and oral, and she confronts the points of view, narratives and memories of both Germans and Czechs. Her attempt to offer a complex insight to this topic provides the readers with a unique opportunity to perceive this complicated issue from diverse perspectives.

The last contribution of the second section by Boris Previsic, „*Europe´s blind spot on violence: the fall of Yugoslavia and references to World War II*", deals with the Europe-made image of Balkan as its uncivilized Other. Concretely, the author attempts to prove the events of the Second World War resulted (to a certain extent) in the wars which happened in the Balkan region in the 1990s. This is why such wars should not be interpreted as outbreaks of violence caused by Europe´s barbarian Other, but rather some aspect that is internal to Europe and its history. This is why Previsic talks about Balkan as Europe´s *internal* Other. The main reason of Europe´s "Othering" of Balkan is, as author argues, „to relieve one´s own people of all responsibility for it [war]" (p. 200).

Contributions in the third section, „*Border Areas and Contract Zones*", deals with the trade or cultural encounters which are not as opposing and hostile as violent and conflictful encounters which were described in the previous section. Jonathan H. Hsy in his text, „*´Oure Occian´: littoral language and the Constance narratives of Chaucer and Boccaccio*", focuses on the works of Giovanni Boccaccio and Geoffrey Chaucer, especially on their style and description of religious Other and encounters between Muslims and Christians. Boccaccio describes the relationship between these two religions as tolerant, familiar and close, on the contrary Chaucer views Muslims as Christians´ hostile Other.

Frances Nethercott´s essay *„Russia and the West: a Russian history of the European Other*" delves into the perceptions of Europe as the Other from the perspective of Russia and its society throughout the 19th century. The antagonism between the self-image of Russia and otherness and history of Europe served as one of the constituting factors of the self-defining of Russian society.

The following two texts focus on the controversial topic in contemporary Europe, which is the complicated relationship between Europe and Turkey. Meliz Ergin

claims in her essay, „*Otherness within Turkey, and between Turkey and Europe*“, that both sides (Turkey and Europe) undergo the process of „Othering“ which means they use stereotypes to create an image of their Other. As she puts it: „Europe represents (...) a foreign land against which a strong sense of identity must be established, and traditions be preserved“ (p. 253-254). She analyzes the novel *Snow* by Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk, which grants her insight to illustrate the clashes between the Islamic and democratic-secular part of the identity of the Turkish state and society. This discrepancy, as she suggests, projects in the antagonism in the Turkey-Europe relationship.

Roger Hillman in his contribution, *„Transnationalism in the films of Fatih Akin“,* explains how filmmakers from New European (or German) Cinema, mainly Fatih Akin, deal with the topic of religious, national and cultural otherness of the German society and the expansive community of Turkish Germans or Turkish speaking inhabitants. Hillman highlights the importance in depiction of clashing or maybe even mixing cultures and slowly changing and permeating identities in these films.

The very last contribution in this book is an essay „*´Mirror of the West´: a critique and a plea*“ by Japanese author Kunio Tsunekawa. At the beginning of his text he asks the crucial and most fundamental question: „Who or what is ´the Other´?“ (p. 277). Consequently, he illustrates the perception of Europe as the Other from a Japanese point of view which was, as he claims, quite positive, because Europe was not understood as an unfriendly or hostile „Other but rather as an entity which is good enough to be resembled. Nevertheless, Tsunekawa critizes the way Europe is constructing its self-image and identity, i. e. through contrasting or opposing its Others.

The objective of this book - to illustrate „how the perceptions formed of (...) an Other have inflected, shaped and defined European identities at various stages throughout its history“ (p. 2) - was successfully achieved. All the case studies contribute to the debate about the Self-Other conception by original topics and highly interesting insights into this issue. Therefore this publication is certainly recommendable to the readers.

The focus of this book lies in the widening of the debate over Europe´s identity formation and Europe´s relationship with its Others. From this point of view is presenting publication surely beneficial. Nevertheless, the theoretical aspects of the Self-Other concept in general lacked in significance. This is further proved by the fact that the texts in this book mainly consist of only case studies concerned with Europe and its Others, with the exception of only one single text which is purely theoretical. This fact, of course, does not reduce the quality of this publication and its particular contributions; therefore, it can still be highly recommended to all scholars and students of political science, international relations, anthropology,

sociology and other disciplines. Very heplful is also its multi-fielded character which provides various perspectives on the same issue.

Gifford, Paul – Hauswedell, Tessa (eds.) (2010): Europe and its Others. Essays on Interperception and Identity, Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern, 297 pages.

Other sources:

Pieterse, Jan N. (1992): *White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture.* Yale University Press: New Haven and London.

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Reinelt, J. (2001): Performing Europe: Identity Formation for a »New« Europe. *Theatre Journal* (53) 3: 365-387.

Said, Edward W. (2003): *Orientalism*, Pinguin Books: Harmondsworth.

Wendt, A. (1994): Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *The American Political Science Review* 88 (2): 384-396.

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List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:

Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia,* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Two or more authors:

Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid.*

Understanding International Development Cooperation, Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

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George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, in Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics. Sixth Edition,* 70-76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5-54.

Online editions of journals:

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632 (15 August 2002).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Excerpts From the Pentagon´s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

Online editions:

Cooper, Robert (2002): 'Why We Still Need Empires', *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2 November, 2003).

RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

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Notes