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EDITORIAL

Dear readers,

most of the new issue of the journal *Politics in Central Europe – The Journal of Central European Political Science Association* is formed by a set of articles concerned with public diplomacy and nation branding in Central Europe. It is one of the outcomes of the research project "Austria and its Neighbour's" (*Österreich und seine Nachbarn: Kulturelle Transformationen, politische Repräsentationen und trans/nationale Identitätsentwürfe seit 1989*) that was supported by the Austrian Future Fund in 2001–2012. Heidemarie Uhl from the Austrian Academy of Sciences was the project leader and, alongside Austrian researchers (Petra Bernhardt and Andreas Priberski), there were also researchers from the Czech Republic (Ladislav Cabada), Hungary (Éva Kovács), Slovakia (Silvia Miháliková) and Slovenia (Oto Luthar) participating in the project.

The aim of the project was an expert reflection of the changes of the perception inside the individual societies and countries of Central Europe on the level of cross-border communication and regional identity after the system change initiated by the fall of the real socialist regimes in the late 1980s. The transdisciplinary research, the main outcome of which will be a common discourse of the research team to be published in 2013, was based on the use of different levels of analyses and a combination of approaches of several social sciences. Cultural, anthropological, sociological, economic, historical and political approaches have become the basis for the presented studies whose character oscillates between the genres of a "standard" scientific article and an essay; they vary conspicuously in terms of their length and extent. We believe that this unevenness of the individual articles is, considering the specificity of the topic and the transdisciplinary approach to the issue, acceptable, but we are aware of the fact that we have sometimes drifted away from the strict frame of the Guidelines for Authors.

The monothematic issue is also supplemented by two discussion entries reflecting two topical issues that will, no doubt, still form a significant part of European Studies in the near future – naturally also in the perspective of the development in Central Europe. We believe that you will find both discussion texts – similarly as in the case of the essays related to the main topic of the issue – as interesting and inspiring as the texts published in the previous issues and volumes.

Ladislav Cabada

ESSAYS

Touristic Trails: Central Europe between Niche Marketing and Brand Management

Petra Bernhardt

Abstract: *The essay addresses nation branding as a recent political und cultural practice in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a special emphasis on the role of tourism marketing. Taking a comparative perspective on the region, the essay focuses on the paradox that CEE countries seek to create distinct and unique images by employing very similar sets of communicative strategies and symbolic articulations.*

Keywords: ***branding, nation branding, image politics, tourism, CEE***

Introduction

In May 2011, the Austrian Federal Government launched the project "Brand Austria" ("Marke Österreich") with the goals of improving the country's image abroad, ensuring its competitiveness, and stimulating its appeal as a business location. Austria was not the first country in the Central and Eastern European (CEE)[1] region to engage in such a nation branding initiative. Today, nation branding has become a widely recognized phenomenon among both academics and practitioners. Nadia Kaneva, a scholar of Media Studies at the University of Denver, defines nation branding as a "compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms" (Kaneva 2011: 118; emphasis in original). The practical manifestations of nation branding range from communicative strategies, such as the creation of logos and slogans, to the institutionalization of branding in governmental structures to manage long-term branding efforts (ibid.). Nation branding is "distinct from national image due to the active rather than passive nature of policy elites in [the] shaping, changing, and maintaining of their country's image" (Saunders 2012: 51).

Branding advocates like government advisor and author Simon Anholt argue that brand management must become "a component of national policy" (2008: 23; emphasis in original). Anholt, who claims to have invented the term "nation branding",

[1] Definitions of the CEE region vary. For the purposes of this essay, my use of the term refers to Austria, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, and Slovenia.

runs a tool that measures countries' brand images. The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index combines six main areas of nation brand interest: exports, governance, culture and heritage, people, tourism, investment, and immigration.[2] This index polls over 25,000 individuals in more than 35 different countries on a quarterly basis. Politicians around the globe keep an eye on it because they believe in the necessity of managing national image "through strategic policy initiatives, targeted public diplomacy, and discrete programs intended to alter global perception on the elite and mass levels" (Saunders 2012: 51).

Critics argue that nation branding is "a marketing practice that simplifies and borrows only those aspects of a nation's identity that promote a nation's marketability" (Volčič 2012: 148). It is stated that nation branding has "aspirations to exercise symbolic power in defining the meaning of nationhood" (Kaneva 2012: 5) and promotes "those traits of a country's culture, commerce, geography, and natural resources that advance it´s instrumental agendas in the marketplace and international relations" (Jansen 2012: 79).

My essay follows the critical inquiry research strand in nation branding[3] by examining ways that tourism marketing contributes to the formation of national images in CEE. After a short overview of the role of branding in the region, I address tourism as a major factor within this process and compare brand strategies employed throughout the region. I follow a constructivist approach to the field of regional studies, which focuses on the socially and politically constructed nature of national identities and branding policies.

Nation Branding: A Hot Topic in CEE?

After the events of 1989–1991, most countries in CEE were faced with the need for self-identification and to assert images to differentiate themselves in the global market. Furthermore, there was a requirement to accommodate unwanted images after the end of state socialism. In CEE, these unwanted images were closely linked with the notion of "the East". Scholars like Larry Wolff (1994) and Robert Saunders (2012) have convincingly shown how external narrators (like Lord Byron, Bram Stoker, and other modern producers of popular culture) have made the term "Eastern Europe" synonymous with backwardness and anti-modernity since the Enlightenment. The "Western tendency to lump all post-communist/post-Soviet states together into an unknown but instantly recognizable whole" (Saunders 2012: 50) perpetuates "Cold War frames of thought" (Saunders 2012: 50) and can still be

[2] For a detailed description of each area, see the website of *The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index* (URL http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/placebranding/nbi/index.en.html).

[3] The research strand of critical inquiry in nation branding is represented by scholars Melissa Aronczyk, Nadia Kaneva, Liz Moor, and Sue Curry Jansen, to name but a few.

considered a challenge for nation branding efforts in the CEE region. Moreover, an "embedded tendency toward exoticization remains a significant factor in the generation of images from the outside and is increasingly made manifest through a sort of 'self-exoticism for Western consumption", particularly when it comes to nation branding (Volčič 2008: 409, quoted by Saunders 2012: 56).

Nation branding has proliferated quickly in CEE. Since the events of 1989–1991, almost every country in the region has engaged in nation branding (Kaneva 2012). László Kulcsár and Younk-ok Yum (2012: 193) identify two major influences on this development. First, the countries rediscovered or reconstructed national and cultural traditions that influenced societal discourses on national identity. This resulted in national narratives constructed around the ideas of unity and belonging. "National identity was rearticulated against the perceived identities of internal and external 'Others', such as minorities and historical adversaries" (Younk-ok Yum 2012: 193). Secondly, the forces of globalisation, "Westernisation", and "Europeanization" influenced the redefinition of national identities in CEE (Younk-ok Yum 2012: 193.).

Nadia Kaneva, who recently edited the remarkable volume Branding Post-Communist Nations, argues that the discourse of nation branding is inevitably linked with post-socialist identity struggle. "What kinds of identities were marked as 'shameful' or as 'desired' became a central area of contestation in nation branding initiatives" (Kaneva 2012: 7). The national identity struggles of post-socialist countries were also significantly impacted by an articulated desire to "return to Europe", which led them to seek formal accession into the structures of the EU (Kaneva 2012: 9). These conflicting discourses of national self-identification and of European integration coexist in the region and are continually renegotiated in political, economic, and cultural terms (Kaneva 2012: 7).

The role of tourism branding in CEE

Tourism holds a significant position in the substantial political, economic, and social restructuring processes[4] that have taken place in CEE since the early 1990s (Hall 1999: 227; 2004: 112) and can be considered an important factor in the promotion of national identity. Throughout the region, tourism and culture have been used "to display a break with the past", "to demonstrate a new openness and willingness and eagerness to embrace a wider European identity", (Hughes/Allen

[4] Hall (1999: 228) mentions: a) the growth and privatisation of service industries; b) decentralisation and a loosening of bureaucratic constraints; c) emphasising private initiatives and entrepreneurial activities; d) stimulating niche specialisation and sector segmentation; e) market internationalisation and foreign direct investment; and f) closer interaction between the host populations and the outside world.

2005: 175) and to project a "safe, stable and welcoming environment to encourage foreign direct investment" (Hall 2004: 111).

In the years following the events of 1989–1991, the flows of tourism and market demands have changed rapidly. Pre-1989 tourism in the region was mainly internal, which means that CEE countries were dependent on tourists from neighbouring countries (Baláž/Williams 2005: 81). The market towards Western Europe and the USA opened in 1989. "The scale of international tourism changed radically, the Czech and Hungarian tourism industries in particular were repositioned in global markets, and tourism production was rapidly marketised" (Baláž/Williams 2005: 88). This was most evident in Prague, Budapest, and at Lake Balaton, but there were also attractions with strong international images in Poland (e.g. Warsaw and Krakow), Slovakia (e.g. the Tatra mountains) and Slovenia (e.g. Lake Bled, the Alps, and the Karst plateau) (Hall 1999: 232; Baláž/Williams 2005: 89).

Most CEE countries without coastlines positioned themselves as niche tourism destinations, including rural and city tourism, sport and activity tourism, health tourism, and cultural tourism. This development can be seen as response to a changing global demand for a more sustainable tourism. At the same time, the growth of cultural tourism coincided with national identity projection and representation – especially when it comes to the use of heritage (Hall 2004: 111).

Brand strategies in CEE and brand images abroad

In a first wave of branding initiatives during the 1990s, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, and Slovenia had to project a safe and friendly environment to reinforce a positive national image (Hall 1999: 227). During this period, "the promotion and marketing of tourism [became] inextricably linked with the portrayal of a national image and identity" (Hall 1999: 228). Slovenia, for example, adopted "The sunny side of the Alps" as its national tourism slogan, "embodying positive attractions of climate, topography and contiguity with Western Europe" (Hall 1999: 233). The country reinforced "the mental geographical imagery of Slovenia being firmly part of ('Western'/'civilised') Europe by emphasising its Central European credentials (e.g. Habsburg heritage, Alpine associations, contiguity with Austria and Italy) and distancing itself from any 'Balkan' association, a desire underscored by the political requirement to put the country's Yugoslav past firmly behind it" (Hall 1999: 233).

During a second wave of branding in the mid 2000s, most initiatives coincided with the rotation of EU presidencies. The 2006 Austrian presidency saw events like the "Sound of Europe" conference and the "Café d'Europe" meeting, and revealed how a country capitalises on tourism factors – like music and gastronomy – to convey a desired brand image of likability and hospitality. In February 2007, just

before Slovenia began its presidency, the slogan "I feel Slovenia" (emphasis in original) "was to be used systematically across the government sector, as well as by nongovernmental organizations, business organizations, and various associations and individuals in order to promote Slovenia to the domestic population, as well as to foreign visitors, investors, and business partners in the cultural, political, and economic spheres" (Volčič 2012: 153). Hungary's presidency in 2011 followed the example of its neighbours with the promotional video, "Hungary – World of Potentials", which features a young couple on a tour through Hungary enjoying the country's beauty and its famous inventions.

Another important factor for the promotion of positive and likeable images is the use of "heart" as a symbol for CEE countries. In the post-war years, Austria has claimed to be located "at the heart of Europe", followed by the Czech Republic and Poland ("The Heart of Europe"). Hungary's "hearty" name logo evolved from the 1996 promotion "1,100 years in the heart of Europe", celebrating the establishment of the Magyar state in 896. The logo is comprised of a heart with an outline of red, white, and green waves, and "Hungary" in non-standard lettering below (Hall 1999: 231). The corresponding emotion of "love" became the leitmotif of the Slovenian brand campaign "I feel Slovenia".

Tourism is also an important factor in popular cultural depictions of CEE from outside the region, where stereotypical narratives dominate the perspective. The American director Eli Roth chose Slovakia as a location for his 2005 fictional horror film, "Hostel". "The subject of the film is a hostel whose guests become fodder for a pay-to-play torture chamber" (Saunders 2012: 61). In reaction to the film, politicians including Bratislava's ambassador to the United States Ratislav Káčer, protested against the unfavourable portrayal of their country in the international media (Saunders 2012: 61). Another example is the teen backpacker film, "Eurotrip" (2004), directed by Jeff Schaffer. "In the motion picture, four Americans end up in Bratislava rather than Berlin, where they encounter sprawling Khrushchev-era *mikrorayons*, downtrodden peasants bathing in the streets, and a dog holding a severed human hand in his maw" (Saunders 2012: 62). One of the backpackers explains the peculiar situation with the casual remark: "We are in *Eastern* Europe!"

Conclusion

In an intensely connected and globalised world, countries experience the need to differentiate themselves through specificity. This belief has contributed to the success of nation branding, a concept and practice that "has captured the attention – and financial resources – of national governments in countries with established capitalist economies and emerging market economies alike" (Aronczyk 2008: 42). In the past few years, countries around the world with diverse political programs

have engaged in branding initiatives "to better manage and control the image they project to the world, and to attract the 'right' kinds of investment, tourism, trade, and talent, successfully competing with a growing pool of national contenders for a shrinking set of available resources" (ibid.). Nation branding has direct impact on national identity production with an inevitably selective "promotion of some aspects at the expense of others" (Hughes/Allen 2005: 175).

After the events of 1989–1991, nation branding became particularly successful in CEE. Almost all countries in the region engaged in nation branding initiatives to show that they were not a uniform entity, but diverse in many factors like topography, climate, history, or culture (Hughes/Allen 2005: 173, 175). Paradoxically, these differences did not result in distinct branding strategies. A comparative perspective on the region reveals the use of remarkably common patterns. First, political elites in CEE find nation branding a useful initiative for promoting political messages. By doing so, they rely on more or less the same group of nation branding experts to shape their national images (e.g. Wally, Olins/Saffron. Branding Consultants Work in Both Hungary and Poland; Anholt, Simon. Anholt Consult in Austria and Slovakia). Second, tourism plays an important role in branding initiatives throughout the region. During a first wave in the 1990s, touristic images were used to project safe and friendly environments.[5] The on-going second wave of branding initiatives in CEE mostly coincides with countries' EU presidencies. Heritage is emphasized as "evidence" of historical glory and cultural superiority (e.g. the Habsburg heritage in Austria, Hungary, and Slovenia). This relates to the wider issue of the use of history for commercial purposes. "Selling history to tourists necessitates generalisation and simplicity and a version of the past that harmonises with expectations of tourists" (Hughes/Allen 2005: 175). Third, the leitmotif of the "centre" of Europe is overemphasized by the recurring use of the "heart" on a rhetorical and symbolic level.

Nation branders "claim that their services are needed to distinguish nations from one another as the world becomes increasingly homogenized" (Jansen 2012: 93). Sue Curry Jansen argues that the proliferation of nation branding services, with their formulaic repertoire of logos and slogans, actually accelerates the homogenizing processes (Jansen 2012: 93). In order to understand the ideological effects of nation branding on the CEE region, I argue for a comparative perspective not only between former socialist countries, but also in relation to their "western" neighbours. The events of 1989–1991 had a massive impact on the entire region. As a result,

[5] Some countries – most notably in southeastern Europe – tried to reinforce an exclusive national or particular ethnic identity by crafting images of a heroic history (Hall 1999: 235). Derek Hall refers to a Serbian promotional brochure ("Serbia: Landscape Painted from the Heart"), in which "landscape" is interpreted as both natural and cultural, and reveals an exclusive concentration on Serbian/Orthodox tradition (ibid.).

the pressure to seek a new and positive image became prevalent throughout CEE. Countries like Austria with long-established images and brand values experienced the need to reposition themselves on the "metal map" of Europe. This development could mark the beginning of a third wave of branding initiatives, where countries react to the image trends of their neighbours.

Although volumes like *Branding Post-Communist Nations* (Kaneva 2012) offer valuable insight into ways that neoliberal discourses and practices can be transformed into the shaping of political images via nation branding, the authors reproduce a common view on post-socialist countries as special cases ("*Sonderfälle*") of Europe. This approach implies a misleading homogeneity of very different cases. First, post-socialist countries were not the only ones to struggle with identity issues and nationalist tendencies after the events of 1989–1991. Secondly, all countries in the region experienced the need to shape their national images in relation to a wider supranational European identity. This could cause a paradoxical dilemma; Simon Anholt, the brand guru of Slovakia and Austria, also consults for the EU.

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Public diplomacy and nation branding as the instruments of foreign policy – Czech Republic in (Central) European context

Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová

Abstract: *During the 20th century, especially in its second half, a substantial transformation of political instruments used by countries to create their own role and position in international relations took place. Countries started using so-called public diplomacy to legitimise their foreign policy activities, during the last two decades they even intensified the marketing elements of their presentation within the scope of so-called nation-branding policy. The aim of public diplomacy and nation branding is to create a positive image of a country and make the country attractive to its neighbours. In our work, we present the grounds of a theoretical discussion on public diplomacy and nation branding, and subsequently apply them to the example of the Czech Republic. We focus especially on strategies used by the Czech Republic, their limitations, and possible alternatives. Our case study is set into a broader (Central) European framework, which corresponds to the characteristics of the Czech Republic as a small country and also to the most significant post-November foreign policy narrative, i.e. the journey, the accession and the membership of the country in the European Union.*

Keywords: ***public diplomacy, nation branding, brand-state, corporate design, marketing, soft power, culture, tourism***

Introduction

In the 20th century, the change in the nature of international politics, the democratisation of both internal and foreign policies of countries, technology innovations, and the development of communication and information means caused a change in the political instruments used by individual countries to create their own role and position in international relations. The transformation of the political instruments is also connected with the transformation of the concept of power and the issues of legitimisation of the (international) policy of the country. The majority of countries (especially liberal democracies and countries endeavouring to earn the label of a democratic country) try to play a certain role in international politics, and try to win the recognition of their role. The role is recognised by other countries and their citizens; every country then, naturally, endeavours to promote its image in international politics towards the role it wants to play.

Countries reacted to the transformation of the concept of power and the need to legitimise the foreign policy activities by complementing the range of the foreign policy instruments with so-called public diplomacy (hereunder PD). In these days, the role of a country is thus not derived purely from "objective" criteria, such as the amount of GDP, or the size of the army, but is rather the result of intersubjective processes of the international relation actors – in other words, it is a social construction, which, as such, is not invariable. The means of influencing the perception and interpretation of a country's image is PD. *Public diplomacy*, in other words supporting the creation of a country's positive image is nothing new in international politics, however, the conditions for forming PD and its instruments have changed dramatically in recent years due to informatisation, internationalisation, spreading of post-modern culture, and major individualisation of the society (McQuail 1999: 48).

The designing of PD strategies is thus not the exclusive domain of state institutions any more but has spread among broader social structures both in individual countries and on the level of the international system. As a result of the development of communication and the increase of the capability of individual groups of citizens to make contacts beyond the borders of their country (transnational relations), it is substantially influenced by the public meaning. The progress of communication media enhances the transparency (and the demand for transparency) of the policies of countries. A striking phenomenon accompanying PD is also the increase of marketing elements in the communication itself, which is related to the overall increase in the importance of brands; when countries endeavour to boost and improve their image by means of methods used in sale and presentation of companies or products, they transform PD into nation branding.

Strategies and activities of countries in the area of PD and nation branding naturally differ depending on a number of determinants, such as the size of the country, its history or location, etc. Our work is focused on a selected country – the Czech Republic – and therefore it naturally cannot encompass all partial aspects related to the phenomena of PD and nation branding. In the first part of the text, however, we shall at least present the essential frame of the theoretical discussion of these foreign policy activities. We shall focus on the aspects which we consider crucial in relation to the Czech Republic as a small, so-called post-communist country.

The theoretical part shall be followed by an analysis of PD and nation branding strategies and activities of the Czech Republic from its origins until present. Our goal is not to present all institutions and activities that should serve as a presentation of the Czech Republic towards other countries and their citizens. We shall selectively focus specifically on the activities that we consider the most distinct, or those which, according to the key actors of the Czech foreign policy, were and are

meant to shape and improve the image of the Czech Republic most distinctly. We shall set our analysis into the (Central) European context, which is related to the dominant Czech foreign policy narrative embodied by the motto, or cliché, "back to Europe". This motto dominated the entire post-1989 process of democratisation, consolidation and Europeanisation of Czech politics and social transformation, and became also the fundamental variable of most of the key changes in the spheres of the foreign policy, (self)presentation, and image-making of the Czech Republic.

The above mentioned processes must, however, be inevitably considered a part of the adaptation of a post-communist country to new conditions and catching up with the development in the so-called First World (later, we shall mention the specific feature of suppressing its own image within the Communist bloc, and its post-communist reality as a limit of creating its own individual image). Critical authors point out the passive and submissive position of new democracies in this process,[1] which also manifests in their ambiguous stances on European integration (EU membership perceived as useful but meaning also a second-rate position and the lack of alternatives or discussion about them). In this text, however, we do not have enough room to discuss in detail – neither is it our goal – this significant issue linked to nation branding in the united European space.

Transformation of the concept of power, the issue of legitimisation of political acts, and the country's foreign policy

Power in contemporary democracies is not concentrated and localised, and it is also not understood as the expression of ownership any more. Power has ceased to be purely a capability of acquiring a certain amount of property, or to influence a certain result and force others to do what they would not do otherwise. Instead, power is understood as forming, omnipresent, and relational and is defined based on practical activities and tasks of governance (Foucault 1984, 1991; Sending/Neumann 2004). Governments seek to convert their sources of power into effective influence; the effective influence then may be not only that of enforcing or ordering nature but also of enticing nature. Whereas the enforcing and ordering force is equated with the material groundwork of power, i.e. so-called *hard power*, "to be an example" to others, "to attract" represents so-called *soft power*. *Soft power* means an indirect way of exercising power and a non-enforcing, nonviolent support of attractive values. According to Joseph Nye, the influence of *hard power* has been decreasing and the influence of *soft power* has been increasing during the last decades, the main cause of this transformation of power being the continuing information revolution and globalisation (Nye 2002). Although both types of power complement and condition each other, specific countries may significantly differ in

[1] As e.g. Nadia Kaneva points out (2001: 118), "this debate includes the problems of cultural imperialism and commodification".

terms of the ownership of the particular types of power. Furthermore, the "owner" or creator of *soft power* is not exclusively the government as in the case of *hard power* – a number of *soft power* sources has little in common with the resources of the given government, it is rather based on the society, its culture and values, behaviours and conduct (Nye 2002: 11). The advantages of acquiring or strengthening *soft power* are the access to communication and information channels, and the credit and reliability of the countries given by both their domestic and international behaviour (Nye 2002: 69).

The effort to acquire or strengthen *soft power* leads the governments to a broader cooperation with non-governmental actors as they are often the vehicles of culture and values and set the frames of conduct and behaviours. The soft power of the state is created by involving a number of various actors, such as non-governmental organisations, academic community and universities, political parties, cultural actors, private companies, etc. (Peterková/Tomalová 2008: 4). In relation to the democratisation of politics, the non-governmental actors, especially the global civil society, are the main audience legitimising the foreign policy activities of individual countries. "Nowadays, the public diplomacy is not related to the foreign policy as its exclusive instrument, but it becomes its priority. The main difference between traditional and public diplomacy is that the latter concentrates not only on the diplomatic community but also on the broader public" (Peterková/Tomalová 2008: 1).

The importance of the state and its institutions in creating PD, however, remains crucial. The basic unit among the public diplomacy actors is undoubtedly the state. Countries create their strategies and by means of them, they try to influence the foreign elites and the public. Considering this we could talk about the *concurring* or *cooperating public diplomacy* (Peterková 2008: 10). "Such themes as democracy promotion, human rights protection, efforts to establish regional stability, or support of the development of civil society are often mentioned as the space for the cooperating public diplomacy" (Peterková/Tomalová 2008: 4).

As said in the introduction, the role of the state, or its image, is influenced by the process of intersubjective communication and interpretation of other actors, i.e. it depends on subjective perception and subsequent interpretation. The perception influences which issues are understood as facts as well as what meaning these "facts" carry… The perception changes according to who the observer is, what the external position and inner nature of the observer are. The positional perspective changes in time and location (Buzan 1991: 343). The perception rarely reflects reality as most of the actors lack flawless information. The image-making process is based on social construction of the role. Countries, their representatives, and other actors realise that a state's reputation is a vital tool for achieving foreign

policy goals. In international politics, the practices of policymakers are girded by their own national self-image (*Selbstbild*), as well as how other nations or cultures perceive their country (*Fremdbild*)" (Saunders 2012: 50).

The described processes significantly shifted the character of the state towards postmodernity which is linked with the growing importance of the image of the state. In this regard, an eminent theoretician of self presentation processes of states, Peter van Ham, "draws on theories of post-modernity to argue that international relations are witnessing the rise of 'brand-states'" (van Ham 2001: 4). For him, nation branding signifies "a shift in political paradigms, a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence" (Kaneva 2011: 126). The position of a country in the international system and its image are then indisputably determined by both types of power. "The success and influence of countries is composed of a balance between what Joseph Nye first termed soft power and hard power... Soft power, he says, is making people *want* to do what you want them to do" (Anholt 2007: 127).

The element of soft power, however, is of far greater importance in small countries than it is in case of super powers. Generally, some crucial differences are found in the analysis of PD of large and small countries. "The differences between the public diplomacies of small and big countries are evident especially in: 1. the goal of such activity – what the respective state would like to achieve by means of public diplomacy; 2. the scope and intensity of promoted themes – the assessment of priorities; 3. the legitimacy of the activity – the effect of the country's size on the evaluation of its intentions" (Peterková 2008: 6). The most frequent goal and purpose of a small country's public diplomacy is to be considered and perceived (Peterková 2008: 7). Peterková identifies successful PD of small states with so-called niche diplomacy. The small country has to meet one of the 3 possible preconditions. "The country has some permanent advantages or specifics that might be related either to its *place* (the geographical reality), or to its *tradition* (the Nobel peace prize – Norway), or has a *consensual character*. It means that such character reflects a deep societal interest and influences the prevailing public opinion of the country to such extent that it becomes a part of its identity" (Peterková 2008: 8). As an example of such consensual identity of the society, the author mentions the Norwegian participation in peace and humanitarian activities. As regards the Czech Republic, we could perhaps discuss the so-called dissident tradition in Czech foreign policy, emphasising themes related to human rights protection and promotion (Cabada/Waisová 2011, mainly chapter 8; Waisová 2012).

Public diplomacy and nation branding

In the previous part of the paper, we repeatedly mentioned the terms public diplomacy, or nation branding. Let us try to define these terms now, and set them in context both in terms of their mutual relation also regarding some other important concepts and strategies used in presenting a country.

Public diplomacy is generally considered an important instrument of image-making and *soft power* enhancing (compare the following table).

Table 1: Public diplomacy

	Behaviours	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	Coercion Deterrence Protection	Threats Force	Coercive diplomacy War Alliance
Economic Power	Inducement Coercion	Payments Sanctions	Aid Bribes Sanctions
Soft Power	Attraction Agenda setting	Values Culture Policies Institutions	**Public diplomacy** Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy

Source: *Nye 2004: 31*

"The term 'public diplomacy' was first used by the US Information Agency in the early 1960s in an attempt to communicate what it meant when a modern state manages its reputation abroad" (Anholt 2007: 12). *Public diplomacy* denotes the outcome of a political system towards the society of a foreign country. PD is a long term activity focused on creating and influencing positive notions of a particular country among foreign public concerning the values, and activities which it represents. The means of achieving the desired goal is truthful communication with the foreign public done by the state apparatus in cooperation with private and other subjects. As pointed out by Simon Anholt when he implied a transfer from PD towards nation branding: "If traditional diplomacy is government-to-government (G2G) and public diplomacy is government-to-people (G2P), then effective nation branding also includes an element P2P." (Anholt 2007: 105).

The aim of PD is to effect in a positive way the perception of a country's goals, institutions, culture, national interests and policy by foreign public or political elites. Another goal of PD is to minimise the risk of misunderstanding. PD should not, however, be understood as a one-way process; PD is a multi-directional process. For a successful result of PD, the appropriate choice of instruments and themes, and suitable timing is crucial. The instruments, themes, and timing are chosen based

on the knowledge of the cultural, historical, social, psychological, linguistic, and political environment of the target group while other PD activities should be based on the feedback from previous campaigns. PD may be focused both on specific short-term or more general long-term goals.

Some instruments of PD are:

a) culture exchanges, governmental scholarships and grants,
b) radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, information and news Internet portals,
c) internet presentations,
d) cultural activities,
e) national centres abroad,
f) "excursion" tours for opinion leaders and opinion makers,
g) "political education" including conferences, seminars, round tables, publications, and institutions for political education, or institutions focused on activities aiming at providing information to foreign public,
h) information campaigns, and
i) forming so-called *corporate design*.

According to Joseph Nye, *public diplomacy* comprises three dimensions: 1. everyday communication, 2. strategic communication, and 3. development of long-term and permanent relations with individuals, especial opinion leaders and opinion makers (Nye 2004). In the sphere of creating and strengthening its image, the state acts similarly to how private companies act in the market. Consequently, PD may be described in terms of management as an effort to create so-called *corporate identity*. Corporate identity refers to the strategic concept for positioning a company. It entails defining identity traits, integrating them into a congruent action concept and coordinating them within it. Its objective is to permanently anchor a distinct, easily recognizable image in consumers' minds.

The main difference between traditional diplomacy, *public affairs,* and PD (or nation branding) is the target group on which these foreign policy activities are focused. Traditional diplomacy is focused on the official representatives of states or international organisations and political elites which participate in creating the foreign and domestic policies of their country, *public affairs* focus on the domestic public (the aim is to increase the knowledge of and to explain the events and acts of the state's foreign policy), while the aim of PD is communicating with the society of a foreign country, especially its opinion leaders and opinion makers.

For the purposes of our analysis it is, however, most important to specify the mutual relation between public diplomacy and nation branding. Szondi (2008) identifies five possible approaches to the relation between public diplomacy and nation branding on a scale whose one end represents the situation where the issues

are not related at all and on the other, public diplomacy and nation branding are fully integrated. The majority of authors agree that both concepts are related, nevertheless, every state – unlike business products – has its own brand image without evolving any intentional effort. In fact, the image of a country is in many cases created by random events. Public diplomacy and nation branding are then activities that intentionally (re)arrange the image of a country.

An important quality differing nation branding from PD is that it is built on communication science and marketing. As stated by Kaneva (2011: 120), "the discourse of nation branding finds its strongest representation in the field of marketing". The author also mentions that there are "two 'schools' of nation branding – 'communication-based' and 'policy-based'" (Kaneva 2011: 123). Concerning political approaches, "writings" in this category focus primarily on "public diplomacy" – a concept which precedes the notion of "nation branding" and which has been in circulation since at least 1960s. We can see then that Kaneva understands PD as the conceptual predecessor of nation branding which has, however, become obsolete and as such it has been replaced by the holistic concept of nation branding. This opinion is shared also by other important representatives of the contemporary discourse on nation branding, for example Gilboa (2001), Wang (2006), or already mentioned Anholt, who has been participating as a counsellor in forming the presentation strategies of a number of countries, including some Central-European ones (Austria, Slovakia). As he points out, the most important reasons for nation branding growth are the spread of democracy; growing power of international media, driven by more informed and news-hungry audience; falling cost of international travel; more tightly linked global economic system; (Anholt 2007: 19–21).

Anholt builds on the fact that public diplomacy and a broader concept of nation branding have become the key instrument determining the political, economic, and cultural power of a country in the globalised world. "That ministries of foreign affairs and their foreign services must practise something called public diplomacy – a discipline closely related to public relations – is now commonplace; likewise the fact that public affairs have become an international affair, and that investment promotion and tourist promotion must be as sophisticated as the most sophisticated commercial marketing, since both are competing for consumer mindshare in the same space" (Anholt 2007: 18). Nation branding is a then multi-sector policy, contributed to by various state institutions and non-governmental actors. "The most ambitious architects of nation branding envision it as 'a component of national policy, never as a campaign, that is separate from planning, governance or economic development'" (Anholt 2008: 23). As emphasised by Kaneva, it is the economic sphere where the impacts of nation branding are most clearly visible: "The benefits of nation branding are best appreciated by marketers... global competition

and 'success stories', image conferred on products by their country of origin (e.g. German cars, French wine)" (Kaneva 2011: 121).

According to Anholt, the aim of nation branding activities is to create a competitive identity of a country. "Competitive identity (CI) is a term I use to describe the synthesis of brand management with public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism, and export production" (Anholt 2007: 3). According to Anholt (2007: 4, 7), "branding is the process of designing, planning and communicating the name and the identity, in order to build or manage the reputation... Brand management uniquely embraces... important ideas of *core branding* (brand identity), *reputation* (brand image), the *asset value of reputation* (brand equity), and the power *of shared goals* (brand purpose), and this is why it is a valuable source of inspiration for governments" (Anholt 2007: 7).

Nation branding – similarly to public diplomacy – encompasses a significant ideological component. According to neomarxist interpretations (e.g. Volcic 2009), "nation branding can also be analyzed as an *ideological project* which reinterprets nationhood in relation to neoliberalism and, in the process, invents a form of 'commercial nationalism'". Also Kaneva (2012: 5) points out that "nation branding is, in an important sense, an ideological construction of its practitioners and scholars". It is important what both authors imply – that not even the formation of multiple identities within the process of Europeanisation diminishes the need of national presentation. Kaneva describes the situation as follows:

"Despite all the talk of globalisation, one's nationality makes a great deal of difference in the way we experience the world... Nation branding sits at the intersection of political, economic, and cultural practices and discourses; moreover, it implicates local and global mediations of identity" (Kaneva 2012: 13–14). In relation to new democracies in CEE, nation branding is then for Kaneva also "a set of discourses and practices located at the intersection of the economy, culture, and politics. It has aspirations to exercise symbolic power in defining the meaning of nationhood... it operates as a new site upon which national identities and globalisation come into contact and are reconfigured in the post-communist environment" (Kaneva 2012: 5). Naturally, positive aspects of national feelings, or patriotism, are emphasised as well as the necessity to refrain from resentments. As recommended by Anholt (2007: 16), "the first and most important component of any national CI strategy is creating a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the population, notwithstanding its cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial and historical divisions".

The constructive character of a "brand-state" stems from several aspects linked to the issues of perceiving a country. According to Anholt (2007: 30) "people's perceptions of the country are formed in the first place: 1. by the things that are

done in the country, and the way they're done; 2. by the things that are made in the country, and the way they're made; 3. by the way other people talk about the country; 4. by the way the country talks about itself". The author speaks of the reputation of a country, which he compares to the reputation of private companies,[2] while emphasising the great role of stereotypes and coincidences which affect the image of a specific subject: "National images... take a long time to form; they are made out of clichés and prejudices which sometimes seem *rusted* into place. In such cases it is obvious that the country's impeccable behaviour simply isn't being noticed, and can't be depended on to shift the negative perception" (Anholt 2007: 40). He also attributes a significant role to the path dependency, or historicity of forming the attitude towards a specific country in the ambient environment: "Some quiet progressive countries don't need nearly as much attention, visitors, business or investment as they need because their reputation is weak or negative, while others are still trading on a good image that they acquired decades or even centuries ago, and today do relatively little to deserve it" (Anholt 2007: 2). He suggests that countries work creatively with prejudices, similarly to what companies do,[3] however, he is aware that countries, unlike business companies, do not wield sufficient means of control over the behaviour and actions of all important actors: "Nevertheless, the fact remains that although countries depend on their reputations as much as corporations do, they have – quiet rightly – very little power to control the way those reputations are treated or mistreated by their own citizens. Nation being viewed as single brand is a phenomenon of growing importance which is increasingly resistant to direct control" (Anholt 2007: 53–54). As an example of a negative impact of activities beyond the control of a democratic state, he presents the case study of the Danish cartoon episode (caricatures of Muhammad) and its impact on the problems of Danish/European products in Islamic countries.

Anholt places – similarly as the EU and its member countries do on the rhetorical level in their strategic documents – the crucial emphasis on innovation. According to him, innovation is the key element of creating a competitive identity. In a somehow overenthusiastic and unscientific manner, he seeks to define the percentage shares of the key segments in building a competitive identity, when he claims: "In summary, creating Competitive Identity for a country, region or city is 80 per cent innovation, 15 per cent coordination and 5 per cent communication" (Anholt 2007: 37). Regardless of this popularising approach, it is still obvious that nation

[2] "My original observation is a simple one: that the reputations of countries are rather like the brand images of companies and products, and equally important" (Anholt 2007: introduction).

[3] As an example of a flexible activity, he presents the behaviour of German fashion companies vis á vis the stereotype that France produces fashion: "German firms like Hugo Boss or Jil Sander downplayed their national origins because fashion products don't chime with the consumer perception of a rational and technical Germany; similarly Italy's brand image as a fashion and style produces made it very difficult for Olivetti" (Anholt 2007: 91).

branding is an activity surpassing significantly the original concepts of public diplomacy both in terms of the number and character of the actors participating in designing a "brand-state", and of the volume and content of the policies that are configured and communicated. Although the original role of the ministry of foreign affairs still remains important even after the transfer from public diplomacy to nation branding, it has to look for the ways of cooperation with a number of other institutions which contribute to the propagation of the country. Nation branding requires a distinctly holistic approach that should be based on what Anholt defined as the "national brand hexagon" – tourism, exports, governance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, people (Kaneva 2011: 122). The individual vertices of the hexagon are mutually interconnected, and disturbing the stability of one may cause harming the country's image in other segments as well.

Public diplomacy and nation branding in new European democracies

Soon after the fall of the Communist regimes, the so-called post-communist countries in Central Eastern Europe faced, among other, the question how and on what grounds they should build their image in relation to other states and actors in the international environment. In fact, as a consequence of their inclusion into the Soviet camp, their "individuality" was greatly suppressed after the Second World War, which disqualified them even after the collapse of the non-democratic regimes. The negative stereotypes, developing as early as during the reconfiguration of the European axes "North" vs. "South" and "West" vs. "East" during the 18th to 20th centuries, have permeated also the formation of the new relations between the so-called "old" and "new" Europe. In it, the phenomenon which Anholt (2007) termed the "continent branding effect" in relation to Africa, took effect – Central Eastern Europe was from outside, similarly to Africa (and its countries), understood as a homogeneous and like-minded unit within which there are no significant differences among individual countries and whose key feature is its problematic and chaotic nature, etc.

The prejudices and stereotypes towards Central Eastern European countries were not overcome even within the process of their Europeanisation, the most significant milestone of which was the "big bang" EU-enlargement in 2004/2007. It was in the very year of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, that Anholt (2007: 117–118) wrote: "Most of the 'transition' economies suffer from an image forged during an earlier and very different political era, and which now constantly obstructs their political, economic, cultural and social aspirations... One of the most damaging effects of Communism was the way in which it destroyed the national identity and the nation brands of the countries within the Soviet Union... The Soviet regime effectively deleted the old, distinctive European nations brand – Hungary,

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, even Russia... Places such as Prague, Budapest, Dubrovnik and Ljubljana are fortunate in that their older heritage is still physically evident and only lacks a narrative to bring it back to life and relevance". We can see then, that optimism is associated rather with path dependency and partial urban units than with countries as the main actors of public diplomacy or nation branding.

We can find a similarly sceptical standpoint with Sussman (2012: 40), who refers to a rather passive approach of Central Eastern European countries to designing their own image, or to an accommodation core of individual "brand-states" formation in the region: "CEE's national identities, subdued in certain respects, but not suppressed during the Soviet period despite the communist parties' official 'internationalism', have been refocused in recent years. Most states in the region seek either a more Europeanised identity or realignment with the centre of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation" (Sussman 2012: 40). The analysis of Kaneva and Popescu (2008) is in a similar spirit, as they argue that nation branding constrains the post-communist national imaginaries within the logic of commodification that seeks to satisfy the desires of an external "tourist gaze".

The post-communist countries, however, had to cope with the complex issues of the course and results of the Second World War and the emergence of non-democratic regimes in Eastern and Central Europe both in relation to their domestic populations and to their external environment. As pointed out by Kaneva (2012: 7), "nation branding arrived to CEE in the thick of transition and is, therefore, inevitably intertwined with post-communist identity struggles. What kinds of identities were marked as 'shameful' or as 'desired' became a central area of contestation in nation branding initiatives".

The stereotypes towards CEE countries were naturally enhanced partly by the behaviours of their domestic political elites. The example of enhancing the stereotypes about CEE by the domestic activities may be e.g. emphasising the advantage of cheap workforce which the countries wield when attracting new investors (Peterková 2008: 17). Such behaviour is in fact in a major contradiction with the rhetoric of innovation, upon which, according to Peterková, e.g. the Czech Republic should build its new, re-branded image of a knowledge based economy. A similarly strong stereotype was also created in the area of market fundamentalism. As Curry Jansen presented (2012: 84), Estonian politician Mart Laar "is popularly known as 'Margaret Thatcher's grandson'". Václav Klaus, a Czech politician, built himself a similar image which strongly opposed the "EU-mainstream" social-market economy.

On the other hand, we cannot overlook how significantly the media in the Western European countries contributed to strengthening of certain stereotypes, depicting

CEE as the "Wild East". As pointed out by Saunders (2012: 56), "Tallinn, Prague, and Budapest are all touted as destinations for such bacchanalia (stag/hen party – quoted by authors), with these and other Central and Eastern European cities recently being featured as the backdrop for television series *Boozed up Brits Abroad* on Bravo TV". Such generalisation naturally means a substantial damage for the remarkable revitalisation of CEE as a whole as well as its individual countries, regions and cities of this part of Europe, that were capable of catching up with, or even exceeding, the European standards within two decades.

The effect of enhancing the stereotypes on both sides of the mental border between the "old" and "new" Europe is that no CEE country has yet achieved becoming such undeniable "success story" as it was, for example, in the case of the "Celtic Tiger" (Ireland) or the "Rainbow Nation" in the time of "South Africa's change from a virtual pariah to the 'Rainbow Nation'" (Anholt 2007: 47).

Even organising a prestigious sporting event, e.g. the Olympics, proved incapable of improving the prestige and position of CEE as a whole or of any of its individual countries, although the example of South Korea clearly shows how profound influence such an event could have on the image of a country, both outwardly and in communication with the domestic population. Even the successful 2012 European Football Championship organised jointly by Poland and Ukraine has positively reached the populations of CEE countries rather than the "old" Europe's media and populations, which even prior to the championship spread rumours the incompetency of these two countries to organise the championship in an appropriate way, including considering moving the event to another country. Paradoxically thus, Russia may earn a much better image in the perspective of the "West" than the successfully transformed CEE countries by organising exceptionally successful (which they – because of obvious political and economic government support – undoubtedly shall do) winter Olympics in Sochi.

Public diplomacy and nation branding in new CEE democracies were substantially affected also by the lack of unambiguous programme priorities (national strategies) and institutions. On the institutional level, it is necessary to point out the lack of strong civil society, or non-governmental sector, which would be capable of arguing with state institutions and offering alternatives to them. On the programme level, it is necessary to emphasise especially the lack of consensus in the political arenas of the majority of CEE countries and consequent frequent strategy changes resulting from the changes of governments. Kulcsár and Yum (2012: 198–199) generalised these problems and characteristics aptly: "In post-communist Eastern Europe, nation branding is close to public diplomacy or IR in that governments are heavily involved in or play a leading role in nation branding campaigns in order to exercise top-down control over national images in the international arena. In

addition, governments in post-communist Eastern Europe often favour particular features among numerous local identities in search of short-term political gains."

The dominant narrative for all CEE countries became the process of convergence with EU countries, joining the partial processes of democratisation, transformation and Europeanisation into one. Crucial was the emphasis on the European character of CEE countries which had only been buried under the surface as a result of the division of the world into blocs. We then spoke of a "return to Europe", not of a journey to Europe. In fact, however, the process of communication between the EU and CEE countries may be considered distinctly unidirectional, as CEE countries had to adapt without having the chance to bring their own approaches to the discussion (this fact is most apparent in the unification of Germany and the position of so-called Eastern Germany).

Perhaps also because of this markedly passive position in relation to the EU, (some) CEE countries decided for secondary strategies concurrent with the dominant narrative which partially overlapped with it and, however, partially contradicted it as well. Such narrative was e.g. the idea of Central Europe including the option of emphasising the "betweenness" (especially in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; with both of the latter countries, or their intellectual circles, receiving significant support in Austria), or the narrative of the "North", as developed by Estonia. Let us point out that in the 1960s–1980s, the theme of Central Europe was the most important narrative that was alternative to the official ideology of real socialism and allowed, among other, an intellectual discussion over the iron curtain.

Considering its size and importance, Poland managed to capitalise on the idea of "betweenness" "between the West and East" politically with the greatest success. As presented by Surowiec (2012: 136), "the idea of *betweenness* is re-articulated in the context of Poland's integration in the EU, where the divide between 'old' and 'new' Europe has been explicit in the Polish public domain". In the area of nation branding, the most successful CEE country working with the concept of Central Europe is the Czech Republic, which was claimed to be "in the heart of Europe" (Kulcsár/Yum 2012: 198). In fact, rather than to the entire Czech Republic, this applies to Prague that regularly gets among the top twenty cities in the City Brand Index and thus profits from the majority of the benefits of being a famous city.[4] The success of Prague in city branding is a good example of how a smaller unit can benefit from a narrative shared by several countries.

Let us move from the issues of public diplomacy and nation branding within CEE to the case study of the Czech Republic now.

[4] Anholt (2007: 58) generalises on the very example of Prague: "The wealth created by investment, trade and tourism in a famous city doesn't always trickle down very efficiently to needier but less well branded cities and regions (as the Czech Republic has found to its cost)."

Czech Republic as a Brand-state?

Czechoslovakia was, in our opinion, on a better starting position compared to the majority of CEE countries. This was a result of how the western media and opinion makers presented the "story of the country" during the first years of the post-1989 transition (a fighter for freedom, the President – writer Václav Havel, the Velvet Revolution cliché, etc.) as well as the result of the real situation of the country within the Soviet bloc, which was, together with the German Democratic Republic presented as the "showroom of socialism". As presented by Kopecký (2006), even after the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic still drew from the brand of Czechoslovakia, characterised by "qualified working power, the geopolitical position of a European crossroads, a country of famous cultural and industrial tradition, dominated by the non-forgettable Prague". In this regard, the Czech Republic had a significant advantage over Slovakia as well as over post-Soviet or post-Yugoslavian countries. Its common border with Germany and the fact that the German language was strongly embedded in the Czech society became, together with the above mentioned characteristics, a magnet for German or Austrian, subsequently also (East) Asian, capital which substantially facilitated the process of creating a network of medium-size enterprises and also the transformation of former industrial giants. Despite all negative aspects of the economic transition, the Czech Republic thus soon succeeded in achieving a relatively high life standard of the population, fully comparable to the EU average. The Czech Republic thus in 2009 and 2010 repeatedly took the last position within the EU-27's evaluation of the population poverty level (the next positions were occupied by Sweden and the Netherlands); in contrast to it, we see the opposite end of the chart where we find seven CEE countries lined-up (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia) (Antuofermo/Di Meglio 2012).

The fact that the image of the Czech Republic seemed so problem-free might perhaps be one of the reasons that during the 1990s, the necessity to create the brand-state, or to work systematically on the image of the Czech Republic towards the external public, was greatly underestimated. Although a network of Czech Centres, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was created, it only focused on certain aspects of cultural diplomacy aimed at the relatively well-informed cultural elites of countries that have been close to the Czech Republic for many years (the neighbouring countries, large European countries, the USA, Russia, new CEE democracies). One of the instruments of public diplomacy was also foreign radio broadcasting (Czech Radio 7 – Radio Prague) that, apart from Czech, also broadcast in English, German, French, Russian and Spanish. The Ministry of Foreign affairs acted as the administrator of the content of the broadcast (Peterková 2008: 19). Contrarily, a major degression of the volume of institutional background

and state-organised activities occurred especially in the area of so-called economic diplomacy during the 1990s. This statement concerns especially the (pro-)export policies, as the Investments and Business Development Agency *CzechInvest*, founded in 1992, released an official statement in which they would bring direct investments and foreign investors into the Czech Republic.

In the 1990s, public diplomacy was left fully to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or to its Department of Cultural and Compatriot Relations and International Presentation. The ministry itself furthermore – or the government as a whole – had no conceptual material that would at least generally declare "the national strategies and aims" of the Czech Republic, let alone the partial goals of public diplomacy. The consequence of this development without any strategy and concept was the stereotyping of the Czech Republic within the CEE region, or suppressing or vanishing the individual "story of the country", that would make it clearly definable within CEE. Only after 2002, the government initiated creating conceptual documents that sought a clearer presentation of the Czech Republic, including priority definitions and competence distribution between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions (on the government level the Ministry for Regional Development with its own tourism agency *Czechtourism* and the Ministry of Industry and Trade)[5] (Peterková 2008: 19).

The key governmental document became the Strategy of Presentation of the Czech Republic for the year 2007. This document brings the main message – "It's Czech and you didn't even know it", or "Czech brands in the world" (Peterková 2008: 19). The goal of the strategy was to point out personalities, events, or products related to the Czech Republic, and to attract tourists and investments to the Czech Republic by means of these recognised Czech brands and people. The strategy also stated the geographical priorities – EU-countries, the USA and Canada, Russia, China, Japan (Peterková 2008: 21). Earlier, also the declared shift of the target group of the activity of Czech Centres towards broader public had taken place.[6] A corporate design based on a recognizable logo and information campaigns were to become a significant segment of newly created mechanisms of public diplomacy and nation branding. Let us see, in a partial digression, how the new intentions were implemented in these fields.

[5] Along Czechinvest, the Czech National Trade Promotion Agency *Czechtrade* was also founded in 1997, which focused more closely on the issues of the export of the capital, products and know-how of Czech companies.

[6] "The main goal of Czech Centres is spreading a positive image of the Czech Republic and addressing the broad public" (*Česká centra rozvíjí veřejnou diplomacii,* 2005).

Corporate Design and the "Logo" of the Czech Republic

Private companies create their *corporate designs,* and so does the state; in the case of the state, however, the term "unified visual style" is used more frequently than *corporate design*. The unified visual style is the visual representation of an organisation, including its logo, design, typefaces and colours, as well as its philosophy. Let us briefly focus on the logo of a country, which is one of the most visible parts of the unified visual style.

A logo is a unique symbol or design (shape/image) that represents a certain company. A logo is a marketing (business) mark.[7] Logos are intended to allow clear and quick identification of a company or product. Examples of logos that have undoubtedly been successful in achieving this goal are e.g. the logos of Apple, Volkswagen or Audi.

Much like companies, countries also desire for a distinct face and quick identification. Most countries were motivated to create their logos by the option of identifying themselves with a certain (positive) notion. Some countries (e.g. Spain, Norway, Portugal, France and Poland) use "only" an image as their logo, while text is a complement for an easy identification of the state, other countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece and Great Britain) combine an image and a message in their logo, where the message, or a short motto or slogan, should distinctly characterise the respective country, its qualities, uniqueness, etc. ("Slovakia – Little Big Country" or "Slovenija – The green piece of Europe")

[7] Besides the term logo, there is also the term logotype, i.e. a graphical arrangement of a text, or a text and an image, that identifies a certain company or product.

The Czech Republic is an interesting case of approaching the creation of a unified visual style including a logo. In 2004–2005, a discussion started on the necessity of a better outward self-presentation of the Czech Republic and the creation of a unified visual style. It was found, actually, that each ministry used different calling cards and different state symbols on their letterhead paper. This debate also included a discussion of a new logo – the existing one had been criticised as too static and lacking originality (see the image below).

In 2005, a tender was opened for the logo and logotype of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic was to get inspiration from other European countries. The new logo of the Czech Republic (see below) is based on an entirely different idea compared to the logos of other countries. While the logos of other countries are invariable, the logo of the CR is supposed to be highly variable. The variability of the logo is facilitated by the bubbles over the words "Czech Republic" – the specific messages in the bubbles may vary according to the occasion on which the logo is used.

The "bubbles" were repeatedly criticised, especially because the original good intention – their flexibility – became contradicted with the effort to connect the name of the Czech Republic with a clear, "static" logo. A number of Czech state institutions including agencies such as *Czechinvest*, either consciously or out of "inertia", rejected using the new "logo", which completely undermined the intention

of creating a corporate identity. Although the "bubbles" form a significant part of public diplomacy and nation branding of the Czech Republic even these days (they were used e.g. in the campaign accompanying the Czech presidency of the EU in the first half of 2009, and represent the graphic base of the information portal Czech.cz, administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), according to numerous analyses (among the latest let us mention the design of communication strategy "Značka Česká republika – the Brand Czech Republic") (Kopecký/Lešková et al. 2012) they should be replaced by a different logo, or even the entire strategy of the presentation of the Czech Republic and its corporate identity should be redesigned (see below).

Some evidence that the "bubbles" do not serve the intended purpose may perhaps be reflected in the fact that some agencies used or use other logos or are even considering their own new logos. An example of this is Czechtourism that opened a tender for "creating a new visual style presenting the Czech Republic as an attractive tourist destination" in 2012. The goal was to select a "destination brand" that would be used especially abroad (we shall present the brand itself in the following sub-chapter). In 2012, Czechtourism also indicated a change in geographical priorities when, declaring its withdrawal from India and strengthening its institutional background in China and the USA.

Information campaigns

Information campaigns are considered one of the "most visible" instruments of PD that can react to current challenges and events. The aim of information campaigns is to explain or convince the public of a certain fact. They are mostly based on using easily understandable symbols and witticisms. These campaigns use billboards, radio or TV spots, Internet presentations, and newspaper/magazine advertising. The information campaigns – especially the enticing ones – of many countries make use of various "positive" events that are in the centre of wide public attention although the attention is not linked directly to a specific country. Examples of such events may me the Olympics or the International Football Championship (the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example, set its goal to win the organisation of the Summer Olympics in 2012). Using these events ensures that the respective country will receive sufficient attention from the media. The country then may connect the presentation of the sporting event with its self-presentation. The activities of national tourist agencies may be included among long-term information campaigns.

Information campaigns may be divided: 1. according to the target of the information, 2. according to the aim of the campaign, and 3. according to the results of the campaign, or the feedback. In terms of the types of targets we can distinguish

campaigns aimed at: 1. the broad public, and 2. opinion leaders and opinion makers, or investors. According to the aim of the campaign, we can divide them into: 1. protest or explanatory, and 2. enticing ones. If the criterion is the feedback, then they may be: 1. successful, or positive, and 2. unsuccessful, or negative. The type of campaign is crucial for the decision which instruments are to be used in its implementation.

An example of an information campaign aimed at opinion leaders and opinion makers/investors with both enticing and explanatory elements is the campaign launched by Germany after its unification. The aim was to broaden the circle of those knowledgeable in German politics, or its background. The main target group were the opinion leaders and opinion makers in English speaking countries, or English speaking opinion leaders and opinion makers in general. The instruments of the campaign were "advertisements" published in two major expert journals for political science, *Foreign Policy* and *Foreign Affairs*. The advertisement invited the reader to get acquainted with the new face of Germany. Germany presented itself as a reliable partner, as a strategic state in the centre of Europe, and as a stable, prosperous, and large market. The campaign was funded by the German government.

Another similar campaign, this time aimed more precisely at investors, is the German campaign "Germany – Land of Ideas"/"Deutschland – Land der Ideen". The aim of the campaign is to point out the fact that Germany is an important knowledge economy which is the holder of a number of patents and important technological innovations, and a country offering excellent infrastructure. The goal of the campaign is to develop positive associations in the audience, when they hear or read of Germany. This campaign was supported by the Federal President Horst Köhler, its initiators were the federal ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior. Claudia Schiffer, the German model, became the face of the campaign.

Deutschland
Land der Ideen

A part of the campaign "Germany – Land of Ideas" are also wristbands, so-called "Freundschaftsbänder". The motto of the wristbands reads "Cool und schick: Die Freundschaftsbänder aus dem Land der Ideen". The silicon wristbands should meet

the attributes that should be assigned to Germany – they should look admirable, solid, chic, and innovative.

Besides the mentioned activities, political education about Germany is running on the Internet – for example, the publication "Facts about Germany" is issued annually in 13 languages in 500 thousand copies.

An example of an information campaign which was focused on the broad public and bore strong explanatory and protest elements was the Polish campaign in 2004 and 2005. During the discussion on extending the EU to include Central European countries, concerns about cheap workforce that might flow to the old EU countries from Central Europe and "threaten" their employment rates came up in many sessions. Most old EU member countries then closed their labour markets for Czech, Polish, Hungarian and other workers in short to medium-term perspectives. In connection with the plebiscite on ratifying the European constitutional document the debate on a tidal wave of cheap labour force from the East started again in France. As a reaction to the French debate, the Polish Tourist Organisation (POT) started an "anti-campaign". It was based on using and ridiculing the stereotype that used to appear in French media – the threat for the French employee became a Polish plumber and a nurse. A smiling, masculine plumber told the French that he was staying at home as Poland was a beautiful and hospitable country. The plumber then invited French citizens to come to Poland abundantly to become better acquainted with such a great country that it would be a pity to leave. While French women were to be enticed by the Polish playboy, a charming nurse lured French men. According to the reports of the POT, the campaign hit the spot – in the first quarter of 2005, Poland was visited by 18 % more French tourists than during the previous years.

A similar idea was used also by the Czech Republic in Austria. On the cover of one of the materials of the Czech Centre in Vienna, there were a construction worker and a cook holding a sign saying "Czech means…". Czechs are reportedly understood to be the representatives of these said trades in Austria. The content of the material itself, however, explained to Austrians what the Czech Republic had given to the world in music, sports, arts, etc.

On the eve of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU (from 4th April–20th May, 2004), Czechtourism came with a campaign enticing tourists to the Czech Republic. The campaign, broadcast on CNN, BBC, EuroSport, National Geographic, and Discovery channels, invited citizens of various countries "to come to slow down" to the Czech Republic. The face of the enticing campaign was a common Czech snail that was presented as a symbol of peace and the love of home. A thirty-second shot intended to present the Czech Republic as an attractive, peaceful country ideal for tourism, with a number of monuments, pleasant countryside, offering visitors its traditional hospitality. The spot was seen by almost 40 million viewers. The snail subsequently became the symbol of the Czech Republic's participation in Expo 2005 in Japan.

In 2005, this campaign was followed by two more spots, this time aimed exclusively at the Polish and Austrian tourists. In the "Polish" spot, a Polish family is crossing the Czech Republic on their way to the sea, when they are suddenly stopped by a police officer. The driver expects a fine for a driving offence; however, it is pointed out to him that they have just passed the Bouzov castle. The Polish tourists return to the castle and then they also visit an open-air folk museum in Rožnov and the Macocha abyss. The "Austrian" campaign was based on the personality and fame of W. A. Mozart – the central slogan of the campaign was "Mozart visited the Czech Republic five times. How many times have you?". Both campaigns were combined with advertising in magazines, newspapers and city lights. In these cases, Czechtoursim endeavoured to interconnect two key vertices of the above mentioned Anholt hexagon, i.e. culture and tourism.[8] Czechtourism concentrated on five key areas of tourism in its subsequent propagation campaigns (including the present ones) – the charm of castles, châteaus, and historical towns; a wholesome and active holiday (within this area, the specific theme of "the Czech Republic as the golf superpower" is used); Prague; spas; church monuments. According to the information provided within the tender for a new destination logo, Czechtourism wants to present the Czech Republic as the "country of stories where tourists may discover the stories of personalities, architecture, landscape, as well as experience their own ones".

The winning design was that of Marvil graphic studio, which Czechtourism shall start using in 2013.

[8] As briefly formulated by Anholt (2007: 100), "Culture is next-door to tourism".

The last campaign to be mentioned is the information campaign of that the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic conducted as a support of the Czech presidency of the EU in 2008–2009. The communication campaign The Faces of the Czech Presidency was launched in September 2008, focusing dominantly on the domestic public. As the faces of the campaign, outstanding personalities of science, arts, and sports were selected. The spot features Czech architect Eva Jiřičná, prima ballerina Daria Klimentová, scientist and medicament developer Antonín Holý, conductor Libor Pešek, model Tereza Maxová, ice-hockey player Jaromír Jágr and football goalkeeper Petr Čech, as they are playing with a Czech invention – sugar cubes.[9] We consider the selection of personalities as well as the overall aim of the campaign successful, what remains unclear, though, is why these personalities, whose significance reaches far beyond the Czech Republic, were not used to promote the country abroad. Paradoxically, the most significant medium of the nation brand of the Czech presidency then became Entropa, the artefact by David Černý, in which the author (mystifying the public by hiding behind a non-existent collective of authors from various European countries) used, quite questionably, national stereotypes for his graphical representations of the EU member states, raising thus a number of diplomatic controversies.[10]

Conclusion

Public diplomacy and nation branding are a term not unfamiliar to Czech governmental and non-governmental institution, a number of them have been trying to establish the Czech Republic brand and give it explicit content, a corporate design, or even a competitive identity. Like the majority of external observers, however, we suppose that the results are rather dubious, and that the Czech Republic presently lacks a sophisticated and intelligible mechanism and system of corporate identity. Let us focus on the crucial external and internal causes of the situation.

[9] Available at: http://www.eu2009.cz/cz/czech-presidency/presidency-faces/tvare-predsednictvi-3641 (29 October 2009).

[10] See for example the article Czech EU Art stokes controversy, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7827738.stm (29 October 2012).

When assessing the external conditions, we undoubtedly have to mention the stereotypical thinking of the so-called post-communist countries that may be observed in the societies of so-called "old" Europe once again. The question is what level of "innovation" the countries like the Czech Republic would have to reach in order to defy this stereotype quickly and effectively. In our, rather sceptical, opinion, there is no quick and simple solution – including the option of professional marketing. Partially limiting in this regard is quite a specific situation of lacking a one-word name for the country. As claimed by Szondi (2007: 14), "the Czech Republic would be well served to change English version of its name to make it easier for foreigners to vocalize". The debate on the one-word version of the country's name in English (e.g. Czechia or Czechlands) keeps recurring, especially in connection with the presentation of Czech athletes, however, with no progress yet.

The Czech Republic is undoubtedly limited in the area of building its image also by being frequently identified with its capital. On one hand, we have to understand that such simplifications are likely to occur in case of a small, monocentric country, on the other – as we have mentioned above – such situation means that a successful promotion of a country's capital does not always reflect in strengthening the image (and profits) of other Czech and Moravian regions. When we put the above mentioned situation into the complex of so-called Central-European tourist routes – especially of overseas (Asian and American) tourists – (the axis Budapest – Vienna – Prague – Berlin with secondary centres in Bratislava, Ljubljana, Brno, and Krakow, i.e. so-called Zentropa), we can see that it is a problem of major impact, furthermore one that is deeply rooted in the mentality of the mentioned visitors to Central Europe. A paradoxical reaction is then, that for example Czechtourism perceives Central European countries as the key competitors to the Czech Republic in tourist recruitment, while its website promotes developing cooperation among the countries of the Visegrád Group. To find a reasonable but pragmatic balance between competition and cooperation appears a crucial goal.

In terms of internal problems and limits, we have to mention the absence of a clear, generally shared message in the first place. As Peterková quotes, the main problem of Czech public diplomacy is the "*absence of a key message or themes* that we would like to share with the world" (Peterková 2008: 22). Czech public diplomacy lacks such message perhaps also because of the absence of the consensus of the political actors concerning such themes. According to (Peterková/Tomalová 2008: 6), "(Czech) public diplomacy should reflect the basic principles and priorities of foreign policy, such as the human face of the Czech Republic, economic diplomacy, the European neighbourhood, the European integration, the Atlantic dimension." This is from where the key message of the Czech Republic towards the outer environment should stem.

The second key problem is the fragmentation of institutions and activities participating in the propagation of the Czech Republic. There certainly has been a positive development in the case of the narrower goals of public diplomacy. The Public Diplomacy Department was established at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2011, in place of the former Department of Culture, Communication and Presentation. In 2012, it first published a report on its activities (*Veřejná diplomacie 2011*). The activities of the transformed department are: "To contribute to asserting our key foreign policy themes abroad, such as promoting peace and stability and supporting civil society, the rule of law, democracy and respect of human rights" (p. 7). The main domestic activities are related to conferences (in 2011, for example the conference about Masaryk's and Wilson's heritage in the 21st century), and *Gratias agit* prizes for spreading the good name of the Czech Republic in the world. The main foreign activities are related to economic presentations and cultural activities such as concerts, exhibitions or film presentations.

The coordination of these activities with other actors is, however, unclear and dubious. As we have shown in the example of Czechtourism in 2012, there still remains the pursuit of individual goals and strategies including creating an individual graphic style, priority setting, etc. At the same time, this criticism is not pointed at Czechtourism, we consider concentrating on outstanding personalities or places to be a reasonable behaviour of a small country, easily "mistakable" for other small CEE countries of similar history.

The strategy of the cooperation between the governmental and non-governmental sector in the field of nation branding also remains unclear, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is successful in developing projects promoting the Czech Republic especially in the sphere of humanitarian cooperation, humanitarian help and transformation cooperation (Peterková 2008: 22).

Let us conclude our analysis with the statement that after as long as twenty years since the origin of the independent Czech Republic, there is still no elaborate system of public diplomacy and nation branding. Governmental institutions and agencies often lack coordination of their work, which is, among other things, a result of the absence of common and generally respected principles of corporate or competitive identity. There is still no clear motto associated with the name "Czech Republic", which a number of other countries have already achieved. An interesting initiative seems to be. The communication strategy suggestion "Značka Česká republika (the Brand Czech Republic)" (Kopecký/Lešková et al. 2012). Having stated the absence of a centralised approach to creating the brand and having criticised the attitude of the respective resorts, they suggest proceeding from the evaluation of the country as a "friendly and safe country of good ideas", and embodying this statement in the logo "Czech Republic – Good Idea". The analysis was presented to the Chamber of

Deputies of the Czech Parliament in the spring 2012, however, its further fate is not yet known at the time of writing this article.

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"Immer noch Sturm". The Intimate Perception of a Neighbourhood

Oto Luthar

Abstract: *As the member of the project team involved in the historical, political and sociological study of the relationship between Austria and its Neighbours, the author tries to explain the attitude of the Austrian state towards the Slovenian minority in Austrian Carinthia. In doing so he is not interested so much in majority-minority relationship, but on how the Austrian or so-called Carinthian Slovenes reflect on this relationship. Rather than the usual historical reconstruction of it, he is interested in a more personal consideration. Being inspired by the work of four creative people and eager to avoid the usual political narrative he is using their biographies to explain why, despite the tectonic changes in relationship between Austria and Slovenia, the lives of Carinthian Slovenes remained more or less the same. He wants to know if and why being Slovenian still affect their emotional biography? Why their double identity (and loyalty) still influence their professional career? And finally, intrigued by Peter Handke's book Immer noch Sturm, he was interested in how stürmisch (storm-like) they personally found the minority-majority relations in Austrian Carinthia and Austria after Slovenia joined the EU. The text at hand therefore is a compilation of self-reflections of authors informants and his own (in)capacity to use their life-stories in an attempt to reconstruct the dynamics of this particular relation.*

Keywords: ***Austria, Carinthian Slovene, biographical method, Austrian-Slovenian relations***

Encouraged by the discussion within the project *Austria and its Neighbours*, I have decided to tackle the theme that occasionally strains the relations between Austria and Slovenia. I am, of course, referring to the attitude of the Austrian state towards the Slovenian minority in the Austrian state of Carinthia. On the other hand, I am not interested so much in majority-minority relationship, but on how the Austrian or so-called Carinthian Slovenes reflect on this relationship. Rather than the usual historical reconstruction of it, I am interested in a more personal and thus somewhat more direct consideration. I have decided to ask four creative people to describe this complex relationship through their own biography and hoped to get a slightly different picture.

However, the principal inspiration for this approach came from one of the most recent books by the Austrian writer Peter Handke, *Immer noch Sturm*.[1] This is also where the idea for the title of my contribution originates. Starting from the literary treatment of the relations between Slovenes and Austrians in Austria, I asked the poetess Cvetka Lipuš, the writer Florjan Lipuš, the publisher and author Lojze Wiesser, and the historian and human rights activist Dr. Feliks Bister to contemplate this relationship through their own personal biography. I also provided each one of them with fairly clear instructions to write a short autobiography with an emphasis on their feelings about Austrian and Slovenian citizenship and Slovenian/Carinthian/German regional and national identity. I inquired when they (FIRST) sensed/realised that they were perceived as other/different. How did it feel? Did they see it as an injustice, as a shame; were they afraid?

In a nutshell, I was interested in how it affected their emotional biography. For instance, in their search for a partner: did they fall in love mainly or exclusively with Slovenian men/women?

I was curious if their possible double identity (and loyalty) influenced their occupational/professional career. Were they in any way defined by their Slovenian identity?

And how did they feel about their children? Were they afraid how their children would be affected by their multiple identity? Did they try to help them? If yes, in what way?

Intrigued by Handke's aforementioned book *Immer noch Sturm*, I finally asked them how stormy (*stürmisch*) they personally found the minority-majority relations in Austrian Carinthia and Austria in general.

The answers I received exceeded all my expectations and encouraged me to truly go ahead and portray the dynamics of the relations between the two nations with my respondents' direct assistance. In other words, the text at hand is a compilation of their self-reflections and my own (in)capacity to use their help in an attempt to reconstruct the dynamics of a certain relation.

But before I do this, let me first present a few basic historical facts. Similarly as in other parts of Central and South-eastern Europe, the end of the First World War and the subsequent disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy had a decisive impact on the life of the Slovenes. Especially in the northern part of present-day Slovenia, which after the First World War became part of the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, respectively, whose

[1] Ulrich Weinzierl described Handke's work in the newspaper *Die Welt* as "... ein fabelhaftes Buch", and his colleague Hans Höller from the newspaper *Der Standard* sees it as "Das schönste Stück, das Handke je geschrieben hat…" Here quoted from the introduction to the book *Immer noch Sturm*, Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin, 2010.

northern border was yet to be determined. Since the German-speaking population resisted incorporation into the new state in southern Carinthia, which the Slovenes considered their own, a referendum was organised in October 1920. More than half (59 percent) of southern Carinthia (the so-called Zone A) voted to live in Austria. This included a considerable number of Slovenes, representing around 80 percent (more than 100,000) of the population at the time. Such a turn of events may be partly explained by the skirmishes that occurred between Carinthian Slovenes and Germans after the SHS had been proclaimed, and partly by the poor organisation of its army, which failed to conquer a major portion of the Klagenfurt basin. But mostly it was the result of anti-Serbian propaganda, which largely drew on the local population's misery under temporary occupation of the "Yugoslav" army. The blame for the outcome may also be attributed to members of the Slovenian political elite in Ljubljana, who had been too certain of a favourable outcome and had not seriously committed themselves to putting up their case. Particularly, they had not bothered to advise Carinthian farmers where and how they should sell their produce in the future state, since they were economically dependent on the regional centre, Klagenfurt, which the plebiscite had not included in Zone A. After 10 October 1920, all explanations and frustration were in vain; Carinthia had become part of Austria.

And here our story begins – or, as Handke would put it, here starts the tragedy which has time and time again impelled Carinthian Slovenes to "disconnect". Every time "something tragic happened to us: we would immediately disconnect" (Handke 2010: 20). On the other hand, he has, just like my sources, come to the realisation that Slovenian poems (which are often "so sad as to get stuck in one's throat" [Ibid.]) emanate not only tragedy, not only sadness, but passivity. Because "tragedy requires being active, becoming active…, [whereas] our nature has always been anti-tragic and, accordingly… also… passive".

A similar opinion is voiced by Maja Haderlap,[2] the 2011 winner of the prestigious Ingeborg-Bachmann Prize and author of the novel *Engel des Vergessens/The Angel of Oblivion*, who maintains that the Slovenian "spiral of silence" started after the disintegration of "der K.u.K. Monarchie" and lasted until the beginning of the 21st century.

"Only a little more than six years ago it became possible to talk openly about these things," says Haderlap and stresses that "school textbooks say nothing

[2] Maja Haderlap, the first (female) Austrian winner of the Ingeborg-Bachmann Prize, the most prestigious of literary awards in the German-speaking world, which will this year (2012) be presented for the thirty-sixth time, is a Carinthian Slovene, dramaturge and Germanist from Klagenfurt. After finishing her studies in Vienna, she was the leading dramaturge for no fewer than fifteen years at the Klagenfurt Theatre, and from 2008 onwards she has made her living as a writer and lecturer at the Alpen-Adria-Universität.

because no one wants to hear about this… A Slovene (in Austrian Carinthia, AA) is considered an anti-Austrian and, even worse, an anti-Carinthian. Since Carinthian Slovenes in the Second World War mostly joined the communist partisans in the struggle against the Nazis, they are also regarded as traitors, communists. German Carinthians are considered the good guys, those who defended the southern border. No one seems to be bothered that they fought on the side of the Nazis, that they themselves were Nazis" (Krekeler 2011: 45). This is the reason why Slovenes have lived in fear for the last sixty years. According to Haderlap, they have been told on every single occasion, again and again, that they are a "disturbance", which is why they have had to justify their presence over and over again. What is more, in her opinion, they have constantly faced the feeling that they are "in danger", that they "need to defend themselves". In a nutshell, they have been pushed into a role of a marginalised, "historyless" minority doomed to oblivion.

Handke, a great admirer of Haderlap, believes that the persecution by the German majority, turned Slovenes into a "nation of servants working for a pittance", into "workers without work…, set free without freedom, voters without volition" (Handke 2011: 27), "into a menace, something that induces guilty conscience" (Handke 2011: 42).

All this because of the language which Jonatan, the main protagonist of Handke's book, describes at a certain moment as "non-Aryan gibberish".

With the same inexorable directness characteristic of his entire literary diction, Handke then crushes the momentary optimism stemming from the common struggle against the occupiers.

In this case, the roles of censors of their son's enthusiasm are assumed by Jonatan's parents, who are used to the chicanery from the period in between the two wars. When Jonatan, as a Carinthian partisan fighting against the Germans alongside Austrian deserters from the German army, is enthusiastically explaining, on one of his rare visits home, that the "Slovenes will no longer be unwanted and damned foreigners", that "no one… will ever again call" them "dogged Slavs" ('Verbissene Slawen'), in brief, when he is trying to persuade them "that this land will henceforth also be our land", his parents remind him that they have torched their beehive, hanged the neighbour's child and Germanised their family name… (Handke 2011: 96–97).

By almost sadistically reproducing the despair which followed the hope that they would be free after the war, that no one "in a pub, on a train, on a bus… would ever again yell at them to talk dajč", Handke gives a compelling account of the sense of disappointment that came in the wake of the "ten days of warm, warm peace". After a few days of euphoria at the end of the war, the Slovenes were, according to Handke, the first in Europe to find themselves in the "cold, cold war". Handke

not only demonstrates his craftsmanship in describing the despondency when yesterday's British allies began threatening them and reasoning with them saying, "dount spik jugoslav", but also provides a brilliant reconstruction of the postwar disillusionment with the most eloquent description of the moment when the "masks of peace" fell and the Slovene language became "hated again". What is more, the discomfort over the Slovene language grew into overt hostility and aggressiveness. Threats like: "If you want to celebrate your old holidays and stage your old plays again, be prepared: we'll sabotage you," were followed by the "breaking of glass, rumbling of stones on the stage, and roaring voices coming from the dark: 'Away with the bandit language, away with you!' ('Weg mit der Banditensprache, weg mit euch')" (Handke 2011: 123–126).

The worst that could happen to the former partisan Benjamin was that after a brawl at a village fete, he was thrown into jail together with former collaborators who were then posing as the "knights of the free world". He began to feel nostalgic about the "former tyranny", when "the devils at least knew they were the devils. Today's devils disguise themselves as angels…" (Handke 2011: 132). This is when he realised that the "history ate" their "lives", that they "lost their homeland forever", that "the storm rages on. A constant storm. Nothing but storm." And finally, that this was "all there was" to their "history" (Handke 2011: 132, 142).

*

And how stormy is the situation now? Before I try to answer this with the words of my "informants", I need to explain the situation in Austrian Carinthia as it has unfolded over the last twenty years. Not least, also because of the change that has occurred after Slovenia's independence and especially after its accession to the EU. That is, at least for Slovenes on the Slovenian side of the border. Demonstrations over the failure to implement the Austrian State Treaty and secure the rights of minorities, demonstrations that had taken place since 1970s, with a majority of demonstrators being high-school students who often did not know what they were fighting for, died down. Slovenes held Austria in an especially high regard, because of its steadfast support during Slovenia's struggle for independence… and hit the Austrian retail stores like never before. All until corporations like SPAR and DM opened their businesses in Ljubljana, Maribor, Koper, and so forth. Slovenian politicians would, every so often and with more caution than before, become alert to a lack of articles in the Austrian State Treaty granting Slovenes bilingualism, but to no greater avail. As in other areas, the euphoria of independence blinded the Slovenes to this part of reality as well. The first significant change only occurred

less than twenty years after the independence, when a few more mixed-language settlements in Austrian Carinthia obtained bilingual signs.

And ow was that Time of Change Experienced by Carinthian Slovenes?

Marjan Pipp, President of the Austrian Centre for Ethnic Groups, is rather sceptical. In his opinion, the fact that a little more than ninety years after the plebiscite only 10 percent of Slovenes remained in Austrian Carinthia is a result of the systematic assimilation policy. Just as many others before him, Pipp regrets the failed proposal to the former federal Chancellor Josef Klaus, President of the Austrian People's Party, who in 1966 drew up a proposal to the government, "in compliance with which the obligations arising from the State Treaty should be incorporated into the implementation act" (Pipp 2012: 12). In accordance with the said proposal, municipalities that at the last census before the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 recorded at least 10 percent of the population with Slovene as their language of communication would be classified as mixed-language zones. If such a proposal had been adopted, all national communities – apart from Slovenian, these were also Croatian and Hungarian – would have been able to arrange all their matters in their mother tongue in all institutions. According to Pipp, the initiative was thwarted by the resistance of the Heimatdienst and Carinthian parties. Ten years later, the parliament passed in its stead "a highly restrictive National Communities Act. Despite strong opposition… from the Slovenian and Croatian minorities, which saw it as a violation of their legal protection under Article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty. The National Communities Act reduced the legal protection area of the Slovenian minority to one third of its settlement area" (Pipp 2012) This led to a wave of protests, both in Austrian Carinthia and Slovenia or, rather, Yugoslavia. But all of this was in vain. The government in Vienna continued to sit on the sidelines and "watch how the provincial politicians" in Carinthia rallied the public opinion against the constitutional court, which in many cases granted the appeals of the Slovenian national community. Thirty-five years later the Austrian parliament passed the Amendment Act in 2011, which contains constitutional provisions listing "villages and towns where bilingual topographical signs and signpost should be installed, as well as municipalities, judicial and administrative districts where the Slovene language should be accepted as official language (in addition to German). This, however, is where the gist of the problem lies: the constitution does not prescribe the use of a minority language in places and administrative units that are not listed …" (Pipp 2012). The amendment act is based on the 17.5percent share of the minority population at the last census in 2001, while the constitutional court has always started from the position that the threshold should be set at 10 percent.

In addition, the Amendment Act limits the number of municipalities where Slovene shall be an equal official language. Rather than in twenty-four municipalities where bilingual topographical signs have been put up, Slovene now remains an official language only in sixteen municipalities. Marjan Pipp also alerts to additional three burning issues concerning this ratio.

Firstly, the office of the federal chancellor, which coordinated the preparation of a draft Amendment Act, did not take into consideration any of the proposals submitted by the Organisation of National Communities and the Austrian Centre for Ethnic Groups. Regardless of the fact that within the framework of the latter, a comprehensive proposal was also prepared by a group of leading Austrian experts in constitutional law under the former justice minister, Maria Berger, and the former vice president of the Austrian parliament, Heinrich Neisser (Pipp 2012:13).

Secondly, the act no longer contains any mention of the Slovenian minority in Styria, or more accurately: "On the national level, the act excludes the possibility of applying the provisions of Article 7 of the AST for Styrian Slovenes" (Pipp 2012: 13).

And *thirdly*, it appears as though the act erases "national elements from the definition of national communities", thus "reducing national communities to the level of civil societies" (Pipp 2012: 13).

And how has the relationship between the Austrian majority and the Slovenian minority affected (or continues to affect) my respondents/informants?

I can most easily relate to the account of the poet Cvetka Lipuš, whose mini biography compiled exclusively for the purposes of our project bears a revealing title: Molčeča Avstrija / Silent Austria / Schweigendes Österreich. I can also relate to her experience for the following two reasons: her manner of description and because I consider her a member of my generation, even though she is ten years younger than me. Due to the latter I can also easily envision the scene at the very beginning of her account, a scene that clearly reproduces the sensation that Peter Handke himself tried to describe as well.

On her way home from school, Cvetka and her school friends were systematically harassed by an older man, just because they spoke Slovene… In front of regular passengers of a city bus – high-school students, pensioners, housewives and a mother with a toddler – the man began calling them "Slovenian vermin" that "must speak German or shut it". The bus went completely quiet … No one on the bus said a word… when he… called our parents Slovenian traitors and no-goods, remembers Cvetka, who could not believe that the hounding continued uninterrupted for the next couple of stops and that none of the passengers uttered a single word. To the contrary, as soon as they grasped what was going on, those who boarded the bus later on quietly supported the hounding, which continued until Cvetka and her two school friends got off the bus at their stop. A bus almost full of people listened "in

complete silence" to the "Hastriade" on Slovenian "Hureneltern und alles Nicht-Deutsche". The Slovenian students were silent as well. Cvetka still remembers how they slipped from the bus with their heads down and quietly returned to their boarding house. When the teacher who received them at the door saw one of the school girls in tears, she asked what had happened. One of the school friends said that she fell and the rest silently nodded. They chose silence**.** They believed that this was the only way they could protect themselves.

More than twenty years later, on her summer visit from the United States where she had lived since the end of the 1980s, Cvetka met one of her school friends in Klagenfurt. On their way to a restaurant where they planned to have a cup of coffee they strolled through one of the shops and browsed through hangers with clothes. They spoke Slovene – until the moment when they were approached by a saleswoman. The school friend immediately switched to German, which came quite as a shock to Cvetka, who had learned to overcome her fear of being different during her postgraduate studies in Pittsburgh. Or, as she puts it: "After spending many years away from Carinthia, I've lost that feeling that I need to conform, without even knowing it." ("Nachdem ich seit vielen Jahren nicht mehr in Kärnten lebe, habe ich diese zutiefst verinnerlichten angepassten Umgangsformen abgestreift, mich von ihnen frei gelebt, ohne dass ich mir zuvor der eingefleischten Verhaltensregeln je bewusst gewesen wären"). Formerly very well accustomed to situations in which she began a sentence in Slovene and finished it in German due to the presence of German speakers, she now perceived this practice as strange.

Taken completely by surprise at the sudden shift, she continued speaking in Slovene until she realised that her friend had by then been speaking to her exclusively in German. She was finally roused by the silence and startled glances from her friend and the saleswoman. Then it instantly dawned on her: she had broken the unwritten rule that, once within the earshot of a German-speaking person, one should immediately switch to German. By continuing the conversation in a language that did not belong in the newly-arisen situation, she felt as though "she had dropped an invisible elephant in the room".

The result was as expected: both her friend and the saleswoman first stared at her in silence and then tried to ease the tension with remarks about the weather. In German, of course. It was either German or silence. This time Cvetka chose the third option – Slovene.

It is also because of situations like these that Cvetka Lipuš, who has in the meantime moved from Pittsburgh to work and live in Salzburg, never felt addressed when someone struck a conversation with "we Austrians". Ever since her early childhood, she considered the Austrians above all as the others, while not knowing for a long time where exactly she belonged herself.

Until one evening when her nanny was unavailable and her parents had to take her with them to the demonstrations in Klagenfurt. That evening, she recounts, the feeling of belonging/not belonging began to be inculcated in her above all by the angry inhabitants of Klagenfurt. The protest march, with which her parents and other Slovenes tried to bring attention to the failure to secure the basic minority rights, met with loud opposition from the German citizens. Cvetka still remembers the shower of swear words, various small objects and spurts of water shot at them from the upper floors of houses during their peaceful march through the city streets.

Nevertheless, it was most often the language that set Cvetka and other Carinthian Slovenes into the position of the other over and over again. Irrespective of whether she spoke perfect German, she would always be given away by her Carinthian-Slovenian accent, which would provoke silence…

Silence or a storm. Her language or her given and family name, which were so "unusual" in Austrian terms. Whenever she was not given away by the former, she caused uneasiness with the latter, i.e. her Slovenian name. The silence was usually broken by a remark about the weather or the usual small talk… But never indifference…

Indifference is a reaction/state/position that she chose herself. More or less subconsciously. She was lucky enough not to have been moulded exclusively by the unpleasant experiences from her youth but also by the years of study and work in the United States where her "foreign" accent would ever so often even give her an advantage. This is also why she returned to her "homeland" with a greater sense of confidence, strength and less vulnerable, especially to possible attempts to humiliate her. The experience and work, her poetry in particular, have made her untouchable and, as she puts it, not an easy target for anyone anymore.

A similar sense of self-confidence may be detected in her father, writer Florjan Lipoš, with the only difference being that he was moulded by considerably harsher circumstances. As a "five-, six-year-old boy" he witnessed during the war not only the disappearance of the Slovene language "from the street, from public spaces", but also his mother's arrest. Like many other women, his mother was sent to the Ravensbrück concentration camp, from which she never returned. Thenceforth and until a very old age he knew that the Slovenes would only be saved by silence – the air was literally thick with hostility towards the Slovene language. ("Nur das Schweigen schützte einen... Die feindliche Gesinnung gegenüber unserer Sprache war förmlich in der Luft spürbar"). Florjan grew up with the feeling that he did not belong anywhere. What is more, he believed that his language took his mother away ("Ich wusste, wegen der Sprache wurde mir die Mutter weggenommen und nicht mehr rückerstattet").

A similar sense accompanied him throughout his youth. His father, who had meanwhile been drafted into the German army, returned home; he and his brother got a stepmother… but he could still not get rid of the feeling that the Slovene language would not earn him a living. In high school, when he joined his peers of both nationalities, the feeling of otherness was revived or, as he himself puts it, “das Gefühl des Andersseins lebte neu auf”. Among his peers he did not feel as the other, but as an equal among equals. But this was only in the classroom. In the afternoon, when he was in the boarding house surrounded by Slovenian peers, the feeling of otherness and being left out came back. The diocesan boarding house only tolerated the Slovene language as a necessary evil (die “vom bischöflichen Internat nur geduldet und sehr argwöhnisch beobachtet wurde”).

Similarly this held true for the love life, which was completely banned from the life in the boarding house (“Die Religion sollte das Liebesleben ersetzen. Jeder Kontakt zu Mädchen war verpönt und unvorstellbar”). But that obviously had no effect on his later selection of a partner. The need for “human contact” was far more important and far more crucial, recounts Florjan, leaving no doubt in this respect. Quite to the contrary: he still continues to dismiss any possible expectations of the surroundings in connection with his choice of a life companion as unimportant and inconsequential. Not least because he was toughened by the years at grammar-school: “…they strengthened my inner freedom, freedom of thinking and taught me that I must always be in opposition. Just as befits an outsider” (“Wie es sich für einen Außenseiter gehört”).

The Slovene language, on the other hand, played a much more decisive role in the selection of occupation. The language and one single, i.e. Slovenian identity. Moreover, Florjan believes that the awareness about it helped him maintain his integrity. And that he could only become and remain a loyal Austrian citizen through his language. Conversely, he finds that he loves both languages: one as the “main course” and the other as “dessert”. One has served him to earn his living and the other filled his spare time. One helped him cope with the daily life and the other was the language in which he wrote. And it appears as though Slovene has helped him to delve into the world of fiction, a different, extraordinary world of the other and often undesirable.

Florjan also draws much strength from the knowledge that his four children have lived in another time. He is reassured by the fact that they have been spared the systematic, state-promoted oppression and political terror. He firmly believes that his children do not perceive their otherness as a burden but as an advantage. That they do not need to hide their origin and that they can openly express themselves in the cultural sphere, although he also feels that the very spiritual level (“geistiger Ebene”) in Carinthia requires plenty of change.

To summarise: on one hand, he is pleased to see that much has recently turned for the better in Austria (“Inzwischen hat sich viels in Österreich zum Besseren gewendet. Zweisprachige Ortstafeln wurden errichtet..., die Wiedergutmachung an den Opfern der Nazizeit findet statt”), while on the other, he is concerned about the democratic rights, which are today once again in jeopardy (“Für die Erhaltung der demokratischen Werte jedoch, die heute wieder gefährdet sind”). And he also thinks that Carinthia would not be Carinthia, if it were not for occasional reprisals stemming from the distorted understanding of the past (“Und Kärnten wäre nicht Kärnten, wären nicht auch sie hier und da Repressalien ewiggestriger Gesinnung ausgesetzt gewesen, denke ich mir”). Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that while the storm has somewhat abated, the reasons for it are still there…

The same opinion is shared by Lipuš’s publisher, Lojze Wieser, whose experience with bilingualism will be presented on the basis of different perceptions and misspellings of his name. Although baptised as Alois, he was never called at home by any other name than Lojzi. At school he was both: Lojzi and Lojz for those who liked him and Windische Alois for those who did not. The situation was just the opposite on the soccer pitch, where he was hailed Alois after he scored a goal, and received a “Lojzi, Lojzi, was war das für ein Dreck!” when he was not on top of his game. Later, during his academic years in Vienna, he was called by his friends Lojzi or Lojz, and turned into Lojze when he signed his first article in the magazine *Die Brücke*. But after that and especially upon his return to Carinthia when he assumed the leadership of the Drava publishing house, it started. Letters sent to his address stated Losche, Lože, Loijze, Louise, Lojsa, Loisse, Loice and Luize. What is more, the mail from the cabinet of the former federal chancellor Schüssel even addressed him as Mrs. Lojze W. A similar attitude was revealed by mail delivery itself. In the mid 1970s, for instance, one letter travelled to his address no less than eighteen months, simply because the sender also wrote a Slovene name of the village where he lives. During the 1970s Austrian Carinthia was permeated with German nationalism, the main victims of which were bilingual signs of villages and towns.

Maja Haderlap, too, remembers the days of the “deutschnationalen Ortstafelsturm” and describes the then developments by portraying her father as well as his acquaintances and friends. It would often happen that they were, even at their own local tavern in Železna Kapla (Germany: Eisenkappel), branded as “stool pigeons”, “bandits” and “traitors” who did “nothing but terrorise the population faithful to their homeland”. This is one of the things that made her father feel deep distrust in any kind of politics. He even rejected “demonstrations at which Slovenes voiced their protest against tearing down bilingual signs. … Just like his fellow fighters from the time of the (second; the author’s note) war, he did not want to find himself called names or spat upon. … One of his best friends, however, came to the

realisation after "one manifestation in Klagenfurt that the German-speaking inhabitants of Carinthia will long not be able to forgive Slovenian farmers… workers and servants for having publicly striven for the implementation of the provisions of the State Treaty… which they considered not as a treaty but as a punishment" (Haderlap 2011: 169–169). Hence, not as a *Staatsvertrag*/State Treaty but as a *Strafvertrag*/ Penalty Contract.

A similar reflection on the stiefmütterliche Vaterland Österreich/stepmotherly homeland Austria is offered by Feliks Bister, who still gets upset, because he was once, just for a moment, ashamed of his Slovenian mother after some school performance in German that discriminated against the Slovene language. With that he effectively pointed to the experiences and feelings hiding behind the apparent pastoral bilingual reality ("zweisprachige Wirklichkeit"). Namely, since language orientation ("sprachliche Orientierung") of individuals was known to all, he would, as a rule, converse in German with some of his school friends who otherwise mastered Slovene, and in Slovene with their nationally more conscious parents. Just as Florjan Lipuš, Bister believes that the "negative climate", which compelled some into speaking German has since those times and up to the present day "significantly improved"; so much so that his children are now in a better position than their Austrian peers. In other words, he firmly believes that bilingual education will facilitate their "access to other languages".

To what extent is this conclusion a fusion of fatherly pride in his universally well-educated children and the so-called multiplication of forgetting/oblivion is difficult to determine, but the fact remains that Carinthian Slovenes would not have been able to survive without the latter. Or, if we use the introductory metaphoric again, without the help of the guardian Angel of Oblivion, Slovenian men and women would most likely not have endured the storm that engulfed them in the 1920s, 1940s and 1970s. A storm that has, for now, almost entirely subsided, allowing people like Maja Haderlap to finally speak up about its ravages. In German. Partly because the German language may serve as a pair of glasses "through which it is possible to see things more clearly" (Krekeler 2012: 46) but mostly to enable the German-speaking Austrians to gradually discover the forgotten parts of minority, i.e. all-Austrian history. The understanding of the relations between Austria and Slovenia takes a little more than just the Slovenes knowing the causes and consequences of the storm, which swept through Austrian Carinthia for the major part of the 20th century.

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Changing Slovak Memory Patterns - Seeking a useable past?[1]

Silvia Miháliková

Abstract: *As well as in all of Europe, various changes affected the way of life, the towns and villages, politics, economics, culture but also the symbolic representation of different states and regimes on the current Slovak territory. Times of regime changes or crisis are opportunities to reaffirm as well as to rethink and reformulate not only fundamental values but also state symbols, myths and rituals in which they are encoded. Just after the Velvet revolution there was a widely shared expectation that "the new beginning" should be represented by the "new generation" of the transition which might symbolised innocence and the potential for democratic politics. The reality did not meet such expectations, moreover, the complaint that "there is a lack of competent people" leads in Slovakia to the acceptance of the re-cycle model of recruitment by the ruling elite. The evolution of Slovak society during the period of transition reflects the contending political traditions, frequent changes in official political values (both before and after 1989), the splitting of social structures and both continuity and disruption within civic society.*

A closer look to these phenomena opens up a perspective which also includes the elementary semantics by which a society develops its self-image and its conception of political meaning. Against this background, the study of the symbolic representation of the new/renewed states allows for a closer look on the symbolic space of politics which frames policy-making processes and political decisions.

Keywords: ***memory patterns, useable past, Slovakia, post-communism***

Changes of the changes[2] – that is one of the possible characteristics of the 20th century life of Slovakia. As well as in all of Europe, various changes affected the way of life, the towns and villages, politics, economics, culture but also the symbolic representation of different states and regimes on the current Slovak territory. It was not always neither a direct nor an easy road – there are occasional stops, returns, impasses, mistakes, and even brave efforts to turn against apparently inevitable destiny and to outdo the Slovaks themselves. Coups d´état, revolutions, changes of

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2 A general description of the milestones of the 20th century history of Slovakia used by the historian Lubomir Liptak appears as a title of his book: Lipták, Ľ. *Changes of Changes. Society and Politics in Slovakia in the 20th Century.* Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2002.

administrative, constitutional, political and economic system represent important milestones; they mark and, at the same time, they indicate that something was accomplished and something began. In the 20th century, we witnessed nine of such changes happening in Slovakia. Every one born in this century experienced four or five of them before reaching his or her retirement age. It is too many – much more than saw most of the countries of the Western Europe for example. Those changes had a considerable impact on thinking, political culture, the visions of surrounding world as well as on perceptions of citizens themselves. They have also kept influencing fundamental historical problem that Slovakia has been facing since the beginning of the 20th century – how to catch up with the economic, social and civilisation lag of the modern-day developed countries. That is the task to be fulfilled in everyday life. The historic events, coups and revolutionary changes are often of decisive importance – they can both – help to reach the direct way but they can, at the same time, offer apparently comfortable shortcuts which could, though, turn in future to be dangerous and harmful. When considering the latest part of history than can still be freshly recalled, we become sensitive and subjective. Historians and politicians use to make a hierarchy of dates and events and, sometimes, they refuse it as a whole. But the modern-day man living in the "permanent present-times" should not be left without knowing that those one hundred years and preponderance of changes and coups were neither fruitless nor without impact upon today´s life. Every change can be characterised by some feature – one by courage, other by judgement or, on the contrary, by its complete absence; every change had its personalities, exterior and interior moving forces and their symbolical representations, its ups and downs.

Times of regime changes or crisis are opportunities to reaffirm as well as to rethink and reformulate not only fundamental values but also state symbols, myths and rituals in which they are encoded. This generalisation away from the specificity of everyday life often takes the form of expression of a new temporality. Turner describes the state of liminality that exists during transitional periods as a "moment in and out of time" (Turner 1969: 96).

In the case of Slovakia, the valuation of the end of communism – whether it was perceived good or bad – was hardly consensual, but the worldwide acknowledged fact of the definitive end evoked a transcendent understanding of temporal separation. It was universally interpreted as "the close of a chapter, and the beginning of a new one" in Slovak/Czechoslovak history.

For most communists and leftists, a temporal break with the past was embodied in appeals to "look forward, not back" at the time of the transition. The new emerging democracy was neither a reform nor a continuation of communism, nor a return to the First Czechoslovak Republic. Of course, in terms of a ritual process and

symbolic politics, "a new beginning" reflects separation from the old discredited regime.

Just after the Velvet revolution there was a widely shared expectation that "the new beginning" should be represented by the "new generation" of the transition which might symbolised innocence and the potential for democratic politics. The reality did not meet such expectations, moreover, the complaint that "there is a lack of competent people" leads in Slovakia to the acceptance of the *re-cycle model* of recruitment by the ruling elite (Miháliková 1996: 167–179). The same people appear on stage repeatedly – Slovak President Rudolf Schuster being an example.[3] Another remarkable fact is that top politicians claim a "political date of birth" after November 1989, disregarding their age and political involvement in the previous regime. This suggests that main factors determining the specific configuration, attitudes, skills, and abilities of the political elites which have shaped post-communist Slovakia are previous historical traditions and political development perpetuated by forms of elite recruitment, the accepted legitimacy of the new power, and the socio-psychological atmosphere in society. Yet the final phase of democratisation is reached only when *democratic* institutions and practices become ingrained in the political culture. Not only political leaders but also the prevailing majority of political actors, and of the population, come to understand such practices as a part of the right and natural arrangement of society.

Nevertheless, the symbol of new beginning was also the debut of democracy. "Democracy" became the "theme" of transition; "democracy" was the new civil religion. Symbols of "democracy" invaded virtually all the major and minor parties of the left, right, and centre during the first electoral campaigns. The sacrality of "democracy" was most often taken for granted – almost all political parties and movements had "democracy" in their names, headlines of electoral programs, party´s slogans etc. Still, the question remains: what did "democracy" mean in the Slovak transition?

The single most important meaning of "democracy" in the Slovak transition was that of the popular sovereignty, or "rule by the people". "Democracy" was the sacred symbolic opposite of (profane) authoritarianism or dictatorship. All the newly emerging political parties in the transition affirmed the sacred value of "rule of the

[3] Rudolf Schuster's political career started under communism. Previously, he had a high position in the Communist Party hierarchy. After 1989, he became the Chairman of the Slovak National Council and remained in this position until the first free parliamentary elections in summer 1990. After the communal elections of 1994, he became Mayor of Košice and strengthened his position as a charismatic, active and successful local politician. Schuster decided to create his own party after his failed negotiations with the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and the Party of Democratic Left (SDL), and when it became clear that he had no chance to be elected President by the MPs of the then Parliament. After the 1998 parliamentary elections, Schuster was nevertheless appointed by SDK as its candidate for the presidential election, which he won.

people". Democracy was understood not only as a macro-level system of popular sovereignty, however, but as a micro-level system of open dialogue (debating problems in depth without taboos) and consensus (accepting the majority consensus). Thus, just as (sacred) popular sovereignty symbolically opposes (profane) authoritarianism; (sacred) dialogue and compromise symbolically oppose (profane) confrontation and demagogy. The approaches rejecting politics as *zero sum game* became in course of time in discussions concerning our old and recent history, in the disputes about the path of economic and political transformation less important. Consensus, compromise, and dialogue did not match the everyday style of policy making once again.

Intertwined with dialogue and compromise (symbolised for instance by the very title of the leading political force *Public Against Violence*, or the poetic term *Velvet Revolution* modified in V*elvet Divorce*) in the transitional symbolic framework were understandings of "rationality" and "moderation". Moderation was understood as a modern, rational attitude – the sacred symbolic opposite of "old" irrationality and extremism. Implicit in this symbolic dichotomy between rationality and irrationality is "violence"/"non-violence". Dialogue, moderation, and compromise are rational, non-violent democratic methods, which symbolically oppose irrationality, violence, authoritarianism. However, the preference given those qualities did not prove stability over time, conflicting behaviour became to dominate politics very soon.

One of the most important representations intertwined with "moderation", "rationality" and "democracy" in the Slovak transitional symbolic framework was "modernisation". Slovakia´s *place* or better to say the very *existence* of the Slovak nation in the Central European cultural and intellectual community has been a volatile issue throughout Slovak history. According to some authors (Pynsent 1994) the Slovak nation, nation without own state in history has needed to be created – it was done by a device which seems to be inherent in Central and Eastern European nationalism – Robert Pynsent calls it as *active atavism*. By this term he means "...a seeking out and even inventing of ancestors and ancestral characteristics. It consists in deriving remote history from the present, rather than deriving the present from history" (Pynsent 1994: 60). This kind of creating a history of Slovak nation could be found in the writings from the beginning of 19th century.[4] The complicated developments represented in a creation of a common state with Czechs in 1918; the duration of inter-war Slovak Republic with number of undemocratic provisions (1938–1945); the following rebirth of Czechoslovakia (1945) where the communist regime became established (1948) and lasted until 1989, influenced the character of post-communist transition. Looking on the present position of Slovakia in Europe,

[4] I have in mind the writings of Ján Kollár and Pavel Jozef Šafárik.

seems to be appropriate to paraphrase the philosopher Ortega y Gasset by saying "Slovakia is the problem, Europe is the solution". In this sense, the transition from communism to democracy means that Slovakia could be transformed into a modern European nation only through its acceptation in Trans-Atlantic integration structures: European Union and NATO. Most of the party leaders in electoral campaigns not only affirmed the goal of European inclusion, but continually sought to project that European inclusion would be most achievable through their party. In addition, party leaders commonly sought legitimacy for their parties through foreign endorsement. Even the Slovak National Party[5] (SNS) follows this idea by looking for partners from the right wing nationalist politicians like V. Zirinovskij, J. M. Le Pen, U. Bossi.

Besides other aspects, the process of *Europeisation* means that Slovaks were and still are exposed to institutions and cultures which are simply far more efficient than their own in achieving some of their traditional objectives as well as other objectives which citizens are rapidly learning to appreciate. In this way, Slovaks learned from, imitated, and trying to identify themselves with the people of Western Europe.

The Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Slovakia

The changes which took place in the social and political climate in Slovakia after November 1989 – including developments after January 1993 – were full of contradictions. The majority of Slovaks hold a rather sceptical view about the early 1990s. This is evident in the succession of names given to the collapse of the old regime. The first poetic term, the "Velvet Revolution", lost favour very quickly: one year after November 1989, students started to talk about the "Stolen Revolution"; and afterwards spread the use of terms like the "Velvet Outbreak", the "Communist Riot", the "Palace Revolution", or the "Jewish-Bolshevik Conspiracy", and other derogatory labels. The symbol "velvet" retains its original connotations in the notion "Velvet Divorce" used to describe the division of Czechoslovakia: it was an exceptionally civilised and moderate way of managing such a complex event, in contrast to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, the notion "velvet" also began to symbolise the opposite: for example dissidents became to be called "the velvet grave-diggers of democracy" and after some privatisation scandals a "Club of betrayed by the velvet" was established (see more in Macura 2001).

In order to shape national memory after 1989, and especially after gaining state independence in 1993, the ruling political elite in Slovakia sought to create

[5] The party did not reach the threshold to enter the parliament in 2002 elections.

a convincing popular narrative linking the "acceptable" past with the reconstructed post-communist state. Thus they attempted to manipulate the shared experiences and common ideas that together structure collective memory. The predominantly nationally oriented political leadership started to use both socially organised forgetting (exclusion, suppression, and repression) and socially organised remembering (the deliberate invention and popularisation of some elements of consciousness). The major goal of this policy was to legitimate the new post-communist independent state, the Slovak Republic.

This national affirmation included the creation of a new collective memory with a *negative* Soviet, Czech, and Hungarian image and a *positive* Slovak one reflected in the fate of the Slovak nation in different historical periods. As Slovaks struggled to create a new national present and future for their country, they also sought to rewrite the past they had shared with the Czechs and Hungarians. Socially organised forgetting – a concerted, popular effort on the part of many Slovaks to reduce or deny the Czech and Hungarian contribution to the shared past – certainly played a role creating a new national identity.

Basic Historical Myths

Those who can invoke myth and establish resonance can mobilize people, exclude others, screen out certain memories, establish solidarity or, indeed, reinforce the hierarchy of status and values (Schöpflin 1997: 22). In the case of Slovakia we might identify several historical myths: the foundation myth of the Slovak nation connected with Great Moravia and the role of Cyril and Methodius;[6] the myth of *dove-like nation – holubičí národ* (in other words a nation as gentle and innocent as a dove, a people that knew only how to defend themselves, they did never subjugate foreign nations);[7] the myth of *Slav reciprocity*, especially of fraternity together with the idea that Slovakia serves as a *bridge between East and West*; the myth of long-running conflict with Hungarians – *1 000 years of oppression*; the Slovak *"martyr myth"* which does exist, at least in the popular consciousness, and may be linked with the nationalist myth of the suffering Slavs – there is perceived need to put an end to Slovak suffering.

One of the basic historical myths says about Old Nation – Young State expressed by the myth of hundreds years lasting struggle for state independence. This myth is still alive among people, supported more by journalists and politicians than histori-

[6] According to narrative on ancient past, Rastislav – ruler of great Moravia invited Thessalonian brothers Constantine – Cyril and Methodius to teach Christianity in Great Moravia in 863.

[7] Jan Kollár employs this myth about peace-loving aspect of the Slav character to all Slav nations with the exception of the Russians and Montenegrins.

ans. It became a kind of official statement confirmed by the Preamble to the Slovak Constitution:

"We, the Slovak nation, mindful of our ancestors" political and cultural legacy and of centuries´ experience of struggles for national existence and our own statehood / in accordance with the Cyrilo-Methodian spiritual legacy and the historical heritage of Great Moravia / on the basis of the natural right of nations to self-determination, / together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic / in the interests of permanent peaceful cooperation with other democratic states / in the endeavor to implement a democratic form of government, guarantees of a free life, the development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity / we the citizens of the Slovak Republic / resolve…"[8]

Slovak historians in attempting to trace the evolution of the Slovaks into a modern nation accounts of ninth-century activity on the territory of today`s Slovakia as accounts of Slovak activity. This approach to Great Moravia is fundamentally a territorial approach (Smith 1989), although the tendency to call at least the inhabitants of the eastern part of the territory Slovaks adds a genealogical element to it: that genealogical element is enhanced if they use for that part of the territory the label invented in the nineteenth century, Slovakia. For, at least at that time, "Slovakia" suggested the "natural" dwelling place of the Slovaks who had once had their own state. "Slovakia" remained an ethnic rather than a territorial denominator until the founding of Czecho-Slovakia. That the post 1989` governments consider the Slovaks an ethnic nation and Slovak as essentially designating the Slovak`s birth-rights is clear from the Preamble too.

Another example of territorial approach considering also ethnic roots in the Slovak mythology represents the explanation of Slovak history by one of the most acknowledged Slovak historians, Dušan Kováč. According to him we have "…to remind of the depth of our roots in this land, with disregard to the length of time it has existed as an independent country – without consideration of how long it has been a nation. Our beginnings are no different from the origins of other nations. We have been marked by events taking place on this piece of the earth as other nations are determined by other happenings. We have lived on our territory, as busy in building as others, if perhaps less warlike and bloody in the creation of its history… The culture inherited from forefathers is our culture; the territory claimed by our ancestors has spanned, by the unfolding of history, the culture of the west and east European" (Twenty centuries in Slovakia 1999: 83).

[8] Ústava Slovenskej republiky. (Constitution of the Slovak Republic). Bratislava: Remedium, 1992, s. 13 (translated by author).

Another Slovak (and Czech) national myth says that Slav literacy and learning spread from Great Moravia to the Slav world (Slovaks are sometimes described as The People of the Word; Klimek – Ward 2000). According to this myth Cyril and Methodius did found a seminary and a literary school in Great Moravia that is interpreted by some scholars as mythopoeia: "…they created basic linguistic education not only for the Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks, but also the Poles, Serbs and other Slav tribes. It was, indisputably, above all Slavonic Christianity that enabled these Slavs, as against their Polabian fellows, to retain their national individuality and not to submit to Germanization" (Pynsent 1994: 196).

The next myth as an instrument of self-definition illustrates the long-running conflict with certain neighbors, especially Hungarians and Czechs: the Hungarians` closing of the three Slovak grammar schools in 1874 constitutes part of the nation myth even for non-nationalists, like the closing down of the Slovak cultural organization, Matica slovenská in 1875. The Matica according to its constitution, belonged to the "Slovak nation", and this is what is mean by saying "we did not exist for the Hungarians". Nationalism need enemies, and in the Slovak Awakening, the Czechs were "our brothers" it was the Magyars/Hungarians who were demonized but later on the leaders of the First Czechoslovak Republic become great demons: "In `Czechoslovakia` Masaryk and Beneš saw a renewal of the Czech state which was territorially expanded by Slovakia, and they saw in the Slovak population (they did not even consider this population a nation) simply a biological amplification of the Czech nation…" (Polakovič 1991: 82). The myth of the Slovaks as the victims of the Czechs was often expressed by repeated use of the terms "Czechomarxist" or "Czechocommunist" for the post 1948-regime.

Changing Public Spaces

It is common for new regimes to symbolise their break with the past by changing the names of public places, especially when those names refer to the dates of significant events or to historical figures from the past that is to be forgotten. The renaming of streets and squares was also a popular initiative in Slovakia, as demonstrated by the formation of numerous organisations, foundations to build memorials to honour "our fallen, forgotten heroes", who "died that we may live", and the many suggestions for people to be honoured. It came to renaming of buildings that had previously housed Soviet cultural institutions (for example the house of a bookstore called Ruská kniha (Russian Book) belongs back to the Catholic Church in Bratislava; the palace located in the very centre of Bratislava hosted in the past Soviet library, cinema, exhibition rooms called Dom ZČSSP (House of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship) became a part of Slovak National Gallery).

Following the new ethnic minority laws introduced after the end of communism there were in the areas of mixed Slovak – Hungarian population re-installed bilingual signs on the streets, on the buildings, towns and villages after 1989.

In post – Velvet Divorce Slovakia, streets and squares have been renamed yet again, as historic figures who were forgotten not only by Communists in the post-war period, but also by the Czechoslovak democrats after 1989, have again been remembered, reflecting both the Slovak nationalist aspirations of the inter-war era and the previously discredited Slovak state. This was particularly the case in the north-western part of the country where the Slovak National Party (SNS) is strongest, and where – in the town Žilina, for instance – Masaryk Square has been renamed for Father Andrej Hlinka[9] Square. In addition to renaming streets and squares, there were renovated public spaces, removing some monuments and constructing others, which also reflected a particular interpretation of history – increasing number of Andrej Hlinka statues; attempt to celebrate the president of the wartime Slovak state, the priest Jozef Tiso[10] by installing his busts; building hundreds of new churches (mostly catholic ones), etc.

An interesting symbolical paradox has occured in Bratislava: local authorities of one district decided to rename a park with the statue of Karol Šmidke (communist politician active in Slovak National Uprising during the WWII) to Andrej Hlinka's Park without removing the statue. It means that not only two completely different but also opposite historical traditions unify this place.

If artefacts play a central role in the memories of cultures and individuals, as researchers of collective memory have argued, then monuments, constructed of durable materials, and seemingly permanent, can serve as ideal "sites of memory" (Wingfield 2000). Certainly their usual location in public places make them part of a shared present, rather than mere works of art or simple symbols of a disputed past. Precisely because of their significance as repositories for memory, monuments are places of conflicting construction of memory and make ideal targets for defacement, destruction, or removal in times of historical contest.

A massive clearing of the monuments that were created during communism took place soon after 1989. Statues and busts that personified the rule of the totalitarian regime that had been unveiled on almost every square and in front of the majority

[9] Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938), Roman Catholic priest, founder of the Slovak People's Party advocating the rights of the Slovak nation against "magyarization", leader of the movement for Slovakian autonomy while the Czechoslovak Republic; "father of the nation" with unclear record of his contacts with fascist representatives before WWII.

[10] Jozef Tiso (1887–1947), Catholic priest, president of the "independent" Slovak Republic controlled by Hitler's Germany; Tiso's government introduced legislation on deportation of thousands of Jews from Slovakia; executed as a war criminal in 1947.

of schools and factories gradually disappeared from public sight over the years that followed.

Some attacks on monuments in post-communist Slovakia were popular actions. In Bratislava, for example, a huge statue of the first communist president, Klement Gottwald, that stood on what was known as Gottwald Square back then and is known as Námestie Slobody (Square of Freedom) today, was helped to be removed by fire made by infuriate people. The remaining rests of the statue are used as study material by the school of applied arts. Two objects that disappeared from the north-western town of Žilina are an enormous bust of Vladimir Ilich Lenin and a sculpture of a hammer and sickle – the idealised symbol of the working class.

The memorials that remain, despite also having been created during communism, are mainly the ones that portray events that have a positive historical legacy rather than the ones that were erected for strictly propagandist purposes. Some of these statues pay homage to soldiers who fell in the two world wars and who fought against fascism, some portray leading figures in Slovak history.

One of most disputed statues in current Bratislava is a bronze statue of Svätopluk astride his horse that was unveiled in June 2010 in front of Bratislava castle. Svätopluk is remembered as the greatest king of the Great Moravian Empire. Than Prime Minister Robert Fico said that he sees the statue "…as a symbol of the birth of the second pillar of the national self-confidence, which is now to be built" (Slovak Spectator 2010). The text of the base of the statue reads: "Svätopluk – King of Old Slovaks", and carries the opening salutation from a papl bull which Pope John VIII sent to Svätopluk in 880 AD. The statue was designed by Ján Kulich, a sculptor prominent during the communist era in Czechoslovakia. Protests against the symbolism of the statue were focused on the location and the artist who created it. They claimed the statue represents a gesture of power, a residue of 19th century thinking and that it was conceived and executed with no discussion or debate. Group of young artists objected to the location, saying that the Slovak power elite have expropriated some of the most prime real estate in the country at Bratislava castle, to further their own agenda.

The other statue being subject of public disputes is a statue of Empress Maria Theresa. Her statue stood in what is now Ľudovít Štúr Square in Bratislava for more than 20 years before it was destroyed in 1921. An iniciative undertaken by a non-profit organisation Bratislavký okrášľovací spolok/the Bratislava Beautification Association has brought a smaller replica of the original statue back to the square, only a few meters from where the original stood. The new sculpture is only one-third size of the original. The unveiling followed an extensive public debate about whether a statue of the same size should return to the site where the original statue of Maria Theresa was installed in 1897.

The most visited and most notable WWII memorial is called Slavín. It was constructed in 1960 and to this day still raises high above the country´s capital. Slavín is a monument commemorating soldiers who fell in the WWII, with a statue of a soldier on top of a high column. The word Slavín refers to the entire military cemetery and all its statues and relief sculptures, it is a part of Bratislava´s cultural heritage. Numerous smaller monuments commemorating war heroes are located all around the country and can still be found in almost every town.

Statues of heroes from the Slovak pantheon, especially Milan Rastislav Štefánik,[11] hidden during the Communism, were triumphantly replaced on their pedestals after the collapse of communist regime. For example, the monumental bronze statue of M. R. Štefánik was festively exposed in front of Slovak National Theatre in 2009 as a memory of 90th anniversary of his death.

Some of artists, politicians, and writers forgotten after 1948 and 1968 have been resurrected. Monuments to their memory once more stand in public places, their faces adorn postage stamps, and their names again appear on street signs.

The Slovaks like all their neighbours have removed many of the symbols of nearly fifty years of communism since 1989, including the omnipresent red stars, and the hammers and sickles, from public places. But the shadows of these emblems of communist rule serve as reminders of historic legacy to be addressed. The integration of conflicting interpretations has proven difficult. Diverse claims are being negotiated only with difficulty as the Slovaks again reinterpret their national history.

Conclusion

The change of the European political landscape in the wake of 1989/1990 and the collapse of the Iron curtain as a clear political demarcation line between Western and Eastern Europe affects deeply the post-communist countries and forces them to redefine their identity concepts along with their position in the new political surroundings, and this, in turn, influences national consciousness. The countries are challenged to rethink and reconstruct their identities on multiple levels – the regional, national and European.

In this redefinition of national identities the respective states make selective references to their "national history", stored in a kind of "collective archive". These

[11] Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919), Slovak politician, scientist and astronomer, general in the French army and commander of its Slovak legionaries. Štefánik together with T. G. Masaryk and E. Beneš belongs to the main representatives of the Czecholsovak struggle for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He died tragically while he was flying home, close to Bratislava.

archives of national symbols, myths and rituals figure as a basis for political representation in the frame of reconstructing national identities. As for Slovakia we can agree that: "In the long term, the political ordeal which Slovaks have been living out might prove to have been a worthwhile, if costly experience. After a tedious, yet hopefully peaceful struggle they will be ready to transform their society and will not be tempted again by false promises of shortcuts to democracy and prosperity" (Abrahám 2012: 126).

The evolution of Slovak society during the period of transition reflects the contending political traditions, frequent changes in official political values (both before and after 1989), the splitting of social structures and both continuity and disruption within civic society. Following, and probably because of, four decades of indoctrination, citizens have still not been able to build up a new hierarchy of values which is important for their everyday life and professional careers. Certainly in the 1990s the communist ideology was not dead, it simply changed in its manifestations. It remained part of the social consciousness, convictions and behaviour of average citizens and of a great number of political representatives in Slovakia. In Slovakia, as in other post-communist countries, there was that "wall in men's heads" first ascribed to the citizens of the former East Germany. No matter how enthusiastically the people welcomed the fall of communism in the streets, they were not disposed to total rejection of the socialist ethos.

Therefore, a closer look to symbols, rituals, myths as well as to the stories told about a nation, memories, traditions, notions, social practices and cultural expressions that shape the respective discourses and imprint processes of national identity reconstruction, seems essential to allow for a better understanding of the interference of national and European identities that plays an important role in the European integration and enlargement process. A closer look to these phenomena opens up a perspective which also includes the elementary semantics by which a society develops its self-image and its conception of political meaning. Against this background, the study of the symbolic representation of the new/renewed states allows for a closer look on the symbolic space of politics which frames policy-making processes and political decisions.

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Monuments and the New Morality of Memory. Transformations of the landscape of public memory in Vienna and beyond

Heidemarie Uhl

Abstract: *The disintegration of the post-war myths and the development of the memory of Holocaust as a central point of reference in a new memorial culture showed the existing landscape of monuments in a new light. The resurgence of interest in monuments in public discourse as well as in contemporary art is a phenomenon of the 1980s. Our findings corresponded to the generally low esteem that looking to the past had in modern society, which was characterised by progress-led optimism and certainty in the future. Monuments and other markers in public space (e.g. street names) represent the social order of this knowledge of the past because they link levels of discourse with social relationships of power.*

Keywords: ***monuments, memory, public memory, Vienna, post-war myths***

Robert Musil's well-known dictum that there is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument (Musil 2004: 63) needs to be qualified. Since the 1980s monuments have been attracting renewed attention, there has been a new sensitisation for the identity-generating intention inherent in these objects in public spaces. Monuments have become socially visible in new forms because they are obviously no longer in harmony with the memorial needs of a new generation. The disintegration of the post-war myths and the development of the memory of Holocaust as a central point of reference in a new memorial culture showed the existing landscape of monuments in a new light. Looked at from the end of the twentieth century, "honouring or being annoyed" (Ekkehard/Schmirber 1989: 7), the criticism of empty spaces, and the lack of any sign of remembrance for the victims of the Shoah on the one hand, and the problematic statements made by existing monuments (especially war memorials) on the other, were the essential stimulus for the memorial initiatives of the "generation of memory" (Winter 2001: 5–16).

In the meantime the markers of a new memorial culture for the victims of the Holocaust have conquered central spaces in European cities (and further afield) (Young 1994). These projects were among the most important tasks of urban cultural politics, and their location and design were central issues of the political controversies and the media conflicts that lasted for months and sometimes years (for more see Leggewie/Meyer 2005; Kirsch 2003). More than anything, the question of

appropriate remembrance of "Auschwitz as a rupture in civilisation" (Diner 1988), the negative crux of modernity, became a challenge for art (Fenz 2002). The resurgence of interest in monuments in public discourse as well as in contemporary art is a phenomenon of the 1980s. Only a few years previously the "end of monuments" had been proclaimed. They were regarded as anachronistic, put in place by the authorities, as instruments of political propaganda, and completely discredited by the enormous flood of monuments during National Socialism (cf. Hubertus 1993: 10; Steiner 1989: 33). Their "social energy" (for more see Greenblatt 2000) appeared to be exhausted, their contemporary relevance only marginal or restricted to particular group traditions and their rituals (memorial ceremonies, wreath-laying). Altogether it seemed that monuments could only be credited with historical value.

These findings corresponded to the generally low esteem that looking to the past had in modern society, which was characterised by progress-led optimism and certainty in the future. However, with the "exhaustion of utopian energies" (see Habermas 1985) in the 1980s, memory was to crystallise out as the new pathos formula for the waning twentieth century. The amnesia of a future-oriented modernity was replaced by a new historicism, an "obsession with the past" (Huyssen 1994: 11), which once again shifted the focus of social and scientific interest onto the dimension of history, though now under the sign of postmodernity.

The meteoric career of "memory" as a new lead concept in the humanities and social and cultural sciences lends insight into the fascination of this perspective. During this phase key academic texts were published that emphasised the relevance of the past for the "imagined community" (Anderson 1988) of the nation. If Eric Hobsbawm depicts the practice of the "invention of tradition" as a genuinely modern phenomenon from which the young nation states of the nineteenth century derived their legitimacy and not as the antithesis of modernity (see Hobsbawm 1998; Hosbawm/Ranger 1984), and if Pierre Nora, with his pioneering project of France's "Lieux de mémoire" (Nora 1984–1992), presents his new form of national history "by means of analysing everything that is characteristic for a country" (Nora 1990: 10), then all this is taking place on the basis of a new understanding of memory as the expression of the collective identity of a society. Monuments, rituals, and anniversaries, even buildings, museums, and sporting events (such as the Tour de France) etc. are regarded and analysed as items in the inventory of the nation's symbolic household (see Uhl 2010).

For the purposes of the question we are posing, Jan Assmann undertook the decisive focusing of memory on the entanglement of cultural formation, social function, and moral dimension in his 1988 essay "Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität (Collective Memory and Cultural Identity)". The term "cultural memory", introduced by Aleida and Jan Assmann, describes the persistence of

cultural formations, institutionalisation, and ritualisation ("maintenance") as being a precondition for handing down bodies of knowledge from generation to generation. Consequently memorial culture is a social phenomenon which is subject to a continuous process of transformation. Potential for conflict is inherent here since the definition of the symbolic household of culture is simultaneously dealt with as being the value and normative system of a society. Assmann makes explicit reference to Maurice Halbwachs when he postulates that memory is always reconstructed from a "frame of reference in the present" and involved in processes of constructing current identity. The image of the past is dynamic: specific historical events and people become points of reference for "our" history while others vanish into forgetfulness. "A society becomes visible in its cultural tradition – for itself and for others. Which past it becomes visible in, and the value perspective it allows to emerge from its identity-generating appropriations, says something about what it is and what it is driving at," summarises Jan Assmann (1988). Andreas Huyssen prefixes his consideration of the renaissance of monuments in postmodernity with a similar postulate, "The way in which we remember determines how we are in the present (…) (we) need the past to construct and anchor our identity and to provide instruction for our conception of the future" (Huyssen 1994: 9).

The category of the monument comes back into play against a background of the interplay of memory and society: as a form of representing cultural memory – to use Aleida and Jan Assmann's terminology – it provides information about the collective's prevailing historical points of reference. In a groundbreaking essay from 1979 Reinhart Koselleck called war memorials "identity formation for the survivors" (Koselleck 1979). They "say more about the time in which they were erected than about the past to which they refer" (Spielmann 1989: 112). Thus monuments provide insight into "hot memory" and therefore into the current "social frame of reference" (see Halbwachs 1985; on "hot memory" see Maier 2002) by which every society reconstructs it´s past.

From this perspective the resurgent social, scientific, and artistic interest in monuments as a category becomes understandable: a field of action is connected with this symbol of memory in public spaces, one which intertwines society, politics, and aesthetics into a paradigmatic form. Monuments are a particularly instructive form of expressing cultural memory because, more than any other medium, they provide insight into the social or socio-political relationships of power underlying their construction.

If memory is defined a socially communicated knowledge about the past (Assmann 1988: 9), this knowledge is neither predetermined nor homogenous, but generated within a *contested space*. A nation circulates a multitude of different narrations about the past within society's parameters of communication. This is

especially true when they concerns disputed, traumatic, referential events of national history. In that case the "negotiations" concerning society's memory coalesce into controversial debates and, not infrequently, to historical-political "scandals". During these confrontations – and that is what the controversy is about – the issues is also always about a binding, normative interpretation of a *common* past (see Marchart 2005).

Monuments and other markers in public space (e.g. street names) represent the social order of this knowledge of the past because they link levels of discourse with social relationships of power.[1] They are also always indicators for struggle and the power of interpretation: the monument landscape of a place, a city, gives insight into the resources of power with which the various interpretations of the past are equipped. Which groups are able to enforce their view of the past so as to make it appear normative and binding? How are contrary or marginalised positions expressed and which groups remain unrepresented?

These socially referential functions are also part of the "dispute value" of monuments:[2] By being a constructed object in public space – on a plot of land that is not in private ownership, but is public property – a monument becomes an indicator for the extent of the social or political support its proponents have received. A large number of layers of meaning determine its symbolic location in social space: the extent of its debt to the view of history that is intended to be expressed in a monument. Thus its relevance can most clearly be seen in the public resources utilised (including the associated artistic aspirations) and the groups responsible: did public authorities participate in the project – municipal, provincial, federal – or was it the initiative of specific groups such as parties or associations? Location is also crucial: is it located at a central urban site or at the periphery, in both a literal and metaphorical sense?[3] In this way monuments mediate "hierarchies of memory" (Nora 1994: 24), they provide information about interpretive hegemonies, but also about marginalisation and "places of silence".

[1] On the links between a semantic analysis of national conceptions and the symbolic practices of the memorial movements see Tacke, Charlotte. *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert.* Göttingen, 1995 (= Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 108).

[2] In relation to monuments this term was introduced by Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper. See Dolff-Bonekämper, Gabi. Gegenwartswerte. Für eine Erneuerung von Alois Riegls Denkmalwerttheorie. In DENKmalWERTE. Beiträge zur Theorie und Aktualität der Denkmalpflege. Georg Mörsch zum 70. Geburtstag. (ed.). by Hans-Rudolf Meier / Ingrid Scheurmann, Berlin/München, 2010, p. 27–40.

[3] This can be seen, e.g. in the debate over Alfred Hrdlicka's "Mahnmal gegen Krieg und Faschismus" located in Albertinaplatz in Vienna and carried out in the main – at least on the suface – on the question of siting. Cf. Jenni, Ulrike (ed.). Alfred Hrdlicka. Mahnmal gegen Krieg und Faschismus. vol. 2. Documentation (Das Mahnmal im Spiegel der Presse), Vienna, 1992.

However the interpretations of history and the ascriptions of meaning that monuments bring together cannot be permanently inscribed when it is constructed. Monuments are integrated into complex processes of ascription which are the result of a dynamic derived from the relationships of tension which arise between synchronous competing or counter narrations on the one hand, and from diachronic shifts of contexts in memorial culture or the general transformation of patterns of thought about the past on the other. In this respect monuments cannot be understood as singular objects, but as junctions of a multiple-voice memorial space.

As mentioned above, the 1980s saw the breakdown of European post-war myths and the Holocaust acquiring a new meaning as a point of reference for a "negative memory" as the background for monument initiatives and, equally, monument critiques. In many respects these "new memorial culture" projects are a reaction to monuments evincing "false mourning" (see Dahmer 1984: 58) most notably war memorials which gave a positive meaning to service in the German armed forces in the Second World War (see Uhl 2004 and Gärtner/Rosenberger 1991). Perhaps the best known example of achieving distance by means of erecting a counter-monument is Alfred Hrdlicka's "antifascist monument" sited at Hamburger Dammtordamm (1985/86) immediately in front of the war memorial to the 76th Infantry Regiment which was erected in 1936 (see Schubert 1989).

However, it is the widespread and general absence – to date – of markers to the memory of the victims of National Socialism – Jews, Roma and Sinti, Jehovah's Witnesses, the disabled, homosexual, so-called "asocials" that now, more than anything else, becomes the motor of civil society monument initiatives with projects which are often taken up by public authorities. The transformation of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial from a private memorial initiative to one to be undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole is symptomatic here (Leggewie/Meyer 2005). In "Western" countries the renewed interest in "honouring or being annoyed" was principally marked by the building of new monuments. In Eastern Europe after 1989, the end of the communist dictatorships was expressed by toppling and removing the symbols of the power that they had overcome. Iconoclasm is characteristic for a fractured political system (see Speitkamp 1997), storming the symbols of those in power in public space becomes – especially when broadcast by the media – a catalyst and a public signal of the collapse of power structures. In the post-revolutionary phase there were negotiations at communal, regional, or state level about the retention, partial modification (such as the removal of the red star from partisan memorials), or demolition (sometimes in the form of transferring the statues to a monument park) of monuments which provide information about

the processes of inclusion and exclusion of historical points of reference during processes of social transformation.[4]

Iconoclasm is symptomatic of critical, revolutionary phases in which there is a correlation of political and symbolic power. However, for long-term transformations of subtle, almost unnoticeable processes of change are characteristic: a slow fading of the political charge of memorialisation, the formal language of aesthetic presentation becoming obsolete, and loss of the social energy necessary for the building of monuments. It is because of the tendencies inherent in these long-term, discrete processes that monuments are pushed into "invisibility" on the periphery of social memorial culture, often despite their monumentality or prominent location. But they become meaningful symbols of memory in this case too – as indicators of the cooling of memorial information, of the transition of the sites of memory as they shift from active social remembering to the archive of "stored memory".[5] The "invisibility" of nineteenth century monuments which, when they were built, were the expression of the obsession of the modern nation state for being legitimated by history, is an example of this. Today often their meaning is unreadable for us – the monuments on the Vienna Ring are a good example: despite their presence at central locations within the urban space, the context and intention from which they drew their meaning has fallen prey to cultural forgetting. The historically and politically competitive relationship between the different forms of liberalism, German nationalism, and Habsburg patriotism which, since the mid-nineteenth century, have left their mark on this monument park of Viennese political and social elite, can now only be decoded with the help of expert academic literature (Kristan 1998).

The monument to Karl Lueger, erected in 1926, belongs among the category of Viennese Ring monuments that continue to intrude on our present. They are still part of "hot history" and, in their wider context, can still be regarded as connected to our contemporary horizon. The Lueger monument has repeatedly provided fuel for criticism and controversy: the being remembered in honour not only applies to the success of the local politician, it naturally includes the populist anti-Semitic aspect too. The initiative to redesign the Lueger monument as a memorial against

[4] See e.g. Hofmann, Birgit u. a. (eds). *Diktaturüberwindung in Europa: Neue nationale und transnationale Perspektiven.* Heidelberg, 2010. Sapper, Manfred – Weichsel, Volker (eds). *Geschichtspolitik und Gegenerinnerung. Krieg, Gewalt und Trauma im Osten Europas.* Berlin, 2008 (= Osteuropa 58/2008/6). This can be seen most clearly in the way the physical symbols of the GDR in public spaces in Berlin after 1989 were dealt with. See Jordan, Jennifer. *Structures of Memory: Understanding Urban Change in* **Berlin** *and Beyond*. Stanford, 2006. Till, Karen, E. *The New Berlin. Memory, Politics, Place.* Minneapolis, 2005. Huyssen, Andreas. After the War: Berlin as Palimpsest. In Huyssen, Andreas. *Present Pasts. Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory.* Stanford, 2003, p. 72–84.

[5] On the difference between functional and stored memory see Assmann 1999, 134ff. Assmann, Aleida. *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses.* Munich, 1999.

racism and anti-Semitism was started by the students and teaching staff of the University of Applies Arts in Vienna[6] and offers an exemplary insight into the political, cultural, moral and aesthetic self-understanding of the "generation of memory" that underpins this new memorial culture. The criticism of the nonchalance with which a "legendary" Lord Mayor and his pioneering role in the functionalisation of anti-Semitism for political ends (see Boyer 2010) is still looked up to, connects up with a sensitivity to symbols which are supposed to express "our" identity, our history. In this respect the engagement is also sustained by a "need for identity" – an identification which applies to a city that has learned from history and therefore should be capable of expressing its position against racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia in its political symbolism.

However, the project does not only operate in the areas of memorial culture and the politics of history, but also in the sphere of art. It thus enables insight into "state of the art" projects in public space. The competition does not talk of re-making but quite decisively about a "re-design of the Lueger statue into a monument against anti-Semitism and racism in Austria".[7] Thus the intention is not to counteract the formulaic pathos of the nineteenth century (the Lueger monument is part of this tradition) with the formulaic pathos of iconoclasm or counter monument. In fact, the results of the competition show a conscious repudiation of simplistic gestures: Klemens Wihlidal's design foresees that the statue and part of the pedestal be tilted out of alignment by 3.5 degrees. The design, the jury stated, expresses "the uncertainty of the City of Vienna in dealing with Karl Lueger" and the "problematic way the City of Vienna deals with its anti-Semitic past".[8]

The design operates by means of a discreet, calm, and simultaneously fundamental intervention that expresses what is not "upright" about this monument, that it is a historical symbol out of line. It is not correction, over-writing, or contrasting by mean of counter-narration that is intended here, but rather a reflections on how to deal with the problematic remnants of past memorial culture.

That means that this project – whether or not it is actually realised – becomes a sign of a reflexive stance that is becoming increasingly observable: by taking leave of "master narratives", the pluralisation of narratives has also undermined the clear dichotomy of "honouring or being annoyed". In postmodern thought the concept of "history" as a whole stands on shaky ground and, with knowledge of

[6] Handbuch zur Umgestaltung des Lueger-Denkmals, ed. Arbeitskreis zur Umgestaltung des Lueger-Denkmals in ein Mahnmal gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus, Wien 2011.

[7] Ausschreibung zur Umgestaltung des Lueger-Denkmals in ein Mahnmal gegen Antisemitismus und Rassismus in Österreich. http://luegerplatz.com/ausschreibung.html.

[8] Quoted from Lueger-Denkmal soll gekippt werden. The winner of the competition to re-design the Luger monument proposes to give it a permanent tilt. http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20100512_OTS0126/lueger-denkmal-soll-gekippt-werden.

contingency and being time bound, previous certainties, including one's own view of the past, have been called into question (see Conrad/Kessel 1994a; Conrad/Kessel 1994b).

The redesign of the Lueger monument has not yet been realised. However, in 2012 the "Dr. Karl Lueger Ring" was renamed in "University Ring". Thus, the city of Vienna reacted to criticism, especially of the University of Vienna, which perceived its address – since 1934 Dr. Karl Lueger Ring 1 – increasingly problematic.[9] The controversial discussions on the position of Karl Lueger in the public space of Vienna are an exemplary case study of the new morality of memory which shows that even on the basis of "uncertain history" (see Goertz 2001) historical-political interventions are both possible and necessary and even more: against the background of lost certainties it has become necessary to redefine memory as a political project once again.

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DISCUSSION

Blackmail in Brussels? A Game-theoretical Epilogue to the Euro "Rescue" Summit

Andreas Haaker

Abstract: *Was the German Chancellor open to blackmail at the Euro "Rescue" Summit on 28/29 June? Despite saying that she would not guarantee any further debts "as long as I live", she nevertheless agreed to bank funding measures. What gave rise to this potential for blackmail? This paper analyses the negotiation process with the aid of simple game-theoretical models and comes to the conclusion that a "better" result (Nash equilibrium) would have been possible. The expectations of the negotiating partners, which were largely influenced by the domestic political situation in Germany, played a decisive role. However, had game theory been applied, it would have been possible to recognize this even before the negotiations began.*

Keywords: ***game theory, focal point effect, Euro rescue, negotiating strategy, bank aid***

Introduction

An epilogue provides the conclusion to a classical drama. This is how the present case would have appeared to an outsider: After the German Chancellor, *Angela Merkel,* despite giving previous commitments in the form of clear demarcation lines (no collectivization of debts "as long as I live"; Steingart 2012), seemingly consented not only to a growth package at the Euro Rescue summit in Brussels on 28 and 29 June 2012 but also, and above all, to direct support from banks via the ESM (*European Stability Mechanism)*[1], there was talk of a "political blackmail manoeuvre" (Steltzner 2012) carried out by the Italian Prime Minister (*Mario Monti*) and the Spanish Prime Minister (*Mariano Rajoy*).[2] In the eyes of the general public, the expected "*No!"* to further risk collectivization became quasi a "*Well, yes and no"*. A further step was taken towards extending liability, which was especially welcomed by the Anglo-Saxon media (see e.g. Economist 2012b).

[1] On the further resolutions cf. EURO AREA SUMMIT STATEMENT, Brussels, 29 June 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf).

[2] On the resolutions cf. *FAZ* (2012). The "Wish List" which was presented to the Federal Chancellor admittedly contained quite a lot more besides. Cf. *Rompuy* (2012).

Blackmail presupposes a certain openness to being blackmailed. In this paper the attested potential for blackmail will be analysed in terms of game theory. The latter provides us with a formal-analytical economic "language, which can help us to analyse such situations" (Holler/Illing 2006: 1). Therewith, it will also be shown how a well-understood application of game theory can contribute to the analysis of politically relevant economic questions, without wishing to fulfill the excessive demands involved in reproducing reality directly (Rubinstein 1991).

Game-theoretical Analysis of the Alleged Blackmailing Potential

By announcing that a (continued) collectivization of debts would be strictly refused, Eurobonds and a joint protection scheme should (for the time being) have been ruled out as the outcome of negotiations at the current summit. With this announcement the *German Chancellor* effectively burnt all her bridges behind her. Looked at in game-theoretical terms, such decisions became dominated strategies due to the future political costs which, for the *German Chancellor*, would have been hardly bearable were she to have given her consent. When she issued her pronouncements, however, *Merkel* apparently did not mean direct bank aid via the so-called ESM bailout fund, to which she is said to have given her consent in the end.

The drama was played out against the following background: On the day following the summit resolution, and just before the summer recess, the *German Chancellor* was compelled to produce a resolution concerning the so-called growth package in order to obtain the agreement of the *SPD* (*Social Democratic Party*) and the *Green Party* to the ESM and fiscal package. This is something that the negotiating partners or the political adversaries (*southern Europeans*) must have been aware of (Böll et al. 2012: 20–24). Despite being initially sceptical, she appropriated the demand for a growth package, which can be traced back to the French President *Francois Hollande*, as her own (Steltzner 2012). For this reason, the *German Chancellor* preferred the enactment of the so-called growth package without further aid measures (game strategy: "growth"), and absolutely refused direct bank aid by means of bail outs without corresponding constraints being placed on governments (game strategy: "bank aid"). In order to secure the agreement of the *SPD* and the *Green Party* in the German Parliament the next day, *Merkel* preferred a combination of "growth and bank aid" to a situation in which the growth measures would not be passed. Thus, with regard to the summit decisions, she had the following preferences: "growth" > "bank aid and growth" > "no decision" > (only) "bank aid". This is something that the adversaries must also have known (and *Merkel* knew that they knew too etc: "*common knowledge"*).

For their part, the *southern Europeans* presumably preferred the passing of a combination of growth measures and bank aid, and preferred direct bank aid

to the growth package. The hopes of getting interest rate cuts in relation to their own government bonds without having to go through a self-imposed programme of reforms may have been decisive here (Berschens et al. 2012; Berschens 2012). Politically speaking, the worst result for them would have been to come to no decision, which is why the following preferences for the *southern Europeans* can be assumed: "bank aid and growth" > "bank aid" > "growth" > "no decision".

Table 1 contrasts the assumptive advantage, in each case, for *Merkel* and the *southern Europeans*. The following game matrix shows the "payoffs" which are dependent on the voting or acceptance strategies of both players. These are, of course, not only dependent on the player's own voting strategy, but also on that of the adversary. Each field, therefore, shows a possible combination of voting strategies for both players ("growth" / "growth", "growth" / "bank aid", "growth" / "bank aid and growth", "bank aid" / "growth", "bank aid" / "bank aid", "bank aid" / "bank aid and growth", "bank aid and growth" / "growth", "bank aid and growth" / "bank aid", "bank aid and growth" / "bank aid and growth"), in which the advantage for *Merkel* is depicted in the bottom left corner (south-west) and that of the *southern Europeans* in the top right corner (north-east). For example, if *Merkel* votes for bank aid, and the *southern Europeans* also vote for bank aid, then *Merkel* has an advantage of (-1), while the *southern Europeans* obtain an advantage of 2.

If there is no decision because the *southern Europeans* insist on "bank aid and growth measures", while *Merkel* only votes for "growth", a zero advantage can be assumed. On the other hand, if both players agree on "growth", then *Merkel* has an advantage of 2 and the *southern Europeans* have an advantage of 1. In the event of bank aid being chosen, *Merkel* has an advantage of (-1) and the *southern Europeans* 2, and with a combination of bank aid and growth package *Merkel* receives an advantage of 1, while the *southern Europeans* have a payoff of 3 (cf. *Table 1*). The assumptive advantage, as can be expected, only relates to the participants in the game, and may not be equated with the advantage of the individual national economies, or of Europe as a whole.

Table 1: Negotiating Situation at the "Rescue Summit"

		Southern Europeans					
		Growth		Bank Aid		Bank Aid + Growth	
Merkel	Growth		1		0		0
		2		0		0	
	Bank Aid		0		2		0
		0		-1		0	
	Bank Aid + Growth		0		0		3
		0		0		1	

Source: Author

Since *Merkel's* assent to pure "bank aid" is dominated by the other voting eventualities (comparison to "Growth": 2 > 0, 0 > -1, 0 = 0), this "strategy" can be deleted (cf. *Table 2*).

Figure 2: Deletion of Dominated Approval Strategies

		Southern Europeans					
		Growth		Bank Aid		Bank Aid + Growth	
Merkel	Growth		1		0		0
		2		0		0	
	Bank Aid		0		2		0
		0		-1		0	
	Bank Aid + Growth		0		0		3
		0		0		1	

Source: Author

After eliminating this "bank aid" dominated strategy, the consent to bank aid, also from the *southern Europeans'* perspective, is dominated by the decision strategies relating to "growth" and to the combination of "bank aid and growth", whereby the consent to "bank aid" can be excluded from further examination (cf. the successive elimination of dominated strategies in Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 2009: 102; Gintis 2009: 52). Consequently, in the remaining game it is only possible to negotiate with regard to "growth" or "bank aid and growth" (*Table 3*).

Table 3: Negotiating Situation after Elimination of the Dominated Strategies

		Southern Europeans			
		Growth		Bank Aid + Growth	
Merkel	Growth		1		0
		2		0	
	Bank Aid + Growth		0		3
		0		1	

Source: Author

From now on, if the respective negotiating partner votes for growth, it is also advantageous to vote for that (*Merkel*: 2 instead of 0; *southern Europeans*: 1 instead of 0). On the other hand, if the respective negotiating partner votes for "bank aid and growth", it is equally optimal to agree to this strategy (*Merkel*: 1 instead of 0;

southern Europeans: 3 instead of 0). In other words, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which no single player can do better by unilaterally deviating from the respective equilibrium strategy.

In the case of multiple Nash equilibria, however, mathematics – when applying pure strategies – offers no direct answer to the question of which of the two negotiating equilibria will occur (Myerson 1992: 113): "The answer is not in the matrix. The question is nicely formulated in the matrix, the answer is not" (Schelling 2010: 33). Since economists are not happy to settle with this, they prefer unequivocally solvable modelling (e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma), even though several possible solutions (multiple Nash equilibria) are an incontrovertible fact of real life (Myerson 2009: 111). Yet, according to Schellings (1960 [1980]: 57) Focal Point Effect, a certain equilibrium should emerge. For this to occur, it is sufficient that there is a reason to believe that the other person will play one of these equilibrium strategies, which he will only do if he assumes that the other person will do the same (Myerson 2009: 111). In other words, which Nash equilibrium will be chosen depends on one's self-fulfilling expectations. For this it is only necessary for a solution to be salient, for whatever reason (Kirchgässner 2008: 225).

In this regard, the certainty that *Merkel* had to produce a resolution in favour of growth in order to get the consent of the SPD and the Green Party in the Bundestag the next day, and that she did not explicitly rule out direct bank aid may well have served as a "*focal arbitrator"* (Myerson 1992: 111), which brought about the "playing" of the consent to the combination of growth measures and direct bank aid – presumably at the expense of the German taxpayer. Furthermore, *Mario Monti* in particular was under not inconsiderable pressure to succeed (Economist 2012), which *Merkel* must have been aware of. Correspondingly, he even conjectured that the Euro could "go to hell".

In the meantime, the German Federal Constitutional Court had, so to speak, already given a "nudge" towards the other equilibrium (Economist 2012a). Since *Merkel* had earlier committed herself (or allowed herself to be committed) to the growth package, the *southern Europeans* may well have assumed that this would be decided sooner or later, even if no result had initially been achieved.

Concluding Remark

As far as the *German Chancellor* is concerned, the "bad" equilibrium "bank aid and growth" was played at the summit (*Merkel*: 1 instead of 2; *southern Europeans*: 3 instead of 1)[3]. The persistent pressure from the rest of Europe and overseas must have been enormous (Böll et al. 2012: 20, further Sinn 2012). However, if we look at the result of the negotiations in game-theoretical terms, it was not compulsive, since it would also have been possible for *Merkel* to have reached a "good" equilibrium. The point here is that if game theory had been applied, this fact could have been recognized even before the commencement of the negotiations.

As a player, *Merkel* – insofar as she really wanted and was able to – could have chosen a different time schedule, categorically rejected measures such as direct bank aid via the ESM, or better utilized the "nudge" provided by the *German Federal Constitutional Court*. Then it may indeed have been possible to reach another focal point (only growth package), and to issue a clear *"No!"* instead of the *"Well, yes and no"* to further "solidarization" of the debts and risks. The "*Well, yes and no"* was not, on its own, a result of the game played in Brussels, for "it is only part of a larger game. There is always a larger game" (Dixit/Nalebuff 2010: 28). In this larger game, the pre-conditions had already been laid for the focal point which was reached, although the other equilibrium would also have been possible. "Moral: If you don't like the game you are playing, look for the larger game" (Dixit/Nalebuff 2010: 334). Before the next "rescue summit game" gets underway, attention should be paid to the situation of the larger game and influence exerted accordingly, in order for *Merkel* (and thus for Germany and Europe as a whole) to reach a "good" negotiating equilibrium. By signalling that she might give way, despite having previously issued relatively clear demarcation lines, *Merkel* brought about a situation which, on the one hand was certainly not helpful. On the other hand, once the signal had been given, the internal political pressure favouring a conservative "rescue policy" undoubtedly increased. After the event, each side managed to pass the end result off as a victory (Busse 2012), although this could well be a Pyrrhic victory for all those involved: "Another victory like that and we are lost."

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[3] The assumptive results are to be interpreted as individual utility values for the game players and may not be understood as advantages for the individual national economies or for Europe as a whole. The benefit here would presumably be evaluated differently and would comprise the external effects on "third players" outside the game calculus.

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Humanitarianism and development assistance as a weapon of war Transformation of civil-military cooperation and armed forces as agents of development

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Abstract: *The academic interest in non-combat activities of armed forces, their character, goals and implementation is motivated by intensive civil-military international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both cases – and few others from the 1990s – have been instrumental in gaining new civil-military experience and roles of military forces. There is a new approach emerging for non-combat deployment of armed forces, when armies carry out projects and activities, which were traditionally in the portfolio of non-governmental organizations and development agencies. In reality we can observe more and more often, that the relation between civilian and military bodies goes beyond the usual understanding of civil-military cooperation. The aim of the article is to discuss and analyse the transformation of civil-military cooperation and armed forces as agents of development. The structure of our research has a logic coming from the fact of those who have been engaged in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, or in reconstruction, stabilization and humanitarian operations and in the war on terror respectively. Our analysis is divided into four sections. The first section frames our research introducing the basic concepts and the contemporary academic, policy and military discussion about civil-military cooperation and non-combat roles of military forces. The second section introduces the terminology which is used for non-combat operations of military forces. The third section researches the evolution of the idea about interdependence between security and development. In the last, fourth, part the contemporary civil-military cooperation in the field is analysed.*

Keywords: ***humanitarianism, development assistance, civil-military cooperation, reconstruction, stabilization, CIMIC, NGOs***

In the middle of December 1998 the British army under the mandate of the Desert Fox operation bombed for four days Iraqi targets. The goal of the bombardment was to force the country to open the door for the UN inspectors to screen the Iraqi's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program. The sending of UN inspectors and verification of the weapons program has been part of a wider international approach to Iraq and has been based on the UN Security Council Resolution number 687. This resolution asked Iraq to remove and destroy all chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. This had been set up as the condition for removing the oil export embargo and other sanctions imposed against the country after 1991.

A few years later the engagement of the international community in Iraq rapidly changed. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been established in the country, which planned to assist with stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. Since 2006, one of the PRTs has been led by Italy. The Italian PRT was deployed in Nasiriya. It coordinated the activities of donor community and played an important role in reconstruction of social and economic life in the province. The Italian PRT built, among others, the complex system of leisure and sports facilities for children, helped build new playgrounds and carried out sports activities for local teenagers. PRTs of other countries in Iraq carried out many similar tasks as well as other civilian activities such as rebuilding schools, roads and bridges, repairing agriculture machinery, building new dams and irrigation systems and distributing humanitarian aid and supplies from non-governmental organizations (An interview with Petr Voznica, former Czech ambassador to Iraq, April 2011).

Both cases show that military forces can carry out very different activities. On the one hand they are deployed in combat operations and fight with the enemy, on the other hand they carry out many non-military activities such as rebuilding of infrastructure and social life. Both cases give us an incomplete picture of non-combat activities which are carried out by military forces, but they clearly show that combat operations and the defeat of an enemy is only one of the armed forces' contemporary roles. The armed forces in today's world fulfill many civilian roles at home as well as abroad and many of these operations are carried out in war zones or in post-conflict environment. The academic interest in non-combat activities of armed forces, their character, goals and implementation is motivated by intensive civil-military international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both cases – and few others from the 1990s (Kosovo for example) – have been instrumental in gaining new civil-military experience and roles of military forces.

We believe that despite armies having carried out non-combat activities for decades, there is a principal transformation in the last years. There is a new approach emerging for non-combat deployment of armed forces, when armies carry out projects and activities, which were traditionally in the portfolio of non-governmental organizations and development agencies. In reality we can observe more and more often, that the relation between civilian and military bodies goes beyond the usual understanding of civil-military cooperation. The normal, usual understanding

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of civil-military cooperation assumes *cooperation* not *exchange* of activities. The transformation of strategic environment and the greater number of complex multidimensional operations make it clear that the role of the armed forces goes far beyond collaboration with civilians or protection of civilian bodies and experts. It is more and more clear that it is not possible to divide civilian and military sectors and the activities of military force is a key factor for implementation of civilian projects. What is really unclear is the situation in the humanitarian and development space. The humanitarian and development projects are done by civilian as well as military bodies, mainly on the bases of their ability to enter the area or ample resources. Furthermore, it seems that development assistance and other civil non-combat projects became weapons of war.

The proposed issue is interesting from four points of view: Firstly, it is the fundamental transformation in the roles of the armies as well as of civil-military relations; secondly, this issue is on the front burner in academic, political as well as military discussions about doctrinal documents and is important concerning international engagement and lessons learned from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan; thirdly, civil-military cooperation will have decisive influence on armed forces' capabilities in all future operations and last but not least it is fast changing issue, where we lack a satisfactory conception, or where the contemporary conception of civil-military cooperation does not correspond to the situation in the field.

Analyzing non-combat activities of military forces in combat operations: attention should be firstly paid to causes of non-combat deployment of armies in war zones and to the reason for civil-military cooperation transformation, secondly, to the consequences of this change. Concerning the causes, we should ask why and how the transformation of civil-military cooperation emerged. Concerning the consequences, the change of doctrinal documents, of the organization and training of military forces and last but not least the thinking of commanders and their men should be analyzed. In this article the causes will be researched. The research of consequences is important and interesting as well but it needs much more sociological data than we have now. The research of consequences thus needs more time to be done.

Researching the causes of non-combat deployment of military forces in war zones and the transformation of civil-military cooperation we are interested in two questions: Why and how are armies used for non-combat activities in war zones. We suppose that there are two reasons why this has been happening:

- firstly, the conflict management approach of donor community as well as the idea about interdependence between security and development underwent a deep change,

- secondly, the transformation of strategic environment continued so far, that it is clear that military capabilities are not enough to reach military goals and to defeat the enemy, and humanitarian and development assistance gained strategic value.

This presented analysis will be divided into four sections. The first section frames our research introducing the basic concepts and the contemporary academic, policy and military discussion about civil-military cooperation and non-combat roles of military forces. The second section introduces the terminology which is used for non-combat operations of military forces. It will also show how the terminology evolved and how is used. The third section will research the evolution of the idea about interdependence between security and development. It will show that the idea that dominated in the last decade is that development and security are only two sides of the same coin and support of the development is the way how to reach sustainable security. This influences not only evolution of new conflict management approaches, but also the interconnection of development and security instruments (this process can be demonstrated by the evolution of Security Sector Reform). The idea that security and development are only two sides of one coin has been the first step for using development projects as a weapon of war and a way how to protect strategic interests. In the last, fourth, part the contemporary civil-military cooperation in the field is analyzed. We will research the civil-military cooperation during the counterinsurgency operations and have a look at the role of CIMIC in the strategy of winning hearts and minds. It will be shown that CIMIC has a very different meaning under counterinsurgency situations and later on within so-called comprehensive and stabilization operations. In these operations CIMIC is only part of the reality; within comprehensive and stabilization operations armies fully developed and carried out non-combat activities done usually by the development agencies and NGOs. It will also be demonstrated in the case of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan what it means when armed forces change into the development agents. We suppose that the Kosovo case very much contributed to the transformation of CIMIC because multinational brigades were very successful in carrying out civilian projects and their non-combat activities had very positive effects and high acknowledgment from local population (see Etchemendy 2010). We think that in the Kosovo case the practice jumped over the theory and doctrinal documents related to humanitarian and developmental activities of military forces.

Analyzing these issues it needs also to be said, that there are at least two limitations for our research: cultural-social context and our academic background. Concerning cultural-social context, it is necessary to say, that our research comes from European and North-American tradition and experience. Many studies showed that there are big territorial and national differences in civil-military relations (see USAID 1998: 11–17; Mockaitis 2004; Etchemendy 2010) and thus any conclusions

can't be generalized. Despite this limitation it is clear that the structure of our research has a logic coming from the fact of those who have been engaged in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, or in reconstruction, stabilization and humanitarian operations and in the war on terror respectively. As mentioned above, the academic context of the present research is not easy as well. The analysis of non-combat activities of military forces is located among political science, international relations, and development studies and last but not least sociology of armed forces. Each of these disciplines prefers different research issues and approaches. This results in a different conception of the research and expectations we get from the analysis (compare Brzoska 2003: 3–32; Brzoska 2008). The academic background of this article mainly comes from political science and international relations.

Debates about civil-military relations, civil-military cooperation and non-combat activities of military forces

Military personnel carried out the non-combat activities for decades at home as well as abroad. The US army for example helped eradicate the malaria in Panama, and cholera, hunger and illiteracy in Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua (Huntington 1993: 6). After the Americans defeated Spain in the Philippines in 1899, the US army set up the military government, judicial system and local administration and organized the first elections. The US soldiers also worked as temporary teachers in rural schools. Between 1889 and 1914 the US navy replaced local governments in some Caribbean countries (USJFCOM 2010a: 1–4). Different examples show the activities of armed forces in Latin American and Asian countries. Here militaries among others own companies and support business. In Argentina and Brazil, for example, the military opened the first extractive companies and steel industry factories. In Cuba, the army owns and operates touristic and agricultural facilities as well as runs domestic economic modernization (Mani 2011; Mora 2004). The army in Sri Lanka runs hotels, shops and a company selling flight tickets (Economist June 2, 2011). In Indonesia the military is the only actor, who is able to offer any medical assistance and education in remote areas (Sidewell 1995).

These cases demonstrate that non-combat activities of military forces are not a completely new thing and that discussion about non-combat deployment of armies is not a new one. What is new is the intensity and frequency of these non-combat military deployments and using humanitarian and development assistance as a strategic instrument (Brigety 2008). But we find various approaches to non-combat operations of military forces. While some authors are soft on these deployments and argue that "the military should only be given military missions which involve possible combat, however, when they advance national security interests and are directed against a foreign enemy of the United States" (Huntington 1993: 42), others

promote the non-combat military deployments arguing with the transformation of strategic environment or by economic necessity (see Mani 2011; Nunn 1993; Brigety 2008).

The starting point of the debate about non-combat deployment of military forces in war zones has to be civil-military relations. The empirical terrain of civil-military relations is very wide and includes various issues and agents. It is among others influenced by the fact if we think about civil-military relations in democratic or non-democratic countries, in developed or underdeveloped areas or in the time of peace or war. There is no universal theory of civil-military relations, or better said, each universal theory of civil-military relation has to be inaccurate. Many useful theories of civil-military relations deal with concrete factors, agents or states (group of states) (more see Burk 2002 or Cottey, Edmunda and Forster 2002). Classical and often cited theoretical works about civil-military relations are represented in production by S. Huntingon and M. Janowitz from the 1950s. The contemporary theorizing of civil-military relations goes back to Huntington's and Janowitz's works but face issues such as post-Cold War strategic environment, penetration of civilian and military sectors, significance of civil-military relations for good governance and last but not least relations between civilian and military sphere on international and transnational level needs to go its own way (USAID 1998; Burk 2002: 15–22; Cottey/Edmunda/Forster 2002; Yamaguchi/Welch 2005). While older theorizing of civil-military relations were bound with national state, the contemporary theorizing call for theories are able to frame and explain civil-military relations over the boundaries. *"Assuming that these activities are not a prelude to forming a larger unified state, they pose novel problems about how militaries work to protect and sustain democratic values in a transnational context"* (Burk 2002: 20). Theorizing about civil-military relations has been made harder by issues such as deployment of militaries by the countries in the Northern and the Southern countries, and the rising number of agents participating in civil-military relations, especially of NGOs and private military companies. The problem goes deeper when it is clear that these are agents who are not loyal to any state. The war on terror, counterinsurgency and humanitarian interventions are operations, where armies have to act in conduct with other agents (this logic has been incorporated into Provincial Reconstruction Teams). The nation-building deployment of military in failed and collapsed states creates from soldiers' temporary substitution of civilian agents. The military's expanding nation-building role has made it a significant provider not only of security but also of aid for governance and development assistance.

Since 1990, not only is there the term "civil-military relations", but also the term "civil-military cooperation" used. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a conception and policy as well as a doctrine (Zona 2011). All three have been transformed

in the last two decades. CIMIC emerged in connection with crisis management and deployment of multidimensional and full-spectrum operations, which use simultaneously offensive, defensive as well as stabilization capabilities. CIMIC was originally based on the idea of cooperation and coordination of activities between civilian actors and military in the place of deployment. NATO documents from 2001 defined CIMIC as "the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (NATO/EAPC 2001: 1–1). The contemporary situation in CIMIC is much more complicated and the interpretation of CIMIC is very different compared to one decade ago. As mentioned above, in many cases it is almost impossible to find a dividing line between activities of civilians and non-combat activities of military. We know cases where the civilian body was fully integrated into the military unit or act fully within military forces scope or the civilian body was subordinated to the operational task of deployed military units (Zlatohlávek 2011). In one of the CIMIC approaches, which emerged in the last few years, called effect based operations (EBO), went "cooperation" too far, that the division of activities between civilian bodies and military units is absent and civilian non-combat activities are an inherent part of the military operations (Zůna 2010: 12; more see below). While in older conception of multidimensional operations the military capabilities are integrated into civilian mission and military unit supports civilian mission, in effect based operations civilian capabilities and tasks are integrated into military operations and are subsumed to military command and management; sometimes civilian capabilities can work parallel to military ones (Zůna 2010: 12). This transformation is discussed and criticized (for more see for example Mockaitis 2004). As argued by many scholars and soldiers at home and abroad (for more see Zůna 2010: 14–15), effect based operations are mainly products of social sciences and from military point of view it is absolutely inappropriate instrument, because it is almost impossible to find a dividing line between EBO and CIMIC on a tactical level, from the military point of view it is very ambiguous, ponderous and administratively demanding instrument decreasing value of military goals. These diverse interpretations of CIMIC are given mainly by the fact that civil-military cooperation results from the practice in the field and is carried out on the basis of everyday demand of the local population (Brigety 2008).

Following the practice in the field, the lessons learned have at least three milestones: 1. the post-Cold War transformation of strategic environment, 2. international engagement in Kosovo, and 3. the war on terror and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The loss of the enemy and the transformation of security environment after the end of the Cold War provoked the discussion about national interests and about the responsibility of military forces to defend national

interest (compare for example collective monograph Graham (ed.). 1993). Almost all states had to rethink their position and policies in the post-Cold-War environment and started the transformation of security policy and defense structures (see Wheeler/Harmer 2006; Gyarmati/Winkler 2002; Haltiner/Klein 2005: 9–13). As shown by Groth and Berliner (1993: 1–2), in the US case after the end of the Cold War the American institutions lost the criteria for defining threats and thus for the deployment of the US army. This situation coincided with the campaign of some domestic actors (for example senator Sam Nunn) who asked for the US army to be used more for domestic purposes such as support of development in urban areas and provision of health care in remote areas (Nunn 1993; Lundgren 1993). Also other countries underwent similar processes.

First, more serious discussions about CIMIC brought an international engagement in Kosovo. KFOR's and UNMIK's activities went many times beyond the normal understanding of CIMIC and beyond traditional interpretation of multidimensional operations. The civilian activities have not been integrated within multinational brigades as today, but their existence has been more or less parallel to the military units, i.e. military capabilities have not been integrated into a civilian mission (An interview with CIMIC KFOR, April 2012). The turning point for the interpretation of CIMIC has been international engagement in Iraq and in Afghanistan. After lessons learned from counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq CIMIC has been radically restructured. According to Duffield: "During the 1990s, the military doctrine among leading states was to support civilian humanitarian agencies and to only become directly involved in humanitarian activities as a last resort. Since Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan, this situation has changed. Humanitarian assistance, especially in relation to crisis states, has increasingly been coloured by political considerations. In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, humanitarian assistance, development and social reconstruction have been redrafted as a legitimate support for transitional state entities and their transformation into showcases of regional stability. This places tremendous responsibilities upon cooperating aid agencies and draws them directly into an exposed political process. At the same time, due to widespread insecurity and insurgency violence, the military has moved beyond protection and become directly involved in activities it labels as 'humanitarian'" (Duffield 2006: 30). Under persistent insurgency the intervening armies changed the strategy – from the war on terror to counterinsurgency. This reason, among others, resulted in the inclusion of civilian capabilities and tasks under military command.

The logic of the transformation is much clearer if we have a look at the insurgency. Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and

violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (O'Neill 1990: 13). Historical experience shows that the most effective counterinsurgency is the reforms which assist people to solve the basic material needs. History has also shown that kindness, administrative and social economic reforms and good management can win support from the public. The success by the counterinsurgency is connected with dealing with public needs and administrative capacities and competence (O'Neill 1990: 143; Thomson 2002: 21).

Many scholars as well as military professionals point out that it is not important how strong the military capabilities of counterinsurgency units are, because no counterinsurgency can win without support of local people (Marston/Malkasian 2008: 17). But the struggle for support of local population is a political issue. Politics become an active instrument of operations of both parties – insurgents as well as counterinsurgents. The political and military action can thus not be separated – each military action has to be evaluated according to its political impacts and vice versa (Galula 1964: 4–5). The military campaign cannot even be the main instrument. What does this mean in the practice? The struggle for efficient counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the broader and more frequent use of civilian non-combat instruments for winning support of the local population and led to the integration of civilian tasks under military command.

To sum up, it is necessary to say, that the debate about civil-military cooperation and relations and non-combat operations of military forces in war zones, has only one result – ambiguity about how to approach CIMIC in theory as well as in the field. Despite real situations in CIMIC in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no agreement among scholars, politicians and soldiers about how far the penetration of civilian, non-combat activities into the military operations should go.

Terminology relating to non-combat operations of armed forces

There are various terms emerging in connection with non-combat operations of militaries. This chapter will have a look at the terms emerging concerning non-combat operations of armed forces and will analyze the content of these non-combat activities.

Suitable material for our analysis seems to be the American and British documents, because militaries of both these countries have an extensive experience with non-combat operations since the 19th century (more see Walker 2001 or DiCicco 2001). Furthermore, the discussion about non-combat operations has been present in both countries, in administrative, parliaments and armies for decades. The US and British presence in the world and relations of those countries with other players in the international system helped also to penetrate the US and British terms and concepts into documents of other countries. Another resource of terminology

concerning non-combat deployment of militaries in war zones is NATO documentation. NATO has an advanced approach to CIMIC which goes beyond the UN multidimensional operations. This is mainly the result of NATO's lessons learned in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO's approach and documentation logically influenced member countries' national documents and national interpretation and implementation of CIMIC.

In all these documents, there are various terms connected to non-combat military operations: non-traditional missions, peacetime engagement, missions other than major regional conflicts, military operations other than war, stabilization operations, comprehensive approach and effect based operations. From all of these there are few which are used more frequently or in more general way – peacetime military engagement, military operations other than war and comprehensive approach.

The "peacetime military engagement" (PME) "comprises all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the [United States] military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support combatant commander's objectives within the theatre security cooperation plan. Peacetime military engagement encourages regional stability. … Combat is not envisioned, although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are always possible. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern peacetime military engagement activities. These are usually conducted bilaterally but can involve multiple nations" (US Army Combined Arms Center, nondated). PME can be more generally and more briefly defined also as "all military activities intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. They include programs and exercises conducted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, counterterrorism, the provision of advisers and specialist training teams, defence sales support, engagement by embassy defence staffs, the nurturing of personal relationships, and military talks. They are aimed at encouraging local or regional stability and cooperation. Combat is not envisaged in these activities, unless is dealing with a threat against deployed elements" (British Ministry of Defence 2010: 8–9).

Both definitions list a number of activities, but neither one includes the full list. To better understand PME it is necessary to have a look at what activities have been included. The US Department of Defense lists such activities eligible as peacetime military engagement domestic as well as international assistance in case of natural disasters carried out by the military, armed forces deployment in domestic unrests, evacuation of civilians from war zones, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping operations, counternarcotics operations, counterterrorism and peacemaking

operations (Groth/Berliner 1993: 3-1–3-12). British Ministry of Defence (2009: 10-B-1–10-B-5; 2010: 8-2–8-9) is more ambiguous. MOD documents list various types of operations with main criteria based on combat or non-combat situation. According to the British PME includes non-combat tasks which are carried out when acceptable level of security is achieved. The doctrine of British land forces even says that "the final phase of the conflict is the restoration of normal peacetime military engagement" (British Ministry of Defence 2009: 10-B-5). This could mean – and it is confirmed by British military doctrine from 2010 as well as British Army Field Manual for Counterinsurgency – that there is something such as "non-normal peacetime military engagement", which is carried out before ending the violence and/or before restoration of acceptable level of security (there are PME in the war zones in the field). Sometimes there are activities such as foreign security assistance and all non-combat operations, for example civilian activities which are parts of counterinsurgency, peace-support operations, operations for support of local authorities which are listed as part of PME. More complicated and more interesting is the term "military operations other than war" (MOOTW). Their goal is defined as support of the UN operations and humanitarian assistance (i.e. as non-combat activities) and as the protection of national security and enemy deterrence (i.e. combat or military activities). MOOTW is "military action encompassing a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Usually involves a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces" (US Army Combined Arms Center, non-dated). MOOTW "focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crisis" (J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, non-dated: 2–3). MOOTW activities do not necessarily seek victory; rather, they seek some politically determined level of success. MOOTW differs from war in that the military is not always in charge of MOOTW at an operational or even tactical level. In some cases the military must coordinate its activities with other players such as NGOs.

As can be seen clearly, PME as well as MOOTW are quite wide in terms. The results from the analysis above show that the key criteria for differentiating between both types of operations are if non-combat instruments are used in peace time or in war zones. The problem stems from the situation when military forces use non-combat instruments or implement non-combat civilian projects in the time of war or before reaching the acceptable level of security. In the field a good example is counterinsurgency, where non-combat activities are part of the strategy and a weapon of war (more see Galula 1964 or O'Neill 1990). It has to be said that the terminology concerning non-combat activities of military forces in war zones is very unclear and confusing, not only in the military documents and doctrines.

The newest terms emerging in the last decade in connection with non-combat activities of armed forces in war zones are "comprehensive approach" and "stabilization operations". Despite both terms (both types of operations) are not synonymous, both of them have a similar base. Both are the result of the US and NATO experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and a rather reluctant approach to the effect-based operation concept (compare Taw 2010; Messineo 2010; Zůna 2010). The stabilization operations are the US's conception and the comprehensive approach is the result of NATO's member states consensus.

The term "stabilization operations" firstly emerged in the US security documents during the Bush era around 2005. The key documents for conceptualizing stabilization operations are National Security Presidential Directive 44 *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 *Military Support For Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations*, new wording of *National Defense Authorization Act* (mainly Section 1207) and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 *Stability Operations*. DODD 3000.05 from autumn 2005 stress, that the pivotal activity for the US administration and Department of Defense will be rehabilitation and stabilization operations. The importance of these operations was compared with combat operations and has been defined as the most important instrument for US national security in the 21st century. The goal of the stability operations is to maintain order in individual states as well as regions. There is no exact specification of stabilization operations in the document, but it is clear that civilians have been included in such missions and subordinated to military command. While the golden rule of classical peace operations was that the mission was deployed after the termination of violence, stabilization operations are deployed before reaching acceptable level of security. This is to say that they correspond much more with MOOTW than with PME.

Having a closer look at stabilization, it is defined as "the process of establishing peace and security in countries affected by conflict and instability. It is the promotion of peaceful political settlement to produce a legitimate indigenous government, which can better serve its people. Stabilizations often requires external joint military and civilian support to perform some or all of the following tasks: prevent or reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes and prepare for longer-term development" (UK Stabilization Unit, non-dated: non-paginated). Stabilization and reconstruction operations are than considered as operations in countries emerging from the conflict or civilian unrest. Stabilization operation in the field assist with economic stabilization, provision of essential services, reconstruction of the political system and the rule of law, registration of voters, and organization of elections (for more see USJFCOM 2010a).

Stabilization operations are transforming the role of the army. The soldier's role is not only to win wars, but also create a space for political negotiations, non-violent environment and assist civilians (Taw 2010: 387). The ever present distinction between civilian agencies and soldiers has been disappearing mainly in daily activities in the field (Messineo 2010). Stabilization operations are based on the idea, that humanitarian and development assistance can also be a weapon of war (Brigety 2008).[2]

When comparing stabilization operations with MOOTW it is possible to say that stabilization operations are part of the broader strategic goals and are superior to combat operations in time of peace as well as in time of war. Stabilization operations are an instrument, which lies between diplomacy and peace-enforcement missions (Ostrom and Job according Taw 2010: 397). Some scholars notify that the difference between MOOTW and stabilization operations is purely semantic. In fact, under both missions' frameworks the strategic priorities are transformed as well as the way of reaching them including the perception of the role of the armed forces in this process.

A comprehensive approach was created as a successor to effect based operations, which were – from the military point of view – unsatisfactory. The comprehensive approach has been approved as the part of the new NATO's strategic concept in 2010. A comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination. It involves political, civilian and military instruments (NATO 2012). A comprehensive approach is the cross-governmental and inter-agency generation and application of security, governance and development services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, both governmental and non-governmental (Lindley-French/Cornish/Rathmell 2010: 2). Civil-military integration in a comprehensive approach takes place from top to bottom and from the strategic to tactical level (Lindley-French/Cornish/Rathmell 2010: 3). A comprehensive approach is based not only on the cooperation with civilian actors, but also on good coordinated civil-military capabilities of armed forces. The goal of a comprehensive approach is to guarantee human security and carry out temporary administrative functions including reconstruction of infrastructure (Peterson/Binnendijk 2008; Junek 2011: 93). A comprehensive approach also requires the integrated training, change of military planning and many other changes (more see Peterson/Binnendijk 2008). We can see that in operations based on a comprehensive approach the role of military forces goes far beyond the protection of civilian experts and cooperation with civilian agencies. Civil-military cooperation is changing here – similarly as in stabilization operations – into the instrument of the operation.

[2] Critics point out, that "money can be a weapon" thinking about winning hearts and minds of local population (Hedgpeth/Cohen 2008). Such an evaluation of stabilization operations resulted from lessons learned from Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP was established to help US commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan stabilize the country. The military commanders use CERP to cover urgent needs of local communities such as garbage collection, reconstruction of schools and hospitals or building of irrigation systems. The goal of these projects and activities is creation of better and more friendly environment in the place of deployment (Patrick/Brown 2007; Hedgpeth/Cohen 2008).

Security by other means: The new interpretation of relation between security and development

As mentioned earlier, we suppose, that there are two reasons, why CIMIC changed: firstly, the transformations of conflict management approach in donor community and the thinking of the relationship between security and development and secondly, the change of the strategic environment. In the following chapter the new interpretation of relation between security and development will be analyzed and introduced. Consideration of the interdependence between security and development (the 'security-development nexus', i.e. the idea that only in a secure environment can development be reached and only a developed society can be secure) has emerged in politics since the end of Second World War. When the US president Truman defended assisting Greece and Turkey before the Congress in 1947 and later argued in favour of the Marshall plan, he connected the security of the United States and of Western world with its economic development. When in 1944 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was established, one of the ideas of the founding fathers was to prevent through reconstruction and development assistance new outbreaks of violence. Later, in the time of the Cold War, some international institutions and also some states used the idea about security-development nexus, but this conception was in no case part of the mainstream. What we could see more frequently was that some countries used official development assistance for support of their strategic goals and allies (more see in Meernik/Krueger/Poe 1997).

A new era starts in the 1990s. It is the period of rapid increase of peace and nation-building missions in various parts of the world such as in Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, Solomon Islands, and Haiti. Lessons learned from these operations and the positive effects of CIMIC and of non-combat military operations resulted in optimism concerning future non-combat roles of armed forces. Another change based on the experience from above mentioned operations, was the interpretation of underdevelopment as a security threat. The security-development nexus interpreting underdevelopment as security problem has been penetrating the UN agenda since the beginning of the 1990s (see for example the wording of an Agenda for Peace from 1992 or Human Development Report from 1994), and later on penetrated the

policy of main donors and international development and economic institutions (compare Hughes 2009; Picciotto 2010; World Bank 2011).

The idea about interdependence between security and development has been evolving further becoming mainstream in the Western world. In the few last years it is possible to see its effects in practice – international institutions as well as donor community argue that development needs to be supported also in insecure environments because underdeveloped and poor societies are not able to sustain security (World Bank 2011). The idea about the interdependence between security and development spread unequally after 2001 inspired by lessons learned from stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq (this was reflected also in an academic space by founding of "Conflict, Security & Development" Journal). "Struggle for justice, well-being and security is now understood as a single activity" (Picciotto 2010: 11). Development has become a security strategy (Brigety 2008; Patrick/Brow 2007). Development projects are today carried out in insecure environments under insurgency attacks where development projects are part of the counterinsurgency strategy (more see for example USJFCOM 2010a: II-52).

Lessons learned from Kosovo, Iraq as well as the early experience from Afghanistan helped produce a special approach based on the security-development nexus idea which is called post-conflict assistance. In post-conflict assistance, development assistance became an instrument of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction after violent conflicts. Its goal is to prevent through development intervention the renewal of violence and assist the target society with peaceful negotiations. This interpretation comes from the idea that post-conflict countries are challenged by a higher risk of violence renewal than countries that did not experience any violence, and that conflict-prone and post-conflict countries lag behind in development because violence is the barrier of development and underdevelopment recycles violence. The way out of this erratic circle comes only through development assistance carried out despite violence and insecurity. The risk of recurrence of violent conflict can be decreased by development assistance (it has to be stressed that development assistance is understood not only as the increasing of the local population's well-being, but also as a way to good governance and rule of law [World Bank 2011: 2–11]).

The first implementations were missions in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Uganda and El Salvador. The process resulted in the second half of the 1990s in integration of development assistance into peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. Following these changes also official development assistance has been redefined. The new definition enabled security expenditures to be allocated as part of official development assistance (more see Brzoska 2008 and 2003 and also documents and doctrines such as OECD Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development

Cooperation from 1997 or UN general secretary report Priorities for Post-Conflict Peace Building from 1996). Interpretation of security-development nexus labelled as post-conflict assistance was definitely embedded after 2001, when the international effort to stabilize and reconstruct the Iraqi and Afghani environment made cooperation of development agencies and humanitarian organizations with military forces inevitable.

Civil-military cooperation in the field, and comprehensive and stabilization operations

The transformation of CIMIC started in the second half of the 1990s, influenced by lessons learned from UN peace missions. The robust UN missions from the 1990s reacted to the collapse of states, genocides and on to the rise of the number of refuges and internally displaced persons in the conflict areas. Based on this experience, the UN set up a new type of operation, the so called multidimensional operations.

The other step had been Kosovo. Kosovo operations – UNMIK and KFOR – brought about new experience. Multinational brigades adapted traditional peacekeeping operations to address developmental issues. Everyday problems and needs of local population led to the broadening of soldiers' portfolio. Militaries not only guaranteed everyday security of local communities but helped local people to make their lives easier. The KFOR and UNMIK soldiers for example transported the furnishings for returnees, conducted demining, provided heavy equipment when necessary, re-built schools, volunteered as English language teachers, distributed food and, last but not least, helped returnees to get their IDs. This was not planned and systematically carried out program. Multinational brigades usually responded to the everyday needs of the local population. During months and years this non-planned activity became a part of the multinational brigades' business in a struggle for support of the local people (Etchemendy 2010; Mockaitis 2004: 10ff). But unlike in the Afghani or Iraqi cases, in Kosovo the non-combat operations of multinational brigades have not been part of counterinsurgency or "hearts and minds strategy" (Etchemendy 2010: 2).

This conclusion is supported by the fact that in Kosovo emerged hybrid civil-military bodies, which were created in the struggle to solve urgent needs of the local population. Following a field assessment in spring 2000 – which identified the problems in reconstruction across Kosovo – planners at SHAPE set up a Kosovo development group. The group worked under the authority of the EU's Kosovo reconstruction department. The members of the team – non-CIMIC officers – travelled (in civvies, not military uniform) through Kosovo and identified in cooperation with local authorities and NGOs and set up priorities in reconstruction projects.

The projects covered all aspects of reconstruction, from repairing infrastructure to regenerating the economy. The cost of deploying the Kosovo development group was shared among the participating nations (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Italy, and Spain), KFOR, and EU (Wentz 2002: 489).

The evaluation reports of multinational brigades' activities and national CIMIC units in Kosovo gave evidence that CIMIC and the penetration of civilian non-combat projects into the soldiers' operation portfolio have been slow, step-by-step and more or less the consequence of daily needs of the local communities and of interaction with the local population than a planned approach. These reports concluded that military forces in many areas in Kosovo became proper humanitarian and development agents (Etchemendy 2010). Some scholars and soldiers (Clarke 2002: 220–224; Holshek 2002: 276) add that this situation has been also partly the result of liberally interpreted mandate, the competition between civilian bodies and armed forces who will be better in providing services for refuges and IDPs, and vague ideas of national units about CIMIC.

While the Kosovo experience is well documented and highly evaluated, the Afghani and Iraqi engagement lacks at this time any systematic evaluation. Thus it is necessary in the Afghani and Iraqi case to have a look at the military operation in the field. Evaluating non-combat activities of militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan it is necessary to keep in mind one great difference between Kosovo on one side and Iraq and Afghanistan on the other – the very different security environment in the place of operation. The change of the strategy in both countries from war on terror to counterinsurgency resulted in the transformation of combat strategy of participating nations including the use of win-hearts-and-minds strategy and in the transformation of operations – stabilization and comprehensive approach have been newly introduced operations.

The formative moment for both types of operations have been lessons learned in Iraq. When the United States came into Iraq, they were not prepared for stabilization, or for reconstruction of governance and socio-economic life. LTC James A. Gavrillus (according UJSFOM 2010a: II-1) explained that the last thing the United States expected to do once it entered Iraq *"*was to begin post-war reconstruction. We had not planned or prepared for governing nor had we received any guidance or assistance in how to do so…" "We came into Iraq to defeat Saddam Hussein, but with his leaving the whole bureaucracy left also. The officers of some ministries disappeared during the night and we – if we wanted a working system in the country – had to substitute them" (An interview with P. Voznica, Czech ambassador to Iraq, April 2011). "The coalition's initial plan – to remove Saddam and his close associates from power and to hold in place the existing bureaucracy to administer the country – became untenable when those structures dissolved. … When the

initial plan proved unrealizable, there was, by all accountants, no backup strategy. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance structures got under way; the ad hoc nature of the ensuing process and the lack of coordination and shared objective" (Celeste J. Ward according USJFCOM 2010a: II-16).

We can understand the situation much better and the transformative moment when reading general McChrystal's letter to Enduring Freedom and ISAF missions from September 2009. The letter said that the number one priority of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is the protection of the local population. The basic conception on new counterinsurgency strategy had to be a new operational culture based on the "Shape, Clear, Hold, Build" strategy. Shape, Clear, Hold, Build construct provides the rudimentary elements of an operational framework in Afghanistan. Commanders were said to create the plan and set up main goals and task, brief their units to know what to do and what role they have to play (SHAPE), "clean up" the area of operations from insurgents and obviate the insurgency attacks (CLEAR), stay in the place so long as necessary and protect local population (HOLD), and implement the projects to support development and reconstruct in the places which need it (BUILD) (*COMISAF Initial Assessment [Unclassified], Searchable Document* 2009). After a few years it is clear that the emphasis on the protection of the local population was the right strategy. The local population understood security as the most important priority and did not mind who protected the local communities, be it Taliban or ISAF (An interview with Robert Batěk, NATO HQ, ISAF Command Afghanistan, April 2012).

The military forces do not only protect Afghani people and ensure security, they also operate sport facilities and training, provide leisure activities, build bridges, roadways, dams, irrigation systems, work as English language teachers, agriculture experts, doctors and servicemen of agriculture machinery.

The struggle for effective counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in wider use of civilian non-combat instruments to win the support of local population and elites and in creation of new body combining military and civilian resources and capabilities – Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The strategic role of PRTs is especially visible in case of Afghanistan. PRTs have been a new instrument and no ISAF country had any experience with such an instrument. The United States learned some lessons in Iraq and historically from the Philippines and Vietnam, but these lessons learned could not be applied in Afghanistan's conditions (An interview with Robert Batěk, NATO HQ, ISAF Command Afghanistan, April 2012).

As mentioned above, counterinsurgency is not a new thing. What is new are the different lessons learned stemming from Iraq's and Afghanistan's experience. The

counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has been very special – evaluating the scope of the fight, size of the territory and number of effected people, cultural, and ethnic diversity of the society and socio-economic diversity. What Afghanistan really changed was the inclusion and rooting of non-combat tasks into the military forces' portfolio. It seems that this idea is confirmed also by interviews we did with military commanders from Kosovo and ISAF and with experts working in CIMIC units (we interviewed Slovenian, Dutch, Czech and Canadian CIMIC units). While those deployed in Kosovo think that stabilization, nation-building and further civilian tasks should be carried out by civilians and "military forces only temporarily fill the gap" (An interview with CIMIC KFOR, April 2012), those who have experience from Afghanistan believe that armies became proper development actors who carry out civilian projects and for successful implementation of such projects it is necessary to be trained and well equipped (Interviews with Canadian CIMIC, May 2011; interviews with Dutch CIMIC, August 2012 and interviews with Czech commanders of PRTs in Afghanistan and OMLT members, March and April 2012).

Conclusion

We showed that military forces carried out many very different tasks at home as well as abroad during the last few decades. Non-combat activities are more and more often part of the armies' roles. Military forces carry out civilian activities as part of combat as well as non-combat operations or better said for military as well as non-military goals. We started to think about non-combat roles and civilian activities of contemporary military forces because we noticed the diverse interpretation of CIMIC and the ambiguous attitude of scientists, soldiers and politicians to this issue. In the debate about CIMIC there are on the one hand opinions that military forces' task is to fight the enemy and non-combat tasks are only the additional issue having no effects on training and organization of military forces. On the other hand there are opinions arguing in favour of development and humanitarian role of soldiers. The discussion about non-combat activities of military forces in war zones is not only – as it may seem – the product of international Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan engagement, but there is much more related to the change of strategic environment in post-Cold War world and uncertainty about who is the enemy, how to fight with him and the use of military forces.

The first part of our text introduced the terminology concerning non-combat activities of military forces and it was shown that there are plenty of terms and variations describing the non-combat activities of militaries in peace as well as war zones used in security documents. It is clear that different actors have different ideas and interpretations of non-combat activities of military forces. Peaceful military engagement, comprehensive approach, military operations other than war,

or stabilization operations do not consist of any exact list of activities and tasks. This gives flexibility in the field, but also begs the question what can be included in the soldier's job and how it should be done.

Our goal was to analyze the causes and conditions of transformation of approach to CIMIC. More concretely the exchange of tasks in war zones when soldiers started to implement civilian projects. We asked why and how this transformation happened. It is evident, that this change was caused by several factors, which coincided in time and place and with particular academic, political and security conditions. In the 1990s after the experience from preceding development decades and increased number of interstate conflicts the approach of the donor community to development assistance has been transformed. The approach of the donor community had been penetrated by security-development nexus and development assistance started to be used as an instrument for eradication of insecurities. Consequently, the official development assistance had been redefined. States can today assign as ODA expenditures for demining, demilitarization, demobilization or security sector reform (more see Brzoska 2008). Many of these above mentioned tasks – such as demining or demilitarization – were done logically by military forces. So, we are in the situation, when military forces carry out the activity which can be according to the new ODA definition understood as development assistance. The growth of military engagement in development assistance was supported also by the implementation of development projects in war zones and using development as an instrument for protection of security.

The reinterpretation of relationship between security and development in the donor community coincided with positive experience and success from civilian projects of multinational brigades in Kosovo. The evaluation reports of KFOR and UNMIK believe that despite non-combat activities were not originally part of the multinational brigades' portfolio, everyday needs of the local population and urgent requests in the field contributed to the soldiers' civilian deployment. The evaluation of civilian activities of multinational brigades has been in most cases positive and soldiers achieved very good success. The experience from Kosovo thus produced in many actors the optimistic attitude concerning the positive effects of inclusion of soldiers into non-combat activities.

The shift of civil-military cooperation conception continued under the experience from international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The shift is tangible in the field as well as in doctrines and strategic security documents. In Iraq and Afghanistan CIMIC has been framed by the establishment of a new body – Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Despite the existence of some differences between various countries' PRTs, the PRT model was based on the integration of civilian and military activities under one roof. Soldiers were in many places the only implementer

of development and humanitarian projects. This transformation was also reflected by the introduction of new types of operations such as effect based operations, stabilization operations and comprehensive approach. The important role by inclusion of civilian tasks into military jobs played the transition from the war on terror to counterinsurgency. On the one hand, because there were no civilian authorities in the place of operation and thus CIMIC – in its original interpretation – was not thinkable, military forces have to carry out development and humanitarian activities and projects on their own. On the other hand, development assistance and humanitarian projects became a weapon of counterinsurgency helping to win hearts and minds of local communities.

The ground-breaking moment for the change of CIMIC, when the performance of civilian activities and projects shifted from civilian actors to soldiers, was the arrival of general McChrystal to Afghanistan and the introduction of the counterinsurgency strategy. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and stabilization operations in Iraq in combination with the international struggle to reconstruct both countries as soon as possible resulted in robust involvement of soldiers in civilian reconstruction and nation-building activities. With regards to the high security risks in both countries, military forces have been very often the only actor able to carry out stabilization and reconstruction.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Europeanization of Migration Policy. The Schengen Acquis between the Priorities of Legal Harmonization and Fragmentation

Helena Hricová[1]

The European Union is not only an economic unit but it is a large space without internal borders where European inhabitants can live, work, travel, study or conduct business etc. Huge economic growth and democratic principles are tempting for migrants, seasonal workers or refugees from third world countries. There are not only people but illegal trade in goods like drugs, guns or tobacco products which are illegally transported into the European Union. The above phenomena are potential dangerous for European values.

Migration and asylum policy are parts of the common European policy and the European Union tries to harmonise these issues. These two policies are the results of the Schengen agreement and the Schengen area. It is possible to agree with the author that the Schengen acquis is the most dynamic EU Law. On the one hand, the harmonisation is very important, on the other hand, it is restricted by national states which try to preserve this very sensitive sphere. These are the most important points for which the migration policy is necessary to study.

The European migration and asylum policy show the various interests and needs of every member state which is determined by the geographic position and of course by state specificity. One good tool how to study this problematic is the theory of Europeanisation. The research and analyses of harmonisation in asylum and migration policy is very important part of the European Union policy. The book by Robert Fisher introduces very valuable texts which summarizes the most important moments of migration policy from 1990s to these days. As mentioned above, the main aim of this book is presents "how the model of Europeanisation influences the harmonisation and fragmentation of asylum and migration law" (15 s.).

The book can be divided into two main parts. The first part is strictly theoretical and introduces the classical authors of Europeanisation theory e.g. Ladrech, Risse, Radealli, Olsen, Vink, Graziano etc. The second part is larger and describes the historical development of migration policy in the EU. The reader can find information about the White Book about the Internal Market; the Schengen agreement

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(1985); follow primary documents – Maastricht agreement, Amsterdam and Nice agreement which use the term Schengen acquis.

With regards to the position of migration and asylum policy they present some specifics. The migration and the asylum policy are supranational but it does not mean that the European law has dominion over the law of member states. The migration and asylum policy stand between international and national law. From this perspective, special attention is given to the border policy, the Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System, the Visa policy and the Asylum Policy, FRONTEX e.g. EU member states are divided into the categories of the Schengen law implementation. The book gives good examples or exceptions to the European law, e.g. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or Denmark. We can see the gradual harmonisation from many perspectives – national member states, the third world countries situated outside the EU, NGO or individual actors which are active participant in legal proceedings.

I appreciate the authors' experience from Germany; the real life information about asylum and visa applicants was very valuable. It is possible to find information about the process of data entry to information systems which fundamentally influences the functionality of the migration and asylum policy. The mother countries of asylum seekers are analysed from the view of readmission agreements or actions of RABIT units.

If I have to summarize the overall impression of the book I must highlight the theory and praxis connection and the very good historical overview of the migration and the asylum policy. It is understandable why the author omitted some law details. The book is suitable for anyone who wants or needs to know more about how problematic the internal security in the EU can be. The text is a good introduction as it is rather short and concise. It is an excellent starting point for studying the internal security of the EU at least since there is not too much available literature in Czech.

Fischer, Robert. (2012): The Europeization on Migration Policy. The Schengen Acquis between the Priorities of Legal Harmonization and Fragmentation, Peter Lang.

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Politics in Central Europe publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.

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