POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association

Volume 14 • Number 1 • April 2018 • ISSN 1801-3422

ESSAYS

DISCUSSION

DE G

METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY PRAGUE PRESS

POLITICS
in Central Europe

The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association

Volume 14 Number 1 April 2018 ISSN 1801-3422

ESSAYS

DISCUSSION

REVIEWS

Politics in Central Europe – The Journal of Central European Political Science Association is the official Journal of the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA). *Politics in Central Europe* is a biannual (June and December), double-blind, peer-reviewed publication.

Publisher:

Metropolitan University Prague, o. p. s.
Dubečská 900/10, 100 31 Praha 10-Strašnice (Czech Republic)

Printed by:

Togga, Ltd., publishing house
Radlická 2343/48, 150 00 Praha (Czech Republic)

Co-editors:

Ladislav Cabada & Šárka Waisová
E-mail: ladislav.cabada@mup.cz; sarka.waisova@mup.cz

Executive Assistant to the editors:

Hana Hlaváčková
E-mail: hana.hlavackova@mup.cz

English language editing:

Debra Shulkes

Home Page

http://www.politicsincentraleurope.eu
or http://www.degruyter.com

Editorial Office

Metropolitan University Prague, o.p. s, Univerzitní středisko Plzeň,
Koterovská 85, 326 00 Plzeň (Czech Republic)

Politics in Central Europe is an independent scientific journal.
The authors are solely responsible for the content of their contributions.

ISSN 1801-3422
MK ČR E 18556

POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE is indexed in the internationally recognised databases: Baidu Scholar, CEJSH (The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities), Celdes, CNKI Scholar (China National Knowledge Infrastructure), CNPIEC, DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals), EBSCO (relevant databases), EBSCO Discovery Service, ERIH PLUS (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences), Google Scholar, J-Gate, JournalTOCs, KESLI-NDSL (Korean National Discovery for Science Leaders), Microsoft Academic, Naviga(Softweco), Primo Central (ExLibris), Publons, ReadCube, Summon (Serials Solutions/ProQuest), TDNet, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory/ulrichsweb, WanFangData, WorldCat (OCLC).

The articles published in this scientific review are also published in De Gruyter, http://www.degruyter.com

ISSN 1801-3422 ČÍSLO REGISTRACE MK ČR E 18556

CONTENTS

ESSAYS

Understanding campaign "axiotechniques": Their nature and practical usage in Ukrainian elections

YEVHEN KUTSENKO

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422)
Vol. 14, No. 1
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0001

Abstract: *This article seeks to shed more light on Ukraine's parliamentary elections by considering campaign tools that were derived from values in the electorate and used in elections between 2006 and 2012. The influence of political values on the electoral process was pointed out by American political scientists in the mid-20th century. My research demonstrates, however, that the political choices of Ukrainians in the 2006–2012 elections gave rise to campaign techniques that were not based on "classic" political values like freedom, human rights and democracy. Instead, their source was national identity-related values including the importance of a common history, culture and language along with religious and geopolitical preferences. These values differed between the western and central regions of Ukraine on the one hand and the southern and eastern parts of the state on the other. This regional polarisation did not seem very dangerous, however, until the emergence of election campaigns based on political ideology. As ideology gradually lost its mobilising potential, there was a need for an effective new system of political influence. Manipulative techniques were deployed to incite artificial clashes between citizens with different political identities. This article analyses specific uses of these techniques and uncovers links between their application and the destruction of the electoral space in Ukraine as well as the division of the country's real political arena.*

Keywords: ***campaign axiotechniques, political manipulation, elections, voters.***

Introduction

Political elections are the basis for the forming of a representative government with voter legitimation. During election campaigns, politicians (whether independent candidates or representatives of political parties) use different methods to attract citizens' votes. The most effective and therefore dominant approach to competing in election campaigns in modern democratic states relies on campaigning techniques.

The term "campaign techniques" refers first of all to a group of activities that may be pre-designed, planned or spontaneous. These are procedures and technical and information tools designed to ensure the successful nomination of candidates and their election. Additionally, the term describes a set of tools and methods which seek to influence voters using relevant scientific sociological research together with political advertising and public relations (PR) techniques in order to achieve electoral success for a certain political party (or individual candidate).

Given the regularity of elections at different levels of power in Ukraine and the fierceness with which these campaigns are contested, research into the creation, operation and application of election techniques has particular relevance. The theoretical framework for this research includes works by Western authors (for example, Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Guelke 2012; Byrne 1997; O'Flynn 2010; Emr and Writer 2013; Schaap 2006, Riker 1986, Coons and Weber 2014; Goodin 1980; McDermott 2010) and Ukrainian authors (Rudych and Paharev 2011; Balaban 2007; Myhalchenko 2007; Nagorna 2008; Poltorak 2015; Vydrin 1991; Variy 2003).

Nevertheless, modern political scientists are yet to conduct any detailed research on the development of campaign techniques based on the axiological priorities of Ukrainian regional populations. In fact, the study of values-related campaign techniques lies at the crossroads of several areas of research. These include theories of political manipulation and societal division.

Goodin's (1980) monograph *Manipulatory Politics* was one of the first attempts to distil the essence of political manipulation. Goodin identified two criteria that seemed central to this phenomenon, noting that this manipulation must be (1) deceptive and (2) contrary to the putative will of its subjects. Coons and Weber (2014) described manipulation as the steering or influencing of others' choices and highlighted three forms this might take: deception, pressuring and the exploitation of emotional vulnerability or character defects.

Riker (1986) defined three key manipulative strategies: (1) controlling the agenda, which involves manipulating the agenda to secure favourable election outcomes; (2) strategic voting, which uses voting procedures to control outcomes and (3) other manipulation in which the context is redefined to create a stronger coalition.

An independent research field has been established by researchers of various aspects of the manipulation of public opinion (Jacobs – Shapiro 2000, Cheminant – Parrish 2011). From an axiological standpoint, one of the most interesting research areas is the impact of the manipulation of public opinion on political behaviour, particularly in elections, and thus, also on election results. In this regard, the conclusions of McDermott (2010) are particularly important. Using contemporary America as an example, she shows how political leaders manipulate emotions to achieve specific political effects and gain a partisan advantage. McDermott (2010) argues that the most commonly and effectively exploited emotion is fear and that this is very useful for garnering political support. The result, she claims, is that voters lose the ability to make informed choices about leadership and policy because they can only judge the truth and accuracy of information based on their relationship with the information source.

The theory of societal division is also closely connected with McDermott's (2010) work. There are two main versions of this thesis. According to the first, which is more popular among academics, divided societies arise when a new ethnic conflict surfaces or an old one reemerges as a result of a lack of consensus about decision-making procedures or a contest for legitimacy among different ethnic groups. Social scientists analyse divided societies drawing mostly on examples from Northern Ireland, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and South Africa. Among the most effective mechanisms for resolving violent unrest in these countries, they argue, are changes to constitutional and electoral laws.

But using this approach to analyse political problems in Ukraine is incorrect since it fails to reflect the essence of the Ukrainian political reality: modern Ukraine has never had ethnic conflicts and such conflicts do not exist today.

That is why I opt for the second approach to understanding divided societies. This approach makes clear that conflating cultural diversity with political division is a mistake. A divided society isn't merely one that is diverse ethno-culturally. Rather, what makes a society divided is the political salience of the differences among its population – in other words, they are persistent markers of political identity and a basis for political mobilisation. A divided society is, thus, one where ethno-cultural differences have such political weight that they can upset constitutional stability.

We can see that on the one hand, the term "manipulation" is used widely and has several meanings, and on the other, social scientists are interested in specific political misuses that can lead to societal division. Of course, we may also call these misuses "manipulation" but this does not clarify the type of manipulation that we are talking about.

In order to explore this issue, I propose giving the name "axiotechniques" to any efforts to manipulate the political identities and values that divide a society. The term "campaign axiotechniques" does not appear in either Ukrainian or

foreign scientific discourse, but I introduce it here with the aim of advancing this field of study. By "axiotechniques" (from the Greek *axia* meaning "value" and *techne* meaning "art, skill, ability"), I refer to the purposeful manipulation of values of the Ukrainian public in order to mobilise voters and increase the incentive to vote for a specific political party or politician. This manipulation is usually based on the simulation of values. It exaggerates the importance of these values with the goal of deepening splits in a society.

The term "axiotechniques" literally describes the management (manipulation) of the axiological sphere. As such, it is closely connected with axiology, another word derived from the Greek (*axio*means "value" while *logos* means "science" or "knowledge"). This science of values was founded in 1902 by the French philosopher Paul Lapie. One fairly common view understands axiology as the "study of values and their place in [...] reality and in the structure of [the] value-based world; that is, the relationship of different values together with social and cultural factors and personality structure" (Gubskiy – Korableva 2003: 18–19).

The desire to clarify how political values influence social processes has led various scientists to conduct research in the field. The earliest of these studies appeared in 1944 and considered voters' attitudes to elections (Lazarsfeld – Berelson – Gaudet 1944: 35). This was the work of Lazarsfeld, one of the founders of political sociology scholarship, together with his colleagues at the Department of Applied Research at Columbia University. Lazarsfeld's main conclusion was that the social characteristics of each citizen give rise to a specific set of interests, which in turn generate values (including values related to elections).

More recent researchers have confirmed that political values have a hugely important effect on political processes (Hernandez and Mynor 2015; Parker and Baretto 2013; Goren 2005). According to these scholars, the only way to better understand this problem is to conduct case studies in different parts of the world and collect our findings.

In this vein, this article aims to detail the axiotechniques at work in election campaigns in Ukraine and to analyse how they have been used in practice. My research objectives are therefore twofold:

- to determine the nature, background and causes of campaign axiotechniques and
- to analyse distinctive features of the axiotechniques used in Ukrainian elections from 2004 to 2012.

In order to pursue these objectives, it is necessary to identify significant values and track how they have determined Ukrainians' election choices. I do this by analysing the results of election campaigns in Ukraine.

Key values and their effects on Ukrainians' election choices

The political values associated with axiotechniques are not traditional political values such as democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, freedom of assembly or freedom of religion. Instead, they are values that underlie citizens' national identity. Without delving too deeply into various approaches to national identity, I would endorse the view of Stepyko (2011), who defines the term as the "recognition by the citizens of one country that they represent one political nation and respect the shared history, culture, language, religion, territory and state which are their political values" (p. 143).

Belief in a unique civic identity fulfils the political goal of consolidating a society axiologically. That is why the main task of every political regime should be to strive to establish a system of political values that focuses on the general public. A society where this consensus of values has been achieved may be considered stable since the main source of disagreement between individuals and the society has disappeared. When values are out of balance, on the other hand, the system is destablised and the results may be insecurity, disasters, fear and shock. Eventually, this can also lead to the system's destruction.

The basis for the civic consolidation of any nation is the understanding that the "nation is all citizens of the country regardless of their ethnicity, the language they communicate in and the traditions they follow and in which they educate their children" (Kasianov 1999: 136). Sociological research suggests, however, that this view of the Ukrainian nation is shared by only 43.1% of citizens; in contrast, for 34% of Ukrainians, the backbone of their society is ethnicity (Razumkov Research Centre 2007). This points to the root of the civic identity crisis in Ukraine.

The percentage of Ukraine's population who identify as Ukrainian citizens remains relatively low: between 1992 and 2015, this figure rose from 45.6% to just 57.5%. This fact itself is alarming, and we should also consider the quantitative differences in the recognition of the value of Ukrainian citizenship across the country: while 65.1% of those in the west affirmed the value of this citizenship, the figure in the south was 45.1% and it was just 38.6% in Donbass (Institute of Sociology 2015).

At the same time, a sense of Soviet identity has remained fairly strong in Ukraine. In 2013, 34.6% of citizens expressed their "congenial attitude to the Soviet Union."This position was most common in the east and the south of the country (48%) followed by the central region (32%) and the west (17%). Roughly 40% of Ukrainians were still"nostalgic" for the USSR (Zolkina 2013: 15).

These identifications have an obvious negative impact on the outlook of Ukrainians. Sociological research has shown that if Ukrainians had the option of renouncing their citizenship and adopting the nationality of a more prosperous country, 47.3% would do so (Mostova 2014).

Nagorna (2008) describes the causes of this situation as follows:

Ukraine, after it had gained... independence and decided on the nation-state paradigm, should have made a meaningful choice in favour of one of the two civic identity models. The first of these prioritises civic consciousness and focuses on the political, legal and humanitarian components of the nation phenomenon. The second model tends to emphasise natural and cultural traits (the concept of "blood and soil"). This model is almost the same as ethnic identity in terms of content. In fact, a hybrid version was selected. This emerged from the tasks of forming a Ukrainian identity based on principles of territory, civilisation and ethnicity. But the efforts of national democrats, who effectively monopolised the ideological strategy in the early independence years, to impose an ethnic model of the nation and a system of preferences based on titularity or "roots," caused a split in social consciousness. This had an immediate and clear regional dimension (p. 56).

Shulman (2005), an American researcher, has objected to aspects of this statement. He claims that after Ukraine failed to create a single platform for national identity, it faced not the choice between civic and ethnic versions of national identity but a more dangerous political reality – alternative versions of ethnic identity. There was a tension between the Ukrainian ethnonationalversion and the eastUkrainian (or, as Bhabhy puts it,"hybrid" (Kryvytska 2015)) version, which was, in fact, Soviet-Russian. These versions, moreover, had clear regional links: Ukrainian ethnonational identity became dominant in western and central Ukraine while the Soviet-Russian version prevailed in the east and the south (Shulman 2005: 65).

Political ideology as the basis for regional polarisation and election preferences (1991–2004)

Regional differences concerning national identity affect the electoral preferences of Ukraine's population. This division was apparent for the first time in the 1991 presidential election. The election results revealed the impact of geographic polarisation on electoral support for Leonid Kravchuk and Viacheslav Chornovil, who were voter favourites. Chornovil won the highest percentage of votes in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil regions. In contrast, these were the regions where Kravchuk had the least support. Chornovil, in turn, saw his worst results in the Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk regions (Khobta 2000: 98) (see Figure 1).

Regional differences in support for political leaders were also clear in subsequent election campaigns (both presidential and parliamentary), with a split between the western part of Ukraine and the country's east and the south.

At the heart of this regional polarisation was, however, an ideological clash between communists and anti-communists. This was confirmed, in particular, during the 1991 presidential election campaign where Kravchuk appeared to

personify the old school officials, communists and government appointees of Soviet times. His main political rival, Chornovil was depicted in contrast as a Soviet dissident and fighter against the Communist regime. In the next presidential election campaign in 1994, Leonid Kuchma claimed Kravchuk's former role, and Kravchuk therefore positioned himself as an ideological opponent of communism and fighter for the democracy. As a result, he received overwhelming support in the Ternopil (94.8% of votes), Ivano-Frankivsk (94.46%), and Lviv regions (93.77%) where voters in previous presidential elections had voted against him and given his former opponent (Chornovil) an absolute advantage (Korzh 2007: 94) (See Figure 2).

During this time, Ukraine was experiencing a kind of renaissance of communist ideology so that democratic positions won out only in the west of the country where memories of the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime were most fresh. In 1991 and 1994, the "anti-communists" lost in the central and south-eastern regions and were therefore defeated nationally. Ukraine's regional polarisation reflected an ideological conflict between two political sides that might be loosely called "communist" and "democrat." This pattern was observed in subsequent presidential and parliamentary cycles. All this changed, however, in 2004.

Election campaigns and political manipulation in the "post--ideological" era (2004 –2012)

It is widely believed that the 2004 presidential election campaign marked the end of ideology-based competition in Ukrainian politics and the dawn of the age of axiotechniques. This campaign was based on an artificial line-up of – and aggressive emphasis on – different values and priorities across the country.

The issues on which these electoral axiotechniques were based included

- the Russian language's status in Ukraine
- the politics of heritage including questions about the Kievan Rus', the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654), the role and place of the October Revolution in Ukraine's history, the Great Famine of 1932 – 1933, the Great Patriotic War (World War II), repression, collaboration, Organizacija Ukrajinskych Nacionalistiv – Ukrajinska Povstanska Armija (En. "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army"), the "glorification" of controversial historical figures (Mazepa, Shukhevych and Bandera on the one hand and Peter I, Catherine II, Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev on the other) and the Soviet Union's dissolution
- Ukraine's geopolitical situation and the country's future in international associations and organisations (including inflammatory talk about the need to choose between "eastern" and "western" civilisations and pressure to join international economic, political and political-military bodies

with different remits such as the EEA, EU, NATO and the Customs Union with Russia) and
- religion and confession (as seen particularly in clashes between Orthodox denominations and issues around the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) etc.).

Starting in 2004, speculation around these topics gave rise to a specific system of social symbols, myths and exaggerated regional identities on which campaign techniques were based. Moreover, from this point onwards, representatives of the same political entities began to highlight entirely different (and sometimes diametrically opposed) issues in different regions in order to win election campaigns. These issues reflected different social values or more specifically the social values of particular regions. These campaign axiotechniques were distinguished by their aggression designed to elicit negative emotional responses such as hatred, anxiety and restlessness.

The pioneers of these axiotechniques in Ukraine were the Russian political consultants Granovsky, Kulikov and Syerhyeytsev. During the 2004 presidential election, these individuals worked from the informal campaign headquarters of Viktor Yanukovych, led by Serhiy Klyueyev, are presentative of the "Donetsk clan"(Leshenko 2014).

These strategists manufactured the first electoral conflict in the history of an independent Ukraine that was based on an opposition between "East" and "West" within the country. Yanukovych's main competitor, Viktor Yushchenko was identified with the threat of "Ukrainian nationalism" and linked to Ukraine's transformation into a "puppet of the West"and especially of the United States. At the same time, the term "*nashysty*" (Nazis) was introduced to denounce Yushchenko's party Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine). Southern and eastern Ukraine were singled out as the bastions of Yanukovych's support. Thanks to an aggressive media campaign, the public in these regions became obsessed with the prospect of a violent "Ukrainisation" in the event that the *nashysty* and their leader came to power. The main TV stations screened a video clip widely thought to be the work of the political strategist Granovsky. A kind of caricature, it depicted the map of Ukraineasan animal carcass that had been divided into various cuts of meat: the west was "first grade," the centre "second grade" and the east and south "third grade" (see Figure 3).

This charge of segmentation of the country was addressed specifically to Yushchenko and his followers. Both videos and print publications circulated the myths that Yushchenko's father had served in the Third Reich army during World War II and that Yushchenko himself supported fascist ideology and aspired "like Hitler to conquer Ukraine and desecrate the memories of our grandfathers who fought fascism to restore peace to their land." Other supposedly incriminating materials authored by Russian political consultants portrayed Yushchenko as a "servant of the Catholics, heretics and schismatics [representatives of the

Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and UGCC]" (Smoliy-Levenets 2007: 773).

Yanukovych, on the other hand, was cast as a strong but fair politician and an experienced economic decision-maker. Most critically, he was said to be a "true believer," a supporter and protector of the orthodoxy and a defender of the Russian language and the Russian-speaking population in the country's south and east. The blatant manipulation of issues that this entailed is clear from the following facts:

1. Yanukovych's official programme for the Central Electoral Committee concerning his presidential candidacy made no mention of the protection of the Russian language or the need to safeguard Russian as a second state language. Instead, this "problem" was introduced by political strategists during the election campaign in a bid to heighten tensions between groups in the electorate.

2. A significant part of Yanukovych's campaign strategy focused on the mass coverage of his "warm" relations with the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church and its Ukrainian chapters including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). The campaign, thus, highlighted the clergy's active support (including political and financial aid) for Yanukovych in his roles as governor of Donetsk region and prime minister of Ukraine. This public rhetoric tilted the delicate balance of power among Ukrainian churches in favour of UOC-MPA. Though the latter was the largest church in Ukraine in 2004, it represented the religious preferences of less than 40% of believers (Religious Informational Service of Ukraine 2017).

By championing UOC-MP in their efforts to mobilise voters and manipulate their religious feelings and beliefs, Yanukovych, his political advisers and their entourage only fragmented the state's religious sphere. Given that Ukraine's major churches do not have an equal impact and specific churches dominate in specific regions (UOC-MP, for example, holds sway in the southern and eastern parts of the country), this move automatically divided the symbolic (and, for the purpose of campaign techniques, electoral) space by creating destructive regional identities and opposing them to one another.

For the sake of objectivity, we should note that Yushchenko's team also tried to use powerful campaign axiotechniques. To this end, they appealed to the Ukrainian electorate by disrupting the debate over the United Ukrainian Orthodox Church's origins and manipulating constituents' desire to join the EU. In 2004, the EU goal was shared by 70.7% of population in the west, Yushchenko's main support base, according to Razumkov Research Centre (2007). Other sociological studies suggest that support for the idea was significantly weaker in other regions at this time. The appeal in western Ukraine can be explained by the fact that the region is closer to EU borders. We should also note the popularity of the European directive on labour-based migration for EU citizens. The European integration promised by Yushchenko would have greatly simplified work options.

The manipulative election strategy pursued by Yushchenko's headquarters was focused on his opponent's past and had dangerous consequences for Ukrainian public discourse. Among its effects was the introduction of terms like "Donetsk mafia," "Donetsk criminals" and "Donbass bandits," which automatically associated the residents of eastern Ukraine in general and Donbass in particular with criminality. Use of these axiotechnique-driven slogans in the media reinforced disparaging regional identities and the political opposition between the regions. At the same time, it weakened the already fragile sense of Ukrainian civic identity.

Nevertheless, the axiotechniques deployed from Yanukovych's headquarters were considerably more devastating, a fact that can be explained solely by way of the campaign's technical capabilities. Given the pressure of his overall administrative role, Yanukovych's appearances in the national and regional media exceeded Yushchenko's by 210 times (at the time, Yanukovych was prime minister of Ukraine and was openly being discussed as Kuchma's successor; he commanded strong governmental support on the one hand and had the help of the richest and most powerful financial and industrial groups in the country – the so-called Donetsk clan – on the other hand) (Smoliy – Levenets' 2007: 775). Of particular note was the massive onslaught of information dispensed by the Party of Regions in the south-east (subsequent electoral cycles saw similar information campaigns by allied groups, especially Ukraine Communist Party).

The psychological impact of the axiotechniques in the regions can be seen from the results of sociological surveys. We may look, for example, at one of the surveys that was conducted soon after the 2004 presidential election (when, as we have noted, the active use of manipulative axiotechniques began) and followed up by a similar survey in 2012. In 2005, this survey asked: "Are there any political, linguistic, cultural or economic differences between the regions of Ukraine which are so profound that they might lead a region to secede and create its own state or join other states?" In western Ukraine, only 10.9% of respondents answered this question positively while 71.3 % replied negatively; in central Ukraine, 14.3% of responses were positive and 72.2% negative; in the south, the results were26.1% positive and 56.4% negative and in the east, 24.2% positive and 59.9% negative (Razumkov Research Centre 2007).

In 2012, in contrast, far more Ukrainians believed that the division of their society was a real problem. Those in the south-east region (the electoral base of the Party of Regions and Ukraine Communist Party) believed it was the most important issue of the day (59.5% of respondents). In the western and central regions, this opinion was shared by 34.1% and 39% of respondents, respectively, that is, three times the percentage in 2004. These figures attest to the serious harm caused by the use of axiotechniques in these regions (Razumkov Research Centre 2012).

One of the main drivers of axiotechniques, I would suggest, was the failure of political actors to communicate with voters in the manner generally required in a democracy. According to this two-way communication system between politicians and voters, a political party first wins an election and then gains a platform from which to help make decisions that are important to the community. In Ukraine, political advertising worked at first to fill some of the communication vacuum between the people and those in power. It promoted public awareness about particular politicians and between 1998 and 2004,helped parties gain support and take office through strong information campaigns directed at voters.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this approach declined gradually because of the irregularity of this advertising (it was concentrated in the lead-up to elections). This strategy was also unilateral: specially crafted and often biased messages were dispatched from the "centre" (the president, the government, the party in power) to the citizens who were, in fact, deprived of the chance to influence the decision-making process.

Campaign axiotechniques emerged as an artificial way to distract voters from the serious problems surrounding political communication in the Ukrainian public domain without making any effort to solve them. This was also an attempt to mobilise voters and gain their support. With this goal, the electoral space of modern Ukraine was carved up among the major political players during presidential and parliamentary elections between 2004 and 2012 in a division of Ukrainian society based on simulated values.

Over the course of parliamentary elections in 2006, 2007 and 2012, the uncontrolled use of manipulative campaign axiotechniques destroyed Ukrainians' sense of national identity and established divisive regional identities. It is worth taking a more detailed look at these elections. During the 2006 campaign, electoral support for the leading political parties followed the geographical patterns seen in the 2004 presidential election. Led by Viktor Yanukovych, the Party of Regions was the electoral favourite in eight regions in the east and the south (the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and Kherson regions)as well as Crimea and Sevastopol– the same places where the party had triumphed in 2004 (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2006) (see Figure 4).

In 2006, former Yushchenko's supporters have been devided between two political parties: Nasha Ukraina and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, which together won in the same areas that Yushchenko had claimed in 2004 (i.e. the central and western regions comprisingVinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy and Chernihiv; see Figure 4).

In percentage terms, the leads of the top parties in most of these regions were not as striking as they had been in the 2004 presidential elections. Nevertheless, there was a very significant difference between these margins in Halychyna

(Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil regions) and the ones in Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk regions) (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2006).

As for campaigning tools, the political forces that made the most aggressive use of manipulative axiotechniques gained the most voter support. In 2006, the Party of Regions and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc were, thus, voter favourites. The Party of Regions sought to incite fear in the electorate about the likelihood of future economic collapse if another party was successful. At the same time, the Party's campaign addressed the particular concerns of certain religious, ethnic, social and other groups. On this basis, it attacked NATO and backed Russian as a second state language and membership of the Eurasian Economic Community without giving much explanation of the advantages of these positions; instead, it relied on stereotypes and prejudices within the electorate (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2007).

The political strategists of YuliaTymoshenko Bloc also used aggressive techniques. In public speeches, Tymoshenko tapped into the sense of hurt among "Orange" voters, who considered they had been cheated by some members of the Party of Regions (Bachevskij 2006). In contrast, other political parties (e.g. Ukraine Socialist Party, Ukraine Communist Party, Nasha Ukraina and Lytvyn Bloc) that did not stage a clash of values but only reiterated their achievements, had unexpectedly low levels of voter support.

The 2007 snap parliamentary election saw no change in the regional distribution of voters' preferences for leading parties from the pattern in the last two nationwide elections. By this stage, however, manipulative axiotechniques had become a mainstream political tactic.

During this campaign, political operatives in Ukraine Communist Party and Lytvyn Bloc tried to learn from the failure of their previous campaign strategies. Both parties made drastic efforts to hang onto voters. This is especially clear from the manipulative axiotechniques used by the Communist Party whose focus on regional identities was obvious. One of the party's advertising spots, thus, played overtly on divisions in society, posing the question: "*Who do you descend from – the* Vatutins and Kovpaks, or the Banderas and Shukhevyches?" (Kutsenko 2012). Arguably, it was because of these techniques that Ukraine Communist Party managed to improve its election result, winning almost twice as many votes as it had in previous campaigns (its level of support increased from 3.66% to 5.39%) (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2007).

The 2009 – 2010 presidential campaign was unique in several ways. To begin with, there was almost no difference in the content of the political programmes of its participants (there were 18 presidential candidates). Secondly, because of the mass poverty in Ukraine in the wake of the 2008 – 2009 global economic crises, economic wellbeing was the foremost concern among Ukrainians. Against this background, topics such as geopolitical and linguistic preferences, heritage, religion and security policy that had been critical to the development

of axiotechniques in election campaigns since 2004, were now thrust aside. Meanwhile, all candidates appealed to left-wing populism as the most effective means of capturing the electorate's attention.

There were five leading candidates in the 2010 presidential elections: Yushchenko.Yaceniuk, Tigipko, Tumoshenko and Yanukovich, and together they received 85.84% of all votes (Central Election Committee, 2010; Official results of the first Presidential elections' round 2010). These politicians can be provisionally divided into two main groups: those in the "Orange" camp (Yushchenko, Yaceniuk and Tumoshenko) and those on the "Blue and White" side (Yanukovich and Tigipko, who had headed Yanukovich'spresidential campaign during the controversial 2004 elections). Both camps relied on the manipulation of values in the electorate as one of their chief tools in the political struggle.

During the 2009–2010 presidential campaign, the two camps found another common tactic in left-wing populism. All their candidates vowed that on becoming president, they would modernise Ukrainian factories, schools, universities and hospitals and so make Ukraine one of the most economically powerful countries in the world (or, as Yanukovich promised, a member of the G20 Electoral platform of Viktor Yanukovich 2010).

As we have seen, the manipulation of voters' geopolitical and linguistic preferences did not have the same major impact on the 2010 presidential elections that it had on previous campaigns (and would have again on the 2012 campaign). Nevertheless, aside from candidates' personal traits, it was the single factor that distinguished them in the campaign.

Two of the three Orange representatives (Yaceniuk and Tumoshenko) set out to win the support of voters from all Ukrainian regions. To this end, they distanced themselves from the images of themselves they had promoted in previous campaigns. Yushchenko on the other handheld fast to his past values, insisting that Ukrainian should be preserved as the only state language and that the EU and NATO were Ukraine's ideal geopolitical partners. In earlier campaigns, the number of voters who had been swayed by these political appeals had been relatively high, and Yuschenko had, thus, won the votes of 10.5 million people (almost 45% of all participating voters) in the 2007 Ukrainian parliamentary snap elections (Central Election Committee, 2007). In contrast, he lost public support during his presidency and only managed to attract 5.45% of all votes in 2010 (Official results of the first Presidential elections' round 2010) despite the political niche he had established.

Yaceniuk, a young politician who had become very popular before the campaign (receiving up to 12% of votes in 2008–2009 according to research (Reytyng Yaceniuka vyros bolee chem. V dva raza, 2009) and later revised his political image and values, did not do much better than Yuschenko. Yaceniuk finished with 6.69% of the votes in 2010 (Central Election Committee, 2010).

One reason for this poor result was his departure from the main positions of the Orange camp. He described his reformulated positions as follows:

- "Discriminating against the Russian language is unacceptable… Avoiding this discrimination will support the Ukrainian language's development step by step" (Electoral platform of Arseniy Yaceniuk 2010).
- "Ukraine's main problem is its perpetual desire to be integrated somewhere else… Instead of doing this, it should become the leader of east European civilisation and unite Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia."Such a project, Yaceniuk claimed, would resolve the problem of Europe's division along East–West lines and offer the unity of a "'Greater Europe' – an economic, political and security integration under taking for all countries of Eurasia" (Electoral platform of Arseniy Yaceniuk 2010).
- The "split" in Ukraine, he said, could only be healed after "resolving the problem of Europe own division (into West and East)" (Electoral platform of Arseniy Yaceniuk 2010).

Tumoshenko was the most successful of the Orange candidates, receiving 25.05% of votes (Official results of the first Presidential elections' round 2010). Nevertheless, she struggled against Yanukovich in the second round of the presidential elections, which Yanukovich ultimately won with 45.47% of all votes (just 3.48% more than Tumoshenko) (Central Election Committee, 2010).

Among the reasons for Tumoshenko's loss were (1) conflict in the Orange camp and the failure to settle on just one candidate; (2) Tumoshenko's departure from the political values of the Orange movementas she tried to gain support in east and south Ukraine and (3) Tigipko's nomination as an alternative Blue and White candidate to Yanukovich. On the latter point, experts noted that Tigipko had captured between 6.5% and 8% of Tumoshenko's potential votes (Kak Yanukovich i Tymoshenko podelili izberateley Tigipko, Yaceniuka, Yuschenka, Symonenko 2010). Significantly, Tigipko had a similar election programme to Yanukovich. He argued that local government should regulate language usage in each region while also promising to "restore Russian to the role of Ukraine's language for international communication." (Electoral platform of Serhiy Tigipko 2010) For Tigipko, Ukraine was "Europe, but not the EU" (Electoral platform of Serhiy Tigipko 2010) and Ukrainian foreign policy required a multi-pronged approach (partnerships with both Russia and the EU) with an emphasis on the Russian connection.

Tigipko did not directly rule out the possibility of Ukraine becoming part of NATO. But his promise to "start creating a new military doctrine immediately on taking office" (Electoral platform of Serhiy Tigipko 2010) was tantamount to a rejection of NATO. The "old" doctrine developed by Yushchenko had envisaged NATO membership as part of Ukraine's future.

For his part, Yanukovich did not change his agenda after his unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2004. In 2010, he again called for Russian to be made the second official state language along with a deeper partnership with Russia and Ukrainian neutrality concerning military blocs (Electoral platform of Viktor Yanukovich 2010)

At the same time, it should be noted that Yanukovich's campaign managers did not emphasise these plans for closer cooperation with Russia throughout Ukraine; instead, they were the focus of the campaign in the country's south-eastern region. Banners with the message "Crimean prosperity through friendship with Russia!" (Ostriakova 2016) were, thus, hung in the streets of Crimea.

Unlike the 2010 presidential campaign, the 2012 parliamentary elections were mired in manipulative tactics, including campaign axiotechniques. Politicians began this manipulation long before the official campaign began. In June 2012, members of Ukrainian parliament from the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, thus, pushed through anew "language law" known as the Kivalov-Kolisnichenko law after the pro-Russia politicians who were its authors (Lelich 2012). This law effectively reduced Ukrainian's status and declared Russian to be a second unofficial state language.

This step by Yanukovich's parliamentary faction met with sharp criticism from Ukrainians, especially Ukrainian intellectuals. Nevertheless, the situation proved profitable for pro-Russian regionalists and their leader, President Yanukovich, who wished to show the electorate that he kept his promises in the lead-up to the 2012 autumn parliamentary elections. At the same time, this was the perfect chance for the so-called democratic camp (the All-Ukrainian Union (Batkivshchyna), Svoboda and Ukrainian Democratic Alliance Reform parties) and its leaders (Yaceniuk, Turchinov, Tyahnybok and Klitschko) to mobilise "patriotic" voters and demonstrate that only "democrats" knew how to defend Ukraine. While the democratic opposition had the legal options of blocking the language law's adoption in parliament or protesting the unconstitutionality of that adoption before the courts (and indeed less than a half the parliamentary deputies had supported the law), it decided against these routes; instead, it provoked massive street fights and brawls between Ukrainian language supporters and police. These events, widely known as the "Language *Maidan,*"[1] destabilised the country politically. In 2012, there were 380 "language" protests and the issue, thus, drove 80% of all protests in the country. Of these protests, 92% consisted of speeches in defence of the Ukrainian language or against laws proposed by the authorities or the already adopted language law (Ishenko 2013: 65).

1 The term "Maidan" derives from *MaidanNezalezhnosti* (Independence Square), the central square in Kiev that has been the site of political protests since the start of the independence movement. The word "Maidan" has come to be associated with ideas of peaceful resistance and determined action; see https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-euromaidan-whats-name-090717845.html

The language law effectively polarised the electoral space in Ukraine, locating the Party of Regions and the Communist Party as defenders of Russian on one side, and Svoboda, the All-Ukrainian Union (Batkivshchyna) and Vitali Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) as Ukrainian defenders on the other.

The language law and the Language Maidan received widespread media coverage and changed the agenda of the parliamentary elections in ways that benefited representatives of both political camps. According to the research of Razumkov Centre, in October 2012, about 22% of respondents had a more positive opinion of the Party of Regions as a result of the language law's adoption (Foundation Democratic Initiatives 2013). This translated to 42.5% of voters in Ukraine's south and 37.5% in the east. Meanwhile, the All-Ukrainian Union (Batkivshchyna) and Svoboda were backed by 28% and 39% of respondents, respectively, having gained the votes of those determined to elect public opponents of the language law (Foundation Democratic Initiatives 2013).

The results of the 2012 election revealed the unprecedented power of campaign axiotechniques. Those who manipulated voters' values most cynically were rewarded with the highest electoral dividends. The proof of this thesis is best seen in examples from political parties on the FarRight (Svoboda) and the FarLeft (Ukraine Communist Party). The Communist Party received two-and--a-halftimes more votes in 2012 (13.18%) than it had in the previous election in 2007 (5.39%). Similarly, Svoboda attracted 15 times more voters in 2012 (10.44%) than it did in the last election (0.76%) (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2012; 2007).

The Communists' axiotechniques emphasised feelings of nostalgia for the "good old USSR days." At the same time, they drew on strong criticisms of Western democracies (including both the EU andthe US); opposition to international and intergovernmental organisations and structures (the Communists, thus, called for an "end to Ukraine's cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the revising of all unfair international treaties beginning with the ones established under the World Trade Organization") (CPU 2012); open support for Russia and the welcoming of Ukraine's entry into geopolitical and geo-economic alliances with Russia ("our foreign policy priority is to join the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Union, " the Communists noted (CPU 2012)); endorsement of Russian as a second state language and the rejection of Maidan-style techniques and other historical interventions ("We won't let them rewrite history!" (CPU 2012) they pledged). The party called for the glorification of the Soviet past (including Lenin, Stalin and World War II heroes) and the criminal conviction of "alternative" figures (especially the leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and those who cooperated with them) (CPU 2012).

The party's political rhetoric was also saturated in Soviet-style populism. The Communists, thus, proclaimed that unlike "those who merely make promises, [we] will establish price controls and install order" and "only the Communists will restore the old ways" and so on (CPU 2012). This strategy of exploiting voters' values was most effective in the south-east where the Communists won 21.15% of all votes, putting them in second place behind the Party of Regions in Crimea, Sevastopol and eight districts in the region. In contrast, the Communist Party had less support in the central (10.1%) and western (3.83%) regions (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2012).

For Svoboda on the other hand, the main source of campaign axiotechniques was the intransigent political struggle for Ukrainian independence and opposition to all political agents working against it. Based on the party's 2012 official election programme and the statements of its leaders, Svoboda's ideological orientation was nationalist-communist: its proponents aimed to increase the country's influence by advancing Ukrainians' own (mainly nationally defined) interests and a strong social welfare policy (VO Svoboda 2011).

The values targeted by Svoboda's campaign techniques are clear from the party's main messages to voters: Svoboda, it claimed, had created the historic "Revolution on Granite," destroyed occupiers' monuments and brought down the "*raikoms*" (Communist Party district committees). It was, thus, an oppositional force that was ready to resist criminal regimes. "We can't be bought; we won't sell out; it's impossible to break us, "the party insisted in its publications (VO SvobodaYouTube Channel 2012).

During the 2012 election campaign, these politicians also manipulated public memory. Among other strategies, this involved the identifying of past enemies (Lenin, Stalin, etc.) with more recent ones (Yanukovych, Azarov, Tabachnik, Putin, Medvedev, etc.); appeals to the sacred ("God-given country"); rhetorical and emotional manipulation (based on oppositions of "us"/"them" and "enemies"/"heroes") and a focus on external enemies ("Moscow agents" "Soviet occupiers" etc.).

This approach to the political conflict led to a wave of protests in March 2010 concerning the appointment of Dmytro Tabachnykas Ukraine's Minister of Education, Youth and Sports under Mykola Azarov's government (the so--called anti-Tabachnyk campaign (V Ukrajini stvoryly koaliciyu Anty-Tabachnyk 2010). It also resulted in growing support for a Tax Maidan, a Language Maidan and a Euromaidan.

On the eve of the 2012 parliamentary election, Svoboda's leader Oleh Tyahnybok publicly stated that Ukraine's tax and pension codes were part of a campaign of "economic terror and political genocide." As a result, he said, his party was "bound to overturn these anti-Ukrainian laws and follow a 'small business, low tax, big business, high tax' approach" (VO Svoboda YouTube Channel 2012).

Concerning other aspects of cooperation with the business sector, Svoboda maintained that its goals were "establishing European-level minimum wages and pensions," "eliminating the gap between rich and poor, stimulating the development of the middle class" and "not taxing migrant labourers who returned to Ukraine and were investing in the domestic economy."These policies reflected the party's efforts to win voter support in the lead-up to the 2012 election by appealing to popular values and priorities in the western and central regions especially. These were the same regions where small businesses were concentrated, and for many Ukrainian families, those businesses were not just highly valued but the very source of their livelihood. People from these two electoral regions also made up the largest proportion of migrant workers in the EU. They were more attached to European-level social payments because they were familiar with the amounts concerned having spent more time in the EU than their fellow citizens in south-east Ukraine.

In contrast, those causing harm to small businesses and other interest groups were denounced as members of the "party of power" and accused of being "Ukrainophobes who wanted to 'russify' Ukraine and take revenge for the Soviet empire." (VO Svoboda YouTube Channel 2012) Only Svoboda, it was claimed, could prevent this fate. This all-Ukrainian union vowed that it would overturn the language law. In addition, it would recognise the members of Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya (UPA) who had fought for Ukrainian liberation and independence and provide them with the good benefits and compensation they had not received since independence. Among the wide-ranging changes that Svoboda promised were making 14 October (UPA day) a national holiday; implementing lustration; restoring nationality information to birth certificates and passports; lowering public utilities rates; "saving "the medical and education sectors; stopping strategic enterprises from being privatised and ensuring the re-privatising of illegally privatised entities. The party also pledged to lead a series of other– for the most party openly populist – initiatives that would help "change everything for Ukrainians" (VO Svoboda YouTube Channel 2012).

In 2012, campaign axiotechniques were most effective in single-member constituencies (the 2012 elections were based on a mixed/parallel voting electoral system whereas a proportional system had been used in 2006–2007). In each of the electoral regions reviewed in this study, different values were prioritised. In the west, for example, the main focus was on devotion to the Ukrainian state, patriotic initiatives and the strength of the opposition movement. This is clear from campaign statements by and about different politicians: "I guarantee that Taras Batenko will serve you and Ukraine faithfully and honestly" (Lukyanenko); "Only a united opposition can stop Yanukovych's bulldozer" (Kanivets); "He will never let this country be a carcass" (Gritsenko); "Defying the repressive state, he erected a monument to Stepan Bandera" (Lopushansky); "Freedom soldier" (Myhalchyshyn);"Experienced fighter" (Stetskiv)

In contrast, the main messages in the south-east concerned nostalgia for the Soviet Union, cooperation with Russia and Russian's status as a second state language: "Sergei Shakhov has a Soviet team!" (Shakhov); "We are Ukrainians, and we will speak in our native Russian language!" (Lyutikov); "Petrov is ready! Decide! Act! Join!" (Petrov); "Our grandfathers fought for their country! Now let us be worthy of their great deeds! We'll win this together!" (Berezhna).

In the single-member districts of the central region, the successful candidates were in fact majoritarians, whose messages and slogans stressed pragmatism: "NizhynTeploMerezhi[a utilities company] says that with the help of Kurovsky MP, heat will be restored to your home on 16 August" (Kurovsky); "Concrete deeds; honest intentions" (Lukashuk);"Caring for the citizens of Kamianets--Podilskyi!" (Melnichenko).

Conclusion

Since Ukraine became independent, the history of elections in the country has fallen into two distinct periods. During the first (1991–2004), the race for electoral support took place between politicians from different ideological camps, with "communists" on one side and "anti-communists/democrats" on the other. Voter support for these camps followed clear geographic boundaries. While the "communists" were more popular in the east and south of Ukraine (and especially in the Crimean, Donetsk and Luhansk regions), the "anti-communists" held sway in the western and central regions (particularly Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil).

In my view, 2004marked the dawn of a new age of campaign management. Its distinctive feature lay in the development of campaign techniques that did not draw on political ideology (which had effectively lost its abilityto mobilise Ukrainian voters) but on the manipulation of political values underlying the national/civic identities of Ukrainians.

Research into the development of these techniques occurs at the crossroads of existing studies of political manipulation and work on societal division. To date, however, no special definition has been offered that would help distinguish these techniques from other types of manipulation. It is for this reason that I have suggested the term "campaign axiotechniques."

The earliest use of these techniques in Ukraine took place during the 2004–2005 presidential elections. Their developers were the Russian political consultants Granovsky, Kulikov and Syerhyeytsev, who worked from the campaign headquarters of Yanukovych, a politician who was determined to win the race at any price.

Campaign axiotechniques manipulate real as well as mythic historical and culture differences among Ukrainians, who live in diverse regions. As such, the main danger they pose is their likelihood of polarising Ukrainian society.

Between 2004 and 2012, the political struggle in Ukraine was in fact conducted between two camps – the Orange and Blue and White blocs – which had been formed before the 2004 presidential race. From 2004 to 2010, the Orange camp consisted of three main political parties: Nasha Ukraina (known as the Nasha Ukraina–Narodna Samooborona alliance from 2007 to 2009 and led by Yushchenko, Ukraine's president from 2005 to 2010); Lytvyna (led by Volodymyr Lytvyn, the Ukrainian parliamentary speaker from 2002 to 2006 and again from 2008 to 2012) and Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc (led by Tymoshenko, who served as Ukraine's prime minister in 2005 and again from 2007 to 2010). Following the defeat of all Orange candidates in the 2010 presidential race, the camp transformed itself into the so-called democratic bloc. The latter included two new political parties, Svoboda (led by Oleh Tiahnybok, a member of parliament from1998 to 2006 and again from 2012 to 2014) and UDAR (led by former professional boxer Vitali Klitschko, a member of parliament from 2012 to 2014 and the mayor of Kiev since 2014). They were joined by the Batkivshchyna party whose leader during the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko was Arseniy Yaceniuk, Ukraine parliament's speaker from 2007 to 2008 and the country's prime minister from 2014to 2016.

Throughout these years, the composition of the Blue and White side remained stable. From 2004 to 2012, it consisted of the Party of Regions (led by Yanukovich, Ukraine's president from 2010 to 2014) and Ukraine Communist Party (led by Symonenko, who had been a member of Ukrainian parliament since1994 and would continue to serve until 2014).

The political situation in Ukraine between 2004 and 2012 may be understood as an ongoing struggle between these political camps, who made active use of campaign axiotechniques rooted in conflicting political values/identities. For its part, the Orange (and democratic) bloc developed axiotechniques based on the following set of values:

- Ukrainian language should be the only state language
- Ukraine's main foreign policy priority should be integration into the EU and NATO
- The Soviet period was a time of Russian occupation. The Ukrainians who fought against the Soviet army and security services are heroes and
- The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is used by Russia to exert influence in Ukraine. Ukraine's government should support "national" churches and work on their integration into a single Ukrainian church.

In contrast, the Blue and White camp had a completely different value system. It held that

- Russian should be the second official state language

- Ukraine's main foreign policy priorities should be cooperating with Russia and integrating into all economic, political and military structures created by Russia
- The Soviet period was a time of Ukrainian prosperity. For this reason, anyone who fought against the Soviet army and security services should be seen as an enemy of modern-day Ukraine and
- The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is the only true Ukrainian church and it should be supported by the state.

As it happened, the 2004 elections established well-defined geographic bases for each of these camps, and these were preserved during the 2004–2012 election campaigns. The Orange and later democrat candidates were backed by the electorates in western and central Ukraine while the Blue and White bloc had the support of the eastern and southern parts of the country.

Each of these camps promoted aggressive messages, which significantly influenced voters in the different regions and played on their sensitivities about their identities. This aggressive rhetoric and the use of campaign axiotechniques restructured Ukraine's political sphere with the result that politicians who were unable to use this type of manipulation had no chance of winning the race. Furthermore, candidates who had used campaign axiotechniques previously and were already associated with one of the two value systems had to continue using these same techniques that were polarising Ukrainian society. Otherwise, they risked the loss of voter support or even total defeat (this was the predicament facing Lytvyn in 2006 and Yaceniuk and Tymoshenko in 2010).

Campaign axiotechniques were mainstream tactics in all elections between 2004 and 2012 except for the 2010 presidential elections. The latter contest was less affected by these techniques owing to external factors (the negative outcomes of the 2008 economic crises).The 2012 parliamentary campaign, however, was plagued by the use of these techniques.

In my view, this active use of axiotechniques led to the polarisation of Ukraine's electoral sphere based on voter values and later to divided opinions about the loss of Ukrainian sovereign territory. As such, this electoral manipulation may threaten not only democracy but also Ukrainian national security. Civil society institutions and law enforcement agencies should play a key role in countering the impact of these destructive techniques.

References

Bachevskij, Dmytro (2006): Chomu vygrajut' vybory, abo agresuvni texty jak najbil'sh efektyvni komunikacijni technologii. Ukrayins'ka Pravda (11 April); available at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2006/04/11/3092442/ (22 May 2017).

Balaban, Rostyslav (2007): *Teorija vyborchojy systemy*. Lybid', Kyiv.

Bafumi, Joseph – Shapiro, Robert (2009): A New Partisan Voter. *The Journal of Politics* 1 (71): 1–24.

Bekeshkina, Iryna (2012): Ukrajina 2012: politycnyj portret (28 December 2012); available at http://dif.org.ua/article/ukraina-2012-politichniy-portret (28 May 2017).

Byrne, Sean (1997): *Growing up in a divided society: the influence of conflict on Belfast schoolchildren*. Associated University Presses, London.

Central Election Committee of Ukraine (2006): Vybory do Verhovnojy Rady 2006. Rezul'taty golosuvannia po regionach Ukrajiny (lidery); available at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/w6p001 (21 May 2017).

Central Election Committee of Ukraine (2007): Pozachergovi vybory do Verhovnoji Rady 2007. Rezultaty golosuvannia po regionach Ukrajiny (lidery); available at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2007/w6p001 (21 May 2017).

Central Election Committee of Ukraine (2010): Chergovi vybory Presydenta Ukrajiny. Rezultaty golosuvannia u drugomu turi vyboriv po Ukrajini; available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011.Central Election Committee of Ukraine (2012): Chergovi parlaments'ki vybory 2012. Vidomosti pro pidrachunok golosiv po zagal'noderzhavnomu bagatomandatnomu okrugu v mezhach regioniv krajiny. Komunistychna partija Ukrajiny; available at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2012/wp302pt001f01=900pf7171=11.html (22 May 2017).

Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) (2012): Povernemo krajinu narodu! Peredvyborcha programa Komunistychnoji partiji Ukrajiny 2012 r. (1 August 2012) [official party website]; available at: https://www.kpu.ua/uk/41336/povernemo-krainu-narodu-peredviborna-programa-komunistichnoi-partii-ukraini (22 May 2017).

Coons Cristian – Weber, Michel (2014): Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Electoral platform of Serhiy Tigipko (2010). Presidential elections 2010. Vybir narodu Ukrajiny; available at: http://vybory.osp-ua.info/ch-1_fl-vybory_presidenta_2010_prog_14.htm (2 March 2018).

Electoral platform of Viktor Yanukovich (2010). Presidential elections 2010. Vybir narodu Ukrajiny; available at: http://vybory.osp-ua.info/ch-1_fl-vybory_presidenta_2010_prog_17.html (2 March 2018).

Electoral platform of Arseniy Yaceniuk (2010). Presidential elections 2010. Vybir narodu Ukrajiny; available at: http://vybory.osp-ua.info/ch-1_fl-vybory_presidenta_2010_prog_18.html (2 March 2018).

Emr, Melanie – Writer, Staff (2013): Electoral systems in an ethnically divided society; available at: https://prospectjournal.org/2013/02/20/electoral-systems-in-an-ethnically-divided-society/ (1 December 2017).

Gubskiy, Eduard – Korableva, Galina (2003): *Filosofskiy enciklopedicheskiy slovar*. INFRA, Moskva.

Goodin, Richard (1980): *Manipulatory Politics*. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.

Goren, Paul (2005): Party Identification and Core Political Values. *American Journal of Political Science* 4(49): 882–897.

Guelke, Adrian (2012): *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Polity Press, Cambridge.

Hernandez, Pablo – Minor, Dylan (2015): Political Identity and Trust. Available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-012_5775a007-2276-45da-bde4-4b5d495b5712.pdf (30 November 2017).

Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2015): Do Dnia Nezalezhnosti: sho ukrayintsi dumayut' pro Ukrayinu. (21 August 2015); available at http://dif.org.ua/article/do-dnya-nezalezhnosti-shcho-ukraintsi-dumayut-pro-ukrainu (15 May 2017).

Ishenko, Viktor (2013): *Protesty i represiji v Ukrajini: rezul'taty monitoryngu 2012*. Centr doslidzhennia suspil'stva. Kyiv.

Jacobs, Lawrence – Shapiro, Robert (2000): *Politiciansdon'tpander.Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness*. University Of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Kak Yanukovich i Tymoshenko podelili izberateley Tigipko, Yaceniuka, Yuschenka, Symonenko (2010): Politika Ukrainy. Censor.net (10 February 2010); available at: https://censor.net.ua/news/112590/kak_yanukovich_i_timoshenko_podelili_izbirateleyi_tigipko_yatsenyuka_yuschenko_simonenko__issledov (2 December 2017).

Kasianov, Grygoriy (1999):*Teorii naciitanacionalizmu*.Lubid.Kyiv.

Khobta, Yuriy (2000):*Vybir Ukrayiny–99. Sho dali?* Lubid.Kyiv.

Kolesnikov, Oleksiy (2008): *Tendenciji evoluciji vyborchych technologij v Ukrajini*. Suchasna ukrajinska polityka: polityky I politology pro neji 5 (Specvypusk): 41–57.

Korzh, Ihor (2007): Vybory v nezalezhniy Ukrayini. Visnyk *Centralnoyi vyborchoyi komisii* 1 (24): 25–34.

Kryvytska, Olena (2015): *Demarkacijni linii v etnopoliticnomu prostori* Ukrajiny. IPIEND, Kyiv.

Kutsenko, Yevhen (2012): Efektyvnist' zastosuvannia vyborchych technologij na parlamentskych vyborach 2007 v Ukrajini. Naukovi zapysky *IPiEND* 57: 142–157.

Lazarsfeld, Paul – Berelson, Bernard (1944): *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York.

Lelich, Milan (2012): Rada uchvalyla "zakon pro movy". Ukrajinsky tyzhden; available at: http://tyzhden.ua/News/54404.

Leshenko, Serhiy (2014): London'ska neruhomist' ideologa ukrayins'koho rozkolu. Ukrayins'ka Pravda. (13 May 2014); available athttp://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/53722f577a5cc/view_print/ (18 May 2017).

McDermott, Rose (2010): Emotional Manipulation of Political Identity. *Politics* 15(1): 103–132.

Macijevskij, Yuriy (2013): Sylaradykaliv, chyslabkist' centrystiv: sho zumovylo elektoral'nuy uspich VO "Svoboda" ta KPU?(27 April 2013); available at http://www.slideshare.net/selectsage/ss-20922218 (22 May 2017).

Mostova, Yulia (2014): Pisnia pro Bat'kivshunu. Slova narodni. Dzerkalo tyzhnia (26 December 2014); available at http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/pisnya-pro-batkivschinu-slova-narodni-_.html (18 May 2017).

Mychalchenko, Mykola (2011): Politychni ryzyky v sychasniy Ukrajini. IPIEND, Kyiv.

Nagorna, Larysa (2008): Regional'na identychnist: ukrayinskiy context. IPiEND imenil.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrayiny. Kyiv.

Official results of the first Presidential elections' round (2010): Chergovi vybory Presydenta Ukrajiny. Ukrajinska Pravda; available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/01/18/4630133/.

O'Flynn, Ian (2010): Democratic theory and practice in deeply divided societies. *Journal of Representative Democracy* 3(46): 281–293.

Ostriakova, Elena (2016): Yanukovich: "Maidan" podtolknul Krym k otdeleniyu. Politnavigator (25 November 2016); available at: http://www.politnavigator.net/yanukovich-majjdan-podtolknul--krym-k-otdeleniyu.html (5 December 2017).

Pacharev, Dmytro – Rudych, Felix (2011): *Politycni instytuty i procesy v suchasniy Ukrajini*. IPIEND, Kyiv.

Parris, John – Le Chemiant, Wayne (2011): *Manipulating Democracy: Democratic Theory, Political Psychology, and Mass Media*. Routledge. New York.

Parker, Christopher – Baretto, Matt (2013): *Change They Can't Believe In The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Poltorak, Volodymyr (2015): Technologii modeliuvannia v elektoralnych kampanijach: paradoxy „Daunsa", "Olsena", "golosuvannia". Visnyk Kharkivskogo nacionalnogo universitetu im. *V. N. Karazina* 34 (1148): 82–85.

Razumkov Research Centre (2007): Yake iz navedenych vyznacen' ukrayins'koyi nacii ye dl'a Vas naybil'sh priyniatnym? (dymanika 2006–2007, regionalnuy rozpodil) (10 September 2007); available at http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=715 (17 May 2017).

Razumkov Research Centre (2016): Chyisnuyut' mizh zahidnymy ishidnymy regionami Ukrajiny glyboki politichni, movni, kulturni ta ekonomichni vidminnosti, sho v perspektuvi vony zmozhut' rozjednatysia i stvoryty svoji vlastni derzhavy abo vvijty do skladu inshih derzhav?. Nacionalna bezpeka i oborona 3–4: 84–87.

Razumkov Research Centre (2012): Ostannim chasom govoriat pro te, sho ukrajinske suspil'stvo rozdilulosia na dvi majzhe vorogujich i chzaregional'noju oznakoju. Jak vy vvazhajete, chy isnuje takyj rozkol suspil'stva? (14 January 2013); available at http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=871 (20 May 2017).

Razumkov Research Centre (2016): Chy potribno Ukrajini vstupaty do Evropejskoho Soyuzu? (regional'nyj rozpodil) (10 May 2016); available at http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1034 (20 May 2017).

Religious Informational Service of Ukraine (2017): Religijna merezha v Ukrajini za rik suttevo ne zminulas (12 June 2017); available at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/authorities_religious_affairs/67280/ (15 June 2017).

Reytyng Yaceniuka vyros bolee chem. V dva raza (2009): Politika Urajiny. Cenzor.net (16 February 2009); available at: https://censor.net.ua/news/84751/reyiting_yatsenyuka_vyros_bolee_chem_v_dva_raza__sotsiologi.

Riker, William Harrison (1986): *The Art of Political Manipulation*. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.

Schaap, Andrew (2006): Agonism in divided societies. *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 2(32): 25–39.

Shulman, Stephen (2005): National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine. *Slavic Review* 1: 54–78.

Smoliy, Valeriy – Levenets, Yuriy (2007): *Ukrayina: politychna istoria XX-pochatku XXI st*. Parlaments'ke vydavnyctvo, Kyiv.

Stepyko, Mychailo (2011): *Ukrayins'ka identychnist: fenomen i zasady formuvannia'*. Nacionalniy instutyt strategichnyh doslidgen. Kyiv.

Variy, Myron (2003): *Polityko-psychologichni peredvyborni ta vyborchi technologii*. El'ga, Nika Centr, Kyiv.

VO Svoboda (2011): Programa VO "Svoboda" (chynna) – programa zachustu ukrajintsiv [official party website] (12 November 2011); available at http://svoboda.org.ua/party/program/ (22 May 2017).

VO "Svoboda" YouTube Channel (2012): Oficijna agitacia VO "Svoboda" u 2012 roci (17 September 2012); available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmFtfi6tsqA (22 May 2017).

V Ukrajini stvoryly koaliciyu Anty-Tabachnyk (2010): Vgolos (23. 05. 2010); available at: http://www.vgolos.com.ua/news/v_ukraini_stvoryly_koalitsiyu_antytabachnyk_52023.html?print.

Vydrin, Dmitriy (1991): *Ocherki praktickeskoy politologii*. Polaris, Kyiv.

Zolkina, Maria (2013):European integration of Ukraine: Experiences of yesterday for the development of tomorrow. *Public Opinion* 13: 15–27.

Yevhen Kutsenko *was born in 1986 in Ukraine. In 2014, he graduated from the I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine after completing a major in political science (honours). Since 2015, he has been a, Ph.D. student at the Institute of International Area Studies at Charles University in Prague. His thesis concerns the use of campaigning techniques in parliamentary elections in Ukraine, drawing on examples from the country's western, central and south-eastern regions. This article is a part of his, Ph.D. work. E-mail: kutsenkojeka@gmail.co*

Figures

Figure 1: The 1991 Ukrainian presidential elections



Source:http://www.electoralgeography.com/ru/countries/u/ukraine/1991-president-elections-ukraine.html

Figure 2: The 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections



Source: https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/ru/countries/u/ukraine/ukraine-presidential-election-1994.html

Figure 3: Manipulative axiotechniques in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election campaign

Source: http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/08/18/6505672

Figure 4: Voter support for Yushchenko and Yanukovich in the 2004–2005 Ukrainian presidential election campaign



Source: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011

The Czech Singers Critical of Islam and Refugees on Facebook in the Age of the "Migration Crisis" (2015–2017)[1]

PŘEMYSL ROSŮLEK

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422)
Vol. 14, No. 1
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0002

Abstract: *The article analyses through qualitative textual analysis and manual coding Czech singers known for their critical attitudes to the "migration crisis"as presented on their Facebook walls (2015–2017). This major focus on the* singer's *Facebook posts was reinforced by the analysis based on the two theoretical concepts – celebritisation of politics and post-truth politics. In sum, analyses across theoretical approaches found that a majority of singers – although not all of them – have been judging the problem through the lenses of a black-and-white "Clash of Civilizational" approach. Only a few singers run for political office and political agenda-setting linked to the "migration crisis" was not frequented as expected. Many of the investigated singers expressed support or political endorsement to xenophobic and anti-islamic political parties. Although the "Russian footage" could be denied, the style and characters of communication via Facebook revealed that in many aspects the singers' strategy is in consonance with current Kremlin propaganda.*

Keywords: ***Singers; migration crisis; refugees, Islam, Facebook; celebritization of politics; post-truth era.***

1 The research could be accomplished and article published thanks to the support of the Internal Grant System of University of West Bohemia in the Framework of the project „Islam in the Czech Republic" under the title SGS-2016-016.

Introduction

In the Czech Republic, public debate over the past few years has been framed within the context of events revolving around the term "migration crisis", a term which the author of this study places between quotation marks because the country in question has long stood and continues to stand far removed from the interest of migrants coming from the Middle East and the North Africa. The same applies to Europe generally. It is true that the old continent has and continues to contend with an unprecedented wave of migrants, but in contrast to the high number of people removed from their homes across the world at present, as noted by the UNHCR, whether locally displaced persons or immigrants beyond the borders of their home countries, the number of people arriving to Europe is still relatively low.

The aim of this text is threefold:

Firstly, the goal is to analyse publicly shared Facebook statuses posted by the popular Czech singers which were identified as critics of the present "migration crisis" within the wider context in the period from the beginning of June 2015 till the end of June 2017. In addition to examining these posts using manual coding within the framework of qualitative textual analysis, the author will also take into account interviews related to the present "migration crisis", in cases where the singers chose to share them on "their" Facebook walls and new songs they introduced and sang as the interpreters of that period.

Secondly, those singers identified as critics of the refugee crisis, Islam and Muslims will be tested within the theoretical framework of the celebritisation of politics in the following three dimensions: (a) whether singers utilize political agenda-setting fields related to the issue of the "migration crisis"; (b) whether singers support or endorse publicly political candidates and/or political parties with a strong anti-immigration profile, and, (c) whether they run for legislative offices in the elections during the investigated period.

And finally, these singers will also be assessed within the theoretical framework of post-truth politics. In this context, there are two aspects in focus which are considered relevant: (a) the major characteristics and style of singers' communication on the Facebook, and, (b) their sympathy to Russian policy during Putin's epoch.

Theoretical Approaches: The Celebritisation of Politics and Post-truth Politics

The word celebrity means fame, status or reputation (Ferri 2010: 403), but the actual process of creating a celebrity is not necessarily linked to talent or diligence as much as it is to image, PR or even controversial behavior (Millner 2010: 379–387). In an era of mass media and social networks, the process of

celebritisation steps out of the cultural domain and is instead often linked to the public sphere (Wheeler 2013: 6, Street 2004: 438). Celebrities do not hesitate to engage with politics (Street 2012: 350–351, Piknerová – Rybáková 2017) — a field that in the present day is de-ideologised, but as a result more personalised and celebritised (Wheeler 2013: 6). This process of personalisation and celebritisation of politics (Ekman–Widholm 2014: 519–520)[2] is accelerated by the opportunities social media offers these celebrities and their PR for direct communication with the public and their fans (Ferri 2010: 407, Ekman–Widholm 2014: 518) The immediate, accessible and interactive nature of social media, besides other factors, further enables the rise of a viral celebrity (Ferri 2010: 404). Social media — and by this Ferri largely means Facebook — forces celebrities to maintain "their name, face and their product on the entertainment and information market" (Ferri 2010: 404). Another reason for the engagement of celebrities, or more precisely, their PR teams, in the role of "gatekeepers" is the mediation between celebrity information and fans as a result of frequent complaints towards the mass media and the misinterpretation of their professional and private lives (Ferri 2010: 407).

There is a vast academic discussion on the typologies of celebrity politicians (eg. Street, 2012, Wheeler 2013, Piknerová – Rybáková 2017), nevertheless, for the purpose of this text, it will be an applied categorisation reduced to originally non-political figures from the cultural background which was first introduced by Marsh et al (2010: 327) in which the main emphasis was put on "high-visibility figures" from "traditionally non-political spheres", differentiated according to the "nature of the relationship with other sphere". For that modified categorisation, the following three subcategories were defined:

(a) the celebrity advocate in which these figures make their way to the political arena through "political agenda-setting and/or policy-seeking behavior";

(b) the celebrity activist/endorser who is "offering financial and/or public support for a specific political candidate and/or party";

(c) the celebrity politician who is a figure running for "legislative or executive offices" (Marsh et al. 2010: 327, see also Mann 2015).

* * *

The post-factual (interchangeable frequently with post-truth) world became a phenomenon in 2016 (Fukuyama 2016) due to Donald Trump's successful campaign in the American presidential elections. Post-truth is a state where objective facts lose their hold on politics and public opinion at the expense of emotion and personal trust (Tsipursky 2017). The post-truth era is characterised

2 Although Ekman and Windholm (2014) have mainly Twitter in mind, the author of this text believes that their basic thesis can be applied to all other social media platforms, including Facebook.

by a gamble on emotions as well as by an absence of the checking of the sources of consumed information. Rational socio-economical issues are not attractive to the media and recipients, but the easy slogans of populists, that for instance target immigrants, successfully flourish. Journalism, if it can still be said to exist, adapts to the taste of its consumers and it accordingly becomes important for the news to be emotionally in tune with its audience and achieve a high number of shares on social media platforms (Suiter 2016: 25–27). In this new, hybrid media model, based to a large extent on social media, the activity of bloggers as well as reality TV shows, widespread skepticism towards the political elite and established mainstream media continues to grow (Tsipursky 2017, Tallis 2016: 9). The world of social media erodes the power and authority of the mainstream media and 'gatekeepers', bringing hoaxes, trolls and hackers into the arena of political communication (Fukuyama 2016). This strongly fragmented spectrum of news sources creates "an atomised world where lies, rumours and gossip spread with alarming speed" (The Economist 2016). Stories rather than facts have greater potential to gain viral success. Narratives that are coloured by emotions such as fear or anger can produce stories capable of inciting irrational group behaviour (Hendricks 2016). Social media users often can't differentiate between an authentic source of information and fake webpages. This tendency is seen across generations, although older rather than younger generations are more susceptible to these tricks (Tsipursky 2017). A majority of users never even click on the link they wish to share with others on social media (Dewey 2016, DeMers 2016). This was confirmed by researchers from Columbia University and the French National Institute (Ibid).

Notes on Methodology

The first step of the analysis was to identify singers who are also Czech celebrities and are linked to the criticism of Islam, Muslims, or immigrants within the context of the "migration crisis" and on the Internet. Using qualitative analysis, with an emphasis on Internet news, singers critical of Islam were then identified with the help of the Google search engine and Mozilla Firefox browser. This was done on the basis of the following terms and their combinations: "singer", in male and female variants, as well as the synonyms "songster" or "vocalist" with the connection to terms such as "Islam", "Muslim", "refugees", "migrant", "migration crisis", and "refugee crisis", The first 100 search results for all the above-mentioned terms and their combinations were chosen in order. These findings were then organised chronologically to demonstrate how singers chosen in the above-mentioned process established – in some cases quite unintentionally – their anti-immigration agendas on the Internet. In concrete, the following names of singers appeared to be linked by various aspects negatively to "migration crisis" and – in that context – with the terms "Islam"

and/or "Muslims": Lucie Bílá, Aleš Brichta, František Ringo Čech, Vilém Čok, Ondřej Hejma, Daniel Hůlka, Jana Yngland Hrušková, Slávek Janoušek, Karel Gott, Daniel Landa, Janek Ledecký, Ivan Mládek, Dominika Myslivcová, Jarek Nohavica, Pepa Nos, Tomáš Ortel, Helena Vondráčková and Olivie Žižková. Afterwards, the above-mentioned list (in alphabetical order) had to still be 'cleared' of the singers not actively critical of (Islamic) immigration on Facebook.

The second, key step of the analysis, which is simultaneously the objective of this text, consisted of researching the public Facebook posts of the chosen singers. This took place in the second quarter of 2017 and included comments posted during and prior to this time.

No mention of the "migration crisis" was made on any of the accounts before July 2015, with the sole exception of Pepa Nos's Facebook profile, on which, even before 2015, several public posts were shared that criticised the nature of Islam. It is safe to assert that the number of Facebook posts culminated in late summer and autumn of 2015, and partially continued into 2016. Throughout 2017, the number of posts decreased sharply. Some users, who were previously very active, only published comments about the "migration crisis" sporadically, sometimes not at all.

All of the singers included in the study, with the exception of František Ringo Čech, were Facebook account holders, and were actively posting comments. However, during the period monitored, some of the singers used their accounts solely for the purpose of publishing their artistic works, or for sharing their (personal/private) lives, but never as a means of discussing the "migration crisis". This applies to Lucie Bílá, František Ringo Čech, Karel Gott, Daniel Hůlka, Jarek Nohavica, Helena Vondráčková and Tomáš Ortel. Some of the singers mentioned the "migration crisis", or a similar topic, only once (Jarek Ledecký), or twice (Josef Pepa Nos). A few others posted about the "migration crisis" several times (Dominika Myslivcová, Slávek Janoušek). Many others, however, posted critical comments about the "migration crisis" regularly and devoted a lot of attention to the topic on their Facebook pages. Between 20–40 posts were recorded on the accounts of Olivie Žižková, Vilém Čok, Ondřej Hejma and Daniel Landa. From our chosen sample of singers, two Facebook profiles stand out among the others for having shared a far higher number of posts, those belonging to Aleš Brichta and Jana Yngland Hrušková, which shared well over 100 posts each.

Table 1: Facebook* & Negative Posts on Various Aspects of the "Migration Crisis"

singer	number of followers	publicly accessible FB posts		
		general	"migration crisis"	
Aleš Brichta	17 952	✓	✓	197
Vilém Čok	6 535	✓	✓	21
Ondřej Hejma	1 130**	✓	✓	24
Jana Y. Hrušková	2 675	✓	✓	77***
Slávek Janoušek	2 442**	✓	✓	5
Daniel Landa	304 744	✓	✓	38
Janek Ledecký	10 139	✓	✓	1
Dominika Myslivcová	46 144	✓	✓	5
Pepa Nos	276**	✓	✓	2
Olivie Žižková	no data	✓	✓	20
Methodology: qualitative textual analysis and manual coding				**Σ 390**

* A (formerly famous) singer František Ringo Čech was excluded from this research for public non-accessibility of his Facebook acount. The following singers were excluded from this research for non-occurrence of negative posts to various aspects of the "migration crisis"on their Facebook walls: Lucie Bílá, František Ringo Čech, Karel Gott, Daniel Hůlka, Jarek Nohavica, Helena Vondráčková, Tomáš Ortel.

** Number of friends on their Facebook accounts.

*** Due to its high frequency, the posts of Jana Y. Hrušková were analysed only for the period of the 2Q in 2017.

It should also not be overlooked that due to numerous Facebook posts and commentaries under scrutiny, Facebook posts and Facebook commentaries under posts made by the singers can be found by readers directly in the text – the Facebook posts in the form of the surname of the singer and exact date (e.g. Hejma 22 Jun 2015) and the text commentaries under the posts are adequately cited (e.g. Nos commentary 22 Oct 2015 in: Nos 21 Oct 2015). In public Facebook posts, the words written in CapsLock form are referred to in this text identically.

Analytical Section

In the Czech Republic, the anti-islamic era in music started as early as 2013 when a controversial Czech band called Ortel became the first successful music group to sing a song criticizing Islam in its track entitled "The Mosque". The

strong anti-immigration discourse which has resonated in Czech politics, society and culture in recent years, found an outlet in five known songs with texts pointing at negative image of refugees, Muslims or Islam newly introduced at the peak of the "migration crisis" (2015–2017). However, only the three texts of songs qualified for the purpose of analysis in this text, because these texts were both critical to the "migration crisis", Islam and the threat of subsequent Islamification and to Muslims and were shared and eventually commented on on the Facebook accounts of the singers (see table):[3]

Table 2 Singers and Songs Which Emerged in the Investigated Period (2015–2017)

singer	name of the song	presented	no. of views*
Dominika Myslivcová	*We Want no Change Here*	August 2016	332 102
Vilém Čok	*Crowds of Crowds*	August 2016	38 226
Olivie Žižková	*Breathe, Europe*	August 2016	559 378

* Number of viewers on YouTube channel up to 31. 7. 2017

For the purposes of our research, public posts on the Facebook accounts of singers mentioned in the table which dealt directly with the "migration crisis" were analysed, from the beginning of its rapid and forceful rise in Czech political discourse in 2015, until the end of June 2017 (In addition to this, the most frequent comments made by the singers were randomly monitored.).

As mentioned in the introductionary section, the following passage of this text will be divided into three major sections:

1) Analysis of the singers' communication on their Facebook walls linked to (a) the "Migraton crisis" and to (b) the image of Middle Eastern Refugees.

2) Analysis through the theoretical concept of the celebritisation of politics focused on singers' activities related to (a) their potential endeavor to run for a political office, (b) their attempt to influence political agenda-setting with

3 The song critical of refugees from Syria titled *Baraba is Touching My Woman* introduced by Jarek Nohavica in the summer of 2016 would also qualify by its content, however, it was never posted on Facebook by this singer.
The song *Tutti Frutti Ramadan* introduced by Slávek Janoušek already at the outbreak of the current „migration crisis" on September 2015 was posted on Facebook but can not be considered as not an anti-islamic but as a satiric one as the text is stressing at 'littleness' of the Czech nation (similar to the song *'Mosques of Prague*' introduced by Ivan Mládek as early as in 2000). Interestingly but contrary to the will of both these singers – Slávek Janoušek and Ivan Mládek – the songs were widely misused and disinterpreted as anti-islamic in the time of migration crisis. See interview with Ivan Mládek (Český rozhlas 2016).

items related to the "migration crisis", and to (c) their potential public support and/or endorsement of political candidates or parties.

3) Analysis through the theoretical concept of the post-truth world linked to (a) singers' styles and characteristics of communication on Facebook and (b) their sympathy to Russian policy in Putin's era.

Public (Facebook) Posts

There was a great disparity in the matter of comments about the "migration crisis" on the Facebook accounts analysed for the purposes of our research. The exception to this was the musician Slávek Janoušek, whose Facebook profile was focused on defending the argument that his song, *Tutti Frutti Ramadan*, performed during the Good Morning show on *Česká televize*, was sung "in role" and meant only as a parody; he further emphasised that he is not a racist. However, generally speaking, we can assert that major differences exist between the subtexts and styles of communication, and that the Facebook posts of the singers in question can be further divided into seven distinct topics: a) the "migration crisis"; b) the image of Middle Eastern refugees (usually understood as "Muslim immigrants"); c) criticism of those "welcoming" immigrants; d) the defence of the 'xenophobe' label; e) criticism of the political elite; f) political support and political engagement; and g) the relationship with the media and media strategy on Facebook. However, given the subject and scope of our research, only the first two of these topics – the "migration crisis" and the image of Middle Eastern refugees will be of our interest in the following part of this text.

a) The "Migration Crisis"

Posts levelled directly at the "migration crisis", and not at its wider context, are those that appear most frequently on the analysed accounts. The "migration crisis" itself is interpreted by some of the singers in terms of an apprehension about European civilisation and its cultural heritage, as well as a fear for personal and family safety and the safety of other citizens.

For example, Ondřej Hejma does not express his views in his posts using his own language, but instead refers to his interviews on the matter. In one of these interviews (Böhmová 2015 in: Hejma 16 Dec 2015), Hejma labeled the "migration crisis" as "the invasion of the year", which "if repeated... could lead to many possible scenarios, each worse than the other". In another interview (Hejma 22 Jun 2015). Hejma expressed a sceptical attitude towards the wave of migrants, saying: "If someone really thinks that Europe needs to be genetically refreshed or offered public slave labor in the 21st century, then we are finished". On his Facebook profile, and in capital letters, Vilém Čok warned against the "migration crisis", which "has the ability to disintegrate and sub-

sequently destroy Europe, as such huge numbers of people are unmanageable" (Čok 16 Nov 2015).

Daniel Landa, Jana Yngland Hrušková and Aleš Brichta were the most active in expressing themselves and sharing their opinions on the overall "migration crisis". Vilém Čok, Olivie Žižková and Dominika Myslivcová introduced and posted on their Facebook accounts new songs which were directly linked to the "migration crisis" and/or to the image of Middle East refugees.

One of Aleš Brichta's posts reflected the skepticism, even gloom, of the author: "An Arab spring, a migrant summer, a terrorist autumn and a nuclear winter? I'm really not into that" (Brichta 22 Mar 2016). Brichta's other posts were similar in tone; he warned against invaders, invoking Europe's historical victory over the Ottomans (Brichta 11 Sep 2015): "Civilizations have always defended themselves against invaders, and we are facing the very same situation right now. We can either, under some pretences, be little brown-nosers and betray our civilization, or we can begin to defend ourselves. There's no third option." (Brichta 21 Jul 2015). In his interview, shared on Brichta's Facebook profile, he stated that: "There's a difference between a natural migration and assimilation of cultures and forcible attempts to integrate invasions of hoards from a different social sphere (Stop Multikulti 2015 in: Brichta 3 Jul 2015). The expression "hoards", in connection with an invasion, was also used by Brichta in other Facebook posts, for example, when discussing the "hoards of expanding Arabs" (Brichta 19 Sep 2015) or when warning that from his point of view, "the invasion of Islamic hoards into Europe is dangerous and an effort to liquidate our nation, culture and traditions" (Brichta 12 Sep 2015). Brichta labels the present "migration crisis" as "an attempt to annex our territory through resettlement (*hijra*)" (Brichta 27 Sep 2015), comparing it to the German and Russian occupations (Brichta 1 Mar 2016).

A similar attitude was expressed by Jana Ynglang Hrušková, according to whom the "migration crisis" "is dragging Europe down into (economic and social) destruction" (Hrušková 25 Apr 2017) and is an intentional war being conducted against Europe (Hrušková 26 Apr 2017). In her posts she repeatedly warned against the millions of illegal immigrants rolling into Europe and against the passivity of the old continent: "There are more and more illegal immigrants coming into Europe (Hrušková 2017), apparently millions of illegal immigrants are completely fine, just as if nothing is happening" (Hrušková 25 Apr 2017).

Daniel Landa, on the other hand, considered another angle of the problem, and deems "the masses of immigrants a safety issue", because some of those who are heading to Europe do not have good intentions (see Landa – Černoch 2016 footage 23:50 min. in Landa 10 Feb 2016). According to Landa, young and well-organised men predominate (Ibid. 53:30 min.). His main message, however, is a warning against the future threat of even larger waves of immigration than

those being experienced now. The best defence against this is in: "education, job opportunities and cultivation of the environment"; it isn't armed conflicts but rather: "water resources and their disappearance that will pose the greatest danger for migration and the future" (Landa 12 Aug 2016).

The lyrics of a song presented and sung by Vilém Čok, "*Crowds of Crowds*", recalls with apprehension the avalanche of immigrants coming to Europe, as is already obvious in the song's title. He promoted the video clip on his Facebook page, writing: "I produced the video as conscientiously as I could, in light of the present situation not only in ČR [Czech Republic] but in the whole of Europe. In this day and age, it is necessary for the people to realise where they are, who they are and what they want. From life, from their governments and from their countries". The very name of the song, which evokes an enormous wave of immigrants, culminates in the chorus:

One, two, three, four, five / One, two, three, four, hundred / One, two, three, four, million / One, two, three, four, million / Crowds of laws / Crowds of fallacies / Crowds of offspring / Crowds of immigrants / Let's keep our nation's identity / Each spring will bring new patriots / The state is the proof and you know it/ Let's all the more get together / Let's all the more get together / With the CROSS let's get closer together (see Čok 29 Aug 2016).

Similarly, Olivie Žižková, in her song "*Breathe, Europe*", calls the "migration crisis" an "invasion" (in: Žižková 3 Aug 2016):

"The invasion is growing, we need to get stronger. / We'll have to get up and start to fight hard. (...)/ Breathe, Europe and look into the future. (...) We refuse to be mere sheep / And to our own slaughter voluntarily march."

Finally, Dominika Myslivcová linked the question of mass migration and radical Islamism in the lyrics of her song appropriately entitled: "*We Want No Change Here*" (Myslivcová 9 Aug 2016, Myslivcová 2016) which is however more related to fear of Islamification by Middle Eastern Refugees (see next chapter).

b) The Image of Middle Eastern Refugees

Generally speaking, we can assert that in the comments influenced by the "migration crisis" we often find passages describing immigrants as rapists, terrorists, burdens on the state, uneducated people, animals, and carriers of contagious diseases who — if "we" do not by our collective effort prevent them from entering — will wish to transform "our" country into their image. It is important to note that such descriptions of immigrants were rarely found on the accounts of Pepa Nos or Ondřej Hejma. Muslim immigrants were discussed much more often on the accounts of Vilém Čok and Olivie Žižková and more often still on the Facebook profiles of Jana Yngland Hrušková and Aleš Brichta.

In a public post on Facebook, Pepa Nos commented on a text giving evidence for the beneficial impact of red wine with the following words: "Yeah, I regu-

larly buy myself a demijohn of red wine. Besides other things, it also kills both male and female Islamists" (Nos 15 Aug 2016). Here he denotes both male and female forms of the word "Islamist". In one of the comments made on the post, he equates Islamists with terrorists: "Such an Islamist really has no fear of being blown into a thousand little pieces after blowing his little elegant semtex waistcoat up" (Nos commentary 22 Oct 2015 in: Nos 21 Oct 2015). With regards to immigration from the Middle East, only one of Ondřej Hejma's comments was found relevant — his response to an inquiry about why immigrants do not aim for the Gulf States. According to Hejma it is because: "they would have to work there…" (Hejma commentary 5 Sep 2015 in: Hejma 3 Sep 2015).

Vilém Čok published two videos about "the true colours" of present-day immigrants from the Middle East and Africa. One of them shows a man dressed as a Nomad who is trying to collect and later drink camel's urine. In his commentary, Čok says: "It is very telling to observe all the beautiful habits they are bringing to Europe" (in: Čok 3 Feb 2016). In the second video, we can see an elderly black man speaking to a group of younger men and hitting them occasionally. Čok comments: "I'm glad the visitors from Africa will cure us" (in: Čok 19 Jan 2016). Čok also shared a song called "*The Sun"* which is introduced on YouTube as the first Czech Islamic children's song. In it, children's voices sing in Czech: "It was Allah The Mightiest, The Greatest, The Wisest…" (in: Čok 10 Jan 2016). Čok's comment follows: "So it has begun…the influence on children… We insist on the tolerance of Muslims towards us as well. If they cannot rid themselves of their superiority and hatred towards us, they should live in a country that shares their values. Not only must we not share these values, in this case we must not even tolerate them. THIS IS OUR HOME." (Čok 10 Jan 2016). According to Čok, the cultures of the people that will "flood Europe" are different and unadaptable on every level (Špulák 2016 in: Čok 16 Jun 2016). This is why he is worried that Europe's culture and people will "mix with cultures and peoples from elsewhere and thus lose their identity and traditional values" (Ibid.). Čok is afraid that this cultural non-adaptability powered by the masses of the incoming immigrants with a much higher birth rate (which he also refers to as a war of vaginas) will lead to "the dismantling of the original population by immigrants. It's true what they say – the vaginas of their women would in the long run overwhelm the European population… After all, this is the very threat that Islamists are propagating" (Böhmová 2016 in: Čok 4 May 2016).

Olivie Žižková shared several photographs on her profile – one of a black man attempting to stuff a gramophone record into a notebook (Žižková 10 Mar 2016), and another illustrating a radical and a moderate Muslim, the radical one saying: "Follow Allah or I shall kill you" and the moderate one pointing at him and saying: "Follow Allah or He will kill You" (Žižková 27 Jun 2017). Another photograph depicts a man wearing a noose around his neck, representing Europe, as he waters a tree, representing Islam, intending to suggest that one day

the tree will be the cause of his hanging (Žižková 16 Mar 2017). Olivie Žižková labels the Middle Eastern immigrants as "animals" and applies for their immediate return to countries of origin ("Let's reverse it, the animals have to go home"). Subsequently, contemporary mass immigration from the Middle East to Europe may result, according to Žižková, in Islamification and therefore she demanded through her lyrics an active defence of Europe (Boomba!cz. 2016 in Žižková 3 Aug 2016, see also Žižková 2016).

There's no time to wait, why be afraid of them. / Islamic burqas, Jihad pulling the strings. / (...) / Don't let them thrash you, return of democracy! / We are strong and we have faith. / We can't even laugh or fall asleep in peace. / Resist, Europe, don't let them shoot you. / Their task is to go on a bloody trip. /

Similarly, the threat of Islamification mirrors the song introduced by Dominika Myslivcová. She links the question of mass migration and radical Islamism in the lyrics of her song appropriately entitled: "*We Want No Change Here*" (Myslivcová 9 Aug 2016, Myslivcová 2016, see also Karaoketexty.cz):

(...) I don't want to go out covered in a robe and scarf/ why change my pink traditions because of someone else / I want to live this dream life for some time to come/ don't want to change it because of those who come to our republic/ I speak for all women/ who like to doll themselves up/ who decide for themselves what to wear/ who don't want these changes/ we want no changes here./ it's us who were born here/ we want to decide what happens in our country/ I voice my opinion and refuse to be mute/ I want to peacefully drink my frappe on the beach wearing my bikini/ and see one man with one woman only.

Jana Yngland Hrušková called for the closing of borders because: "there are too many of them already" (Hrušková 25 May 2017). She argues that "their integration [in Europe] is impossible" (Ibid.) which was supposedly already demonstrated by the Turkish referendum, in which "their second generation proved to be more aggressive and dangerous than the first" (Ibid.). Present-day immigration is characterized by "rapes, robberies and murders" (Hrušková 21 June 2017), and these immigrants are "contributing RIGHT NOW to higher criminal rates in all of Europe" (Hrušková 25 May 2017). Hrušková also unequivocally connects the migration wave with terror or terrorism – "not all of them are terrorists but there are increasingly more and more of them" (Hrušková 7 Apr 2017). "He who sows Islam reaps terror" (Hrušková 4 Jun 2017). "The direct correlation is clear. The more Muslims in a country the more terror" (Hrušková 7 Jun 2017) – and if nothing changes, there is a danger that all the negative aspects of immigration in the West will spread to our country as well – conflict (Hrušková 17 Jun 2017), and soon we will become "an oppressed minority in our own country" (Hrušková 21 Jun 2017).

Aleš Brichta defended the policy of refusing immigrants on the basis of the following three reasons: they could potentially spread contagious diseases, they are an absurd financial burden on the state, and they are neither culturally nor

religiously adaptable (Brichta 27 Sep 2015, see also 2 Jul 2015). On another occasion, Brichta emphasizes the risks stemming from terrorism (Stop Multikulti 2015 in: Brichta 3 Jul 2015). He too sees a direct correlation between (Muslim) immigration and terrorism. Shortly after one terrorist attack in the West, he published the following post: "So which city is next? What is really sad is the fact that the attacker could be your neighbour whom you might have taken for an idiot, but not as big an idiot as he turned out to be" (Brichta 23 Mar 2017). He attributes the immigrants' inability to adapt to the fact that "a refugee is not capable of loyalty towards the state, culture and religion in which I wish to live" (Brichta 1 Mar 2015). Another problem, according to Brichta, is the non-adaptability of immigrants in the job market. In an interview for the conspiratorial *Svobodné Rádio* [*Free Radio*], which he shared a link to on his Facebook profile (9 Nov 2016), Brichta described "simpletons from North Africa" as uneducated people who "have never seen a screwdriver in their life, though they might hold a camel driver's license, might know how to tie it to a palm tree... and might know how to milk a goat" (see Brichta in: Svobodné radio 2016).

In stark contrast, Daniel Landa, in one of the most widely discussed posts on Facebook or any other social media platform at the time of the "migration crisis", published a photograph of himself surrounded by a group of Muslims along with a comment in which he categorically refutes the sweeping condemnation of all Muslims.

"These people around me are Muslims. They are my wonderful friends (...) We are united by shared human values and long-term friendship. I'm honoured to march hand in hand with these patriots in the fight against the goblins of this world (...) I'm certainly not a Muslim agent, neither am I a Russian or American one. I'm our man. Landa/Žito" (Landa 16 Nov 2015).

There are no posts on Daniel Landa's Facebook account disparaging Islam, immigrants or Muslims. In an interview with Marek Černoch, he stated: "I cannot and will not identify myself as someone who is against Islam when I travel to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to resolve various issues" (Landa – Černoch 2016 39:30 min.). On two other occasions on Facebook, Landa uses the term "scumbag", seemingly to denote the "goblins" he mentions, together with the adjective "fanatic scumbags" (Landa 30 Nov 2015), or with reference to "people who might not have any good intentions" (Landa 30 Nov 2015). However, generally speaking he does not refer to Muslims, but rather to radical Islamists against whom we, together with the Muslims, must fight by any means possible. Landa's opinion on Muslim integration in the Czech Republic cannot be found on his Facebook profile, but rather in the conversation with the parliamentarian Marek Černoch which was referred to earlier. Landa does not, in this debate, express agreement with the building of mosques in the Czech Republic (Landa – Černoch 2016 39:43 min.). He considers mosques "a means of infecting people with things that are not good but rather sinister"

(Landa – Černoch 2016 40:00 min. in: Landa 10 Feb 2016). "The growth of the Islamic population in our country would surely devour our way of life" (Landa – Černoch 2016 7:40 min. in: Landa 10 Feb 2016). Landa expressed his scepticism towards Muslim integration by comparing it to the problematic integration of the Roma population, which has long plagued the Czech Republic, saying: "…if an enormous group of people from elsewhere suddenly appears here, how will they integrate? Someone rightly said, why would they integrate at all, they have a right to their own culture. Integration? That's an insult" (Landa – Černoch 2016 50:50 min. in: Landa 10 Feb 2016).

Celebritisation of Politics – Findings

It is important to point out that in the context of the above-mentioned definition and theoretical concepts of the celebritisation (of politics) all of the singers analysed in our study – apart from Hrušková, Myslivcová and Žižková, perhaps – fulfil the status of a singer-celebrity although the exact term shall be "a local celebrity" or "a regional celebrity" as neither of the figures under analysis in this text could be by no means ranked as a global celebrity or a celebrity on the European level (see table):

Table 3: In a Search for a Celebrity Status

Singer	Number of Followers***			Youtube Viewers*** / *The title* (year) & number of viewers of the most-watched video's	The Czech Nightingale Awards* & The Best Placing (1997–2017)	Popularity Peak (decade) & Genre
	FB	TW	IG			
A. Brichta	17952	–	–	*Barák na vodstřel* (1994) / 3 183 537	10th (1997)	peaked around 1990 *rock music celebrity*
V. Čok	6535	795	–	*Zachraňte Ježíška* (2011) / 258 967	26th (1997)	peaked around 1990 *rock music celebrity*
O. Hejma	1130**	–	–	*Sametová* (1994) together with Žlutý pes / 3 693 814	44th (1997)	peaked around 1990 *rock music celebrity*
J. Y. Hrušková	2675	1584	–	*Moře* (1989) together with Petr Novák / 64 438	–	peaked in the late 1980's
S. Janoušek	2442**	–	–	*Imaginární hospoda* (1986) / 51 393	–	peaked around 1990 *folk music celebrity*
D. Landa	304744	14k		*Bílá Hora* (2004) / 7 688 229	2nd (2004–5)	popular singer

J. Ledecký	10139	1725	–	*Proklínám* (1994) / 5 095 267	3rd (1998–9, 2000, 2008)	popular singer
D. Myslivcová	46144	183k	126	*Barbie girl* (2011) / 73 083 044	–	peaked after 2010 *occasional singer celebrity for teens*
P. Nos	276**	–	–	*Agent Sí Aj Ej* (1990) / 124 069	–	peaked around 1990 *folk music celebrity*
O. Žižková	no data	1307	4	*Evropo dýchej* (2016) / 727 045	29th (2017)	peaking now *occasional singer*

* An annual music award in the Czech Republic similar to the American Grammy *Award.*
** The number of friends on the Facebook accounts of the singers was recorded by the summer 2017.
*** FB = Facebook, TW = Twitter, IG = Instagram. Youtube, Instagram and Twitter followers were recorded by the end of February 2018.

Moreover, only a few of the "high-visibility figures" mentioned at the beginning of this text fall into the first category of celebrity in the Czech music scene (e.g. Karel Gott, Lucie Bílá), and furthermore, not all of the figures analysed here remain singers to the present day. In fact, some have in the meantime shifted their careers to a different art field, and are more likely to be primarily considered painters, for instance (i.e. František Ringo Čech).

In the following part, the findings are divided into three categories outlined above in the text related to the celebritisation of politics: (a) celebrity politician; (b) celebrity advocate; (c) celebrity activist/endorser.

a) The Celebrity Politician

A celebrity politician is by definition a figure running for "legislative or executive offices". The celebritisation of politics by the singers analysed in this text appeared in various forms but there was only a single case, Dominika Myslivcová, as a candidate running for political party and therefore suitable to the "celebrity politician" subcategory which might be a singer running for legislative offices, as she appeared on the ballot of the extremist, xenophobic and anti-immigration party of *Úsvit – National Coalition* at the end of the 2014 regional elections in northeastern Moravia. In that short period of electoral campaigning between the summer and fall 2014, she used her surveyed Facebook account several times as a platform for political communication with voters. Nevertheless, she was not elected and afterwards she totally drove her agenda on Facebook away from her short political engagement.

Interestingly, there was yet another (potential) candidate, Jana Yngland Hrušková, who acted as a "candidate for the presidential elections in 2018" on

her Facebook profile for a period under analysis and as such she gave many interviews to various media. Nevertheless, Hrušková never qualified officially into the candidate status as she gave it up before the term by which candidates must be registered by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic and prove support either by 50 thousand voters, 20 Czech deputies or 10 Czech senators.

Table 4: Singers & a Type of Running for "Legislative or Executive Offices"

Dominika Myslivcová	• candidate of the anti-immigrant party of *Úsvit – National Coalition* for the 2014 regional elections
Jana Yngland Hrušková	• candidate for the presidential elections in 2018*

* Hrušková barely managed to set up a legally-binding transparent bank account in the required term but her candidacy terminated shortly afterwards as she failed to collect the demanded number of voters' signatures or members' of the Czech Parliament nominations.

b) Celebrity Advocate

A celebrity advocate is by definition a figure which makes its way to the political area through "political agenda-setting and/or policy-seeking behavior". All of the singers surveyed in the text can fall into the category "celebrity advocate" due to their political engagement on Facebook critical to Islam and refugees. Among the most frequented items discussed by singers on Facebook involved a suggested ban on Islam, better protection of national borders or were against mandatory quota system on refugees demanded by the EU. Most of the investigated singers did not exceed their "Facebook" political engagement beyond the "migration crisis".

Nevertheless, in several cases singers' policy-seeking behavior via their Facebook walls was focused on political agenda-setting beyond the issue of the "migration crisis" although they strongly differed as to the items and intensity of their political activities.

Aleš Brichta promoted via the Facebook, both mainstream and "alternative" media and in the Czech parliament his personal engagement – in cooperation with the anti-immigration party SPD of Tomio Okamura – in a petition calling for a referendum to exit the EU (4 Jan 2016, 6 Jan 2016, 3 Jan 2016).

Daniel Landa advertised repeatedly a petition against the regulation of weapons of the EU and self-defence products from the EU side (22 Dec 2016, 3 Dec 2015) and expressed support to the Czech Firearms Rights Association (26 Nov 2015). Secondly, Landa promoted his own foundation Aria Boiohaemum which was focused primarily (though not only) on water system infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan (e.g. 21 Dec 2015, 12 Aug 2016).

And finally, Jana Yngland Hrušková constantly appealed to exit the EU (18 Apr 2017, 7 May 2017, 8 May 2017, 30 May 2017).

Table 5: Singers & Political Agenda Setting/Policy-Seeking Behaviour

Aleš Brichta	• petition for a referendum on exiting the EU
Jana Yngland Hrušková	• exiting the EU
Daniel Landa	• petition against the regulation of weapons
	• promoting the *Aria Boiohaeum* foundation for assistance in Afghanistan

c) Celebrity Activists / Endorsers

A celebrity activist/endorser is by definition a person "offering financial and/or public support for a specific political candidate and/or party". In this regard, there are mixed results as for subcategorisation of singers into the "celebrity activist/endorser" group. The most common case among singers under investigation in this text was a public support or even clear political endorsement of certain politicians and – in some cases – also the political party of that leader.

Concretely, several singers expressed via Facebook support or even direct political endorsement to the xenophobic, anti-immigration (and mainly anti-Islam) politician Tomio Okamura and some of them also to the SPD–TO party (*Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomia Okamury* [*Freedom and Direct Democracy* of Tomio Okamura]) which is led by the above mentioned populist politician Okamura.

Hereby, Aleš Brichta worked the most extensively and intensively for Tomio Okamura of all the singers surveyed here. Brichta regularly posted on Facebook promotions of politician Tomio Okamura (7 Oct 2016) or of anti-immigrantion demonstrations co-organized by the SPD and usually held at Wenceslas Square in the centre of Prague (1 Nov 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 14 Jan 2016). Brichta was often a speaker. Afterwards, Brichta commented on these events on his Facebook wall in a positive way (2 Jul 2015, 15 May 2016). In September 2016, Brichta openly supported the SPD party before the regional elections (4 Sep 2016). Moreover, singer Brichta was a face on the petition to exit the EU organised by the SPD party. In joint cooperation with the chairman of the SPD Tomio Okamura, Brichta appeared in public on several popular TV programmes ("Máte slovo" a public broadcast of Czech Television and "Nikdo není perfektní" from commercial TV Barrandov) and regularly posted these events on his Facebook account (Brichta 3 Feb 2016, 7 Mar 2016). Brichta expressed support also to extremist and at that time highly visible anti-Islam politician Martin Konvička (24 Nov 2015, 15 May 2016).

Apart from Brichta, there were three other singers investigated here who publicly – although not as extensively – manifested promotion of the SPD party and its leader Tomio Okamura – Olivie Žižková, Jana Yngland Hrušková and Pepa Nos.

Olivie Žižková even introduced the videoclip titled "Já volím SPD" [I vote for the SPD] in which she together with her husband expressed direct endorsement of Tomio Okamura (13 Jun 2017). In another Facebook post, she shared her husband's post of a man wearing t-shirt with "Freedom" and a badge linked to the SPD party (19 Jun 2017). Formerly Žižková posted on her Facebook wall a poster with the logo of National Democracy which was an invitation to a joint demonstration of the SPD, ND, DSSS and other groups organizing a protest in the center of Prague against the "blunt government" appealing that national borders must be closed (14 Nov 2015).

Jana Yngland Hrušková published a photo with the SPD leader Tomio Okamura (19 Apr 2017) after inviting the Facebook community via a poster to a joint meeting with Tomio Okamura in Prague (17 Apr 2017).

Pepa Nos openly supported the populist, xenophobic and strongly anti--immigration and anti-Islamic party SPD–TO on his Facebook account by adding a badge of the SPD on his Facebook profile picture (21 Oct 2015) and by posting rather favourable comments on Okamura to his own Facebook page (see Nos comment 22 Oct 2015 in: Nos 21 Oct 2015). Additionally, Pepa Nos sang at Okamura's public demonstrations.

The other investigated singers expressed support or even endorsement to various political figures or parties. In sum, similarly to Okamura and SPD, all of these political players can be also classified with strong anti-immigration profiles.

There was only one singer, Dominika Myslivcová, who publicly promoted another populist radical right party, *Úsvit*. Nevertheless, it applied only to the relatively short period of her political campaign during candidacy in regional elections from July to October 2016. As already mentioned, after that period her Facebook page returned to be totally depoliticised as it used to be before her candidature.

Ondřej Hejma expressed support for former president Václav Klaus (21 Sep 2015, 3 Sep 2015) or for political figures linked to him as e.g. Václav Klaus jr. (7 Sep 2015) who is also strongly against current immigration from distanced cultures. Hejma gave strong political endorsement via Facebook to Petr Robejšek (15 Jun 2015, 3 Aug 2015, 14 Jun 2016) who decided to run with the anti-immigration political party *Realisté* (Realists) in the 2016 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic.

Finally, two of investigated singers expressed – though only once and rather incidentally – sympathy with the Czech President Miloš Zeman – Jana Yngland Hrušková and Janek Ledecký.

Hrušková indirectly expressed support for Zeman when she posted on Facebook (13 Jun 2017) Zeman's speech critical towards multiculturalism and Islam held at a commemorative gathering in the village of Lidice (The massacre and complete destruction of Lidice in 1942 came in reprisal for the assassination of Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich). Janek Ledecký supported – although rather reluctantly – Zeman for his interview with the popular online news server idnes.cz, critically aimed at current immigration from the Middle East (26 Nov 2015).

There are a few singers remaining who – taking into consideration their Facebook accounts during the investigated period between the beginning of June 2015 till the end of June 2017 – did not show open support neither to any politician nor to a political party: There is absolutely no sign of any kind of political endorsement or support expressed by Vilém Čok. Daniel Landa discussed immigration on Youtube with Marek Černoch, parliamentary deputy of the strongly anti-immigration party of *Úsvit* (10 Feb 2016). Nevertheless, Landa refused to openly advocate for any politician neither on his Facebook nor in that long interview (see Landa – Černoch 2016).

Table 6 Singers & Public Support / Public Endorsement

Aleš Brichta	• Tomio Okamura / SPD • Martin Konvička	• SPD
Olivie Žižková	• SPD • ND, DSSS, (SPD)	• SPD / Tomio Okamura
Pepa Nos	• Tomio Okamura	• SPD
Jana Yngland Hrušková	• SPD • Miloš Zeman	×
Dominika Myslivcová	• Úsvit	• Úsvit
Ondřej Hejma	• Václav Klaus jr. • Petr Robejšek	×
Janek Ledecký	• Miloš Zeman	×

The post-truth Era – Findings

As already mentioned above, testing the field in post-factual politics, there are two areas of analysis: the ways of collecting news sources and subsequently the relationship of the singers to Putin's Russia.

a) Media Bias

There were number of characteristics with which the singers can be in full accord with the post-truth era. However, their communication styles sometimes differ significantly. In sum, the following characteristics were found:

- There is clear evidence of singers' harsh criticism aimed at public TV and radio broadcasting in particular (e.g. Brichta 23 Apr 2017, 11 Jan 2016, 11 Sep 2015), however, in a few cases the severe criticism is targeting "all the media" en bloc (Nos 19 Nov 2016, Hrušková 17 Apr 2017).
- Facebook also became a target of criticism for censorship and for eventually taking down pages with hate and racist comments in relation to the "migration crisis" (Brichta 24 Mar 2016, Žižková 24 Jun 2017).
- On the contrary, singers under scrutiny in this text can be usually characterised by their uncritical trust in news on the "migration crisis" spread from hybrid media, doubtable sources or Facebook communities presumably linked to – or to satisfy at least – the interests of the Russian propaganda machinery (e.g. Čok 3 Feb 2016, 19 Jan 2016, 24 Nov 2015, Hrušková 16 May 2017, 14 May 2017, Žižková 10 Mar 2016). There is some evidence of sharing news directly from disinformation websites, Facebook communities and openly pro-Russian media bodies such as *Svobodné rádio* (Brichta 9 Nov 2016), *WeAreHereAtHome* (Brichta 16 Nov 2015, 26 Feb 2016), *svobodnenoviny.eu* (Brichta 25 Sep 2015), *kriminalitauprchliku.com* (Brichta 20 Jul 2015), *deutsch.rt.com* (Hrušková 12 Jun 2017) and *AC24.cz* (Hrušková 28 Apr 2017). Aditionally, in a videoclip to the song *Breathe, Europe* which calles the migration crisis an "invasion" and is sung by Olivie Žižková and advertised on her Facebook page (Olivie Žižková 3 Aug 2016) is a short track portraying a man, a wild black immigrant, taken directly from the Russian *RT Rupty* (Žižková 2016: 1:09–1:12 min.). In some cases, singers upheld false information on various events related to the "migration crisis" which was deliberately spread to deceive the public by mainstream media networks, as was the case of Aleš Brichta defending the influential commercial company *TV Prima* which secretly took a strategy to report on the "migration crisis" strictly in negative terms; one of its controversial coverages on the refugees from the Middle East reported on immigrants' disatisfaction with flats provided by the city of Jihlava, supposedly saying in Arabic that the flats were "painted over cow-sheds" (see Brichta 12 Feb 2016, 3 Jun 2016). In a manner similar to the previous case there was evidence of shared information

fabricated on the "migration crisis" *by Novinky.cz* which is the most popular website for news online (Čok 2 Jan 2017, Landa 10 Jan 2016) and during the "migration crisis" used it to take advantage and strenghten its leading position among domestic online news servers. In a number of cases, singers shared bloggers critically portraying the "migration crisis" in Europe which matched their opinions published in *lidovky.cz* (Brichta 28 Dec 2015), *blogspot.cz* (Čok), *aktualne.cz* and *idnes.cz* (both shared by Hejma 7 Sep 2015).

• Worth special notice is the relationship of some singers investigated in the text to the hoax-news industry focused on manufacturing negative myths on migrants in the time of the "migration crisis". A hoax is by definition an attempt "to trick into believing or accepting as genuine something false and often preposterous" (See Merriam-Webster since 1828). As already mentioned, distrust in public broadcasting services and in some cases to all media strongly contrasts with the singers' credence of alternative news regardless of the reliability of their original sources. In several absolute cases, singers approved of a hoax, or denied that a hoax they posted on Facebook was a problem at all. Given the fact that two singers (Aleš Brichta, Ondřej Hejma) could not resist posting – in a different period – on Facebook the current Czech version of the one of the most known hoaxes which had already spread around the world by 2008 in an e-mail version stating that the "Australian Prime Minister John Howard [the name being flexibly replaced by the current one] told the media that immigrants should adapt to Australian culture, language and belief or leave the country..." (Hejma 6 Jun 2015, Brichta 19 Aug 2017).

Hejma did not correct himself for spreading the hoax after one of the comments explicitly warned him on that. On the contrary, Hejma even replied "hoax or not, in my opinion, it is said correctly, and that is the main point!" (Hejma comment 7 Jun 2015 in: Hejma 6 Jun 2015). Vilém Čok repeatedly posted hoaxes on his Facebook page. Čok propagated a link *Welcome to Reality* (2016 in: Čok 29 Dec 2016) refering to videos and information on NGO's in collaboration with Frontex smuggling thousands of immigrants from Africa to Europe in order to pump the grants from the EU budget. The identical video, news and headline appeared on the Kremlin's propaganda website Aeronet a week before (AE News 2016). In another case, Čok posted a picture allegedly from the Bulgarian border with an emphatic poster declaring "Dear Immigrants, Welcome to Bulgaria! No Work, No Money, No Future, Proceed Back. Thank You" (6 Nov 2015) but it was impossible to verify that from any reliable sources of information. Third, as a consequnce of negative videos on current immigration in the Russian language with Czech subtitles shared by Čok on his Facebook page, he was criticised by other Facebook users that the translation from Arabic to Russian was not accurate and that Čok's initiative serves Russian interests. Čok initially even admitted that the translation of that video he shared was without guarentee but did not delete the controversial Facebook post and only added

that it would be appropriate if anybody would put a correct translation there (Čok comment 24 Nov 2015 in: Čok 24 Nov 2015).

• The sharing of videos and photos on singers' Facebook walls displaying immigrants, muslims or Islam in one-sidedly negative ways from unknown or unreliable sources, used for communicaton with their fans and the wider public came under frequent investigation (Aleš Brichta, Vilém Čok, Jana Yngland Hrušková, Olivie Žižková).

• The Facebook posts can be also characterised by the expertisation or academisation of the reasoning in the various negative aspects of the "migration crisis" with the goal to legitimise the negative opinions of the singers on that issue. There are various scientific authorities and publishers which are favoured by the singers:

- Ondřej Hejma applauded the opinions of former Czech President Václav Klaus, his son and member of the parliament Václav Klaus Jr. and close co-worker of the former president Jiří Hájek. Hejma further praised the "political scientist from Hamburk" and the politician representing anti-immigration issues Petr Robejšek, controversial politician Jana Bobošíková and intellectual Benjamin Kuras and the American academic Walter Russell Mead.
- Aleš Brichta liked and shared the opinions of the intellectual Alexander Tomský, publisher Jiří X. Doležal, and lawayer and pro-Putin figure Miroslava Hustáková, who was named by the online hybrid news medium *Parlamentní listy* as "a genuine friend of Russia", writer and comedian Pat Condell known for criticism of Islam in Youtube videos of which perhaps *The Trouble with Islam* is the most famous.
- Pat Condell's opinions were shared by Vilém Čok at the outbreak of debates on the "migration crisis" in the Czech Republic (9 Jun 2015). Čok was further inspired by the political analyst Roy Beck, an anti-immigration figure and author of the book *The Case Against Immigration* and founder of the think-tank NumbersUSA lobbying for the reduction of both legal and illegal immigration to the USA.
- In other cases, Daniel Landa shared an interview with the historian Vlastimil Vondruška given to the server *Novinky.cz* in which he was concerned about the Islamification of Europe due to the current wave of immigration and Jana Yngland Hrušková published the opinions of the anti-Islam publicist Soeren Kern with a link to the anti-Islamic Gatestone Institute.

• On the other hand, there is rather scarce evidence on the "tabloidisation" of the whole debate. Tabloid online media was not as frequently shared by the singers but, on the other hand, was also not totally overlooked by them either. Aleš Brichta sometimes shared articles on immigration issued in the Czech tabloid newspapers *Blesk.cz* (16 Sep 2016, 31 Jan 2016). Jana Yngland Hrušková

became a major figure sharing tabloid content, usually from German online newspapers (e.g. *Bild.de* and the headline "Munchen immer bunter"; *The Star Online* and the headline "Eight detained, 30 injured in Good Friday mayhem in Seville" which was however not about Muslims attacking the paschal procession in Sevilla as Hrušková misleadingly claimed in her Facebook posts (16 Apr 2017). The reserach brought no another evidence of working with the tabloid press by the singers.

• Another characteristic feature of singers sharing "information" was to persuade their followers and the public with the (alternative) sources of news from the West which circled around two key arguments: (1) they have serious problem with multiculturalism there already and (2) mainstream media are fully engaged in political correctness and are quiet or censored in respect to the negative side of co-existence with Islam in the West. Jana Yngland Hrušková held the leading position in this way of argumentation against Islam, while Olivie Žižková argued the same way. Interestingly, this reasoning against immigration is backed by long-time experience living in the West (Hrušková) or by having friends there in the West who keep us informed. Olivie Žižková argues that relatives from Germany and Austria who are writing to us that they are afraid and people write letters daily mentioning some rapes which are intentionally not covered by the mainstream media and the TV. "People are sending me links and that will do", says Žižková in an interview for Czech online media DVTV (2016).

• In the end, it should not be overlooked that it is common that some of the singers gave interviews on the "migration crisis" and shared them on their Facebook walls (similar to their songs on that issue). These were with the mainstream media network, however, in some cases the singers agreed to be interviewed on the issue by the hybrid and controversial online medium *Parlamentní listy* (e.g. Aleš Brichta, Vilém Čok, Ondřej Hejma, Jana Yngland Hrušková, Janek Ledecký, Pepa Nos) or by the tabloid media (Aleš Brichta, Dominika Myslivcová) and in a rare case even in the conspiratorial medium *Svobodné Rádio* (Aleš Brichta).

b) Relationship to Putin's Russia

After thorough analyses of all the Facebook posts, there are absolutely no key words based on "Putin" or "Russia" on any of the singers' accounts during the examined period with one exemption.

Daniel Landa (27 Jan 2016) mentioned Russia in the context that "some people would prefer to go back into the arms of Russia." Landa however does not seem to follow that persuasion. On the contrary, on the same occasion, Landa called for the Czech Republic to be as much as sovereign state "as a bridge between the West and East surrounded by loyal and stable partnership states" in the Centeral European realm (27 Jan 2016). On another occasion, Landa

denied being neither a Muslim nor a Russian nor even an American agent (16 Nov 2015). In an older Facebook post beyond the time limit for the investigated period, Pepa Nos commented on the danger of immigration from the Middle East for Europe and Denmark in particularly, equating Islamists to Satan, Hitler and Putler, of which the latter is certainly merger of words Putin and Hitler (11 Sep 2014). There is no other "Russian footage" on the investigated Facebook accounts.

Conclusion

The analysis of the first part of the text focused on the Facebook posts of the singers, interviews given to media if shared on "their" Facebook walls, and on their new songs about the "migration crisis" they sang, and if shared on Facebook revealed – though jointy concerned about the consequences of the "migration crisis" – a rather diffused picture of how the singers viewed that issue. A black-and-white judgment on the "migration crisis", Islam and the consequent refugees appeared particularly on the Facebook walls of Aleš Brichta and Jana Yngland Hrušková. To a lesser degree, the same can be concluded about Vilém Čok, Olivie Žižková and Ondřej Hejma. Findings related to Dominika Myslivcová bought mixed results as she was politically engaged only for a limited period for a few months and manifested her concern about the current "migration crisis" and the subsequent Islamification and at the same time she rejected the idea that she was against people of different colour. Moreover, she did not view her prior engagement in the humanitarian NGO Hate Free Culture as strongly contrasting to her later involvement with the xenophobic party *Úsvit*. For that reason, the activism of Myslivcová can most likely be judged as politically naïve. Daniel Landa is a different case as – unlike the above mentioned singers – he was very active on Facebook in an original way far unsuited to the black-and-white "Clash of Civilization" approach. Janek Ledecký appeared active only once and therefore it is not possible to evaluate his approach. After initial findings, Slávek Janoušek was excluded from the research as he was not linked to criticism of Islam.

Analysis based on the theoretical concept of the celebritisation of politics only partially confirmed the fact that Facebook is not just a platform for PR within the music scene, but that it also offers an opportunity for local celebrities to engage in the political scene and political debate beyond the posts concerning the "migration crisis". There is quite rare evidence that any of the singers running for legislative political office (Dominika Myslivcová) and only one piece of evidence of a proclaimed but then dropped effort to run (formally) for executive office (Jana Yngland Hrušková). Apart from the rather harsh criticism of the "migration crisis", singers only scarcely used Facebook as a platform for political agenda-setting in a related context: behind the proposal to exit the

EU (Aleš Brichta, Jana Yngland Hrušková) or the fight for more rights for owners of weapons and self-defence products (Daniel Landa) stands the strongly criticized institutional framework and policy of the EU. Finally, there is no surprise that owerhelming numbers of singers openly support (Aleš Brichta, Olivie Žižková, Pepa Nos, Jana Yngland Hrušková) or even gave endorsement (Aleš Brichta, Olivie Žižková, Pepa Nos) to the populist, xenophonic and anti-immigrant *SPD* headed by highly controversial political figure Tomio Okamura or to the similarly xenophobic party of Úsvit (Dominika Myslivcová). It is not surprising either that the singers further expressed their support to strong anti-immigration political figures as e.g. the current Czech president Miloš Zeman (Jana Yngland Hrušková, Janek Ledecký) or to the group of people around the former Czech President Václav Klaus (Ondřej Hejma).

And, finally, despite the fact that there was not any direct or indirect evidence of pro-Putin sympathy by the singers investigated in this text, they were not – although perhaps unintentionally – in discordance with the post-truth malaise formed presumably by the Kremlin which was targeting EU citizens with various forms of disinformation campaigns directed against Western interests. Apart from backing populist radical right parties and a critical approach towards Islam and refugees from countries with a Muslim majority, there were other common areas of interest amongst the singers which overlap with the issues frequented by the Russian propaganda machine – incapability of political elites in Western Europe to cope effectively with the "migration crisis", which applies particularly to the malfunction of EU institutitons, the irresponsible welcoming policy of the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and to the negative consequences of irresponsible and naïve multicultural political strategies pursued by political elites in West European democracies during the previous decades. Humanitarian NGOs and volunteers keen to help refugees were often also targets of criticism (Aleš Brichta, Vilém Čok). Furthermore and again in accord with Russian propaganda goals, some of the singers pointed to the serious danger of security, terrorism, Islamfication and growing "no-go areas" in Western European cities and wanted to ban Islam and/or exit the EU (Aleš Brichta, Jana Y. Hrušková). In addition to that, the singers under survey here hold a sceptical or very critical view to sources of information broadcast by the public media network and usually have no antipathy to the tabloid or hybrid media industry. Moreover, the singers often interpreted the "migration crisis" and its wider context while relying on emotionally coloured news from untrustworthy, unreliable and unbalanced sources (Vilém Čok, Jana Yngland Hrušková, Aleš Brichta, Olivie Žižková) and in some cases they did not hesitate to post on Facebook news which originated on influential disinformation websites, came from their Facebook friends or that they took for granted the information from their friends living abroad.

References

AE News (2016): VIDEO: To musíte vidět! (21 December): available at https://aeronet.cz/news/video-to-musite-videt-neziskovky-ve-spolupraci-s-frontexem-pasuji-v-primem-prenosu-lodemi-do-evropy-tisice-migrantu-z-afriky-aby-mohly-cerpat-od-eu-granty-na-jejich-integraci/ (7 July 2017).

Böhmová, Olga (2015): Ondřej Hejma nejen k uprchlíkům: Německo je de facto stále okupovanou zemí…, *Parlamentní listy* (15 December): available at http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/rozhovory/Ondrej-Hejma-nejen-k-uprchlikum-Nemecko-je-de-facto-stale-okupovanou-zemi-ale-az-se-volici-emancipuji-pozname-jeho-skutecnou-tvar-A-budou-se-dit-veci-412980 (11 October 2017)

Böhmová, Olga (2016): To jsem nežral. Vaginální válka…, *Parlamentní listy* (30 April): available at <http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/rozhovory/To-jsem-nezral-Vaginalni-valka-Pomatene-slunickarky-se-rady-nechaji-oplodnit-imigranty-Vilem-Cok-na-rovinu-o-tom-o-cem-se-v-kapele-hada-s-Kocabem-433254 (12 September 2017).

Boomba!cz. (2016): Rasistka natočila hudební video, ve kterém podněcuje národ k nenávisti hrozí ji vězení, (3 August): available at: http://boomba.cz/clanek/565-rasistka-natocila-hudebni-video-ve-kterem-podnecuje-narod-k-nenavisti-hrozi-ji-vezeni/ (30 October 2017).

Brichta, Aleš. Ales Brichta hudebník OSVČ, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/ales.brichta1?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Český rozhlas (2016): Ivan Mládek: Píseň Pražská mešita byla zábavná. Dělám si v ní legraci Čechů, kteří se bojí islámu, *Český rozhlas* (24 Februrary): available at http://www.rozhlas.cz/radiozurnal/host/_zprava/ivan-mladek-pisen-prazska-mesita-byla-zabavna-delam-si-v-ni-legraci-z-cechu-kteri-se-boji-islamu--1586867 (30 November 2017).

Čok, Vilém. Vilém Čok, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/vilem.cok.7?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

DeMers, Jayson (2016): 59 Percent Of You Will Share This Article Without Even Reading It, *Forbes* (8 August), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysondemers/2016/08/08/59-percent-of-you-will-share-this-article-without-even-reading-it/#5140dc4f2a64 (4 November 2017).

Dewey, Caitlin (2016): 6 in 10 of you will share this link without reading it, study says, *Washington Post* (16 June): available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/16/six-in-10-of-you-will-share-this-link-without-reading-it-according-to-a-new-and-depressing-study/?utm_term=.7ac3139c2fbb (4 November 2017).

DVTV (2016). Krvavý uprchlický výlet?, *Online Partners* (9 August): available at https://video.aktualne.cz/dvtv/verim-zemanovi-a-krampolovi-nejsem-rasistka-lide-mi-za-evrop/r~30ac60765da711e683920025900fea04/ (12 July 2017).

Ekman, Mattias and Widholm, Andreas (2014): Twitter and the celebritisation of politics. *Celebrity Studies* 5 (4): 518–520.

Ferri, Anthony J. (2010): Emergence of the Entertainment Age. *Society* 47 (5): 403–409.

Fukuyama, Francis (2016): The emergence of a post-fact world, *LiveMint* (30 December): available at http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/93hZcSFMVKtz4y5cTylOxI/Francis-Fukuyama--The--emergence-of-a-postfact-world.html (8 November 2017).

Hejma, Ondřej. Ondřej Hejma, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/ondrej.hejma.90?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Hendricks, Vincent F. (2016): In the post factul democracy politicians win by getting feelings right and facts wrong, *Quartz* (5 July): available at https://qz.com/723537/in-the-post-factual--democracy-politicians-win-by-getting-feelings-right-and-facts-wrong/ (17 December 2017).

Hrušková, Jana. Jana Yngland Hrušková kandidátka na prezidentku ČR 2018, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/prezidentka2018/?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Janoušek, Slávek. Slávek Janoušek, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/slavek.janousek.1?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Karaoxetexty.cz (no date): Dominika Myslivcová Změnu tu my nechcem – text, available at: http://www.karaoketexty.cz/texty-pisni/myslivcova-dominika/zmenu-tu-my-nechcem-770051 (30 October 2017).

Landa, Daniel and Černoch, Marek (2016) Afghánistán – Debatní klub. *Youtube* (9 February): available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7Acn6NimMA (10 October 2017).

Landa, Daniel. Daniel Landa Hudebník/kapela, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/Daniel-Landa-22487394100/?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Ledecký, Janek. Janek Ledecký Official Hudebník/kapela, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/LedeckyJanek/?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Lewandowsky, Stephan and Ecker, Ullrich K. H. and Cook, John (2017): Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and coping with the post-truth era. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* 6 (4): 353–369.

Mann, Rafi (2015): The Transmigration of Media Personalities and Celebrities to Politics: The Case of Yair Lapid**.** *Israel Affairs* 21 (2): 262–276.

Marsh, David and 't Hart, Paul and Tindall, Karen (2010): Celebrity Politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity? *Political Studies Review* 8 (3): 322–340.

Merriam Webster since 1828 (no date): available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hoax (12 December 2017).

Millner, Murray Jr. (2010): Is Celebrity a New Kind of Status System? *Society* 47: 379–387.

Myslivcová, Dominika (2016): Změnu tu my nechcem, *Youtube* (9 August): available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgb_qWu0Q9s (12 June 2017).

Myslivcová, Dominika. Dominika Myslivcová (Soukromý Profil), *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/dominika.dominikova.75?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Nos, Pepa. Josef Pepa Nos, *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/josefpepa.nos?fref=ts (31 July 2017).

Piknerová, Linda and Rybáková, Eva (2017): The "celebritization" of development – Bono Vox and Angelina Jolie as actors in development.' *Development, Environment and Foresight* 3 (1): 20–35.

Stop Multikulti (2015): Aleš Brichta: Multikulturalismus je boj kultur a ne jejich zbližování, available at: http://www.stop-multikulti.cz/products/ales-brichta-multikulturalismus-je-boj--kultur-a-ne-jejich-zblizovani/ (12 September 2017).

Street, John (2004): Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6 (4): 435–452.

Street, John (2012): Do Celebrity Politics and Celebrity Politicians Matter. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 14 (3): 346–356.

Suiter, Jane (2016): Post-truth Politics. *Political Insight* 7 (3): 25–27.

Svobodné rádio (2016): Host: hudebník Aleš Brichta [interview], *Svobodné rádio*, Studio Kladno – Spolek Svobodné rádio, (9 November): available at http://svobodne-radio.cz/download/2016-11-09-studio-kladno-host-hudebnik-ales-brichta/?wpdmdl=6494 (30 October 2017).

Špulák, Jaroslav (2016): Vilém Čok: Politika je svinstvo. Bohužel je nutná, *Novinky.cz* (23 May): available at https://www.novinky.cz/kultura/404083-vilem-cok-politika-je-svinstvo-bohuzel--je-nutna.html (21 October 2017).

Tallis, Benjamin (2016): Living in Post-truth, *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 24 (1): 7–18.

The Economist (2016): Art of the Lie, *The Economist* (10 September): available at https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21706525-politicians-have-always-lied-does-it-matter-if-they--leave-truth-behind-entirely-art (11 October 2017).

Tsipursky, Gleb (2017): Towards a post-lies future: Fighting „Alternative Facts" and „Post-Truth Politics", *The Humanist* (21 February): available at https://thehumanist.com/magazine/march--april-2017/features/towards-post-lies-future (11 November 2017).

Welcome to Reality (2016): VIDEO: To musíte vidět! (21 December): available at http://vitejte-realite.blogspot.cz/2016/12/ (7 July 2017).

Wheeler, Mark (2013): *Celebrity Politics. Image and Identity in Contemporary Political Communications*, Polity Press.

Žižková, Olivie (2016): Evropo dýchej, Youtube (2. 8. 2016): available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meXpKEhXKxw (28 August 2017).

Žižková, Olivie. Olivie Žižková (White gipsy), *Facebook*: available at https://www.facebook.com/oliviezizkova/friends_mutual?pnref=eh (31 July 2017).

***Přemysl Rosůlek** is Associate Professor of Political Sciencee affiliated to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic. E-mail: rosulek@kap.zcu.cz.*

DISCUSSION

The Kallikrates vs the Kapodistrias Reforms in Greece: A Story of Moderate Success

VASILIKI KALIMERI

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422)
Vol. 14, No. 1
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0003

Abstract: *This article aims to analyse and evaluate the implementation of Greek local government reforms based on the surrounding economic and political situation. The main two reforms in question, the Kapodistrias and the Kallikrates programmes, both tried to modernise the state under the influence of Greece's European Union membership. Though revolutionary for its era, the Kapodistrias programme soon reached its limits. The newer Kallikrates reform, adopted under pressure from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund due to the economic crisis, has sought to reduce public spending and create a leaner state. Nevertheless, largely because of its external origins, even this more recent reform has failed to improve the deteriorating Greek local government sector.*

Keywords: ***Greece, local government, reforms, municipalities, prefectures, regions, economic crisis, Council of Europe***

Introduction

Decentralisation is defined by the World Bank as the transfer of authority and responsibilities for public services from central governments to regional governments, quasi-independent government organisations and/or the private sector. Article 101, paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution establishes a "decentralisation" principle covering the administration of the state: "Administration of the state shall be organised according to a principle of decentralisation." Article 102 paragraph 1 further specifies: "The administration of local affairs shall be performed by first- and second-tier local authorities. In the administration of local affairs, there is a presumption of local authorities' competence."

At the outset, we should note that over the last three decades in Greece, decentralisation has been pursued through the Kapoditrias and Kallikrates programmes, two different reforms at local government level. The more recent Kallikrates project represents a major administrative reform for Greece. The associated law, Act no. 3852/2010 was first applied in the November 2010 local elections and came into full effect in January 2011. The Kallikrates reform has introduced a comprehensive decentralisation process, rearranging the distribution of power in the Greek state in favour of local government. Its two central pillars are the advancement of local and regional authorities and the establishment of institutional bodies including regional and municipal advisory and executive committees.

The development of local self-government in Greece: a historical analysis

Since the establishment of the Greek state in 1830, civil service corruption, bureaucracy and clientelism have been seen as the main problems facing the Greek public sector.[1] Particularly since the country's accession to the European Union in 1981, another ongoing obstacle affecting development has been the weak and inefficient implementation of adopted European legislation. For these reasons, assessing the success of any reform calls for consideration of whether it has significantly changed the domestic legal situation.

The modern Greek state was inspired by the French Napoleonic institutional model of territorial organisation. Even the Constitution adopted through the 1821 Greek revolution – that is, before the establishment of the modern state – reflected the idea of a state organised by principles of local self-governance and popular participation.

A closer historical analysis suggests that under the 1912 territorial system, municipalities (*demoi*) and communities (*koinotites*) were the only self-governing entities. These local authorities appear to have been rather small with limited powers and insufficient financial resources.[2] The country was further divided into prefectures (*nomarchia*), which were deconcentrated outposts of the central state headed by a prefect (*nomarchis*) appointed by the government.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Greece remained a centralised (Athens-centric) state, highly corrupt and controlled by clientelistic practices. Local authorities continued to be seen as a danger to the central state.

The first attempt to introduce effective administrative reforms took place in the mid-80s in connection with Greece's European Union membership. The European Union was then introducing a programme of service liberalisation

1 The state's extensive collaboration with powerful private companies has been a particular concern.

2 Eighty-five percent of these entities had fewer than 1000 residents.

and privatisation and Greece was obliged to adopt new policies to qualify for European funds. Many EU states were also taking steps to reform their public sectors, influenced by a new public management theory whose aim was to decrease public spending and install new management practices at local level. In contrast, Greece's forays into these reforms were very delayed, coming only in the late 1990s when other European countries were beginning to experience the negative consequences of this doctrine.

After two failed attempts at establishing an upper level of decentralised government with general powers (1913–1953 and 1970–1973), Greece adopted Act no. 1622/1986, introducing thirteen administrative regions. This system was finally installed under Presidential Decree no. 51 on 6 March 1987. The regions in question lacked broad powers, having been set up to coordinate regional development so that Greece could take advantage of European structural funds.[3] They were controlled by a regional secretary-general appointed by the government.

In the meantime, the modernising of the public sector had emerged as a complete failure. The sector had gradually been expanded and the civil service was highly politicised with patronage being a very common practice. Strong labour unions also appeared and blocked many reforms. The majority of policies represented reforms that had been externally driven due to the Europeanisation process without any real knowledge of what they were intended to improve (Manojlovic 2011).[4]

Eventually, Greece's local self-government system was formed through two successive reform processes, the Kapodistrias and Kallikrates programmes, which reduced the huge number of municipalities, replaced prefectures with regions as the second level of local government and transferred a set of powers from the central government to the municipalities and regions.

The Kapodistrias reform

Until 1994, municipalities across both urban and rural areas were the only decentralised authorities in Greece.[5] These local authorities lacked the resources, however, to undertake any significant tasks. Under Act No. 2218/1994, the prefectures also became self-governing authorities, and certain state tasks were

3 This reorganisation of the state was a precondition for the receipt of these funds.

4 Manojlovic (2011) puts it: "[T]hese reforms proved to be exterior reforms in which new institutions were created and former existing institutions transformed, but the performance of the entire public sector remained untouched. Interior reforms that comprise the change of administrative culture, as well as the change in the way public sector operates, were not conducted" (p. 41).

5 As well as municipalities, Greece contained provinces (*nomoi*), however beginning from 1833, they were directed by provincial governors (*nomarchoi*), who were government appointees. In 1994, the provinces were turned into territorial authorities with elected councils; the provincial governors (now leaders of the successful parties) became their heads.

deconcentrated and transferred to regional level. In other words, the regions took over the role that the prefectures had played until then. Prefects were elected and their administration was reinforced through a set of jurisdictions. Seen from one standpoint, these 1994 reforms were in fact fairly radical: not only did they convert the provinces into territorial authorities with elected assemblies and leaders but they endowed them almost immediately with all the powers previously exercised by appointed provincial governors. On the other hand, these new authorities remained financially dependent on the central state budget.

As part of this framework, the government adopted the Kapodistrias programme (Act No. 2539/1997), which aimed to reduce the number of local authorities, create stronger municipalities equipped to handle new tasks, promote local development and provide modern-style social services to the public. In concrete terms, this called for a reorganisation of institutions, powers, staff and financial resources.

Under the Kapodistrias reforms, local government was comprised of two completely independent levels of power. The first level contained 900 municipalities and 134 communities, all of which had full administrative autonomy.[6] These municipalities were run by a mayor, a deputy mayor, a municipal council and a mayoral committee elected for four years through direct universal suffrage. The second level consisted of fifty self-governing prefectures, three of which were supra-prefectures made up of large geographical clusters (for instance, the Athens-Piraeus supra-prefecture). These prefectures were deconcentrated entities headed by an elected prefect, a prefectural council and a prefectural committee; the legality of their decisions and actions was to be overseen by the thirteen regions. The highest regional authority was a secretary-general appointed by Greece's Council of Ministers on the Minister of Interior's recommendation. During this period, the province system was also abolished.

The Kapodistrias reforms converted local institutions into municipal authorities at provincial level and developed a decentralised state administration at regional level. Subsequent governments – especially the Karamanlis government of 2004 and 2007 – set out to achieve more efficient administrative reforms, adopting new policies including the reorganisation of local administration (and the local self-government system) under a broad and ambitious programme known as the "re-founding of the state." This policy introduced innovative regulations around different aspects of local participation including local referenda, rights to information and to lodge petitions, municipal citizens' charters and an annual accountability requirement for local authorities.

6 The Kapodistrias reforms (Act no. 2539/1997) amalgamated 5755 municipalities and rural communities into 900 larger municipalities and 134 expanded communities but did not upgrade the powers of these amalgamated municipalities and communities. As a result, the number of first-tier local authorities was reduced from 5775 to 1033.

In the meantime, other measures had been taken to upgrade the local public sector. Among them was another ambitious programme known as Politeia, which sought to enhance structural reforms to the organisation, processes and activities of public administration and facilitate citizen participation. Its main achievement was the creation of non-stop "citizen service centres" (KEP) where citizens could seek out any service. As part of the state's fight against corruption, a number of special inspection bodies were set up including an administrative inspectorate, a financial inspectorate and a financial crime crackdown body.[7] These bodies were tasked with performing regular and ad hoc inspections to ensure efficient and transparent administration. Furthermore, in 1998, a Greek ombudsman was appointed to mediate between citizens and the public administration. This entity remains responsible for investigating specific administrative acts and omissions by government departments and public agencies.

Although the Kapodistrias plan introduced some changes to the local government system, it did not complete the process of decentralising power and reinforcing local institutions. This was because too much authority was still vested in the central government. As a result, Greece remained one of the most centralised countries in Europe.

The Kallikrates reform

A third stage of local government reform started in 2010 after the breakdown of the Greek economic system. A new initiative was launched by socialist party PASOK after its victory in the 2009 elections. The new government's reforms aimed to abolish small municipalities, which had been starved of funds and left unable to perform their tasks, and to reduce the number of government employees. In this context, the Kallikrates programme was adopted with the goal of not only creating a smaller state but cutting public spending in line with ongoing proposals from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.[8] This reform was an essential first step for the creation of independent, transparent and reliable domestic structures and the pursuit of cost-cutting and effective governance. Significantly, these were also preconditions for Greece's receipt of funds from the Troika – that is, the IMF, the EU and the European Central Bank.

In fact, the need for this reform was tied in other important ways to Greece's participation in international and European organisations. In general, participation of this kind necessarily leads to the delegation of substantial power to governance levels beyond the state. Policy-making, rule-making and

7 The financial crime crackdown body was known as the Civil Service Internal Inspectorate. It was established in 2002.

8 See Act no. 3852/2010 (ΦΕΚ 87/Β/7. 6. 2010) "New Architecture for Self-Governance and Decentralisation – the Kallikratis Programme" (*Νέα Αρχιτεκτονική της Αυτοδιοίκησης και της Αποκεντρωμένης Διοίκησης – Πρόγραμμα Καλλικράτης)*. [Add publication details?]

planning are, for example, largely delegated to the global and regional levels of governance. In addition, even after the Kapodistrias reforms, local entities in Greece continued to have limited autonomy from a tax standpoint; they remained largely dependent on central government funds. This meant that they could not contribute to strengthening the Greek economy. This was an unacceptable situation for the Committee of the Regions and the Directorate of Regional Policy of the European Commission, whose criteria required Greece to reform its administrative system and set up effective decentralised local entities with real powers and adequate funds.

Under the Kallikrates reforms, which remain in place today, the first and lowest level of power has been assigned to the municipalities (*dhmos*), whose number has been reduced from 914 to 325. The 325 municipalities have been further divided into local communities and municipal communities (the latter are known as "communi-cities" and have a population of fewer than 2000 citizens). In this way, the Greek municipalities have achieved a population of 31,000 residents in line with other municipalities in the European Union. Administration of these municipalities falls to a mayor, a deputy mayor, a municipal council,[9] an economic affairs committee, a quality-of-life committee[10] and an executive committee.[11] Municipalities with a population exceeding 10,000 citizens also have an advisory committee made up of local community groups.[12]

But the main innovation of the Kallikrates reforms has been the establishment of the regions as an "intermediate" level of government between municipalities and the state. The 54 prefectures, which were the second level of local self-government, have been abolished and their role taken up by various regions (*periféreies*). These regions are self-governing territorial legal entities, and they form the upper division of local government. In each region, regional authorities (*Perifereiakes Enotites*) have been set up within the boundaries of the former prefectures and the once insular provinces (*eparchy*). Two metropolitan regions have also been introduced (in Attice and Thessaloniki/Central Thessaloniki respectively) in order to promote environmental protection and improve quality of life and urban and land planning in these areas. The main tasks of these new

9 This council has between thirteen and forty-seven members depending on the size of the municipality.

10 The quality-of-life committee has been set up in municipalities with a population of over 10,000 residents. It consists of the mayor and a number of municipal councilors elected by the municipal council. Its responsibilities include urban planning, land planning, environmental issues, business and shop licensing and deciding on street market spaces and outdoor trading places. The committee also has a special responsibility for enhancing quality of life in the municipality.

11 The executive committee is described as a joint executive and coordinating body that is responsible for preparing and implementing the municipality's work programme. It is also charged with monitoring and implementing municipal decisions. Executive committees have been set up in municipalities with more than one deputy mayor. They are presided over by the mayor and composed of deputy mayors.

12 A second advisory committee in these municipalities brings together representatives of local stakeholders such as businesses, trade unions, chambers of commerce and NGOs.

entities include implementing European development policies and promoting regional development projects and competition.

Each self-governing region is administered by an elected regional general secretary,[13] a deputy general secretary, a regional council, an executive committee and an economic and social affairs committee.[14] There is also a regional advisory committee with members drawn from business, industry and labour groups and a regional ombudsman for business and citizens' affairs. The region's head (*Peripheriarchs*) is responsible for protecting the public interest, monitoring implementation of regional development plans and performing other regional duties transparently and efficiently. The regional council takes care of all regional issues not assigned by law to other regional bodies.

For these purposes, the regions have been endowed with administrative powers and given their own budgets (to be allocated by the state and implemented by regional governors) and their own staff. At the same time, they lack any independent legal personality and remain an echelon of the state administration, which is answerable to the central government.

Furthermore, seven general directorates have also been created. They are not local self-governing authorities but perform the role previously played by the regions as deconcentrated state powers with a state-appointed general secretary and an unelected advisory council. The directorates are responsible for town and urban planning and environment, forestry, migration, citizenship and energy policies. They are also meant to oversee actions and decisions taken at the first and second levels of local government and, in particular, to ensure legality and transparency across their administration. For this reason, a separate independent service has been installed within each directorate to supervise local government; it is run by an auditor who reviews the legality of all actions and decisions at the two self-governing levels.

In addition to all these measures, the Kallikrates reforms have reduced the minimum age of election to 18 years for municipal and regional councillors and 21 years for the mayor and the general secretary, thus enabling the active participation of young people in local affairs. In another key change to the mandate, the term of office for local authorities has become five years. Since 2014, subnational elections have taken place at the same time as European parliament elections, with elected officials receiving a five-year mandate. Moreover, the right to vote and to stand for office as municipal councillors and deputy mayors has been extended to legal immigrants, with the aim of promoting their integration into local communi-cities. Each municipality also has a council responsible for migrant integration and a local ombudsman (*Symparastatis*) for business

13 The direct election of governors is intended to increase citizens' participation in the region.

14 The economic committee is responsible for financial oversight and the regular monitoring of the municipality's economic performance. It designs the municipal budget and proposes potential charges, fees and levies to the municipal council.

and citizens' affairs. This ombudsman serves for five years and is authorised to investigate claims of improper administration and draft an annual report on the protection of citizens' rights by municipal authorities.

As part of their programme of abolishing political appointments and increasing public sector transparency, the Kallikrates reforms have also tried to set up very strict controls over municipal and regional spending under the supervision of the Court of Auditors. Financial committees and executive committees have been established to deal with government corruption and professionalise financial accounting. Local government spending commitments are tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance so that the state can ensure numerical targets/quantitative criteria.[15] Furthermore, for transparency reasons, each local government decision must be published and made accessible online.[16] This is also meant to build citizens' trust in the actions of local authorities.

Nevertheless, in spite of all this progress, there have been persistent problems including a lack of communication and interaction between the national and subnational levels of power. Another key issue is the lack of statutory powers of municipal authorities, preventing them from regulating local affairs. Moreover, some of the most important public services including education, health and social protection systems remain subject to direct and comprehensive control by the central government.

Reasons for the partial failure of the Kallikrates reform

It is known that the economic and financial environment has a critical impact on the decentralisation process. As far as the Kallikrates programme is concerned, we should bear in mind that the implementation of this reform coincided with the start of the economic crisis, which has had profound effects on Greece. For this reason, the Kallikrates project must also be assessed in the general context of the financial crisis and the Troika's demands to reduce spending and the size of the public sector.

In fact, Greece adopted all of these measures under the pressure of several memoranda produced by the Troika.[17] Particularly in the first and second

15 Under Articles 275 and 276 of the law establishing the Kallikrates programme, the Court of Auditors has the power to supervise the financial activities of local authorities (municipalities and regions). The court should perform a preventive audit of all expenses incurred by municipalities, regions and their legal bodies (excluding school committees) as well as public utilities and municipal water supply/sewerage enterprises and municipal limited companies. These rules apply regardless of population size.

16 Another achievement has been the open government initiative, introduced in 2009 just before Greece's signing of a related Troika memorandum. This programme requires the online publication of certain calls for open positions. The Diavgeia programme – *diavgeia* means transparency in Greek – aims to make all acts by government and public administrative bodies available for revew online.

17 There were three specific memoranda:
1. the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP)
2. the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU)

of these documents, there were specific provisions concerning local government's role in ensuring overall austerity. The Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) called for the reorganisation of sub-central levels of government in order to reduce the number of local administrative divisions and elected/appointed officials. This memorandum also specified that "[p]arliament should adopt legislation to reform the public sector at the local level, notably by amalgamating municipalities, prefectures and regions in order to reduce operating costs and the wages bill." Another memorandum endorsed by the Greek government advised that "the bulk of the change will be achieved through spending cuts that aim to permanently streamline the state and improve government efficiency by winding up entities that no longer deliver a cost-effective public service and through targeted cuts to public sector employment." Greece's adoption of these memoranda has posed a lot of problems; the most important concern is that the new measures arose from external pressures and were put into place quite fast without the necessary consultation at the local and regional levels.[18]

In 2015, the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities visited Greece in order to monitor the implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-government. The Congress also outlined some problems in the complex implementation of the new reform.

The Congress expressed concerns about the role of – and indeed need for – the seven new state authorities (directorates general), noting that the distribution of power and responsibilities remained unclear among the state administration, regions and municipalities. The Congress also highlighted local entities' lack of statutory powers, observing that they did not have the authority to regulate local affairs.[19] This recent monitoring report has also made clear that the Greek regions cannot be considered to be "regions" in the context of the Council of Europe Reference Framework for Regional Democracy; rather, they represent a second tier of local government. This is because they lack regulatory powers as self-organising entities and have limited power as tax authorities. While the

3. the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality

18 Article 4 paragraph 6 of the European Charter of Local Self-government reads: "Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-making processes for all matters which concern them directly." In just one example of the problem, the geographical boundaries prescribed do not correspond with actual boundaries in some cases.

19 The European Charter of Local Self-government refers to the right and capacity of local authorities to "regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population" (Art. 3, para. 1). The term "substantial" remains open to interpretation, however. Moreover, this provision refers to local authorities in general rather than the separate levels of local authority in a particular state. In the final analysis, it is up to the national legislator to determine – directly or indirectly – what local matters comprise – and it may decide to broaden or narrow this definition for general policy reasons.

regions may establish their own organisational charter and define internal administrative rules, this must be done within the strict framework of national laws.

The most significant point raised by the report, however, is the lack of adequate concomitant funding for the transfer of powers to local authorities, which rely mainly on state funds. In fact, throughout the financial crisis, the Greek central government has tried to transfer some of its powers to the local level without providing adequate funding. This is despite the recognition in Article 9 of the European Charter of Local Self-government that "local authorities' financial resources shall be commensurate with the responsibilities provided for by the Constitution and the law." What we have seen has, thus, been more like the devolution of austerity policies. Furthermore, during the first year of the implementation of the Kallikrates reforms, the central government cut funding to local authorities by 25% or 1.2 billion euros. Increasingly, local and regional authorities have faced cuts of 60% to the central government budget for this kind of funding. According to one explanation raised several times by rapporteurs, the implementation of the reform has been deeply affected by the economic crisis.

Conclusion

The main purpose of the article has been to offer a historical perspective on the development of the local self-government system in Greece. To this end, I have mapped the progress achieved with a special focus on the two latest system reforms, analysing both the reasons for their adoption and the implementation process. In fact, both the Kapodistrias and Kallikrates programmes reorganised not just the Greek local government system but the overall administration of the country. Both aspired to modernise the state by upgrading local government's role in the regional planning process and they led to a few important achievements in terms of spatial planning and social capital. The Kallikrates reform, in particular, put special emphasis on state efficiency; through a bottom-up process, it aimed to create economies of scale, improve the management of human and financial resources and deliver professional quality services. Ultimately, however, any improvements to social capital were extremely limited, perhaps because the reform's implementation began during a major financial crisis in Greece.

Despite the abolition of Greece's self-governing prefectures and remaining provinces and the transfer of its thirteen regions from the decentralised state to local government, the state remains a distinctly unitary entity with no real split in the atom of sovereignty. Even the term "region" is deceptive: these regions are simply administrative districts, and apart from certain ministerial agencies, the regional governor is the only administrative authority. Furthermore, local authorities do not have tax-generating powers. Another problem

is clearly the country's new directorates general, which highlight the central government's goal of decentralising systems while retaining all power in its own hands. From this point of view, the reforms have not had the expected results.

Given all these factors, the most important next steps may be to limit the responsibilities of the directorates general, assign more tasks and powers to local and regional self-governing authorities and push for financial decentralisation in order to fight corruption and clientelism. Reducing the number of public servants may also prove beneficial (Torres Pereira – Mosler-Tornstrom 2015).

We may conclude that neither the Kapodistrias nor the Kallikrates reform took account of the particularity of the Greek case and they therefore failed to achieve the expected success. It may be that the entire Greek public sector needs reforming in addition to any changes to local self-government.[20] The question that persists is whether the latest reforms, driven by European pressure and prepared in a hurry because of the economic crisis, are Greece's last chance to break the inertia and finally change its public administration system. As such, the challenge for Greece is now to "Hellenise" the measures required by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund; if it can't do this, any reforms will fail. The present crisis presents a once-in-a-generation chance for change, and we may need to wait a few years to see whether new reforms succeed.

References

Akrivopoulou, C. – Dimitropoulos, G. – Koutnatzis, S.-I. (3/2012): The Kallikratis Program, The Influence of International and European Policies on the Reforms of Greek Local Government, Istituzioni del Federalismo: 653

Andreadis, I. – Chadjipadelis. T.: The 2010 Elections for the Greek Regional Authorities, http://www.polres.gr/en/sites/default/files/PSA2011-GPSG.pdf

Code of Civil Servants (1999):Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, Issue No A/19, 9. 2. 1999. Act no. 2683/1999: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/14/35526160.pdf

Constitution of Greece, as revised by a parliamentary resolution on 27 May 2008 of the Eighth Revisionary Parliament: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf

Ioannidis, P. (2015): Decentralization, Local Government Reforms and Perceptions of Local Actors: The Greek Case. MPRA Paper No. 66420

Hlepas, N. – Getimis. P. (2011): Greece: Prefectures, in Loughlin, J. – Hendriks, F. – Lidström, A. The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe, 410–433. Oxford University Press.

20 To reform the entire system, the government will need to consider areas such as the civil service and the pension system.

Hlepas, N. (2010): The impact of local government reforms in Greece: A critical overview, in Impact of Reforms on Public Administration in the Balkan States. National Experiences in Public Administration in the Balkans from Weberian Bureaucracy to New Public Management, Workshop, Athens, EPLO.

Manojlovic, R. (2011): Public Sector Reforms in Greece: Uncertain Outcome of 2010 Reforms. Croatian & Comparative Public Administration 11(2):337–377.

Panara, C. – Varney, M. (2013): Local Government in Europe. The Fourth level in the EU multi-layered system of governance, Routledge,

Rhodio, G. – Van Nistelrooij, L. (2001): Report on the situation of local and regional democracy in Greece.

Sarafopoulos, G. – Hazakis, K. – Ioannidis, P. (2014): Modeling economic growth policy interaction with local government reform: Evidence from Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, in Journal of Economics and Business 17(2).

Skamnakis, C. (2011): Smaller Governments, Less Social Policy? Paper delivered at the Social Policy Association annual conference, Lincoln, UK, http://www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln2011/Skamnakis%20P3.pdf.

Skordas, A. (2010): Greece's Financial Crisis : The Politics of Resolution and Reform, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Southeast Europe Project, 24 March 2010.

Spanou, C. (2003): L'administration grecque en mutation: le double défi de la démocratisation et de l'européanisation, Pôle Sud, 18(1):51–62.

Torres Pereira, A. – Mosler-Tornstrom, G. (2015): Local and regional democracy in Greece. Local and regional monitoring committee, Council of Europe, 28th session, Strasbourg, 24–26 March 2015.

Vamvakas, P. – Kulich-Vamvakas, C., European Economic Crisis: Enhancing Good Regional Governance in the EU? The Case of Greece: http://www.umdcipe.org/conferences/DecliningMiddleClassesSpain/Papers/Petros.pdf

***Vasiliki Kalimeri**, Ph.D., studied Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki/ Greece and the University of Paris 1 Panthéon–Sorbonne. She works as the legal policy assistant in the European Commission and Attorney-at-law (Paris Bar Association). E-mail: vasiliki.klm@gmail.com*

Challenges to European Integration: Missions and Instruments[1]

TAMÁS SZEMLÉR

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422)
Vol. 14, No. 1
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0004

Abstract: *The aim of this article is to highlight challenges to European integration by raising key concerns and generating debate about potential responses. This discussion is intended to be a starting point for further research and the development of more policy-specific recommendations to tackle these challenges successfully. I begin by explaining the need for a clear and realistic integration mission and then turn to the example of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), one of the most tangible achievements of European integration policy. The EMU also highlights the critical importance of clarity and realism in any approach to integration. My analysis moves next to the challenges that the EU is facing today and considers how the European Commission has evaluated and reacted to these challenges. Finally I propose some key elements of – and make the case for – a constructive practical approach.*

Keywords: ***European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, crisis, mission, multi-speed integration, flexibility.***

Introduction

The history of European integration has shown us several times that the perception of real challenges is what drives the integration process forward. Without a significant challenge, the mission of the integration process may become unclear to all or some Member States. This can endanger integration itself,

1 This work was commissioned by the National University of Public Service as part of project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 – "Public Service Development for Establishing Good Governance" at the Ludovika workshop.

potentially leading to partial or complete disintegration. Of course, serious challenges may also be seen as dangers, but each challenge faced and survived can strengthen the EU and so contribute to its development. The entire history of the European Monetary Union (EMU) – including not just developments in recent years but also earlier turbulence and its resolution in the 1970s – is one of the most tangible examples of this process.

Today the EU faces a number of challenges. These include insufficient social and territorial cohesion, mass immigration, negative demographic developments, questionable competitive practices and the lack of any real strategy regarding many problems in the EU's neighbourhood. These challenges are best approached as opportunities to reform – or, if required, radically change – traditional policies and approaches in these fields. In order to arrive at that point, however, we will need to open up an EU-wide political discussion of these topics and set priorities – which will, of course, mean some compromises. Based on the outcomes of this process, various mechanisms – and not only financial means – will need to be added to specific policies at the relevant (local/regional/country/country-group/EU) level.

It is clear that this proposed approach reflects a model of multi-speed integration. While some may be afraid of this process, it must be emphasised that given the current depth of integration and the number and great variety of Member States concerned, this is the only realistic way forward. Multi-speed integration has already become a reality, however this is not a tragedy. The true tragedy would be if the integration process were ended solely for the sake of the unrealistic goal of preserving (an already non-existent) uniformity.

This article aims to tackle these issues by taking a realistic but at the same time optimistic approach.[2] My objective is to propose ideas and provide a discussion that can inspire further research and the elaboration of more policy-specific recommendations. Bearing this in mind, I begin by highlighting the need for a clear and realistic mission concerning European integration and then turn to one of the most striking achievements of EU integration, the Economic and Monetary Union. The EMU, I show, exemplifies the importance of clarity and realism around the integration project. This article then considers key challenges for the European integration process today. I describe the European Commission's evaluation of and response to these challenges, and finally, propose some key elements of and arguments for a constructive practical approach.

2 This article draws on elements of my presentation "What Doesn't Kill the EU Makes the EU Stronger" based on a draft concept paper with the same title. This presentation was delivered at the 2016 ECPR General Conference at Charles University, Prague, 7–10 September, 2016. This article is a new, expanded and fully updated work.

The Need for a Mission

Defining a mission is a critical step in the life of every institution or system; this is also true of the European integration process. Originally, the mission of the whole process was formulated based on the situation that Europe found itself in after World War II. As the first sentences of the Schuman Declaration stated, peaceful development and establishing long-term guarantees for that process were the most important objectives (see Box 1).

Box 1: Thoughts on the mission of the European integration process in the beginning

Excerpt from the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950:

"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.

The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries."

Source: Schuman (1950).

Since then, the French-German partnership in particular has become a reality, surviving fundamental political and economic changes, including most crucially the reunification of Germany. We have also seen the conclusion of a key sectoral treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community followed by broader treaties on the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.

These ties led to rapid development in the form of deepening integration with the achievement of many treaty goals in the 1950s and 1960s. In the beginning, the number of participating countries was limited, but in the 1970s, it began to grow, and today the majority of countries in Europe are included. This widening scope of integration – reflected in a series of enlargements and the appearance of candidate countries – speaks to the success of the process in different fields, which has attracted many countries that share the basic values associated with this integration.

Nevertheless, as a result of internal and external changes over this long period and the accomplishment of some of the original goals, new and unforeseen challenges have also emerged. On several occasions, these have raised

questions about the success of the European integration process and thus the long-term sustainability of its original mission. In some cases, they have also given rise to Euroscepticism and even – since the first half of the 1980s – claims of "Eurosclerosis."[3]

It must be noted that challenges can play a very important role in defining – and, if and when necessary, redefining – an organisation's mission. In principle, this can also happen independently of any challenges. In most cases, however, such independence is unrealistic – and pressure plays a key part in changing the status quo or even just raising the prospect of its reform. Along these lines, I would argue that both external and internal challenges have been very important in defining, and subsequently on various occasions, redefining the objectives of European integration.

Of course, such challenges can also be dangerous. To a great extent, our ability to judge whether a response to a challenge was positive or negative will depend on the timing of our observations. While a challenge judged to be too great may damage an organisation in the short and medium term, the effects could still prove positive over the longer term. European integration has a rich history of such situations including, as we will see, what is probably the most compelling example – the case of the Economic and Monetary Union.

There are, it is true, some challenges that prove lethal – but they are the exception. These challenges are also hard to identify at the outset. When it comes to European integration, pessimists have seen each new challenge facing the European Union as fatal – and yet the EU continues to exist. Furthermore, even the biggest challenges can be tackled satisfactorily if the power of the European Union (and its Member States) is applied effectively. Needless to say, this may call for adaptation, institutional changes, financial resources and – above all – political will. But adaptation is crucial to the progress of the European Union: the series of adaptations that have taken place over decades of EU history can be seen as part of a learning process.[4] Even if this learning can sometimes appear painfully slow, the main thing is that it occurs in the long run. And this process can be sped up under pressure.

We can also grasp the importance of challenges in defining the mission of European integration by considering those periods when these challenges were

3 Mongelli (2008) writes: "[T]he term 'Eurosclerosis' was coined to describe a pattern of high unemployment, slow job creation, low participation to the labour force and weakening overall economic growth during the 1980s and most of the 1990s […]. Eurosclerosis contrasted with the more dynamic experience of the United States where economic expansion was accompanied by high job growth" (p. 22). The term also has somewhat different and broader political implications. It is widely thought that the period of Eurosclerosis came to an end with the adoption of the plan for a single European market – a plan that clearly offered a new vision for European integration and helped fulfil this updated mission.

4 In fact, all the treaties express at least an intention to adapt to changing conditions. For a chronological overview of treaties concluded by the European Union (and its predecessors), see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties/treaties-overview.html.

not present. These were periods when there were, of course, some unresolved tasks, but no really big internal or external problems. In these circumstances, a mission and associated challenges had to be "invented" by the leaders of the integration process, of course, taking into account past experiences and the current environment. A consensus then had to be reached among the Member States about this mission.

This consensus among the Member States is an important issue. Attaining a consensus first proved crucial during the so-called empty chair crisis of 1965, which was eventually solved by the Luxembourg compromise of 1966.[5] This solution paved the way for the continuation of the integration process. With more and more Member States on the scene, however, achieving this consensus has become increasingly difficult.[6]

In this situation, as we have seen, adaptation is vital: there is a need for the ongoing creation of mechanisms that will allow the European integration process to forge ahead even at times when some Member States are not ready to back a particular – and potentially important – step that others would like to take. Differences between the Member States' positions and their willingness to deepen ties should not be treated as irresolvable. Rather, they must be seen as challenges that once again require us to find good responses that will enable development.

An Exemplary Case: the Economic and Monetary Union

The history of the European integration process is unique. At the same time, it cannot be said that the steps leading up to the current state and depth of integration were always easy. While the general trend has been positive, the history is full of ups and downs. This is also because in many cases, the leaders of the European integration process were able to learn from the "downs" and to turn them into "ups."

The history of the Economic and Monetary Union may best exemplify this pattern. To understand the EMU's genesis, we need to return to the tumult of the first half of the 1970s, which had swept away the original ideas of the Werner Plan.[7] For a couple of years, it may have seemed that the plan had been abandoned altogether especially in view of other developments. Instead, however, what followed was the incremental development of the Economic and Monetary

5 For details of the reasons for the crisis and related background as well as its longer-term consequences, see Caraffini (2015).

6 For details of the Luxembourg compromise, see the official communications issued in January 1966 (Council of the European Economic Community 1966).

7 For details, see the full text of the Werner Plan (or Werner Report) (Council–Commission of the European Communities 1970).

Union along with the establishment of the European Currency Unit (ECU)[8] and the operation (and later reform) of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.

A key turn in this story took place in the 1980s when France declared that it would follow *la politique du franc fort* ["the policy of the strong franc"], an expression that carried extra symbolic weight since "Francfort" is the French name for the city of Frankfurt, home of Deutsche Bundesbank. This alignment of French and (West) German monetary policy was crucial for establishing the minimum economic preconditions needed for the creation of the EMU that was designed in Maastricht.

The EMU would undergo a crisis before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was complete, however the Member States managed through what at the time seemed like ad hoc solutions to overcome this situation and turn the euro into a success story.[9]

Of course, becoming a "success story" did not mean the elimination of all of the problems. In the very early stages (i.e. the first and second phases of the creation of the institutional framework for the future Eurozone), both the convergence criteria and their application attracted criticisms. At the time, these criticisms were overcome through political will, and the Eurozone went ahead even including Greece in its borders.

More than a decade later, some elements of the criticisms of the mid-1990s have proven to be accurate: the Eurozone has entered into a serious crisis and certain members have been hit particularly hard. In the short run, this may be seen as a major failure of European economic policy and European politics. Responses have, however, been considerably delayed – this is especially clear when we recall that critics in the 1990s warned of most of the problems that had surfaced by 2010.[10]

Nevertheless, the steps taken – even if delayed – have allowed us to avoid the worst case scenario (the collapse of the Eurozone) using new financing tools and mechanisms. This system is, of course, still far from ready but there are increasingly precise plans in place for its completion. Moreover, it has allowed for the continued operation of the Eurozone, already with slowly decreasing risks.

8 Created in 1979, the ECU was a basket of European Community Member States' currencies, which served as the official unit of account of the European Community until 1 January 1999 when the euro was introduced.

9 For a brief analysis of the history of the EMU from the Maastricht Treaty to 2017, see Lehmann – Umbach (2017).

10 It is very interesting to reread the so-called Schäuble-Lamers paper [Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik 1994] in light of the dramatic EMU crisis of 2010 since by this date, several key problems described in the paper had come to pass, and they were not limited to the EMU. The paper makes for illuminating reading today given the broader contexts it considered. On the topic of potential approaches (including differentiated or multi-speed integration), many of the points raised are still worthy of reflection. Significantly, one of the unnamed authors, Wolfgang Schäuble has recently written another document which presents his ideas on the future system for the EMU. See Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union (2017) (Schäuble's authorship is also uncredited in this document).

During this recent history of the Eurozone, the role of the Member States has been especially important from two standpoints. First, it has become very clear to everyone that the performance and approach (or philosophy) of the Member States remain crucial even in the thoroughly regulated field of European (economic) policy. Second, significant differences have appeared regarding the Member States' involvement in the new financial solutions and mechanisms aimed at stabilising the Eurozone.

This second fact, in particular, confirms that there are important differences in the Member States' interests and that the European Union can accept these differences. In this vein, differentiated integration is seen and acknowledged as a way forward – even in an integrated field where the choice to opt out was frozen decades ago.

Today's Challenges: How to Proceed?

In recent years, the news has been full of the challenges facing the European Union. These challenges include issues that have been well-known for some time and are largely economic in nature (e.g. insufficient social and territorial cohesion, problems concerning European growth and competitiveness, the Eurozone crisis) as well as others that have even broader implications and are at least partially new (e.g. mass immigration and its demographic consequences, the lack of any real strategy regarding the broadly defined EU neighbourhood, the problem of Brexit and other potential "xxxits").[11]

These challenges are often presented in the news and debates as issues that the European Union cannot deal with appropriately. This may be true at a given moment, and, of course, in the case of certain issues, we cannot be sure of future developments. However, I would argue that it is very important to approach these challenges as opportunities. They are, in particular, opportunities that promote changes – in institutional design, in strategies, in policies, in operating procedures – which would be needed in any case but could not attract sufficient political support without external pressure.

Of course, it is vital that the EU28 or at least a critical mass of Member States recognise(s) this need for political support in due time. A too slow and/or too weak response could cause serious or even fatal damage. But if the worst case scenario is avoided – and we should not forget that the European integration process has managed to avert this outcome over the course of many difficult situations in its first 65 years – then these experiences and adaptations can strengthen the process.

11 Significantly, there is currently far less news coverage about the successes of the integration process. Even when news stories state the facts about European integration correctly, the news is often cast in a negative light. For more details about this trend and the relationship between these kinds of communications and the definition of a mission, see Szemlér (2009), pp.130–131.

This broad approach should be borne in mind even in situations where various Member States propose different solutions to particular issues. These challenges should be seen as opportunities to reform (or, if necessary, even radically change) traditional policies and approaches in the fields they directly or even indirectly concern.

In the spring of 2017, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the European Commission began to make public its evaluation of the state of the European Union, outlining different scenarios for the future integration process.

In this vein, the Commission published its "White Paper on the Future of Europe" on 1 March 2017. This document addressed the current state of European integration along with major challenges to the process. It also set out five different scenarios for future development up to 2025[12] and described the major potential consequences of associated development paths. Table 1 summarises these consequences in some of the most important areas of integration.

Table 1: Five scenarios: A policy overview

	"Carry on"	"Nothing but the single market"	"Those who want more do more"	"Do less more efficiently"	"Do far more together"
Single market & trade	The single market is strengthened, including in the energy and digital sectors; the EU27 pursue progressive trade agreements.	The single market for goods and capital is strengthened; standards continue to differ; the free movement of people and services is not fully guaranteed.	As in the "Carry on" scenario, the single market is strengthened and the EU27 pursue progressive trade agreements.	Common standards are set to a minimum but enforcement is strengthened in areas regulated at EU level; trade is dealt with exclusively at EU level.	The single market is strengthened through harmonisation of standards and stronger enforcement; trade is dealt with exclusively at EU level.
Economic & Monetary Union	Incremental improvements are made to the functioning of the euro area.	Cooperation in the euro area is limited.	As in the "Carry on" scenario; an exception applies to a group of countries who deepen cooperation in areas such as taxation and social standards.	Several steps are taken to consolidate the euro area and ensure its stability; the EU27 are less active in some aspects of employment and social policy.	An economic, financial and fiscal Union is achieved, as envisaged in the report of the Five Presidents of June 2015.

12 According to the subtitle of this document, it presented "[r]eflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025" – as such, it considered Brexit to be a (future) fact.

	"Carry on"	"Nothing but the single market"	"Those who want more do more"	"Do less more efficiently"	"Do far more together"
Schengen, migration & security	Cooperation is gradually stepped up around external border management; progress is made on establishing a common asylum system; there is improved coordination around security matters.	No single migration or asylum policy unites the EU27; further security coordination is dealt with bilaterally; internal border controls are more systematic.	As in the "Carry on" scenario; an exception applies to a group of countries who deepen cooperation around security and justice matters.	There is systematic cooperation around border management, asylum policies and counter-terrorism matters.	As in the "Do less more efficiently" scenario, there is systematic cooperation around border management, asylum policies and counter-terrorism matters.
Foreign policy & defence	Progress is made towards speaking with one voice on foreign affairs issues; there is closer defence cooperation.	Some foreign policy issues are increasingly dealt with bilaterally; defence cooperation remains as it is today.	As in the "Carry on" scenario; an exception applies to a group of countries who deepen their defence cooperation with a focus on military coordination and joint equipment	The EU speaks with one voice on all foreign policy issues; the European Defence Union is created	As in the "Do less more efficiently" scenario, the EU speaks with one voice on all foreign policy issues; the European Defence Union is created
EU budget	Part of the budget is updated to reflect the reform agenda agreed on by the EU27.	The budget is refocused on essential financial operations needed for the single market.	As in the "Carry on" scenario; additional budgets are made available by some Member States in the areas where they decide to do more.	The budget is significantly redesigned to fit the new priorities agreed on at EU27 level.	The budget is significantly updated and increased, backed up by the EU27's own resources; there is euro area fiscal stabilisation.
Capacity to deliver	A positive agenda of actions yields concrete results; the decision-making process remains complex to grasp; the capacity to deliver does not always match expectations.	The decision-making process may be easier to understand but the capacity to act collectively is limited; issues of common concern often need to be solved bilaterally.	As in the »Carry on« scenario, a positive agenda of EU27 actions yields results; some groups achieve more together in certain domains; the decision-making process becomes more complex.	Reaching initial agreement about tasks to prioritise or give up is challenging; once in place, the decision-making process may be easier to understand; the EU acts faster and more decisively when it has a greater role.	Decision-making happens faster and enforcement is stronger across the board; questions of accountability arise for some who feel that the EU has taken too much power away from the Member States.

Source: European Commission 2017a:29.

As this table shows, the five scenarios presented in the White Paper could lead to very different results by 2025. These scenarios span a wide range of possibilities from a "minimalist" approach ("Nothing but the single market") to an idealistic future vision ("Doing much more together"). The three scenarios in between these poles reflect compromises in different respects: "Carrying on" describes the continuation of the European Union's current course of action with all the results and comforts but also all the problems of the status quo; "Doing less more efficiently" means focusing on (and therefore presumably making more progress in) fewer areas than is currently the case; "Those who want more do more" is a scenario that opens the way for multi-speed integration.

Significantly, all these scenarios refer to future actions. This means that pursuing the "Nothing but the single market" option, for example, would not destroy the EMU's achievements to date, but it also does not foresee any substantial progress in this field. A lack of progress could, however, endanger effective European integration in any area. The example of EMU is extremely interesting in this respect; the crisis which hit the Union in 2010 clearly reveals the realistic nature of this risk.

In fact, this danger might apply to any of the areas where European integration has led to considerable achievements since the 1950s. We should also note that some challenges could result in crises in other areas where no such results (no European policies or joint actions) have previously been seen. The most striking example is the mass immigration issue where brutal Europe-wide debates have caused not "only" intra-EU debates but the significant strengthening of radical political ideas and corresponding parties in a number of Member States.

The importance and, thus, the main message of these remarks, is that "carrying on'" would not mean maintaining our current situation. The challenges that we face make this impossible. Similarly, "Nothing but the single market" and "Doing less more efficiently" represent only partial responses (responses to challenges in one or just a few fields). "Doing much more together" seems politically unfeasible given the experiences of the last two decades.[13]

The White Paper had the merit of presenting the options (scenarios) very clearly while also highlighting some of the major potential consequences of these choices. Nevertheless, on its own, it was not the outline of a new strategy: rather, it was a new approach calling for a potentially wide-ranging political debate.

The White Paper was followed by several "Reflection Papers," which dealt in more detail with some of the key issues and challenges of European integration. Published between April and June 2017, these documents tackled the following issues in the order listed: social affairs, globalisation, the EMU, defence

13 The EMU may be understood as the last major European "project" that had the potential to include all Member States. Exercising their choice to opt out, the United Kingdom and Denmark became de jure exceptions to the rules; for all other Member States, joining the Eurozone was a question of timing (dependent on their ability or readiness to do so).

and EU finances (the EU budget) (European Commission 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e and 2017f).

The Reflection Papers on social affairs and EU finances applied the five scenarios in the White Paper under the same or similar names. In contrast, the Reflection Paper on defence outlined three scenarios whose scope differed from the scenarios in the White Paper. The remaining two Reflection Papers addressed the EMU and globalisation respectively, focusing in the first case on the means of completing the "project" and in the second on opportunities and the further steps needed to harness the effects of globalisation.

The differences in the structures of these papers should not be seen as a problem. On the contrary, it makes visible the differences in the potential courses of action that are open to the European Union in different fields. The White Paper and the Reflection Papers together provide a solid basis for reflection as well as political and public debate. The European Commission has, thus, done its homework by presenting this initiative. From this point onwards, it will fall to Member States' representatives – of course, acting together with and within European Union institutions – to agree on strategies, inform and convince the public, make concrete plans and take the necessary steps.

It was because of the obvious need for political backing from the Member States that 2017 was such a keenly anticipated year. Aside from several other major events, elections in the two biggest Member States – in France and Germany – were considered crucial for the future of European integration.

In both these states, big changes were not ruled out in the months before the election. In France, where some candidates had proposed abandoning the euro and returning to the franc among other anti-EU ideas, tensions ran very high at the beginning of 2017. In Germany, the chancellor's stance on mass immigration attracted strong criticisms, and at the start of 2017, the race between her and her main opponent looked wide open. This situation brought great uncertainty to a European Union that was still reeling from the shock of the Brexit referendum in the previous year.

Ultimately, the outcome of both elections proved to be calming from the points of view of most supporters of continued European integration (even if the new German government has not yet been formed): Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel emerged as the leaders of France and Germany, respectively. The most important tasks for these leaders include coordinating – and along with the leaders of other Member States – ensuring the required political groundwork for reforms, conceiving of a new vision (mission) with all its key elements and taking the first steps towards realising this vision.

Back in the summer of 2017, an exchange of ideas was begun between the newly elected French president and the German chancellor seeking re-election. Of course, given the difference between their situations at the time, it was the French president who took the more active role in this dialogue. His initiatives

addressed many aspects of the European integration project and were generally received positively if cautiously by his German partner, with discussion of the details being deferred until after the German elections.

Just two days after the German elections, when he was already aware of Merkel's victory, Macron delivered a key speech at the Sorbonne. This presentation emphasised the need for the "re-foundation of Europe" and outlined a vision of Europe both in general terms (see Box 2) and more detail (Macron 2017).

Box 2: Thoughts on the mission of the European integration process in 2017

Excerpt from a speech by Emmanuel Macron on 26 September 2017:

"The time for France to make proposals has returned. I'm thinking right now of Robert Schuman, who, in Paris on 9 May 1950, was bold enough to propose building Europe. I remember his powerful words: 'A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.'

So today, I take responsibility for making proposals, forging further ahead, being bold enough to talk about Europe and finding words of affection and ambition for it again. Not imposing, forcing or seeking to reinvent everything – many things have already been said – but taking the risk of proposing a coherent, ambitious vision, proposing a way forward, an objective, rather than discussing instruments, and taking the vital risk of proposing initiatives. Two days after our main partner's elections I want again to congratulate Federal Chancellor Merkel, whom I look forward to going on working with because we share the same European commitment, and I know her commitment to Europe. […]

So first of all I am making the proposal to Germany for a new partnership. We will not agree on everything, or straight away, but we will discuss everything. To those who say that is an impossible task, I reply: you may be used to giving up; I am not. To those who say it is too difficult, I say: think of Robert Schuman five years after a war, from which the blood was barely dry. On all the issues I have talked about, France and Germany can inject decisive, practical momentum. […] Let's produce another Élysée Treaty on 22 January next year.

[…] I have met 22 of my counterparts over the past few months; I want to work with every one of them, humbly but with determination, because this is our moment.

France's time for making proposals has returned, so I will be making proposals to everyone who shares this desire for a sovereign Europe, based on the central objectives I have mapped out: the desire for a united, differentiated Europe, for a democratic Europe supporting the conventions initiative, for launching in the next few weeks a group for the refoundation of Europe. This group will include representatives of each participating Member State and will involve European institutions."

Source: Macron 2017: 23–24.

One very important aspect of this vision of the future integration process was its positive approach to potential differences and refusal to exclude any Member States:

[L]et's embrace the differentiations, the vanguard, the heart of Europe I was talking about earlier. We've got to make progress on all our major challenges, quickening the pace and setting our sights higher. No State must be excluded from the process, but no country must be able to block those wanting to make faster progress or forge further ahead (Macron 2017: 23)

At the time of writing (late autumn of 2017), far more reforms have been put forward than was the case a year ago. At that time, we were still dealing with the fresh shock of the Brexit referendum and uncertainties around France and Germany along with an external factor, the unexpected outcome of US elections, which injected yet another element of uncertainty. Currently, however, there is good news: the French and German elections (and even the less internationally significant Dutch contest) have brought some calm to the supporters of the European integration process. Moreover, despite some turbulence, the relationship with the new US administration is still functional. It is now up to the leaders of the Member States to use this opportunity to move ahead.

Concluding remarks

The previous parts of this article have discussed the importance of challenges and the need to have a mission. I have also highlighted a compelling example from the history of European integration to support these ideas. Finally, I have stressed the need to overcome the stalemate that the European integration process has found itself in since the mid-2010s and outlined the road maps presented by the European Commission in 2017.

In order to proceed with the options on the table, we will need to open up an EU-wide political discussion of these topics and set priorities – which will surely also require some compromises. This exercise must be different from the public consultations held on various topics in the past: while the spirit of those consultations (an openness to new ideas) should be retained, these new talks should lead to decisions about overall priorities and specific objectives. Based on the results of this process, new mechanisms – meaning not only financial instruments but also preconditions for institutional operations – can and should be added to policies at the corresponding (local, regional, country-, country-group, EU-) level. Efforts must be made at all levels to respond to the specific problem rather than a (supposed) proxy for that problem. To ensure this happens, we will need to rediscover the principle of subsidiarity and apply it in practice.

It is clear that given the differences in Member States' positions and their readiness to deepen integration in specific areas, the outlined approach raises the prospect of multi-speed integration – an idea also suggested in the European Commission's proposals. For those who still fear this process, we would stress that based on the current depth of integration and the many and very different Member States involved, it is the only realistic path forward.

Multi-speed integration is already under way but this is not a disaster. The true disaster would be if the integration project were discarded for the sake of the unrealistic goal of maintaining an already non-existent uniformity.

If the European Union and its Member States are to face challenges and survive unscathed as possible, they will need to use and develop already exist-

ing elements of flexibility. Of course, the choice to intensify integration in any area should remain open to any Member State that is willing and able to commit to this development. Ultimately, it is the willingness and ability of these states that will decide the future of the integration process.

So long as the very important condition of openness is fulfilled, recognising and adapting to differences when planning future steps will not bring an end to European integration. To the contrary, this may be the only way to rise successfully to serious challenges and even crises and – by surviving and learning from them – become stronger and better prepared for challenges to come.

References

Caraffini, Paolo (2015): De Gaulle, the "Empty Chair Crisis" and the European Movement, Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 7, issue 2, 2015, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Moncalieri: available at http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/219_download.pdf (28 October 2017).

Council–Commission of the European Communities (1970): Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and monetary union the Community, Supplement to Bulletin 11–1970 of the European Communities: available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1002/1/monetary_werner_final.pdf (28 October 2017).

Council of the European Economic Community (1966): Final Communiqué of the extraordinary session of the Council, Luxembourg, 17 to 18 and 28 to 29 January 1966, Bulletin of the European Communities, March 1966, 3–66, pp. 5–11: available at http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/297_Luxembourg%20Compromise.pdf (28 October 2017).

European Commission (2017a): White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, European Commission, Brussels, 1 March 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf (27 March 2017).

European Commission (2017b): Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe, European Commission, Brussels, 26 April 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-social-dimension-europe_en.pdf (30 October 2017).

European Commission (2017c): Reflection Paper on harnessing globalisation, European Commission, Brussels, 10 May 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-globalisation_en.pdf (30 October 2017).

European Commission (2017d): Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, European Commission, Brussels, 31 May 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf (1 July 2017).

European Commission (2017e): Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, European Commission, Brussels, 28 June 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf (31 October 2017).

European Commission (2017f): Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances, European Commission, Brussels, 28 June 2017: available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-eu-finances_en.pdf (30 June 2017).

Lehmann, Wilhelm – Umbach, Gaby (2017): EMU – 25 Years after Maastricht: Historical Challenges, Economic Ideas, Political Solutions, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Policy Brief 2017/18, July 2017, Florence: available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/47404/RSCAS_PB_2017_18.pdf?sequence=1 & isAllowed=y (30 October 2017).

Macron, Emmanuel (2017): Initiative for Europe. Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, Paris, 26 September 2017: available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/english_version_transcript_-_initiative_for_europe_-_speech_by_the_president_of_the_french_republic_cle8de628.pdf (27 October 017).

Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union (2017): available at http://media2.corriere.it/corriere/pdf/2017/non-paper.pdf (14 October 2017).

Mongelli, Francesco Paolo (2008): European economic and monetary integration and the optimum currency area theory, European Economy, Economic Papers No. 302, February 2008, European Commission, Brussels: available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication12081_en.pdf (18 October 2017).

Schuman, Robert (1950): Declaration of 9th May 1950, in: European Issue No. 204, 10th May 2011, Fondation Robert Schuman: available at https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-204-en.pdf (17 October 2017).

Szemlér, Tamás (2009): Future Prospects of the European Union, in: Revista de Economía Mundial, No. 22, 2009, pp. 127–138: available at http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/866/86611893007.pdf (31 October 2017).

Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik (1994), 1 September: available at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/schaeuble-lamers-papier-1994.pdf?__blob=publicationFile & v=1 (29 October 2017).

***Tamás Szemlér**, Ph.D, is an economist, French language instructor and associate professor at the Faculty of International and European Studies of the National University of Public Service (Budapest) where he has worked since September 2016. Between 1993 and 2010, he was a researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Science's Institute for World Economics (IWE) where he also served as Deputy Director (responsible for scientific affairs) from 2008 to 2009. Between 2009 and 2016, Dr. Szemlér was an associate professor at the Faculty of International Management and Business of Budapest Business School and also held posts as Head of the Department of Economics (2009–2014) and Dean of the Faculty of International Management and Business (2012–2016). Dr. Szemlér is the author of more than 140 publications. His research and teaching work focus on deepening ties within the European Union as well as its enlargement and external (economic and political) relations. E-mail: szemler.tamas@uni-nke.hu.*

A Poggean Reform Agenda for Improving Political Will in Response to Mass Atrocities

JED LEA-HENRY

DE GRUYTER OPEN

Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422)
Vol. 14, No. 1
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0005

Abstract: *Like other types of humanitarian intervention before it, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has suffered in practice from a pervasive lack of political will. This represents a failure of moral motivation, but also a failure to accept the often steep political, material and human costs associated with intervening to try and halt mass atrocity crimes. In order to ease this second barrier to intervention, we need a reform agenda that will limit the prevalence, intensity and duration of mass atrocities as well as the crisis situations that make them possible, thereby reducing the various costs associated with any specific intervention. This can be achieved through certain aspects of the work of cosmopolitan philosopher Thomas Pogge.*

Keywords: ***Responsibility to Protect, R2P, Thomas Pogge, mass atrocities, humanitarian intervention***

Introduction: The Need for a Reform Agenda

"*Intervention is no substitute for prevention*" – Alan Kuperman

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), like other kinds of humanitarian intervention before it, has failed in practice despite the best hopes of many international actors and supranational institutions. The failure comes down to a simple lack of political will to take action (Lea-Henry 2014: Ch. 1). The political, material and human costs associated with intervention have effectively become a near permanent barrier to fulfilling our moral obligations associated with mass atrocities. This is despite the fact that in most mass atrocity crimes, the vast majority of the world's citizens can be proven to have an institutional responsibility and

hence a moral obligation to remedy the violence in question (Lea-Henry 2014: Ch. 2). Furthermore, this institutional responsibility gives rise to a secondary obligation to "compensate" by way of reforms intended to avoid such violence in the future (Pogge 2008: 26).

This situation calls for the creation of a reform agenda which can limit the prevalence, intensity and duration of mass atrocities and the crisis situations that make them possible, thereby reducing the various costs associated with – and, thus, also the barriers to – any future interventions. The less violence there is in the world, the more likely people are to be morally outraged enough to confront it when it occurs. These changes can be achieved through certain aspects of the work of the cosmopolitan philosopher Thomas Pogge.

The links between mass atrocities and potential causal factors are always complex (Bellamy 2011b) and the global institutional order that is the focus of much of Pogge's work can be shown to be manifestly unjust in countless possible ways. As such, there are literally tens of thousands of possible reforms that would produce progress in this regard, making the process of global justice-seeking reform one that is neither special nor particularly creative (Pogge 2008: 18). This has led to a failure to focus in the international community, which by and large has pursued uniform reform agendas that value the current hierarchy. The international order and its unjust nature are, however, neither accidental nor organic; rather, they have been designed to satisfy the self-interest of various global actors. For this reason, any open and far-reaching attempt to overhaul and reconstruct the international institutional order is likely to be politically unachievable. Instead what is needed is a reform agenda that is minimally imposing upfront and still manages to have a disproportionate impact downstream through intelligent targeting (Pogge 2005a: 59; Pogge 2012a; Pogge 2012b). It should operate, as Pogge (2005a) notes, in much the same way that the "Manchester mobilization of 1787 triggered the defeat of slavery," that is, through an "intelligent effort by even just 11,000 people" (p. 83).

Though his work focuses predominantly on the issue of global poverty, Pogge has inadvertently produced precisely such an achievable global reform agenda that is capable of dramatically affecting the incidence of mass atrocities around the world without being too openly imposing. By operating from key indices for understanding the prevalence of (i) four kinds of crime (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing) and mass atrocities and (ii) the phenomena that may potentially be their causes (poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, autocratic governments, ethnic tensions, arms flows and internal repression), a few strategically important reforms could have a disproportionately large impact by reducing the prevalence, intensity and duration of such humanitarian crises. These reforms could also increase the political will for humanitarian intervention and R2P by making such actions more palatable and their moral force all the more convincing.

Addressing the Borrowing Privilege

"*The task of building a democracy is harder than razing a dictatorship*" –
William Dobson

Statistics show that almost all mass atrocity violence happens within situations of forced regime change, loss of central authority or reversal of democracy (Ulfelder 2012) and in the absence of genuine political representation (Pogge 2010: 41). The mere presence of authoritarian governments dramatically increases the likelihood of mass atrocity crimes occurring (Bellamy 2011a: 108, 97). Indeed a metadata analysis of 47 independent studies showed a strong tendency towards mass violence and internal conflict within autocratic and repressive regimes (Bellamy 2011a: 97).

Significant economic growth, itself a significant bulwark against mass atrocities, is most commonly achieved through democratic institutions (Moyo 2010; Gasiorowski – Power 1998; Huntington 1984: 198–199; Pinkney 2004: 6). Democratic Peace Theory indicates that democratic governments are less likely to go to war against one another, thereby reducing the regularity of the type of conflict zone in which the "mass slaughter of civilians" is likely to happen (Kuperman 2001: 116; Weiss 2007: 62; Russett – Layne – Spiro – Doyle 1995). Moreover democratic states are statistically more likely to participate in and support peacekeeping missions (Perkins – Neumayer 2008). Once established, democracies tend to create a cultural contagion, with the presence of regional democracies increasing the likelihood that new democracies will form, be accepted and survive in the long term (Pogge 2008: 156; Gasiorowski – Power 1998). Similarly, once a democratic form of governance has been maintained for a period over 12 years, it becomes culturally entrenched and develops institutional strength against attempted reversals (Gasiorowski – Power 1998).

Genuine democratic institutions are the best means to build "social capital" (Fukuyama 2001) and achieve key goals including establishing impartial legal structures, realising human rights, producing social equality and protecting against the state itself (Lijphart 1991; Moyo 2010; Pogge 2008: 152; Huntington 1984: 205–210). Democracies have been shown to meet the basic needs of their citizens 70 percent more effectively than non-democracies (Moyo 2010). By embracing constitutionalism, such democracies can also ease entrenched ethnic divisions (Collier et al. 2003: 57). In this respect, "[d]emocracy is a scalar predicate," producing a foundational level of protection against mass atrocity crimes (Pogge 2008: 153). And importantly for Pogge's reform agenda, both the strength of new democracies and the ability to transition to democracy depend heavily on elements of foreign policy.

For these reasons, the reform agenda developed by Pogge to address the "borrowing privilege" (a current international norm) offers a pathway away

from coups, civil wars, conflict, violence and repressive autocratic rule and towards democratic consolidation. The borrowing privilege gives anyone who gains control over a country, no matter how this happened or how their power is maintained, the right to borrow internationally in the name of that country. Significantly, this privilege is afforded regardless of how the borrowed funds are used. This makes the borrowing privilege an extremely attractive means of personal enrichment as well as a way of holding power by force in cases where the privilege is used to arm and develop repressive internal security structures. The borrowing privilege is, thus, an incentive for carrying out mass atrocities and creating the structural environments that cause them. Institutional reform of the borrowing privilege could be achieved through intervention agreements, democratic panels and, in particular, use of a democratic fund.

Under intervention agreements, new and/or weak democratic states sign contracts with powerful organisations and states that pre-authorise intervention if the government in question is removed by coup or itself turns undemocratic (Pogge 2008: 159). Such agreements could undoubtedly help produce the desired political will for intervention by seeking it out before the need for it arises; even more importantly, this pre-emptive arrangement would rely on a select few strategically linked states and organisations. This would help bypass the requirements for achieving collective political will at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As open statements of joint desire and commitment, these binding bilateral agreements would also have a normative strength and legality which, though potentially challengeable, might be a significant protective mechanism and deterrent against anti-democratic shifts. Nevertheless, this approach would likely meet with a few difficulties including the reluctance of states to sign their sovereign rights over to third parties and the reality that democratic deviations and coups often appear ambiguous (Pogge 2008: 159).

Democratic panels offer a more targeted response to the problem. Under this approach, new and/or weak democratic states would adopt constitutional amendments explicitly affirming that future debts incurred under a non-democratic government would not be serviced due to their non-constitutionality (Pogge 2008: 160). These provisions should deter any future creditors from lending to the country in question while it remains non-democratic. Moreover, because of the advance public notice, there should be significant pressure on creditors not to pursue loan repayments that violate this constitutional amendment. Importantly, a credible external authority with constitutional expertise and transparent guidelines – a democratic panel – would be set up to assess the nature of the government at specific times, thereby offering clarity to the business community and international creditors (Pogge 2008: 160–161). Establishing such a panel would be a fairly simple proposition involving the appointment of a small group of international legal experts with the authority to deliver discretionary judgments; the panels should, thus, be both inexpen-

sive and operationally uncomplicated. Over time, individual panels might be incorporated into a single United Nations body, thereby offering an avenue to increased legitimacy, stability, investigatory reach and broader acceptance (Pogge 2008: 161–164).

As part of the structural support for democratic panels, an international democratic loan guarantee fund should also be formed. Such a fund would protect against the risk that future autocratic governments might retaliate against democratic panels by refusing to service the loans of previous democratic regimes – a risk that would make the countries in question a universal credit liability. If this retaliation occurred, the international democratic loan guarantee fund would step in with temporary capital for creditors; in this way, it would offer a permanent loan guarantee for creditors to democratic regimes. The capital would then need to be reimbursed when the country returned to democratic rule. And, of course, autocratic governments refusing to repay historical democratic loans would be held to have violated their international obligations while the same would not apply to democratic governments in the reverse situation. Autocratic governments would, thus, be punished by economic exclusion, sanctions and restrictions to future credit (Pogge 2008: 165–168).

Addressing the Resource Privilege

"*Democracy is a scalar predicate*" – Thomas Pogge

Mass atrocity crimes are statistically more likely to occur in situations of state collapse, loss of central authority, civil war, predatory takeover or political instability as well as under authoritarian rule (Ulfelder 2012; Bellamy 2011a: 97; Weiss 2007: 62). It is therefore important to address the role that the presence and seizure of natural resources often have in creating these circumstances. Statistics indicate that a typical country with 30-percent reliance on primary resource exports for its GDP is at a 33-percent increased risk of civil war, a risk that drops to 11 percent when resource reliance drops to 10 percent (Collier et al. 2003: 58). On the other hand, economies that are more than 25-percent reliant on the extraction of natural resources are five times more likely than their counterparts to experience periods of internal oppression and internal conflict (Goodhand 2001: 26–27).

In a 2005 report, the UNSC recognised the causal link between the level of exploitation of natural resources within an economy and the inflow of light arms and weapons (United Nations 2006). This is important because the sheer presence of such high levels of arms in conflict-ridden and fragmented societies has been shown to increase the likelihood of political oppression, civil war and mass atrocities (Pogge 2005a: 64–65), as experienced on countless occasions in the post-Cold War period (Yanik 2006). This resource-related "pull factor"

for mass violence and predatory takeovers is so marked that the survival rate of any democratic regime drops by one percentage point with every one percent increase in the country's resource base (Pogge 2010: 48). In fact, in 1998, a UN Secretary-General report on conflict and sustainable peace in relation to the "resource curse" found that the "exploitation of natural resources" represented a substantial impediment to peace, democracy and the protection of human rights (United Nations 2006).

By this measure, the "resource privilege" is an institutional feature of the international order which incentivises violent, repressive governments, autocratic rule, coups, civil wars and communal violence (all contexts linked to mass atrocity crimes). Based on this privilege, the government of any given country – regardless of how it came to power or how its power is maintained – has rightful ownership over the country's resources and therefore the right to sell and profit from them, irrespective of what the revenue is used for. This effectively creates a situation where the natural resources of a country are a permanent enticement to commit violence – they are the legitimate spoils of war (Collier et al. 2003: 58; Pogge 2005a: 72). This is an institutional challenge that could be overcome by reforms including the expansion of democratic panels and the introduction of a global resources dividend and an ecological tax.

Expanded democratic panels would operate in much the same ways as the panels assembled to address the borrowing privilege. In this case, weak and/or new democratic states would produce constitutional provisions declaring that legal rights over national resources only exist if the government in question is demonstrably democratic. Third-party willingness to purchase resources from autocratic governments would likely fall away on the understanding that future democratic governments would invalidate any such purchase agreements and seek compensation, or where possible, reappropriation. The democratic (or undemocratic) nature of governments would be adjudicated by expanded democratic panels, re-augmented for this purpose. All this would, however, also present some challenges. The disincentive to purchase resources would likely have a significant impact on domestic procurement because of the state's ability to re-possess property within the national jurisdiction. On the international level, however, it might hold less force. Attempts at international reappropriation or compensation would hinge on legal debate and, where available, international pressure, with no easy option available. And even if the legal argument were won and pressure created, purchasing countries could still refuse to abide by their obligations. For simple reasons of jurisdictional control, resource panels might have less power than borrowing panels to deter anti-democratic behaviour and violent repression (Pogge 2008: 168–172).

One complementary measure that might neutralise the resource privilege is the creation of a global resources dividend. This dividend would be based on the understanding that all citizens own a rightful share of the natural resources of

their country; as such, a dividend should be paid on all resource transactions and associated degradation, erosion or removal impacts. This dividend would then be applied to meet the basic needs of all citizens (such as medical care, nutrition, sanitation and education). In effect, this would mean that a percentage of the profit attached to all of the country's resources would be returned to its citizens. The dividend wouldn't interfere with the areas of eminent domain or national control or the use of resources. At the same time, it would need to be globally administered in order to encompass all resource transactions and limit the jurisdictional control issue associated with resource panels. Beyond satisfying the basic needs of global citizens, the capital raised through the dividend could be used to help fund humanitarian operations and support supranational structures (Pogge 2008: 202–222).

Some kind of minimal, decentralised sanction mechanism would also be needed to enable individual countries to punish states proven to be in violation of the dividend obligations. The minimal nature of these sanctions is important since they would exist merely to impose an economic burden on the country matching what would otherwise have been imposed by the dividend – that is, as a way to incentivise compliance rather than inflict additional punishment. As a starting point, it is feasible that if the large economies of the United States and the European Union took part, then their resource market shares would effectively create a critical mass, producing the momentum needed for global compliance (Pogge 2008: 214). The dividend itself would need to be administered through the UN, which would then supply funding to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), regional organisations, international institutions and, if practical, domestic governments to initiate poverty-relieving development (Pogge 2008: 212–218).

Criticisms of the global resource dividend plan tend to focus on claims that given the extreme wealth of resources in question, the dividend distribution would have little impact on poverty, even less impact on inequality and less effect still on coups and autocratic governance. One fundamental objection holds that the dividend would put an unduly heavy burden on the primary extraction of resources rather than on purchasing countries; as such, there are fears that dividend-related costs would be returned to developing countries through a correlative rise in the price of manufactured goods. Beyond this, critics note that since the dividend focuses on a single point of extraction, it would do very little to deter environmental damage, which often affects poorer societies disproportionately since they tend to lack the capacity to reverse or mitigate changes. On this basis, the dividend would only contribute to entrenching poverty, underdevelopment and state weakness and producing a social reality prone to mass atrocities (Hayward 2005: 317–322).

The creation of "ecological space" is an alternative approach that might prove helpful in this context. Ecological space focuses on the "command of resources,"

a measure of the global hectares of water and land required to produce and consume resources and dispose of related waste. This figure is calculated by subtracting exports from both domestic consumption and national imports; this becomes a measure of "ecological debt." Taxation would be applied to debts of this kind, thereby transferring the redistribution burden from the country in which the resources originated to the governments that benefit most from their extraction (Hayward 2005: 317–331).

Development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

"*One of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all states are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face*" – Kofi Annan

Environments characterised by poverty, economic stagnation and underdevelopment are linked in deep and complex ways to the incidence of communal violence and mass atrocity crimes. Myriad examples of these links can be found in conflict zones in Rwanda (Weiss – Collins 2000: 100), Sierra Leone (Bellamy 2011a: 107), Ethiopia (Ignatieff 1999: 16), Bangladesh (Bellamy 2011a: 98), El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala (Weiss – Collins 2000: 72), among others. One study notes that "[a]round 85 percent of new civil wars are either the marginalized countries falling into conflict or post-conflict countries relapsing" (Collier et al. 2003: 186–187). The corollary of underdevelopment, "state weakness," is a key factor in the occurrence of mass atrocities and related violence (Ulfelder 2012). In 2002 alone, half of all the world's civil wars and humanitarian interventions happened in Africa – in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, South Sudan, North Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Uganda, Mozambique, South Africa, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, the CAR, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Western Sahara, Burundi and Mali – within environments of extreme underdevelopment that had previously also blighted the continent with a disproportionately high number of coups and genocides (Adelman 2002: 9).

State weakness invariably means that the best intentions and actions of international aid and intervention agents are not sustained; instead, such efforts waste away and these societies tend to relapse into conflict (Ignatieff 1999: 106). In this regard, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect highlights the Responsibility to Rebuild (R2Rebuild) as a key priority (ICISS 2001: 5:1–5:31). Another study of 52 countries over the period 1960–1999 found that any given developing country had a 17-percent chance of descending into civil war within a five-year period. These countries could reportedly have halved this risk by doubling their per capita income; a further one percent reduction in risk was correlated with each one percent increase in growth (Collier et al. 2003: 58). Successful development is the most statistically certain means of immu-

nising a country against communal conflict and mass atrocities; this has been explained as a "financial cushion" (Collier et al. 2003: 122). Youth employment and opportunities are vital if internal conflict, civil war and mass atrocities are to be avoided (Collier et al. 2003: 62–63). Development, employment and social opportunities help to mitigate the impact of the nefarious external financing of civil wars and coups (Collier et al. 2003: 127–128).

In addition, economic development and wealth are strongly correlated with democratisation based on the precipitous development of a new middle class on the path to genuine political representation (Huntington 1984: 198–199); there are also clear links with decreasing rates of corruption and cronyism (Moyo 2010). Conversely, the links between underdevelopment and mass atrocities tend to become cyclical, with the average civil war creating a 15-percent loss in per capita income (Collier et al. 2003: 84). Such wars cost the equivalent of four times the annual GDP of the country in question (Moyo 2010), tend to cause development challenges to spread to neighbouring countries and create large diasporas, thereby crippling a country's ability to redevelop (Collier et al. 2003: 84–85). These causal links pose a challenge for those seeking to increase the political will to address mass atrocities, a problem that led the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to comment: "Every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth is a step toward conflict prevention" (ICISS 2001: 3.19). On this understanding, the existence of 750 million global citizens living in extreme poverty (Jones 2001) is a serious challenge to efforts to increase political support for humanitarian interventions since it may create the perception that the problem of mass atrocities is intractable.

The entrenched and entrapping nature of both poverty and underdevelopment (Azariadis – Stachurski 2004; Sachs 2007; Sachs et al. 2004) has dictated overly simple policy commitments to "development aid" as a means to break this cycle. (This is based on the view that the absence of wealth can be fixed by the supply of wealth.) However, such development aid has not only been proven consistently to fail in practice (Cotter 1979; Ovaska 2003; Bovard 1986; Moyo 2010) but also tended to do further harm to the very people that it intends to help and deepen development challenges. In this respect, development aid has often fostered corruption, stifled local industry, distorted markets, pushed up inflation, lowered employment opportunities, sapped domestic savings, incentivised unrepresentative governments, disenfranchised populations, encouraged dependency and decreased productivity (Anderson 1998: 138–153; Appiah 2006: 170; Moyo 2010). Beyond this, aid flows have been shown in and of themselves to prolong mass atrocities and civil wars that were already underway (Anderson 1998: 137; Weiss 2007: 74–75; Weiss – Collins 2000: 106), incentivise and sustain autocratic rule (Collier et al. 2003: 72–73; Bellamy 2011a: 109) and encourage communal conflict, coups and societal oppression (Collier et al. 2003: 63; Moyo 2010).

Despite these findings, Jeffrey Sachs argues that extreme poverty can be eradicated in 20 years at an annual cost of $ 150 billion (Appiah 2006: 173). This highlights the importance of producing an alternative development agenda to the present aid-heavy model. Though the rhetoric often suggests otherwise, a key impediment to development is, as Pogge (2005; 78) has suggested, the maintenance by rich countries of protectionist barriers that limit the market access of exports from poorer countries. In 1999, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) forecast that the developing world could export its way to a further $ 700 billion in wealth by 2005 if the developed world only did more to open its markets to global competition (Jordaan 2010: 246). Among the liberal economic reforms desperately needed in the developing world, particularly for the promotion of good governance, are the introduction of independent banking regulators and independent central/reserve banks; financial integration in the region; the development and expansion of securities markets (both domestic and regional) and the creation and enforcement of corporate governance standards; there may potentially also be a need for the development of monetary unions such as the proposed African Monetary Union (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa – Southern African Development Community 2009). The end goal of these reforms must be "reach[ing] threshold levels of capital [...] to enable these economies to establish a process of self-sustaining growth" (Sachs et al. 2004). In many ways, this was also the objective of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Pogge has focused particularly on the MDGs, and they certainly offer a useful framework, which, if refined and fulfilled, could reduce conflicts, civil wars and mass atrocities (Collier, et.al. 2003: 186–188). The UN Millennium Declaration (2000) signified a moment at which all 191 UN member states committed to eight development goals, the most prominent of which was "to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger" (Pogge 2010: 57). However, the MDGs were riddled with problems from the time of their inception and this has also affected their implementation. The goals were fundamentally a wish list, with an emphasis on impoverished countries and their reduction of poverty and little to no focus on countries that are free from or have little poverty. In addition to this obfuscating focus, the founding principles of the MDGs allowed member states to dilute the stated goals by selectively defining recording mechanisms and backdating the denominators for poverty and, also in some cases, altering the denominators retroactively. This meant that an extra 165 million people were left to live in extreme poverty in 2015 than would otherwise have been the case had a more accurate measure been used (Pogge 2010: 59). The total impact of this revision alone was a reduction in the size of the population to be relieved from poverty between 1996 and 2015 from 50 percent down to 20 percent (Pogge 2010: 71). This "clever shifting of goalposts"

(Pogge 2010: 71) undermined the MDGs through several deft moves: it defined poverty based on income rather than the more accurate and informative metric of "hunger"; it adopted the language of "proportion" rather than "number" to evaluate what constitutes a reduction by half; and it put the focus on achieving a quick statistical fix rather than an overall increase in standards of living (Pogge 2010: 58–71).

While they represent an improvement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which have replaced the MDGs, remain a wish list which lacks any real detail – Pogge (2015a), thus, calls them a "cosmetic effort." According to Pogge, improvements should be made by: i) describing and clarifying the specific responsibilities of capable states, international organisations and multinational enterprises; ii) appointing independent monitors to analyse failures and progress and specify the measurement methods and definitions that will be locked in for the 15-year life of the SDGs; iii) highlighting systemic/structural challenges such as democratisation, illicit financial flows and illicit arms flows and the need to prevent tax evasion, cancel unserviceable debts and avoid aid--based approaches; iv) making the SDGs part of a binding treaty rather than a voluntary agreement in order to stop states from skimping on their commitments; v) including robust human rights terms such as "interdependence," "indivisibility" and "universality" to improve the moral foundation and potential reach of the SDGs; vi) moving beyond an income-based measure of poverty to include overlooked factors such as illiteracy, undernourishment, child labour, exposure to violence and access to safe drinking water, electricity, essential medicines and sanitation and vii) focusing on inequality and not only poverty (Pogge – Sengupta 2014; Pogge 2015a).

The Health Impact Fund

"*Poverty, when it is completely avoidable, is a massive crime against humanity*" – Thomas Pogge

Building on the causal links between poverty, state weakness and underdevelopment on the one hand and the occurrence of mass atrocity crimes on the other, it is important to address the specific health impact of such conditions. Eighteen million people die annually as a result of curable and/or treatable diseases that mostly occur within underdeveloped societies; this has the flow-on effects of social fragmentation and the loss of human capital, which in turn deepen poverty and block economic growth (Pogge 2008: 222). Outside of this, the lives of hundreds of millions of people are debilitated by the symptoms of avoidable diseases (Pogge 2008: 222), a situation with myriad negative effects including draining government resources, stripping away domestic savings (DSAED 2010; WHO 2014), damaging business opportunities, hindering educational outcomes,

fracturing family structures, creating forced diasporas and reducing productivity (Acemoglu – Johnson – Robinson 2003: 398–401; Acemoglu – Johnson 2007).

Unhealthy people are often unable to work and under-perform when they are present at work. Similarly, sick children are less likely to attend school or to achieve high results when they do attend. It is also clear that reduced life expectancies in a society limit the strength of business arrangements and partnerships because of the increased likelihood of interruption by death. Against this, greater life expectancies lead to an increase in population size, and with it, GDP growth. Studies show that health is often the first index to improve on the path to economic development (Acemoglu – Johnson 2007; Acemoglu – Johnson – Robinson 2003). The World Health Organisation (WHO) also acknowledges that improved health and access to essential medicines have a significant causal impact on "economic progress" (WHO 2014). Disease-ridden environments and poor health conditions within conflict situations work to exacerbate human suffering and have the long-term effect of perpetuating conflict-heavy situations (Gayer – Legros – Formenty – Connolly 2007).

These are conditions that produce mass atrocities and they are heavily contributed to by the extreme cost of, and sheer lack of research and development about, essential medicines for less developed societies (Chris – Singh – Sudarshi 2011; Pogge 2008: 222–261). Due to the high cost of pharmaceutical manufacturing, companies charge prices for their newly developed drugs that effectively put them out of reach of poorer communities. Alternatively, these companies simply focus on developing drugs that are targeted at richer societies, thereby obtaining greater profits but also ignoring the specific disease burdens of those most in need. Around the world today, 38 percent of all people lack access to essential medicines. To address this situation, Pogge suggests a new means of pharmaceutical development which could re-incentivise the industry to focus on the disease burdens in the developing world and so lift people out of violence-inducing poverty. This targeted approach involves the formation of a "health impact fund" (Hollis – Pogge 2008).

The production of new medicines is extremely expensive and risk-heavy in terms of research and development. For this reason, the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) incentivises pharmaceutical development by offering long-term internationally enforceable patents amounting to a global market monopoly, thereby protecting the profitability of the industry. However, this agreement is part of the global institutional architecture that significantly harms already impoverished populations, who are unable to afford medications at current prices and also unable to develop their own generic copies. Additionally, the current system is weighted against medical research into the diseases and conditions that most commonly afflict impoverished and developing societies. While this medical research could have a far greater impact on human suffer-

ing than research into the medical conditions associated with affluent societies, wealthier countries simply have a greater capacity to pay the high prices that must be charged in order to see a return on investments.

A health impact fund is an alternative payment system for medical development that would supplement the current system. This system would focus on medical progress in the developing world and deliver finished products at a marginal and affordable cost. Backed financially by willing governments, the fund would create an alternative incentive for socially conscious companies who would choose to focus on drugs for the developing world if only there were a profit to be made. The fund would do this by paying companies to forgo traditional patent options and be remunerated based on the calculable health impact of their medicines rather than traditional market factors. Opting into the fund would mean that all of the company's new medicines would be put on the market at marginal cost in order to make them as widely available as possible, thereby increasing each drug's achievable health impact (based on "quality adjusted life years"), and with it, the profits of the company responsible for its development. Though likely to be less profitable than the traditional patent system, the health impact fund would, thus, provide socially conscious companies with a platform through which to address the disease burden that so heavily afflicts the developing world while still pursuing a profit (Pogge 2008: 222–261; Pogge 2005b).

Transparency

"*There is not a crime, there is not a dodge, there is not a trick, there is not a swindle, there is not a vice which does not live by secrecy*" – Joseph Pulitzer

By simple virtue of achieving power, governments gain access to the benefits of international bribery and are protected in this access by the widespread nature and relative legitimacy of such behaviours. This system incentivises and rewards violent seizures of government by offering an easy avenue to material reward to anyone capable of holding power, regardless of the means. Such conditions, in turn, encourage cultures of self-interested rule as well as cultures of corruption that become normalised within a society. Indeed, before 1999 when relevant OECD legislation was introduced, such behaviours were generally considered legal, with many international firms being authorised by domestic governments to bribe foreign officials and able to receive tax deductions on such bribes (Pogge 2008: 29; Pogge 2010: 45–46).

Transparency is a key requirement for the implementation of institutional reforms, whether this involves changing entrenched values and behaviours, strengthening governments and regional and supranational organisations or securing funding and support for essential changes to protect against mass

atrocity crimes. Transparency limits the allure of holding power by force as well as the pull factor for violent uprisings and the incentives for repressive rule (Pogge 2008: 212). Transparency within a society is strongly correlated with development outcomes: for every one- percent increase in a country's "opacity index," which signals a loss of transparency, there is an average one-percent decrease in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a share of GDP along with a $ 986 decrease in per capita income (Moyo 2010). Institutional transparency is widely considered to be the best solution to "financial volatility, environmental degradation, money laundering, and corruption" (Florini 1999).

A lack of transparency within international institutions remains the key barrier to achieving accountability within such institutions (Gartner 2013). The current level of transparency within organisations such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank remains disproportionately low given these institutions' global and domestic impact on conditions and policies (Reiterer 2009; Woods 2001). Moreover, transparency is a vital aspect of all successful economic functioning (Tuladhar 2005: 21–24) and it has cultural reach, having been shown historically to spread and become entrenched once a critical mass of political resistance can be overcome (Florini 1999).

The dominant supranational institutions, specifically the IMF, World Bank, UN and WTO, are architecturally archaic and yet their legitimacy remains paradigmatically linked to their accountability and decision-making processes. The secrecy of international institutions conceals the impact of their decisions and any malice or self-interest behind them (Woods 2001). The IMF and the World Bank do publish their decisions, but their decision-making processes are hidden. Similarly, the WTO allows access to all documents and minutes, however backstage deals and internal negotiation processes that produce specific legal language are still obscured from outside scrutiny, and this extends to sub-negotiations, panel proceedings and the full pleadings of the parties. It has, thus, traditionally been very difficult, if not impossible, to understand and deconstruct published documents or to determine which delegates argued for what, which countries insisted on which language and which language this excluded. Supranational organisations help design and control the global institutional order, but in reality this order is achieved through the lobbying of states and their representatives to influence the policy agenda – and those agents are granted anonymity around their behaviour (Steger 2008; Pogge 2011c).

In this sense, increased transparency and the opening up of decision-making processes at all levels of negotiations are often more important than greater/wider participation at the supranational level. Key reforms would cover the thorough and immediate reporting of meeting minutes, including details of who is responsible for what language; the streamlining of ministerial conferences; the deeper and more open incorporation of NGOs in decision-making processes and the creation of institutional architecture to govern both initial

and intermediary stages of the decision-making process including the creation/implementation of a parliamentary dimension. Such steps would also promote institutional effectiveness, efficiency and successful outcomes (Spiro 1995; Wolfe 2005; Steger 2009).

A lack of international transparency – as enabled by corporate opacity, secret jurisdictions and tax havens – leads to the ability to launder money and create flows of illicit funding that finance terrorism, trafficking, light weapons sales, coups and civil wars, while also hindering development and democracy. Between $ 21 and $ 32 trillion in illicit, privately acquired financial wealth is currently held in secret jurisdictions, and the existing global environment is such that a global industry has formed to facilitate this behaviour with banks, corporations, accountancy firms and lawyers all competing for services. This normative legitimacy has created a situation in which as little as one percent of all illicit funds are detected globally (Pogge 2015b).

To address these problems, Pogge has proposed a number of systemic reforms including i) abolishing the legal right to form a shell company and so shedding greater light on the individuals and smaller companies that actually own and ultimately benefit from companies (in this regard, the G20 has adopted "Beneficial Ownership Principles" and the EU has forced member states to register companies so they can be accessed by law enforcement agencies; these rules, however, have limited reach and lack global influence); ii) abolishing the use of "anonymous accounts"; iii) developing a system that allows for the instant worldwide exchange of tax information; iv) requiring multinational corporations to report publically on all profits, sales and tax outlays for each and every jurisdiction that they do business or exist in (i.e. country-by-country reporting as a part of annual audits) and v) focusing on exposing the full responsibilities and complicity of powerful and rich actors and secret international jurisdictions and tax havens. Small nations such as the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macau, Dubai, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Lebanon and Panama are unlikely to undertake transparency reforms unless countries such as the US and Germany lead the way (Pogge 2015b).

Addressing the Banking Privilege and Tax Avoidance

"*The mistake you make, don't you see, is in thinking one can live in a corrupt society without being corrupt oneself*" – George Orwell

The "banking privilege" works to incentivise violent uprisings, coups and repressive authoritarian rule by empowering governments and associated elites to misappropriate public funds through international bank accounts. The annual total cost of such embezzled funds, often flowing from less developed countries into more affluent countries, is estimated at $ 1 trillion (Pogge 2010: 36). The

international banking system facilitates the embezzlement of such public funds due to the benefit that they afford in terms of capital leverage (Pogge 2010: 50). Guinea is a particularly egregious example of the banking privilege in practice with the country's immense oil wealth largely being stolen by government and elites while 77 percent of the population still live below the poverty line under the autocratic rule of President Obiang. All this is despite the fact that the country's oil exports give it one of the world's highest per capita incomes ($ 35,000). The transfer of these revenues to overseas banks has allowed the President's eldest son to purchase a $ 180 million mansion in Paris and a $ 30 million mansion in California, among other things (South African Foreign Policy Initiative 2013).

Similarly, developing countries lose $ 160 billion annually in tax revenues alone (nearly $2.5 trillion over the life of the MDG period 2000–2015), an amount which, if invested in health services, would be enough to save the lives of 350,000 children under the age of five every year. From the practice of misinvoicing alone, multinational corporations shift funds into outside jurisdictions at a rate of $ 760 billion a year (the 2011 estimate of the Global Financial Integrity think-tank). This amounts to five to six times the total of all international development assistance that flows into developing countries each year. Thirty-three percent of all wealth privately owned by individuals in the Middle East and Africa and 26 percent of all individual wealth from Latin America is held outside the country of origin (Pogge 2014). The inability to collect tax on these funds restricts a country's ability to develop, build an engaged civil society and transition to/strengthen democratic institutions, all of which has a precipitous effect on the incidence of mass atrocity crimes. Tax abuse is often funnelled through the following methods though it is certainly not limited to these practices: (i) mispricing in order to shift corporate profits; (ii) intense lobbying by well-connected business groups for favourable tax treatment; (iii) the use of secret jurisdictions and tax havens and (iv) corrupt and illegal natural resource licensing (Pogge – Brock 2014).

There are various ways to impose global opportunity costs with respect to these challenges. At their core, these strategies involve targeting the responsible agents (the beneficial owners) and their behaviours and forcing them into the public spotlight. The agenda presented by Pogge includes: i) requiring all domestic governments to disclose the beneficial ownership of companies within their jurisdiction; ii) creating a publicly accessible, country-by-country tax and profit database for all multinational corporations; iii) creating a system for the automatic exchange of financial information; iv) establishing a mandatory international public database of all natural resource extraction, including details of related funds paid to governments and the subsequent use of that revenue by the government in question; v) standardising anti-money laundering regulations; vi) setting up a tough international legal structure, including significant

penalties for the facilitators of illicit financial flows such as insurance agencies, legal firms, banks, accountancy firms and hedge funds; vii) mandating timely, frequent and public reporting of government fiscal policy and finances, as supervised by third parties and viii) renewing the global focus and engaging civil society in a discussion of the moral issues around tax evasion, tax bases, tax exempt status, tax gradients, uses of natural resources, tax reform policies, uses of tax revenue and the challenges of tax abuse (Pogge 2014; Pogge 2015b; Pogge – Sengupta 2014; Pogge – Brock 2014).

*** Ideally the above policy reforms and targets would be codified under a significant supranational accord such as the SDGs.

The United Nations

"*Endorsing moral ideals is one thing, having real existing institutions that effectively protect them is quite another*" – Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner

A 2001 ICISS report on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect stated that "the Commission is in absolutely no doubt that there is no better or more appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for human protection purposes" (ICISS 2001: 6:14). This was in part an expression of a fear outlined by Kofi Annan: "If the conscience of humanity [...] cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and justice" (ICISS 2001: 6.22). And yet, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was designed with a susceptibility to paralysis given the creation of veto powers for the Permanent Five (P5) Security Council members (Tsagourias 2013: 143) and it has operated in this manner ever since – a situation that has become a key impediment to attempts at humanitarian intervention (Pogge 2010: 167).

As such, much academic attention has been applied to United Nations reform, focusing particularly on the UNSC mechanisms. Proposed changes include democratising the UN; creating a P5 code of conduct (ICISS 2001: 6:21); establishing a UN constitution; expanding the General Assembly (UNGA) powers (ICISS 2001: 6:29, 6:30); expanding UNSC membership and limiting the veto power or abolishing it altogether. Such reforms would undoubtedly offer benefits, however they are unlikely to be adopted due to the absence of any subtlety in their challenge to the UNSC's authority. More intelligently targeted and conceptually focused reforms are required that will clear the hurdle of acceptance while still having a meaningful impact and helping operationalise the UN's stated values (Tsagourias 2013: 135–153). The need for UN reforms affects a range of key issues that could have a significant impact on mass atrocity crimes. These areas of action include regulating a responsible approach to global arms sales (Williamson 1998: 251–268); targeting rebels' external financing (Collier, et al.

2003: 140–150); sharpening the focus of diplomatic pressure, embargoes and sanctions and, in particular, easing the political barriers to humanitarian intervention.

Proposals for reforms of just this kind have long been considered. A good example is the creation of a UN Standing Army that would ease concerns about dependency on powerful nations, be quickly deployable, remove the problem of differing interpretations of resolutions, serve as a symbolic and empowered global police force and enable smoother transitions to war crime prosecutions at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Criminal Tribunals (Pattison 2008; Tsagourias 2013; ICISS 2001: 7:1–7:51). The 2001 ICISS report also proposed creating a P5 "Code of Conduct" in order to reform the UNSC. This was effectively recognition that though conceived with the best intentions, the R2P was limited by the whims of P5 members. The ICISS proposal essentially involved getting P5 members to refrain from using their veto powers over majority resolutions in cases where the particular P5 member's national interest was not the direct subject matter. Importantly, it also required the P5 to "constructively abstain" rather than veto otherwise majority humanitarian decisions (ICISS 2001: 6:21). Subsequent reform attempts have aimed to "democratise" the UNSC by increasing the decision-making capacity of the UNGA or imposing a UN constitution. Such a constitution would be a step towards creating confidence in both the behaviours and intentions of the member states. The text would definitively outline not only the rules, tools and structures of the UN but also importantly, a "*common mindset*," that is, a shared understanding of what constitutes peace and security (Tsagourias 2013: 151–152). To date, all these reform proposals have failed to gain any traction, partly because they entail a fundamental reconstruction of the UN.

By comparison, the "jurying process" developed by Thomas Franck targets the UN's overly "strict constraints" and their impact on international society. Similar to a grand jury but comprised of state representatives, this process provides an open forum for debating how law and moral norms should be applied in certain contentious situations. As a forum for debate that challenges international developments, the jurying process would be a means of reconciling common sense moral values with international law under an umbrella that gave them both equal weight. In this way, it should work to bypass dogmatic legal and institutional restrictions. The risk would, however, be that this process might be hindered by its own lack of impartiality and independence. Moreover, it would probablysuffer (though to a lesser extent) from the same political intransigence and strategic pressure from powerful states that plague the UNSC today (Pogge 2010: 165–177).

An alternative to this suggestion is the international court proposed by Pogge. This is envisaged as an "effective judicial organ for the authoritative interpretation and adjudication of international law – in real time" (Pogge 2010:

180) – something which is currently absent from the international stage. This court would comprise a selection of independent judges with expertise in international law and UN procedure, and its role would be to deliver verdicts on – and provide clarity around – issues affected by UN power structures. Importantly, the creation of the court would be fairly non-intrusive but it would be capable of disproportionately influencing the behaviour of powerful states downstream.

The international court would effectively free the processes of defining and deliberating on breaches of international laws/conventions from the control and influence of powerful member states. As such, it would likely offer smoother and clearer legal and moral pathways to taking military interventions against mass atrocities. The court's independent nature would limit misuses of the law, thereby building a more vigorous international legal structure and likely triggering member states to launch long-delayed institutional reforms once it became clear that only the court could interpret and validate the UN's structural operations and aspects of international law. Unless a specific intervention was already forbidden under a UNSC declaration or by a UNGA supermajority, the court would have the legal and normative authority to make rulings authorising humanitarian intervention. This would be an important shift since by putting the emphasis on the passing of a "forbidding resolution" rather than an "authorising resolution," the court would largely remove the veto as a crippling barrier (Pogge 2010: 180–181).

The court's operations would need to be restricted by three precautionary principles: i) the court's legal justifications would have to be published in detail, with background deliberations also being made public; ii) court decisions could be overturned by the UNSC or a UNGA supermajority based on the court's perceived failings or substantial doubts concerning a decision and iii) court decisions could be overturned by the UNSC or a UNGA supermajority on the grounds that a legally approved intervention was operationally unfeasible and/or an unacceptable risk to human life and the international order (Pogge 2010: 181).

The most important feature of the court would, however, be its absolute commitment to independence and impartiality. The international court would need to resist all pressure to install channels by which states could exert influence, lest it lose its *raison d'être* and become a meaningless institutional structure. Together with a proven legal structure, this independence and impartiality should encourage early stage compliance. Furthermore, with the rise of China along with other potential world powers, the current upper echelon of states should be more willing to give international law a greater role in defining the global order and global operations than is currently the case. As such, the court has a growing chance of future implementation as global power dynamics shift and the world is confronted by new dominant powers while existing dominant powers search for a means of mitigation (Pogge 2010: 182).

Conclusion

"Whatever we, as prospective participants unaware of our specific features, would desire society to be like is what, morally speaking, we ought to institute" –
Thomas Pogge

Due to an absence of political will to take action, the R2P, like other humanitarian interventions before it, has been a near total failure both institutionally and practically. The political, material and human costs associated with intervention have become near permanent barriers to fulfilling our moral obligations around mass atrocities. There is, thus, a need for reforms of the current institutional environment that have the capacity to reduce the material barriers for motivated states. These reforms should work to limit the prevalence, intensity and duration of mass atrocities and the crisis situations that make them possible, thereby reducing the various costs associated with any future intervention.

Through the predominantly poverty-focused work of cosmopolitan philosopher Thomas Pogge, and attention to key indices – for example, poverty, inequality, development, environmental degradation, natural resource extraction, autocratic governance, global health, ethnic tensions, arms flows, internal repression, democracy, transparency, United Nations operations and global tax evasion – precisely such a reform agenda is possible. Importantly, this is an agenda that is not so upfront and imposing as to clearly damage its chances of implementation, and yet it is also capable of having a dramatic impact on incidences of mass atrocities around the world.

References

Acemoglu, D. – Johnson, S. (2007): Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth. *Journal of Political Economy* 115(6): 925–985

Acemoglu, D. – Johnson, S. – Robinson, J. (2003): Disease and Development in Historical Perspective. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(2–3):397– 405

Adelman, H. (2002): Theory and Humanitarian Intervention, in Keren, M. – Sylvan, D.A., eds, *International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility*. Frank Cass Publishing: Cornwall.

Anderson, M.B. (1998):You Save My Life Today, But for What Tomorrow?: Some Moral Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, in Moore, J., ed, *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Maryland, USA.

Appiah, K.A. (2006): *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. Norton Publishing: New York.

Azariadis, C. – Stachurski, J. (2004): Poverty Traps. Research Paper no. 913, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne. Prepared for Aghion, P. – Durlauf, S., eds), Handbook of Economic Growth. The University of Melbourne.

Bellamy, A.J. (2011a): *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds.* Routledge: New York.

Bellamy, A.J. (2011b): *Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent*. Policy Analysis Brief. The Stanley Foundation: Iowa.

Bovard, J. (1986): The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid. Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 65: 1–15.

Chris, B. – Singh, S. – Sudarshi, D. (2011): Neglected Tropical Diseases, Conflict, and the Right to Health, in Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, The Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic Diseases: Opportunities for Integrated Intervention Strategies. National Academies Press: Washington, D.C.

Collier, P. – Elliott, V.L. – Hegre, H. – Hoeffler, A. – Reynal-Querol, M. – Sambanis, N. (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. The World Bank & Oxford University Press: Washington, DC.

Cotter, W.R. (1979): How Aid Fails to Aid Africa. *Foreign Policy* 34 (Spring, 1979): 107–119.

De Simone, M. & Fagan, C. (2014): Ending Secrecy to End Impunity: Tracing the Beneficial Owner. Transparency International. Policy Brief # 02/2014.

Florini, A.M. (1999): Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? The Politics of Transparency. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 28–30 April 1999.

Gartner, D. (2013): Uncovering Bretton Woods: Conditional Transparency, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. *The George Washington International Law Review* (45): 121–148.

Gasiorowski, M.J. – Power, T.J. (1998): The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World. *Comparative Political Studies* 31(6): 740–771.

Gayer, M. – Legros, D. – Formenty, P. – Connolly, M.A. (2007): Conflict and emerging infectious diseases. *Perspective* 13(11): 1625–1631.

Goodhand, J. (2001): Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty, CPRC Working Paper 6. INTRAC: 1–49.

Hayward, T. (2005): Thomas Pogge's Global Resources Dividend: A Critique and an Alternative. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 2(3): 317–332.

Hollis, A. – Pogge, T. (2008): The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All, Incentives for Global Health. Incentives for Global Health (IGH), The World Health Organisation.

Huntington, S.P. (1984): Will More Countries Become Democratic?. *Political Science Quarterly* 99(2): 193–218.

Huntington, S. (1992): New Contingencies, Old Roles. *Joint Forces Quarterly* 2 (Autumn, 1992): 38–43.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001): The Responsibility to Protect. International Development Research Centre: Canada.

Ignatieff, M. (1999): *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience.* Vintage Publishing: Great Britain.

Jones, C. (2001): *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*. Oxford University Press: Oxford,

Jordaan, E. (2010): Questioning Thomas Pogge's Proposals to Eradicate Global Poverty. *Global Society* 24(2): 231–253.

Kuperman, A.J. (2001): The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C.

Lea-Henry, J. (2014): *A Poggean Approach to Mass Atrocities: Addressing Indeterminacy and Failures of Political Will for Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect.* Deakin University: Melbourne.

Lijphart, A. (1991): Constitutional Choices for New Democracies. *Journal of Democracy* 2(1): 72–84.

Moyo, D. (2010): Dead Aid: Why Aid Makes Things Worse and How There is Another Way for Africa. Penguin Books: London.

Ovaska, T. (2003): The Failure of Development Aid. *Cato Journal* 23(2): 175–188.

Pattison, J. (2008): Humanitarian Intervention and a Cosmopolitan UN Force. *Journal of International Political Theory* 4(1): 126–145.

Perkins, R. – Neumayer, E. (2008): Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping. *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 895–914.

Pinker, S. (2011): *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined*. Viking Penguin.

Pinkney, R. (2004): Democracy in the Third World. 2nd ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado.

Pogge, T. (1989): Realizing Rawls. Cornell University Press: USA.

Pogge, T. (2002): World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. Polity Press & Blackwell Publishing.

Pogge, T. (2005a): Severe Poverty as Violation of Negative Duties. *Ethics & International Affairs* 19(1): 55–83.

Pogge, T. (2005b): Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program. *Metaphilosophy* 36 (1/2): 182–209

Pogge, T. (2008): *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*. 2nd ed. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Pogge, T. (2009): Baselines for Determining Harm, in Barry, C. – Rosenthal, J.H. eds, *Ethics and international affairs: A reader.* 3rd ed. Georgetown University Press: Washington.

Pogge, T. (2010): *Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric*. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Pogge, T. (2012a): Ending Poverty. RSA Keynote Lecture, 20 Nov 2012: available at http://www.thersa.org/events/audio-and-past-events/2012/ending-poverty (9 May 2014).

Pogge, T. (2012b): What Do Human Rights Demand From You and Me. Public Lecture Co--presented with the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights at the University of Sydney, 7 March 2012: available at http://sydney.edu.au/sydney_ideas/lectures/2012/professor_thomas_pogge.shtml (9 May 2014).

Pogge, T. (2014): Message to the UN: stop the loss of trillions of dollars to tax abuse. The Guardian: available at – https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals--network/2014/sep/10/tax-avoidance-development-foreign-aid-united-nations (10 September 2014)

Pogge, T. (2015a): Thomas Pogge Interview: 3 Ways to Improve SDGs. KAP talks lecture in Bucharest: available at – http://thomaspogge.com/thomas-pogge/poverty/thomas-pogge--interview-3-ways-to-improve-sdgs/

Pogge, T. (2015b): Thomas Pogge: How Are Human Rights and Financial Transparency Connected? Global Financial Integrity. Speech delivered at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, 18 May 2015.

Pogge, T. – Brock, G. (2014): Global Tax Justice and Global Justice. Moral Philosophy and Politics 1(1): 1–15.

Pogge, T. – Sengupta, M. (2014): Sustainable Development Goals: A Better Pact is Possible!. Academics Stand Against Poverty.

Reiterer, M. (2009): The Doha development agenda of the WTO: Possible institutional implications. Progress in Development Studies 9(4): 359–75

Russett, B. – Layne, C. – Spiro, D.E. – Doyle, M.W. (1995): The Democratic Peace. International Security 19(4): 164–184.

Sachs, J. (2007): Breaking the Poverty Trap: Targeted investments can trump a region's geographic disadvantages. Scientific American (September 2007): 40–41.

Sachs, J.D. – McArthur, J.W. – Schmidt-Traub, G. – Kruk, M. – Bahadur, C. – Faye, M. – McCord, G. (2004): Ending Africa's Poverty Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity March 2004 (1).

South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) (2013): Is there an African resource curse? Open Society Foundation For South Africa: available at: http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/there-african-resource-curse (11 March 2014).

Spiro, P. J. (1995): New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making Institutions. The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1995): 45–56.

Steger, D.P. (2008): Introduction to the Mini-Symposium on Transparency in the WTO. Journal of International Economic Law 11(4): 705–715.

Tsagourias, N. (2013): Cosmopolitan Legitimacy and UN Collective Security, in Pierik, R. – Werner, E., eds. Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press: Cambridg

Tuladhar, A. (2005): Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks. International Monetary Fund (IMF) WP/05/183.

Ulfelder, J. (2012): Forecasting Onsets of Mass Killing. Paper presented at Northeast Political Methodology Meeting at New York University on 4 May 2012. The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

United Nations (2006): United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming a Peace Liability into a Peace Asset. Organised by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). Conference Report: Cairo, Egypt.

Weiss, T.G. (2007): *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action*. Polity Press: UK

Weiss, T.G. – Collins, C. (2000): *Humanitarian Challenges & Intervention*. 2nd ed. Westview Press: Colorado.

Williamson, R. (1998): Moving in Vicious Circles: The Moral Dilemmas of Arms Transfers and Weapons Manufacture, in Moore, J., ed. *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Maryland, USA

Wolfe, R. (2005): Decision-Making and Transparency in the "Medieval" WTO: Does the Sutherland Report have the Right Prescription? *Journal of International Economic Law* 8(3): 631–645.

Woods, N. (2001): Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable. *International Affairs* 77(1): 83–100.

Yanik, L.K. (2006): Guns and human rights: Major Powers, global arms transfers, and Human rights violations. *Human Rights Quarterly* (28): 357–388.

***Jed Lea-Henry** is an Australian-born academic. After graduating from La Trobe University with majors in Political Science and Philosophy, Jed completed his post-graduate education in International Relations at Deakin University. His research has covered a broad range of topics, including humanitarian intervention, civil conflict, violence prevention, regional development and moral philosophy. Jed is currently an assistant professor in the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty at Vignan University. You can follow his work or contact him directly at http://www.jedleahenry.org/. E-mail: jedlea_sh@vignanuniversity.org*

REVIEWS

How the Czechoslovak legions in Siberia helped create an independent state

LADISLAV CABADA[1]

One of the most striking differences between the American and European social science traditions is the European insistence on a clear division between "scientific" and "popular" research publications. Among the most harmful effects of this split is the failure of much European research to find an audience because it is so far removed from everyday life and readers' expectations. Many scholars are, in other words, unable to "sell their story." The situation is even worse for researchers working in fairly minor national language markets where even "bestsellers" are bought by only a tiny number of libraries and readers. This research work depends largely on state funding and scholars often have no interest in producing more readable and appealing versions of their findings. In my opinion, these issues point to some of the most important challenges facing the social sciences and highlight the need to develop workable communication strategies.

The subject of this book review happily embodies an alternative tradition: it brings together an exceptionally captivating story, an academic with a long-standing research interest and the use of effective and accurate storytelling to convey the issues. The author, Kevin McNamara, is an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia who studied journalism and later international relations. As such, he is well equipped to conduct historical, sociological and political science research and apply narrative conventions to report his findings. And he is an outstanding storyteller. McNamara's interest in the history of the Czechoslovak legions and their activities in Russia, particularly Siberia, dates back to the early 1990s when he made his first journey

1 Ladislav Cabada is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Humanities at Metropolitan University Prague (Czech Republic). He is also a permanent resident scholar at National University of Public Service in Budapest (Hungary). He can be contacted at ladislav.cabada@mup.cz.

on the Trans-Siberian Railway. This marked the start of his research on the role of the Czechoslovak legions during World War I, the Russian civil war and the whole question of external interventions against the emerging Bolshevik regime in Russia.

In this centenary year of the founding of an independent Czechoslovakia (to be celebrated on October 2018), McNamara gives us an astute and comprehensive analysis of the activities of the Czechoslovak legions, embedded in more general stories of Russian/Soviet and global history of the 1910s and 1920s. A skilled narrator, he combines a sweeping historical tale with well-chosen insights into the daily lives of ordinary legionnaires, capturing their thoughts, expectations, hopes, doubts and fears as they travelled and fought for more than three years via the Trans-Siberian Railway.

McNamara opens his story in early 1918, with a focus on Russia's withdrawal from the Great War under the Brest-Litovsk peace agreement signed on 3 March 2018. For Germany, this agreement represented a final chance to arrest the developments that had been hastening its defeat. As McNamara stresses, almost two-and-a-half million prisoners of war (POWs) from the Central Power countries, including about two hundred thousand POWs of Czech or Slovak origin, were to be transferred from camps across Russia and repatriated. Back in 1917, around one-third of these prisoners had heard the appeal of the Czechoslovak National Committee led by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk in Paris and pledged support to the goal of a new independent state – Czechoslovakia – from their posts in France, Italy and other battlefields and fronts. On their way to Vladivostok, these POWs faced the threat of attacks from German POWs and even more worryingly from Hungarian POWs and Bolsheviks. This was the main reason why after the so-called Chelyabinsk incident in April 1918, Czechoslovak legions seized control of this city and, shortly after, of all other important cities and stops between Chelyabinsk and Vladivostok, covering a distance of more than 5000 kilometres on "enemy land."

McNamara describes and analyses the military successes of the Czechoslovak legions as they took charge of these critical junctions on the Trans-Siberian Railway and defended their positions; all the while, they awaited a decision from the Western Allies, including the Czechoslovak National Committee, on their future deployment and fate. The most pressing issue was whether to intervene in Russia and/or extend the Eastern Front with the Central Powers into Russian territory. Naturally, the POWs behind this unexpected military capture of the most important transport route between Moscow and Vladivostok/Beijing, a group loyal to Masaryk and his associates Edvard Beneš and Milan Rastislav Štefánik, became important actors in the "grand history" of World War I's final act; their actions gave rise to a new way of thinking about the prospects of the Russian state. Like many other scholars of the last two or three decades – and like the Czechoslovak political elite of the interwar period – McNamara notes

the crucial impact of the legions on negotiations of Czechoslovak independence and the new state.

McNamara's analysis is contained in relatively brief, but well-structured and powerful chapters detailing the modern history of Central Europe and Austria-Hungary with a keen eye on the Czech nation. He calls the residents of the Czech lands "Vienna's unloved stepchildren," a description I would support entirely. At the same time, he correctly observes that the Czech lands were at the centre of Austrian industry, generating about 60% of all Austrian production and two-thirds of all jobs. This development potential was not, however, rewarded with rights that were adequate or acceptable to the Czechs. To the contrary, with the so-called dual monarchy of 1866/67 and the creation of the Austro-Hungarian confederation and personal union, the position of the Czech lands and nation only worsened. This dualism undermined efforts to create a supranational Austrian identity that might have been similar to the Swiss one. Rather, the establishment of the Hungarian state revealed the dominance of ethnicity over a political definition of nationhood and the Czechs were even more threatened by pan-German plans for Central Europe. Significantly, the dual system also enabled a strong and aggressive Hungarisation that affected other ethnic groups in Hungary, particularly Slavs. For Czechs, relations with Slovaks and later also Rusyns/Ruthenes became most crucial, and it was precisely through cooperation with these ethnic groups that the Czechoslovak state was eventually created. Nevertheless, the Czech(oslovak) intellectual and political elites did not forget the southern Slavonic nations and after 1918, the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was their closest ally.

McNamara offers a sensitive analysis of Czech domestic politics both before the outbreak of World War I and during the war itself. He stresses the role of Sokol – in his words, "a Slavic network of nationalist-inspired gymnastic and cultural clubs" – as well as the impact of a strong civil society including modern ideologically based and pro-democratic political parties. There is a specific focus here on the "Russian issue" in Czech politics, and McNamara highlights the Janusian position of the Czech nation and elites when it came to Russia and Pan-Slavism. The information that Russia's Czech diaspora was the second largest in the world (after the one in the United States) is indeed important: it shows why it was more than logical that Czechoslovak politicians saw Russia (under the February 2017 government) as their most promising future partner aside from France and the US. Between 1917 and 1918, Masaryk, then sixty-seven, made the long trip from France to Russia (including the Trans-Siberian Railway route) and across Japan to the United States. He was welcomed and celebrated as a liberator by the Czech, Slovak and Rusyn diasporas and he would come to be known as the "President-Liberator" after the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia. Masaryk's highly idealist approach was also in full keeping with the administration of Woodrow Wilson. On more pragmatic matters and

political strategy, Beneš and Štefánik took charge, with the former handling diplomacy and the latter military tasks.

Štefánik visited the legions in Siberia in the spring of 1919, sharing with them both his enthusiasm for the new state, created thanks in part to their initiative, actions and exceptional organisation, and his fears for the future. There would be no intervention and the Red Army, formed in response to the Czechoslovak legionnaires' military successes, was gaining increasing ground against the exhausted foreign troops. For these tired POWs, who were citizens of the new state but still so far from its territory, the greatest desire was to leave Siberia and head home. Masaryk and his associates were waiting for them, having emerged as the new Czechoslovak military elite after the death of the first defence minister Štefánik in a plane crash on 4 May 1919. In fact, it would take another year for the tens of thousands of legionnaires to make it from Vladivostok to Europe. In the meantime, these Czechoslovak soldiers resisted the pressure to join the White Army and enter the Russian civil war. That resistance earned them a new enemy besides the Red Army.

After their return, the legionnaires became part of the new state's military, political and cultural elite. McNamara does not explore the position of these individuals after 1920, and this might make a terrific topic for his next book. It is striking that one hundred years after these events, the myth of the legionnaires is alive and resonates throughout Czech society and politics. After 1989, Czechoslovak and later Czech (and Slovak) governments and other entities restored war-time cemeteries and other memorials along the Trans-Siberian Railway often after meeting with opposition from the new Russian political actors. There are also a large number of veterans' societies in the Czech lands: significant groups include the Czech Union of Freedom Fighters, which consists largely of World War II veterans of the Eastern Front and members of International Brigades from Spain (1936–1939) and honours their memories, and the Czechoslovak Community of Legionnaires (*Československá obec legionářská*), which highlights the importance of the legions and their members in the genesis of the Czechoslovak state.

McNamara's book is an excellent contribution to both scholarly and public debates about the Czechoslovak legions in Russia and also offers a broader framework for understanding their establishment, activities and impact. This study reveals how a strong-principled and well-organised group managed not only to survive but also to shape the course of history. In this sense, the legions made the small Czech (and Slovak) nation great, as the title of this important book suggests.

McNamara, Kevin J. (2016): *Dreams of a Great Small Nation. The Mutinous Army that Threatened a Revolution, Destroyed an Empire, Founded a Republic, and Remade the Map of Europe.* New York: Public Affairs, 395 pages.

Report about the powerful man

RADIM ŠTÍCHA[1]

Russia and the current Putin regime have been attracting more and more attention as various forms of information become available to the public. Up until recently, however, there's been a problem with the coverage of these topics: on the one hand, Czech readers have had access to different resources including books, news reports and specialist websites, and on the other, no source has offered a more comprehensive view of Russian politics and Putin's personality. In this context, Czech author Veronika Salminen's book *Putin – nezkreslená zpráva o mocném muži a jeho zemi* [Putin: The Undistorted Truth about the Strongman and His Country] fills an important gap. Salminen is a long-time specialist in 19th- and 20th-century Central European and Russian history who has lectured at respected universities across Europe from Charles University in Prague to the University of Tampere in Finland. In this volume, she aims to give an all-encompassing and global picture of Russian politics covering both domestic affairs and Russia's relationships with other players internationally.

Over seven chapters, Salminen attempts to analyse Russia from all possible angles in order to explain why the world's biggest country acts so differently from other states. At the same time, this study details changes in Russian political culture over the last 25 years since the fall of the USSR. Underpinning Salminen's project is the concept of hybridity, and she makes the case for its current relevance. The term, she argues, reflects three basic conditions: ambivalence, internal diversity and the fusion of various intercultural influences and phenomena. As such, it resonates with Putin's regime with its particular fusing of authoritarianism with a democratic façade.

The book's first chapter provides an introduction to modern Russian history that lays the groundwork for understanding Russian political behaviour. Generally speaking, the Russian style of political negotiation is a result of old

1 Radim Štícha is PhD student of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Humanities at Metropolitan University Prague (Czech Republic). He can be contacted at sticr2ax@student.mup.cz.

and newer traditions including caesaropapism (based on an exceptional alliance between Church and state), militarism and the military mobilisation of the population, patrimonial government, etatism and the idea of a strong and centralised state. The latter especially tends to produce a system of weak formal and powerful informal institutions. Salminen does not leave out the question of Russia's unstable borders, which have been apparent since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 (p. 20). She is also astute on the issue of Russia's democratisation and reports that democratic and liberal thinking emerged in the country at the turn of the twenty first century. Nevertheless, she notes the world's largest country has generally had no experience of democracy (p. 22). Putin's regime is a hybrid one combining elements of democracy and authoritarianism. Salminen focuses particularly on three concepts developed by Western and Russian experts: electoral authoritarianism, defective democracy and imitation democracy. While her research is based largely on the ideas of Western scholars, it also reflects the work of Russian academics including political science lecturer Ekaterina Shulman. The latter is responsible for the theory of the "petrostate," a kind of imitation democracy in which the state is dominated by an interest in natural resources, particularly oil. Shulman has also suggested that authoritarian regimes take on a hybrid form in the current era. As such, they imitate democracies, which they are not, while aspiring to an authoritarianism that does not quite exist (p. 27).

Salminen's second chapter explores the precursors of Putin's government. In recounting the history of Gorbachev's perestroika, the decline of the USSR and the political and economic transformation led by Yeltsin between 1991 and 1999, she points out significant influences on the present regime. Clearly, Yeltsin's "phony democracy" of the 1990s provided a ground plan for the modern-day political system, which Putin re-modelled as an imitation or rather "sovereign" democracy (p. 38). This idea is reiterated throughout the book, and Salminen maintains it is crucial. Generally, I would concur that without understanding the 1990s, we cannot make sense of today's Putinism. The chapter also gives a pivotal role to the Yeltsin Constitution, which was drawn up in 1993 during a legislative and executive crisis. Notably, though that 1993 Constitution remains valid, leading Russia expert Richard Sakwa has stressed the current "para-constitutional policy," which supports "practices that do not violate the written word of [the] Constitution, but do not correspond to its meaning and spirit" (p. 34).

The third part of Salminen's book outlines Vladimir Putin's biography. Here Salminen looks for the causes of the Russian president's "skyrocketing" career success. Ultimately she suggests this rise can best be attributed to his loyalty and management skills and the faith of the Yeltsin's "family." Critically, it appears Yeltsin's "team" saw Putin as "a blank slate they could write anything on" (p. 81).

The fourth chapter also considers Putin's persona, but the focus shifts to the philosophy behind his regime and various aspects of its "pseudo-ideology."

Those elements include patriotism, imperial identity and particular notions of statehood, social solidarity, national strength and economic power. Salminen is especially interested in "sovereign democracy," a concept defined by chief Kremlin propagandist Vladislav Surkov and which may be understood as an attempt to break free of Western concepts and impose Russia's own stamp on the domestic regime. This phrase was apparently coined in response to Western characterisations of Russia as a "managed democracy" (p. 93).The theme of Russian national identity gains context in a discussion of the problems affecting the state symbols used by Putin. The most obvious example is surely the national anthem, which invokes traditions from the USSR. In contrast, the state flag recalls imperial times and the brief interregnum of the Provisional Government of 1917. One way or another, Putin has been trying to reconcile different epochs across the centuries including the monarchy, the totalitarian regime and the "democratic period" (p. 126).

Salminen's fifth chapter probes the changing relationship between the centre and the periphery in the Russian context. Here she compares the situation after the breakup of the Soviet Union when centrifugal trends predominated, i.e. efforts were made to weaken Moscow in favour of the regions, with conditions after Putin's inauguration as president in 2000. In that year, Putin began reinforcing the structure of his regime or what is known in the literature as the "power vertical." This phrase describes a way to re-centralise power in the hands of the president as the central authority. Salminen connects these practices with Putin's efforts to dissociate himself from the Yeltsin era, which had been characterised by a rise in segmented pluralism (p. 136). At the same time, she notes the role of "informal" policymaking in Russia, including the creation of a parallel cabinet known as Politburo 2. 0. The latter is an informal but highly influential body composed of the president's closest associates throughout the political system.

The final two parts of Salminen's book cover topics that are equally important for the current Russian political system: foreign policy and the economy. This foreign policy analysis draws on the work of the Russian-American international relations scholar Andrei Tsygankov, who divides Russian foreign policy into several periods based on individual presidential terms from 1991 to 2014. The first period (1991–1995) is said to be one of *cooperation* and describes a time when the Kremlin's main goals were achieving crucial cooperation with the West and Russia's integration into Western structures. In contrast, the next phase (1995–1999) was marked by *defensiveness* as the new foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov developed strong and positive partnerships with non-Western countries including India, China and various Islamic states. After Putin's arrival in the Kremlin in 2000, there was a reprisal of *cooperation* as Russia tried to build ties with the European Union and NATO. By 2005, however, Putin had become critical of the US and the entire North Atlantic Alliance, signaling

a new phase of *assertiveness*. While the Dmitry Medvedev interlude saw renewed *cooperation* with the West on foreign policy, the current era is characterised by a mix of *assertiveness* and *defensiveness*, particularly since the 2011 Syrian crisis (p. 210). Salminen's reflections on the Russian economy reflect a similarly sharp historical analysis: she contrasts the Yeltsin era of rampant capitalism and unchecked privatisation and resulting new minority of billionaire oligarchs, with Putin's economic consolidation at the start of the new millennium. The analysis, of course, extends to the present day, with Salminen noting that the Russian economy has been in the doldrums in recent years due to the loss of foreign investment after the annexation of Crimea and declining oil prices (p. 290).

To sum up, this recent volume by Veronika Salminen provides comprehensive and accurate information about the state of Russia today. In general, there's much to appreciate in this work that not only captures the current regime from various perspectives but also grapples with historical issues and contrasts the 1990s with the present day. The absence of a separate chapter on problems with the Russian media and broader political communication is a minor shortcoming; such a detailed analysis of information distribution both within the regime and among Russia's citizens would be helpful and beneficial. This topic clearly connects with the media privatisations of the 1990s when almost all significant media organisations were bought by the private sector. Putin's rise saw the expropriation of large-scale media holdings, which became the property of the state and its mouthpiece. Similarly, Salminen neglects the question of Russian election campaigns and the election process more generally.

Nevertheless, putting aside these quibbles, I am struck by the originality and inventiveness of this work, which combines a reappraisal of historical assumptions with an exploration of the current situation. Salminen does not try to justify or defend the Putin regime, and nor does she demonise it, and this approach is to be commended. I am convinced this book will be a valuable resource for anyone looking for basic and comprehensive information about this controversial country and the even more controversial Putin regime.

Salminen, Veronika (2015). *Putin: nezkreslená zpráva o mocném muži a jeho zemi.* Prague: Daranus. 347 pages.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

Politics in Central Europe publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic version via e-mail to ladislav.cabada@mup.cz, preferably in Word format.

Presentation of the paper

Each issue the *Politics in Central Europe* focuses on one main topic or theme. This theme is indicated in advance, at the latest in the previous issue. Besides essays focused on the current issue, essays with other themes are welcomed too.

Essays should be written in English (preferably British English).
Essays should not normally exceed 12,000 words in length.

When submitting the essay, please also attach:

- an abstract of 150–200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
- a brief biographical note about each author, including previous and current institutional affiliation
- a full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about the second author.

All essays are checked by a referee; they undergo a double-blind peer review. At least two external referees review manuscripts. *Politics in Central Europe* reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form, without requesting an external review.

In order to ensure anonymity during the peer-review process, the name(s), title(s), and full affiliation(s) of the author(s) should only appear on a separate cover sheet, together with her/his preferred mailing address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers.

Politics in Central Europe reserves the right to edit or otherwise alter all contributions, but authors will receive proofs for approval before publication.

Style Guidelines
Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

Manuscript style guidelines
Authors are urged to write as concisely as possible, but not at the expense of clarity. Descriptive or explanatory passages, necessary for information but which tend to break up the flow of text, should appear in footnotes. For footnotes please use Arabic numbers. Footnotes should be placed on the same page as the text reference, with the same number in the essay.

Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994-1998; or the 1990 s.

References in the text
In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

Since Bull (1977) has shown that. This is in results attained later (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), are states the.

Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005 b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994 b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by '–' (not 'and' or '&'). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by '*et al.*', or write all names separated with '–' (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in *International Security* (Summer 1990: 5).' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:

Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia,* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Two or more authors:

Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid. Understanding International Development Cooperation,* Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

EDITED VOLUMES:

Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1993): *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Clarendon Press.

CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:

George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, in Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics.* Sixth Edition, 70-76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5–54.

Online editions of journals:

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632 (15 August 2002).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Excerpts From the Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

Online editions:

Cooper, Robert (2002): Why We Still Need Empires, *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2 November 2003).

RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

Illustrations and tables

Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced. Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

Book Reviews and Review Essays – Guidelines for Contributing Authors

Politics in Central Europe welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of *Politics in Central Europe* was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

Politics in Central Europe encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

- A book review should not exceed 1,500 words
- State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified
- An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.

Contributors of review essays should meet the following requirements:

- A review essay should not exceed 6,000 words. It should also comply with all of the above requirements for book reviews
- Authors may either review several books related to a common topic, or provide a review essay of a single book considered to provide an exceptional contribution to the knowledge in a given field of research
- While a review essay should primarily deal with the contents of the book(s) under review, *Politics in Central Europe* encourages authors to use the reviewed material as a springboard for their own ideas and thoughts on the subject.