POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association

Volume 11 • Number 2 • December 2015 • ISSN 1801-3422

ESSAYS

The Bumpy Road of Civil Society in the New Member States:
From State Capture to Renewal of Civil Society
Attila Ágh

I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation
of the Czech Republic to the European Union
Johana Galušková and Petr Kaniok

Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History:
The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014
Henriett Kovács and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner

Attitudes towards the Governments's Remembrance Policy in Poland:
Results of an Experimental Study
Patryk Wawrzyński and Ralph Schattkowsky

The Personalisation of Politics at the Local Level in Poland and Selected
Central and Eastern European States: A Contribution to the Research
Pawel Antkowiak and Łukasz Scheffs

DE G

METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY PRAGUE PRESS

POLITICS
in Central Europe

The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association

Volume 11 Number 2 December 2015 ISSN 1801-3422

EDITORIAL

ESSAYS

The Bumpy Road of Civil Society in the New Member States: From State Capture to Renewal of Civil Society
Attila Ágh

I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union
Johana Galušková and Petr Kaniok

Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014
Henriett Kovács and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner

Attitudes towards the Governments's Remembrance Policy in Poland: Results of an Experimental Study
Patryk Wawrzyński and Ralph Schattkowsky

The Personalisation of Politics at the Local Level in Poland and Selected Central and Eastern European States: A Contribution to the Research
Pawel Antkowiak and Łukasz Scheffs

DISCUSSION

In the Eyes of the Collapsing Empire: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Slovenian Independence as seen through Russian Diplomatic Sources (1990–1992)
Andrej Stopar

Politics in Central Europe – The Journal of Central European Political Science Association is the official Journal of the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA).
Politics in Central Europe is a biannual (June and December), double-blind, peer-reviewed publication.

Publisher:
Metropolitan University Prague Press
Dubečská 900/10, 100 31 Praha 10-Strašnice (Czech Republic)

Printed by:
Togga, s. r. o., Volutová 2524/12, 158 00 Praha (Czech Republic)
Copyright © by Metropolitan University Prague, v. o. s.

Co-editors:
Ladislav Cabada & Šárka Waisová
E-mail: ladislav.cabada@mup.cz; sarka.waisova@mup.cz

Executive Assistant to the editors:
Hana Hlaváčková
E-mail: hana.hlavackova@mup.cz

English language editing:
Debra Shulkes

Home Page
www.politicsincentraleurope.eu
www.degruyter.com

Executive Committee of the CEPSA (2012–2015)

Senior presidents:
Jerzy J. Wiatr
Attila Ágh
Silvia Miháliková
Karin Liebhart

President: Ladislav Cabada
Vice-President: Miro Haček
Secretary General: Liutauras Gudžinskas

National Representatives:
Krisztina Arató (Hungary)
Petr Just (Czech Republic)
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka (Poland)
Tonči Kursar (Croatia)
Marek Rybář (Slovakia)
Andžėj Pukšto (Lithuania)
Andreas Pribersky (Austria)
Cirila Toplak (Slovenia)

International Advisory Board

Jan Bureš (Metropolitan University Prague, Department of Humanities)
Alenka Krašovec (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences)
Danica Fink-Hafner (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences)
Petr Kopecký (University of Leiden, Department of Political Science)
Christian Lequesne (SciencePo-CERI, Paris)
Magdaléna Leichtová (University of West Bohemia, Department of Politics and International Relations)
Paul Luif (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna)
Cas Mudde (University of Georgia, Department of International Affairs)
Beate Neuss (Technical University in Chemnitz, Institute for Political Science)
Otto Pick (Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences and Czech Diplomatic Academy)
Jacques Rupnik (National Foundation for Political Science, Paris)
Boyka Stefanova (University of Texas at San Antonio, Department of Political Science and Geography)
Soňa Szomolányi (Comenius University in Bratislava, Department of Political Science)
Rein Taagepera (University of California, School of Social Sciences)

Editorial Office

Metropolitan University Prague, v. o. s., Univerzitní středisko Plzeň,
Koterovská 85, 326 00 Plzeň (Czech Republic)

Politics in Central Europe is an independent scientific journal.
The authors are solely responsible for the content of their contributions.

Politics in Central Europe is an Open Access Journal and may be freely citeed,
downloaded, photocopied, and scanned for scholarly purposes only.

ISSN 1801-3422
MK ČR E 18556

Politics in Central Europe is listed in the internationally recognised databases of ERIH plus and DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals)

The articles published in this scientific review are also published in De Gruyter, http://www.degruyter.com

ISSN 1801-3422 ČÍSLO REGISTRACE MK ČR E 18556

CONTENTS

ESSAYS

Attila Ágh
The Bumpy Road of Civil Society in the New Member States: From State Capture to the Renewal of Civil Society 7–21

Johana Galušková and Petr Kaniok
I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union 23–48

Henriett Kovács and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner
Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014 49–72

Patryk Wawrzyński and Ralph Schattkowsky
Attitudes towards the Government's Remembrance Policy in Poland: Results of an Experimental Study 73–94

Pawel Antkowiak and Łukasz Scheffs
The Personalisation of Politics at the Local Level in Poland and Selected Central and Eastern European States: A Contribution to the Research 95–108

DISCUSSION

Andrej Stopar
In the Eyes of the Collapsing Empire: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Slovenian Independence as seen through Russian Diplomatic Sources (1990–1992) 111–149

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS 151–155

ESSAYS

The Bumpy Road of Civil Society in the New Member States: From State Capture to the Renewal of Civil Society

ATTILA ÁGH

Abstract: *This theoretical paper discusses the controversial development of civil society in the new member states (NMS) over a quarter century of systemic change and after 10 years of EU membership. In doing so, it attempts to elaborate a new conceptual framework for the decline of top-down democracy and the return to democratisation as a bottom-up process. This study of the bumpy course of NMS civil society analyses the gap between large formal legal institutions and small local informal ones and emphasises the need for participatory democracy if democracy in the NMS is to be sustainable. In fact, in this quarter century, two faces of informal institutions have emerged, reflecting the tension between genuine civil society organisations and large corrupt clientele networks. The mass emergence of these "negative" informal institutions has led to a situation of state capture and a democratic façade often analysed in the NMS academic literature. The study concludes that after the political and policy-learning processes of the last 25 years, there are now some signs of a participatory turn in the bottom-up process of NMS democratisation.*

Keywords: ***decline of democracy, formal and informal institutions, state capture, democracy-supporting civil organisations, social activism, participatory turn***

Introduction: The Decline of Democracy and the Absence of Participatory Democracy

The backsliding of New Member State (NMS) democracies has been described and documented extensively in the publications of large international ranking agencies like Bertelsmann's *Next Generation Democracy Report* (Bertelsmann 2015: 8, 16, 23) and *The Economist*'s *Democracy Index 2014* (EIU 2015: 2, 18, 22). This process has been comprehensively analysed and assessed in the recent academic literature from the perspectives of both 25 years of systemic change and 10 years of EU membership (see primarily Blokker 2013; Rupnik – Zielonka

2013; Banac 2014; Epstein – Jacoby 2014). This paper expresses a deep concern with the present decline of democracy in the NMS and puts a special focus on informal civil society institutions and the role of participatory democracy in democracy-building. 'New democracies in crisis' (Blokker 2013) are analysed in terms of their general features in the NMS, and this study concludes with new perspectives on the renewal of civil society. Both ranking agencies and academic overviews have emphasised that the NMS countries have the same historical trajectory of declining democracy and catch-up-related defects (European Catch--Up Index 2014). At the same time, there are greatly divergent patterns in the developments in the individual member states from Poland to Hungary.[1]

The decline of democracy can be described most simply – as the EIU does – by contrasting formal and substantive ("informal") democracy. This weakness of democracy in the NMS has become more and more evident in the broad databases of ranking agencies as the split between formal and informal institutions has been exposed over time. As the *Democracy Index 2014* notes: 'Democracy has also been eroded across east-central Europe. […] [A]lthough formal democracy [is] in place in the region, much of the substance of democracy, including [a] political culture based on trust, is absent' (EIU 2015: 22). In the past, the old institutionalisms focused on formal institutions, applying "legalism" in a normative analysis, but the new institutionalisms have emphasised the social and cultural embeddedness of patterns of development for institutional change. There has been a hidden agenda, as Douglass North indicated at the very start of the NMS democratisations: 'Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decision[s], informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints not only connect the past with the present and future, but also provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical change' (North 1990: 6).

The twin processes of Europeanisation and democratisation in the NMS meant the initial creation of large formal institutions in the checks-and-balances system followed by institutional transfers from the EU. In order to secure formal membership, the NMS countries established all EU *formal* institutions, but they have not yet set up the proper *informal* institutions for civil society. This twin institution-building system has created formal institutions for (party) *competition* in the emerging NMS democracies, but only brought some of the

1 As a European Science Foundation (ESF) Forward Look research project on the NMS region points out, there is an urgent need for 'a conceptual breakthrough in terms of better framing the overall context of societal developments' (ESF 2012: 12). In the mainstream literature, Poland represents the best case scenario for the NMS while Hungary is the worst case scenario. Still, as Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) demonstrate, the common historical trajectory can be seen to produce negative informal institutions in both cases. For more information about these informal organisations and the civil sector, see EEA and Norway Grants Report (2014) Mid-Term Evaluation of the NGO Programmes under the EEA and Norway Grants (2009–2014), Part Two, Country Reports (e.g. Hungary pp. 28–47 and Poland pp. 95–119).

opportunities for (citizen) *participation* that could exist today if proper informal – mobilising and supporting – institutions for patterns of civic political culture had also been established in this process. It has been assumed that the creation of big formal institutions accomplished the transition to democracy so that the NMS countries became and would stay democratic. In fact, classic democracy-supporting informal institutions were not completed in the first decades of democratisation, and they are still rather weak. Large Western constitutional institutions have been transferred to the NMS without the relevant socio-cultural environments, i.e. without proper social embedding. Sustainable democracies have, hence, not yet emerged in the NMS region since meaningful political participation remains missing in these states (see Demetriou 2013 for NMS country chapters).[2]

From Clientele Networks to State Capture: The Façade of Democracy in the NMS

The disparity between formal and informal institutions has long been one of the issues neglected by theorists. The first quarter century of democratisation has shown that establishing big formal institutions in the young NMS democracies is far easier than creating the corresponding/supporting small informal institutions of civil society. Analysing Eastern enlargement, Heather Grabbe (2006: 36) distinguished early on between the 'hard policy transfer' of formal institutions and the 'soft policy transfer' of ideas, norms and attitudes from the EU and also raised the issue of the balanced relationship between them. The democratisation process in the NMS has, however, proved to be far more controversial than expected since it has produced a shocking asymmetry between formal and informal institutions and ultimately even the big formal institutions have become increasingly eroded. To some extent, they have become a legal façade for these Potemkin democracies albeit in very different ways across the NMS countries. As Antoaneta Dimitrova argues, 'If formal and informal rules remain different and do not align, institutionalization will not take place,' and the large formal institutions will turn out to be 'empty shells without substance' (2010: 138–139).[3]

2 There is no space in this study to analyse the socio-economic processes leading to the decline of democracies in the NMS, but this "triple crisis" has been the focus of my past publications (e.g. Ágh 2013 b and 2014a,b). I have also described the NMS democratisation based on the large database of international ranking agencies concerning good democracy and good governance; see Ágh 2013a.

3 Given the extensive literature on civil society, it is sufficient here to refer to the recent comprehensive overview by Heidbreder (2012). This long report also discusses the impact of EU membership on NMS civil society and concludes that the latter has not yet followed the EU's participatory turn (Heidbreder 2012: 9–11). Thamy Pogrebinschi (2014: 55, 58) notes that "[h]igher demands for participation lead to higher political dissatisfaction when institutions do not properly accommodate them' and adds that this produces a situation of 'misalignment of citizens' demands and political institutions' supply.'

In fact, formal institutions have not worked properly in the absence of a vibrant civil society and deeply ingrained democratic norms. The NMS academic literature has therefore expressed increasing warnings about the erosion of formal institutions. Many analysts have pointed out that definitions of democracy based on the "procedural minimum" for the operation of big formal institutions have limited explanatory power. Summarising the experiences of the first years of EU membership, Paul Blokker (2013), thus, concludes that the EU has prioritised formal institutions related to the rule of law while overlooking the 'sociological-substantive dimension to the building of constitutional democracy.' Blokker has reiterated the distinction between formal and informal institutions in terms of legal constitutionalism and civic constitutionalism. He has also emphasised that the latter is the 'dimension that involves democratic learning and deliberation, as well as engagement and participation' (2013: 2). Similarly, Lise Herman has analysed the erosion of NMS democracies from the standpoint of party-citizen dynamics and the socialising role of parties. She concludes that a 'culturalist' theory of democracy is needed based on a comprehensive analysis of civil society that properly describes the process of democratic consolidation; the latter should have been a process of radical cultural change for a real participatory turn (Herman 2015: 14–17). Democratic political learning through cognitive change among NMS populations, thus, turns out to be the main precondition for sustainable democratisation. In contrast, earlier mainstream theories have been unable to properly explain the current decline of democracy in the NMS because they have usually favoured a minimalist concept of democracy. As such, they have considered the creation of an institutional façade to be sufficient for the establishment of sustainable democracy.

Today, these arguments for "minimum democracy" are resurfacing in many NMS countries – and also among EU authorities – as a means of conflict avoidance. Even more significantly, political elites in some NMS countries have sought out the ideological protection of these minimalist theories in order to market their eroding democracies with authoritarian features as full democracies at home and abroad, as in the case of Hungary. In fact, in the historical trajectory of the NMS, two types of informal institutions have developed with democratic and autocratic variations. Some negative informal institutions such as clientele corruption networks have arisen gradually in the NMS and even become dominant, and thus, varieties of Potemkin democracy have emerged. It is only now finally – in response to this distortion of democratisation – that new forms of democracy-supporting informal institutions have been activated via citizens' resistance; they are substitutes for the declining/weakening large formal democratic institutions that are discussed below.

This process of voiding NMS democracy through the weaknesses of "positive," democracy-supporting informal institutions and the emergence of "negative," clientele-based informal institutions has been outlined by Rupnik and

Zielonka (2013). They offer a fresh approach to the history of democratisation by focusing on the conceptual framework of negative informal institutions and identifying a special NMS-type of these institutions in the comprehensive system of "closed" party patronage (see also Kopecky 2012). Non-transparent and corrupt clientele networks between the political and economic spheres have undermined the big formal institutions, and thus, been responsible for declining democracy. The overview offered by this comprehensive analysis also leads to the well-known theory of state/agency capture (see, e.g., Innes 2014) since it widens the picture of democracy's decline and draws attention to the process of oligarchisation in the NMS.[4]

In explaining the reasons for the 'democratic regression,' Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) place the contrast between formal and informal institutions at the centre of their analysis. They consider that to date, 'political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the study of formal institutions in the region such as parties, parliaments and courts. However, informal institutions and practices appear to be equally important in shaping and in some cases eroding democracy, and we know little about them' (Rupnik – Zielonka 2013: 3). In fact, there is more and more of a 'gap between the institutional design and actual political practices,' and hence, no sustainable democracy has emerged (Rupnik – Zielonka 2013: 7). These authors also point out the weaknesses of past assessments by noting the simple fact that political debates across the NMS region have omitted 'the role of informal politics in undermining formal laws and institutions' even though formal democratic institutions 'perform differently in different political cultures because of informal codes and habits' (Rupnik – Zielonka 2013: 12). They summarise the historical course of NMS countries as a road from democratic transition to 'democratic regression.' These countries embarked on their democratic transition in the '90s, and while they were considered consolidated democracies in the 2000s when they joined the EU, they have since slid back in a democratic regression. In sum, '[o]ver years, students of Central and Eastern Europe have acquired a comprehensive set of data on formal laws and institutions, but their knowledge of informal rules, arrangements, and networks is rudimentary at best.' The reason for the backsliding of democracy is, then, that 'informal practices and structures are particularly potent [in] Central and Eastern Europe because of the relative weakness of formal practices. Informal practices and networks gain importance when the state is weak, political institutions are undeveloped, and the law is full of loopholes and contradictions.' All in all, 'cultural anthropologists are

4 The distortion of civil society may take several forms (see Amnesty International 2015). There is a vast academic literature about 'uncivil society' and/or 'bad civil society.' The present study refers to the "negative" corrupt clientele networks that have prevailed over the "positive," democracy-supporting informal institutions in the NMS. These types of negative informal institutions have been analysed extensively by Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) while Innes (2014) sets out a theory of state capture.

probably more suited than political scientists to study social networks' (Rupnik – Zielonka 2013: 13, 14).

Thus, the new NMS literature has generally described the decline of democracy within a conceptual framework of oligarchisation, corruption networks and state capture as a historical trajectory 'from corruption to state capture' (Corruption Research Centre ACRN-CRCB 2015; see also EC 2014). Oligarchs' informal and corrupt clientele networks have produced a new kind of political system by turning big formal institutions into "sand castles" built on moving sand or, to a great extent, a façade, i.e. by reducing this new political system to some kind of Potemkin democracy. Corruption in the NMS is not a marginal phenomenon, but the very essence of the kleptocracy system in the "normal" workings of a Potemkin democracy. This system of power is, in fact, based on the joining of political and business groups in a fusion of economics and politics. These social clientele networks can be likened to a modernised system of "feudal" dependence or "vassalage," or to some kind of subordination pyramid providing mutual support and protection in exchange for certain privileges. In this kleptocratic system, the "vassals," clients or subordinates are organised into a large, nationwide political family. In this perverse world, everything is "legal," including corruption through public tenders since the rule of law has been turned into the "law of rule" or "rule by law." The politico-administrative elite have merged – or at least have been "synchronised" – with the oligarchical business elite to form a unified politico-business elite, who have legislated accordingly to make all their actions "legal." Following the tradition in the southern member states, European transfers in the NMS have been diverted from their original functions and mostly been distributed among the most influential oligarchs. The regulations on EU transfers have not disturbed these clientele networks, which have been completely adapted to suit this system, and thus, with the EU transfers, they have not only survived but also blossomed (Roth 2014).

Although the tensions between short-term "*responsive*" and long-term "*responsible*" government profiles have also appeared in advanced democracies (Bardi et al. 2014), blatant populism and the lack of a long-term strategy have caused far bigger distortions in the declining NMS democracies than in the West since these Central European countries have a long historical tradition as over-centralised states. Furthermore, this chaotic democracy in which the weak state fails to control parallel and complex socio-economic processes has also caused much "collateral damage" incidental to the intended target. Above all, this has produced unprecedented legal uncertainty due to the quickly changing short-term interests of clientele networks as well as the administrative incapacity of the politico-business elite, who have relied on strict political loyalty over professional selection processes. The practices of NMS governments and state administrations have indeed demonstrated the direct and close correlation

between the decline of democracy and poor governance (European Catch-Up Index 2014).

These deficiencies of declining democracies can be described – and measured – in terms of the classic twins of competition and participation. At the present stage of these declining democracies, competition has been restricted to parliamentary and municipal elections among party elites where there is relatively low participation, while in most cases, participation has been reduced to electoral participation. Competition has been eroded by the high level of apathy and the lack of state transparency. Citizens have remained without the meaningful information and strong motivation needed for proper action in the elections, let alone for non-electoral civic activities. Thus, in the NMS, there has been a complete absence of genuine participatory democracy after a quarter century of Europeanisation and democratisation. The democratisation of the NMS has so far followed a *top-down* historical trajectory that was not completed on the first try and has to be changed into *bottom-up* democratisation on the second try. Since formal democratic institutions have been incapacitated and democratic parties have proven elitist, democratic innovations must aim to elaborate this bottom-up democratisation strategy in order to renew the NMS democracies.

The "Western Fallacy," or a Simplistic Modernisation Theory for the NMS

Europeanisation and democratisation have often been called the Westernisation of the NMS, and rightly so since the NMS countries have wanted not only to catch up with the West in socio-economic terms, but also to create a democratic order following the Western model of democracy. This model is consensual according to both the majority of these populations and analysts in the NMS, but the real problem is how to get there. The major difficulty is the existence of a particular "Western fallacy" in the simplified modernisation theory applied to the NMS that presupposes a virtuous circle of legal-political, socio-economic and cultural-civic developments. This fallacy has been embraced by many NMS analysts and politicians since it has provided an easy, quick and optimistic model. This evolutionary model of copying the "West" in the "East" through "blueprint thinking" has assumed that the West offers not only a model of democracy, but also a road map leading to this model. From a socio-economic standpoint, this notion of the "Western Road" in the East presupposes that there is sustainable economic growth, which generates sustainable social development (leading to a strong middle-class and solving the problems of social inclusion) and that the ensuing prosperity creates sustainable participatory democratisation. Similarly, from a legal-political perspective, the idea is that the establishment of formal institutions generates strong informal institutions and so this mature civil society plays its proper role in mobilising citizens to control and balance the state.

As early as the 1990s, Ernest Gellner emphasised the importance of participatory democracy featuring a vibrant civil society for the new democracies. He therefore warned against viewing civil society as a space of atomised individuals:

> *Atlantic society is endowed with Civil Society and on the whole, at any rate since 1945, it has enjoyed it without giving much or any thought. Much contemporary social theory takes it for granted in an almost comic manner: it simply starts out with the assumption of an unconstrained and secular individual, unhampered by sociological or theological bonds, freely choosing his aims, and reaching some agreement concerning social order with his fellows. In this manner, Civil Society is simply presupposed as some kind of inherent attribute of the human condition* (Gellner 1996: 10).

Despite this warning, proponents of an Eastern carbon copy of the "Western Road" in the NMS have suggested that democracy will work properly after the establishing of formal institutions that will solve the problems in a virtuous circle of political-legal, socio-economic and cultural systemic changes supporting each other, even in the short term, in a sequence of positive, reinforcing feedback. However, this conceptual framework has proven false for the "Eastern Road" because it has taken into consideration neither the specific problems of the NMS' local/regional path dependence nor the negative externalities of the EU and globalisation. Earlier mainstream literature assumed that the formal institutions would "automatically" create informal ones in a positive spiral. In fact, however, a negative spiral has been set in motion in which the absence of informal institutions has eroded the formal ones. Moreover, civil organisations and civic attitudes have themselves been weakened by a series of socio-economic crises in the NMS, and some negative informal institutions have also been organised by politico-business clientele networks.

Nevertheless, thanks to the re-emerging role of "epistemic communities" of political analysts, recent democratic innovations have elaborated a new conceptual framework. This concept has relied on the analysis of social capital and trust in political institutions – matters that were neglected in NMS theories in the long era of strict optimism. The basic argument is that due to their inherited mental structures, people act habitually, and, in particular, their learned behaviours are cognitive templates representing specific informal institutions. Trust enables and facilitates cooperation, especially in conditions of uncertainty or rapid change. However, trust may also be destroyed by negative experiences; it may turn into distrust, suspicion or even hatred. In "low-trust societies," trust is predominantly embedded in personalised relationships and informal social networks, while in "high-trust societies," systemic or generalised trust is more developed and present in both public and private institutions and organisations. Essentially, in low-trust societies, there is a clear-cut separation between private and public. The

private space is one of security, trustworthiness and solidarity, whereas the public one is perceived as a dangerous and hostile arena of uncertainty. In the terms of Robert Putnam, bonding social capital (which is inward and person-oriented) and bridging social capital (which is outward and institution-oriented) must be distinguished. In these societies, bridging social capital is blocked by reciprocal suspicions, and it cannot reduce uncertainty and provide predictability; bonding social capital, on the other hand, is restrained by the legacies of private networks and closed communities due to the long and hostile history of oppressive statehood (see the extensive literature on this issue noted in Roth 2014).

Based on these inherited informal rules and institutions and reinforced to a great extent by the negative effects of the global crisis, a low level of trust in public institutions and politicians is very typical in the NMS. According to all the data, the NMS countries are, in fact, "low trust societies"; in the World Economic Forum rankings, Bulgaria, thus, ranks 130th, Croatia 124th, Czech Republic 138th, Hungary 113th, Poland 101st, Romania 109th and Slovakia 121st while Slovenia is in 133rd place (WEF 2014). In fact, in the formally EU-integrated NMS societies, the interplay of newly established Western-type formal institutions and old Eastern-type informal institutions produces major institutional dysfunctions. In the thicker definition of inclusive institutions, path dependency and the inertia of the institutions and behaviours have played very important roles alongside the destructive impact of socio-economic crises. Thus, a sophisticated process-tracing of the institutional setting is needed in order to explore critical junctures and punctuated developments and capture the rapid bursts of institutional change on EU accession and subsequent long stasis during membership. Even more significantly, since the 2000s, the new institutional set-up has generated an institutional drift away from the Western model towards some kind of "crony capitalism" accompanied by systemic corruption and renewed authoritarianism, as can now be best observed in Hungary.

Consolidation theories of the 2000s presupposed that the NMS had reached a point of no return since the civic culture was developed and embedded enough to ensure a certain resistance to crisis. But developments since the late 2000s have proved that instead of consolidation, there is a pattern of recurring crises in this region. This is partly due to the global crisis that has seriously hit the NMS, but mostly because of the inherent weaknesses of civil society since there has not been adequate societal resistance to the authoritarian turn represented by the clientele networks discussed above. Western Road theorists have ignored both the impact of socio-economic crises and the negative feedback between economic, social and political systemic changes, which undercut each other. Since the 2010s, their sunny-side narrative has increasingly turned into a dark-side narrative in the academic literature evaluating the last quarter century. Socio-economic crises have had a detrimental effect on both democratic norms

and the EU identity of the NMS populations, and hence, the old narrative has lost its analytical value.

All in all, the Western fallacy of easy and rapid democratisation through the establishing of big formal institutions has been confirmed to be not only false but also misleading for the NMS. The transfer of EU institutions has not generated the predicted automatism since inherited social networks – based on former non-democratic habits and practices – have prevailed and been increasingly activated by successive socio-economic crises over the last quarter century. Neither domestic democratic forces nor EU authorities have prevented the development of these negative informal institutions, and the result has been not only state capture, but also the "capture" of EU transfers by domestic oligarchs to a great extent. The decline of democracy began in the chaos of the '90s when emerging weak democratic states could not control multidimensional – political, economic, social and cultural – transformations. Moreover, the pressure of global crisis has also weakened the NMS, and the ensuing state capture by these powerful politico-business elites has been accomplished by maintaining a democratic façade, with some kind of oligarchic rule behind it. The "law of rule" or "rule by law," which replaces the rule of law, has created a legislative façade and non--transparent world to cover up corrupt business networks and the illegitimate political actions of the politico-business elite. These activities inside closed, negative informal organisations cannot be seen by "outsiders" and so both the abuse of political power and increasing wealth of oligarchs are mostly hidden from the population at large. It is no accident that transparency is the main weapon of the democracy-supporting organisations that are removing the pseudo-democratic façade and discovering the kleptocratic-clientelistic system behind it.

Conclusion: Civil Society-based Democratisation in the NMS as a Second Try

Informal politics have recently come to the fore worldwide, and especially in the NMS from the emerging perspective of re-democratisation. The EEA and Norway Grants Agency recently presented a report about the last five-year period (2009–2014) for democracy-supporting civil organisations in the NMS. The Grants Report is an assessment of the Agency's activities, but also provides a larger view on the situation in NMS civil society in general. The Agency's key task is to support 'vibrant civil society' by 'making democracy truly functional' and by 'strengthening the functioning of democratic institutions' (Grants Report 2015, Part 1: 1). In this respect, 'innovation challenge' is particularly important since 'working for social change requires innovation in thinking and acting to respond to the new realities.' The report notes that there have been some positive signs of the remobilisation of civil society in the NMS:

While the national NGO sectors are facing their challenges with innovation, the nature of civic action is rapidly changing worldwide. There is a new energy of individuals and groups beyond traditional NGOs – informal groups, bloggers and informal platforms in social media. [...] A critical challenge for both donors and NGOs is how to grasp the new dynamics, how to tap into this new energy for social change of various pop up civic initiatives, new interactive spaces and communities (Grants Report 2015, Part 1: 5).

In this new situation of remobilisation, the dismantling of state capture in the NMS has been a frequent topic on social media. One analysis by Open Society raises a vital question rarely touched upon in academic discussions: Can a think tank help expose a captured state? This is a very relevant issue that has been formulated in the broadest terms by democracy-supporting civil organisations. In order to confront state capture, the point of departure for this analysis is widespread apathy in the NMS in which 'people disheartened by mainstream politics either withdraw from political participation of follow simplistic populists who offer fantasies of systemic change.' Here the role of think tanks – or democratic civic organisations in general – begins since they can initiate the fight against state capture by way of a participatory turn:

But organisations that research, write, and analyse can go after a captured state at is source: the ideas driving it. [...] Think tanks can dig into the necessary systematic analysis of the structure of the state capture, providing watchdogs and advocacy organizations [...] Society and grassroots coalitions can thus focus their attention where the captors are weakest and create a source of public pressure on antidemocratic actors, to liberate the captured country. [...] Think tanks can offer intellectual support for these wide public coalitions by analysing the weak points of capture. Thins tanks should not only analyse the system but also devise and bring policy proposals into public discussions (Nosko 2014: 2–3).[5]

The activities of democracy-supporting civil organisations are instrumental in dismantling state capture since these groups can elaborate on and implement democratic innovations and organise/mobilise mass movements for participatory democracy. In this way, informal institutions have become the real battleground between democratic and anti-democratic forces in the NMS, and they have gained more and more influence. Informal institutions with their

5 According to Open Society, state capture appears to be the main disease in the NMS countries: 'A perverse pattern of "state capture" – substantial, institutionalized, particularistic, self-interested influence or control of unrepresentative actors over public finances of state policy formation and implementation – has settled over a number of countries [...] state capture is a systemic failure which occurs in a country without functioning checks and balances by design. [...] Deficiencies and loopholes become integral to laws and institutions' (Nosko 2014: 1).

democratic innovations have acted as "icebreakers" providing special political and policy instruments for a breakthrough in re-establishing democracy. It is not by chance that the authoritarian governments of some NMS countries have dubbed them 'agents of foreign powers.'[6]

In sum, reports from international and national informal institutions have dissipated the myth of "consolidated democracy" in the NMS and instead discovered that these facade democracies are only based on an illusion of effective competition and political participation. Politico-business elites have used many legal tricks to restrict the opposition, and they have manipulated official communications by using and abusing the politics of historical memory – that is, by creating the images of enemies through the falsification of history. Thus, with the erosion of the formal checks-and-balances system of formalised macro--institutions, the balancing and mobilising roles of democracy-supporting informal micro-institutions have been upgraded. They cannot replace big formal institutions, but they can offer powerful corrective mechanisms against the backsliding of democracy. Above all, they can provide mobilising networks for participatory democracy. Civic organisations have become the most important actors in democratic innovations, and this includes the scientific-expert innovations initiated by the research of the NMS academic community. Within the system of external-internal linkages, democracy-supporting international NGOs and/or policy institutes have played an important role worldwide, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance is one example (IDEA 2014). These organisations specialise in democratic innovations and their implementation, and the importance of their work has increased recently, especially in countries with big democracy deficits. As such, the national institutions supporting democracy in the NMS have either taken part directly in global institutional networks like Transparency International and the Helsinki Committee, or they have emerged to address specific national civic, local, minority and gender issues. In most cases, these two kinds of NGOs are closely interwoven and the "national" NGOs usually also receive some support from the international NGOs. Overcoming widespread apathy, the participatory turn is very high on the agenda in the NMS. After the long period of top-down democratisation and ensuing decline of democracy, bottom-up democratisation may offer the NMS a second try at re-democratisation.

6 In this paper, I have focused on general NMS developments accompanying the decline of democracy (see also my previous publications: Ágh 2013a,b, 2014a,b and 2015a). I have not dealt with recent Hungarian developments since these are the focus of another forthcoming work by me under the title *Redemocratization Efforts in Hungary as a Second Try: Civil Society Organizations and Mass Movements* (in press). I have also authored several recent papers on the Hungarian party system and the country's participatory revolution; see, e.g., Ágh (2015 b).

References

Amnesty International (2015): Report 2014/15, The State of the World's Human Rights, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/.

Ágh, Attila (2013a): *Progress Report on the New Member States: Twenty Years of Social and Political Developments*, Budapest: Together for Europe Research Centre, p. 104.

Ágh, Attila (2013 b): The triple crisis in Hungary: The 'Backsliding' of Hungarian Democracy after Twenty Years. *Romanian Journal of Political Science* (PolSci) 13 (1): 25–51.

Ágh, Attila (2014a): The fall of the Berlin Wall and European politics: Perspectives of new Europe in the early twenty-first century, pp. 116–131, in Magone, José (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, London: Routledge.

Ágh, Attila (2014 b): Decline of democracy in East-Central Europe: The last decade as the lost decade in democratization. *Journal of Comparative Politics* 7 (2): 4–33.

Ágh, Attila (2015a): De-Europeanization and de-Democratization trends in ECE: From the Potemkin democracy to the elected autocracy in Hungary. *Journal of Comparative Politics* 8 (2): 4–26.

Ágh, Attila (2015 b): The Transformation of the Hungarian Party System: From the Democratic Chaos to the Electoral Autocracy. *Südosteuropa* No. 2.

Ágh, Attila, Tamás, Kaiser and Boglárka, Koller (eds) (2014): *10 Years After: Multi-level governance and differentiated integration in the EU*, Budapest: Together for Europe Series, p. 207.

Banac, Ivo (2014): Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall, *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 653–657, Special Issue on the Post-1989 Developments in the Region.

Bardi, Luciano, Stefano, Bartolini and Alexander, Trechsel (2014): Responsive and Responsible? The Role of Parties in Twenty-First Century Politics. *West European Politics* 37 (2): 235–252.

Bertelsmann Foundation (2015): Next Generation Democracy, www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org and http://www.bti-project.org/next-generation-democracy.

Corruption Research Center ACRN-CRCB (2015): From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework, http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org.

Demetriou, Kyriakos (ed.) (2013): *Democracy in Transition: Political Participation in the European Union*, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, p. 289.

Dimitrova, Antoaneta (2010): The new member states of the EU in the aftermath of enlargement: do new European rules remain empty shells? *Journal of European Public Policy* 17 (1): 137–148.

EC, European Commission (with Transparency International) (2014) EU Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, 3. 2. 2014, COM(2014) 38 final, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf.

EEA and Norway Grants Report (2014): Mid Term Evaluation of the NGO Programmes under the EEA and Norway Grants (2009–2014), http://eegrants.org.

EIU, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015): Democracy Index 2014, http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download & campaignid=Democracy0115.

Epstein, Rachel and Wade, Jacoby (2014): Eastern Enlargement Ten Years On: Transcending the East-West Divide?. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (1): 1–16, Special Issue on Eastern Enlargement Ten Years On

ESF, European Science Foundation, Forward Look (2012) *Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe*, Strasbourg: ESF, p. 67.

European Catch-Up Index 2014 (2014): Lessenski, Marin (ed.) The Gravity Effect: Findings of the European Catch-Up Index 2014, European Policies Initiative-Open Society Institute, December 2014, http://eupi.osi.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001 & p=0070 & g.

Gellner, Ernest (1996): *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*, Penguin Books.

Heidbreder, Eva (2012): Civil Society Participation in EU Governance, http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2012-2/.

Herman, Lise Esther (2015): Re-evaluating the post-communist success story: party elite loyalty, citizen mobilization and the erosion of Hungarian democracy. *European Political Science Review* 7 (1): 1–34.

IDEA, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2014): Constitution-building, http://www.idea.int/publications/constitution-building-a-global-review/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile & pageid=65189.

Innes, Abby (2014): The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (1): 88–104, Special Issue on Eastern Enlargement Ten Years On.

Kopecky, Petr, Peter, Mair and Maria, Spirova (eds) (2012): *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies*, Oxford University Press, p. 415.

North, Douglass (1990): *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge University Press

Nosko, Andrej (2014): Can a Think Tank Help Expose a Captured State? 5 November 2014, Open Society Think Tank Fund, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/can-think-tank-help-expose-captured-state.

Pogrebinschi, Thamy (2014): The Pragmatic Turn of Democracy: Combining Representation and Participation", WZB (Wissenschaft Zentrum Berlin) Report 2014, pp. 55–58.

Roth, Klaus (2014): The implementation of EU Funds in Southeast Europe, 84–93, in Ágh, Kaiser and Koller (eds).

Rupnik, Jacques and Jan Zielonka (2013): The State of Democracy 20 Years on: Domestic and External Factors. *East European Politics and Societies* 27 (3): 1–25, Special Issue on The State of Democracy 20 Years On.

WEF, World Economic Forum (2014) Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf.

***Attila Ágh** is a Professor in the Political Science Department at the Budapest Corvinus University. He was the founder and the former Head of Department of Political Science at this University, the Director of the Research Centre "Together for Europe"*

and also the President of the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA). He was a visiting professor at many universities from Aarhus to Vienna, and also from New Delhi to Los Angeles. His major research interest is comparative politics with special regard to the EU developments, focusing the Europeanization and Democratization in the New Member States. He has published more than twenty books and dozens of papers in the international journals. Email: attila.agh@chello.hu.

I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union

JOHANA GALUŠKOVÁ, PETR KANIOK[1]

Abstract: *This article analyses development of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union (PermRep) from 2004, when the Czech Republic joined the European Union, until 2013. Its main aim is to test four concepts related to the three neoinstitutionalist theories – firstly, the path dependency and critical junctures models related to the historical neo-institutionalism, secondly principal-agent relation typical for the rational neo-institutionalism and the concept of the logic of appropriateness related to the sociological institutionalism. The authors try to determine which of these four models have the best explanatory potential when it comes to the development of the Czech PermRep. After analysing three independent variables (changes in executive, EU Council Presidency, EU strategies), and their impact on the dependent variable (character of the Czech PermRep), the authors conclude that particularly historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism models have the greatest explanatory power while the contribution of rational institutionalism model of principal-agent is relatively weak.*

Keywords: ***Permanent Representation to the EU, neoinstitutionalism, path dependency, critical junctures, principal-agent, logic of appropriateness***

Introduction

Recent research on the Europeanization of EU member states political systems[2] has included responses of institutions within these political systems to the EU. As typical examples of such can be used national parliaments and coordination processes related to the EU agenda (e.g., Wright 1996, Kassim 2000, Sepos 2005). What has not come under scrutiny to this point is the institution of the

1 This article has been written under the grant Europe in Changing International Environment (MUNI/A/1316/2014).

2 An overview is available in Goetz – Meyer-Sahling 2008.

permanent representations of the member states to the EU. Their significance is particularly that they serve in each country as a point of contact between the European and national levels (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2014). Their role is particularly crucial in coordination and communications among capitals and EU institutions: without PermReps, EU and national levels would remain in isolation and the administration of European issues would become ineffective. PermReps are strikingly ambivalent institutions — although being part of a country's domestic political system, their permanent location in Brussels nevertheless weakens their national loyalty to a considerable extent.

For these reasons, it is surprising that adequate research into PermReps has not yet been carried out. This study aims to fill this gap by providing an analysis of how the PermRep of the Czech Republic functions as an institution. Our analysis is anchored in theories of neoinstitutionalism. It aims to determine how the Czech PermReps developed during the period from the country's accession to the EU until late 2013, and whether and to what extent this development may be explained by assumptions defined under theories of neoinstitutionalism. In this context, our analysis targets Rational Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism[3]. We pose a major research question and three auxiliary questions to determine which of models related to these theories best explicates development of the PermRep. Our analysis takes the form of an instrumental case study that draws on documents issued by relevant institutions and on interview with former PermRep diplomat. To explain the development of the PermRep to the EU, we are looking for the best theoretical explanation. As a main result, we found that the Czech PermRep is a highly stable institution. Development of the PermRep was determined by preceding historical developments and corresponded to some elements of the logic of appropriateness and concept of critical junctures. Historical Institutionalism assumptions therefore have the greatest explanatory potential, followed by Sociological Institutionalism concept of logic of appropriateness. Scenarios predicted by Rational Choice Institutionalism and its principal-agent model were not confirmed.

Our article importantly expands our knowledge of how institutions involved in promoting national politics perform within the EU environment. Its theoretical contribution is limited – we are aware that we take into account only fragments of the neo-institutional theories and therefore we do not aspire to generalize our findings or evaluate neo-institutional theories as a whole.

The text is structured as follows: The first part comments on relevant research. After that we explain theoretical background and key concepts. The third section

3 The fourth neo-institutional theory is represented by Discursive Institutionalism that explains the causes behind changes by means of ideas and discursive interaction (Schmidt 2010: 5). Because this article focuses on changes caused by external factors, we omit this theory from our theoretical framework.

sets out the research questions, briefly explains methodology used and specifying our data. The analysis itself is contained in sections four through seven. Last part of the article summarizes findings and puts them into research context.

Literature Review

Any attention PermReps have gotten so far in the literature has been almost entirely in the form of descriptions and overviews. Themes covered include PermReps' size, staffing, and their function and position within the structure that coordinates the European agenda in the country concerned. Case studies represent clear majority of work; comparative and theoretical articles are scarce.

The most comprehensive view of PermReps' role has been provided in an anthology by Kassim et al (2001) focusing on the national coordination of the European agenda. Kassim and Peters (2001: 311–324) see the most substantial similarities in the manner by which some functions of PermReps are fulfilled, particularly regarding delivery of documents, communication with EU institutions, and the creation of bases for national negotiators. On the contrary, most important differences are found in the influence held by PermReps, their position within coordination structures and in their performance of particular functions.

Majority of research on PermReps focus on their functions. A study by Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne and Mayor Lopez (1989) using examples of Ireland, France and Spain to deem the educative role PermReps play for national governments. Blair (2001) makes a similar observation. He identifies the function of PermReps to be 'a natural point of connection between the interests of member states and institutions' of the European Union (Blair 2001: 22). He sees the negotiations between the national and European levels to be the most important function of the PermReps.

Some attention has also been devoted to the PermReps in studies of the coordination mechanisms for the European agenda (for the new member states, see, e.g., Dimitrova – Toshkov 2007, Panke 2010, Gärtner – Hörner – Obholzer 2011). PermReps are analysed particularly as actors involved in coordination mechanisms. Anecdotal mentions of PermReps can be also found in a bunch of works on the Council of the EU (e.g., Spence 1995, Hardacre 2011).

Within the Czech Republic, the PermRep has almost been neglected as a topic. The exception is a study by Karlas et al. (2013) focused on the role of the PermReps in coordinating the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certain attention to the PermRep is also paid in yearbooks published by the Institute of International Relations (e.g., Beneš – Karlas 2009; Beneš – Braun 2010; Beneš – Braun 2011). In these cases, however, the PermRep is not analysed as an institution but as an actor in Czech foreign and European policy.

Theoretical Background

Various neoinstitutional theories differ in four basic aspects. First, they differently conceptualize key term 'institution'. Second, they vary in their answers to the question whether states or institutions came first. And third, diversity can be identified in their conceptualizations of the influence held by institutions over states and vice versa. Last but not least, neoinstitutional theories disagree on structure-actor issue. Thus, the neo-institutionalist approach as a whole offers several options for explaining development and behaviour of institutions (Kratochvíl 2008: 134–136).

Rational Institutionalism assumes that the actors act rationally having fixed preferences and pursuing strategic goal to maximize them. Institutions are structures through them actors minimize problems connected with collective negotiations. Thus, institutions are beneficial because they reduce negotiation costs and increase predictability of actors involved (Schmidt 2010: 5–6; Kratochvíl 2008: 137).

The most widespread model connected with Rational Institutionalism is *principal-agent*. According Braun and Guston it is 'a special type of social relationship in which two actors exchange resources' (Braun – Guston 2003: 303). Under this relationship, principal owns resources but is incapable of using them to attain results required. Therefore an agent as entity to which the principal transfers resources is needed. Thus, countries delegate authority for institutions they have created with the aim of maximizing benefits. However, delegating authority to the agents gives rise to a degree of insecurity. The principal cannot confidently say whether the agent will carry out its entrusted duty.

Historical Institutionalism approach defines institutions as 'formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy' (Hall – Taylor 1996: 6). Institutions are seen as a stable part of history pushing development forward. The first important term used in Historical Institutionalism is *critical junctures*. Capoccia and Kelemen define them as 'relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest' (2007: 348). This probability must be substantially higher in this time period then under normal development. The second key concept employed in HI is *path dependency*. It stresses that 'history matters', since it forms future development (Ebbinghaus 2005: 5–6). The model is based upon actors' decision-making being influenced by the past or current form of institutions. Key point is the extent to which prior decisions influence institutions' future developmental alternatives (Ebbinghaus 2005: 16).

Sociological Institutionalism, considers institutions as 'symbols, scripts and routines which act as filters through which actors interpret their situation, their particular place in it, and the most appropriate course of action for whatever deci-

sion faces them (Harty 2005: 54). Institutions are not set up by rational actors but reflect the cultural background and habits of their communities. The institutional structures form the norms and values that subsequently govern and influence actors (Kratochvíl 2008: 141). Authority is also perceived differently as Sociological Institutionalism emphasises legitimacy and trust (Niemann –Mak 2009: 10).

The first key Sociological Institutionalism term is '*institutional isomorphism*' describing a process in which institutions within the same environment draw closer[4]. Institutions thus accept behavioural patterns to ensure their legitimacy. This approximation gives rise to institutional change (DiMaggio – Powell 1983: 150). Another important concept represents *'logic of appropriateness'* assuming that actors' behaviour is not motivated by maximal benefits but instead by what is right or expected (Niemann – Mak 2009: 10). The concept is based upon the presumption that actors are willing to maintain rules and observe them in their everyday activity because they consider them 'natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate' (March – Olsen 2009: 3). Although behaviour governed by the logic of appropriateness bears evidence of moral action, it may also be inspired by historical models and the lessons learnt from them. If rules have been used in the past and proved to be effective, actors opt for them again (March – Olsen 2009: 4, 12).

In line with the theories outlined, this study presents three explanations. Firstly, an explanation made through the Rational Institutionalism logic of principal-agent model: the PermRep, as an institution established by a national state, adjusts its form to the domestic political situation. Under the principal-agent model, the PermRep is the agent and the government is the principal. Secondly, from the standpoint of Historical Institutionalism and its path-dependency and critical junctures models, it may be presumed that the setup, functioning and role of the PermRep depend upon its prior development, and upon key moments that have shaped its existing form. Thirdly, Sociological Institutionalism refers to inspiration the institution might have gotten from other EU member states and their coordination systems, and to the process of learning and adapting to themes discussed and strategies adopted by the EU. Therefore, we expect that the PermRep would develop according norms and patterns important for the EU.

In keeping with theoretical expectations, we pose the following research question:

Which of the concepts related to the three approaches of neo-institutionalism best explains the development of the Czech PermRep to the EU?

4 However, significant divergence in the individual mechanisms of EU member states is a general trend in the national coordination of the European agenda despite the effort to harmonize these mechanisms (Kassim, Peters, Wright 2000: 12).

To be able to identify which concepts best describes the development and form of the PermRep, the following sub-questions are asked:

Sub-question 1: *Have changes in the executive influenced the personnel, structural and coordination components of the PermRep?*

In view of its size and importance, it hardly seems suitable to treat the PermRep as standard embassy. The impact of European immigration makes the PermRep a unique actor. Its tasks are not limited to the interests' representation but the PermRep is responsible for their promoting as well. Therefore we assume that a change in the executive may lead to change in the composition of the PermRep. Nevertheless, we do not expect a complete staff replacement after every change of government. There are likely to be politically motivated appointments to the three highest-level posts, those at the ambassadorial level: the head of the PermRep, the deputy head of the PermRep, and the representative in the Political and Security Committee.[5] We do not take into account changes at the level of ordinary diplomats (attachés, heads of units) for whom politically motivated change is not a factor, because their work is not primarily political in nature. Changes to the structural component involve issues as the reorganization of individual units traceable to changes in the government. When it comes to the coordination changes, we take into consideration the position of the PermRep within the EU affairs national coordination structure.

Sub-question 2: *Was the* PermRep *reinforced within the coordination structure during the Czech EU Council Presidency?*

As EU Council Presidency increases demands on national EU affairs coordination systems, we assume that such consequences of the Presidency should be reflected in the functioning of the PermRep. Concerning management of the Presidency, Czech Republic selected the so-called mixed model consisting of a combination of capital-based and Brussels-based models. Mix model thus assumes significant involvement of the PermRep as well as its increased autonomy (Kaniok 2010: 73, Tomalová 2008: 121–122). The Presidency thus logically opens the door to reinforcing the PermRep even after its end. We therefore focus on whether the PermRep's role was reinforced during the preparatory phase for the Presidency, that is, whether the institution's capacity was increased.

Sub-question 3: *Has the PermRep reacted structurally to any preference shown for particular EU themes?*

5 In the Czech case, the political nature of these posts is notable if the careers of former ambassadors are examined. Milena Vicenová (ambassador in 2008–2012) served as Minister of Agriculture in the first government of Mirek Topolánek, Jan Kohout (ambassador in 2004–2008) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the governments of Jan Fischer and Jiří Rusnok. The first permanent representative, Pavel Telička, became directly involved in politics in 2014, as an MEP representing ANO.

This sub-question will help us identify whether the development of the PermRep may be explained using Sociological Institutionalism. If so, the institution's structure will have been adapted to reflect the themes preferred, as well as to strategic plans and concepts adopted in the EU, particularly in the Council of the EU. More specifically, we focus on the amended Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy. Both strategies incorporate a midterm outlook for the EU that takes in a broad range of policies, and both discuss key issues. Europe 2020, in particular, requires that member states undertake a number of economic reforms, and these changes are frequently structural in nature. Thus we may assume that if the EU emphasises particular themes, this preference will be reflected in the structure of the PermRep, either as a reinforcing or moderating influence on some of its units.

Methodology and Data

Our analysis represents a case study (George – Bennett 2005), specifically an instrumental case study that tests existing theories (Kořan 2008: 33–35). It focuses on the role the Czech PermRep plays and analyses its form and role in coordinating European issues.

Our dependent variable *'Character of the PermRep'* has two values — *'stability'* and *'change'*. Dependent variable is analysed at two different levels — the personnel level and organizational level. The value *'stability'* is assigned if no changes have occurred in structural or organizational factors that are attributable to the independent variables. The value '*change*' is given if personnel or structural-organizational changes have in fact occurred.

Three independent variables are studied. The *'Executive'* independent variable may be followed on three levels. First is the personnel level: here, we examine whether a change in the executive has led to changes in the three ambassadorial posts. To take the natural diplomatic cycle into account, we consider the impact of the *executive* independent variable during the six months after formation of a new government. Second, structural changes the new executive may implement at the PermRep are also relevant. This prompts us to follow whether, over a six-month period,[6] any units of the PermRep have undergone reorganization. And, finally, we examine whether any change in the executive has changed the position of the PermRep within the national EU affairs coordination system.

The *'Presidency'* independent variable is relevant for all above mentioned concepts. If the Presidency country is to meet or exceed expectations generally awaited from the Presidency, it must ensure that Council negotiations at all

6 We believe that six-month period is an adequate time to follow changes in the personnel level and in the PermRep's structure. Within four-year electoral cycle, a period of several weeks would be too short to objectively assess any changes. In contrast, a longer time period, e.g., a year, would be subject to influences we do not follow, such as the natural rotation of the PermRep's staff.

levels are efficient and of high quality (Kaniok 2010: 26–27). For a successful Presidency, the PermRep must be reinforced, particularly by having its capacity increased. The changes that occur under the Presidency may therefore be interpreted as constituting a critical juncture (Historical Institutionalism), stemming from the logic of appropriateness (Sociological Institutionalism). Conversely, from perspective of Rational Institutionalism, the Presidency may be perceived as an ideal opportunity to promote interests of the national actors controlling the PermRep (Kaniok 2010: 46).

The third independent variable is *'EU strategies'*. Their impact can be expected at the organizational–structural level. After Czech EU accession, two significant strategies were adopted: the Lisbon Strategy adopted in 2000 (and its amended version from 2005) and the Europe 2020 strategy adopted in 2010. As Member states are expected to increase the attention they devote to themes emphasized by the EU, the PermRep's structure should change in line with themes preferred in the strategies, both nominally and operationally.

Table 1 captures anticipated scenarios for the behaviour of the independent variables should they follow various theoretical expectations. As analysed models are not in every case exclusive, we minimize risk of misinterpretation by providing the most detailed explanation when it comes to the impact of independent variables.

Table 1: Impact of Independent Variables on the PermRep Based upon Theoretical Expectations

	Principal-agent	Critical junctures/ Path-dependency	Logic of appropriateness
Executive	Dependent Variable – change PermRep staff changes in dependence on changes in the executive. The PermRep is subject to the interests of the government in office, which may change. A change in the executive also leads to structural changes in the organization of the PermRep.	Dependent Variable – stability The PermRep has developed stably; change in the executive does not mean change in its staff or in the coordination system. Changes result from long-term development and are not simply a reaction to the wishes of domestic actors. To a large degree, the institution is autonomous.	Dependent Variable – stability The PermRep does not react to the needs of domestic actors and a change in the executive does not mean any staffing, structural or coordination changes. If changes occur, they are in the form of input following from the culture of the environment in which the institution is operating. The PermRep acts in line with the logic of appropriateness.

	Principal-agent	**Critical junctures/ Path-dependency**	**Logic of appropriateness**
Presidency	Dependent Variable –change There are changes in staff, in the coordination system and the PermRep is reorganized. The PermRep is one of the players and does not enjoy an exclusive position. After the Presidency has finished, the PermRep original structure is restored.	Dependent variable – change The Presidency is a key moment with the potential to modify the development of the institution and influence its future path. As a result of the Presidency, the PermRep reinforced its position within the coordination system.	Dependent variable –change The PermRep's capacity increased; the PermRep is a key player in the preparation and realization.
EU strategy	Dependent Variable – change/stability Changes at the PermRep occur only if it is in the interest of domestic actors. If topics preferred by the national government are concerned, changes at the PermRep occur.	Dependent Variable – change/stability The impact of strategies is negligible. It may be identified only if the strategies are considered as path breaking events. Otherwise, the path dependency concept prevails.	Dependent Variable – change The emphasis on strategy-related themes results in the fact these topics are stressed at the PermRep. Units charged with the new themes are established or the themes become part of the existing units thereby modifying their role.

Source: Authors

Change of Government/Government Coalition

When analysing the *'Executive'* independent variable, we focus on personnel, structural and coordination changes at the PermRep. The personnel changes at the PermRep were followed for the posts of ambassadors, specifically the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the EU, Deputy Permanent Representative, and the Permanent Representative to COPS. Table 2 provides an overview of individual governments and ambassadors.

Table 2: Overview of Government Coalitions and Terms of Office of PermRep Ambassadors

Executive	Permanent Representative	Deputy Permanent Representative	COPS
7/2002 – 9/2006: ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU	1/2003 – 4/2004: Pavel Telička 5/2004 – 1/2008: Jan Kohout	5/2004 – 9/2005: Luděk Stavinoha 8/2005 – 1/2011: Jana Reinišová	5/2004 – 7/2004: Petr Mooz 9/2004 – 8/2009: Ivo Šrámek
9/2006 – 1/2007: ODS	5/2004 – 1/2008: Jan Kohout	8/2005 – 1/2011: Jana Reinišová	9/2004 – 8/2009: Ivo Šrámek
1/2007 – 5/2009: ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ	5/2004 – 1/2008: Jan Kohout 1/2008 – 9/2012: Milena Vicenová	8/2005 – 1/2011: Jana Reinišová	9/2004 – 8/2009: Ivo Šrámek
5/2009 – 7/2010: caretaker government	1/2008 – 9/2012: Milena Vicenová	8/2005 – 1/2011: Jana Reinišová	8/2009 – 7/2013: Václav Bálek
7/2010 – 7/2013: ODS, TOP-09, VV	1/2008 – 9/2012: Milena Vicenová 9/2012 – Martin Povejšil	8/2005 – 1/2011: Jana Reinišová 8/2011 – Jakub Dürr	8/2009 – 7/2013: Václav Bálek
7/2013 – 1/2014: caretaker government	9/2012 – Martin Povejšil	8/2011 – Jakub Dürr	8/2009 – 7/2013: Václav Bálek 8/2013 – David Konecký

Source: Authors

From a political standpoint, the most interesting post is that of the Permanent Representative. Although there has been no change of appointment to this post within six months after the forming of a new government coalition, some changes have nevertheless been accompanied by significant discussion. An example is the early termination of Jan Kohout's term of office. Kohout was replaced with Milena Vicenová in January 2008 instead of ending in May of that year. However, the government decided to make the replacement early, justifying this choice by reference to the approaching Czech EU Council Presidency. According to Alexander Vondra, then Deputy Minister for European Affairs, the change would have occurred sooner or later anyway (Lidovky 2007). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a similar view of the matter. It confirmed that the change of appointment would improve collaboration between the Prime Minister's office and the PermRep (iDnes 2007). Thus, although change happened after six months period following existence of new cabinet, the step was clearly politically motivated. This conclusion confirms also stormy political discussion

following this replacement. The loudest criticism came from opposition ČSSD, whose cabinet had appointed Kohout to the position in 2004 (Ihned 2007).

While in the case of Deputy Perment Representative no changes related to the shifts in executive can be found, Table 2 shows that two cases involving COPS took place within the six-month timeframe. These two cases concern Václav Bálek, appointed in 2009 after the caretaker government took office, and David Konecký, who was appointed in 2013, once again after a caretaker government had taken office. Nevertheless, in both cases, the change was natural, since the predecessors to both Bálek and Konecký had served for five and four years respectively.

The second level of the analysis deals with structural changes in the PermRep. The PermRep was established by Government Resolution No. 208, dated 27 February 2002, under which the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the European Communities was transformed to the PermRep. Prior to the Czech Republic EU accession, the Permanent Mission served as a standard embassy. The Permanent Mission consisted of 6–7 departments. It was headed by the ambassador and deputy ambassador (Interview with former PR employee, 2014).

Immediately after Czech accession to the EU did the structure of the PermRep begin to assume the fixed form which characterized it, with minor modifications, until 2014 (Interview with former PermRep employee, 2014). The oldest available record of the organizational structure dates from 2005. At that time, four departments and twelve units were created, as depicted in Table 3.

Table 3: Organizational structure of the PR in 2005

Department/section	Unit
COREPER II	Legal Affairs Unit
	Financial Unit
	Trade Policy Unit
	Justice and Home Affairs Unit
COREPER I	Sectorial Policies Unit A
	Sectorial Policies Unit B
	Agriculture and Environment Unit
Political and Security Committee (COPS)	Unit of Internal EU Relationships
	Unit of Common Foreign and Security Policy
Committee for Internal Operations and Personnel Agenda (VCHOD)	Central Secretariat
	Financial-Economic Unit
	Information Technology Unit

Source: Authors

The Permanent Representative and Deputy Permanent Representative stood at the helm of the PermRep. The former was responsible for COREPER II agenda whilst the latter dealt with COREPER I units. Two other units (COPS and VCHOD) were managed by the Deputy Head of the PermRep charged with Common Foreign and Security Policy (Permanent Representative to COPS) and the Deputy Head of the PermRep charged with Internal Operations and Personnel Agenda, respectively (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2005). In late 2004 and early 2005, the Cabinet of the Permanent Representative was established. It consisted of the Permanent Representative, member of the Antici group and COREPER II secretary. Next, a Cabinet of the Deputy Deputy Permanent Representative was created, consisting of the COREPER I ambassador, a member of the Merten group and COREPER I secretary (Interview with former PermRep employee, 2014; Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2005).

Another organizational structure was introduced within the PermRep in 2008. Its basic parts were units defined as a '*comprehensive units responsible for the PermRep's operation within their individual competency*'. The units were grouped into departments/sections. This organizational structure also allowed setting up working groups (permanent or temporary) that focused on specific issues (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, not dated). With the exception of cosmetic changes consisting in modifications to the section's names, only a single substantial change occurred: the Military Section was established under the COPS department.

The final organizational scheme comes from 2013. At that time, minor terminology modifications were made and sections were re-named as working groups. Their definitions, however, did not change. Terminology modification also took place at the level of the offices that made up COREPER I, COREPER II and COPS. They were labelled the 'Secretariat' (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, 2013). Both COREPER I and COPS have remained unchanged; they consist of secretariats and working groups identical to the offices and sections under the previous organizational structure. The structure within units/working groups did change in COREPER II and VCHOD. Previously unified Financial and Trade Policy Unit split into two independent working groups. Under the VCHOD section, the IT working group has remained. However, new working groups were established: Administration and Human Resources; Finance and Property; and Operation and Technology. In 2013, the PermRep had four departments/sections and 14 units/working groups.

The third level of analysis focuses on changes in the EU affairs national coordination system. Typically, the European agenda is in the Czech case shifted between two key coordination centres: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Government. Because key changes in the coordination system for European affairs took place in line with changes in the executive (Galušková 2012: 39), we may assume the PermRep was also affected, particularly in terms of changes to its position versus the superior entity.

Gärtner, Hörner and Obholzer (2011: 90) call the Czech coordination system as decentralised and highly complex whereas Karlas describes it as semi--centralized and pluralist (2009: 4). In more practical terms, quite many actors are involved in the coordination system. The most significant represent the Office of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PermRep, the Prime Minister, the President, and previously the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs (Karlas 2009: 6).

Table 4 depicts where the main Coordination Centre for European Affairs was located and what significant changes in EU affairs coordination took place, as well as which institution managed control over the PermRep.

Table 4: Influence of Change of Government in the Position of the PermRep within the Coordination System for EU affairs

Executive	Coordination Centre	Position of the PermRep
7/2002 – 9/2006: ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9/2006 – 1/2007: ODS	11/2006 – post of the Secretary to the Government for Coordination of Czech Presidency was established; the Secretary was not a member of the government	Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1/2007 – 3/2009: ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ	2007 – the post of Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs was established – weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs
5/2009 – 7/2010: caretaker government		
7/2010 – 7/2013: ODS, TOP-09, VV	7/2010 – post of the Minister for European Affairs cancelled – the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reinforced. 9/2011 – the post of the State Secretary for European Affairs under the Office of the Government was established along with the State Secretary for European Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, close collaboration with the Office of the Government
7/2013 – 1/2014: caretaker government	8/2013 – post of the State Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cancelled thereby reinforcing the Office of the Government	Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, close collaboration with the Office of the Government

Source: Authors

As a body, the PermRep is placed among Czech permanent missions and delegations that subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several units supervising the PermRep can be found – EU General Affairs Department, the EU Policies Department, the European Community Law Department and the Common Foreign and Security Policy Department (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2010).

Another coordination change that took place was related to the Czech Council Presidency. As the responsibility concerning Presidency organization was shared between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs (Government Resolution dated 12 March 2007, No. 210), the PermRep reinforced its relations with the later body. From an institutional point of view, the PermRep remained part of the foreign mission network in 2007 but was now explicitly 'governed jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs' (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2007). Although the PermRep was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has earned certain autonomy. First, PermRep directly participated in the Committee for EU and could independently communicate with the Ministerial Coordination Group. Moreover, Beneš and Karlas (2008: 71) point out that a new 'communications triangle involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PermRep, and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs' was created. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs, as the new coordination actor, thus brought uncertainty into the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PermRep (Beneš – Karlas 2008: 71–72).

After the Presidency, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs was cancelled. This had also impact on PermRep's position in the national coordination system. Subsequent lack of clarity regarding simultaneous existence of two Secretaries for European Affairs moderately strengthened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly the Minister, since there was no 'member' of the Government to look after the European agenda (Galušková 2012). The PermRep remains an associate member of the Committee for EU at the working level (Statute of the Committee for EU 2014) and collaborates with the Ministerial Coordination Groups at individual ministries (Beneš – Braun 2011: 72).

How can we evaluate the influence the *'Executive'* variable has over the dependent variable? While the Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism scenarios were built around the stable form of the dependent variable, principal-agent model anticipated changes in all areas examined.

As the analysis shows, the assumptions of Rational Institutionalism do not work well. The PermRep has undergone stable development and does not react to national turbulence caused by change to the executive. To a certain extent, the PermRep tends to develop autonomously, independently of the wishes and interests of domestic actors. This trend is notable when it comes to personnel

choice, and at the structural-organizational level. On this level, the assumption of stable, uninterrupted development in Historical Institutionalism, offering an explanation for *path dependency*, seems to be confirmed. Four main departments/sections remained active throughout the existence of the PermRep. The only unit that was not part of the PermRep's 2005 organizational structure was the military unit. However, according to a former PermRep employee, military topics were among agendas covered by COPS already from 2003 (Interview with former PR employee, 2014). This means the unit was established only formally.[7] Moreover, stability may also be demonstrated in the PermRep's position within national EU affairs coordination system. The PermRep developed in parallel with shifts in competency along an axis running from the Office of the Government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically from the Prime Minister/Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs to the Foreign Minister and back. Although many changes and events affecting PermRep's position occurred, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be regarded as the entity to which the PermRep is responsible. For the PermRep, paradoxically, any changes that weaken the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mean more independence and the establishment of more intensive contacts with the other components in the coordination system. When the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs as a new actor in the coordination structure was introduced, the PermRep got an opportunity for greater independence and reinforcement of its position among the entities coordinating the EU agenda. What is important, the PermRep maintained this position also after the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs had been abolished. This development provides evidence that the PermRep's position within the coordination system may be considered a *path dependency* process. In this respect, the PermRep acts autonomously and in spite of the fact that the EU affairs coordination system in the Czech Republic is not considered stable, this instability had no significant impact on the PermRep's position.

Elements of Sociological Institutionalism can be regarded as complementary explanations of the *path dependency* model. The fact that only minor changes occurred within the organizational structure throughout the development of the institution implies that the initial design proved its worth. The PermRep became accustomed to it, and it regards it as effective. Aside from minor changes, the structure of the PermRep established in 2003 proved to be permanent. Minor changes taking place concerned particularly names of individual units and their mergers or splits. No significant change thus took place (Interview with

7 The exact year in which the military unit was established is questionable. Although the statements by the former PermRep employee (Interview with a former PR employee, 2014) and Málek (2009) confirm that the PermRep's structure was reorganized to include military themes immediately after Czech Republic joined the EU, organizational structure from 2005 does not include it (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2005).

Former PermRep employee, 2014). The PermRep drew inspiration for its basic setup from the PermReps of other EU member states. Its structure engineered to suit the European environment. This particularly means that the individual departments and units/working groups reflect configurations of the Council of the EU (Interview with Former PR employee, 2014).

Czech EU Council Presidency

The performance of the Czech EU Council Presidency can be divided into several phases. First one is the preparatory phase launched already by early 2005. During this phase, the Presidencies of other EU member states were evaluated. Systematic preparations for the upcoming Presidency started in October 2006, when the post of the Secretary to the Government for Coordination of the Czech Presidency in the Council of the EU was established (Government resolution dated 25 October 2006 No. 1238). As already mentioned, major changes to the EU affairs coordination system took place in this period. Although originally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with coordinating the Presidency, this duty was later shifted to the Secretary to the Government. Finally, it was the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs that served as the key coordination body (Galušková 2012: 31).

The PermRep played in this preparatory phase an important role. More importantly, because of the nature of the model selected for the organisation and coordination of the Presidency, it acted autonomously. With its extensive experience in the European environment, the institution took part in all preparatory work. Its knowledge of the Council working and its access to positions held by EU member states enabled the PermRep to submit unique analyses and documents relevant for the preparatory work. These were later used by individual ministries (Kaniok 2010, 96–97). For instance, the PermRep prepared a list of legislation having high importance for the Presidency (Kaniok 2010: 142). It also took part in creating the media communication strategy or in scheduling meetings between the central coordination body and individual ministries (Kaniok 2010: 97).

In terms of the PermRep's structure and organization, there was an increase in the number of employees during the preparatory phase: their number doubled from the regular approximately 100 employees to 200–220. To maintain continuity, the mandate of many employees who had worked at the PermRep from 2004 was extended until 2009 (Interview with former PermRep employee, 2014).

During the Presidency, the PermRep reinforced its position as the 'key link between the Czech administration and Union bodies' (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009). The PermRep chaired over all meetings of the Council of the EU in Brussels at the COREPER and COPS levels (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009). In terms of organization and logistics, the PermRep also bore responsibility for political meetings among ministers. A total of 146 PermRep diplomats

were authorized to chair meetings of 150 working groups. The PermRep also worked closely with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare 34 meetings on the level of ministers and two European Councils (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2009). PermRep diplomats also played an important role in negotiating between the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP) (Kaniok 2010: 159). In the area of negotiations, the coordination system was decentralised: PermRep diplomats worked independently; they were not forced to consult every step they took (Kaniok 2010: 153, 159). The PermRep also helped administer the Presidency agenda database and, with individual ministries, ensured information entered in the system was up-to-date (Kaniok 2010: 161).

Throughout the Presidency, the PermRep maintained close contact with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs, particularly via video conference (Beneš – Braun 2010: 72). The intensive communication between PermRep diplomats and the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs took place because the PermRep was capable of acting autonomously. In the same way, the PermRep coordinated its activities with the Committee for EU on the working level (Kaniok 2010: 162).

Even after the end of the Presidency, when the PermRep and the coordination mechanism for EU affairs returned to their 'original' form, the PermRep maintained intensive contacts with the Section for European Affairs that operated under the Office of the Government, particularly via the Committee for EU on the working level (Beneš – Braun 2011: 70). The PermRep remains an associate of the Committee (Statute of the Committee for EU 2014) and its representatives have an opportunity to work with individual Ministry Coordination Groups. The PermRep's role in formulating the Czech Republic's positions in the EU legislative process was thus reinforced (Beneš; Braun 2011: 71). The PermRep also showed greater initiative in communicating and establishing contacts with Czechs working in the European Commission and the EP (Beneš – Braun 2011: 72).

In other words, the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU presented the PermRep with a unique opportunity to prove itself as a capable component in the coordination system. Testimony to this is that, although the Presidency was evaluated fairly negatively from a political point of view, the diplomats and persons responsible for preparing and chairing the individual meetings were praised. For the PermRep, the Presidency was beneficial not only for its reputation but also because it built a network of contacts. Reinforcement is also noticeable in informal meetings among ambassadors, e.g., of the Visegrad Group (Beneš – Braun 2011: 72).

The impact of the *'Presidency'* independent variable may be found for expectations derived from Historical Institutionalism and Sociological institutionalism. Their theoretical explanations are, complementary. By contrast, the assumptions of the principal-agent model were not confirmed. In terms of the PermRep's or-

ganization, no significant reform related to the preparatory phase took place. In terms of changes in coordination, there is an observable connection to the preparations for the Presidency. The changes prompted benefits especially for the PermRep and its independent development, which is not in line with the principal-agent concept.

Historical Institutionalism and its concept of critical junctures offer the greatest explanatory capacity. The Presidency, as a new experience demanding enormous commitment, represented a critical juncture with potential to change the PermRep's role. During the Presidency and as a consequence of it, the PermRep reinforced its position within the national EU affairs coordination structure and initiated close collaboration with other national coordination actors, as well as with European institutions and partners.

Match between assumed and real values of the dependent variable can be also found when it comes to Sociological Institutionalism. This approach however anticipated that change would be due to different reasons. The starting point is the logic of appropriateness expecting that the Presidency will follow norms and patterns set up before. In the Czech case, such behaviour can be traced down already in the preparatory phase. Number of employees was increased in order to ensure smooth conduct of Council business, relations within the 'European environment' reinforced and the PermRep as an expert on Brussels was substantially involved in the preparation and performance of the Presidency. Specifically from the point of view of Sociological Institutionalism, another fact was relevant: during the Presidency and its preparatory stage, mandates of some diplomats were extended so that the 'institutional memory' was maintained.

EU Strategies

Documents we examine under the '*EU strategies*' independent variable include the Lisbon Strategy (more precisely, its amended version adopted in 2005), and Europe 2020 adopted in 2010. The institution's organizational structure in 2005 will be compared to that in 2008 and 2013, identifying potential changes. These changes concern not only the creation/elimination of individual units, but also modifications of units'scope. Because both strategies focus on socio-economic agendas, our analysis does not deal with units administering agendas related to foreign policy or the security agenda as well as internal operations of the PermRep. Comparing the organizational structure will allow us to determine whether the Sociological Institutionalism approach, which assumes the PermRep adapts to strategic themes, is applicable.

Tables 5 and 6 depict three PermRep organizational structures as overviews of their units and agendas. Sections that could be most influenced by the themes of both strategies are those focused on trade and financial policies and sectorial policies A and B.

Table 5: Agenda of Individual Units in 2005

Section	Agenda
Legal Affairs	Legal expertise, Court of Justice, human rights and minorities, contact with NGOs, IGC, future of Europe and enlargement.
Financial	EU tax policy, EU budget, multi-annual financial framework and monitoring, OLAF, insurance, capital movement, money laundering, regional development, structural funds, Cohesion fund, EU funds, EU grants and loans, EMU, contact with EIB and statistics.
Justice and Home Affairs Unit	Schengen – civilian component, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police collaboration and terrorism.
Trade	Expert level of Art. 133 Committee, development and humanitarian aid, EFTA, trade issues, trade and development, anti-dumping, commodities and customs issues.
Agriculture and Environment	Horizontal and sector agenda on environment, air, hazardous substances, rural development, commodity agenda, CAP, veterinary issues, fisheries and CAP control mechanisms.
Sectorial Policies A	Technical harmonization, consumer protection, participation in EU foreign aid, energy, nuclear energy issues, EU transportation policy, competition, public procurement, public support, telecommunication and post services, Galileo, enterprise policy, industry and competitiveness.
Sectorial Policies B	Company law, industrial and intellectual property, social policy, employment, labour market, culture, audio-visual field, education and youth, public health, pharmaceutics and medical devices.

Source: Authors

Table 6 presents a similar schema, but for the years 2008 and 2013, the time period in which goals promoted by the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 should have been fulfilled.

Table 6: Agenda of Individual Units in 2008 and 2013

Section	Agendas in 2008	Agendas in 2013 (changes compared to 2008)
Legal Affairs and Communication	Institutional relations among the PR and EP, European Court of Justice, consultancy in EU legal affairs, issues of protocol, PR spokesperson, public relations, communication strategy and contact with media.	No change.

Section	Agendas in 2008	Agendas in 2013 (changes compared to 2008)
Financial and Trade Policies	Financial and tax policy, EMU, statistics, regional policy, free movement of capital and services, funds from the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, contact with EIB, European Court of Justice and ECB. Tax statistics, external trade relations, common commercial policy, anti-dumping and sensitive commodities, trade agenda and ACP, monitoring of strategy development, development in policies, legislation and management of EU funds connected to these areas.	Only a formal separation occurred resulting in two independent units: Financial Policy and Trade Policy. Agendas remained unchanged.
Justice and Home Affairs	Judicial collaboration in criminal matters, police collaboration, fighting terrorism, organized crime, corruption, financial and economic crime, civil security, anti-drug, migration and asylum policies.	No change.
Agriculture and Environment	Agriculture, biotechnics, phytosanitary and veterinary issues, fisheries, rural development, sectorial operational programs, agenda under the Alimentarius codes, trade negotiations, monitoring of strategy development, development in policies, EU legislation and drawing monies from the corresponding funds.	No change.
Sectorial Policies A	Competitiveness and entrepreneurship connected to horizontal issues of the internal market, transportation, telecommunications and information society, competition, energy and nuclear safety, monitoring EU conceptual documents and legislation and drawing monies from relevant funds, where necessary.	No change.
Sectorial Policies B	Education, culture, audio-visual field, work and social affairs, science and research, youth, professional qualification, company law, consumer protection, protection of intellectual and industrial property, monitoring of strategy development, development in policies, EU legislation and policies, providing from drawing monies for CR projects under the European Social Fund and the corresponding EU programs.	No change.

Source: Authors

When comparing the organizational schemata and the scope of individual units in 2005 and 2008, it is clear that the adoption of the (revised) Lisbon Strategy had no impact concerning the agenda covered by the PermRep. But it clearly influenced scope of individual units tasked with monitoring the development of strategies adopted by the EU. However, there is no specific note of the Lisbon Strategy (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, not dated).

Similarly, tasks carried out by working groups in 2013 do not differ from those carried out by units under the preceding organizational structure. Nor

can it be said that Europe 2020 changed the scope of the PermRep. Similarly as with the 2008 structure, the working groups continued to be charged with monitoring the development of EU strategies, policies and legislation adopted. However, there is no specific note of Europe 2020's objectives in the description activities of the working groups in 2013.

The themes promoted by the Lisbon strategy and Europe 2020 were part of the PermRep's agenda from the very beginning. It may thus not be said that the institution ignored or refused to pay attention to themes accentuated by the EU. The contrary is true: as noted above, the original structure of the PermRep was quite durable and this was also reflected in the agenda of individual units. The strategies adopted in the Council of the EU thus had no significant influence over the structure that had been established.

The independent variable in question did not influence the form taken by the PermRep, and should thus be assigned the value 'stability'. Thus the greatest explanatory ability may be ascribed to Historical Institutionalism and its concept of path-dependency: EU strategies clearly do not represent watershed moments that could change the form of the PermRep in the sense of a radical reconfiguration of its structure and scope. It becomes clear that the institution has conformed to the structure established at its establishment, a feature typical for the *path dependency* concept (Pollack 2008: 4). In other words, once institutions choose a path, they tend to follow it, because the cost of any potential change is too high. Only watershed events have the potential to change the institutions' course; this, however, was not confirmed in the case of the EU strategies.

Complementary to Historical Institutionalism are elements of Sociological Institutionalism, specifically the logic of appropriateness. Although neither strategy led to clear changes in the organization, shifts may be noted in the scope of units/working groups and emphases placed on key themes closely related to the strategies.

Principal-agent model was hardly to evaluate as both strategies had very small saliency for Czech politics. Although Czech governments incorporated both documents into their policies, no specific interest or problem was identified.

Conclusion

The PermReps of EU member states are among the least studied actors involved in promoting national interests in the EU. While the PermReps of the old member states received at least some coverage, it is hard to find any information about the PermReps of the new member states. This article has attempted to close the gap and examine the extent to which the roughly 10 year development of the Czech PermRep may be explained on the basis of the key assumptions contained in three neoinstitutionalist theories. The analysis took in the account

impact of the three independent variables — *Executive*, *Presidency* and *EU strategies* — on the development of the PermReps.

To answer our key research question — which of models related to neo-institutionalist theories best explains PermRep development — we constructed further three sub-questions. After finding answers to them, we have found that historical models seem to be best suited to explain the logic behind the development of the independent variables. The potential for sociological logic of appropriateness was adequate but nevertheless not impressive. The lowest explanatory ability came with the rational model of principal-agent. What does this imply?

First, limited capacity of principal-agent model does not mean that Rational Institutionalism as a theory is incapable of explaining the situation with European integration. The success of historical and sociological models may be caused by the fact that any PermRep is a specific institution which differs from regular embassies or parts of EU political system. Moreover, Czech PermRep's unique and strong position is also result of unsteady and turbulent approach towards the EU which characterized Czech political elites. The Czech 'EU policy' is typically marked by changes appearing after each executive's alternation in the EU affairs coordination system. On the other hand, it is evident that institutions depart from their principals, they act independently, and they are subject to influences that the principals fail to control. On this level, our study confirms conclusions of studies focusing on the socialisation of actors in the committees of the Council of the EU and particularly on shifts in their loyalty (e.g., Lewis 1998, Lewis 2005, Aus 2008). Our findings also show that changes in the PermRep are gradual and internal. In this regard, it would be interesting to test the assumptions of Discursive Institutionalism and try to analyse PermRep discourse. However, as PermReps work behind closed doors, this direction of further research represents rather wishful thinking than real option. Such research would require either a long-term stay by a researcher at the PermRep, or access to a large body of internal documents.

From a purely empirical viewpoint, Czech PermRep seems to be an institution resilient to influences with the potential for long-term change. The path established for the PermRep at its beginning continues to be functional. There is therefore no reason for change. On the other hand, events providing new opportunities and potential to change the PermReps's future course do exist. An example was the Council Presidency and its preparation[8]. Apart from such

8 There are good reasons to believe that importance of the Council Presidency for the PermReps prevails even after changes in the Presidency system which was done by the Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty excluded from the Presidency's power only the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. In other policy areas and formations of the EU Council, rotating Presidency kept its influence and responsibilities. For evaluation of the post-Lisbon Council Presidency see for example Warntjen 2013, Batory – Puetter 2013 or Puetter 2014.

potential critical junctures, the PermReps is permanently under the influence of the EU and other PermReps, which make it to be sensitive to its partners' requirements and can accommodate them. Influence of this environment, PermRep self-perception and its history thus seem to be much more influential than potential wishes of domestic principals. Czech PermReps is thus likely one of the few elements to ensure the continuity and stability of Czech European politics, perhaps the only such component.

References

Aus, Jonathan P. (2008): The Mechanism of Consensus: Coming to Agreement on Community Asylum Policy, in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (ed.): *Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Government Play in Brussels*. Houndmills/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 99–118.

Batory, Agnes – Puetter, Uwe (2013): Consistency and Diversity? The EU's Rotating Trio Council Presidency after the Lisbon Treaty. *Journal of European Public Policy* 20 (1): 95–112.

Beneš, Vít – Karlas, Jan (2008): Evropský rozměr české zahraniční politiky, in Kořan, Michal (ed.): *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2007: Analýza ÚMV*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 61–91.

Beneš, Vít – Braun, Mats (2010): The European Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy. In: Kořan, Michal (ed.): *Czech Foreign Policy in 2007–2009: Analysis.* Praha: Institute of International Relations, 59–92.

Beneš, Vít – Braun, Mats (2011): Evropský rozměr české zahraniční politiky, in Kořan, Michal (ed.) *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2010: Analýza ÚMV*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 57–91.

Blair, Alasdair (2001): Permanent Representations to the European Union. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12 (3): 173–193.

Braun, Dietmar – Guston, David H. (2003): Principal-agent theory and research policy: An introduction. *Science and Public Policy* 30 (5): 302–308.

Capoccia, Giovanni – Kelemen, Daniel R. (2007): The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. *World Politics* 59: 341–69.

DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1983): The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality, in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review* 48 (2): 147–160.

Dimitrova, Antoaneta – Toshkov, Dimiter (2007): The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In? *West European Politics* 30 (5): 961–986.

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (2005): Can Path Dependence Explain Institutional Change? Two Approaches Applied to Welfare State Reform. MPIfG Discussion Paper 5 (2). Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Galušková, Johana (2012): Vývoj koordinace evropské agendy v České republice. Bakalářská práce. Masarykova univerzita, Brno.

Gärtner, Laura – Hörner, Julian – Obholzer, Lukas (2011): National Coordination of EU Policy: A Comparative Study of the Twelve 'New' Member States. *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 7 (1): 77–100.

George, Alexander L. – Andrew Bennett (2005): *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Goetz Klaus H. – Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik (2008): The Europeanisation of national political systems: Parliaments and Executives. *Living Review of European Governance* 3 (2). Available at: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-2

Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C.R. (1996): Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44: 936–57.

Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona – Lequesne, Christian – Pedro, Mayor Polez (1989): The Permanent Representations of the Member States to the European Communities. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 28 (2): 119–137.

Hardacre, Alan (2011): *How the EU Institutions Work and…How to Work with the EU Institutions*. London: John Harper Publishing.

Harty, Siobhán (2005): Theorizing institutional change. In Lecours, André (ed.) *Neo-institutionalm, theory and analysis*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kaniok, Petr (2010): *České předsednictví Rady EU: most přes minulost*. 1. vyd. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav.

Karlas, Jan (2009): The Executive Coordination of the Czech EU Presidency. All Academic Research. Available at: http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/5/2/pages310523/p310523-6.php

Karlas, Jan – Weiss, Tomáš – Šlosarčík, Ivo – Dostál, Vít (2013): Systémová koordinace evropských záležitostí: Středně velké státy a SZBP. *Mezinárodní vztahy* 48 (4): 5–26.

Kassim, Hussein – Peters, Guy B. – Wright, Vincent (2000): *National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kassim, Hussein – Menon, Anand – Peters, Guy B. – Wright, Vincent (2001): *The National Coordination of EU Policy. The European Level*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kassim, Hussein – Peters, Guy B. (2001): Conclusion: Coordinating National Action in Brussels – a Comparative Perspective, in Kassim, Hussein – Menon, Anand – Peters, Guy B. – Wright, Vincent (ed.): The National Coordination of EU Policy. The European Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 297–342.

Kořan, Michal (2008): Jednopřípadová studie. In: Druhák, Petr (ed.): *Jak zkoumat politiku: kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích*, 29–61. Praha: Portál.

Kratochvíl, Petr (2008): *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál. 224 s. ISBN 978-80-7367-467-0.

Lewis, Jeffrey (1998): Is the 'hard-bargaining' image of the Council misleading? The COREPER and the local elections directive. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36 (4): 479–504.

Lewis, Jeffrey (2003): Institutional environment and everyday EU decision making. Rationalist or constructivist? *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (1–2): 97–124.

Málek, Jan (2009): Postoj České republiky k evropské bezpečnostní a obranné politice. Bakalářská práce, Filozofická fakulta UK.

March, James G. – Olsen, Johan, P. (2009): The logic of appropriateness. ARENA – Centre for European Studies Working Papers 04/09.

Niemann, Arne, and Mak, Jeannette (2009): How do norms guide Presidency behaviour in EU negotiations? UCD Dublin European Institute Working Paper 09–10.

Panke, Diana (2010): Good Instructions in No Time? Domestic Coordination of EU Policies in 19 Small States. *West European Politics* 33 (4): 770–790.

Pollack, Mark A. (2008): The New Institutionalisms and European Integration. Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB 1.

Puetter, Uwe (2014): The Rotating Council Presidency and the New Intergovernmentalism, *The International Spectator* 49 (4): 18–32.

Sepos, Angelos (2005): The National Coordination of EU Policy: Organisational Efficiency and European Outcomes. *Journal of European Integration* 27 (2): 169–190.

Schmidt, Vivien A. (2010): Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'neo-institutionalism'. *European Political Science Review* 2 (1): 1–25.

Spence, David. (1995): Negotiations, Coalitions and Resolution of Interstate Conflicts, in M. Westlake (ed.) *The Council of the European Union*. London: Cartermill.

Tomalová, Eliška (2008): Možnosti nízkoprofilového předsednictví, in Jan Karlas a kolektiv autorů (ed.): *Jak předsedat Evropské unii? Návrh priorit předsednictví ČR v Radě EU v roce 2009*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů.

Warntjen, Andreas (2013): The Elusive Goal of Continuity? Legislative Decision-Making and the Council Presidency before and after Lisbon. *West European Politics* 36 (6): 1239–1255.

Wright, W. (1996): Negotiating the Quagmire: Mechanisms of EU Policy Coordination, in Richardson, J. (ed.), *Policy-Making in the EU*, London: Routledge.

Electronic sources

idnes (2007): Vláda chce odvolat českého velvyslance v Bruselu. Available at: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/vlada-chce-odvolat-ceskeho-velvyslance-v-bruselu-f6h-/domaci.aspx?c=A070724_101325_domaci_miz.

Ihned (2007): Vláda chce předčasně odvolat Kohouta, ČSSD to kritizuje. Available at: http://ihned.cz/3-21676330-jan+kohout-000000_d-ff.

Lidovky (2007): Velvyslanec v Bruselu končí. Available at: http://www.lidovky.cz/velvyslanec-v-bruselu-konci-d1u-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A070724_093235_ln_domov_fho.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2005): Materiál poskytnutý tiskovým odborem Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČR.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2007): Vyhodnocení institucionálního zajištění členství.

České republiky v Evropské unii v období od 1. května 2007 – 31. prosince 2007. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/evropska_unie/vyhodnoceni_institucionalniho_zajisteni.html.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí (2009): Role SZ během předsednictví. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/evropska_unie/ceske_predsednictvi_2009/-zastupitelske_urady-representation_brussels-publish-cz-evropska_unie-ceske_predsednictvi_2009-role_staleho_zastoupeni_behem.html.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2010): Útvary MZV. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/organizacni_struktura/utvary_mzv/index.html.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2013): Organizační struktura SZ. Materiál poskytnutý tiskovým odborem Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČR.

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2014): O Stálém zastoupení. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/o_stalem_zastoupeni/index.html

Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. nedat. Organizační struktura SZ. Materiál poskytnutý tiskovým odborem Ministerstva zahraničních ČR.

Interview with former PR employee (2014).

Statute of the Committee for EU (2014).

Government Resolution dated 27 February 2002 No. 208.

Government resolution dated 25 October 2006 No. 1238.

Government Resolution dated 12 March 2007 No. 210.

Johana Galušková *is PhD student of European studies at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno. Her main interest is a coordination of EU affairs at domestic levels. Email: johana.galuskova@volny.cz.*

Petr Kaniok *works as Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk University. His research focuses on the EU institutions, Euroscepticism and Czech politics. He can be reached at kaniok@fss.muni.cz.*

Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014

HENRIETT KOVÁCS AND URSULA K. MINDLER-STEINER

Abstract: *This paper deals with the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014 and the ongoing debate about how to assess Hungary's involvement in the Holocaust. By introducing the Holocaust Memorial Year 2014, erecting the Monument on the German Occupation and initiating a Memorial to Child Victims of the Holocaust (the House of Fates), the Hungarian government tried to establish a common narrative about the Holocaust in Hungary. For various reasons, however, this attempt failed. Instead, it turned out that the anniversary year 2014 fostered the emergence of diverse new cultures of commemoration at different levels of society. This study discusses the reasons for these developments and provides an overview of the (public) events surrounding commemorations in the Holocaust Memorial Year, thus exploring Hungary's process of coming to terms with its past. The events in 2014 were accompanied by disputes at multiple levels that were held in the public domain and involved all types of traditional and modern media. This study highlights the reactions to several statements and explains how they came about. Our aim is to engender interest in further scholarly examination.*

Keywords: ***Hungary, Budapest, Holocaust, memory, memorial, museum***

Research Context

The subject of this paper is the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014 and the debate about how to assess Hungary's involvement in the Holocaust, a politically charged topic that is the focus of current discussions about Hungary's history. This connects to events surrounding the 2014 commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Holocaust in Hungary. Although the discussion has been intense, it would be a mistake to assume that it has been followed by the entire country. In fact, outside of Budapest, the capital, the general public has not shown much interest. The debate is basically being held among different politically engaged intellectual groups and has also been characterised by its polemics, including personal attacks on opponents. This – as well as the fact that the controversy has not yet cooled

down – puts certain restrictions on our efforts to approach the topic from a purely academic position.

After the fall of state socialism, Hungary and other Central European countries which had existed under Communist rule until 1989 developed new cultures of commemoration. The fact that they had been among the losers of both world wars made it even more difficult for Hungarians to come to terms with their past. It should be taken into consideration that "open societies" west of the "Iron Curtain" had more opportunities to cope with their fascist past than former "socialist" states. Thus, cultures of commemoration in Eastern and Central Europe may reveal certain delays in this respect. Moreover, these developments differ from country to country, and the Hungarian debate serves as only one example. In order to explore Hungary's process of coming to terms with its past, we take as our case study the events surrounding the commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Holocaust in Hungary, which took place in 2014.

Hungary and Memory

Although in 1944 more than 400,000 Jews were deported from Hungary and most of them murdered, Hungary's Jewish community is today one of the largest in Europe. This is partly due to the fact that in contrast to the fate of Hungary's rural Jews, many of the Jews living in Budapest were able to escape annihilation in 1944, and most Hungarian Jews today live in the capital. While Budapest – and the *Zsidónegyed* (Jewish Quarter) in particular – has recently experienced a boom, turning 'from ghetto to hot spot' (Weber-Steinhaus et al. 2011), both the city and Hungary as a whole have made the headlines abroad in a more unfavourable light, not least due to anti-Semitic incidents (e.g. Bognar 2012; Roser 2012; APA 2012; Rásky 2012; JTA 2013; A. Kovács 1999; Ungváry 2012). Against this backdrop, the Hungarian government has been trying to improve the country's image. The year 2014 was designated the Holocaust Memorial Year. In this way, the government tried to "exculpate" itself internationally from accusations that it was not fighting anti-Semitism sufficiently. Nonetheless, it did not succeed. What was meant to create and establish a common narrative on Holocaust history ended with mudslinging and highly-charged debates and a struggle for interpretive predominance over history. And all of this was carried out publicly.

This research paper shows how the government failed to establish a common narrative on the Holocaust in Hungary when it introduced the Holocaust Memorial Year 2014 and erected two central monuments. This outcome may not have come as a complete surprise since in Hungary, as in other countries, the politics of memory and history have been characterised more by conflict than by consensus. This, too, will be no surprise since the roots of this contest

can be found in the interwar period. Hungarian intellectuals have been divided since the 1920s when *népiek* (folklorists) and *urbánusok* (urbanists) shaped intellectual life (Borbándi 2000). After the First World War and the subsequent loss of territory, some saw the rural population as the only social group with a promising future and others located this promise in the urban bourgeoisie (Borbándi 2000; Papp 2012). To this day, the (supposedly irreconcilable) differences between the Hungarian national and international (often labelled "Jewish") approaches to "Hungarian memory" typify this debate, and reconciliation seems impossible. Under Communism, the dispute between "folklorists" and "urbanists" was silenced by the state or at least this appeared to be the case. In fact, it survived the Communist Kádár regime (Oplatka 2015: 110). After 1989, it re-emerged and became a virulent force in party politics, particularly within the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. Initially, today's governing party, FIDESZ (then the Alliance of Young Democrats and now the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance) aimed to overcome this split. However, after 1994, it took a turn from liberal to conservative, adopting the legacy of the "Democratic Forum," which basically vanished from the scene (Ripp 2011).

Our research shows that unlike former debates, the disputes of 2014 were no longer mere discussions among historians published in professional journals, but were now carried out on multiple levels. All types of traditional and modern media (especially the Internet and social networks) were used by the participants in the discussion. Moreover, the proponents published their articles in several languages (often Hungarian, German and English) in order to address not only a national but also an international audience. The character of the debates became personal, particularly in the case of the discussion between the historians Krisztián Ungváry and Mária Schmidt (e.g. Schmidt 2014a; Ungváry 2014d).

A vast number of newspaper articles, comments and blog posts were published in these discussions but there was hardly any scholarly literature (for exceptions, see Pető 2014; Marosi 2014; Ungváry 2014d). In her article, Andrea Pető, a professor at Central European University in Budapest and researcher of social and gender history, oral history and the Holocaust, considered non--remembrance as a conscious strategy of not participating in the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust in Hungary. She argued that there was an absence of 'dialogic remembering,' and rather, the 'lack of common language, the imprisonment of a "true" versus "false" dichotomy is contributing to the further polarisation of the Hungarian memory culture' (Pető 2014). This accords with the (culturally) historical preconditions mentioned above. Drawing on national and international media, the current study, while still preliminary research, is an attempt to review the course of events in 2014 from a (trans)national perspective. We discuss the chain reaction triggered by some statements and why this transpired. Our hope is to engender interest in addi-

tional scholarly examination. This paper is a work in progress since the debate is informed by complex discourses that continue to circulate.

All the incidents discussed here must be placed in a broader context. They are accompanied by (inter)national debates on Hungarian history and historiography, including particularly those on the classification, interpretation and assessment of recent Hungarian history. Academics from several disciplines, including historians, cultural and media studies scholars, political scientists and sociologists have named and analysed political turning points, key events, places of remembrance and spaces of memory. Publishing in several languages, they have reached out to an international audience (e. g. Kovács – Seewann 2004; von Klimó 2006; Gröller – Balogh 2011; Pók 2014). At stake here are not only issues of historical memory and commemoration but also those of political legitimising and identity (religious and national) and the matter of identifying victims and perpetrators. As in the case in many Western as well as Central and Eastern European countries, memories of the Holocaust have been suppressed for decades and made "taboo," at least on the surface (cf. É. Kovács 2003).

This paper is divided into several parts. First, we discuss the literature available on the issue of Hungary and the Holocaust and provide some background information on Hungarian (Holocaust) history. Second, we follow the historical course of events during the Holocaust Memorial Year 2014. We then address the construction of the Monument on the German Occupation and the *Sorsok Háza* (House of Fates) project and discuss how they were perceived by different groups (the "public," politicians and academics).

Hungary and the Holocaust

As Andrea Pető (2014: 4) has stated: 'After the forcible forgetting of memory policy under communism, a memory bomb exploded in 1989.' The year 1989/90 brought not only political upheaval but also a reassessment and re-actualisation of history (Fritz 2008: 128). Only a few early publications were available (see, e.g., Lévai 1948) before American historian and political scientist Randolph L. Braham wrote his comprehensive and pioneering works on the Holocaust in Hungary (e.g. Braham 1981; Braham 1984; Braham 2001).[1] Since then, the number of debates and publications on the topic has increased considerably (see, e.g., Gerlach – Aly 2002; É. Kovács 2004; Ungváry 2005; Molnár 2005; Kádár – Vági, 2013; É. Kovács et al. 2014; Laczó 2014). In recent years, the so-called Hungarian historians' dispute has caused quite a stir. The argument among the historians Krisztián Ungváry, László Karsai, Mária Schmidt and

1 There is only scope to name a few of the relevant authors in this article. For further reading, please see the bibliographies edited by Braham (1984; 2001). We would like to express our gratitude to Stefan Benedik, Dieter A. Binder, Christina Griessler, Éva Kovács, Carla MacDougall, Christoph Ramoser, Gert Tschögl and Heidemarie Uhl.

Mária M. Kovács has centered on the preamble to the new Hungarian constitution (of April 2011) and the question of responsibility for the deportation of Hungarian Jews in 1944 (e.g. Schmidt 2014 b; M. Kovács 2014; Csuhaj 2014). Recent works dealing with the politics of history in Hungary since 1944/45 (e.g. Fritz 2012) focus on individual Jewish fates (e.g. Molnár 1995), discuss the issue of Jews and the Holocaust in Hungarian commemorative culture since 1945 (e.g. Seewann – Kovács, 2006; Fritz 2006; Fritz – Hansen 2008) or analyse representations of the Holocaust in museums (e.g. Fritz 2008; Pölcz 2012) or memorials (Taylor-Tudzin 2011). In the "Memorial Year" itself, several books were published, some of which were supported financially by the state-sponsored Civil Fund 2014. Well-known public personalities and scholars contributed to the multidisciplinary book *Magyar Holokauszt 70 – veszteségek és felelősségek* (The Hungarian Holocaust 70: Losses and Responsibilities); they included the biochemist Máté Hidvégi, sociologist Viktor Karády, Rabbi József Schweitzer and Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, David Harris, to name just a few (Babits 2014). The book History and Remembrance (Hunyadi – Török 2014) consists of papers presented at a conference organised by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Among other things, it contains a long hoped for statement about the discussion of the Holocaust Memorial Year by the Academy. Special attention should also be drawn to a published series on the situation of Jews in Hungary and, in particular, its volume four about Budapest (cf. Karsai – Karsai 2014).

As we have seen, the "historians' dispute" initiated a discussion about responsibility. What role had the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1944), Miklós Horthy (1868–1957) and many other Hungarians played in the deportation of Hungarian Jews? Most of the above-mentioned scholars concluded that Hungary was the first European state to enact an anti-Semitic law after the First World War and that the Hungarian political position on the Jews was quite ambivalent. On the one hand, the Hungarian government had declined to hand over the Jews to the German Reich during the Second World War. On the other, three further anti-Semitic laws had been passed; (fascist) Hungarians as well as Hungarian troops had murdered Jews; and tens of thousands of male Jews were conscripted for dangerous *Munkaszolgálat* (fatigue duty). On 19 March 1944, German troops took over Hungary and German Nazi official Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) was in charge of organising the deportation of the Jews. Nevertheless, Miklós Horthy remained in power. From March until July 1944, more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau where the majority were murdered. This was, then, the quickest deportation carried out in the history of the Holocaust. Emphasising the role of the Hungarian perpetrators and bystanders, Máté Hidvégi has said: 'Apart from the responsibility of the Nazis we must not forget the responsibility of those, who have assisted to this tragedy cowardly and without taking care of the events' (quoted in Holokauszt

2014: 70). Under international pressure, Horthy stopped the deportations in July 1944. Some historians infer that he had had enough power to end them in May, but did not do so. Horthy was forced to resign on 15 October 1944 when the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross took power. Horthy's intervention had saved the lives of many Jews but the Arrow Cross continued to deport Hungarian Jews or murder them on the banks of the Danube (thus, the Budapest memorial "Shoes on the Danube Bank," which was erected in 2005) until February 1945 when Budapest surrendered to the Soviet army.

"Victim Discourse"

Memory takes many different forms: the memories of victims, perpetrators, bystanders, resistance fighters, silent collaborators and so on. Seewann and Kovács (2006: 27) assert that in the post-Holocaust era, two 'main' identities can be distinguished: one denotes Jewish Holocaust survivors and the other Hungarian society, parts of which were either bystanders or perpetrators.[2] It can be said that since the end of the Second World War, Hungarian memory has been divided into many different "memories," all of which have been highly contested and polarised. Further, "victim myths" have enabled Hungarian society (like the societies of other countries) to expunge an anti-Semitic history from the collective memory (Fritz 2008: 128). In Hungary, there have been competing "memories of victimhood"; the commemoration of Holocaust victims is challenged by the commemoration of the victims of the Communist regime. Above all, there is a general myth that Hungary and Hungarians were the victims of the Treaty of Trianon at the end of the First World War (seen in the revisionist literature as the "peace dictate" of 1920). Lately, there has also been a general trend in Hungarian historiography to re-assess Horthy and his era, focusing therefore on his efforts to stabilise the country in the interwar period (Turbucz 2014; Romsics 2015). At the same time, in right-wing politics especially, there is a move to rehabilitate Horthy and his regime, externalising responsibility and crimes and "heroising" and victimising the Hungarian population (Fritz 2008: 133).

The first Orbán government (1998–2002) tried to establish a national Hungarian victim discourse, taking up the idea that Hungarian history was nothing but a chain of historical catastrophes. This enabled Hungarians to hold the Communist regime to account, but it also paid attention to the Holocaust. Holocaust Memorial Day was established in 2000, followed soon after by the establishment of a memorial day for the victims of Communism. As Fritz has demonstrated, the raising of awareness about the Holocaust was closely linked to two issues (see Fritz 2012: 286; Fritz – Hansen 2008: 73). First, the Holocaust served as a point

2 Seewann and Kovács (2006) give a clear and explicit outline of the Hungarian 'stations of coming to terms with the past.' The page number seems to be missing here.

of comparison for the Communist terror (Fritz 2012: 286; Fritz – Hansen 2008: 73). Second, it was connected to international developments and expectations. Hungary was eager to enter the European Union (EU). Therefore, the year 2002 saw not only the opening of the "House of Terror"[3] but also the laying of the foundations for the Holocaust Memorial Centre. The House of Terror is a museum that deals with the terrors perpetrated by the Communist regime as well as by the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party. It was built as a memorial to the victims of these regimes. In contrast with the years it took to inaugurate the Holocaust Memorial Centre, the House of Terror was opened within one-and-a-half years of its conception. This difference met with international criticism. As Fritz and Hansen (2008: 73, 78) argue, the Holocaust Memorial Centre was opened in 2004 due to Hungary's accession to the EU that year but the permanent exhibition was only inaugurated two years later. According to Seewann and Kovács (2006: 56), the different values ascribed by the government to these projects can also be seen at a symbolic level in the fact that the House of Terror is located in the centre of the city while the Memorial Centre was built on the periphery.

Thus far, the history and fate of Jewish Hungarians have not been perceived as integral parts of Hungarian history although as early as 1994, the then prime minister Gyula Horn (1932–2013) publically declared that Hungarian officials had collaborated with the Nazis (Kovács – Seewann 2004: 830). Since then, it has been government policy to – at the very least –acknowledge national responsibility, particularly on Holocaust Memorial Day and after anti-Semitic incidents; this occurred more recently in connection with the Holocaust Memorial Year when Undersecretary László L. Simon and Minister János Lázár made official statements (cf. Magyar Nemzet 2013; Népszava 2013; Holokauszt70 2014; kormány 2015). Whether these actions were merely tactical remains to be seen. At the same time, it should be noted that these announcements do not always reach the general public. In practice, there were no follow-up actions, and thus, the situation remains a 'political whitewash,' as Ungváry (2014a) puts it. To this day, there is no common Holocaust narrative in Hungary.

The Holocaust Memorial Year 2014

In 2013, hopes were raised when the Hungarian government announced its plan to establish a Holocaust memorial year. Initially, the commemoration year seemed well prepared. János Lázár, the minister overseeing the Prime Minister's Office, was appointed head of organisation. The government had allocated a HUF 1.5 billion (approx. USD 5.4 m) budget, and therefore, a special fund, Civil Fund 2014, was established and a public call for applications issued (Civil Fund 2014). The planned programme included nationwide commemora-

3 Ungváry (2009) gives a summary of the main points of the 'House of Terror controversy.'

tion services, funding for memorial projects and publications, renovation of synagogues and the establishment of the Memorial to the Child Victims of the Holocaust – European Education Centre (House of Fates) at Józsefváros railway station in Budapest (Közlöny 2014 b). The government seemed to be eager to present an ambitious and unprecedented programme to the world. We should keep in mind that 2014 was not only the 70th anniversary of the deportation of Hungarian Jews but also the 10th anniversary of Hungary's accession to the EU as well as a year of parliamentary elections, and thus, the government had to cover both international and national interests.

In 2013, the government established a website for the memorial year, which was also available in English (at http://holocaustmemorialyear2014.gov.hu/); by this means, it addressed an international audience. The Holocaust 2014 Memorial Commission was created and embassies from selected foreign countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, Israel and the US) were invited to contribute to the preparations. Thus, in February 2013, the Austrian ambassador to Hungary invited Austrian researchers to participate by submitting project proposals; they proceeded to do this, elaborating ideas about different levels of collaboration –with Hungarian state institutions, civil society organisations and schools, for example. In the end, however, after several meetings and negotiations, the actual implementation of the projects proved to be difficult. Ultimately, only one of three projects was realised, and this occurred through Research Society Burgenland in cooperation with the Cultural Association of Hungarian Jews, MAZSIKE (www.mazsike.hu) and schools in Hungary and Austria. This was the project *Zsidó sorsok a közös határon* (Jewish fates in the shared border region), and it was fully financed by the state of Austria (except for the working hours spent on the school project by the Hungarian partners) (BFG 2014).

To reiterate, expectations were raised high in 2013 due to the establishment of Civil Fund 2014 and the Hungarian government's invitation to foreign countries to contribute to the Holocaust Memorial Year. In the end, the events of 2014 did not meet all of these expectations, and the Austrian case is just one example among many. The plan did not unfold according to the government's wishes in 2014. But let us pause to take stock of the situation for a moment.

The year 2014 started with a lively debate. As has been mentioned, research has proven the Hungarian responsibility for decision-making and implementation around the Holocaust in Hungary (Kádár – Vági 2013). Nevertheless, Sándor Szakály, a military historian and the head of the newly founded government-based history department, *Veritas* (Truth) stated the opposite point of view in a presentation on 17 January 2014. This speech concerned the 1941 Kamenez-Podolsk massacre in which Nazi troops murdered more than 20,000 Jews (MTI 2014; Fejes 1997). In 1941, many of the victims had recently been deported to this area by Hungary, by then an ally of Nazi Germany. Since they were not Hungarian citizens but rather Jewish refugees who had fled to Hungary, the

country claimed it was "repatriating" them, and thus, participated in one of the largest mass murders during the Holocaust. Szakály now called the deportation 'action taken by the Foreigners' Police [immigration authorities].' Both inside Hungary and internationally, many people understood his statement as a "relativising" of Hungarian responsibility for the murder of Jews. While Szakály himself clung to this opinion in later public statements (Lakner 2014; Magyar Narancs 2014), it must be noted that on several occasions, Veritas allowed different academic experts in Hungary (e.g. Andrea Pető, Ignác Romsics, János Botos) to have a say on this controversial topic. As Andrea Pető argued in a critical article, the discussion was such that the "truth" found by Veritas was challenged by a "counter-truth" set out by civil society organisations, historians and Jewish organisations, etc. This was the approach 'rather than analyzing the factors that go beyond the true/false binary' (Pető 2014: 6).

These events were followed by the controversy surrounding the government's announcement on 17 January 2014 of its plan to erect a monument on Budapest's Szabadság Tér (Liberty Square) that would commemorate the German occupation and present all Hungarians as victims of the Nazi regime. Again, from the government's point of view, the Hungarian state was either not all responsible or only partly to blame for the murder of Hungarian Jews. Based on the new preamble to the 2011 Constitution, the argument was brought that the state had lost sovereignty on 19 March 1944. Countering this position, historian Krisztián Ungváry and others published several newspaper articles in different languages in which they discussed the issue of historical distortion in detail (e.g. Ungváry 2014a; Ungváry 2014 b; Ungváry 2014c; Ungváry 2014d).

In response to these developments, the historian Randolph L. Braham protested against 'government efforts to rewrite history and exonerate the country from its role in the Holocaust' by returning a high award he had received from the state in 2011 (The Guardian 2014). In an open letter, Krisztián Ungváry and about two dozen other historians (including Gábor Gyáni, János Rainer M., Mária Ormos etc.) denounced the government's distortion of history and demanded that the monument not be erected as planned (Galamus Group 2014). At their meeting in February 2014, the members of MAZSIHISZ, the umbrella organisation of Jewish communities, called for a boycott and decided to pull out of the Holocaust commemorative year because they disagreed with such politics of remembrance (Pető 2014: 6). MAZSIHISZ named the following as conditions for its re-entry into commemorative activities: 1) the right to have a say in the creation of the House of Fates, 2) the removal of Sándor Szakály from Veritas and 3) the scrapping of plans to erect the mentioned monument.

We can safely assume that it was no coincidence but rather a politically calculated decision that in August 2014, Holocaust survivor and Nobel laureate Imre Kertész (born in 1929) received Hungary's highest state award, the Order

of Saint Stephen of Hungary. This came as something of a surprise since Kertész lives in Germany and has been a rather controversial figure in Hungary due to his criticisms of the Hungarian government, which have been taken amiss by the Hungarian media. The conferring of the order provoked mixed reactions: 'certain leftist journalists and critics... called upon Kertész and asked him to reject the state award, warning the writer that he was being used to legitimize the Orbán government' (Orzóy 2014). When Kertész accepted the award, many people were disappointed. The Holocaust Memorial Year of 2014, thus, generated a great degree of unrest. Let us now take a closer look at the two main government projects which were at the root of the matter.

The Monument on the German Occupation at Liberty Square

The government's announcement of its plan to erect a monument dedicated to 'all victims of German occupation' (Közlöny 2013a) immediately met with great criticism. The monument was supposed to be inaugurated on 19 March 2014 (Közlöny 2013 b), 70 years after the German invasion of Hungary, but this event had to be postponed (Közlöny 2014a) due to strong domestic resistance and criticism from abroad. Nevertheless, in April, two days after Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's party won the parliamentary elections, the construction of the monument began (Kirchengast 2014). It was completed during the night from 20 to 21 July 2014 under police surveillance in an effort to avoid public resistance, but it has still not been inaugurated (Euractiv 2014). The monument depicts Hungary as an adolescent (the Archangel Gabriel) with his arms outstretched; he is holding an orb in his right hand and being attacked by a black German imperial eagle. In its claw, the eagle is carrying a ring bearing "1944," referring to the year of invasion by German troops.

This monument was supposed to be a 'gesture of invitation' to supporters of the right-wing Jobbik party, but it instead 'became a flashpoint of the Hungarian government's failure to create national consensus in remembering' (Pető 2014: 2; Assmann 2014). Why did this happen? The monument's critics have said that it distorts Hungary's role in the Holocaust by blaming the Germans and so externalising responsibility and suppressing the active role of Hungarians in sending more than 400,000 Jews to the death camps in 1944. The dedication to 'all victims' glosses over the fact that different people were targeted for different reasons. The racial persecution of Jews and Romani people ("gypsies") cannot, for example, be equated with the wartime situation of the Hungarian population during the German occupation. The monument has been perceived as 'falsifying the Holocaust,' 'confusing the murderer and the victim' (Euractiv 2014) and dishonouring Holocaust victims (including not only Jews but Roma and others as well). Well-known philosopher Ágnes Heller has called it a 'desecration of the commemoration of the victims' (cited in Lendvai 2014a; Lendvai 2014 b).

It is not only the government that has defended the monument against this commentary. Sculptor Péter Párkányi Raab claims the monument might have served as a means of reconciling Jewish and non-Jewish Hungarians but 'protesters have barred the country from commemoration' (Fehér 2014). His statement refers to a wave of physical protests on Liberty Square as well as the intellectual debate. At Liberty Square, members of NGOs, the general public and different political parties protested by forming human chains (Euractiv 2014). As we discuss below, through these actions, different forms of "counter--memory" were developed. MAZSIHISZ decided to boycott the Memorial Year, expressing regret at the failure to establish a dialogue successfully but noting that a discussion among academics, church officials and public personalities had at least been ushered in (Euractiv 2014). Their decision met with varied responses. Open letters were exchanged between MAZSIHISZ and German historian Michael Wolffsohn, a member of the international advisory board of the House of Fates. Wolffson accused MAZSIHISZ of withdrawing for strategic political reasons before the national elections (Hungarianvoice 2014) while Andrea Pető argued that MAZSIHISZ had passed up a golden opportunity to participate in the development of a remembrance culture (Pető 2014: 6).

This 'monument of shame' (Lendvai 2014a) can, thus, be regarded as a symbol of the split between society and policies in Hungary. As Assmann (2014) has stated, 'the controversy over the new monument replaces a societal debate, which cannot take place, because the requirements of an open media landscape are increasingly reduced.'

Memorial to Child Victims of the Holocaust – European Education Centre (*Sorsok Háza* / the House of Fates)

In 2013, the government also announced the creation of a new Holocaust memorial at 'a memorial site that w[ould] be Europe's largest and very likely most grandiose and sophisticated such [sic] project' (Schmidt 2014a). The memorial site was to be made up of three parts – an exhibition, an education centre and a training centre – and an international advisory board (including Yad Vashem representatives etc.) was to be established. Nevertheless, reactions were quite lukewarm. Many points of critique were put forward. They might be summarised as follows (in no particular order): First, there was objection to the name of the memorial/museum, *Sorsok Háza* (the House of Fates). It was argued that "fate" had not determined the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz; it was people, human beings, who decided on and implemented their persecution and murder. Second, the site itself was called into question. It was claimed that historically, there was no important connection between the Holocaust and the abandoned railroad station in the Budapest district of Józsefváros. One could, however, object that Józsefváros train station had played an important role for

many Jews, including those rescued by the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who provided them with protective passes in 1944 (USHMM 2015). Third, the need for a new Holocaust museum was questioned. After all, there was already a Holocaust memorial centre, which was also a research and education institution. It was also argued that it would make more sense to invest money in this Holocaust memorial centre than to build a new one (Balogh 2013a). Fourth, the government's argument for the creation of this new museum was seen as unconvincing. Minister Lázár explained that the site would be dedicated to children: 'We chose the "child Holocaust" as the theme because we were trying to find a point which cannot be relativized: no explanation, no answer can be accepted when it comes to the murder of a child' (quoted in Balogh 2013a). This, however, raised the question of whether the murder of adult Jews could be explained. Critics referred to the anti-Semitic subtext of this statement. The restriction of victimhood to children might also suggest that the history told at this site would lack a context, thus giving a distorted picture of the past. It was feared that the intent was to appeal to the emotions for shock value, recalling the representation of history at the House of Terror.

This was connected to a fifth critique: When it emerged that the project would be headed by "state historian" Mária Schmidt, the general director of the House of Terror, where fascism and Communism are seen as equal crimes, many feared that she would create a museum like that earlier project, displaying a similarly indiscriminate approach to history (see the debates at www.hungarianspectrum.org). Many felt their suspicions were confirmed when Schmidt declared that the site would only focus on the deportations and not on the events preceding them (Balogh 2014). A sixth point of criticism was that the whole idea did not amount to a well thought out plan; instead it reflected a rash government decision with strict parameters leaving no room for a real discussion or dialogue. Although Schmidt went on to write letters to (Jewish) intellectuals asking for their help, some thought the government was only pretending to include intellectuals and Jewish organisations while in fact using them as "fig leaves" or "background actors." The celebrated author György Konrád (born in 1933) took this line. He made Schmidt's letter public and responded: 'I find it difficult to free myself of the suspicion that this hurried organization of an exhibit is not so much about the 100,000 murdered Jewish children but rather about the current Hungarian government' (quoted in Balogh 2013 b). Schmidt's strategic approach summoned the critics to action. Through this Holocaust site, she said that she intended 'to take an oath on a common fate shared by all Hungarians: Jews and non-Jews alike,' and thus, take up the government strategy already displayed at the 'Occupation monument' (Schmidt 2014a). She wanted to show that 'we can also plan a shared future despite the cataclysms of the twentieth century.' Ignoring all historical facts, Schmidt quoted a friend who stated that the House of Fates was all about '... a love story. A story of love between Hungarian Jews

and non-Jews. A love that has survived everything. As a result of which there is still a large Hungarian Jewish community living in this country' (Schmidt 2014a). This position clearly matched Schmidt's historical views since she was known for her nationalist interpretation of Hungarian history in line with all three conservative (1998–2002, 2010–2014 and post-2014) Orbán governments (Schmidt 1994; Halpert 2012/2013). While employed as a state commissioner for contemporary history, she had also taken a revisionist approach, claiming that there had been no Holocaust in Hungary and that the Holocaust was only a 'side aspect' of the war (Seewann – Kovács 2006: 54; Pölcz 2012: 71).

Despite these tensions, on 30 June 2014, an agreement was reached among Schmidt, MAZSIHISZ, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and a number of international and Hungarian experts about 'a five point "road map"' for the project. That agreement was also published (see Balogh 2014). Ultimately, however, all attempts at cooperation failed and were followed by a mutual assignment of guilt. In sum, things turned out to be more complicated and MAZSIHISZ published new conditions for further cooperation that were supported by the IHRA (see Balogh 2014). Yad Vashem and MAZSIHISZ finally withdrew from the international advisory board, and Mária Schmidt has continued to work on the programme. Her plans remain highly contested (Dercsényi – László 2015). The site was supposed to be unveiled in April 2015, but that opening did not take place (Győr 2015). At the time of writing, the project has been postponed. In her own account published in a Hungarian newspaper, Mária Schmidt connected her fate to that of Hungary. In nationalist rhetoric which at times revealed a latent anti-Semitism, she depicted herself and Hungary as victims while also asserting that she was (heroically) carrying out this project 'for Hungary' despite all the attacks. She claimed that she had agreed to this professional project team only 'out of love for my country... thereby neutralizing or at least weakening the forces continuously calling Hungary an anti-Semitic and fascist country, using these unfounded stigmata as a political weapon to discredit the Hungarian nation as a whole' (Schmidt 2014a). Schmidt has also compared her most recent experiences with events when the House of Terror was opened, locating the protesters in the 'same camp' and defending herself against 'unfair attacks' from abroad and from political and Jewish opponents, in particular MAZSIHISZ (key language included the 'same ruthless attack,' a 'politically motivated onslaught,' a 'relentless campaign,' the 'unleashing that orgy of hate which is so characteristic of them,' Schmidt 2014a). She has had a knee-jerk response to any criticism, rejecting and immediately assigning it to the interests and strategies of the opposing "camp." She has not refrained from bringing severe allegations including blackmail and has strongly defended the project against the interference of foreign diplomats (i.e. from the UK, the US and Israel) and 'a variety of influential international organizations' as well as against interpretations of Hungarian history 'from outside.' Her appeal has,

thus, been to the 'national community that cannot be influenced by any particular or external interest,' and whose aim is to 'preserv[e] solidarity' (Schmidt 2014a). Finally, she has reproached Minister Lázár, who was responsible for postponing her project (HVG 2015a): 'Mr. Lázár apparently fails to understand that this time we are dealing with our very identity' (Schmidt 2014a). Lázár had declared several times that the *Sorsok Háza* should only be opened with the approval of Jewish communities, experts and others (HVG 2015 b). Clearly, the government is trying to avoid a scandal similar to the one surrounding the Monument on the German Occupation.

Responses

As has been mentioned, the Holocaust Memorial Year and related debates met with many different responses. Certainly, the prevalent response was indifference. It seems that most Hungarians, and in particular those outside of Budapest, simply did not care. At the same time, however, there were a number of reactions from different groups. It is impossible to describe all these responses, but we will try to give a few examples.

Although there is not scope here to delve into this subject, it should be mentioned that for several reasons, Budapest specifically, and Hungary more generally, have found themselves at the centre of international attention. The Internet and social media like Facebook have become increasingly important not only for organising and advertising events and demonstrations and putting information and propaganda material at people's disposal (in different languages), but also, as Pető notes, as a means of sharing a (personal, informal) 'counter-memory.' Pető (2014: 6) refers to the Facebook group The Holocaust and My Family where people have posted their stories, memories and reflections. Virtual commemoration platforms and archives (e.g. centropa) have supported the publication of counter-narratives. Moreover, there have been physical protests, marches and human chains. A 'counter-memorial' has appeared in front of the Monument on the German Occupation in order to exhibit alternative forms of memory such as family photos, personal objects etc.(Pető 2014: 2). We have already written about some of the reactions of MAZSIHISZ, the federation of Jewish communities. But responses have not been limited to the Jewish community; last but not least, these events have stimulated discussion among church officials and public personalities and in academia (Euractiv 2014). To cite one example among many, several historians took part in a public discussion at ELTE state university on 27 March 2014. The appearance of the Monument on the German Occupation as well as Szakály's controversial statements had induced the Union of PhD Candidates (DOSz) to organise this event titled 'What to do with our past? Talk about current questions on politics of memory.' The discussion closed with the conclusion that in Hungary, right-wing governments have influenced national

identity formation and the creation of a collective view of history and memory culture. It was said that there had not been enough time since 1989 to develop a 'binding' collective view of history.

As a result of this public dispute, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, known for its caution about voicing an opinion on current political questions, has finally felt obliged to respond. It, thus, held a conference in May 2014 on historical memory/commemoration and the discipline of history. Participants discussed questions about the responsibility of historians, decisive elements for determining national identity and the tragic fate of Hungarian Jews during the Second World War. Overall, all speakers objected to the idea of political authorities steering a particular course with regard to memory and identity formation (Hunyadi – Török 2014).

In November 2014, a "counter-memorial" was also established at ELTE University. In the context of another conference there, students and professors inaugurated a memorial to the victims of the Holocaust and the Second World War. That memorial was described as follows: 'The 1-centimeter-wide and 200-meter-long bronze strip embraces the university campus along its walls as a kind of unique grout between the bricks, bearing 199 names. The university pays homage to its former professors, students, and staff members, all of those who lost their lives as a result of the anti-Jewish laws in forced labor, concentration camps, ghettos, or military service' (CEU 2014). The names on this list are to be updated and supplemented. A website has also been developed to give further information about the victims. The original intention was to create a silent memorial, which demands the 'work of remembrance' and produces 'common agreement' (ELTE 2014a; ELTE 2014 b).

Another view of Hungary's memorial culture can be seen in an example from the Petőfi Literary Museum and Goethe Institute, which held a conference titled 'Trauma-Holocaust-Literature' on 28–29 November 2014. The well-known cultural scientist Aleida Assmann participated and made the following remarks, which were recorded by Ágnes Huszár:

> *In this respect, Hungary is an exceptional country, I have not seen in any other Central European country such a captivating intensive confrontation with her own past. [...] The state monument speaks a historicizing symbolic language, which is hardly understood today, whereas the other part [ELTE memorial, A.N.] shows very moving individual fates. As the two stand opposite each other, they are a wonderful lively picture of society, which reacts like this. The monument appears to be a clinical thermometer, which does not only measure society's temperature but also raises it. The "generation 1968" has been missing here but it seems as if their task is now taken over by others. Something is on the point of being developed. [...] This memorial helps people to enunciate their opinions even more clearly* (Huszár 2014).

We would like to conclude, however, by noting the latest developments: To the surprise of many, and based on an idea from Israel's ambassador to Hungary that was developed by two University of Tel Aviv professors in light of the "Hungarian peculiarities," the Catholic Peter-Pázmány University in Budapest has recently introduced a compulsory class titled 'The Holocaust and its Remembrance' (BBC 2015; ORF 2015; Curriculum-PPKE 2015). This announcement has prompted controversy and wide discussions across Hungary. Some like the Budapest University of Jewish Studies have welcomed the decision; others have voiced their opposition, saying that the course should not be mandatory. A student group has gone so far as to say that there is a Jewish lobby behind the unit; in an open letter to the rector, they state that they do not believe this attitude is compatible with the university's identity (cf. Lukácsi 2015). Nevertheless, as of September 2015, all Pázmány students will have to take the course before they can graduate.

Conclusion

In 2014, 'instead of a story with a happy ending, a memory war [...] started' (Pető 2014: 6; Assmann 2014). This was not a sudden phenomenon, but one rooted in Hungary's past, as Éva Kovács (2015) explains: 'The memory of the treaty of Trianon competes with the memory of the Shoa [Holocaust], and most people prefer the first victim narrative. I am of the opinion, that this complex, which I would call a "collective neurosis," prevents the country from coming to terms with her past. Thus[,] there is no success in establishing a firm national identity' (see Halpert 2013). As Seewann and Kovács (2006: 49) have written, the events of 2014 were not only about the 'polarization of Hungarian society, successfully pushed on by the Orbán government,' which has left "Hungarian society split in two hostile political camps that vilify and demonize each other. They were also about a 'polarization of memory,' a 'clash of memories.' (Seewann – Kovács 2006: 49). In the end, the key issues concern the sovereignty of interpretation and competition for collective recognition. The situation seems to be an *imbroglio*. What are the consequences of the 'failure of [the]Hungarian government intervention into memory politics' (Pető 2014: 2)?

After all that has transpired, it is important to point out that the initial refusal to accept political responsibility for Hungary's involvement in the Holocaust has supported new cultures of commemoration and led to an intensive discussion of the past as well as of current political issues. Furthermore, these debates have been held in public and been widely accessible due to online media. However, we must not allow these public disputes to obscure the fact that there have always been individuals, NGOs, associations etc. who have carried out remembrance projects and actively fought racism, stereotypes and anti-Semitism (e.g. HAVER 2015); this work stretches back to before 2014 and it will extend beyond.

At least on the surface and judging from official statements, it seems as if all these debates have also led to some modification of the government's policies.

There is a long road ahead. In March 2015, Hungary assumed chairmanship of the IHRA, which held its plenary meetings from 08–11 June 2015 in Budapest. During this event, Minister Lázár gave an impressive speech in which he addressed Hungary's responsibility for its past (breuerpress 2015, also available online). The Hungarian chair declared: 'The main focus of the Hungarian Chairmanship programme will be on tackling anti-Semitism, promoting Holocaust education, the issue of the Roma genocide and increasing visibility and importance of the IHRA' (IHRA 2015). This sounds like a promising and forward-looking programme, a challenge that has the power to effect transformation. It could engender change. Only time will tell if this was merely lip service, as has so often been the case in the past.

References

APA (2012): Ungarn. Hetze gegen Juden empört Israel [Hungary. Jew-baiting angers Israel], Die Presse (21 August): 6.

Assmann, Aleida (2014): Zwei leere Stühle, die sich gegenüberstehen [Two empty chairs facing each other], Neue Zürcher Zeitung (18 December): available at http://zeitungsarchiv.nzz.ch/neue-zuercher-zeitung-vom-18-12-2014-seite-45.html?hint=45040077 (22 December 2014).

Babits, Antal, ed. (2014): Magyar holokauszt 70 – veszteségek és felelősségek [Hungarian Holocaust 70 – losses and responsibilities], Logos.

Balogh, Éva S. (2013a): The Orbán government and the international Jewish community, Hungarian Spectrum (12 December): available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2013/11/12/the--orban-government-and-the-international-jewish-community/ (12 January 2015).

Balogh, Éva S. (2013 b): "House of Fates". What does it mean?, Hungarian Spectrum (30 December): available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2013/12/30/house-of-fates-what-does--it-mean/ (12 January 2015).

Balogh, Éva S. (2014): Federation of Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz) versus Mária Schmidt, Hungarian Spectrum (11 August): available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2014/08/11/federation-of-jewish-communities-mazsihisz-versus-maria-schmidt/ (12 January, 2015).

BBC (2015): http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-32904523 (15 June, 2015).

BFG (2014): www.forschungsgesellschaft.at.

Bognár, Peter (2012): Antisemitische Töne im Parlament sorgen für Entrüstung [Anti-Semitic tones cause outrage], Budapester Zeitung (30 November–06 December): 1 and 3.

Borbándi, Gyula (2000): Népiség és népiek. Esszék, tanulmányok, cikkek ["Folklore" and the "Folklorists". Essays, contributions, articles]. Püski.

Braham, Randolph L. (1981): *The politics of genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary*, Columbia University Press.

Braham, Randolph L. (1984): *The Hungarian-Jewish catastrophe. A selected and annotated bibliography* (revised and extended edition), Social Science Monographs and Institute for Holocaust Studies, City University of New York.

Braham, Randolph L. (2001): *The Holocaust in Hungary. A selected and annoated bibliography: 1984–2000,* Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, Graduate Center/City University of New York.

breuerpress (2015): Lázár János: A Holokauszt embertelen és hazaárulás is! [János Lázár: The Holocaust is inhuman and also treason!], breuerpress (10 June): available at http://www.breuerpress.com/2015/06/10/lazar-janosa-holokauszt-embertelen-es-hazaarulas-is/ (15 June 2015).

Centropa: http://www.centropa.org/.

CEU (2014): CEU PhD Student Szekely on New War Memorial, CEU Website (1 December): available at http://www.ceu.edu/article/2014-12-01/ceu-phd-student-szekely-new-war-memorial (02 March 2015).

Civil Fund (2014): http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/DFDCDFC7-CEEE-4C79-B197-47F39B-F81AF7/0/CallforapplicationsCivilFund2014.pdf (08 October 2014).

Csuhaj, Ildikó (2014): Schmidt Mária: És az én érzékenységem nem számít? [Mária Schmidt: And my sensitivity does not count?], Népszabadság Online (12 July): available at http://nol.hu/belfold/schmidt-maria-es-az-en-erzekenysegem-nem-szamit-1473777 (17 June 2015).

Curriculum-PPKE (2015): http://infopoly.info/h-2014/2015/05/26/pazmany-peter-katolikus--egyetem-a-holokauszt-es-emlekezete-tantargyleiras/ (18 June 2015).

Dercsényi, Dávid – László, Ferenc (2015): Az Akadémia ízekre szedte Schmidt Mária 30 milliós tanulmányát [The Academy [of Sciences] has mangled Mária Schmidt's 30 million study], HVG (5 March): available at http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150305_Az_Akademai_izekre_szedte_Schmidt_koncepc (18 June 2015).

DOSz (2014): Meghívó [invitation]: available at http://www.dosz.hu/hirek/dosz_cafe_0327_mit_kezdjunk_a_multunkkal_beszelgetes_az_emlekezetpolitika_aktualis_kerdeseirol (01 January 2015).

ELTE (2014a): Névsor a fugákban [Names in the gaps]: available at http://www.elte.hu/hir?id=NW-5756 (12 May 2015).

ELTE (2014 b): Együtt jártak a falak közé [They studied together behind these walls]: available at http://www.elte.hu/hir?id=NW-6255 (12 May 2015).

Euractiv (2014): Controversial monument divides Hungarians, angers Jewish community: available at http://www.euractiv.com (23 July 2014).

Fehér, Margit (2014): Hungarian Sculptor Defends Monument to Victims of Nazis, The Wall Street Journal (1 August): available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/hungarian-sculptor-defends--monument-to-nazi-occupation-1406910612 (12 May 2014).

Fejes, Judit (1997): On the History of the Mass Deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941, in Braham, Randolph L. – Pók, Attila, eds., The Holocaust in Hungary Fifty Years Later, 305–328, Columbia University Press.

Fritz, Regina (2006): Wandlung der Erinnerung in Ungarn. Von der Tabuisierung zur Thematisierung des Holocaust [Transformation of memory in Hungary. From the "tabooisation" to the addressing of the Holocaust]. *zeitgeschichte* 33 (6): 303–317.

Fritz, Regina (2008): Gespaltene Erinnerung. Museale Darstellungen des Holocaust in Ungarn [Divided memory. The museum representation of the Holocaust in Hungary], in Fritz, Regina – Sachse, Carola – Wolfrum, Edgar, eds., *Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa* [Nations and their self-perception. Post-dictatorial Societies in Europe], 128–148, Wallstein.

Fritz, Regina (2012): *Nach Krieg und Judenmord. Ungarns Geschichtspolitik seit 1944* [After war and murder of Jews. Hungary's politics of history since 1944], Wallstein.

Fritz, Regina – Hansen, Imke (2008): Zwischen nationalem Opfermythos und europäischen Standards. Der Holocaust im ungarischen Erinnerungsdiskurs [Between the national victim myth and European standards. The Holocaust in the Hungarian memory discourse], in Eckel, Jan – Moisel, Claudia, eds., *Universalisierung des Holocaust? Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in internationaler Perspektive* [Universalisation of the Holocaust? Memory culture and politics of History from an international perspective], 59–85, Wallstein.

Galamus Group (2014): Történészek tiltakozása a "Magyarország német megszállása 1944. március 19." emlékmű ellen [Historians protest against the 'Monument on the German Occupation']: available at http://www.galamus.hu/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=352719_torteneszek_tiltakozasa_a_magyarorszag_nemet_1944 (22 January 2014).

Gerlach, Christian – Aly, Götz (2004): Das letzte Kapitel. Der Mord an den ungarischen Juden 1944–1945 [The final chapter. The murder of the Hungarian Jews 1944–1945], S. Fischer.

Gröller, Harald D. – Balogh, László L. (2011): "Mit Geschichte will man etwas!" Erinnerungs- und Gedächtnisorte in Debrecen ['With history, we want something!' The place of remembrance and the space of memory in Debrecen], LIT.

Győr, Ágnes (2015): Sorsok Háza. Álcázott ellenőrzés? [House of Fates. Disguised control?], Magyar Nemzet Online (18 May): available at http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/sorsok-haza-alcazott-ellenorzes-1286710 (20 May 2015).

Halpert, Marta S. (2012/2013): Gut verpackte Judenschelte [A well-packed rebuke from the *JewsWina* 2 (11): 10–12.

Halpert, Marta S. (2013): Éva Judit Kovács: "Der Antisemitismus in Ungarn tritt offen und aggressiv auf" ["Anti-Semitism in Hungary appears open and aggressive"], Wina (April): 28–30.

HAVER (2015): http://haver.hu/english/.

Holokauszt70 (2014): Könyv a Magyar veszteségekről, a felelősségről [book about Hungarian losses and responsibility], Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year Website (19 November): available at http://holokausztemlekev2014.kormany.hu/konyv-a-magyar-veszteségekrol-a-felelossegrol (31 January 2015).

Hungarianvoice (2014): Historiker Michael Wolffsohn übt scharfe Kritik an MAZSIHISZ [Historian Michael Wolffsohn criticizes MAZSIHISZ], Hungarianvoice (10 March): available at https://hungarianvoice.wordpress.com/2014/03/10/historiker-michael-wolffsohn-ubt-scharfe-kritik--an-mazsihisz/ (01 February 2015).

Hunyadi, György – Török, László, eds. (2014): Történelem és emlékezet [History and Remembrance: lectures from a session at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences], Kossuth.

Huszár, Ágnes (2014): Lábjegyzet Assmann cikkéhez [Footnote on Assmann's article], Galamus (21 December): available at http://www.galamus.hu/index.php?option=com_content & view=article & id=431070_labjegyzet_assmann_cikkehez (12 April 2015).

HVG (2015a): http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150514_Schmidt_Maria_A_helyzetert_Lazar_Janos_a (14 May 2015).

HVG (2015 b): http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150305_Lazar_a_Sorsok_Haza_vitaja_nem_ket_ember (5 March 2015).

IHRA (2015): https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/ihra-plenary--meetings-budapest-june-2015 (17 June, 2015).

JTA (2013): Anti-Semitic? Us? Hungary launches PR blitz to combat racist image, Haaretz (25 October): available at http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.554364 (27 October 2013).

Kádár, Gábor – Vági, Zoltán (2013): *A végső döntés* [The Final Decision]. Berlin, Budapest, Birkenau 1944, Jaffa Publishers.

Karsai, Elek – Karsai, László, eds. (2014): Vádirat a nácizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyarországi zsidóság történetéhez 4 [Charge sheet against Nazism. Documents on the history of the persecution of Hungarian Jews, vol. 4], Balassi kiadó [internet book].

Kirchengast, Josef (2014): Horthy und Orbán. Die Tradition des Januskopfes [Horthy and Orbán. The tradition of Janus face], Der Standard (13 April): available at http://derstandard.at/1397301955889/Horthy-und-Orban-Die-Tradition-des-Januskopfes (10 December2014).

kormány (2015): A Holokauszt hazaárulás is volt [The Holocaust was also treason], Infopoly Foundation Website (9 June): available at http://infopoly.info/h-2014/2015/06/09/kormany--hu-a-holokauszt-hazaarulas-is-volt/ (10 June 2015).

Kovács, András (1999): *Antisemitic prejudices in contemporary Hungary*, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Kovács, Éva (2003): "Die nicht in Anspruch genommene Erfahrung". Zwei fehlende Sätze über die ungarische Shoa ['The experience not made use of.' Two missing sentences on the Hungarian Shoa], in Uhl, Heidemarie, ed., Zivilisationsbruch und Gedächtniskultur. Das 20. Jahrhundert in der Erinnerung des beginnenden 21. Jahrhunderts [Break with civilisation and culture of commemoration. The 20th century remembered at the start of the 21th century], 209–222, Studienverlag.

Kovács, Éva (2004): A holokauszt és a modernkori Magyarország [The Holocaust and modern Hungary], Élet és Irodalom, XLVIII (48): available at https://mta.academia.edu/EvaKovacs (12 June 2015).

Kovács, Éva (2012): A Magyar történelmi kultúra helye Európában [The situation of Hungarian historical culture in Europe], in Kovách, Imre – Dupcsik, Csaba – Tóth, Tamás P. – Takács, Judith, eds., Társadalmi integráció a jelenkori Magyarországon [Social integration in present-day Hungary]: available at http://mek.oszk.hu/12700/12706/12706.pdf (18 June 2015).

Kovács, Éva (2015): Trianon, avagy "traumatikus fordulat" a magyar történetírásban [Trianon or the 'traumatic turn' in Hungarian historiography]. Korall 59: 82–107.

Kovács, Éva – Seewann, Gerhard (2004): Ungarn. Der Kampf um das Gedächtnis [Hungary. Fight for memory], in Flacke, Monika, ed., *Mythen der Nationen* [Myths of the nations], 817–846, von Zabern.

Kovács, Éva – Lénárt, András – Szász, Anna Lujza (2014): Oral History Collections on the Holocaust in Hungary. S.I.M.O.N. Shoah: Interventions. Methods. Documentation, Working Papers No. 2014–10–15, 1–18.

Kovács, Mária M. (2014): Schmidt, Népszabadság Online (9 July): available at http://nol.hu/velemeny/schmidt-1473055 (02 December 2014).

Közlöny [Official government gazette] (2013a): Cabinet decision 565/2013. (XII.31): available at http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK13225.pdf (03 April 2015).

Közlöny (2013 b): Cabinet decision 2056/2013. (XII.31): available at http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK13225.pdf (03 April 2015).

Közlöny (2014a): Cabinet decision 1077/2014. (II.19): available at http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK14024.pdf (03 April 2015).

Közlöny (2014 b): Cabinet decision 1390/2014. (VII.18): available at http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/mk14098.pdf (03 April 2015).

Laczó, Ferenc (2014): Felvilágosult vallás és modern katasztrófa közt. Magyar zsidó gondolkodás a Horthy-korban [Between enlightened religion and modern catastrophe. Hungarian Jewish thought in the Horthy era], Osiris.

Lakner, Dávid (2014): "Nem szerencsés történeti kérdéseket politikaivá transzformálni" ['It is not favourable to convert historical questions to political questions'], Heti Válasz Online (6 July): available at http://vs.hu/kozelet/osszes/nem-szerencses-torteneti-kerdeseket-politikaiva--transzformalni-0706#!s1 (01 February 2015).

Lendvai, Paul (2014a): Monument der Schande [Monument of shame], Der Standard (22 July): available at http://derstandard.at/2000003360540/Monument-der-Schande (22 December 2014).

Lendvai, Paul (2014 b): Sturm um ein Denkmal [Monument creates stir], Der Standard (28 January): available at http://derstandard.at/1389858421504/Sturm-um-ein-Denkmal (22 December 2014).

Lévai, Jenő (1948). *Black book in the martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry*, The Central Publishing Company.

Lukácsi, Katalin (2015): http://infopoly.info/h-2014/2015/06/19/barankovics-hu-a-holokauszt-es--emlekezete-cimu-tantargy-mint-allatorvosi-lo/#more-6025 (22 June, 2015).

Magyar Narancs (2014): Csak azért is idegenrendészet! Fenntartja botrányos állításait Szakály Sándor [And the Foreigners' Police again! Sándor Szakály stands by his scandalous statements], Magyar Narancs (10 October): available at http://m.magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/xyz-92114 (09 November 2014).

Magyar Nemzet (2013): (17 April): 4.

Marosi, Ernő (2014): Derűre ború? Művészettörténeti megjegyzések [Clouds after the sunshine? Art history notes], in Hunyadi, György – Török, László, eds., Történelem és emlékezet [History and Remembrance: lectures from a session at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences], 74–87, Kossuth.

MAZSIHISZ: http://www.mazsihisz.hu/2009/02/04/adalek-a-magyar-holokauszt-elso--szakaszanak-tortenetehez-es-a-bardossy-kormany-felelossegehez-807.html (11 June 2015).

Molnár, Judit (1995): Zsidósors 1944-ben. Az V. (szegedi) csendőrkerületben [Jewish fates in 1944. In the 5th gendarme district of Szeged], Cserépfalvi.

Molnár, Judit ed. (2005): *A Holokauszt Magyarországon európai perspektivában* [The Holocaust in Hungary from a European perspective], Balassi Kiadó.

MTI (2014): Press report (17 January): available at http://orientpress.hu/123582 (30 April 2014).

Népszava (2013): Emlékezés az áldozatokra [Reminiscence of the victims], Népszava Online (17 April): available at http://nepszava.hu/cikk/638411-emlekezes-az-aldozatokra (02 January 2014).

Oplatka, András (2014): Németh Miklós. "Mert ez az ország érdeke" [Miklós Németh. 'Since this is the interest of our country'], Helikon.

ORF (2015): Ungarn. Katholische Uni führt Fach "Holocaust" ein [Hungary. Catholic University introduces "Holocaust" class], ORF Website (15 June): available at http://religion.orf.at/stories/2716189/ (15 June 2015).

Ormos, Mária (2014): A történész dolga [The historian's task], in Hunyadi, György – Török, László, eds., Történelem és emlékezet [History and Remembrance: lectures from a session at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences], 26–42, Kossuth.

Orzóy, Ágnes (2014): Imre Kerész received Hungary's highest award, Hungarian Literature Online (23 August): available at http://www.hlo.hu/news/imre_kertesz_received_hungary_s_highest_award (05 January 2015).

Papp, István (2012): A magyar népi mozgalom története, 1920–1990 [History of the Hungarian "national" movement, 1920–1990], Jaffa.

Pető, Andrea (2014): "Hungary 70". Non-remembering the Holocaust in Hungary. Culture & History Digital Journal 3 (2): e016. doi: available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2014.016 (03 June 2015).

Pók, Attila (2014): Klios Schuld, Klios Sühne. Politische Wendepunkte und Historie im Karpatenbecken, 1867–2000 [Clio's crime, Clio's punishment. Political turning points and history in the Carpathain Basin, 1867–2000], MTA-BTK.

Pölcz, Sabine (2012): *Die Ausstellung "Az elárult állampolgár" im staatlichen Museum Auschwitz--Birkenau* [The exhibition 'The Betrayed Citizen' at Auschwitz Birkenau Memorial and State Museum], unpublished thesis, University of Vienna, Political Sciences.

Rásky, Béla (2012): Die Debatte über Ungarns Mitschuld am Holocaust [The debate about Hungary's complicity in the Holocaust], Die Presse (01 September): 9.

Ripp, Zoltán (2011): A többpártrendszer létrejötte és a pártrendszer változásai (1989–2010) [The establishment of a multiparty system and changing of the party system (1989–2010), in Vida, István, ed., Magyarországi politikai pártok lexikona (1864–2010). I: Parlamenti választásokon jelöltet állító pártok [Encyclopedia of political parties in Hungary (1867–2000). vol. I: Parties running for parliamentary elections], 315–443, Gondolat.

Romsics, Ignác (2001): Magyarország története a XX. században [The history of Hungary in the 20th century], Osiris.

Romsics, Ignác (2015): A múlt arcai. Történelem, emlékezet, politika [The faces of the past. History, memory, politics], Osiris.

Roser, Thomas (2012): Ungarns geläuteter Antisemit [Hungary's repentant anti-Semite], Die Presse (21 August): 6.

Schmidt, Maria (1994): Doppelidentität trotz Holocaust. Der Holocaust in der modernen Geschichte des ungarischen Judentums 1945–1956 [Double identity in spite of the Holocaust. The Holocaust in the modern history of Hungarian Jewry 1945–1956], in Steininger, Rolf, ed., Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust. Europa – USA – Israel [Handling of the Holocaust. Europe – USA – Israel], 299–314, Böhlau.

Schmidt, Mária (2014a): A love story, Mandiner's Hungarian globe (3 October): available at http://hungarianglobe.mandiner.hu/cikk/20141003_schmidt_maria_a_love_story (20 October 2014).

Schmidt, Mária (2014 b): A múlt fogságában [Captive to the past], Heti Válasz (30 June): available at http://valasz.hu/publi/a-mult-fogsagaban-101365 (01 December 2014).

Seewann, Gerhard – Kovács, Éva (2006): Juden und Holocaust in der ungarischen Erinnerungskultur seit 1945 [Jews and the Holocaust in Hungarian commemorative culture since 1945]. Südosteuropa [Southeastern Europe] 54 (1): 24–59.

Taylor-Tudzin, Jessica (2011): Holocaust memorials in Budapest, Hungary, 1987–2010. Through the words of the memorial artists, unpublished MA thesis, Central European University, Department of History.

The Guardian (2014): Holocaust survivor and historian returns award to Hungary in protest, The Guardian (26 January): available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/26/holocaust-historian-braham-hungary-award-protest (11 October, 2014).

Turbucz, Dávid (2014): Miklós Horthy, Napvilág.

Ungváry, Krisztián (2005): Der Getriebene und der Treiber. Das Verhältnis zwischen ungarischer Politik und deutschen Deportationsplänen [The driven man and the herder. The relationship between Hungarian politics and German plans for deportation], in Mihok, Brigitte, ed., Ungarn und der Holocaust. Kollaboration, Rettung und Trauma [Hungary and the Holocaust. Collaboration, rescue and trauma], 41–54, Metropol.

Ungváry, Krisztián (2009): Belastete Orte der Erinnerung [Charged spaces of memory]. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 29–30: 26–33.

Ungváry, Krisztián (2012): A Horthy-rendszer mérlege. Diszkrimináció, szociálpolitika és antiszemitizmus Magyarországon 1919–1944 [Taking stock of the Horthy regime. Discrimination, social politics and anti-Semitism in Hungary 1919–1944], Jelenkor.

Ungváry, Krisztián (2014a): "Böse Deutsche und gute Ungarn"? Es war komplexer ['Bad Germans and good Hungarians'? It was far more complex], *Die Presse* (03 February): 26–27.

Ungváry, Krisztián (2014 b): The Living Horror, Hungarianspectrum (21 January): available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2014/01/24/krisztian-ungvary-on-the-memorial-to-the-german--occupation-of-hungary-the-living-horror/ (15 June 2015).

Ungváry, Krisztián (2014c): Az eleven borzalom [The Living Horror], HVG (21 January): available at http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20140121_Az_eleven_borzalom?utm_source=mandiner & utm_medium=link & utm_campaign=mandiner_201506 (12 April 2015).

Ungváry, Krisztián (2014d): Tettesek vagy áldozatok? Feltáratlan fejezetek a 20. század történetéből [Perpetrator or victim? Undeveloped chapters of 20th century history], Jaffa.

USHMM (2015): Raoul Wallenberg and the rescue of Jews in Budapest, Photograph: available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_ph.php?ModuleId=10005211 & MediaId=1329 (13 June 2015).

Von Klimó, Árpád (2006): Ungarn seit 1945 [Hungary since 1945], Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Weber-Steinhaus, Fiona – Wahsner, Matthias – Horváth, Flóra (2011): Vom Ghetto zum Trendbezirk [From ghetto to hotspot], Jüdische Zeitung (January): 7.

Henriett Kovács *studied in Hungary and Austria, earning a, Ph.D. in history from the University Eötvös Loránd Budapest (ELTE, Hungary). Since 2007, she has been an academic researcher in the area of history at Andrássy University in Budapest. Her research focuses on Austrian-Hungarian relations at the time of the Austro--Hungarian monarchy as well as peace movements and pacifism until 1918. E-mail: henriett.kovacs@andrassyuni.hu.*

Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner *studied in Austria and Sweden, earning a, Ph.D. in history from the University of Graz (KFU, Austria). Since 2012, she has been Assistant of Jewish Studies at Andrássy University in Budapest (AUB, Hungary). In the spring of 2014, she was Visiting Assistant Professor at Arizona State University. Ursula currently splits her time between AUB and KFU Graz where she is Assistant Professor of Austrian History in the Department of History.E-mail: ursula.mindler@uni-graz.at*

Attitudes towards the Government's Remembrance Policy in Poland: Results of an Experimental Study[1]

PATRYK WAWRZYŃSKI AND RALPH SCHATTKOWSKY[2]

Abstract: *The paper presents the results of an experimental study of Polish students' attitudes towards their government's remembrance policy (or, in other words, the intentional narration and interpretation of the past by the government). It includes four parts: a justification of why remembrance is a significant political asset in post--Communist Poland; a classification of remembrance policy instruments; a presentation of general results of the study; and a discussion of participants' attitudes to particular policy instruments. In our assessment of the general results, we discuss three types of collected data: the results of the initial measurement of attitudes; the results of measurement after the manipulation of emotions (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) and commitment (no commitment vs. low commitment); and the results in terms of attitude change. In the section on attitudes to particular instruments, we compare participants' support for different commemorative actions with their support for the governments' dominant role in the popularising of remembrance narratives. The study's results lead us to formulate three conclusions about the relationships between attitudes to the policy and Polish political culture.*

Keywords: ***political attitudes, government remembrance policy, politics of memory, political culture, politics in Poland, experimental political science.***

1 The paper is the result of the project Commitment, Positive vs. Negative Emotions and the Efficacy of the Politics of Memory supported by the National Science Centre in Kraków (Poland) under decision no. DEC-2013/09/N/HS5/03103.

2 We would like to express our gratitude for Mr. Marek A. Muszyński (Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland) and Ms. Gabriela Czarnek (Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland) who participated as members of the research team in the study that enabled us to gain results presented in the study. We would also like to thank prof. Dariusz Doliński (SWPS University in Wrocław, Poland) for a support in designing the project and Ms. Beata Bielska (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland) for help in organization of experiments.

Introduction

Political leaders and governments often use interpretations of national history as a way to legitimise or substantiate their ideologies and agendas (Eyal 2004: 7, Gagiano 2004: 812, MacGinty 2001: 11). Today, political conflicts not only shape the imagination of the future, but they also fundamentally influence representations of the past; remembrance narratives have become a powerful means of political mobilisation and citizen manipulation (Khalili 2007: 222, Wawrzyński et al. 2015: 21, Weston 2008: 41–49). However, in a democracy, the government is not the only narrator of the past. It negotiates shared interpretations of national history with other significant participants in the politics of memory: minorities, local communities, non-governmental organisations, artists, academic historians and the private mass media (Fogu – Kansteiner 2006). Therefore, the issue of citizens' support for their government's role as the leading narrator of past experiences can be applied to investigate political culture (Almond, Verba 1965, Lijphart 1999).

The relationship between official narratives and the political culture is noticeable in the case of contemporary post-Communist Poland. Since the opening of the Warsaw Uprising Museum in 2004, the conservative move to endorse government as the leading narrator of national history has divided Polish society; the question of whether to support these changes has been presented as an ideological choice between conservative and liberal visions of the state (Magierska 2008: 9–27; Korzeniewski 2007: 8–10; Wolff-Powęska 2007: 39–40; Wawrzyński 2012: 68–78). Therefore in the 21st century, the government's policy on remembrance (or, in other words, its intentional narration and interpretation of past events in order to influence citizens' identities or behaviours) has become one of the key issues in political disputes in Poland and its implementation has been the subject of an emotional debate (Wolff-Powęska 2007: 3).

Polish historian Paweł Machcewicz (2012: 172–176) emphasises that attitudes towards remembrance narratives have divided society into two antagonistic groups: *advocates* for and *critics* of post-Communist Poland and its accomplishments. The core issue in this conflict is not whether government should influence shared representations of the past, but which objectives should be realised by this policy. In public debates on the procedures adopted for transitional justice, the political role of the Institute of National Remembrance and the significance of history in school curricula have been clearly evident. However, this division within Polish society has deeper causes; it is the result of different understandings of post-authoritarian trauma (Dudek 2011: 36–39, Król 2008: 24–25) and conflicting interpretations of Polish-Jewish relations during the Second World War. The latter have been radicalised since the publication of the book Neighbors by American historian Jan Tomasz Gross in 2000 (Korzeniewski 2010: 182; Machcewicz 2012: 15–16).

Opposing assessments of the accomplishments of democratic Poland, different understandings of the authoritarian experience and conflicting representations of Polish martyrdom are not the only explanations for the increasingly politicised remembrance of Polish politics. Antoni Dudek (2011: 13) notes that history-based arguments became highly effective tools in the political contest when transitional objectives were achieved and Poland entered the European Union. Roman Kuźniar (2012: 289–290) considers the role of international challenges and the introduction of new policies on remembrance in Germany and Russia. At the same time, Zdzisław Krasnodębski (2008: 17–21) discusses the impact of the unresolved ideological dispute between the *successors of inter--war Poland* and *descendents of Communist Poland's architects* and notes that this conflict has caused the emergence of two antagonistic visions of the past, present and future.

In fact, all six factors have influenced the Polish debate on the social, cultural and political roles of remembrance narratives. However, we assume that political elites have used these symbolic *triggers* to exploit national history as a field of debate for two essential issues for Polish democracy: the post-transition vision of the nation's future and the limitation of governmental power. In both cases, a question about interpretations of the past has concealed a question about the relationship between the government and civil society. Thus, citizens' attitudes towards the government's remembrance policy – treated as a coherent cluster (Jackman, Miller 1996: 634) – may be considered a valuable source of knowledge about Polish political culture (Ponczek 2007: 118). Moreover, as Thomas Eckes and Bernd Six (1994) have shown, attitudes towards social and political activities correlate closely with respondents' behaviour, which makes this cluster even more interesting for political scientists.

This article considers citizens' attitudes to the government's remembrance policy in Poland with reference to a comprehensive classification of policy instruments (Wawrzyński 2014; Khalili 2007; Rydel 2011). The additional criterion enables us to compare respondents' support for the government's influence across eight rather different areas of remembrance policy. Moreover, in this experimental study, we also manipulate two dependent variables, emotional arousal (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) and incitement of commitment (no commitment vs. low commitment), to measure how different conditions may influence attitudinal change. Thus, this article is not only a presentation of empirical evaluations, but a contribution to theoretical considerations about the role of the government as a narrator of national history and the limits on its use of remembrance narratives to influence citizens in a democracy (Koczanowicz 1997: 259–260; Smith 2003: 56–59).

Instruments of Governmental Remembrance Policy

A review of existing academic literature on the government's role as a narrator of the past leads us to create a draft taxonomy of instruments that can be used to implement a remembrance policy.[3] We distinguish nine types: (1) public and civic education, (2) organisation of time, (3) use of the mass media and the fine arts, (4) topography of memory, (5) academic research, (6) specialist institutions, (7) transitional justice, (8) definitions of attitudes or values and (9) a polyphony of narratives. The first four categories are recognisable as traditional ways of enforcing governmental interpretations of the past. The next three are a result of the professionalisation of remembrance policy while the last two classes perform a modal role within the structure and so connect the other applied instruments into one composite of narratives.

Figure 1: Relationships and interdependencies among instruments in the government's remembrance policy



Source: Authors' own diagram

Despite the differences among them, all instruments in the government's remembrance policy are interdependent and they complement one another in a story-telling process (Assmann 1995). Figure 1 presents these relationships

3 Carried out between 2011 and 2014, this review included almost 700 items – books, papers and conference presentations – published in different countries in six languages.

and the links between the individual categories. It also emphasises the central (or focal) role of the definitions of attitudes or values that are promoted in the narratives; we recognise this promotion as the basic objective of the government's remembrance policy. Moreover, the model shows the dominant role of the mass media in popularising narratives and interpretations and the possibility of the interactive modeling of a message (or even the mediatization of policy). These factors may be interpreted as another limit on the government's power as a narrator (Mazzoleni – Schultz 1999; Hjarvard 2008).

In Europe, the public *education* system has been a popular means by which governments have exerted influence since the 19th century. This system has been used to shape citizens' identities, behaviours, beliefs, opinions and knowledge through the manipulation of curricula and certain specialist civil servants – that is, schoolteachers. Currently, in well-developed countries, we can observe that public education is becoming less influential. Nevertheless, various case studies show that it can still serve as an effective instrument in the government's remembrance policy: it is used to establish emotional relationships between citizens and the interpretation of the past (Dror 2001); to promote a selection of events which are significant for national identity (Yablonka 2009); to associate past experiences with preferred behaviours (Meseth – Proske 2010); to shape political preferences (Bukh 2008; Fukuoka 2011) and even to mobilise young citizens and involve them as an additional force in ongoing political conflicts (Wang 2008).[4]

The *organisation of time* results in an official calendar of political holidays and it informs citizens about the past events which are to be commemorated or celebrated. This instrument is not, however, limited to the creation of holidays, celebrations of anniversaries or the constitution of an official calendar of remembrance. Rather, as David Cesarani (2001: 40–43) and Neil Gregor (2001: 71–78) note, its effectiveness is based on the establishment of political links between commemorated events and contemporary identities or patterns of behaviours. Thus, the organisation of time has two main dimensions: the selection of past experiences and the interpretation of their significance for the present (Grundlingh 2004: 361).[5]

4 In the case of Poland, this shift cannot be observed, and public education is still being used by the government in a rather traditional way: to popularise unambiguous interpretations of national history during (at least) five hundred hours of compulsory lessons of history and civic education (Smoczyńska et al. 2012).

5 In Poland, the official calendar of political holidays includes two national holidays that are non-working days – Constitution Day (03 May) and Independence Day (11 November). In addition, there are three national holidays that are working days – "Cursed Soldiers'" Remembrance Day (01 March), Warsaw Uprising Remembrance Day (01 August) and Solidarity and Freedom Day (31 August) – and nine less significant public holidays. The Polish calendar also includes National Victory and Freedom Day (09 May), but these has not been celebrated since the fall of Communism.

The government's remembrance policy should be seen as a method of exerting political influence, and thus, it requires the existence of reliable channels of communication between the government and citizens. While public education shapes the younger generations, the *use of mass media* and the fine arts enables political elites to popularise their interpretations for the entire society. The mass media format offers narratives with a high degree of emotionalism, which often has to be reduced in other instruments; in addition, it enables the government to present simplified (or mythical) interpretations and to popularise unproven hypotheses about the past, an option that is also limited for other instruments (Baer 2001; Kansteiner 2004; Landsberg 1997; Lisus – Ericson 1995; Meyen – Pfaff-Rüdiger 2014). Moreover, Olaf Hoerschelmann (2001) and Katja Fullard (2010) point out that mass media and the fine arts may be used by governments to introduce new remembrance issues into the public debate or to accustom citizens to new interpretations of national history.

Like the organisation of time, a *topography of memory* seems to have been applied since the very beginning of political organisation (Assmann 1995). This aspect of a remembrance policy symbolically represents the government's power over the landscape. It includes two main strategies: the establishing or creation of new landmarks (e.g. monuments, graveyards, public buildings) and the naming of places, both natural (e.g. mountains, rivers, islands) and created by humankind (e.g. streets, parks, cities, schools, libraries). Owen J. Dwyer and Derek H. Alderman (2008) consider three different aspects of the alliance between remembrance and space: (1) space as the content of narrative, (2) space as an arena for competing narratives and (3) space as the stage for commemorative rituals. The last aspect leads to the *sanctification* of places and the delimitation of areas where past events manifest themselves in the present (Carlson 2006; Eschebach 2011; Gotham – Greenberg 2008; Schaller 2007; Schramm 2011).

The professionalisation of the government's remembrance policy results in a closer relationship between political authorities and the academic community. Although the nature of scientific investigations (to some extent) limits the utility of *academic research* as an instrument of social influence (Friedländer 2000: 13–14; Tamm 2014), at least three reasons may lead to the involvement of social scientists in the government's story-telling: (1) ideological or conditional (reward vs. punishment) motivations, (2) the desire to investigate research problems which seem to be popular or significant and (3) adaptation to a grant system which favours certain types of studies and some research topics. In all three cases, scientists' involvement may be unconscious, unintentional or involuntary, but in non-democratic countries, the academic community may also participate in the government's premeditated manipulation of society (Mitter 2003; Shafir 2014; Uldricks 2009).[6]

6 In the case of Poland, it is worth mentioning that a public institution, the Institute of National Remembrance is the leading centre for studies of contemporary history; its researchers have their own system

The development of *specialist institutions* is also due to the professionalisation of the government's remembrance policy. Museums, galleries, libraries, archives, institutes, centres, educational parks and commemorative chambers integrate civic education and academic research and multiply policy's influence across a society. Specialist institutions stimulate and inspire citizens and integrate them into a single community of remembrance (Wawrzyński 2014). Their role is not limited to the narrating of past events: they explain national history (Landsberg 1997), highlight links between the past and the present (Berman 2001; Worthy 2004), reinforce individuals' commitment to narratives (Cadot 2010; Freed 1989) and integrate remembrance narratives with essential definitions of national identity (Seo 2008). In the 21st century, however, specialist institutions have become so popular because they often offer less official communication. They are spaces of individualised and diverse interactions between the narrator and recipient which enable both sides to negotiate (equivalent) interpretations of past events (Lisus – Ericson 1995: 18).

Sometimes specialist institutions are established as part of the *system of justice*. As such, they popularise a simplified vision of reality in which heroes are rewarded and wrongdoers are punished by the government (Valiñas Vanspauwen 2009: 270). Especially in the transition period, use of the judiciary plays a significant role in the remembrance policy; it prevents citizens from experiencing injustice and curtails less-than-empathetic attitudes towards victims of former repressions or harms (Dalbert 2009: 288; Bègue Muller 2006). In her study of transitional justice, Lavinia Stan (2006: 383) notes that the alliance between remembrance and justice results in powerful labels and enables governments to distinguish heroes and victims from villains and tormentors. Moreover, thanks to this alliance, political elites are able to control public expressions of emotions and the political system is protected from the rank-and-file deconstruction (Elster 2004; Grosswald Curran 2003) which may be caused by unhealed political trauma (Kattago 2001: 41; Withuis 2010: 1–3; Beall 2006: 470–471; Eyal 2004).

Our classification of the instruments of the government's remembrance policy also includes two modal types of action, which connect other instruments and establish all the stories in one composite of narratives. The first of these – *definitions of attitudes and values* – explains ideas, beliefs, convictions, patterns of behaviour, political visions and shared images by reference to interpretations of national history. It combines various aspects of policy so as to label past actions on the basis of present political standards (Schwartz – Schuman 2005; Schwartz 1996). Definitions of attitudes and values therefore determine whether

of financing investigations and it is closed to researchers from universities and other institutions. Moreover, the Polish academic community is highly dependent on the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and other governmental agencies which distribute financial support for research.

narratives will be *nationalised* or *privatised* (Gutwein 2009); as such, this instrument also establishes a type of relationship between a government, a society and a remembrance narrative (Moyn 1998). On the other hand, the *polyphony of narratives* delivers social proof of the correctness of an interpretation (Cialdini 2003: 100–105). It is the reason why governments aim to use diverse narrators with different authorities (Cappalletto 2003: 241). Such persons include witnesses of past events, respected members of local communities, historians, archaeologists, school-teachers, artists, journalists, celebrities and political leaders. The plurality of story-tellers increases the presumed authenticity of the narrative and its interpretation.

Methodology of the Experimental Study

The measurement of attitudes to the government's remembrance narratives in Poland was undertaken in December 2014 and January 2015 at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and its medical school in Bydgoszcz. The participants in the study were 364 male and female students (aged 18–29 years with an average age of 21 years old) with different academic majors: accountancy, biotechnology, cognitive studies, computer science, economics, education studies, journalism, international relations, management, mathematics, pharmacy, philology, security studies and social work. The selected sample was random since the recruitment procedure for the study was based on voluntary participation in the experiment. We therefore do not recognise the final results as representative of the population, but rather see them as an observation of attitudes among a select group of university students.

In the study, 364 participants were randomly assigned to six experimental conditions that were based on the project's research design. We introduced two dependent variables: the arousal of emotions (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) and the incitement of commitment (no commitment vs. low commitment). We then observed and compared attitude changes under the different experimental conditions. The manipulation of emotions was achieved based on the presentation of three short movies about the 1945 Augustów Roundup that were produced for the study; the narrators of these movies expressed neutrality, pride or sorrow. Moreover, participants were also asked to write either a short informative text about the topic of movie (the "no-commitment condition") or a short persuasive text about it (the "low-commitment condition"). In sum, they were randomly assigned to watch one of three movies and then to write one of two types of text. This procedure enabled the research team not only to measure students' attitudes towards the remembrance policy, but to observe how different uses of emotions or commitment may influence attitude changes in just half an hour.

In the study, we used a new research tool, a questionnaire about attitudes to the government's remembrance policy, which was constructed after a pre-test

procedure with 449 participants (in Toruń and Kraków). Moreover, ten experts were asked to assess the questions' relevance to the theoretical category under discussion. As a result, we created two parallel versions (A and B) of the questionnaire with 17 items each, including two reverse questions in both versions. During the experiments, participants were asked to express their support for the statements presented on a seven-level Likert scale.[7] The minimum score was, thus, 17 points while the maximum score was 119 points. The total score can be used to determine seven general attitude types: strongly negative (17–32 points), negative (33–46), fairly negative (47–61), moderate (62–75), fairly positive (76–90), positive (91–105) and strongly positive (106–119).

Particular items in the questionnaire were presented as statements about specific tools in the government's remembrance policy. Public education was considered four times, the organisation of time seven times, the use of mass media and the fine arts five times, the topography of memory five times, academic research twice, specialist institutions five times, the system of justice once and definitions of attitudes and values twice.[8] Moreover, three other questions discussed general aspects of the remembrance policy. The questionnaire integrated two basic and opposing (idealised) types of attitudes: (1) the government should not be a narrator of national history vs. the government should be the leading narrator of remembrance discourse and (2) narratives of past events are irrelevant to my identity and political decisions vs. remembrance narratives greatly influence my identity and political decisions. These dichotomies were concurrently investigated on three levels: cognitive, behavioural and emotional.

All experiments were carried out under the same circumstances. Firstly, participants were asked to share basic information (sex, age, academic major) and to assess their interest in history and politics. Secondly, they were asked to complete an initial version of the attitudes questionnaire (17 items) followed by the need-for-closure questionnaire and a test of their knowledge of history and remembrance. Thirdly, a movie was presented. Afterwards, participants were asked to fill out a manipulation assessment form and to answer four simple questions about the movie. Next, they were asked to write a short text about the narrative presented. This text was to be informative or persuasive depending on the assigned condition. Finally, all participants were asked to complete a second version of the attitudes questionnaire (17 items). Before retesting took place, they had, thus, experienced the manipulation of their emotional arousal (through a movie) and commitment to the narrative (through the writing of the short text).

7 In the study, we used the following format: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – disagree somewhat, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 5 – agree somewhat, 6 – agree, 7 – strongly agree.

8 None of the questions considered the polyphony of narratives because of the rather modal role that this has in the policy.

General Results of the Experimental Study

The average score for the 364 participants in their first (pre-test) attempt at the attitudes questionnaire was 73.90 points, which suggests a moderate level of support among students for both the government's remembrance policy in Poland and the role of national history in social and political life. The data collected showed that the participants' attitude to the government's role as the principal narrator of past events was more positive than negative, however only two participants (0.55%) expressed a highly positive attitude while 44 of them (12.09%) displayed a positive attitude. Furthermore, we noted that male participants showed slightly more support than female participants for the remembrance policy (76.30 points versus 73.18 points). We also observed some differences across the age groups: in general, younger students had higher overall results, but the decline in support was not linear and could not be explained by the age of participants. In terms of academic majors, the most favourable attitudes were expressed by students of international relations (79.42 points) followed by those majoring in accountancy (77.61 points), security studies (76.98 points) and journalism (76.27 points) while students of education studies (65.39 points), mathematics and computer science (65.80 points) and management (65.93 points) were less supportive.

The results of the initial measurement of attitudes to the remembrance policy showed that citizens' support for the government as the leading narrator of past experiences was connected to their interest in history.[9] Participants who were highly interested had an average score of 85.75 points. Other scores were as follows for participants with different levels of interest: interested (84.79 points); quite interested (80.90 points); neither interested nor uninterested (73.13 points); quite uninterested (70.26 points), uninterested (62.61 points) and highly uninterested (59.59 points). Thus, participants' curiosity regulated the extent of their support for politicised remembrance and its role in the political life of the nation. This relationship was less visible when it came to their interest in politics, however, participants with a higher declared level of interest tended to have better results in the questionnaire. The knowledge test concerning history and remembrance also revealed interesting differences: erudition was associated with greater support for the policy and on average, participants who scored six or more points (of a possible 11.0) had quite a positive attitude towards the government as the principal narrator of the past.

The results of the need-for-closure questionnaire also delivered valuable insights into the dynamics of support for the government's remembrance policy in Poland. Participants who had a preference for order endorsed the policy

9 This was also measured on a seven-level Likert scale: 1 – highly uninterested, 2 – uninterested, 3 – quite uninterested, 4 – neither interested nor uninterested, 5 – quite interested, 6 – interested, 7 – highly interested.

more strongly (low-level preference: 71.78 points; moderate-level preference: 73.26 points; high-level preference: 75.32 points). Participants who favoured predictability also showed a greater level of support (low-level preference: 70.83 points; moderate-level preference: 74.27 points; high-level preference: 75.63 points). Furthermore, the difference in attitudes was noticeable when it came to opposition to ambiguity (low-level opposition: 59.71 points; moderate--level opposition: 73.62 points; high-level opposition: 74.54 points). There was no observable relationship between closed-mindedness or decisiveness and support for the policy and the government's role as the principal narrator of remembrance.

The experimental manipulation of emotions and commitment caused observable attitudinal changes. The average score for all the participants in the second (post-test) questionnaire was 75.82 points, an increase of 2.60%; this suggested that opinions about the government's remembrance policy in Poland were generally rather positive. It is worth emphasising that this change came as a result of participants just watching a short movie and answering a simple question. Moreover, seven students (1.92%) expressed a highly positive attitude while another 52 (14.29%) manifested a positive attitude. In the second measurement, the difference between male and female participants decreased (with scores of 76.82 points for the former vs. 75.52 points for the latter); there continued to be no linear relationship between age and the average result. Turning to academic majors, the greatest support for the government as the principal narrator of past events came from students of international relations (81.18 points) followed by those majoring in pharmacy (79.68 points, a +6% increase), cognitive studies (79.67 points, a +5% increase), security studies (79.19 points), accountancy (78.11 points) and journalism (76.81 points). The least supportive were again students of mathematics and computer science (66.00 points) followed by those studying education studies and management (both with 69.00 points).

The results of the second measurement of attitudes confirmed the previously observed connection between support for the remembrance policy and an interest in history. It was only in the case of participants who were highly uninterested that we noted a decrease in the average score (from 59.59 to 57.91 points). For all other groups we observed a score increase; the largest of these was in the group of participants who were highly interested in history (whose scores leapt from 85.75 points to 90.00 points). The second measurement also showed, that a higher level of interest in politics was associated with stronger support for the policy. The knowledge test enabled us to detect a linear relationship between the test result and the average score in the second measurement; on average, participants who scored five or more points (out of a possible 11.0) in the test had quite a positive attitude to the government's role as the principal narrator of past experiences.

The results of the need-for-closure questionnaire were again quite informative. In our post-manipulation measurement, we observed once more that participants with a greater preference for order were more supportive of the policy (low-level preference: 74.83 points; moderate-level preference: 75.33 points; high-level preference: 76.75 points) though the differences were less visible this time. In the case of the preference for predictability, the distinctions between the participants increased; a stronger preference for predictability led to an even greater endorsement of the policy (low-level preference: 71.68 points; moderate-level preference: 76.10 points; high-level preference: 78.79 points). Once again, the differences were also noticeable among participants with varying levels of opposition to ambiguity (low-level opposition: 58.29 points; moderate-level opposition: 76.09 points; high-level opposition: 76.21 points). In general, a lower level of closed-mindedness was connected with a more favourable attitude, and moderately decisive participants were most supportive of the remembrance policy.

The use of two parallel versions of the attitude questionnaire enabled us to observe changes in the level of support for the government as a result of exposure to a narrative. Generally, the average score increased by 2.60%. However, this increase was more likely in the case of participants with a lower score in the pre-manipulation measurement. (The changes recorded by score results were as follows: very low: 6.60%; low: 3.48%; moderate: 2.59%; high: 0.08%; very high:–0.25%.)[10] We also observed that the change among the female group (3.20%) was more significant than the one among the male group (0.69%). The age of the participants did not influence any attitude changes. On the other hand, a comparison of students with various academic majors revealed interesting differences: a small increase was observed in the cases of students of mathematics and computer science (0.30%), economics (0.40%), accountancy (0.64%), journalism (0.71%), philology (0.72%) and biotechnology (0.80%). Some increases were also seen among students of international relations (2.22%) and security studies (2.87%) while there were notable increases among students of management (4.66%), cognitive studies (5.52%), education studies (5.52%), social work (6.00%) and pharmacy (6.32%).

Only participants who were highly uninterested in history experienced a decrease in their support for the remembrance policy (–2.82%). In contrast, the most significant increases were seen among the groups who were highly interested in history (4.96%) or uninterested in the subject (4.58%). Similar observations were made about participants' interest in politics: those who were highly uninterested in the field recorded a slight decrease (–0.08%); the biggest increases occurred among the groups who were uninterested (5.91%), quite interested (5.31%) or highly interested (4.34%) in the subject. These results

10 This division is based on quintiles in the first measurement.

show that exposure to a narrative may also be an effective stimulus among citizens who are not interested in history and politics. The results of the knowledge test confirmed this observation: participants who scored fewer than two points (out of a possible 11.0) experienced a significant decrease in their support (–10.08%) while the highest increases took place among participants with two points (4.42%) or seven or more points (3.72%). Our experimental study, thus, proved that the potential effectiveness of the government's remembrance policy is not limited to recipients who are interested or educated in history and politics.

Participants with less of a preference for order tended to see greater increases in their support (low-level preference: 4.25%; moderate-level preference: 2.81%; high-level preference: 1.90%). In the case of the preference for predictability, the opposite relationship was observed (the increase was 1.21% for those with a low-level preference; 2.47% for a moderate-level preference and 4.7% for a high-level preference). A lower level of opposition to ambiguity caused a decline in support (–2.38%) while moderate – and high-level opposition were related to a greater susceptibility to manipulation (with shifts of 3.36% and 2.24% respectively). A lower level of decisiveness was associated with a slightly greater attitude change (low-level decisiveness: 2.75%; moderate-level decisiveness: 2.63%; high-level decisiveness: 2.31%). In the case of closed-mindedness, the reverse relationship applied (low-level close-mindedness: 2.24%; moderate-level close-mindedness: 3.04%). Nevertheless, less closed-minded participants continued to express more favourable attitudes to the government's remembrance policy.

As part of the study, we also observed how differences in the emotional character of a narrative can influence attitude change. Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of three short movies: the first of these presented a story without any additional attempt to arouse emotions (the neutral condition); the second also attempted to induce pride (the positive condition) and the third presented a story and made an additional effort to induce sorrow (the negative condition). After watching the emotionally neutral movie, participants experienced a 3.10% increase in their level of support for the government's policy; in the positive condition, the level of change was slightly higher (3.54%) while in the negative condition, we observed an increase of only 1.15%. The manipulation of commitment also caused different results: participants assigned to the no-commitment condition (writing a short informative text) experienced a 2.37% increase; those fulfilling the low-commitment condition (writing a short persuasive text) experienced a 3.42% increase while a reverse commitment[11] led to a noticeable decrease in support (–3.19%).

11 Nineteen participants assigned to the low-commitment condition wrote persuasive texts opposing the promotion of the presented narrative. We decided to treat these as cases of "reverse commitment."

The most influential combination of emotions and commitment was low commitment with the additional inducement of pride (producing a change of 4.60%). The presence of positive emotions without the incitement of any commitment was less effective (3.05%). Surprisingly, in neutral conditions, the lack of any commitment was slightly more effective (3.33%) than a low-level commitment (3.13% change). When sorrow was induced in addition to a low level of commitment, there was a greater increase in support (2.49%) than was the case in the same scenario with the no-commitment condition (0.66%). Moreover, the presence of additional emotions intensified the negative influence of the reverse commitment (neutral state: –1.30%, positive emotions: –1.98%, negative emotions: –5.44%).

Attitudes to Tools in the Government's Remembrance Policy

The data collected were useful not only for investigating general attitudes to the government's remembrance policy in Poland, but also for considering attitudes to particular policy instruments. As has been mentioned, the two parallel versions of the questionnaire each presented 31 statements that referred to specific government actions along with another three more general statements. In the case of 18 statements, the support declared for the policy was above average while for the other 16 items, it was below average.

After the first measurement (whose results were not influenced by experimental manipulation), we noted that the support declared for all the general statements was above average. The participants tended to agree that they felt regret about the presence of unresolved issues in contemporary Polish history (for an average score of 5.62 out of a possible 7.0); they also agreed that they were not indifferent to Polish heroes of the past (for an average score of 5.16). Moreover, participants expressed a moderate level of support for the government's involvement in resolving historical issues even if this might cause conflicts with other countries (for an average score of 4.48). Notably, participants' general attitudes to the policy were rather positive and they recognised remembrance as a significant aspect of national politics and their political identities.

On the matter of public education, the participants in the study were less supportive: the results for two items showed an above-average level of support while for another two questions, the level was below average. Polish students somewhat agreed that history is one of the most significant courses at school because it educates informed citizens (for an average score of 4.73) and that during classes, pupils should learn more about the patrons of their schools[12] even if this is at the expense of other courses (average score of 4.35). However,

12 Polish state schools often have a patron, an international, national or local hero who is presented as a role model for pupils.

they neither agreed nor disagreed that the government should fund not just public education but also other ways of popularising historical knowledge regardless of the costs (average score: 4.16) and they disagreed somewhat that there should be extra history lessons instead of other courses at school (average score: 3.52). Therefore, Polish students did not express their support for using public education in the remembrance policy although they recognised its role in shaping civic behaviour.

The organisation of time met with rather a positive response from participants: the results of four items were above average while the other three had below-average results. Polish students agreed that political leaders should participate in celebrations of significant anniversaries (average score: 4.92); they supported the government funding of active forms of commemoration, e.g. location-based games or guided excursions (average score: 4.88); they agreed somewhat that celebrations of significant anniversaries should be ceremonial regardless of the expense (average score: 4.75) and they also supported the statement that the organisation of time is essential for the national community even if this is connected with the promotion of one interpretation of history (average score: 4.70). However, the participants were less supportive when questions considered their emotions and behaviour. They neither agreed nor disagreed that they felt unemotional when participating in national commemorations (average score: 4.02) or that it was important to participate in celebrations of significant anniversaries (average score: 3.90). Moreover, they disagreed somewhat that they preferred participating in national commemorations to taking a stroll in the park (average score: 3.71). Polish students, thus, expressed their support for the government's actions, but were fairly uninterested in participating in these events.

In the study, the lowest level of support was attached to the use of mass media in the government's remembrance policy: only one item here had an above-average result while the results of the other four were below average. Participants agreed somewhat that they watched historical films on public television with interest and attention (average score: 4.48). At the same time, Polish students neither agreed nor disagreed that reading about or listening to accounts of famous battles stimulates their imagination (average score: 3.91) or that public television should include more shows concerning national history (average score: 3.91). They also neither agreed nor disagreed that they preferred special editions of newspapers about the past over other special editions (average score: 3.84). Moreover, participants somewhat disagreed that they would watch news broadcasts more often if the latter focused more on history (average score: 3.48). These results may lead us to form two quite different conclusions: first, we may see them as the reflection of rather negative attitudes to the use of mass media as a remembrance policy instrument. Second, we may recognise them as a consequence of the government's inability to combine remembrance

narratives with entertainment. If we accept this second interpretation, we will also agree that Poland's remembrance policy is being implemented ineffectively since in the 21st century, the mass media seem to be the key instrument for popularising narratives.

The attitudes observed towards the topography of memory were the most supportive of the government: four results were above average while one was below average. Participants in the study agreed that monuments to Polish heroes are not irrelevant to them (average score: 4.91). They agreed somewhat that they experience strong emotions when visiting commemorative sites (average score: 4.57), that building monuments is important despite the possible expense (average score: 4.47) and that they feel pride when they see monuments of Polish national heroes even when those heroes are not unblemished (average score: 4.47). Only the commemoration of significant events despite possible conflicts with other countries met with a slightly less favourable response from participants (average score: 4.23). The study's results showed that Polish students considered the public space to be a stage for commemorative rituals and an arena for narratives and that they recognised the government's dominance in this sphere.

As regards academic research, participants somewhat disagreed with the idea of giving additional funding to studies of contemporary history instead of other topics (average score: 3.69). Nevertheless, they agreed that they were interested in documentary films about Polish history (average score: 4.87) – again, this showed that Polish students like the outcomes of the alliance of remembrance and cinematography. Concerning specialist institutions for remembrance policy, the participants expressed less approval: the result was above average for only one item and it was below average for the other four. The participants agreed that visiting historical museums is a reflective experience (average score: 4.90). At the same time, they neither agreed nor disagreed on any of the following propositions: they would like to participate in a debate organised by the Institute of National Remembrance (average score: 4.03); the government should fund institutions that specialise in the documentation of history even at the expense of other policies (average score: 3.99); the government should build new historical museums even if doing so could be a financial liability (average score: 3.80). Moreover, the participants somewhat disagreed that they would prefer to see public support for remembrance projects over support for sports infrastructure projects (average score: 3.55). These results lead us to an interesting observation: even if Polish students like experiencing remembrance narratives, they do not tend to agree with the public funding of institutions dedicated to creating and promoting these narratives.

The participants in the study expressed the opposite attitude to public funding when it came to special pensions for former underground soldiers during the Second World War which they agreed should be financed by the government (average score: 5.05). Regarding definitions of attitudes and values, they agreed

that the lack of commemoration of past heroes is sad (average score: 4.75); they neither agreed nor disagreed that national heroes should be presented as civic role models even if the selection of examples may be controversial (average score: 4.00). Polish students, thus, clearly agreed that the commemoration of national heroes is the government's duty, but they expressed some reservations when asked to call controversial heroes role models.

Conclusions

In our experimental study, we investigated the influence of emotions and commitment on Polish students' attitudes to the government's remembrance policy. We also studied various aspects of these attitudes, especially the level of support for the government's use of particular tools for popularising narrative. Our basic research objective was to consider whether emotions and commitment can explain the effectiveness of remembrance narratives as a political asset. While undertaking the project, however, we noticed that – to some degree – we were also performing a diagnosis of the state of the relationships between remembrance, national history, the government and Polish students. This article has been a presentation of that diagnosis.

We stated earlier that citizens' attitudes to the remembrance policy may be applied to discuss Polish political culture. The overall results of the first (pre--manipulation) measurement of attitudes suggest that Polish students tended to approve somewhat of the government's dominant role in the politics of memory and they recognised remembrance as the duty of political elites rather than a task for civil society. Participants in the study supported the government's dominance in the public sphere and they legitimised its power to name places and recreate landscapes (Guyot – Seethal 2007). However, although Polish students generally recognised the significance of remembrance and its role in shaping civic behaviours, they were rather unwilling to support the development of three key policy instruments: public education, specialist institutions and the use of the mass media. The issue remains whether their stance was moderate because of the very nature of these actions or because they did not agree with the current methods of their application.

The results of the study lead us to an intriguing observation: Polish students agreed that the government should implement a remembrance policy, but they did not like being involved in these actions. They agreed therefore that there is some symbolic distinction between the duties of the political elite and the duties of the ordinary citizen. As a result, they were more interested in being the subordinated subjects of a remembrance policy than in being active participants in historical debates. However, participants saw two limitations on the government's power: first, they expected that the policy would not be used to incite political conflicts, and second, they were rather unwilling to support

the funding of new commemorative initiatives from their taxes. We may, thus, assume that Polish students recognised remembrance as an ideology which establishes a national community, but they were rather opposed to increasing the costs of the government's management of collective memory.

The collected data enable us to formulate three conclusions: first, we may note that in the case of remembrance policy, the participants in the study were more supportive of the government than of civil society. Second, these participants preferred not to be involved in commemorative actions, which they recognised as being the domain of political elites. Third, the participants considered remembrance to be a type of ideology which the government and political elites should use to consolidate the citizenry and prevent conflicts. In addition, the study results allow us to create a general profile for the strong supporter of the government's remembrance policy: this is a citizen who is interested in history and politics, has developed knowledge of national history, prefers order and predictability, does not like ambiguity, is not closed-minded and has a fairly moderate level of decisiveness. And as another part of our experimental study showed, the more supportive participants were five times more likely to be personally involved in popularising the narrative than all of the participants. Thus, students who were more obedient to the government were also more willing to engage in political actions. This shows that in post-transitional Poland, political elites still dominate civil society on the basis of remembrance and Polish students are rather supportive of this state of affairs.

References

Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney (1965): *The Civic Culture*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Assmann, Jan (1995): *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*. "New German Critique" 68, 125–133.

Baer, Alejandro (2001): Consuming history and memory through mass media products. *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 4 (4): 491–501.

Beall, Jo (2006): Cultural Weapons: Traditions, Inventions and the Transition to Democratic Governance in Metropolitan Durban. *Urban Studies* 43 (2): 457–473.

Bègue, Laurent, Muller, Dominique (2006): Belief in a just world as a moderator of hostile attributional bias. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 45, 117–126.

Berman, Judith E. (2001): Holocaust Museums in Australia: The Impact of Holocaust Denial and the Role of the Survivors. *Journal of Holocaust Education* 10 (1): 67–88.

Bukh, Alexander (2007): Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization. *Asian Survey* 47 (5): 683–704.

Cadot, Christine (2010): Can Museums Help Build a European Memory? The Example of the Musée de l'Europe in Brussels in the Light of 'New World' Museums' Experience. *Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 23, 127–136.

Cappalletto, Francesca (2003): *Long-Term Memory of Extreme Events: From Autobiography to History*. *The Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute* 9 (2): 241–260.

Carlson, Marla (2006): Looking, Listening, and Remembering: Ways to Walk New York after 9/11. *Theatre Journal* 58: 3, 395–416.

Cesarani, David (2001): Does the Singularity of Holocaust make it Incomparable and Inoperative for Commemorating, Studying and Preventing Genocide? Britain's Holocaust Memorial Day as a Case Study. *Journal of Holocaust Education* 10 (2): 40–56.

Cialdini, Robert B. (2003): *Influence. Science and Practice*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Dalbert, Claudia (2009): Belief in a just world, in M.R. Leary & R. H. Hoyle. *Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behaviour*. New York: Guliford Publications, 288–297.

Dror, Yuval (2001): Holocaust Curricula in Israeli Secondary Schools, 1960s-1990s: Historical Evaluation from Moral Education Perspective. *Journal of Holocaust Education* 10 (2): 29–39.

Dudek, Antoni (2011): *Instytut. Osobista historia IPN*. Warszawa: Czerwone i Czarne.

Eckes, Thomas, SIX, Bernd (1994): Fakten und Fiktionen in der Einstellung-Verhaltens-Forschung: Eine Meta-Analyse. *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie* 25, 253–271.

Elster, Jon (2004): *Closing the books: transitional justice in historical perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Eschebach, Insa (2011): Soil, Ashes, Commemoration. Process of Sacralization at the Ravensbrück Former Concentration Camp. *History & Memory* 23 (1): 131–156.

EyaL, Gil (2004): Identity and Trauma. Two Forms of the Will to Memory. *History & Memory* 16 (1): 5–36.

FOGU, Claudio, Kansteiner, Wolf (2006): *The Politics of Memory and the Poetics of History,* in R. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner & C. Fogu. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe.* Durham – London: Duke Univeristy Press, 284–310.

Freed, James Ingo (1989): The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. *Assemblage* 9, 58–79.

Friedländer, Saul (2000): History, Memory, and the Historian: Dilemmas and Responsibilities. *New German Critique* 80, 3–15.

Fukuoka, Kazuya (2011): School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in Japan: A Study of Reception. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 24, 83–103.

Fullard, Katja (2010): Memory and Identity in Autobiographical Texts by Günter Grass and Dieter Wallershoff. *Rocky Mountain Review* 64 (1): 71–85.

Gagiano, Annie (2004): Adapting the National Imaginary: Shifting Identities in Three Post–1994 South African Novels. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30 (4): 811–824.

Gotham, Kevin Fox, Greenberg, Miriam (2008): From 9/11 to 8/29: Post-Disaster Recovery and Rebuilding in New York and New Orleans. *Social Forces* 87 (2): 1039–1062.

Gregor, Neil (2001): Four Days in April 2000: The 55th Anniversary of the Liberation of Ravensbrück. *Journal of Holocaust Education* 10 (2): 71–78.

GROSS, Jan Tomasz (2000): *Sąsiedzi. Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka*. Sejny: Pogranicze.

Grosswald Curran, Vivian (2003): The Politics of Memory / Errinerungspolitik and the use propriety of law in the process of memory construction. *Law and Critique* 14, 309–323.

Grundlingh, Albert (2004): Refraining Remembrance:The Politics of Centenary Commemoration of the South African War of 1899–1902. *Journal of Southern African Politics* 30 (2): 359–375.

Gutwein, Daniel (2009): The Privatization of the Holocaust: Memory, Historiography, and Politics. *Israel Studies* 14 (1): 36–64.

Guyot, Sylvain, Seethal, Cecil (2007): *Identity of Place, Places of Identity, Change of Place Names in Post-Apartheid South Africa. South African Geographical Journal* 89 (1): 55–63.

Hjarvard, Stig (2008): The Mediatization of Society. A Theory of Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change. *Nordicom Review* 29 (2): 105–134.

Hoerschelmann, Olaf (2001): „Memoria Dextra Est": Film and Public Memory in Postwar Germany. *Cinema Journal* 40 (2): 78–97.

Jackman, Robert W., Miller, Ross A. (1996): A Renaissance of Political Culture*? American Journal of Political Science* 40 (3): 632–659.

Kansteiner, Wulf (2004): Nazis, Viewers, and Statistics: Television History, Television Audience Research and Collective Memory in West Germany. *Journal of Contemporary History* 39 (4): 575–598.

Kattago, Siobhan (2001): *Ambiguous Memory. The Nazi Past and German National Identity*. Westport – London: Praeger.

Khalili, Laleh (2007): *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine. The Politics of National Commemoration*. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press.

Koczanowicz, Leszek (1997): Memory of Politics and Politics of Memory. Reflections on the Construction of the Past in Post-Totalitarian Poland. *Studies in East European Thought* 49, 259–270.

Korzeniewski, Bartosz (2007): Teoria kultury a badania nad pamięcią społeczną. *Kultura Współczesna* 2, 6–15.

Korzeniewski, Bartosz (2010): *Transformacja Pamięci. Przewartościowania w pamięci przeszłości a wybrane aspekty funkcjonowania dyskursu publicznego w Polsce po 1989 roku*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk.

Krasnodębski, Zdzisław (2008): Rozmowy istotne i nieistotne, in I- Sariusz-Skąpska. *Pamięć jako przedmiot władzy.* Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 17–21.

Król, Marcin (2008): Manipulacje władzy, in I. Sariusz-Skąpska. *Pamięć jako przedmiot władzy*. Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 23–25.

Kuźniar, Roman (2012): *Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

Landsberg, Alison (1997): America, the Holocaust, and the Mass Culture of Memory: Towards a Radical Politics of Empathy. *New German Critique* 71, 63–86.

Lijphard, Arend (1999): *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lisus, Nicola A., Ericson, Richard V. (1995): Misplacing Memory: The Effect of Television Format on Holocaust Remembrance. *The British Journal of Sociology* 46 (1): 1–19.

Macginty, Roger (2001): The Political Use of Symbols of Accord and Discord: Northern Ireland and South Africa. *Civil Wars* 4 (1): 1–21.

Machcewicz, Paweł (2012). *Spory o historię 2000–2011*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Znak.

Magierska, Anna (2008): Polityka historyczna – politycy – historia. *Społeczeństwo i Polityka* 4, 9–27.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, Schultz, Winfried (1999): 'Mediatization' of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? *Political Communication* 16 (3): 247–261.

Meseth, Wolfgang, Proske, Matthias (2010): Mind the gap: Holocaust Education in Germany, between pedagogical intentions and classroom interactions. *Prospects* 40, 201–222.

Meyen, Michael, Pfaff-Rüdigen, Senta (2014): Mass Media and Memory: the Communist GDR in Today's Communicative Memory. *Medijske Studije – Media Studies* 5, 3–18.

Mitter, Rana (2003): Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics. *Journal of Contemporary History* 38 (1): 117–131.

Moyn, Samuel (1998): Two Regimes of Memory. *The American Historical Review* 103 (4): 1182–1186.

Ponczek, Eugeniusz (2007): Kultura polityczna społeczeństwa polskiego. Doświadczenia dziejowe oraz znaki czasu współczesności i przyszłości. *Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Res Politicae* 2, 117–133.

Rydel, Jan (2011): *Polityka historyczna w Republice Federalnej Niemiec. Zaszłości. Idee. Praktyka*. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego.

Schaller, Dominik J. (2007): From the Editors: genocide tourism – educational value or voyeurism? *Journal of Genocide Studies* 9 (4): 513–515.

Schramm, Katharina (2011): Introduction. Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacred Space. *History & Memory* 23: 1, 5–22.

Schwartz, Barry (1996): Memory as Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II. *American Sociological Review* 61 (5): 908–927.

Schwartz, Barry, Schuman, Howard (2005): History, Commemoration, and Belief: Abraham Lincoln in American Memory, 1945–2001. *American Sociological Review* 70 (2): 183–203.

Seo, Jungmin (2008): Politics of Memory in Korea and China: Remembering the Comfort Women and Nanjing Massacre. *New Political Science* 30 (3): 369–392.

Shafir, Michael (2014): Unacademic academics: Holocaust deniers and trivializes in post--Communist Romania. *Nationalities Papers* 42 (6): 942–964.

Smith, Rogers (2003): *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Mortality of Political Membership*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smoczyńska, Anna, Górowska-Fells, Magdalena, Maluchnik, Beata, Płatos, Beata, Chojnacki, Michał, Smolik, Marcin (2012): *The System of Education in Poland*. Warszawa: Polish Eurydice Unit & Foundation for the Development of the Education System.

Stan, Lavinia (2006): *The Vanishing Truth? Politics and Memory in Post-Communist Europe*. *East European Quarterly* 40 (4): 383–408.

Tamm, Marek (2014): Truth, Objectivity and Evidence in History Writing. *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 8, 265–290.

Uldricks, Teddy J. (2009): War, Politics and Memory. Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II. *History & Memory* 21 (2): 60–82.

Valiñas, Marta, Vanspauwen, Kris (2009): Truth-seeking after violent conflict: experiences from South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Contemporary Justice Review* 12 (3): 269–288.

Wang, Zheng (2008): National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China. *International Studies Quarterly* 52, 783–806.

Wawrzyński, Patryk (2012): The Usage of Politics of Memory in Polish Foreign Policy: Present State and Perspectives. *Copernicus Journal of Political Studies* 1, 67–91.

Wawrzyński, Patryk (2014): Sharing the Past: Specialized Institutions as an instrument of Politics of Memory in the 21st Century, in R. Schattkowsky, M. Řeznik. *Society and Nation in Transnational Processes in Europe*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, in print.

Wawrzyński, Patryk, Ratke-Majewska, Anna, Marszałek-Kawa, Joanna (2015): The Transformation of National Identity and the Remembrance during Post-Authoritarian Transitions: case studies of Spain and South Africa. *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies* 9 (1): 19–32.

Westen, Drew (2008): *The Political Brain. The role of emotion in deciding the fate of the Nation*. New York: Public Affairs.

Withuis, Jolande (2010): Introduction: the Politics of War Trauma, in J. Withuis & A. Mooij. *The Politics of War Trauma. The aftermath of World War II in eleven European countries*, Amsterdam: Aksant, 1–11.

Wolff-Powęska, Anna (2007): Polskie spory o historię i pamięć. Polityka historyczna. *Przegląd Zachodni* 1, 3–44.

Worthy, Scott (2004): Communities of Remembrance: Making Auckland's War Memorial Museum. *Journal of Contemporary History* 39 (4): 599–618.

Yablonka, Hanna (2009): Izraelczycy i Szoah: pamięć, tożsamość i dyskurs, in E. Kossewska. *Brzemię pamięci. Współczesne stosunki polsko-izraelskie.* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 95–112.

***Dr. Patryk Wawrzyński** – researcher at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland, and visiting researcher at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He develops research in political culture, remembrance policy, politics of memory and transitional studies, mostly in Central Europe and Southern Africa. E-mail: patryk.wawrzynski@gmail.com.*

***prof. Ralph Schattkowsky** – Chair of International Relations' History at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, faculty at the University in Rostock, Germany. He develops research in civic society, identity politics and the history of German-Polish relations. E-mail: rascha@umk.pl.*

The Personalisation of Politics at the Local Level in Poland and Selected Central and Eastern European States: A Contribution to the Research

PAWEŁ ANTKOWIAK AND ŁUKASZ SCHEFFS

Abstract: *Images about politics take a specific form in the imagination of the electorate, eliciting specific associations and thus becoming a source of attitudes and influencing election preferences. At the same time, the increasing importance of politicians' perceived personality traits and images has been observed. Empirical studies of politicians' personalities provide one of the more effective tools for studying the basic features of the personalisation of politics, including at a local level. Such studies involve the measurement of citizens' perceptions of politicians' personality traits. This article seeks to systematise key concepts and provide an introduction to conducting advanced empirical research in this area.*

Keywords: ***Personalisation of politics, political image, local politics, political leadership, local government***

Introduction

It is commonly believed that contemporary politics (political activity) has been permanently coupled with the circulation of the mass media. In practice, implementing policy in modern times means having a media presence in order to manage the discourse and continuous activity. The consequence is that, unlike in the past, politicians are now obliged to partake in a political game of media performance where their images are transformed, their presentations and attitudes created and their stage masks incessantly changed. In this context, the roles and importance of all kinds of consultants and advisors are increasing. Politicians and their collaborators are also taking growing advantage of professional studies and analyses prepared for the purpose of current political activities. To an unprecedented extent, a politician's image and, in consequence, their personality, have become their assets. For decades, social studies scholars have used three categories – the leader, the commander and the statesman – in

an effort to describe a complex political reality. It may even be said that politics has always been highly dependent on individuals and their personalities. Nevertheless, a significant increase in the importance of political leaders' personal image has come in the wake of the pervasiveness of the mass media and their rapid development.

The marketisation of politics – and its subsequent mediatization – have influenced the way of doing politics and also contributed considerably to the transforming of the political system and evolution of political institutions. Among the different transformations and modifications, a process of the *personalisation of politics* has emerged and already been defined and identified in the literature as having particular importance for political science. This process involves explaining political events in "personal" categories and treating them as outcomes of the intentional acts of individuals, leaders or other persons with important social and political roles (Sielski 2012: 100–111; Reykowski 2002: 124; Deegan-Krause 2010: 147).

The term *presidentialisation* also figures in the literature on the subject. It refers specifically to changes in the electoral image used when a party leader begins to play a new role on the political stage (Mughan 2000: 7; Kolczyński 2002: 81–87). Presidentialisation, however, first and foremost concerns the evolution of the position and role of a political leader when they hold the office of prime minister. This results, on the one hand, from the fact that an increasing number of prime ministers are employing a presidential style of administration (Poguntke 2011; Dobek-Ostrowska 2004: 202–203; Karvonen 2011); on the other hand, it is due to actual (that is, institutional) changes happening within the framework of the given political system such as the direct election of the prime minister (Hazan 2011). In this instance, presidentialisation takes the form of institutional personalisation.

Polish political science applies yet another term, that of *personification*, which is equivalent to what we have defined here as the personalisation of politics (Karwat 1996: 85–97; Pawełczyk 2001: 196–206; Annusewicz 2001: 148–160; Karwat 2006: 101–116) with a few exceptions (Karwat 1995: 435–454).

Personalisation is therefore nothing other than the use of a particular symbol – a symbolic object – in order to interpret the image, attitudes and views of a given politician (Walczak 2008: 168). A narrow approach to personalisation links it to transformations in the structure of contemporary election campaigns while a broad understanding of this term encompasses the entire complex process of political decision-making (Helms 2008: 37–38). At the same time, the personalisation of politics should be identified with a process in which there is continuous growth in the importance of individual political actors while the significance of political groups, movements and parties decreases (Kaase 1994: 211–230; Brettschneider, Gabriel 2002: 127–157; Rahat – Sheafer 2007: 65).

The reasons for the increasing personalisation of politics include the following:

1) The individualisation of messages; the increased emphasis on the image of political leaders is far more interesting to potential voters than an informed debate or a clear political platform
2) Increased levels of education and, in consequence, a greater demand for access to information
3) The increased role and importance of the mass media and of television in particular (Caprara – Zimbardo 2004: 581)
4) The end of the importance of the political party and the related growing similarities among different groups; the adoption of identical political and electoral strategies (Mair 2010: 271–272)
5) Differences in the nature of electoral systems and in the manner and mode of selecting political leaders, e.g. concerning direct elections of the prime minister or the duration of election campaigns
6) The use of extended and professionally developed electoral strategies, primarily electoral advertising (Mazzoleni 2000: 326) and
7) The individualisation of social life; people are increasingly perceiving themselves and others as individuals rather than as representatives of a collective (Bauman 2008: 23).

Notwithstanding these factors, the assumption behind the personalisation of politics thesis is that the increasing importance of individual political actors (politicians) is occurring at the expense of political parties and collective identities (Baines – Harris – Lewis 2002: 6). This is facilitated by institutions, which increasingly often (and in line with established processes) accept the growing importance of individual politicians, and by the people who approach politics as an ongoing competition between particular politicians who also enjoy their affection and electoral preferences (Karvonen 2011).

Personalisation has also been shown to assume the form of the heroisation of politics where popular politicians are perceived as heroes and individual experiences are seen as the outcome of the activities of strictly defined groups or persons, who are either glorified or demonised. Personalisation can also present a sociometric vision of politics where the mechanisms of political contest, entering alliances, working out compromises and mediation are perceived in terms of social relations or cronyism (Karwat 1996: 87–89; Mandrosz 2002: 171–172).

Finally, personalisation can refer to the matters of presentation and influence (or strength of impact). Presentation is related to the leader being the core of the idea being created or of the party they represent; the leader, then, becomes the public image. Strength of impact concerns the influence that a given leader has on voters' decisions. In contrast with presentation, influence depends on not only the role of the media, but also politics' institutional structures, that

is, on the political and, even more importantly, the institutional position of the leader (Brenner 2010: 118).

The Personalisation of Politics at the Local Level

The issue of the personalisation of politics at the local level is one that we intend to examine in a future project. Taking into account the studies carried out to date, this issue can be considered in three domains: the territorial, the subject-related and the object-related. The territorial dimension specifically concerns the leadership of local government units, mainly communes (municipalities) (*gmina*) and districts (*powiat*). As far as the subject-related dimension is concerned, leadership is identified with the representatives of legislative and executive bodies that are directly or indirectly elected. The object-related dimension relates intrinsically to strictly political matters (Michałowski 2008: 27–28). Given the amount of material that will need to be verified and the human and financial resources available, we intend to confine our studies to the subject-related dimension of personalisation.

The primary objective of this work is to update perceptions of the place, role and importance of leaders in local government. These transformations are directly associated with the continually increasing importance of political marketing, the ongoing professionalisation of all activities performed within the scope of local politics (Sielski 2012: 54) and current institutional transformations.

Direct elections at the local level have come to be associated with the need to create an image for the local politician holding office or aspiring to do so (Piechota – Ratajczak 2012: 42). Relying on the findings of other scholars, we assume that contemporary politicians, and especially their images, are becoming products offered in a particular marketplace. The latter may be defined as all of the legal, material and symbolic relations that occur among the subjects of exchange processes in social space, as determined by the political system (Skrzypwiński 2011: 65). This is also happening in the context of the local activities that interest us here.

We propose the following preliminary research hypotheses:

1) The growing personalisation of politics is a common political phenomenon.
2) Personalisation is also increasingly present at the local level.
3) Among the factors which impose the transformation of modern leadership at the local level are the increasing importance of politicians' private personae, the advancing mediatization process and all kinds of systemic transformations believed to influence the growing individualisation of social life.
4) These transformations in the way of doing politics at the local government level are resulting in institutional transformations, which have culmi-

nated in Poland in legislation introducing the direct election of district heads (*wójt*), town mayors (*burmistrz*) and city presidents (*prezydent miasta*).

5) The personalisation of politics can be observed both on the domestic (local) political stage and in many other Central and Eastern European states such as Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.
6) The personalisation of politics at the local level, which can be noted in numerous post-Communist states, relates significantly to systemic transformations implemented since the late 1980s and the specific nature of post-transformation states.

Significance of the Research

Existing in-depth studies of local government leadership more and more often suggest that transformation processes in many countries are reflected, among other things, in formal changes in the position of city mayors/presidents. These studies refer to a particular 'fashion' for the direct election of local authorities in communes and towns (Ptak, 2010: 143–152). This is also the case in Poland, which witnessed considerable turmoil on the local political scene in the wake of a law of 20 June 2002 on the direct election of heads of communes, mayors and presidents of cities. This statute introduced the principle of direct election of a one-member executive body at the lowest level. Previously, communes had been ruled by a collective executive body indirectly elected by a legislative body (Antkowiak 2011: 41–42). The change clearly strengthened the position of the executive body at the level of the commune. By the same token, the office of president of a large city has become highly attractive to prominent politicians on the national political stage. The president of Warsaw, for instance, ranks as the fifth most important political figure in Poland behind the country's president and prime minister and the speakers of both chambers of parliament (Antkowiak 2010: 157–158).

The initiators of the above legislation supposed that the direct election of the executive bodies of communes would make local elections more attractive. During the debates on the law, some participants pointed to the social consequences of such a solution (Grzesik-Robak 2004: 38). It was claimed that this type of election of commune heads would lead to the emergence of new local government personnel, thus contributing to the professionalising of local public administration. Some believed that the move would liberate the administration from party and political influences, providing a new and better channel for the political promotion of people committed to social and political activism. It was also argued that the direct election of executive power would facilitate the identification of citizens with local authorities and so increase the social prestige of public officers. It is worth noting that this claim has been confirmed to a certain

extent (Antkowiak 2012: 77–78). It should also be stressed that direct elections of the heads of basic units of local governments take place in several Central and Eastern European states such as Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania as well as Poland.

The transformations in question, however, had far more significant outcomes which also affect the academic considerations we are engaged in. In this respect, traditional studies of local politics, which have focused on the influence of individual actors on decisions made at local level, have turned out to be insufficient. At present, these studies are complemented by work including theoretical considerations and empirical studies into leadership styles in local government (Swianiewicz – Klimska 2003: 17). What we are interested in, however, is a new dimension of this issue which has yet to be studied. This is personalisation at the local level.

The observation that the personalisation of politics is a complex process driven by numerous causes that cannot be explained by a single factor (Marciniak 2013 b: 27) is as true as it is enduring. The essence of the phenomenon can be expressed by noting that the crucial factor that determines electoral decisions lies in the leader and his socio-political image (Peszyński 2012 b: 173). It seems justifiable to assume that personalisation or presidentialisation can be discussed in a context of parliamentary, local and presidential elections that increasingly conform to each other (Peszyński 2013: 75–90). Associating personalisation directly with electoral competition or with marketing activities (Scheffs 2010 b), we may assume that personalisation entails a concentration on individual politicians in public office while failing to account for the content of public and electoral debate (Hartliński 2012: 91). More and more publications dedicated to the issue of the personalisation of politics not only reiterate the statement that the leader is the most recognisable symbol of their party (Peszyński 2012a: 62; Scheffs 2010a: 131–140), but also note that this is an interdisciplinary issue that encompasses personalisation at the institutional and media levels, for instance, as well as in the electoral behaviour of voters and politicians (Rahat – Sheafer 2007: 70–72).

Fully aware of the complexity of these matters as well as of the multitude of theoretical outlooks and definitions, we do not want to become embroiled in semantic and terminological discussions (Scheffs 2012: 287–304). We hold that the thesis that leaders have increasing importance on the national political stage, as noted over a dozen years or so, has been confirmed, and we do not contest the argument that when voters cast their votes, they are more often driven by loyalty and trust in a concrete individual than in some “abstract” group or other political entity. We also support the position that there is considerable evidence that political power has shifted from collective bodies – such as political parties, parliaments and local councils – into the hands of political leaders (Skiba 2010: 26).

Nevertheless, it must be stated that in order to justify our focus on this issue – and given both our personal interest and the empirical studies that we are planning – we are particularly keen to find an appropriate perspective for studying the process of the personalising of politics. Unlike other publications that we are aware of, we do not intend to study the influence that personalisation has on social, cultural and political transformations. The question of the reasons for the ongoing process of personalisation is also of secondary importance to us. These issues have, in any case, been relatively well researched and described (Blumler – Kavanagh 1999: 209–230). In our opinion, the issue of personalisation at the local level is both crucial and still awaiting proper examination (Niklewicz 2014: 2). This area of work seems compelling to us, particularly since the first studies of the personalisation of politics at regional level have recently begun in Poland though taking quite a different approach from our own (Peszyński 2011; Bukowski – Flis – Hess – Szymańska: 2011).

As has been said, our studies will focus on the subject-related dimension – that is, on the personality traits of local political leaders that voters take into consideration when making their ultimate election decisions (Turska-Kawa 2011: 165–186). This is an issue that has yet to be studied; based on our enquiries, there has not yet been a thorough analysis of the personalisation of local authorities in Poland. The situation is quite different at the national level where studies of political images and the reasons for the increased significance of this aspect of modern politics are becoming increasingly important (Pawełczyk – Jankowiak 2013: 35–43; Marciniak 2013a: 64–74).

Examining this issue also seems crucial in the context of political science's development. An alternative outlook on local leadership – and one that involves psychological foundations – represents a new approach; this is all the more true in the context of the personalisation of politics at the local level since this issue has only been addressed at a macro level, both in Poland and abroad. This topic is especially compelling since there have only been a few international studies that take account of the specific nature of different states and the systemic solutions adopted there. In our view, this approach is important since these studies will add value to the achievements of the social sciences in Poland and abroad.

The activities that we suggest in the project represent fundamental work in the social sciences and the discipline of political science. There has been no comprehensive publication on this topic in Poland so far.

Work Plan

Our general plan includes questionnaires (surveys) and the analysis of the content of election materials. In this way, we will seek to answer the question of which personality traits voters take into consideration when making their election decisions. The studies should be conducted in Poland and selected

CEE states. In choosing these states, our key consideration has been the direct election of the heads of basic units of local government. On this basis, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania have been selected. The analyses will be based on a model of conformity of electoral preferences with the personality traits that voters accurately perceive and consider when endorsing candidates for elected posts in local administration at the lowest level.

The starting point here is provided by the proven fact that voters identify with the politicians who represent them. This identification relates to personality features, and in particular, the congruency of the personalities of voters with those of the politicians they elect (support). This is the standpoint taken by Philip G. Zimbardo and Gian V. Caprara (2004), who designed a congruency model of political preferences. They noted that contemporary politics (on a micro-scale) has become personalised and that among other things, this is due to the fact that the individual features of politicians and voters have become considerably more important in political discourse. This importance is reflected in the electoral behaviour in societies. Voters frequently cast their votes so as to support the candidates whose personality features correspond with their own. In other words, this similarity is the factor behind electoral support. The congruency model of political preference, which Zimbardo and Caprara (2004: 581–94) designed and implemented, states that personality features attract more voter attention than political views and platforms and that in the course of political campaigns, candidates polarise their positions and emphasise the personality traits that voters can use to rationalise (justify) their choices.

This paradigm has been expanded by studies of the personality traits displayed by politicians and voters. Based on this work, it may be concluded that people tend to describe the personalities of others in the same terms they use to establish their own personalities. Nevertheless, politicians are perceived in terms of a limited number of dimensions. The reasons for this lower number can be traced to the selection process among other things. We cannot rule out the possibility that during the creation of a politician's image, their personality is composed from features their supporters find desirable. The consistent promotion of the same cluster of features can translate into a belief among voters that those features are all present in politicians' personalities. Another possible reason for the reduced number of perceived personality dimensions may stem from the process of perception itself. Voters frequently apply a strategy of cognitive economy. In other words, they apply heuristics (simplified rules of inference) to cope with the multitude of information they receive. This, however, results in a simplified mode of perceiving the political leader as well as the party and political movement they represent. In fact, perception is limited to those features that increase the possibility that the politician will behave in a certain way when elected to a given post (Oleś 2000: 7–18; Hornowska – Kaliszewska

2003: 7–14; Szarota 2008: 127–138; Miluska 2009: 505–521; Strus – Cieciuch – Rowiński 2011: 65–93; Strus – Cieciuch 2014: 17–49).

Taking into consideration the preliminary research that has already been conducted on a slightly different scale as well as our own inquiries which evidence the absence of comprehensive studies in the areas of interest, we intend to do the following:

1) demonstrate the personalisation of politics at a local level
2) better define the prerequisites for the advancing personalisation process.
3) examine the process in view of the personality traits voters attribute to different candidates
4) design an appropriate research tool and verify it by means of detailed empirical studies in Poland and abroad
5) analyse the personality traits which voters find desirable and seek out in candidates and which are then emphasised in election messages.

Research Methodology

Our studies are designed to achieve the following objectives:

a) define the personality traits which voters take into consideration when making voting decisions and
b) indicate the personality trait clusters that voters find desirable and which are emphasised in media messages constructed primarily during election campaigns.

To put this differently, we intend to demonstrate that both at the local level and beyond, the primary goal of the authors of what is broadly understood as political marketing is to identify the fundamental traits that voters take into consideration when making their political choices; they then emphasise (present) these traits in the media messages that they design and publicise. We realise that these messages are largely constructed around a given political leader, and thus, they are significantly related to the increasing personalisation of politics (as indicated above), a process which is also employed and applied during election periods.

Taking the above into consideration, we intend to:

1) design a research tool in the form of a questionnaire featuring adjectives that better identify the features that voters consider when making decisions about their support for a given candidate
2) apply this research tool through field research in Poland and selected CEE countries and
3) compare the research results collected with media messages designed in Poland.

We will be able to carry out the research efficiently in selected CEE countries based on the cooperation that Adam Mickiewicz University has established with academic centres in the respective countries.

While the plan is to conduct field research in selected CEE countries, the review of designed and published election materials will be limited to the Polish electoral market. This will be facilitated by the Content Analysis System for Television (CAST), which has been used for over a year by faculty in the political science and journalism department at Adam Mickiewicz University. The system includes two components:

- A digital repository system which makes it possible to record and search television programmes in real time and facilitates searches for individual programmes. Key functions include marking fragments, describing them with keywords, attaching comments, categorising materials and exporting clips. This system also allows for the monitoring of recurring material such as commercials and electoral spots. The CAST software is equipped with a search engine that allows for rapid searches of the database including clip descriptions and user comments.
- A speech-to-writing transcription system designed by the Poznań Supercomupting and Networking Centre (Poznańskie Centrum Superkomputerowo Sieciowe). The transcribed Polish text is attached to the description of the given programme and available at the repository.

We will limit our research to media coverage in Poland because we do not aim to achieve a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing personalisation of politics in CEE countries, a goal which seems methodologically infeasible. Rather, our purpose is to identify the premises for claiming that this process is observable and clearly present in Poland. Additionally, we assume that one of the reasons for this is the post-transformation status of Polish society. Therefore, our preliminary plan is to investigate this issue in other post-Communist countries where a similar procedure exists for electing a one-member executive body at the most basic level of local government. Another tool we find useful for such studies comes from Olga Gorbaniuk (2009), who designed a questionnaire that incorporates 148 adjectives selected in the course of a complex research process to describe the personality features of politicians taken into account by voters.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to systematise key concepts and provide an introduction to conducting advanced empirical research into the personalisation of politics at a local level in Poland and selected Central and Eastern European states.

Taking note of the transformations that are occurring in modern politics, it is becoming more and more apparent that we are facing a process of the in-

creasing personalisation of politics. Growing circles of scholars, coming mainly from the social sciences, have referred to the issue of politics' concentration on candidates. While such analyses have taken place on a national scale in different parts of the world, examinations of this process at local government level have hitherto been both scarce and superficial. Bearing this in mind, we assume that the personalisation of politics that is happening at a local level is important and deserves attention. Local government elections have conformed to the principles of presidential electoral campaigns, resulting on the one hand in the increased importance of individual images of politicians and on the other, in the simplistic conflation of this political and electoral level with specific individuals, thus leading to institutional transformation and the direct election of communes' executive bodies.

Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to update perceptions of the place, role and importance of leaders in local government. These transformations are directly related to the continually growing importance of political marketing, the ongoing professionalisation of all activities performed within the context of local politics and current institutional transformations. These studies may mark the beginning of a broader future research project to be financed, for example, from the Standard Grants Visegrad Fund.

References

Annusewicz, O. (2005): Dlaczego tak głosujemy, czyli przesłanki decyzji wyborczych. *Społeczeństwo i Polityka* 3–4.

Antkowiak, P. (2011): *Samorząd terytorialny na przykładzie miasta Konina*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, Poznań.

Antkowiak, P. (2012): Ewolucja samorządowej ordynacji wyborczej w Polsce w okresie transformacji systemowej. *Przegląd Zachodni* 1.

Baines, P. R. – Harris, P. – Lewis, B. R. (2002): The political marketing planning process: improving image and message in strategic target areas. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning* 20 (1).

Bauman, Z. (2008): *Zindywidualizowane społeczeństw*, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Gdańsk.

Blumler, J. G. – Kavanagh, D. (1999): The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features. *Political Communication* 16.

Brenner, M. (2010): Zjawisko personalizacji politycznej. *Studia Politologiczne* 16.

Brettschneider, F. – Gabriel O. W. (2002): The Nonpersonalization of Voting Behavior in Germany, in King A., eds., *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, NY: Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bukowski, M. – Flis, J. – Hess, A. – Szymańska, A. (2011): *Opcja czy osoba? Upartyjnienie versus personalizacja w wyborach samorządowych*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.

Caprara, G. V. – Zimbardo P. G. (2004): Personalizing Politics. A Congruency Model of Political Preference. *American Psychologist* 59 (7).

Deegan-Krause, K. (2010): Nowe wymiary rozłamu politycznego, in Dalton, R. – Klingemann, H. D., eds., *Zachowania polityczne t. 2*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (2004): *Media masowe i aktorzy polityczni w świetle studiów nad komunikowaniem politycznym*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław.

Gorbaniuk, O. (2009): Wymiary dyferencji profili spostrzeganych cech osobowości polskich polityków: analiza danych zastanych. *Psychologia Społeczna* 4 (1–2).

Grzesik-Robak, A. (2004): Bezpośrednie samorządowe wybory prezydentów miast 2002 – próba analizy. *Samorząd Terytorialny* 6.

Hartliński, M. (2012): Prezydencjalizacja współczesnej polityki. *Szkice Humanistyczne* 12 (2).

Helms, L. (2008): Governing in the Media Age: The Impact of the Mass Media on Executive Leadership in Contemporary Democracies. *Government and Opposition* 43 (1).

Hornowska, E. – Kaliszewska, K. (2003): Neurogenetyczna koncepcja osobowości R. C. Cloningera – związki z teorią PEN H. J. Eysencka oraz Model Wielkiej Piątki w ujęciu P. T. Costy i R. R. McCrae. *Czasopismo Psychologiczne* 9 (1).

Karwat, M. (1995): O statusie metodologicznym personifikacji, in *Historia, idea, polityka. Księga dedykowana profesorowi Janowi Baszkiewiczowi*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.

Karwat, M. (1996): Stereotypowa personifikacja polityki. *Studia Polityczne* 5.

Karwat, M. (2006): Personifikacja instytucji i instytucjonalizacja osób, in: Rubisz, L. eds., *Idee – instytucje – demokracja. Instytucjonalizacja polskiej transformacji ustrojowej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń.

Kaase, M. (1994): Is there personalization in politics? Candidates and voting behavior in Germany. *International Political Science Review* 15.

Karvonen, L. (2011): The Personalization of Politics What does research tell us so far, and what further research is in order?, Paper prepared for the 4th ECPR Conference: available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/papers/PP226.pdf (10 October 2015).

Kolczyński, M. (2002): Marketing polityczny – w drodze do personalizacji dyskursu politycznego, in Walczak-Duraj, D., eds., *Marketing polityczny a postawy i zachowania wyborcze społeczeństwa polskiego*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe „Novum", Płock-Łódź.

Mair, P. (2010): Orientacje lewicowe i prawicowe, in Dalton, R. J. – Klingemann, H. D., eds., *Zachowania polityczne t. 1*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Mandrosz, J. (2002): Czynniki ograniczające racjonalność decyzji politycznych, in Skarżyńska, K., eds., *Podstawy psychologii politycznej*, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, cop., Poznań.

Marciniak, E. M. (2013a): Percepcja cech osobowości Jarosław Kaczyńskiego i Donalda Tuska przez ich zwolenników. *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* 39.

Marciniak, E. M. (2013 b): *Personalizacja zachowań wyborczych w Polsce w kontekście Modelu Zgodności Preferencji Politycznych*, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, Warszawa.

Mazzoleni, G. (2000): A Return to Civic and Political Engagement Prompted by Personalized Political Leadership?. *Political Communication* 17.

Michałowski, S. (2008): Uwarunkowania pełnienia ról przywódczych w samorządzie terytorialnym, in Michałowski, S. – Kuć-Czajkowska, K., eds., *Przywództwo lokalne a kształtowanie demokracji partycypacyjnej*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin.

Mughan, A. (2000): *Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Election*, Palgrave, Hamshire.

Niklewicz, K. (2014): Sposób na wyborcę. *Analiza Instytut Obywatelski* 5.

Oleś, P. (2000): Kontrowersje wokół „Wielkiej Piątki". *Czasopismo Psychologiczne* 6 (1–2).

Pawełczyk, P. (2001): Polityk czyli aktor, in Marciniak, E. M. – Mołdawa, T. – Wojtaszczyk, K. A., eds., *Etyka i polityka*, Aspra-Jr, Warszawa.

Pawełczyk, P. – Jankowiak, B. (2013): Cechy wizerunku politycznego a emocje w głosowaniu na Bronisława Komorowskiego i Jarosława Kaczyńskiego w wyborach prezydenckich w 2010 roku. Raport z badań postaw politycznych studentów. *Przegląd Politologiczny* 2.

Peszyński, W. (2011): Kandydat czy partia? W poszukiwaniu determinant zachowań wyborczych elektoratu. *Preferencje Polityczne* 2.

Peszyński, W. (2012a): Personalizacja kampanii parlamentarnej w Polsce 2011 roku. *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* 35.

Peszyński, W. (2012 b): Personalizacja politycznych preferencji. *Preferencje Polityczne* 3.

Peszyński, W. (2013): Prezydencjalizacja zachowań elektoratu w roku „niewyborczym" 2012. *Preferencje Polityczne* 6.

Piechota, G. – Ratajczak R. (2012): Media samorządowe jako narzędzie kreacji wizerunku lokalnego lidera i jego otoczenia. *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* 34.

Poguntke, T. (2011): The Presidentialization of Parliamentary Democracies: A Contradiction in Terms?, Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Workshop 'The Presidentialization of Parliamentary Democracies?: available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/joint sessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws7/poguntke.PDF (20 October 2015).

Ptak, A. (2010): Ewolucja systemu wyborczego do organów samorządu terytorialnego w Polsce, in Stelmach, A., eds., *Prawo wyborcze i wybory. Doświadczenia dwudziestu lat procesów demokratyzacyjnych w Polsce*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, Poznań.

Rahat, G. – Sheafer, T. (2007): The personalization(s) of politics: Israel 1949–2003. *Political Communication* 24.

Reykowski, J. (2002): Myślenie polityczne, in Skarżyńska, K., eds., *Podstawy psychologii politycznej*, Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, cop., Poznań.

Scheffs, Ł. (2010a): Lider polityczny w totalitarnym i demokratycznym systemie politycznym. Pozorna opozycja?. *Refleksje* 2.

Scheffs, Ł. (2010 b): Polska wideopolityka w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2009 roku, in Jeziński, M. –Peszyński, W. – Seklecka, A., eds., *Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego. Media i marketing polityczny*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń.

Scheffs, Ł. (2012): Proces personalizacji polityki, in Karwat, J., eds., *Komunikowanie społeczne w badaniach młodych naukowców*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Handlu i Usług w Poznaniu, Poznań.

Sielski, J. (2011): Liderzy partyjni we współczesnych polskich partiach politycznych, in Kowalczyk, K., eds., *Partie i systemy partyjne III RP*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń.

Sielski, J. (2012): Przywódcy i liderzy samorządowi (lokalni). *Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie* wydanie specjalne.

Skiba, L. (2010): *Rządzić państwem. Centrum decyzyjne rządu w wybranych krajach europejskich*, Instytut Sobieskiego, Warszawa.

Skrzypiński, D. (2011): Marketing w lokalnych kampaniach wyborczych: faktyczne czy deklarowane działania liderów, in Churska-Nowak, K. – Drobczyński, S., eds., *Profesjonalizacja i mediatyzacja kampanii politycznych w Polsce*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Nauk Humanistycznych i Dziennikarstwa, Poznań.

Strus, W. – Cieciuch, J. (2014): Poza wielką piątkę – przegląd nowych modeli struktury osobowości. *Polskie Forum Psychologiczne* 19 (1).

Swianiewicz, P. – Klimska, U. (2003: Kto rządzi gminą i jak? Lokalni liderzy polityczni w teorii i praktyce samorządów w Polsce, *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne* 4.

Szarota, P. (2008): Wielka piątka – stare problemy, nowe wątpliwości. *Roczniki Psychologiczne* 11 (1).

Turska-Kawa, A. (2011): Osobowościowe predykatory zachowań wyborczych. Rozważania w kontekście modelu „wielkiej piątki". *Preferencje Polityczne* (2).

Walczak, R. (2008): Percepcja wizerunku polityka rozszerzonego za pomocą społecznie akceptowanych symboli, in Szklarski, B., eds., *Mity, symbole i rytuały we współczesnej polityce*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.

***Paweł Antkowiak** is Assistant Professor in the Department of Local Government and Self-Government Studies in the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. He is the recipient of a scholarship from the AMU Foundation. His academic interests address the functioning of local government, professional associations and self-regulatory business associations and local and regional policy-making of the European Union. E-mail: pawel.antkowiak@amu.edu.pl.*

***Łukasz Scheffs** Assistant Professor in the Political Marketing and Social Engineering Department at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. He is the recipient of a scholarship from the AMU Foundation. His academic interests include political marketing, new media and different dimensions of collectivism and individualism. E-mail: lukasz.scheffs@amu.edu.pl.*

DISCUSSION

In the Eyes of the Collapsing Empire: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Slovenian Independence as seen through Russian Diplomatic Sources (1990–1992)[1]

ANDREJ STOPAR

Abstract: *It is of critical importance for every newly established state to receive international recognition. The Soviet Union strongly supported the unity and territorial integrity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and considered the latter's break-up within the context of its own disintegration. The article sets out Slovenia's efforts to gain Russian recognition of Slovenian independence and sovereignty, as described in Soviet and Russian diplomatic sources, official statements and comments from academic circles. It aims to demonstrate that Moscow's decision on this subject was the result of the momentary overlapping of various international developments along with a new Russian foreign policy strategy (which changed frequently and was, thus, exceptional in the Russian foreign policy tradition). Especially important in this context were the internal political tensions in the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union.*

Keywords: ***Soviet Union, Russia, Yugoslavia, Slovenia, diplomatic relations, collapse of socialist federations***

At the close of the 1980s, Europe faced two opposing processes: the disintegration of multinational socialist federations on the one hand and a tendency towards European integration on the other. With the collapse of continental empires after World War I, the concept of the nation state, which had gradually gained ground in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), became a postulate for an understanding of statehood built on a triad of principles: sovereignty, integrity and self-determination (Simoniti 1996: 46). The states that emerged in Europe after 1990 claimed such self-determination as a basic and inalienable

1 The work was partly financed by the European Union, the European Social Fund and the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport under the Operational Programme for Human Resources Development for 2007–2013 (ESS-OP-07-13)

right and the realisation of their dream of establishing their own statehood. In contrast, developed countries no longer regarded the concept as acceptable as they had during the Cold War when they held that self-determination derived from liberal notions of justice and equality and thus contributed to the strengthening of the peace (Simoniti 1996: 46). This change of view was forced upon them by the reality that the achievement of the emancipation plans of individual self-determination-invoking nation had led to conflict and war. Exercising the right to self-determination came to be seen above all as a violation of the principle of the territorial integrity of states. In exercising this right, independence-seeking nations were said to seize the political moment for their own advantage with no consideration of the consequences for others since their focus was merely on their own project (Simoniti 1996: 47). In the Balkan context, Simoniti adds diplomatically that the 'Croatian "secession," which followed that of Slovenia, triggered a four-year war between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims.' According to Božo Repe (2002:8), however, the vast majority of the international political, diplomatic and intellectual community maintains that it was Slovenia's secession which set in motion the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the bloody war in the Balkans. The Russian analysis of this issue is quite similar if slightly more trenchant. Some Russian authors do not even consider that Slovenia's emancipatory ambitions were based on a quest for the democratisation of Slovenian society:

> It is not surprising that the desire of Slovenia and Croatia to break away from Yugoslavia was expressed not through the struggle for "democracy" against the "communist center," but above all through their aspirations to integrate with European structures. This coincided with the general military-political objectives of the Western states in exercising their concept of NATO expansion (Vasileva – Gavrilin – Mirkiskin 2005: 337).

Some Russian authors have qualms about the Slovenes' state-building aspirations and their desire for a truly independent state. Yelena Ponomareva (2010:9), for instance, cannot find a single example in Slovenian history that would testify to a struggle for national independence:

> The Slovenes did not have their own state until 1945 when they won recognition as a state-building nation and, as a titular nation, obtained their own republic – the People's/Socialist (since 1963) Republic of Slovenia. What is more, the national history of the Slovenes knows nothing about a national liberation struggle for independence.

Ponomareva finds reasons for this situation in the high level of development experienced by the Slovenian provinces during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy

and maintained by them in both the monarchic and federal Yugoslavia. In her opinion, the Slovenes had no particular need to attain sovereignty and when they did so, this was based solely on the influence of foreign powers:

> On the other hand, the centuries-old custom of being politically "attached" to the Slovenian political class was formed as a persistent reflex of dependency on external powers, whose leading role was determined by the hegemony in the region. [...] I may argue that Slovenia would have never demanded independence without the profound transformation of the system of international relations. However, once it declared sovereignty, it failed to truly fathom and feel it. Thirteen years after Slovenia voted for independence in a referendum and declared independence on 25 June 1991, it ceded a major part of its sovereignty to the European Union (2004) (Ponomareva 2010: 9–10).

Seen in this light, it is particularly interesting to observe how the creation of the new post-Yugoslav states was followed and received in an environment that was closely akin to Yugoslavia albeit one that was bigger and more consequential for world politics – the Soviet Union. This is despite the fact the leader of this similarly collapsing multinational state, Mikhail Gorbachev – at least officially – underestimated the existence of the so-called national question:

> If the national question had not been solved in principle, the Soviet Union would never have had the social, cultural, economic and defence potential it has now. Our state would not have survived if the republics had not formed a community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance (Gorbachev 1987: 118).

Much later, Gorbachev (1992: 175–176) would admit that it had taken him too long to fully grasp the pressing importance of the national question in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's belated proposal of a new federal treaty among the sovereign republic not only led to a failed attempted coup in August 1991 when a conservative circle of his close associates tried to prevent the scheduled signature of the agreement on August 20, but fell completely short of suppressing the 'parade of sovereignties' (1988–1991) in which one Soviet republic after another declared sovereignty and then independence.[2]

Nevertheless, the structural and ideological similarity between the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia alone would hardly have sufficed to create a climate in which to commence dialogue between Moscow and Ljubljana, the capital of the emerging Slovenian state. Until Slovenia, whose situation recalled that of the Soviet republics pursuing their independence, became a sovereign

2 *Parad suverenitetov*. Available at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/_ (accessed on 01 April 2015).

state, the two capitals could not engage in a dialogue of equals. These talks finally commenced after 14 February 1992 when the barely established Russian Federation recognised the independent Slovenia. The material available from the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, the Russian consulate-general in Zagreb and the Third European Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (USSR MFA) in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is not sufficient to allow for a comprehensive sense of the Soviet – or rather, Russian – understanding of Yugoslavia's collapse. It does, however, give us some idea of how the Soviet Union's foreign policy was shaped during the Union's disintegration. Based on media depictions and the memoirs of then key political figures and their advisers, we can infer that the Russian Federation's decision to recognise the new states of the post-Yugoslav expanse was a consequence of the short-term foreign policy priorities and tense internal politics which marked the early Yeltsin era.

"Constructive Parallelism"

It is evident from the memoirs of Vadim Medvedev,[3] who escorted Gorbachev on his official visit to Yugoslavia between 14 and 18 March 1988, that the Soviet leaders were quite well abreast of Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The visit also enabled them to learn more about the positions of the Slovenian republican leadership:

> I have already been to Slovenia and its capital Ljubljana. The image of the republic spoke volumes of its affiliation, which was more to Western than Eastern Europe: carefully cultivated land, dotted with beautiful houses and countless churches with highly inventive architecture, set against the backdrop of snowy Alpine peaks. Ljubljana is a tiny but all the more comfortable, well-organised city with a Western European lifestyle (Medvedev 1994: 490).

The Slovenian leadership seems to have been very eager to show their Soviet guests how very special, independent and "Western" Slovenia was. They even compared Slovenia's economic data with the Austrian and Italian equivalents rather than the Yugoslav average or respective Serbian and Croatian statistics. Medvedev detected clear suggestions that an autonomous Slovenia made independent from the federation could accomplish far more:

> The President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia, Milan Kučan, elaborately explained his view of the

3 3 A politician, economist and academic, Vadim Andreevich Medvedev (1929) served as CPSU central committee secretary between 1986 and 1990. He then worked at the Economic Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Gorbachev Fund.

> political and economic reforms programme in socialist states, which could be viewed as a public demonstration of Slovenia's autonomy. [...] Interestingly, Kučan's programme was very similar to both the ongoing and anticipated reforms in the Soviet Union. As though they were trying to tell us: 'It doesn't matter what happens in Belgrade, the basis for political cooperation between Slovenia and the Soviet Union is here' (Medvedev 1994: 492).

Medvedev (1994:499–500), however, concluded that 'the visit to Yugoslavia [...] only further strengthened the Soviet conviction that Yugoslavia should be supported as a united federal state pursuing its democratic development. Such support was an organic, constitutive part of Soviet politics [...].'

Nonetheless, an opportunity for cooperation presented itself in the form of establishing of relations and collaboration between Slovenia and the individual Soviet republics. The success of these bilateral relations was most evident in the contact with Belarus[4] and in subsequent talks with Ukraine during the latter's independence process (and in Ukraine's swift recognition of Slovenia on 12 December 1991). The potential was, in principle, also there in the relations with Russia, whose then foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev endeavoured to establish cooperation at a regional level:

> I personally, both in the Soviet Union and abroad, have always encouraged such a "constructive parallelism." Naturally, we must not face the foreign partners with a choice which would be dangerous or difficult for them to make: either the Union or the republics. From my viewpoint, relations should develop on a parallel basis, that is, both with the Union and the republics. Russia has an interest in having the shoots of new relations with the Soviet Union and the West not only preserved but also strengthened (Razuvaev 1991: 10).

With his interest squarely focused on Western Europe, Kozyrev, however, made no mention of the Yugoslav republics. He concluded that regrettably those in the European region such as the German federal states had always had far greater manoeuvring room when it came to forming their policies in addition to their own financial resources. The Soviet republics, on the other hand, had no foreign exchange budget. Therefore, when Russian delegations went abroad, they were obliged to seek foreign currency in the city centre or procure it by 'inconceivable methods' (Razuvaev 1991: 10).

4 Ljubljana and Minsk established the closest contact. This can be seen from a report on L. Peterle's visit to Belarus from 02 to 04 June 1991; an agreement on the opening of diplomatic missions for the republics in Minsk and Ljubljana respectively; and the opening of a Belarus bank set to work in coooperation with not only Slovenia, but also Austria, and Italy. In: Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, Eks. 1, Ish. 216, 13 June 1991.

Efforts to Institutionalise Relations

Roman Kokalj, the head of Slovenijales' Moscow office, the biggest branch office of any Slovenian company in the Soviet Union, was a trailblazer in establishing direct contacts between Slovenian and Soviet diplomatic representatives. He was later appointed an "authorised representative of Slovenia" though not an ambassador. In his memoirs, Kokalj writes about the large Serbian community in Moscow as well as the well-established Serbian lobby, which drew on historical and cultural/literary ties between Russia and Serbia. This community steered the Yugoslav embassy's activities during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and clearly opposed Slovenia's sovereignty:

> The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow at first tried to present the process of Slovenia's independence as an internal political issue and then portrayed the already independent Slovenia as the main culprit for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing armed conflicts in the territory of the former common state (Kokalj 2006: 1).

The main task of the small Slovenian community was to find and establish contacts with influential people who would be sympathetic to Slovenia and, through them, create contacts with the Russian foreign ministry, which had closed its doors to representatives of unrecognised states. However, as Kokalj (2006:5) writes, 'very few people were in favour of Slovenia's sovereignty and the recognition of Slovenia's independence.' At the end of 1990, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel visited Moscow where he was not received by Boris Yeltsin, then still the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Rupel then met with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Y. A. Kvitsinsky,[5] RSFSR Deputy Foreign Minister B. Kolokolov, USSR Minister of Trade USSR, K. Terekh and E. Bičkauskas and J. Han, who were permanent representatives in Moscow of Lithuania and Estonia respectively. Rupel presented them with the four basic referendum documents: the announcement to voters, the statement of good intent, the referendum law and the document concerning relations with the Council of Europe. The report of the Soviet diplomats drew largely from reports in the Slovenian media, which they described as generally objective and unbiased. They commented especially on the immense success of Slovenian diplomacy after:

> the Soviet side stated that the Soviet Union strongly supported the inviolability of Europe's borders, the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the development of bilateral relations, without excluding dialogue with

5 On 28 December 1991, Rupel also wrote to invite Kvitsinsky to Slovenia. In: Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 7, Papka 125. 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, Ish. 76/3EU ot 18 January 1991.

> individual republics, [since] the Slovenian referendum is an 'internal matter of Yugoslavia.' According to D. Rupel, Kvitsinsky 'has in no way denied Slovenia its path to autonomy through a referendum.' [...] The only embarrassment he admittedly faced in Moscow arose in a conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador, M. Vereš. After D. Rupel handed him the referendum documents, the ambassador notified him over the phone a while later that he still thought it was pointless to join D. Rupel in the talks with the Soviet representatives because he would be forced to present views contrary to the Slovenian ones.[6]

Before this, the Slovenian foreign minister paid a courtesy visit to the Yugoslav embassy, where he spoke solely in Slovene, clearly noticing that the others present had great difficulty in understanding him:

> Ambassador Vereš sighed loudly, anxiously wringing his hands. Standing behind him was Secretary Dikić, staring at the ceiling and sometimes at me. I had known him from before. The embassy had not hosted such a show for quite a while. The ambassador apologised for not understanding Slovene and Rupel responded that the front gate bore the inscription "Embassy of the SFRY." Hence, the embassy in the Soviet Union also represented Slovenia and the ambassador should also understand its language. Now, a member of Rupel's delegation, Janez Kocjančič intervened, saying that language should unite rather than divide and that there was no need to speak Slovene. Rupel explained to him that it was inappropriate to use English in the common embassy and that he would insist on Slovene (Kokalj 2006: 7–8).

In their efforts to establish contacts with Soviet diplomats and hold talks on Slovenia's recognition, the Slovenes faced yet another problem: finding space for these discussions. The staff members of the representative office of Slovenijales had close and even familial ties with the embassy. A considerable number of diplomats in the foreign ministry had connections with Yugoslav colleagues in Moscow and Belgrade:

> On the grounds of secrecy, most meetings were held in the basement of Slovenijales' exhibition hall in Kozitsky Pereulok, Moscow. Had the talks taken place in the embassy building, Belgrade would have learned about them much sooner than Ljubljana. Nor could meetings be held in the foreign ministry building, where, as Deputy Minister Kolokolov told me, many staff members had close personal contacts with colleagues from the Yugoslav embassy. Information

6 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 7, Papka 125, 170 Voprosy pressy i informatsionno-propagandistskoy raboty. Eks. 1, Ish. 411, 03 January 1991.

> might quickly reach the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade (Kokalj 2006: 9–10).

Others also tried to convince the Soviet side that Slovenia had undertaken the correct course of action. Such persons included President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan, Slovenian Assembly President Dr. France Bučar and President of the Slovenian Government Lojze Peterle. In January 1991, the latter wrote to Eduard A. Shevardnadze, who was still obviously acting as Soviet foreign minister despite having resigned from the position on 20 December 1990. In this message, Peterle reported the results of the independence referendum, stressing that Slovenia was obliged to abide by the will of its citizens and prepare all necessary legal provisions to ensure Slovenian independence within six months.[7]

Next, on 18 March 1991, Kučan wrote directly to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, requesting his support and understanding of Slovenia's endeavours and recognition of its independence. Preserved only in translation in the archive, the letter which Y. Girenko, Consul General in Zagreb sent to A. Nikiforov, First Deputy Chief of the Third European Administration of the USSR MFA, included the wording of the resolution on Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia, which the Slovenian assembly passed on 20 February 1991. As Kučan wrote, the resolution was a clear indication of Slovenia's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. At the same time, Slovenia believed that it was building a new, independent home – just like the homes that other European nations, small and large, had already built for themselves.[8]

During the Slovenian prime minister's visit to Moscow from 14 to 16 May 1991, Slovenia and the Russian Federation signed the Agreement on Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation. Nikiforov prepared a diplomatic report from the Soviet consulate-general in Zagreb, drawing largely on responses in the Slovenian media. To the evident satisfaction of the Soviet diplomats, that media praised the visit, and a source quoted Peterle's statement that it was 'the most important and successful of all such visits abroad.'[9] Rupel had also pointed out the high level of Peterle's dialogue partners and Yeltsin's promise to visit Ljubljana. Nikiforov put it:

---

7 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 7, Papka 125. 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, Vh. 7-ChP-3EU ot 24 January 1991.

8 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 103 – Obmen poslaniyami i pismami, Eks. .1, Ish. 112, 27 March 1991.

9 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124. 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY. O slovenskey reaktsii na vizit premier-ministra Slovenii L. Peterle v Moskvu. . 1, Ish. 180, 24 May 1991.

> Another reason why the Slovenes think that the visit may contribute to the republic's greater reputation and weight is because in this way it will strike a balance to the well-known unilateralism of the hitherto markedly pro-Western foreign relations pursued by the Slovenian leadership (only recently, this could be said for Kučan's visits to Austria, Germany and Italy, Peterle's trip to France, and so forth). In this regard, the Slovenian dailies Delo and Dnevnik provide some eloquent comments, clearly illustrating the need to broaden and deepen the cooperation with the Russian Federation, especially after the visit to Moscow proved that Russia not only showed sympathy and understanding [of] Slovenia, but confirmed this with an actual agreement while 'Western politicians did little more than buzz in our ears about the necessity to preserve the united and democratic Yugoslavia.' […] Major publicity in the republican media was given to I. S. Silaev, who said that 'the Russian leadership follows with great interest the developments in Yugoslavia,' and that he was literally 'rooting for Slovenia' because, as he put it, 'the Russian Federation also aims to ensure autonomy within the framework of the reformed Soviet Union and strives to reconstruct the state on confederative principles.' […] Yeltsin emphasised that the "historical" agreement (*Author's note: This was the first such document to be signed by Russia and Slovenia*) was in complete congruence with the process of "sovereignising" the republics. Peterle: 'Regardless of our geographical distance, Russia and Slovenia are on the same wavelength.'[10]

At the end of the report, which also touches upon Serbia's press coverage of Peterle's visit to Moscow, Nikiforov observed that the latter had nevertheless prompted different reactions. He illustrated his point with a commentary from Borba (May 18–19 1991), titled 'Peterle's Secrets,' which 'states with unconcealed jealousy that Slovenia is trying to talk the Russian Federation into supporting its separatist aspirations.'[11]

But this is only one side of the complex story of the forging of Slovenian–Russian relations. Slovenia's endeavours were one thing, Belgrade's interests were another and both were situated within a context of maintaining the ratio of powers and interests in the international sphere. Outsiders' opinions about the kind of policy the Soviet Union should pursue towards Yugoslavia were far from what the Slovenes wished for. On 07 February 1991, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinsky informed the new chief of the Soviet Diplomatic Mission, Alexander A. Bessmertnykh (15 January – 23 August 1991) about a recent statement issued by the United States on 25 January 1991 concerning Yugoslavia and the increasingly volatile situation in Croatia. In that statement, the United States expressed its concern over 'the growing tensions between the Yugoslav

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

republics and peoples, and the threaten[ed] escalation of violence.'[12] Kvitsinsky wrote that the United States had showed no interest in abandoning the idea that Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participants should issue a joint statement on the situation in Yugoslavia, a position which the deputy Soviet foreign minister condemned as unilateral:

> While protecting the 'democratically elected institutions' in Croatia, the United States "fails to notice" the unconstitutionality of armed units raised by their authorities. [...] In the key American formulation, 'the United States supports the democracy and unity in Yugoslavia,' the emphasis is shifting more and more onto 'democracy' at the expense of dwindling support for the integrity of the Yugoslav federation. The Yugoslav side trusts that in our contacts with the United States (and possibly the Federal Republic of Germany) we will do everything in our power to prevent any attempt at internationalising the issue of inter-republican relations. [...] In our opinion, it is possible to comply with the Yugoslav requests and further pursue our efforts in this direction.[13]

The Soviet Union proceeded to express concerns about the weakening of the Yugoslav central government, the dismantling of federal state and socio-political structures, the deepening of the economic crisis and the exacerbation of antagonisms between the republics and peoples. Such antagonisms were further intensified by the ideological divergence of power structures in the Yugoslav republics as well as intensifying religious friction and the growing influence of Islam. According to a Soviet embassy report dated 15 February 1991, over two hundred political parties and movements had sprung up at that time:

> In 1990, all republics held multiparty elections which the communists only won in Serbia and Montenegro. The remaining four republics witnessed the rise of "nationalist forces."[14]

The loosening of the Yugoslav federation sent a rippling effect across the Balkans, which mobilised nationalist forces in neighbouring states according to the Soviets. The eventual departure of individual republics from Yugoslavia

12 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSI, MID SSSR Upravlenie SShA i Kanadi, Vh. 1050 ot 5. 3. 1991/3EU MID SSSR Vh. 379 ot 7 March 1991.

13 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, MID SSSR Upravlenie SShA i Kanadi, Vh. 1050, 5 March 1991/3EU MID SSSR Vh. 379 ot 7 March 1991/ 2357/OS-ns.

14 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, O POLOZHENIYE V YUGOSLAVSKOY FEDERATSII I NASHEY LINIYI V OTNOSHENIYAH SFRYU, Eks. 12, 201/3EU ot 15 February 1991.

would complicate the situations of national minorities and give rise to the issue of changing borders. The authors of the Soviet report maintained that any change in the current state structure of Yugoslavia would encourage individual regions to seek their own "patrons." The main emphasis was on two factors: the Austro-German one to the northeast of Yugoslavia and the "Islamic" one represented by the rising economic and military power of Turkey, the supporter of Yugoslavia's so-called Muslim belt (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia).[15] None of this was in the interests of the Soviet Union. Put more explicitly, these developments threatened not only to negatively affect perspectives on the general European situation but – most importantly – to harm other multinational states:

> The Soviet Union should therefore give its unconditional support to the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and its stable development, as well as encourage the implementation of democratic changes and government measures to overcome the crisis. [...] We find it of utmost importance not to lose sight of the positive aspects that have accumulated in our recent relations with Yugoslavia. Unlike other Eastern European states, Yugoslavia and its nations have retained the same genuinely amicable attitude towards the Soviet Union. Hence, rather than "making the turn to the West," Eastern Europe continues to remain steadfast in its universal national consensus on the necessity to actively develop relations with the Soviet Union.[16]

The opinions of the Soviet diplomats in Belgrade and Zagreb differed slightly from one another when it came to the situation in Yugoslavia. Reporting on the Resolution on a Peaceful Separation from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which had been adopted by the Slovenian assembly on the night of 20—21 February 1991, P. Zavgorodniy, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, expressed his confidence that this was merely another loud statement by the Slovenes rather than an actual step towards Slovenia's secession.[17] The diplomat admitted that Slovenia had passed all required legal provisions to attain its independence, but maintained that the Slovenes were 'sobered' by economic difficulties although the politicians had shown less restraint than the economists. Peterle and Rupel had not garnered the desired international support; Zavgorodniy considered Pučnik and Bučar 'radical' for demanding Slovenia's immediate separation from Yugoslavia, and he opposed

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, 1 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 119, 28 February 1991, O nekotorikh deystviyakh rukovodstva Slovenii pri obespecheniyu suvereniteta i nezavisimosti respubliki (Informatsiya).

them to the more 'realistic' Kučan and Drnovšek. Nonetheless, the leadership of the republic was forced to consider the increasingly radicalised positions within a population encouraged by extremist politicians.[18]

In contrast, Nikiforov, the attaché at the consulate-general in Zagreb, pointed to the intensifying attempts of the 'northern' republics to internationalise the Yugoslav crisis. Slovenia and Croatia were stepping up their international activity: examples ranged from Tuđman and Peterle's participation in the high--profile Franz Josef Strauss forum in November 1990 in Bavaria to Tudman and Drnovšek's presence at the February 1991 economic forum in Davos and at a round table with a massive turnout in Vienna on 24 March 1991. Nikiforov concluded that Slovenia and Croatia had mostly been intensifying connections with their neighbours such as Austria and Italy along with Germany. The changes in their official positions were quite remarkable. The diplomat also provided an interesting assessment of Slovenia's not-always-successful efforts to keep its international activities in step with those of Croatia. After a series of failed attempts to win international recognition of Slovenia and in the face of opposition criticism of the failure to provide a clear programme, Foreign Minister Rupel was now taking a more cautious line. Kučan had made the most successful visits, travelling to Vienna (13–14 March 1991) as well as Stuttgart and Bonn (19–20 March 1991). On the occasion of his visit, Austrian Foreign Minister A. Mock had stated that Austria would react swiftly to Slovenia's declaration of independence, to which Rupel responded with a quote from German Foreign Minister H. D. Genscher: 'Germany cannot push Yugoslavia towards disintegration, but it will understand Slovenia's secession.'[19]

Nikiforov also noticed that Slovenia had undertaken a new two-prong strategy: on the one hand, it was developing a policy of appointing businessmen, for example, from Slovenijales and Ljubljanska banka as the republic's authorised representatives abroad. On the other hand, it was trying to convince prominent foreign figures that Slovenian independence was legitimate and just. In view of the scathing criticism the Belgrade meeting of 09 March 1991 had attracted in the international community, Nikiforov took note of growing sympathies towards Croatia and Slovenia. This trend, in his opinion, would continue in the future.[20]

In the early days of June 1991, Belgrade received a visit from Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, who confirmed to the Pravda newspaper that Moscow's position remained unchanged. Its main dialogue partner continued to be the Yugoslav federation:

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, Tom 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 118, 27 March 1991, Novye tendentsii po vneshnepoliticheskoy aktivnosti Khorvatii i Slovenii.

> I would very much like to emphasise the special relation that our country has towards Yugoslavia. We are tied by good old historical tradition. We understand very well the current predicament of Yugoslavia. And our opinion is well-known: we extend our solidarity to the forces which endeavour to preserve a strong state of unity and freedom. We express our hope that the processes that are ongoing today will reach a successful conclusion, without any external interference (quoted in Fadeyev 1991: 5).

The Declaration of Slovenian Independence

While they followed the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the Soviet diplomats wrote detailed reports on debates about the future arrangement of the federation and the confrontation between two diametrically opposed concepts: federalism and confederacy.[21] The Zagreb consul, V. Marusin warned that differences in opinion – with the Presidency of the SFRY, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Slobodan Milošević categorically rejecting the idea of a confederation – had led Slovenia and Croatia to hold talks that were primarily bilateral with the delegations of other republics. The deteriorating situation in Croatia in the spring of 1991 prompted Slovenia's leadership to step up its preparations for independence. In doing so, Demos resorted to more radical measures than Kučan, fearing that growing tensions in Yugoslavia and in Serbian–Croatian relations might thwart their independence plans. Kučan, on the other hand, tried to prevent Slovenia from being forced into unilateral secession. While Prime Minister Peterle claimed that the 'issue of independence will be resolved in June,' President Kučan explained the Resolution on Separation as though it were not a matter of secession.[22] Slovenia and Croatia adamantly promoted the concept of a union of sovereign states: 'With both sides failing to reach an agreement on the future of Yugoslavia, the crisis is taking on a protracted nature and may stir up much more than dissent among the republics. It is quite possible to imagine that the intransigent approach of the Serbian leadership to resolving the deadlock may prompt Slovenia and Croatia to take steps that will eventually lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.'[23]

21 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, Tom 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 151, 24 April 1991, O pozitsii slovenskogo i khorvatskogo rukovodstva na peregovorah o pereustroystve Yugoslavii (Informatsiya).

22 Ibid.

23 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, Tom 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 172, 16 May 1991, O podkhodakh Khorvatii i Slovenii k razresheniyu yugoslavskogo krizisa i pereustroystvu Yugoslavii (Informatsiya).

Still, on the eve of Slovenia's independence, diplomatic reports continued to present different opinions about whether such a step was at all possible. Whereas the diplomats at the Belgrade embassy were sceptical at best, those at the Zagreb consulate-general held, albeit with some reservations, that independence was a probable outcome. The Zagreb attaché Nikiforov, thus, stated in his May report that Slovenia would secede by the designated date (26 June 1991), no matter what it called this step – secession, separation or something else.[24] However, he argued that owing to internal and external obstacles, the Slovenian action would only have a normative-declarative character. The internal obstacles mostly had to do with the economic predicament; the major external ones included concerns in the international community over the possible aftermath in the rest of Yugoslavia. Some members of the Slovenian government, Nikiforov wrote, were not willing to venture a quick secession that might prompt a decline in citizens' living standard. According to some assessments, that standard would drop by 30 percent:

> Therefore, an increasing number of voices have been raised in Slovenia against the immediate termination of all ties with the Yugoslav federation, for which it would not find alternatives any time soon. All the more so because once it secedes, the Slovenian republic will undoubtedly remain in international isolation for some time.[25]

According to Nikiforov, the statement that the Slovenian assembly submitted to the federal assembly on 08 May 1991 demonstrated a 'certain change in the Slovenian position. Namely, the document not only announces that the republic will declare its state independence on 26 June, but also clearly expresses its willingness to cooperate in inter-republican negotiations on all outstanding issues, including those that may arise from the separation process.'[26] Peterle, Rupel and others were equally aware of the harmful implications of breaking ties, as is evident from their statements that 'this is a smooth, peaceful secession, based on negotiations'[27] and that Slovenia must first gain recognition within Yugoslavia. At the same time, the republic seemed less radical when it came to the introduction of its own currency, passports and armed forces. Yugoslav passports and the dinar would remain valid during the transition period and Slovenia would continue to fund the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). In other words, as Nikiforov

24 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, Tom 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 177, 16 May 1991, K voprosu o perspektivah vozmozhnogo vyhoda Slovenii iz sostava SFRYu (Kratkaya spravka).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

writes, the transition period would actually commence – rather than end – with the declaration of independence, with no knowing how long this period might last or how successful the negotiations with Belgrade would be.[28]

Nevertheless, the entanglement in the Yugoslav presidency hampered talks with the central government. Slovenia and Croatia reacted harshly to the failure to elect Stipe Mesić as president of the state collective governing body – according to the rotation principle, he should have assumed that position on 15 May 1991. The Zagreb consul Marusin noted that even high-level federal politicians such as Marković and Lončar unofficially admitted that the Serbian leadership had made a mistake by not electing Mesić.[29] Slovenia and Croatia took this as a clear indication that their plans for the future arrangement of Yugoslavia had become even less feasible and they blamed Serbia for the situation. Owing to the collective state leadership's inability to act, both republics now directed their efforts at preventing the activation of armed forces. Slovenia and Croatia supported Federal Prime Minister Marković, fearing that his removal would allow Serbia to take the initiative and realise its own plans with the assistance of the army.[30]

The presidential gridlock also left Yugoslavia in a dead-end when it came to international relations. At a Pentagon session in Bologna, Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel stated that Slovenia could not be fully involved in governing the Yugoslav state, which it perceived simultaneously as a threat. He proposed thating a "goodwill mission" be formed within the Pentagon to assist withthe drawing up proposals for negotiations on the separation of the Yugoslav republics.[31] Consul Marusin concluded that the Brussels stance on Slovenia and Croatia had even greater consequence than that of the United States, but that certain unnamed Western states were changing their positions. In any event, Slovenia and Croatia felt confident enough to launch an independent defence against the JNA, and the consul noted that according to some rumours, they were relying on outside support in the form of NATO's rapid reaction through force. This is the first reference to the NATO alliance in the diplomatic sources.[32]

The Soviet Union reacted to the declaration of Slovenian and Croatian independence by promptly issuing three statements. The foreign ministry drew up

---

28 Ibid.

29 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 172, 16 May 1991, O podhodah Khorvatii i Slovenii k razresheniyu yugoslavskogo krizisa i pereustroystvu Yugoslavii (Informatsiya).

30 Istoriko- diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 9, Papka 125, 710, Tom 1, SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 200, 29 May 1991, O novyh podhodah Khorvatii i Slovenii k resheniyu yugoslavskogo krizisa (Informatsiya).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

two statements condemning the steps taken by Ljubljana and Zagreb;the first of these was dated 26 June 1991:

> The Soviet Union continues to extend its unwavering support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the stability of its borders, including the internal ones, the right of the Yugoslav peoples to determine their own future, as well as support for the federal authorities, which strive to preserve the Yugoslav state (Gus'kova 1993: 56).

Three days later, the ministry issued a second statement in response to actions by the JNA and the armed conflict that had erupted in Slovenia. This time it no longer referred to several peoples but a single Yugoslav nation:

> The dramatic developments in the SFRY are causing grave concern. A united, independent Yugoslavia is of utmost importance for stability in the Balkans and Europe more generally. It is imperative for every constructive European and international political domain to offer its assistance and support to the Yugoslav nation in this difficult moment. The Soviet Union extends its sympathies and solidarity to the friendly Yugoslavia. It welcomes the call by the Federal Executive Council of the SFRY for the political forces in the state to issue a three-month moratorium on the implementation of all decisions taken with regard to the separation, break-up, the change in the regime of external and internal borders…(Gus'kova 1993: 57–58).

The Soviet foreign ministry also called on the international community to support the Yugoslav government and ensure conditions for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Finally, it returned to the "peoples": 'we must help the peoples of Yugoslavia to provide a solid future for their state in a democratic and peaceful manner' (Gus'kova 1993: 58).

On 28 June 1991, a special statement was also issued by the parliament of the Russian Republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, whose leadership had been assumed by Ruslan Khasbulatov after the previous chair Boris Yeltsinwon the presidential elections on 12 June. This statement was brief and laconic and is therefore presented in its entirety:

> The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR expresses its concern over the developments in the friendly Yugoslavia and deplores the fact that the civil conflict has exacted a human toll. We firmly believe that the parties in the conflict will find a solution to the predicament through negotiation and without resorting to the use of force (Gus'kova 1993: 57).

The most striking aspect of this statement is its impartiality. The members of Russian parliament refrained from condemning individual Yugoslav republics. They were later embroiled in bitter debates concerning Russia's policy toward the crisis in Yugoslavia and, with the exception of the Liberals and Democratic Reformists, they all parted ways with President Yeltsin on internal political issues. Yeltsin, in turn, also took leave of his former ally Khasbulatov. Nevertheless, according to Gryzunov and Romanenko, the conciliatory tone in the aforementioned statement had less to do with Yugoslavia than it did with its authors' own fate and that of the Soviet Union:

> The Russian leadership viewed the Slovenian and Croatian efforts towards complete political self-determination and sovereignty as a confirmation of the anti-centralist and disintegration tendencies in the territory of the Soviet Union (Gryzunov – Romanenko 2012: 11–12).

War

As far as the international political sphere's stance towards Yugoslavia is concerned, the war in Slovenia brought many changes. The head of the Third European Administration of the USSR MFA, Senkevich concluded his report to Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh as follows:

> After the chief of the general staff of the JNA, Colonel General Adžić, stated on 02 July that the army would 'win at all costs,' a certain danger appeared that federal organisations would lose control over the army, which would annul the agreements that had been achieved.[33]

According to Senkevich, the Yugoslav federation still had support from the international community, but at the same time, Germany, Austria, Hungary and others were beginning to take positions that would enable them to collaborate with republics leaving the federation in the future. In Europe and the United States, far-right political parties were starting to exert pressure on governments to recognise Slovenian and Croatian independence. Step by step, the two republics were fulfilling their goals and so trying to achieve a broad internationalisation of the "Yugoslav question" and – aside from CSCE mechanisms – also involve the UN Security Council. There was some evidence to indicate that the West had put pressure on Mesić in that direction. According to British information sources, in a letter received in London on 02 July, Mesić appealed to the

33 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, 819/3EU, 04 July 1991.

international community to take concrete steps towards achieving peace and normalcy in Yugoslavia. The letter stated that 'an overthrow [has] happened in Yugoslavia and that the JNA is out of control.'[34]

After the Brioni Declaration was signed, Soviet Foreign Minister Kvitsinsky's deputy and delegate visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana (from 06 to 08 July 1991) together with a negotiating mandate. According to the records of the Soviet diplomat in Zagreb, A. Nikiforov, the Slovenian and Croatian media understood Kvitsinsky's visit as a sign of the strengthening of Soviet politics in Yugoslavia and of the Soviet presence more generally in this area. They put special emphasis on Soviet support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the inviolability of its borders, including internal ones. Neither the Soviet Union nor Europe wanted to create a precedent for separatism that could trigger similar tendencies in the Soviet Union.[35]Nevertheless, Nikiforov pointed out an important detail that was becoming more and more evident in the Soviet Union: this was the strong Slovenian and Croatian conviction that Soviet support for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity in fact translated into direct support for Serbia and a passion for the idea of Greater Serbia. In the northwest of Yugoslavia, that kind of understanding fostered a growing and strengthening opposition to the Soviet Union. The Zagreb attaché mentioned that calls and letters to the consulate-general had conveyed Croatian citizens' complaints about Soviet foreign policy; the complaints even identified traces of support for the *C*hetniks.[36] Based at least on the available sources, the first diplomatic warning that the Soviet Union would need to the change its attitude to the Yugoslav reality also came from Zagreb. On 16 July 1991, Consul General Girenko sent a detailed message to Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Kvitsinsky in Moscow. This text expressed views that were diametrically opposed to Soviet foreign policy practices at the time:

> The intoxication of nationalism has blinded the leaders of the republics so much that it will be hard to reach an agreement without international help. [...] Hence, there is no point in insisting on opposition to internationalisation, rather, we need to strive for a policy, and a political policy in particular, that won't allow for harsh interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and the imposing of foreign will. [...] It would make sense to soften our intransigence,

34 Ibid.

35 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 7, Papka 125, 170 Voprosy pressy i informatsionno-propagandistskoy raboty, Annotatsiya materiyalov yugoslavskoy pechaty o prebivanii spetsial'nogo predstavitelya Prezidenta SSSR Yu. A. Kvitsinskogo v SFRYu 6–9 yulya 1991 g. (10 July 1991. 850/3EU) (posol'stvo), Eks. 1, Ish. 259, 11 July 1991 (attashe Genkonsul'stva A. Nikiforov).

36 Ibid.

> also having regard to the possibility of discussing the Yugoslav crisis in the UN Security Council.[37]

Referring to matters beyond support for internationalisation, Girenko also proposed that given the situation, the withdrawal of support for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity also be discussed: 'The most delicate element of the inevitable correction of our stance on the Yugoslav crisis is apparently our thesis about maintaining Yugoslavia's unity and wholeness.'[38] The consul-general believed that the support extended by Germany and other Western states to the separatist leaders of Slovenia and Croatia stemmed from these countries' self-interest and self-serving agendas. Nevertheless, he argued that:

> The clear list of external factors that would support Yugoslavia's wholeness only ignites violence on the side of the JNA and strengthens the tendencies of the greater-Serbia hegemony. [...] Our stance that supports the unity of Yugoslavia is being linked with the patronage of the Russophile orthodox Serbia, which is in turn being accused of making efforts to turn Yugoslavia into Serboslavia. It seems that — given the circumstances — it would be strategically smarter to combine the idea of supporting Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity with greater flexibility, which would enable us to distance ourselves from the efforts of those who wish to frame us as supporting the idea of greater-Serbia or even neo-chetnik ideas, which are continuing to grow stronger, also in response to the revival of Croatia-centric tendencies.[39]

Girenko concluded that the Yugoslavs were relinquishing the idea of Yugoslavism, which they considered to be one 'not properly reinforced in the course of history and something that had been artificially forced upon people by Yugoslavia's Communist Party.'[40] The consul had noticed a certain degree of nostalgia for some former states as well as the struggles of Western states (Germany, Italy, and France) to create spheres of interest in areas where they had formerly ruled Balkan territory —that is, before World War II. In Croatia, the idea of a 50:50 division was gaining strength under a plan in which Serbia would become part of the Soviet-influenced zone and Slovenia and Croatia would be part of the Western zone. The opposition to the Soviet Union was strengthened by statements like those made by Minister Yazov and President Gorbachev in Kiev' it emphasised their opposition to the break-up of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and

37 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, 3EU Vh. 2387, 26 July 1991

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

Croatia, such statements were understood as an expression of support for the idea of Greater Serbia.

> Along with stressing the importance of the permanence of external borders under the Helsinki documents and the Paris Treaty, and in order to support a peaceful, democratic way of solving the Yugoslav crisis, we would also need to take a turn and introduce a thesis about the Soviet Union — in line with its striving towards the de-ideologisation of state-to-state relations – and its lack of support for any of the Yugoslav republics in either the ideological, religious or any other sense.[41]

Girenko considered it sensible to avert the connections between the Soviet Union and the Chetniks. This was, in his words, something that the Croatian and Slovenian publicity channels had achieved. The Soviet Union could not support a movement that collaborated with fascists.[42]

Meanwhile, Yugoslavia continued to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union. Ante Marković and his delegation visited Moscow on 01 August 1991 and informed the Soviet side about the situation in the country as well as the steps taken by the federal government to ease tensions and find a way out of the crisis. Marković thanked the Soviet government for its understanding and support:

> The prime minister confirmed the Soviet Union's stance concerning its support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Soviet Union was inclined to create the kind of internal and external conditions that would enable the Yugoslav peoples to themselves find a peaceful, democratic and constitutional way of solving the question of future political arrangements. The parties agreed that international efforts to stabilise Yugoslav conditions could not be contrary to the principles of non-intervention in internal matters.[43]

At this point, however, the Soviet Union was mostly dealing with its own problems. A project called the Union of Sovereign States backed by President Gorbachev had stirred up many heated debates, and at the same time, the Soviet republics were starting to demand greater independence; the situation was similar to the one in Yugoslavia. The unsuccessful coup from 19 and 22 August 1991 in which the State Committee on the State of Emergency took control while President Gorbachev was held in Crimea, also caused gradual changes in foreign policies. Comparing the responses of Slovenia and Croatia to the August

---

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 TASS: Sovetsko-yugoslavski preregovori. *Izvestiya* (183), 02 July 1991: 4.

action, historian Sergey Romanenko concludes that Slovenia expressed interest, but was quite reserved and considered this to be a case of "foreign politics." Slovenian sources generally kept silent about the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the influence of the August coup on Slovenian politics (Romanenko 2011: 980). Romanenko sees this 'reserve' as part of the final Slovenian decision to leave Yugoslavia as well as its choice to head away from the East and move more distinctly towards the West:

> According to public polls, public perceptions did not reveal a lot of sympathy or interest for Russia. What came up was a negative view of the needs of Slovenia and Slovenes among the Moscow political elite, which was based on a complete lack of understanding of the situation in Yugoslavia. The Slovenian politicians did not give, or only very rarely (and especially never publically) gave opinions or estimates about the events in Moscow. Taking all that into account, it is clear that Ljubljana had no intention of supporting the "putschists," whose victory would put the only just surfacing Slovene state in a troubling position (Romanenko 2011: 788).

The Croatian response was different. President Franjo Tuđman condemned the coup and expressed his support to the presidents of the Soviet Union and Russia. Because of his nationalistic-state interests, he, thus, reacted in a way that was diametrically opposed to the Serbian administration, which supported the putschists and the arrest of President Gorbachev (Romanenko 2011: 787). At the same time, diplomatic sources reveal that the Slovenian administration did, in fact, express an opinion. Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel told the Soviet consul-general:

> Don't be surprised that the Slovenian administration viewed the recent events in the Soviet Union with great concern; we are sceptical about anything that involves armed forces. Hence, our reaction was fairly negative. We do not make any long-term inferences. We will do that only after we get more precise information from the Soviet Union and after talking to Germany, where I am flying in an hour, and after the talks with Italy, Hungary, Austria, our neighbours with which the Slovenian government is trying to coordinate its foreign policy goals. To be honest, if we look retrospectively at the connections between the Soviet Union and Yugoslav governments (the visit of V. S. Pavlov in Belgrade, A. Marković's trip to Moscow), we see them in a somewhat different light today, for we would not want to have such destabilised conditions in Yugoslavia as we witnessed in the Soviet Union. The development of connections with the Soviet Union and its republics is of extreme importance to the Slovenian government, so the government is interested in continuing and deepening these

> relations. We wish the Soviet Union, which is a key player in world politics, a lot of success in solving its growing internal issues.[44]

President Kučan and Prime Minister Peterle sent separate telegrams to Moscow as early as 22 August 1991 as soon as it became obvious that the coup had not succeeded. Kučan wrote to Russian President Yeltsin while Peterle congratulated Yeltsin as well as Silaev, the Prime Minister of the RSFSR. Minister Rupel did the same and sent a letter on 30 August 1991 to the Boris Pankin, the new Soviet foreign minister, who had been appointed two days prior. Rupel expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the coup had failed:

> It is essential for us that the principle of national self-determination won over other outdated principles that can rule a nation; by this, I refer to the Eastern bloc-based principles and ways of thinking that defined the relations between nations and states as well as the fact that many states had already confirmed their understanding of new values by expressing their support for some former Soviet Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – in their struggle for freedom and independence.[45]

The Slovenian foreign minister concluded that deplorably the situation in Yugoslavia was becoming more and more serious. He used the opportunity to stress his wish for the acknowledgement of Slovenia's independence:

> The war in Croatia, which is being fought by Serbian nationalists backed by the JNA, is becoming a symbol of totalitarianism and of the Dark Ages. The government of the Republic of Slovenia turns to your government once again with this plea to acknowledge Slovenia as a sovereign and independent European country.[46]

On 09 September 1991, the letter was apparently delivered to Minister Pankin by ambassador Yuri Derjabin. The latter added a supplementary letter to the English translation of the Slovenian telefax in which he advised:

> Taking into account the fact that the position of the Soviet Union with regard to the Yugoslav crisis was clearly explained to the Yugoslav government as well as to Slovenian leaders, I think it best to leave D. Rupel's letter unanswered.

44 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, O REAKTSII V KHORVATII I SLOVENII NA PROVAL GOSUDARSTVENNOGO PEREVOROTA V SSSR, Eks. 1, Ish. 332, 28 August 1991.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

> We can return to the question of Slovenia's independence at the end of the moratorium on declaring this republic's independence and when we get hold of the results that the CSCE Peace Conference on Yugoslavia brings. This is, in fact, the position of the vast majority of countries—as members of European process.[47]

Despite the negative stance on recognition, the general tone had nonetheless changed somewhat. Moscow decided to wait until the end of the moratorium, and in a September statement from the Soviet foreign minister, we cannot detect any sign of reference to Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity; what is foregrounded rather is a deep concern regarding the war in the area, violence and the victims of war:

> Our call to cease fire, to fulfil the decisions that the government proper made on 02 September of the same year, to follow the CSCE's recommendations is directed to all the federal structures that are directly responsible for the fates of individual republics and nations in Yugoslavia. We ask the Yugoslav People's Army to hold back and be aware of its responsibility since a lot depends on it. We are turning to the Croatian leadership with a request to continue peaceful dialogues and not resort to ultimatums. We ask Serbia to contribute to a cease-fire at this tragic moment. We are strongly convinced that the only way to solve Yugoslavia's problems is through fair negotiating processes, patient dialogue that seeks out sensible solutions and new ways of coexisting and cooperating in joint economic and legal spaces and maintaining historically legitimised connections.[48]

The change in Soviet views was apparently related to the appointment of the new foreign minister, Boris Pankin (28 August – 14 November 1991). The available diplomatic sources are quiet on this point, but Pankin's own 1993 memoirs are vocal about it even if they touch more on relationships at the foreign affairs ministry than on foreign policy as such. In particular, Pankin wanted to eliminate "hard line" followers at the foreign affairs ministry and as early as the day of his appointment, he fired the first assistant to former foreign minister J. Kvitsinsky, the Soviet mediator in the Yugoslav crisis. At the same time, the foreign affairs ministry launched an initiative to send an intermediary mission of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia. On 12 September 1991, Gorbachev welcomed Vatican State Secretary Archbishop Jean-Louis Touran. The special envoy of Pope John Paul II put in a request to Gorbachev for 'the Soviet Union to exert additional influence on Serbia' (Romanenko 2011: 790). In the Vatican's opin-

47 Ibid.

48 Iz zayavleniya MID SSSR. *Izvestiya* (222), 17 September 1991: 5.

ion – endorsed by Gorbachev – the most important thing was to stop the war. The Soviet president's foreign policy adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev did not agree with the proposal that the president should host Milošević and Tuđman. He felt ignored and wrote in his diary:

> Pankin could not explain why he involved M.S. *[Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev]* in this matter. The first world leader who gives his blessing to Croatia's "leaving" Yugoslavia? To talk Serbia and Croatia into peaceful...? Ridiculous! As if we didn't have Chechens, Ingush people, Ossetians, Armenians, etc., peoples and places where reconciliation is essential. This is once again not politics but only rhetoric. M.S. is apparently dealing with this in order to create an impression that he is taking part in "real world politics" (Chernyaev 2008: 998).

On 07 October 1991, Gorbachev wrote an appeal to the Yugoslav administration – along with a similar letter to the Croatian President Tuđman (Romanenko 2011: 791) – in which he also stressed that

> there is proof that in the next few hours, attacks are going to be launched on large industrial centres and even on Croatia's capital, Zagreb. Such an escalation of attacks would result in numerous victims and tremendous material damage, and the crisis in Yugoslavia would acquire a new dimension, one even more dangerous than was previously recorded. This would undoubtedly bring immediate and harsh condemnation and appropriate responses from around the globe. [...] In these troublesome times, the Soviet leadership turns to the Yugoslav leadership and the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army and makes a strict appeal to take maximum responsibility and show restraint, so that the attacks do not escalate but change into unconditional and total respect of the cease-fire (Gus'kova 1993: 63).

Gorbachev's appeal came as a big surprise both in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia:

> Among staff members of the Soviet Embassy, the reaction to the appeal was a certain lack of understanding, to say the least. Serbian circles were simply shocked. Our president only appealed to one side to cease fire – the Serbian army. As if Croatia had respected the conditions of the cease-fire (Gorlov 1991: 3).

Accepting Gorbachev's invitation, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman arrived in Moscow on 15 October 1991. The newspaper Izvestiya commented on the intermediaries' peace mission with great enthusiasm: 'Mikhail Gorbachev, displaying top-notch diplomatic skills, managed to achieve that which only yesterday morning seemed highly unlikely' (Yusin 1991: 1). Chernyaev, however,

went back on his words after the meeting when it was not immediately clear what the long-term effect of the talks would be. He was not optimistic and, in fact, it emerged soon after that none of the agreements had led to anything concrete; they had led to nothing at all. Gorbachev's mediation attempts received negative reviews, both from his contemporaries and subsequently from historians and historiographers:

> The unsuccessful diplomatic mission of Gorbachev, who invited the leaders of Serbia and Croatia to have pancakes with him, was easy to predict as Moscow does not have the means to successfully influence Yugoslavia's situation over the long term; a single action could not solve the problem. The CSCE's system has obstructed the eternal search for an oftentimes unattainable consensus. As far as the main mediator – the European Community – is concerned: it totally missed its opportunity because it was caught up in ingrained stereotypes and other strategic games. All of a sudden, everyone in Brussels collectively sees the reality clearly: when the initial idea of a Yugoslav federation (which would also have meant recognition of Slovenia and Croatia) was rejected, Europe did not allow for UN flags to be planted on Balkan soil. Of course, we could not have talked about an operation like "Operation Desert Storm," but the "blue helmets" cordons might have prevented the bloodshed. However, Europe's rigid kind of reasoning has its own logic. When in the capitals of the "Old world" they wrote "Yugoslavia," they had the "Soviet Union" in mind. The wish to ensure there was no precedent for border-closing blurred [the discovery] of a healthy way of dealing with a bloody crisis. It obstructed the search for any kind of compromise besides one involving maintaining the *status quo*. In order to maintain stability, Moscow, like Brussels, wanted to sacrifice the ambitions of the Yugoslav republics. But the complete opposite happened: 'European constructions will be under attack for many years' (Gus'kova 1993: 452–453).

The views here concerning the European Community's opposition to blue helmets may be challenged since as far as international peace units were concerned, the Soviet Union agreed with Belgrade's stance that foreign units would amount to interference with the country's internal affairs. The Soviet Union also voted in line with this view in the UN Security Council; this is noted in the above-mentioned consul-general report on changes in Soviet policies towards Yugoslavia in July 1991. Although Gorbachev continued to try to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, some believe that it was this unsuccessful mediation with Milošević and Tuđman that ended the era of Soviet support for Yugoslavia's unity.

International Recognition of Slovenia

Following Croatia, which recognised Slovenia's independence on 26 June 1991, the first states to do likewise were Lithuania on 30 July 1991 (having officially re-established its own independence on 11 March 1991) and Georgia on 14 August 1991 (having declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 09 April 1991). All four states were in a similar position: despite having declared their independence, they had to wait for official recognition – for Slovenia and Croatia, this was due to the moratorium and even its expiry did not bring immediate international recognition – while the former Soviet Republics had to wait for the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

> According to media reports, Lithuania has officially announced its recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence. The recognition can have no international legal consequences since Lithuania itself is not a separate and international legal entity. In terms of politics, the decision of the Lithuanian government undermines the efforts of the international community to resolve the Yugoslav crisis in accordance with its constitution through the peaceful dialogue of all parties concerned and within the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.[49]

Responding to the Lithuanian government decision, Slovenian president Milan Kučan stated in an interview with the weekly Novoe vremya in early August:

> We appreciate Lithuania's decision as a gesture of solidarity. Slovenia would not, however, want this to have adverse effects on our relations with the Soviet Union. Regardless of what fate the Soviet Federation faces in the future, we are as ever interested in cooperation with all the nations within your state.[50]

Croatia, Lithuania and Georgia were followed by Latvia (28 August 1991), Estonia (25 September 1991) and Ukraine (12 December 1991). According to Roman Kokalj (2006: 12), Ukraine quickly determined that Slovenia did not want to be in conflict with anyone within Yugoslavia; Ukraine's swift decision to recognise Slovenian independence therefore came as no surprise. Looking for an intermediary in Ukraine and one with connections at the foreign affairs ministry in Kiev, Kokalj found the right man in Alexander Slinko, a former official at the Soviet embassy in Belgrade and the Soviet consulate-general in Zagreb. Slinko was retired and happy to accept a position that would earn him extra money and so Kokalj hired him as an outworker for Slovenijales. It was

---

49 Zayavlenie MID SSSR. *Izvestiya* (182), 02 August 1991: 6.

50 Interv'iu s Milanom Kuchanom: Voyna eshche ne konchilas'. *Novoe vremya* (32), 06 August 1991: 21.

Kokalj, by then Slovenia's official representative in the Soviet Union, who notified Ljubljana of Ukraine's official recognition of Slovenia. A few days before Christmas (on 18 December 1991), Slovenian Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel sent a letter to his Ukrainian colleague Anatoly M. Zlenko expressing satisfaction with the countries' mutual recognition and commending Roman Kokalj as Slovenia's authorised representative and the head of the Slovenijales branch office in Moscow. In his next letter (on 19 December 1991), Rupel proposed that Ukraine and Slovenia establish diplomatic relations.[51]

The decision on the recognition of new states within the territory of the disintegrating Yugoslavia took significantly longer for the Russian Federation than it did for the aforementioned former Soviet republics and the European Community. The coordination between the Russia foreign affairs ministry and the responsible parliamentary committee reached a decisive point in December 1991 and January 1992 respectively. While the diplomatic documents available are not very revealing, it is nevertheless evident that the Committee on International Affairs and External Trade of the Supreme Soviet asked the Third European Administration of the USSR MFA to prepare the document 'Current Concerns regarding Developments in Yugoslavia and Proposed Guidelines for our Relations,' which was signed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kolokov.[52] On 29 December 1991, Kolokolov also wrote to Andrei Kozyrev:

> The situation has reached a boiling point and we must urgently define our position regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia, including the question of recognising the former Yugoslav republics.[53]

On 13 January 1992, Kolokolov notified Kozyrev of the ongoing discussions in the aforementioned committee:

> We have been actively addressing the issue of the recognition of Slovenia and other Yugoslav republics and the establishing of diplomatic relations. There is to be a discussion soon on the subject in the Committee on International Affairs and External Trade of the Supreme Soviet. The minutes with our suggestions have been sent to V. P. Lukin at your behest. Pending the committee's discussion of the issue and the final decision of the Russian governing bodies, it would

51 Consul General Y. Girenko sent translations of the correspondence between Rupel and the Ukrainian side to the foreign affairs ministry. In: Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, 110 – POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, Opis 52, Delo 6, Papka 124, Eks. 2, Ish. 505, 24 December 1991, Vh. 36 – 3EU, 04 January 1992.

52 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 5, Papka 128, 110 POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY, 6/3EU, 4. 1. 1992.

53 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 5, Papka 128, 110 POLITICHESKIE VOPROSY; Ish. 1829/3EU, 29 December 1992.

be best to refrain from direct contact and correspondence on this subject with the Slovenian representatives.[54]

On his return to Moscow from Bonn in January 1992, Minister Kozyrev hinted to Izvestiya's diplomatic correspondent, Maxim Yusin, that the Russian Federation was changing its position:

> The decision of the European Community has set in motion an irreversible process. As you know, Russia was not overly active regarding the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics. In light of our special relations with Belgrade, that was perhaps understandable – a Slavic factor, if you will. But today we can no longer ignore the political reality and fall behind our partners in the European process (Yusin 1992a: 1, 4).

On 24 January 1992, Deputy Minister Kolokolov wrote to inform Kozyrev about the ongoing preparations for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. He proposed the following plan of action: on 27 January 1992, a special Russian envoy would notify the Yugoslav foreign affairs ministry of Russia's intention to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, explaining Russia's motives for doing so and emphasising its willingness to continue good relations and cooperation with Yugoslavia. The envoy would then meet with the foreign affairs ministers of Serbia and Montenegro and assure them that their traditional friendly ties with Russia would remain unchanged. The day after the envoy arrived and once Moscow had received his telegram conveying Belgrade's response, Russia would declare its simultaneous recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence 'and, in doing so, withdraw its past reservations for expressing sincere support for recognition.'[55]

President Yeltsin announced Russia's intention to recognise both Slovenia and Croatia on 31 January 1992 during his visit to Washington (Gus'kova 1993: 225). Then, on 11 February 1992, at a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, he emphasised that Russia was gaining new friends and allies while in no way rejecting all the positive achievements of Yeltsin's predecessors (Gus'kova 1993: 68). That same day, Consul Marusin and Attaché Nikiforov of the consulate-general in Zagreb sent a summary report to Moscow, detailing the process of Western countries' recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The report also noted that some countries would not recognise

54 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, 3EU MID SSSR, Eks. 1, Vh. 43, 21 January 1992.

55 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, 3EU MID SSSR, 639/ShChS-ns / 1700/OS-ns.

Croatia until certain constitutional amendments had been made in regard to national minorities. The United States was expected to declare its recognition by mid-February, Marusin and Nikiforov agreed, anticipating that it would opt for conditional recognition and delay full diplomatic relations:

> Also, by quoting G. Bush, the media emphasised that the United States has not yet recognised the breakaway republics of Yugoslavia so as not to 'thwart the UN's peace-seeking efforts' and that, for the time being, it is in no hurry to 'follow the EC's lead.' There is a general and well-grounded assumption among observers here that the United States will give its recognition once the UN operation commences in Croatia.[56]

The consul and attaché reported that the Slovenian and Croatian media were buzzing with speculation that Russia would recognise these states as well. In their view, this was the reason behind the anticipated arrival of Special Mission Ambassador Yuri Deryabin.

> Both Croatia and Slovenia have great interest in gaining Russian recognition and establishing diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation at the embassy level. Slovenia and Croatia envisage establishing a Russian embassy in Ljubljana and Zagreb, respectively. If, for financial reasons, that should not prove possible, they would consider it acceptable if our interests were represented by the Russian Federation ambassador to Austria while Zagreb and Ljubljana establish separate diplomatic missions.[57]

On 19 February 1992, five days after Russia's recognition of Slovenia, Deputy Minister Kolokolov wrote a special letter to Kozyrev, notifying him of the exchange of diplomatic notes, which had taken place outside the originally planned day (Consul Y. Girenko presented the notes in Ljubljana and Zagreb on 14 and 17 February, respectively):

> President Tuđman received the note in Croatia and responded immediately – by writing to Yeltsin that same day. In the letter, he conveyed his gratitude and an invitation to commence talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, who received the note in Ljubljana, also addressed the issue of embassies. Both Slovenia and Croatia would like to hold these talks in Moscow, preferably within the framework of their for-

56 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 40, 11 February 1992, O priznanii nezavisimosti Khorvatii i Slovenii i ustanovlyenii s nimi diplomaticheskih otnošeniy (Kratka informatsiya).

57 Ibid.

eign ministers' working visits to Russia. [...] Until diplomatic relations are established, the two governments have made a reasonable request that their interests in Moscow be represented by the heads of corporations accredited in Russia (i.e. R. Kokalj and M. Devičić) while Russia's interests in the new states during this transitional period will be represented by the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Zagreb.[58]

On 28 February 1992, Girenko, the Russian consul-general in Zagreb, sent his own report, enclosing the official statement that he had cited in interviews with the Slovenian and Croatian media:

> The new Russia is embarking on an open policy of broad cooperation, free of ideological dictates and imperial ambitions; hence it finds "double standards" strange: having won its own right to freedom, independence and democracy, Russia cannot deny the same rights to other countries; one cannot value their own freedom without equally honouring the independence of others as well as their right to their own socio-political choices. Russia has accepted the political reality in Yugoslav territory, especially the fact that the majority population in Slovenia and Croatia voted in the referendum for an autonomous and independent future. Therefore, Russia can no longer stand idly by in the process of their recognition on the basis of the criteria set by the European Community, i.e. the inviolability of borders and protection of national minority rights in accordance with European standards. At the end of January, the Russian government took a principled political decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent sovereign countries and new members of the international community of nations. Accordingly, the Russian President B. N. Yeltsin has initiated efforts towards official recognition on the basis of bilateral consultations with the state leaders of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia, during which it will explain the grounds for its decision.[59]

Perturbations in Belgrade

Russia's decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia provoked an indignant response from the Yugoslav government. The available diplomatic sources, comprising Soviet – or rather, Russian – embassy archives in Belgrade, do not

58 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, 3EU MID SSSR Vh. 170, 24 February 1992 (3661/OS-ns).

59 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 44, 28 February 1992, O vruchenii not MID Rossiskoy federatsii o priznanii gosudarstvennoy nezavisimosti Khorvatii i Slovenii (Informatsiya).

include Yugoslav dispatches, but the atmosphere that pervaded Belgrade is more than aptly summed up by the news headlines:

> 'Stab in the back of Yugoslavia,' 'Europe slides back into chaos' are just two headlines from the covers of today's newspapers. [...] So then: euphoria in Slovenia and Croatia and countries openly sympathetic to them; anxiety and utter consternation in Belgrade and a series of other capitals (Fadeyev 1992: 5).

Although Serbia's open exasperation placed Russia in an awkward position, Russia decided to respond nevertheless. Failing to do so would have been contrary to well-established diplomatic practice and perceived as not only ignoring Yugoslavia's request to present a diplomatic note to the Russian Federation government, but also, to a certain degree, as a nod by Moscow to Belgrade's harsh criticism of Russia's stance.[60] The author of the aforementioned instruction, Y. Agayev, advised Head of Third European Administration of USSR MFA O. Kabanov, to respond with restraint and equilibrium and state in very calm tones and short sentences that the Russian government had taken note of the Yugoslav position on the matter and wished to continue their close cooperation in the future.[61] It was precisely in connection with reassuring Belgrade and including all parties in the process that Consul General Girenko reported that their special envoy Deryabin had conducted talks in Belgrade on 05 February 1992 and the following day in Ljubljana and Zagreb:

> In no sense, ethically, ideologically or religiously, does Russia support one Yugoslav republic over the other. Rather, it wishes to maintain friendly relations with all of them, including Croatia and Slovenia without harming its relations with Serbia and Montenegro, and vice versa. We firmly reject attempts. from whichever side they came, to cause trouble over religious matters between Russia and its old friends in the Balkans, with insinuations that Russia is trying to form a kind of "Orthodox axis" in the Balkans. Such allegations are nothing more than malicious fabrications.[62]

60 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, 3EU MID SSSR Vh., 179, 26 February 1992 (25 February 1992, 65/uop, 2-mk/VS, 25 February 92).

61 Ibid.

62 Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, Arkhiv vneshney politiki SSSR, Fond 144 3EU, REFERENTURA PO YUGOSLAVII, Opis 53, Delo 8, Papka 129, 710 SPRAVKI PO POLITICHESKIM VOPROSAM, Eks. 1, Ish. 44, 28 February 1992, O vruchenii not MID Rossiskoy federatsii o priznanii gosudarstvennoy nezavisimosti Khorvatii i Slovenii (Informatsiya).

Establishing Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Slovenia and the Russian Federation were officially established on 25 May 1992, with the signing of an appropriate protocol in Ljubljana. Kokalj described the preparations with enthusiasm and emotion. The Russian foreign ministry had made no public announcements of its intentions. Kokalj simply received an invitation to formally accompany Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to Vnukovo airport. The Minister was setting out on a tour through all six former Yugoslav republics and then heading to Lisbon to attend a conference on international community aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Yugoslav embassy delegation, too, received an invitation to Vnukovo, where they flatly ignored Kokalj and his wife. At the time, they must have had a sense of what was coming. The matter was cleared by Deputy Foreign Minister Kolokolov, who arrived in the airport hall a few minutes before Kozyrev:

> He looked around, smiled, bowed his head and started walking purposefully towards me. Just a few metres away, he stopped suddenly and walked away with the same air of purpose in the direction of where the Yugoslav delegation was seated. It looked larger than it really was. Their voices became increasingly animated. Murmuring with satisfaction, while the rest of the hall grew silent, looking towards the left corner. My wife and I stood there alone, humiliated. I said to myself: Don't show them how you feel. Then again, restraint wasn't really necessary since everyone was looking the other way. The next thing I knew, Kolokolov approached me with Chargé D'affaires Lazić on his arm. Speaking plainly and directly as was his custom, Kolokolov said: 'I am sure, Mr. Kokalj that Mr. Lazić does not know you yet; but he should. The thing is that Mr. Kokalj is here today in a special capacity, as the representative of a new state, which Russia has established diplomatic relations with.' That is how he introduced me, and Lazić could only say: 'Yes, I know him!' (Kokalj 2006: 20).

Kozyrev's tour of the six former Yugoslav republics was to include a visit to besieged Sarajevo with a special mediation mission. A JNA helicopter managed to take him to Bosnia and Herzegovina's capital from Belgrade, but after a few hours there, his visit was cut short by the Crimean crisis. On President Yeltsin's orders, he returned to Moscow to attend the Supreme Soviet meeting.[63] He visited Ljubljana on 25 May 1992, flying directly from Lisbon:

63 Russian parliament held urgent discussions over the Crimean crisis, which has threatened up until recently to harm the relationship between the new states, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, both Soviet republics. On 05 May 1992, the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea declared its independence, and the following day, Ukrainian parliament adopted the Crimean Constitution, which stated in its preamble that the peninsula was part of Ukraine. A series of tense polemics followed, lead-

> The tour started on Monday in Slovenia. The Minister talked to the state leaders, signed the protocol on establishing diplomatic relations and then set out to Croatia... (Yusin 1992 b: 4).

Izvestiya dryly reported on the commencement of diplomatic relations between Slovenia and the Russian Federation; this dryness was characteristic of all Russian media reports on the subject. Roman Kokalj is more expressive in his memoirs, revealing that due to an unfortunate set of circumstances the Russian diplomats had to wait several hours in Lisbon[64] before they could fly to Ljubljana, and they arrived at their Brdo residencerather tired. While impressed with the castle and its surroundings, they kept the meeting with Minister Rupel short:

> That was the grandest diplomatic occasion in independent Slovenia. It was the first time that a foreign minister from another country had personally flown to Slovenia to sign an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations. This great country, a founding member of the UN Security Council, showed us an immense honour. [...] The Russian political leadership looked very favourably on Slovenia; they liked our way of working and considered Slovenia as an exemplary modern state even though it had just barely come into existence. Once signed, the protocol also set the principles of action for both sides concerning succession issues in the USSR and SFRY (Kokalj 2006: 21–22).

Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy

Mikhael Gorbachev's *Perestroika*, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first presidential term of Boris Yeltsin represent a special period in the formation of Russian foreign policy. Gorbachev's concept of 'new political thinking' (Tsygankov 2008: 50) broke with the policy of confrontation with the West and the arms race and stressed the importance of international organisations. The key principles of Gorbachev's new thinking were de-ideologisation and a departure from the basic postulates of Marxism-Leninism in interstate relations (Georgieva – Georgiev 2006: 309). Andrei Tsygankov (2008: 32) considers that the development of this foreign policy was based on a concept of identity, which

ing ultimately to an agreement in June 1992 that Crimea would remain in Ukraine as an autonomous republic.

64 Kokalj refers to Barcelona, but there are several inaccuracies in his memoirs. Kozyrev attended the conference on aiding the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was held in Lisbon, not in Barcelona; he also provides wrong dates for Russia's recognition of Slovenia (suggesting 18 February instead of the correct 14 February) and Croatia (24 February instead of 17 February). He writes mistakenly that the United States recognised Slovenia six months after Russia established diplomatic relations with Slovenia when in reality the US recognition was granted on 07 April 1992 less than two months after that of Russia.

defines notions of national interests. Gorbachev was interested in achieving transformation through the creation of a new socialist man. Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev pushed the policy of "transformation" even further by proclaiming that complete integration with the Western system was Russia's foreign policy priority. They rejected the model of the Soviet man and instead strove to construct a new identity for Russia as part of the West. As a consequence, the national interest was equated with integration with Western economic institutions and security system. Although Kozyrev drew on Perestroika's premises, he was also critical of the concept:

> [...] the makers of Perestroika displayed an all-too-obvious desire to merely colour the façade of the system, to humanise it "little by little" and invent its own "Prague Spring" to create socialism with a human face. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, I can only say that the principal mistake lay in the failure to understand the complete condemnation of the Bolshevik system. The decision to renounce violence actually ate away at the support structure of the regime, which soon then began to crumble. And equally inconsistent was its restoration... (Kozyrev 1992a: 3).

Neither Gorbachev nor the so-called young reformers of the new Russia had a genuine concern for Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Rather, they were focused on pursuing their own interests through dialogue with the United States and Western Europe. But the European east and southeast nevertheless posed a challenge to their policy. Once Gorbachev had granted them "freedom of choice" and Russia had "isolated "itself from the remaining post-Soviet expanse, Moscow renewed its interest in the former Soviet republics in 1993. The aforementioned steadfast support for the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was therefore not surprising. Positions began to change after the August coup, and they completely evolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia, which, to quote Kozyrev, aimed to step in line with 'civilised countries,' could not afford to fall behind. At the same time, the recognition of the new post-Yugoslav states and adoption of critical distance towards Serbia in the spring of 1992 had strong internal political connotations:

> If the Russian Federation were to recklessly support only Serbian national--Bolsheviks out of all the Southern Slavs, it would be left in isolation in the Balkans, in the CSCE and in the UN. The fact, however, that Russia itself would suffer betrayal is equally important. After all, in Moscow today essentially the same forces are consolidating as they are in Belgrade. They are trying to push us into the same abyss. With Bolshevik straightforwardness, they are replacing the communist mythology with a pseudo-patriotic mythology, placing the same reliance on arguments of force instead of the force of arguments (Kozyrev 1992 b: 4).

May 1992 brought about one of the major shifts in Russian policies on the Balkans. On 12 May 1992, Russia opposed the exclusion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the CSCE in Helsinki. Nevertheless, during a critical vote on 30 May in the UN Security Council, it voted in favour of international sanctions against Belgrade rather than abstain from voting, a move which would have put it on the same bench as China and Zimbabwe (Kandelj 1992: 32):

> Russia is doing its utmost to strengthen the traditional links of friendship and cooperation with the Yugoslav nations, to restore peace to their land, to guarantee their freedom and independence. That is the significance of the unprecedented steps we have taken recently with regard to Serbia, Croatia and all the sovereign states that have been formed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, so far, Belgrade has not heeded our good advice and warnings and failed to comply with the demands of the international community. By doing so, it has brought upon itself the UN sanctions. In voting for these sanctions, Russia fulfilled its obligation as a superpower for the maintenance of international law and order… (Gus'kova 1993: 71).

At a press conference, the Russian foreign ministry's spokesperson, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, admitted to a shift in foreign policy. In his words, Russia had done more than any other world power to promote a solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia. To support the sanctions was a 'difficult step, and it had taken it with a heavy heart' (Gus'kova 1993: 228). During his tour of the former Yugoslav republics in May 1992, Kozyrev met with Slobodan Milošević twice, but the two were unable to find common ground. Milošević claimed that Serbia was not formally involved in the conflict and had no influence on the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an interview with Izvestiya, the Russian foreign minister, thus, only concluded as follows:

> Unfortunately, there are forces that ignore friendly advice and understand only the language of dictate. They have obviously underestimated the role of Russia as a superpower… Being friendly is something other than showing leniency to those who clearly breach the principles of the CSCE. I wish Belgrade would understand that (Yusin 1992c: 6).

The course that Russian foreign policy was taking provoked sharp polemics from the Russian public. The newspaper Moskovskie novosti featured a diametrically opposed viewpoint written by the academic Pavel Volobuev and scholar Lyudmila Tyagunenko from the Russian Academy of Sciences:

> We have not forgotten the solemn announcement of the heads of the Russian foreign ministry of a fundamentally new foreign policy concept, which is the

> aspiration of the new Russia. However, an objective look at some episodes in the foreign political activities of the Russian government raises the following question: Does this perhaps mean that Russia has relinquished its independent foreign policy? […] It could hardly find a more inappropriate moment to sign the documents on establishing diplomatic relations with Croatia and Slovenia. Did this not amount – even inadvertently – to unilateral support of Croatia? And what kind of a stance, if not unilateral, did the Russian foreign minister assume in regard to Serbia when he joined the initiative of the United States and European states, EC members, who are apparently not in the least bothered by numerous casualties among the Serbian population? (Volobuev – Tyagunenko 1992: 13).

Further reservations were expressed over the recognition of the newly created states in the former Yugoslavia's territory, and hence, of the disintegration of the federation as such. Vadim Medvedev (1994: 506–507) was critical of how the Yugoslav issue had been treated within the context of the disintegration of the Soviet Union:

> The measures taken by the Russian leadership towards the strengthening of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation – giving momentum to the centrifugal forces in the other republics – led to the disintegration of the union. Not so much through constitutional as through radically destructive neo-Bolshevik methods. From this viewpoint, the Russian stance towards Yugoslavia seems logical enough although not perfect; to be honest, it is a wrong one: it sends a strong signal in support of disintegration processes and unilateral secessions of the republics from the federation.

The Russian academic and the broader public, thus, had a uniform understanding of Russian policy in the Balkans:

> The enthusiastic recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence just poured more oil on the crisis in the region. With no effective mechanism to contain the conflict and settle it through peaceful means, it exploded into a bloody civil war that engulfed nearly the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. […] The attitude of the Soviet leadership towards the war makes little sense. The same may be said for many aspects of Gorbachev's politics. By 1991, the Soviet leadership had finally lost its political freedom and turned […] into a collective political eunuch. Straining for the short-lived effect of implementing the "new political thinking," Gorbachev and his crew did not take care to protect state-national interests. The international authority of the Soviet Union was melting catastrophically under the radiating "Prague Spring," with the betrayal of former allies at both the state and personal levels. When Gorbachev decided to take on the role of peace mediator in the negotiations between the Serbian

> and Croatian presidents with no tangible plan, the international community looked down on these endeavours with no expectation that anything good would come out of the meeting. The Soviet Union had ample reasons to exert its influence over the developments in Yugoslavia. No one drove us out but ourselves; we left the region voluntarily (Ponomareva 2007: 134).

Conclusion

The diplomatic material available reveals the restraint with which the Soviet diplomats approached emancipatory processes in the former Yugoslav republics. Officials at the Soviet embassy in Belgrade and the consulate-general in Zagreb viewed the developments in Yugoslavia within the context of disintegration processes in their own country. It was not until after the ten-day war in Slovenia that the Zagreb consulate-general finally warned the foreign ministry in Moscow that the situation on the ground had changed to the extent that a change in official positions was urgently required. The unsuccessful attempted coup that took place between 19 and 22 August 1991 in the Soviet Union compelled the Russian foreign ministry to gradually soften its view that Yugoslavia should preserve its unity and territorial integrity – a last-ditch attempt at mediation came in the form of Gorbachev's invitation to Serbian and Croatian presidents Milošević and Tuđman to take part in consultations in Moscow on 15 October 1991 – but the ministry did not break with the old foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the diplomatic sources available cast light on the internal mechanisms for reporting on conditions and on decisions made about the recognition of new states, the motives for that recognition are more elaborately explained in the official statements of Russian authorities, especially the interviews with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in the Russian media. Russia wanted to become part of the West so as not to lag behind in political terms. The same period, however, witnessed growing internal antagonisms between President Yeltsin's circle on the one hand and, on the other, the conservative and Communist opposition whom the President's close associates considered ideationally akin to government circles in Belgrade. Slovenia first sought to establish cooperation with some Soviet republics at an inter-republican level and then tried to talk Moscow into recognising its barely established statehood. However, given the considerations revealed by diplomatic sources and media assessments as well as in the memoirs and diaries of influential figures in the Soviet Union, it is safe to assume that the recognition of Slovenia's independence was more a consequence of the narrow "window" that opened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and then quickly closed due to the internal situation in the Russian Federation. Yeltsin's reforms provoked a growing revolt among Russians; state foreign policy came under increasingly scathing criticism and

the opposition increased faster than Yeltsin's associates had expected. As concerns the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia, which had advocated for the longest for the existence of the Yugoslav federation, soon became the target of Western critics. This quickly stirred and strengthened Russia's traditional solidarity with Serbia.

References

– Istoriko-diplomaticheskoe upravlenie MID SSSR, ARKHIV VNESHNEY POLITIKI SSSR, Fond 202, Posol'stvo SSSR v SFRYu.

– ISTORIKO-DIPLOMATICHESKOE UPRAVLENIE MID SSSR, ARKHIV VNESHNEY POLITIKI SSSR, Fond 144, 3EU, Referentura po Yugoslavii.

(1991): Interv'iu s Milanom Kuchanom: Voyna eshche ne konchilas'. *Novoe vremya* (32), 6 August 1991: 21.

(1991): Iz zayavleniya MID SSSR. *Izvestiya* (222), 17 September 1991: 5.

(1991): Zayavlenie MID SSSR. *Izvestiya* (182), 2 August 1991: 2.

Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:

Chernyaev, Anatoli (2008): *Sovmestnyi ishod. Dnevnik dvuh epoh 1972–1991*. Moscow.

Fadeyev, Yevgeni (1991): Razvyazivaniye uzlov nachalos'. *Pravda*, 10 June 1991: 5.

Fadeyev, Yevgeni (1992): Proshchay, federativnaya Yugoslaviya! *Pravda*, 17 January 1992: 5.

Georgieva, Natalya – Georgiev, Vladimir (2006): *Istoriya Rossii*. Moscow: MGU, Velbi.

Gorbachev, Mikhail (1987): *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira.* Moscow: Politizdat.

Gorlov, Vladimir (1991): *Voyna po-prezhnemu ba rasstoyaniy vystrela. Iz Belgrada…* Komsomolska pravda, 16. October 1991: 3.

Gryzunov, Sergei – Romanenko, Sergei (2012): *Raspad Yugoslavii, "perestroichny" SSSR i nezavisimaya Rossiya.* Contribution presented at the International Conference "Twentieth Anniversary of the Collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia: New Findings and Lessons Learned." MGIMO University, Moscow, 20 February 2012.

Gus'kova, Yelena (ed.). (1993): *Yugoslavskiy krizis i Rossiya: Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii (1990–1993)*. Moscow: Fond Yugoslavyanskikh issledovaniy i sotrudnichestva „Slavyanskaya letopis'".

Kandelj, Pavel (1992): Chto nam Balkani? *Novoe vremya* (25), 16 June 1992: 32.

Kokalj, Roman (2006): *Moskovskie vospominaniya*. Moscow: RAN.

Kozyrev, Andrei (1992a): Preobrazhennaya Rossiya v novom mire. *Izvestiya* (1), 2 January 1992: 3.

Kozyrev, Andrei (1992 b): Na ch'ey storone Rossiya v Yugoslavskom konflikte? *Izvestiya* (133), 8 June 1992: 4.

Medvedev, Vadim (1994): *Raspad: Kak on nazreval v "mirovoy sisteme sotsializma"*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya.

Pankin, Boris (1993): *Sto oborvannykh dney.* Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno.

Parad suverenitetov. Available at: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Парад_суверенитетов. (1 April 2015).

Ponomareva, Yelena (2007): *Politicheskoe razvitie postyugoslavskogo prostranstva (vnutrennie i vneshnie faktory).* Moscow: MGIMO University.

Ponomareva, Yelena (2010): *Novye gosudarstva na Balkanah*. Moscow: MGIMO University.

Razuvaev, V. (1991): Interv'iu s Andreem Kozyrevim: 100 dney ministra. *Novoe vremya* (9), 27 February 1991: 10.

Repe, Božo (2002): *Jutri je nov dan. Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije*. Ljubljana: Modrijan.

Romanenko, Sergei. (2011): *Mezhdu "Proletarskim internatsionalizmom" i "Slavyanskim bratstvom". Rossisko-yugoslavskie otnosheniya v kontekste etnopoliticheskikh konfliktov v Sredney Evrope (nachalo XX veka–1991 god.).* Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie.

Simoniti, Iztok (1996): Svet po l. 1990. In: Russet, Bruce – Starr, Harvey. (1996): *Svetovna politika*. Ljubljana: FDV.

TASS. (1991): Sovetsko-yugoslavskie peregovori. *Izvestiya* (183), 2 August 1991: 4.

Tsygankov, Andrei (2008): *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii ot Gorbacheva do Putina*. Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga.

Vasileva, N. – Gavrilov, V. – Mirkiskin, V. (2005): *Balkanskiy uzel, ili Rossiya i "yugoslavskiy factor" v kontekste politiki velikikh derzhav na Balkanah v XX veke*. Moscow, Zvonitsa-MG.

Volobuev, Pavel – Tyagunenko, Lyudmila (1992): "Srbskiy vopros" i interesi Rossii. *Moskovskie novosti* (25), 21 June 1992: 13.

Yusin, Maxim (1991): Posrednicheskaya missiya M. Gorbacheva, kazhetsia, udalas'. *Izvestiya* (247), 16 October 1991: 1.

Yusin, Maxim (1992a): Andrei Kozyrev: Zapad—estestvenny soiuznik novoy Rossii. *Izvestiya* (16), 20 January 1992: 1, 4.

Yusin, Maxim (1992c): Nad Belgradom sgushchaiutsia tuchi. *Izvestiya* (125), 29 May 1992: 6.

Yusin, Maxin (1992 b): V Lissabone vnov' obeshchana pomoshch' stranam SNG. *Izvestiya* (121), 25 May 1992: 4.

***Andrej Stopar** completed studies in comparative literature and history at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana and is currently working towards a PhD within the humanities doctoral programme at the University of Nova Gorica, Slovenia. He is the editor-in-chief of the First and News programme of Radio Slovenia and was previously chief correspondent from the Russian Federation and CIS for RTV Slovenia (2005 – 2013). As an international politics commentator, he focuses mainly on events in Central and Eastern Europe. He is the author of the book Pax Putina (2014) and several documentary films for TV Slovenia. He can be reached at: andrej.stopar@rtvslo.si.*

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

Politics in Central Europe publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic version via e-mail to ladislav.cabada@mup.cz, preferably in Word format.

Presentation of the paper

Each issue the *Politics in Central Europe* focuses on one main topic or theme. This theme is indicated in advance, at the latest in the previous issue. Besides essays focused on the current issue, essays with other themes are welcomed too.

Essays should be written in English (preferably British English).
Essays should not normally exceed 12,000 words in length.

When submitting the essay, please also attach:

- an abstract of 150–200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
- a brief biographical note about each author, including previous and current institutional affiliation
- a full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about the second author.

All essays are checked by a referee; they undergo a double-blind peer review. At least two external referees review manuscripts. *Politics in Central Europe* reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form, without requesting an external review.

In order to ensure anonymity during the peer-review process, the name(s), title(s), and full affiliation(s) of the author(s) should only appear on a separate cover sheet, together with her/his preferred mailing address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers.

Politics in Central Europe reserves the right to edit or otherwise alter all contributions, but authors will receive proofs for approval before publication.

Style Guidelines

Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

Manuscript style guidelines

Authors are urged to write as concisely as possible, but not at the expense of clarity. Descriptive or explanatory passages, necessary for information but which tend to break up the flow of text, should appear in footnotes. For footnotes please use Arabic numbers. Footnotes should be placed on the same page as the text reference, with the same number in the essay.

Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994-1998; or the 1990 s.

References in the text

In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

Since Bull (1977) has shown that. This is in results attained later (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), are states the.

Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005 b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994 b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by '–' (not 'and' or '&'). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by '*et al.*', or write all names separated with '–' (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in *International Security* (Summer 1990: 5).' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:

Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia,* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Two or more authors:

Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid. Understanding International Development Cooperation,* Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

EDITED VOLUMES:

Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1993): *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Clarendon Press.

CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:

George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, in Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics.* Sixth Edition, 70-76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5–54.

Online editions of journals:

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632 (15 August 2002).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Excerpts From the Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

Online editions:

Cooper, Robert (2002): Why We Still Need Empires, *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2 November 2003).

RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

Illustrations and tables

Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced. Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

Book Reviews and Review Essays – Guidelines for Contributing Authors

Politics in Central Europe welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of *Politics in Central Europe* was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

Politics in Central Europe encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

- A book review should not exceed 1,500 words
- State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified
- An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.

Contributors of review essays should meet the following requirements:

- A review essay should not exceed 6,000 words. It should also comply with all of the above requirements for book reviews
- Authors may either review several books related to a common topic, or provide a review essay of a single book considered to provide an exceptional contribution to the knowledge in a given field of research
- While a review essay should primarily deal with the contents of the book(s) under review, *Politics in Central Europe* encourages authors to use the reviewed material as a springboard for their own ideas and thoughts on the subject.