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Stereotypes Determining Perceptions of Female Politicians: The Case of Poland

AGNIESZKA TURSKA-KAWA AND AGATA OLSZANECKA-MARMOLA

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Abstract: *The aim of this study is to find out whether women in Polish politics are perceived through the prism of gender stereotypes. We conducted a two-stage empirical study (N=447) to investigate the kinds of qualities that young voters attribute to politicians in the context of gender stereotypes. Our findings correlated with a pattern of research that shows that female politicians are typically associated with "female issues" and seen in terms of stereotypically feminine traits. The results of our survey showed gender solidarity, with female and male participants generally responding more positively to politicians of the same gender. There were also significant differences based on respondents' interest in politics; people interested in politics were, for example, significantly less likely to ascribe qualities related to political ability and self-composure to women. Finally, ideological identifications did not modify perceptions of female politicians but people who identified as right-wing more often viewed male politicians as politically capable, diligent, likeable and go-getters.*

Keywords: ***women in politics, gender stereotypes, female politicians, politics, Poland***

Introduction

The Polish political scene is known for the low proportion of women in public office. The democratisation processes that Poland underwent in the early 1990s did not involve an increase in the number of women in positions of public authority. This was typical of all Central and Eastern European countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995) where the *ancien regime* gave rise to a society

dominated by patriarchal values. In this context, post-Communist societies are often referred to as conservative or "neo-conservative" when it comes to the social role of women (Siklova 1993). Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk (2000) argue that during the socialist period in Poland, the dominant image of womanhood was that of the mother; this was later transformed into a model of the "brave victim." These researchers also point out that despite systemic changes and the emergence of a new image of women as attractive, independent and professionally active, the Polish mother stereotype has in some ways been preserved in the public imagination.

After Poland's first entirely free elections in 1991, fewer than 10% of all seats in the *Sejm* (lower chamber) were occupied by women (Fuszara 2010: 90). Over the next two terms, the proportion of women in the lower house was around 13%. The introduction of recommended representation quotas by the victorious Democratic Left Alliance-Labor United coalition (SLD-UP) and growing public calls for equal rights for women helped increase the proportion of women in the lower chamber to 20%. The Polish Electoral Code, which was adopted in 2011, stipulated that at least 35% of candidates on party lists should be women. Still this measure did not bring the expected significant changes: in the 2011 elections, only 23.9% of successful candidates were women. This may have been due to the low share of women in prime positions on candidate lists, but it also reflected the fact that social values and attitudes had not yet adapted to the new conditions.

The negligible presence of women in Polish politics is also apparent from an analysis of those holding appointed positions (i.e. as ministers and party leaders). In the 1990–2015 period, women constituted only 11.3% of ministers (including members of the Council of Ministers without assigned departments) and Ewa Kopacz was the only woman to lead a relevant party. The country has had two female prime ministers (Kopacz and Hanna Suchocka), however in both these cases, this was a result of cabinet reshuffles and not elections. The 2015 election campaign saw a dramatic change in the leadership of the main political parties. For the first time in Polish electoral history, women were the leaders of the two biggest competing parties: Civic Platform was headed by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, who had assumed the position one year before (after Donald Tusk became president of the European Council) while Law and Justice was led by Beata Szydło. Barbara Nowacka, a woman representing the third most important political group, United Left, also competed for the chance to be head of government. One possible goal of this female leadership was to temper perceptions of the political realm as tough, devoid of empathy and combative, a view reinforced by numerous recent disputes on the political scene.

After the 2015 parliamentary elections, Polish politics saw some changes. United Left did not hold any seats, having failed to reach the threshold for parliamentary representation, a situation that naturally marginalised Barbara

Nowacka. Ewa Kopacz did not stand for the position of chairperson of Civic Platform, and on 26 January 2016, that role was assumed by Grzegorz Schetyna. Beata Szydło became Poland's new prime minister but she was widely perceived as dependent on Law and Justice chairperson Jarosław Kaczyński. Polish politics, thus, remained the domain of domineering men. The marginalisation of women is also confirmed by recent data on the percentage of women in representative bodies. The proportion of women in the lower chamber is 27.4% while in the senate, it is 13%.

From social role to stereotype

The social position of each gender is connected with role divisions. Studies by various anthropologists point to a number of conclusions: first, gender is the basis for the attribution of social tasks and the different roles attached; second, certain tasks are consistently assigned to one gender only; and third, apart from a few tasks that are assigned on the basis of biological sex, there is a great diversity in role allocation culturally: what is regarded as feminine behaviour in one community may be characteristic of men in another (Goodman 1992: 168; Marszałek 2008: 268). During the socialisation process, women are mostly taught and prepared to serve traditional roles connected with the family and the provision of care, while men are prepared to perform professional roles. Women tend to develop a calmer, friendlier, milder, conciliatory approach while men are expected to be aggressive and proactive (Mandal 1995; Vasta et al. 1995). Research shows that women are more sensitive than men around issues concerning care for the ill; they feel more responsible for the health of their family members (Verbrugge – Wingard 1987) and have greater emotional competence (Filipiak 2001). Bakan (1966) describes the social orientation of women as communal and that of men as agentic. A communal orientation emphasises emotional closeness, caring for others and reciprocity while an agentic one stresses efficiency and strength.

Gender stereotypes in politics

Traditional understandings of masculine and feminine roles generate stereotypes. A gender stereotype is an oversimplified belief or idea about the behaviour of male and female individuals that is shared by most people in a society and learnt in the course of growing up and socialisation (Deaux – Lewis 1984). Brannon (2017) notes:

> [A] gender stereotype consists of beliefs about the psychological traits and characteristics of, as well as the activities appropriate to, men or women. These beliefs often have something to do with the behaviours typically performed

> by women and men in a particular culture, but gender stereotypes are more generalized beliefs and attitudes about masculinity and femininity. (p. 46)

Gender stereotypes have descriptive and prescriptive components (Bauer 2013). The descriptive part results from the fact that gender stereotypes provide a "standard of comparison in construing the implications of behavioral information" for men and women (Lambert – Wyer Jr. 1990). This is connected with the stereotypical attribution of certain personality traits to women. The prescriptive part refers to expectations about women's behaviour. According to scholars, stereotypical prescriptions for women maintain "traditional emphases on interpersonal sensitivity, niceness, modesty, and sociability'' (Prentice – Carranza 2002: 275).

Children adopt gender stereotypes at a very early stage of development, either by learning them directly or by observing gender-related social roles and behaviours (Hoffmann – Hurst 1990). Later, these stereotypes are consolidated or reinforced during the process of education, in the workplace and through the media. Stereotypes reflect the different roles attributed to men and women: the masculine role is more agentic and proactive while the feminine one is more connected with community-building, empathy and milder emotions (Eagly 1987). Stereotypes are a useful cognitive tool, especially when people have limited information about particular phenomena, individuals or social groups. This is also relevant in the sphere of politics (Rahn 1993; Lau – Redlawsk 2001). According to Sambomatsu (2002), the concept of "gender stereotypes" may be more helpful than that of "voter discrimination" because gender stereotypes offer (positive and negative) information about a voter's view of candidates. An individual whose original views are based on gender stereotypes may update their "baseline preference" if they have new experiences with candidates and elected officials that alter their long-term beliefs about female candidates.

Politics is generally considered to be a "masculine" area of work. Voters prefer candidates with "masculine" qualities at each level of the electoral competition (Rosenwasser – Dean 1989). Empirical studies show that politicians tend to be described as strong, ruthless, competitive, able to manipulate others and concerned with their own interests (Jarymowicz 1976; Reykowski 2000). Women's role in politics, thus, conflicts in some ways with the traits and dispositions attributed to women. Female politicians must transcend the social and professional roles traditionally associated with women. This also affects the strategies which female candidates use when competing for political positions. These women often flout gender stereotypes, assuming qualities deemed to be masculine or emphasising their competence in areas typically associated with men.

Experiments prove that even when male and female politicians have identical messages, women are most often associated with stereotypical "female" topics

while men are considered more knowledgeable on "male" issues (Sapiro 1982; Matland 1994). Other studies show that perceptions of women politicians are significantly better when their campaigns focus on typical "female issues" (Kahn 1996). In this respect, women do far better on social issues and men on economic ones (Kahn 1993).

According to Huddy and Terkildsen (1993), there are two types of gender stereotypes in the realm of politics: *belief stereotypes*, which concern the areas of men's and women's respective political activities, and *trait stereotypes*, which relate to the traits attributed to each gender. In the case of belief stereotypes, women are perceived as being better at handling "female" issues such as education, health care, social welfare and environmental protection while men are said to be more fluent in "male" issues like defence, crime and terrorism prevention, the economy, public finance, commerce, agriculture and foreign policy (Rosenwasser – Seale 1988; Rosenwasser – Dean 1989; Leeper 1991; Alexander – Andersen 1993; Brown et al. 1993; Kahn 1996; Koch 1999; King – Matland 2003; Dolan 2004; Dolan 2010). This is confirmed by several American studies of legislative activity, which show that women lawmakers tend to focus on issues stereotypically regarded as female (Thomas 1991; Norton 1999). In addition, the ideological positions of politicians are often stereotyped based on gender. Women politicians are presumed to be more leftist than men (Dolan 2014; Devroe – Wauters 2017). As regards trait stereotypes, women who work in politics are perceived as being more empathetic, expressive, trustworthy, consensus-oriented and able to deal with constituents than men; they are also viewed as less resolute than male politicians (Burrell 1994; Kahn 1996). In contrast, men are regarded as more assertive and rational than women (Huddy – Terkildsen 1993). They are generally seen as resolute, competent, strong leaders who are able to cope with crisis situations (Paul – Smith 2008).

These stereotypes are not surprising since they simply extrapolate from private, domestic roles to the public sector (Sapiro 1983: 146). A study by Lawless (2004) showed that after 11 September 2001, women candidates faced greater voter disapproval because public fears were focused on the threat of terrorism, and men were perceived as being more effective at handling this threat.

Another view of the stereotypes about women in politics is presented by Schneider and Bos (2014). Their study found that female politicians were "a subtype of the superordinate group women"; as such, stereotypes about women in politics were more related to stereotypes about professional women than to general perceptions of the gender. In contrast, stereotypes about male politicians proved to be similar to those about men in general. Women politicians were more likely than their male counterparts to be defined by their deficits rather than their strengths. They were said to lack the strengths associated with being a woman (e.g. sensitivity and compassion) as well as the leadership, competence and other traits connected with male politicians (Schneider – Bos 2014: 260–261).

It should be stressed that the different perceptions of men and women in politics may not have a negative effect on their popularity or the effectiveness of their election campaigns (Aalberg – Jenssen 2007: 17). By taking a stand on different policies, women may introduce new issues into the political sphere and so attract new or less mobilised groups of voters. The idea here is that female politicians can open up new aspects of party competition through their emphasis on new issues. Similarly, these politicians may introduce new kinds of personal strengths into politics, including communication skills, compassion and the ability to persuade important segments of the electorate. Against this, election campaigns may serve to ignite stereotypes. As more political advertisements are broadcast during a campaign, there is greater likelihood that voters will watch them and this will affect their decisions. Exposure to stereotype-laden spots about women lowers the probability of voting for a female incumbent (Bauer 2015).

A study by Okimoto and Brescoll (2010) showed that when female candidates openly admitted that they wanted to gain power during election campaigns, their chances of success decreased. Negative campaigns were more likely to trigger a backlash if they were led by women (Krupnikov – Bauer 2014).

Politicians who show emotion may also be assessed differently depending on their gender (Lewis 2000). Women are perceived more positively when they express no emotions than when they display sadness or anger. In contrast, men are seen more positively when they show anger or no emotions than when they express sadness. A study by Tiedens (2001) found that whenever Bill Clinton expressed anger, his prospects improved.

The research problem

As we have seen, people expect politicians to have traits and dispositions that are incompatible with the socially and culturally accepted female role. Women are seen as empathetic, conciliatory, friendly and mild, while the political world is perceived as ruthless and combative. The current study aims to compare the importance of two factors: the traits attributed to women and those ascribed to politicians. A study by Gawor (2006) found that perceptions of women politicians focused on their appearance, traits, social skills, motivations for entering politics and typical activities. This list suggests that women politicians are seen in terms of categories typically applied to women and those typically applied to men, which shows the interaction of these two factors.

This article seeks to establish whether women in Polish politics are perceived through the prism of gender stereotypes. To this end, we compare the descriptive categories that organise perceptions of male and female politicians.

Three additional variables have been added to our survey: the respondent's gender, the extent of their interest in politics and their ideological self-

-identification. All these factors may have a significant effect on how women politicians are perceived. Interest in politics is the variable most frequently associated with subjective political knowledge. The greater an individual's interest in politics, the more likely it is that they can assess and interpret political phenomena and processes (Jakubowska 1999). Moreover, interest in politics translates into greater exposure to political stimuli, which, in turn, increases political participation (Skarżyńska 2002). The second variable is the respondent's ideological self-identification, as seen from their location on a spectrum extending from left to right. We assumed that individuals closer to the extreme right would uphold traditional values and be more likely to perceive women in terms of stereotypical roles connected with the family and household. These respondents would, thus, find it harder to see a role for women in politics.

In order to satisfy our research objectives, we needed to compare perceptions of men and, thus, ensure a deeper analysis of the research problem. Our approach aimed to highlight not only the importance and interaction of different associations with "female politician" but also their relationship to comparable associations with "male politician." Through the research process, we tried to find answers to the following questions:

1. What descriptive categories underlie perceptions of female politicians?
2. What descriptive categories underlie perceptions of male politicians?
3. Does a voter's gender modify their perceptions of men and women in the political space?
4. Does a voter's interest in politics modify their perceptions of men and women in the political space?
5. Does a voter's ideological self-identification modify their perceptions of women and men in the political space?

The first two questions were exploratory. The third one aimed to test our assumption that there is a relationship between a person's gender and their perceptions of women in politics. Our working hypothesis was that based on gender solidarity, women voters would perceive women politicians more positively while male voters would take a more favourable view of male politicians.

Turning to the fourth question, we presumed that we would find a significant correlation between the level of a voter's interest in politics and their perceptions of female and male politicians. In particular, we predicted that greater interest in politics would translate into a higher level of political knowledge, and that in line with McDermott's (1998) findings, this would substantially reduce reliance on stereotypes. Knowledge can minimise simplistic reasoning and limit the use of cognitive heuristics when making evaluations.

The last question explored the relationship between leftist and rightist self-identifications and perceptions of women and men in politics. We assumed that because of their attachment to conservative values including the traditional

division of gender roles, right-wing voters would rely on stereotypes to a greater degree. As such, they would perceive men in terms reserved for descriptions of political life while their perceptions of women would reflect stereotypical female traits.

Methodology

The first stage of our research was a pilot study involving 100 participants. The sample was diverse in terms of age (18–24: 15%; 25–34: 16%; 35–44: 18%; 45–54: 17%; 55–64: 18%; over 65: 16%), gender (women: 52%; men: 48%) and place of residence (town: 56%; village: 44%). The respondents were asked to answer two open-ended questions: "What do you associate female politicians with?" and "What do you associate male politicians with?" There was no limit on the number of qualities that respondents could mention. They were asked first about female politicians and then separately about male politicians so as to minimise the risk of being guided by their initial associations with male politicians. Otherwise, the qualities listed might have referred to men to a greater degree. We then compiled a list of the qualities used most frequently to characterise each of the genders in the pilot study. "Overall 146 qualities were selected for both genders, and these were assessed by qualified judges". The latter were 12 experts consisting of three psychologists, four political scientists, three sociologists and two cultural critics. Based on their assessment, we selected 50 characteristics for female politicians and 50 characteristics for male politicians to be included in the final assessment tool.

The actual study took place in late November and early December 2016. The respondents were students at the University of Silesia in Katowice who were enrolled in licentiate or master's degree courses in the following areas: political science, psychology, journalism and communications, political and public sector consultancy, domestic and international security and film and TV production. The group consisted of 276 women and 171 men – a total of 447 people.

The respondents first filled in a questionnaire in which they were asked to evaluate the degree to which women and men in politics displayed particular characteristics. The same inventory of characteristics that had been identified for each gender in the pilot study was applied to them again in this context. The respondents used a five-point scale extending from 1 ("not at all") to 5 ("a great deal"). Interest in politics was also measured on a five-point scale, with 1 denoting a complete lack of interest and 5 a very high level of interest. Ideological self-identifications took place on the left–right spectrum. For this purpose, respondents used a seven-point scale, selecting from the categories extreme left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right and extreme right or else choosing the "I don't know" option.

Results

In the first stage of the research, we verified the significance of the differences between the perceived characteristics of female and male politicians. The t-Student test for dependent samples showed that the characteristics used to describe female politicians were different from those applied to their male counterparts. As the table below shows, certain characteristics were attributed significantly more often to each gender.

Table 1: Significant differences between the perceived characteristics of female and male politicians

Female politician	Male politician
ambitious (t=5.109; df=446; p=.001) kind-hearted (t=15.920; df=446; p=.001) well-organised (t=6.247; df=446; p=.001) elegant (t=11.475; df=446; p=.001) empathetic (t=13.360; df=446; p=.001) trustworthy (t=9.472; df=446; p=.001) intelligent (t=2.206; df=446; p=.001) competent (t=3.133; df=446; p=.002) forms relationships easily (t=3.616; df=446; p=.001) naive (t=6.045; df=446; p=.001) responsible (t=2.201; df=446; p=.028) caring (t=9.392; df=446; p=.001) hard-working (t=9.298; df=446; p=.001) a go-getter (t=2.509; df=446; p=.012) friendly (t=11.400; df=446; p=.001) reliable (t=7.569; df=446; p=.001) weak (t=3.481; df=446; p=.001) calm (t=7.289; df=446; p=.001) nice (t=10.347; df=446; p=.001) submissive (t=6.393; df=446; p=.001) fights for the rights of others (t=10.138; df=446; p=.001) socially engaged (t=6.191; df=446; p=.001).	Supports nepotism (t=8.385; df=446; p=.001) ruthless (t=5.633; df=466; p=.001) works for the good of the party (t=2.088; df=446; p=.037) egotistical (t=9.702; df=446; p=.001) hypocritical (t=6.415; df=446; p=.001) careerist (t=5.398; df=446; p=.001) combative (t=3.831; df=446; p=.001) lazy (t=7.360; df=446; p=.001) manipulative (t=10.303; df=446; p=.001) strong (t=3.080; df=446; p=.002) competitive (t=11.569; df=446; p=.001) has high self-esteem (t=3.302; df=446; p=.001) resolute (t=3.685; df=446; p=.001)

Other characteristics were not ascribed significantly differently based on the politician's gender. This was true of the following traits: devoid of ideals; controllable; a good negotiator; media-savvy; copes with problems; independent; self-composed; courageous; enterprising; represents the community; reasonable; has a sense of humour; content with life and determined.

Female politicians were significantly more likely to be ascribed traits connected with caring for others and the ability to listen to their problems. In contrast, male politicians were associated considerably more often with features commonly linked to politics, for example, being ruthless or combative (Mouffe 2005).

In the next stage, we verified the factors highlighted in perceptions of female and male politicians using a factorial analysis. Varimax rotation was performed to rotate the factors. Only items with a loading of >0.3 were counted for each factor. In the case of women, the final analysis included 26 statements that were divided across three factors, producing a total variance of 41.74%. For men, 29 statements were chosen and these were also divided across three factors. The result was a total variance of 40.68%.

Table 2: Factors and key traits in the perception of female and male politicians

Female politician		
(F1) *political ability and self-composure*	(F2) *public appeal and sense of civic duty*	(F3) *competitiveness*
competent intelligent copes with problems resolute self-composed enterprising strong a good negotiator independent	friendly kind-hearted socially engaged empathetic fights for the rights of others represents the community forms relationships easily nice has a sense of humour calm elegant caring	has high self-esteem competitive ruthless careerist manipulative

Total variance=41.74%

Male politician		
(F1) *political ability and diligence*	(F2) *public appeal and go-getter attitude*	(F3) *ruthless competitiveness*
reliable hard-working competent copes with problems resolute enterprising a good negotiator intelligent well-organised determined independent strong	friendly caring nice kind-hearted empathetic has a sense of humour calm a go-getter	supports nepotism manipulative egotistical combative careerist competitive hypocritical ruthless has high self-esteem

Total variance=40.63%

Source: Authors' study

The factor most emphasised in perceptions of female and male politicians was their possession of the qualities needed to be a politician, or what can be summed up as political ability. Individuals with these qualities were said to be resolute, enterprising, independent, strong leaders, able to cope with problems, intelligent, competent and highly skilled at negotiation. Interestingly, this category varied slightly depending on whether it was applied to women or men. For women, self-composure was added to the list. In contrast, for men, this category was seen as part of a broader set of qualities reflecting diligence and reliability, i.e. being well-organised, reliable, a hard worker and determined. For women, this factor was, thus, called *political ability and self-composure*, while for men, it was labelled *political ability and diligence*. This may also explain why this factor featured in perceptions of male and female politicians to a similar degree: for men, the variance was 19.69% and for women it was 18.95%.

The second factor related to the characteristics that reflect a politician's public appeal. These are "soft" skills that support relationship-building and are valuable in social interactions. Characteristics associated with this factor included being friendly, kind-hearted, nice, caring, empathetic, calm and having a good sense of humour. In the case of women, this factor also encompassed some extra characteristics that showed the politician's commitment to working for the public benefit. These traits included being socially engaged, fighting for the rights of others, representing the community and forming relationships easily. Elegance was another characteristic factored in for women. For men, on the other hand, this category was extended to include having a go-getter attitude. Based on all these considerations, this factor was described as *public appeal and a sense of civic duty* in the case of women, while for men, it was *public appeal and a go-getter attitude*. There was significantly more variance in perceptions of this factor among female politicians (14.94%) compared to their male counterparts (10.70%).

The third factor concerned the politician's self-orientation. This was associated with characteristics such as having high self-esteem and being competitive, ruthless, careerist, manipulative and media-savvy. Interestingly, our study showed that this category was significantly broader in the case of men. Male politicians were perceived as approving of nepotism and being egotistical, combative and hypocritical. Taking all this into account, this factor was described as *competitiveness* in the case of women and *ruthless competitiveness* when it came to men. There was also significantly more variance in the perception of this factor in male politicians: the result was 10.23% for men compared to 7.85% for women.

The third stage of the study considered differences in the perception of female and male politicians among groups with different levels of interest in politics and different ideological self-identifications. In order to verify these relationships, we performed t-Student testing along with a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with post-hoc Tukey HSD.

Table 3: Factors in the perception of female and male politicians; differences and mean results for all-female versus all-male respondent groups

Factor	Gender of group	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Standard error of mean	t	df	p
Political ability and self-composure	Women	276	3.7512	.71017	.04275	5.707	445	0.001
	Men	171	3.3372	.79895	.06110			
Public appeal and sense of civic duty	Women	276	3.7472	.69391	.04177	2.413	445	0.016
	Men	171	3.5870	.66296	.05070			
Competitiveness	Women	276	3.4141	.58536	.03523	1.860	445	n.s.
	Men	171	3.3616	.54815	.04192			
Political ability and diligence	Women	276	3.5484	.71748	.04319	-2.921	445	0.004
	Men	171	3.7540	.73168	.05595			
Public appeal and go-getter attitude	Women	276	2.9199	.64530	.03884	-3.664	445	0.001
	Men	171	3.1475	.62702	.04795			
Ruthlessness	Women	276	3.3388	.72872	.04386	1.780	445	n.s.
	Men	171	3.2150	.69049	.05280			

The gender of respondents significantly affected the perception of female and male politicians in the case of all but the third of the factors identified. The outcomes of this study showed gender solidarity: women were significantly more likely to attribute *political ability and self-composure* as well as *public appeal and a sense of civic duty* to female politicians. Men, in turn, were more likely to ascribe the equivalent factors to male politicians.

Table 4: Variance* and post-hoc Tukey HSD test for each factor in the perception of female and male politicians; results for groups with different preferences on the left–right ideological spectrum

Factor	Medium				ANOVA (df=446)		Tukey's HSD
	Left (N=77)	Centre (N=84)	Right (N=160)	Don't know	F	p	
Political ability and self-composure	3.6032	3.6561	3.4986	3.6640	1.350	n.s.	–
Public appeal and sense of civic duty	3.5920	3.7183	3.6737	3.7373	0.795	n.s.	–
Competitiveness	3.3358	3.3776	3.3679	3.3923	0.159	n.s.	–
Political ability and diligence	3.4026	3.6446	3.8201	3.5075	7.646	0.001	L/R p=0.001 R/DN p=0.001
Public appeal and go-getter attitude	2.8485	3.0437	3.1056	2.9541	3.193	0.023	L/R p=0.021
Ruthlessness	3.4156	3.2344	3.2245	3.3386	1.604	n.s.	–

* The Levene's test results indicate that the variance for all factors was homogenous. The results were as follows: F(3.443) = 1.584, p = n.s.; F(3.443) = 1.483, p = n.s.; F(3.443) = 1.778, p = n.s.; F(3.443) = 1.394, p = n.s.; F(3.443) = 1.705, p = n.s.; F(3.443) = 0.407, p = n.s.

The results of our study showed no significant differences among groups with different ideological (left–right) preferences when it came to their perception of any factor in female politicians or the third factor in men. These groups did, however, have different perceptions of the *political ability and diligence* and the *public appeal and go-getter attitude* of male politicians. The post-hoc test showed that right-wing individuals were significantly more likely to see male politicians as politically capable and diligent than either left-wing respondents or those with no specified political orientation. Right-wing people also credited male politicians with *public appeal and a go-getter attitude* considerably more often their left-wing counterparts did.

Table 5: Variance and post-hoc Tukey HSD test for each factor in the perception of female and male politicians; results for groups with different levels of interest in politics

Factor	Medium			ANOVA (df=446)		Tukey's HSD
	"I'm not interested in politics" (NI) (N=116)	"I'm a little interested in politics" (LI) (N=174)	"I'm interested in politics" (I) (N=157)	F	p	
Political ability and self-composure	3.7040	3.6795	3.4289	6.733	0.001	I/NI p=0.010 LI/I p=0.013
Public appeal and sense of civic duty	3.7198	3.7388	3.6144	3.496	n.s.	-
Competitiveness	3.4224	3.3394	3.3758	2.033	n.s.	-
Political ability and diligence	3.4784	3.6537	3.7102	2.496	0.029	NI/I p=0.025
Public appeal and go-getter attitude	2.9339	3.0405	3.0255	0.730	n.s.	-
Ruthless competitiveness	3.3924	3.1792	3.3361	2.746	0.032	NI/LI p=0.040

Source: Authors' study

Regarding groups with different levels of interest in politics, our results showed no differences when it came to the perception of two "female" factors (*public appeal and a sense of civic duty* and *competitiveness*) or one "male" factor (*public appeal and a go-getter attitude*). At the same time, people with an interest in politics associated women with *political ability and self-composure* significantly less often than those with little interest or no interest at all. People who were interested in politics also attributed *political ability and diligence* to men considerably more often. Those with no such interest were significantly more likely to see men as *ruthlessly competitive* than people who said they had little interest.

Discussion

Five questions were posed to respondents in the course of our research. The first two referred to the descriptive categories informing perceptions of female and male politicians. Our findings showed significant differences in the perception of women and men in the political sphere. First, female politicians were significantly more likely to be attributed traits connected with caring for others and being able to listen to their problems while male politicians were identified considerably more often with features commonly associated with politics such as ruthlessness and combativeness. This finding correlated with research which shows the association of female politicians with typically "female" issues (Sapiro

1982; Matland 1994) and their perception in terms of stereotypically feminine qualities – e.g. compassion, expressiveness, honesty and greater interest in and proficiency at activities like caring for children and dealing with poverty, education and health care.

Our identification of the factors behind perceptions of male and female politicians also revealed some interesting differences. The first two factors for both genders focused on a similar root idea (*political ability* and *public appeal*). While in the first case, the degree of variance was similar for male and female politicians, there was slightly more variance in perceptions of women politicians' public appeal. This disproportion was likely due to the saturation of this category with stereotypically female attributes. In contrast, the third category (*competitiveness,* further specified as *ruthless competition* for men) produced more variance when it was applied to male politicians. Moreover, in the case of men, this factor took into account more characteristics. Its content came close to Machiavellianism, a philosophy introduced into social psychology by Richard Christie. This doctrine assigns four traits to leaders: a lack of emotion in interpersonal relations, which allows them to treat partners instrumentally; the abrogation of moral norms, which enables application of the principle "the ends justify the means"; the lack of any ideological agenda, which means they can focus strictly on pragmatic goals and the absence of clear psychopathy so they do not lose contact with reality (Pilch 2008: 231).

The third question referred to the difference that a respondent's gender makes to their perceptions of women and men in the political space. In line with our hypothesis, we found that there was evidence of gender solidarity. Women were significantly more likely to ascribe *political ability and self-composure* as well as *public appeal and a sense of civic duty* to female politicians. Men, in turn, more often characterised male politicians as having the equivalent qualities. In the case of the third factor (*competitiveness* or *ruthless competitiveness*), there were no statistically significant differences.

The fourth research question introduced the variable of the respondent's interest in politics. Here we found that our hypothesis that greater interest would reduce reliance on stereotypes was not confirmed. In contrast with McDermott's (1998) findings, our results showed that interest in politics did not significantly affect perceptions of female and male politicians as far as the factor *public appeal and a sense of civic duty/public appeal and a go-getter attitude* was concerned. This was also true of *ruthless competitiveness* in the case of male politicians. People who were interested in politics were significantly less likely to perceive women as having qualities connected with *political ability and self-composure*. Interestingly, the results for this category were different for male politicians. Those with more interest in politics associated men with characteristics linked to *political ability and diligence* more often. Our results may have been affected by the fact that the men in our sample declared a higher level of interest

in politics (W=2.92 M=3.57; t=-6.963; df=343.875; p=.001), which is typical in many world democracies (Atkeson – Rapoport 2003; Turska-Kawa 2011: 274).

The fifth question considered the impact of ideological self-identifications on the left–right spectrum on perceptions of female and male politicians. In this case, our hypothesis was partially confirmed: right-wing self-identifications did affect perceptions of men in politics. Our study showed that ideological identifications did not have a significant impact on perceptions of female politicians. In contrast, respondents identifying as right-wing more often perceived male politicians as politically capable and diligent and having strong public appeal and a go-getter attitude. The reasons for the situation may be twofold. First, it may reflect specific features of the current Polish political scene where no left-wing party has any seats in parliament. The outlook may be more positive among right-wing people who see their own political views being represented. At the same time, Polish politics remains male-dominated: despite her position, Prime Minister Beata Szydło is viewed as dependent on others in her party. For right-wing individuals, the image of male politicians tends to be filled with positive characteristics.

Conclusions

Our study is part of a larger trend of research that considers the influence of gender stereotypes on perceptions of female and male politicians. It provides a positive verification of this relationship. In particular, our research confirms the finding of earlier studies that women in politics are seen through the prism of certain stereotypical traits (Huddy – Terkildsen 1993; Burrell 1994; Kahn 1996). Furthermore, it supports Schneider and Bos's (2014) conclusion that stereotypes about female politicians largely conform with stereotypes about women in general. Women in the political realm are perceived as being more empathetic, trustworthy, consensus-oriented and interested in caring for others. These characteristics do not correspond with ideas about politics, which is widely perceived as a sphere of conflict and ruthless rivalry.

The sample group in our study consisted of social science students, and this calls for some additional comments about the interpretation of the findings. First, people with a higher level of education are likely to display less use of stereotypes in their political thinking; this is connected with their greater level of knowledge and political awareness (Falk – Kenski 2006). Second, since 2002, the right-wing identification of young people (aged 18–24) has been a key feature of the political scene. Interestingly, in the period when our research was carried out, there was a drop in the share of this young cohort who identified as right-wing (Głowacki 2017). In this regard, we may assume that young people's right-wing ideologies have complex determinants and these may not entail a conservative approach to socio-political issues, which is associated with reli-

ance on stereotypes. Moreover, the period when participating students gained the right to vote coincided with the move to include women in Polish politics. These young people were, thus, naturally exposed to women holding important political offices, which may have made them less prone to stereotyping. We are aware that samples made up of students tend to be homogeneous not only in terms of age and education but also certain psychological characteristics: they display weak self-definitions, a high level of egocentricity and a strong need for peer approval (Sears 1986). By recruiting students of the social sciences and the humanities, i.e. disciplines involving daily professional contact with others, we tried to minimise the limitations associated with student samples. Students of these courses are constantly called on to improve their interpersonal relations and stay open-minded and empathetic. Furthermore, Kardes (1996) and Lucas (2003) observe that students make appropriate research subjects if the stress is on basic psychological processes. The perception process, which involves interpreting and attributing meaning to sensory experience definitely falls in this category. This conclusion is reinforced by the innate nature of psychological processes accompanying the stages of human development. Because of this internal coherence in student samples, they are also valuable for comparative studies carried out in different countries (Sears 1986; Druckman – Kam 2011).

The results of our analysis may be beset by two other kinds of limitation. The first is the overrepresentation of women in the study sample. Given the gender solidarity principle, this may have led to a slightly more positive perception of women than would have been the case with a more diverse sample. The other factor is the possibility of a social desirability bias, i.e. an inclination among respondents to present themselves in the best possible light by giving socially desirable responses (Fisher 1993; Grimm 2010). Such a bias can affect the validity of survey results, especially when questions concern socially sensitive issues. Our study was designed to limit the influence of this factor as much as possible: questions were constructed in a neutral way, and the survey was anonymous and performed in large respondent groups.

In the context of this broader discussion, it is worth considering the implications of our findings not only for political judgements and attitudes but, above all, for voters' decisions in elections. One interesting take on the influence of stereotypes on voters is presented by Sanbonmatsu (2002), who introduces the term "baseline gender preference." Her findings suggest that many people give primacy to one of the genders, and this inclination is formed by gender stereotypes. At the same time, many authors have speculated about whether there are certain situations where stereotypes are more readily activated and where contextual factors play a greater role. The question is important because much of the work establishing the major role of gender stereotypes has involved experiments or hypothetical situations (see, e.g., Adams 1975; Rosenwasser – Dean 1989; Brown et al. 1993; Rosenthal 1995; Fox – Smith 1998; Sanbonmatsu

2002; King – Matland 2003; Lawless 2004; Fridkin – Kenney 2009). More work is needed to highlight factors that can limit the activation of stereotypes in real-life situations.

In this respect, it must first be stressed that gender stereotypes change over time. Until the 1980s, women politicians were a kind of curiosity in the public domain and the issue of female representation was simply ignored (Mueller 1988; Listhaug et al. 1995). Recent studies show, however, that the public perceives women to be better performers in several areas traditionally associated with male politicians, including political leadership. The respondents in one study believed that women and men were equally destined to be good political leaders (Pew Research Center 2008).

Secondly, the influence of the party context on political decisions is also worth examining. Many studies emphasise the role of environmental factors which can neutralise the impact of gender in political elections (Huddy et al. 2002; Philpot – Walton 2007; Dolan 2010). This dominance of party cues as an information source makes all the more sense in an age of increasing party polarisation in politics as a whole (Bartels 2000; Fiorina et al. 2006; Layman et al. 2006).

Thirdly, taking into account that stereotypes traditionally fill "information gaps," a politician's image can be understood as a composite of stereotypes and reliable knowledge among voters. It may be hypothesised that voters with less knowledge resort more often resort to stereotypes. At the same time, one interesting study by Koch (2002) reached the opposite conclusion, noting that people with the highest level of knowledge relied on stereotypes significantly more often.

Finally, we may speculate that the greater presence of women in politics will help neutralise stereotypical notions about women. Research shows that the involvement of more women leaders contributes to greater voter support for female politicians in the following election as well as the greater desire of such leaders to participate in politics (Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani 2009; Ferreira – Gyourko 2009). Furthermore, knowing about women politicians – and perhaps even having personal contact with them during electoral campaigns – makes voters see more and more non-stereotypical qualities in candidates, which, in turn, modifies initial perceptions.

Our study essentially confirms a thesis described in the literature and proven by other research: female politicians in Poland are perceived through the prism of gender stereotypes, which may be one of the reasons for the low proportion of women in parliament compared to the figure in Western European countries. This situation will not be changed by the introduction of 35% female quotas on candidate lists under the Electoral Code. This is clear from the lack of public support for equal opportunity measures for women in politics (Marmola – Olszanecka 2012) and from the fact that most women leave politics because they cannot win seats despite the quota system (Flis 2012). In this context, there is

a need for further exploration of the influence of institutional factors (e.g. the electoral system, the number of female representatives) and the political culture on gender stereotypes in politics. Including these factors in the analysis would definitely make clearer how permanent they are.

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The Never-ending Story: Czech Governments, Corruption and Populist Anti-Corruption Rhetoric (2010–2018)[1]

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Abstract: *Corruption is a phenomenon with significant effects – economically, politically and culturally. Corruption tends to be viewed negatively by the public. As such, anti-corruption rhetoric may be an ideal election strategy for individual political parties. Nevertheless, anti-corruption rhetoric does not necessarily translate into an actual anti-corruption policy. This study analyses the impact of anti-corruption rhetoric that does not reflect the actual practices of its speaker and has been used strategically to gain favour. My focus is on elections and the subsequent formation and exercise of government in the Czech Republic. I analyse how anti-corruption rhetoric directed at political opponents works as an election success strategy. At the same time, I show how electoral success, transformed into real political power, strengthens the ability of actors to engage in activities that amount to borderline or outright corruption, irrespective of any anti-corruption rhetoric.*

Keywords: ***corruption, Czech politics, anti-corruption, Czech government, populism.***

Introduction

The research for this study was completed at the beginning of 2018, a time when the Czech Republic found itself in a unique political situation. Parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2017 had resulted in the clear victory of the ANO

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movement led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, and before the year's end, he was authorised by President Miloš Zeman to form a government. All other parties refused, however, to participate in or support a Babiš minority government, and it therefore failed to gain the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless, shortly after his own election for a second term in January 2018, Zeman announced that Babiš would be given a second chance to establish a government. The President's repeated nomination of the same prime minister who had already failed to form a government was not a new development in Czech politics. What was entirely novel, however, was the context in which it took place. Babiš is currently being prosecuted by police on extensive charges of grant fraud, and a recent Court of Appeals ruling confirmed that he was an agent of the Communist secret police before 1989. (This decision followed the billionaire's loss of several legal disputes over the legitimacy of his inclusion on a list of Communist police informants.) Finally, Babiš is the first prime minister to hold open negotiations with both the Far Left (the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia–KSČM, the direct successor of the totalitarian party that ruled before 1989) and the Far Right (the openly xenophobic Freedom and Direct Democracy Party–SPD) over their support and cooperation.

As things stand, most parties in the Chamber of Deputies are worried about the prospect of a prime minister facing criminal prosecution. These concerns have multiplied due to Babiš's political style, the concentration of political, economic and media power in his hands and his links to a number of corruption cases. The issue of government-connected corruption is, thus, now at the forefront of Czech politics. Clearly, this phenomenon is not peculiar to the Czech Republic; examples of government representatives embroiled in corruption scandals can be found in many countries (in the Eastern European context, see, for example, Eunjung Choi – Jongseok Woo 2011). As in other cases, the current Czech situation is the culmination of a visible long-term trend. On the one hand, we find actors who promote themselves using strong anti-corruption rhetoric – Babiš is a typical example of this, having explained his own entry into politics as an attempt to crack down on corrupt politicians (Kopeček 2016; Naxera 2016). On the other, we see these same actors using their political power to carry out activities that often border on or even cross over into corruption.

The recent escalation of this trend in the Czech Republic may be tied to dramatic changes in the 2010, 2013 and 2017 elections with the appearance of new political parties (Havlík – Voda 2016; Maškarinec 2017; Šárovec 2017) whose rhetoric had a strong anti-corruption message, albeit one not necessarily reflected in their own activities. This is part of a broader pattern of the emergence of new political formations and the rise of populism (clearly connected to anti-corruption and anti-elitist rhetoric) in various countries in Europe. These groups often present themselves as opposed to corruption and party politics in general (Pasquino 2008: 21). In doing so, they draw on the prevailing view

that corruption is a negative phenomenon with a marked effect on the whole political and social system (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999). Anti-corruption rhetoric, thus, appeals as a strategy for addressing voters. In this regard, it should be noted that the impacts of corruption may be explored on multiple levels. For my purposes, the effects on how citizens assess a political regime and its actors are of primary importance. If there is a strong perception that political leaders are corrupt, public confidence in the political sphere decreases. Research suggests that the perceived level of corruption is one of the most important factors influencing not only overall dissatisfaction but dissatisfaction with particular institutions and political parties, mistrust of individual politicians and so on (Linek 2010: 135). Political dissatisfaction may lead to a change in voter support for a particular party (Linek 2010: 51–73). As such, we may assume that a high degree of perceived corruption, which is, in turn, a source of political dissatisfaction, will in some cases result in changes in party support. This was evident in the 2010, 2013 and 2017 elections when new political parties, several of which employed clearly populist rhetoric, succeeded on platforms outside the existing party spectrum. These parties put great emphasis on their difference from established political entities. Their programmes highlighted corruption and the general need to replace contemporary politicians (Naxera 2016).

The current work draws on Steven Sampson's (2011) thesis that "anti--corruption rhetoric itself is often not innocent." Sampson supports his claim with the example of anti-corruption NGOs in the Balkans. His conclusions, however, are easily applicable to other contexts, including different actors and strategies. They show that combatting corruption may be a mere rhetorical move that actually hides the problematic activities of the presenter of the anti--corruption rhetoric.

This study analyses the impact of anti-corruption rhetoric that does not reflect the actual practices of its speaker and has been used by them to gain approval. My focus is on selected political actors during elections in the Czech Republic as well as in the subsequent formation and exercise of government. I consider how anti-corruption rhetoric directed at other political entities works as a strategy for achieving election success. At the same time, I show how electoral success, transformed into real political power, strengthens actors' ability to carry out borderline or outright corruption, regardless of their anti-corruption rhetoric. This analysis is placed in the context of a broad range of existing studies. There is extensive research that uses different examples to study the role of anti-corruption rhetoric in elections and the ways perceived corruption is reflected in election results (see, for example, Slomczynski – Shabad 2011). Such work also assesses the abuse of political power for an entity's own corrupt purposes (in the Czech context, see, for example, Kupka – Mochťak 2015). As I have noted, my general framework is based on the research of Sampson (2011), who points out that anti-corruption fighters are themselves sometimes corrupt.

Prelude: Corruption and Czech governments before 2010

Communist Czechoslovakia, like other Communist countries, was known for its widespread corruption, which existed at all levels (see Karklins 2005). Along the same lines, various corrupt activities after the fall of Communism allow us to trace similarities between Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic) and other post-Communist countries. One key example is privatisation, which created an enormous number of opportunities for corruption in the context of the post-Communist economic transformation (Holmes 2003). These opportunities existed in all these countries and often benefited not only individuals but entire political parties that were able to leech off and exploit the state (Grzymala-Busse 2007). Between 1990 when the first free post-Communist elections took place and 2010 (i.e. the date from which this study's deep analysis begins), there were a total of 11 different governments, nine of which were political and two of which were caretaker governments. Examples of government-related corruption can be found throughout this whole period. This includes corruption associated with privatisation, which was quite extensive in Czechoslovakia though it did not receive significant attention from politicians. This was related to a broader philosophy that gave the rapid establishment of private ownership precedence over law and morality (Reed 1999). Most privatisation took place under the centre-right governments of Petr Pithart (1990–1992) and Václav Klaus (1992–1996). A second government led by Klaus for the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) resigned at the end of 1997 due to a split in the governing coalition after secret ODS finances in Switzerland were revealed (see Linek – Outlý 2008; Císař – Petr 2007). Other political parties also had problems with financing. After the fall of the Klaus government, the caretaker government of Josef Tošovský held office for half a year (see Hloušek – Kopeček 2014). Following early elections in 1988, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) took power. Complex coalition negotiations established a ČSSD minority government that was tolerated by ODS in the role of "contractual opposition." The two parties divided up a number of important political and bureaucratic posts in a rather non-transparent fashion. This period from 1998 to 2002 is often associated with a steep increase in corruption connected with the highest political circles (Kopeček 2013).

The next term in office (2002–2006) saw a succession of three centre-left governments led by the Social Democrats. Stanislav Gross, the prime minister under the second of these governments, was forced to resign after a scandal involving his wife's business, which had murky ties with organised crime. After the 2006 elections, the Right returned to power and an ODS government chaired by Mirek Topolánek succeeded on its second attempt at gaining the Chamber's confidence. Even this government was not without corruption scandals. Lobbyist and Topolánek consultant Marek Dalík was, for example, involved in a number of shady deals (Müller 2012) that later led to convictions. At the time,

ODS was also increasingly being connected to the activities of "regional godfathers" (Langr 2014), individuals who had linked their political and economic interests at regional level – ODS had long controlled local governments – and were using that influence to draw non-transparently from public funds. Finally, in the midst of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009, the Chamber of Deputies expressed its mistrust of the government. The following year, a caretaker government headed by Jan Fischer took over. It held office until the regular elections in 2010 (Hanley 2017).

As we have seen, a number of examples of government-related corruption can be detected before 2010. It is, however, important to observe that the nature of these activities has transformed over time and reflected broader developments. Social perceptions of corruption have similarly changed. During the initial post-Communist period, corruption did not resonate with the public or politicians as a fundamental problem despite a number of outright scandals. However, this view gradually shifted and respondents to various surveys began to highlight concerns about corruption. At the same time, media coverage of the topic increased (Naxera 2016). Over time, corruption emerged as a central issue for political and social debate. This was accompanied by a general conviction that politicians and political parties are corrupt. As we will see, this view of the Czech public, coupled with the well-chosen anti-corruption rhetoric of some political leaders, would be a decisive factor in Czech parliamentary elections.

Scene 1: Petr Nečas's government (2010–2013)

The 2010 election marked a turning point as the newly formed Public Affairs Party entered the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. Public Affairs was a "business-firm party" (see Krouwel 2006; Hopkin – Paolucci 1999) headed by a typical political entrepreneur (see Keman – Krouwel 2006), Vít Bárta, the owner of a private security agency. The party itself had all the signature features of a business-firm party, including a lack of internal institutionalisation and the ultimate authority of its political entrepreneur leader whose goal was to maximise financial profits by gaining political power. For our purposes, it is also important to note how the party succeeded in reaching voters. The campaign took a strong anti-establishment line (see Hanley – Sikk 2016), highlighting the corruption of established parties and calling for the replacement of the current political elite. This was clear both from its slogan "Out with the political dinosaurs" and the launch of its campaign with the symbolic firing of a cannon at Czech government headquarters (Naxera 2016: 67). Public Affairs became the first Czech parliamentary party to follow the basic principles of political populism. As part of its strategy, the party depicted society as ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite," who should be replaced (Mudde 2007: 23).

Despite its strong claims about the corruption of established political parties, Public Affairs became part of the government of Petr Nečas of ODS. As we have seen, ODS had been linked with shady dealings between the political and business worlds, especially in certain Czech regions, i.e. the domain of the regional "godfathers" (Langr 2014: 6). The third governing party was TOP09, a right-wing conservative group that emerged from a split in the right faction of the Christian Democrat Party shortly before the elections. This government was able to rely on a comfortable parliamentary majority of 118 of the 200 seats, an advantage that was unusual in the Czech context. The fight against corruption was one of its key targets. This was reflected in the name it gave itself in its programme: "a coalition for budgetary responsibility, a government for law and order and the fight against corruption."

In spite of this plan and Public Affairs's staunch anti-corruption rhetoric, this stance remained largely limited to words. The government was weakened by a series of corruption scandals and its gradual decline culminated in the resignation of the Prime Minister in the summer of 2013. That resignation was itself the result of revelations of borderline and actual corruption that directly implicated the Prime Minister (Kupka – Mochťak 2015). Both the resignation and the events that soon followed would have a crucial influence on the direction of Czech politics. It is, however, worth pausing to consider the corruption issues that plagued this government during its mandate.

From 2010 to 2013, when the Nečas government held office, its cabinet went through many changes. Several ODS and Public Affairs ministers were forced to leave their posts because of problems related to corruption or the illegal handling of finances. Vít Bárta was himself affected by these problems when he became transport minister at the beginning of the government's mandate. Public Affairs was not only a party with very little institutional structure (Jarmara 2011) but there was a vast difference between what its statutes said and the way it functioned in reality. Although he did not hold the main executive position in the party, Bárta was effectively in control and often relied on practices that were borderline or flagrantly illegal. One key issue was the links between the personnel of ABL, Bárta's personal company and the leadership and deputies of Public Affairs (Just – Charvát 2016). ABL was also important to the party in another way – it was later shown that in its capacities as a large security agency, it had long been wire-tapping a number of Czech politicians and providing Public Affairs with compromising material on political opponents (Klíma 2015: 257–259). Two Public Affairs MPs filed a criminal complaint against Bárta in 2011 alleging that he had bribed prominent party representatives in exchange for their silence on the party's shady financing. Bárta was later convicted on these charges though an appellate court overturned the judgment. A second set of problems surfaced in 2011 when Czech investigative journalists revealed an ABL internal strategy document from some years earlier in which Bárta had

described the individual steps to connect political and economic power and strengthen his company's position. This document had been created as early as autumn 2008, long before Bárta and Public Affairs had even entered into politics in order to carry out the plan. Under pressure from all these scandals, Bárta resigned from his ministerial post in 2011. Public Affairs later dissolved into two parties that both failed altogether in the parliamentary elections. Bárta's case is important, however, for at least two reasons: it confirms Sampson's (2011) thesis that anti-corruption rhetoric is not always innocent and it is the first instance of a political entrepreneur making a strong foray into Czech politics. Later, this scenario would be repeated, albeit on a much larger scale.

As we have seen, Bárta was not the only politician who was forced to step down in this era as a result of corruption charges. Perhaps the most serious issues were those surrounding Prime Minister Petr Nečas, who resigned after his government lost the confidence of the majority of MPs. The central figure in the Nečas affair was Jana Nagyová (now Jana Nečasová), who served as chief director of the Prime Minister's cabinet. At the time, she was also his secret lover and she later became his wife. In mid-June, a massive political scandal broke out when a number of influential individuals – Nagyová, three former ODS MPs, several intelligence officials and other high-ranking bureaucrats and business figures – were arrested during a police raid. This scandal contained at least three different strands that were all connected to Nagyová (Kupka – Mochťak 2015).

The first issue concerned a group of three ODS deputies who had been charged with corruption. According to the prosecutor's office, the three had accepted a bribe in the form of lucrative positions in state-owned companies in exchange for giving up their mandate and not taking part in negotiations of a law on which their opinions differed from those of the party and the entire governing coalition. The Supreme Court later acquitted the three on the grounds that they could not be prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed while still in office – their acts were, thus, protected by parliamentary immunity (Naxera 2015: 40). The whole affair gave rise to a broad political and social debate about whether the deputies' behaviour in fact met the criteria for corruption or law enforcement bodies were attempting to criminalise a standard political agreement. Critics objected above all to the exchange of MPs' votes for economic profit stemming from their role in the management of state-owned companies.

The second thread in the scandal involved the misuse of the intelligence service. It was revealed that Nagyová had misused military intelligence to spy on Nečas's then wife. This problem has several layers – not only had the intelligence service been misused for purely private purposes, but it had received instructions from an individual who had no legal right to assign it any task. The misuse of intelligence services by private interests and the conducting of civilian surveillance via security forces are both hallmarks of undemocratic

regimes (Svolik 2012). These acts were, thus, clear violations of the principles of democratic governance (Kupka – Mochťak 2015).

The third issue related to the links between prominent businessmen or "godfathers," ODS and Nagyová. This was in some ways the latest chapter in a long history of ties between Czech businessmen and political representatives who have allowed them to make lucrative profits from public sector cooperation and contracts. The businessmen involved in the Nagyová case were typical of the actors in this kind of corruption. At the time of writing (late February/early March 2018), the litigation of the cases concerning Jana Nagyová (Nečasová) has yet to be completed. It is clear, however, that these scandals were decisive in the collapse of Petr Nečas's government.

Interlude: Jiří Rusnok's government (2013–2014)

Shortly after the fall of the Nečas government, the third caretaker government in the history of the independent Czech Republic (see Hloušek – Kopeček 2014) took office. Miloš Zeman, who had become the first directly elected Czech president at the beginning of 2013, nominated Jiří Rusnok to head this government. Rusnok, an economist, had been minister of finance in Zeman's own government from 2001 to 2002. His nomination clearly went against the will of the majority of political powers represented in the Chamber of Deputies (Wintr – Antoš – Kysela 2016: 147). Rusnok was a long-time ally of Zeman, a description that also applied to many members of his government. The majority of the Czech public shared the view that this was a government of President Zeman's friends (Česká televize 2013). That idea was reinforced when several of its members ran in the subsequent parliamentary elections as candidates for the fringe Civic Rights Party. Zeman was that party's honorary chairman.

In August, the Chamber of Deputies failed to express confidence in the Rusnok government. Despite this fact, the President allowed the government to continue ruling until the beginning of 2014. The government in resignation adopted a number of important measures. When a government that lacks the confidence of the legislature takes these kinds of steps, the logic behind the parliamentary system is undermined. A government in resignation should always be restricted to only the most essential actions and its office should be limited to the shortest term possible. The President's appointment of a group of his close associates to government and his decision to override standard protocol and allow them to rule in resignation for an extended period came close to the essence of clientelism or patronage (Naxera 2015). The individuals involved stood to benefit considerably from these decisions in the future (e.g. by exploiting information about economic activities which they had obtained as ministers). Aside from these problems, there was another troubling link between this government and corruption. In his speeches, Zeman expressed

great hopes for the cabinet's anti-corruption mission, claiming it was made up of an incorruptible elite that was struggling against party corruption. On appointing the government, he told its ministers: "I believe you will guarantee that affairs won't be swept under the carpet and gangsters won't be made out to be innocent citizens under political pressure." When the cabinet failed to gain confidence, Zeman stressed that though it lacked the faith of parliament, it had the confidence of the people, which was more important (Naxera – Krčál n.d.). This was a very clear use of the rhetoric of populism, which holds that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde 2008: 23).

Scene 2: Bohuslav Sobotka's government (2014–2017)

The Rusnok government ruled in resignation until the beginning of 2014 when it was replaced by the government of Social Democrat Bohuslav Sobotka, which had risen to power in the 2013 autumn parliamentary elections. Those elections were absolutely crucial for reinforcing the links between government and corruption in the Czech context, and it is therefore worth considering them briefly. Above all, this period was marked by the constant efforts of different actors to take a stand against political parties that they deemed to be corrupt. The most prominent of these individuals was President Zeman, who repeatedly claimed that political parties were the organisers of corrupt activities and the recipients of resulting profits (Naxera – Krčál n.d.). This rhetoric closely followed the principles of political populism, which insists on the presence of a corrupt political elite. Given the belief during Zeman's own government (1998–2002) in the rise of corrupt transactions and the links between corruption and politics, it is clear that his turn to this rhetoric was purely calculated. Its primary purpose was to justify his support for the Rusnok government.

Another key player in this respect was the billionaire Andrej Babiš, who led the newly formed ANO political movement. That party's success in the 2013 elections was to have a significant impact on the structures of the Czech party system. ANO filled a void in right-wing politics that had been left by the weakening and disintegration of Public Affairs (Linek – Chytilek – Eibl 2016). Its strategy also resembled the one that Public Affairs had used to win in 2010. There were many other similarities between the two parties. The subtext of both campaigns was clear: "We're not like established politicians – we don't steal, we work hard." Babiš's success was enormous: he gained 18% percent of votes, putting him only 2% behind the victorious Social Democrats to the great surprise of pundits.

Babiš's popularity was fostered by an excellent campaign that had the support of many well-known individuals (athletes, artists, etc.). He also benefited from extensive media coverage (in the summer of 2013, the billionaire had bought the Mafra publishing house, which publishes two of the largest national news-

papers) and a general mood that supported distancing from political parties. Combined with a fairly simple campaign slogan ("Yes, things will get better!"), Babiš's messages ("everyone steals" and "we have to de-politicise things") had great success. His focus on corruption also proved to be critical, contrasting sharply with the approach of established parties that had significantly reduced their emphasis on corruption despite a number of high-profile cases. As we have seen, the impact of those cases had been enormous in the case of ODS, with the Nečas government forced to resign because of corruption scandals in the summer of 2013. Nevertheless the party's own programme did not make a single mention of the need to fight corruption (Naxera 2016: 61–62).

Graph 1: Agreement and disagreement with the statement that political parties are corrupt– comparison over time (responses in %) (CVVM 2014: 6)



In fact, confidence in political parties was so shaken by the scandals of the previous ODS government among other things that public opinion about the parties' operations did not improve even after the 2013 elections. Graph 2 depicts the attitudes of the Czech public to political parties less than a year after those elections.

Graph 2: Attitudes to political parties in the Czech Republic (September 2014; responses in %) (CVVM 2014: 6)



For a movement that presented itself as a "non-party" and a force against corruption, the situation was more than favourable. Babiš was able to take advantage of his position outside the party system to claim he was not a member of the elite that was the target of his populist rhetoric.

Before turning to the formation and operation of the new government, it is therefore necessary to deal with the ANO movement along with Babiš's own persona and his past. If Public Affairs can be described as a business-firm party and Vít Bárta as the political entrepreneur at its head, then this characterisation is doubly true of ANO and Andrej Babiš (for more detail, see Kopeček 2016). ANO is a one-man party that has no internal opposition. The tight rule of this party by its chairman and a narrow group of party leaders around him is a natural consequence of the way it was created: from the top (Babiš's management decisions) down. (The billionaire's edicts have led to the development of a party structure, albeit one that is not very institutionalised; Klíma 2015: 313). Babiš's privileged position within the party was made clear before the 2017 parliamentary elections when ANO authorities endorsed his right to make arbitrary changes to party ballots.

Babiš entered Czech politics openly before the 2013 elections but his links to the political scene stretch back further in time. He began as a foreign trade official under the Communist regime, where he gained important contacts and at the same time became a state security agent. After the fall of Communism, Babiš capitalised on these past contacts when doing business. This was a textbook example of the reproduction of Communist elites as post-Communist elites (Szelényi – Szelényi 1995). Elites who had already benefited from a high level of political capital under the Communist regime transformed it into economic

capital using their networks of contacts and opportunities after the regime's collapse (Bourdieu 1986). In this way, they were able to function comfortably even under the new regime where their status derived not from membership the Communist Party but from their economic standing (Tomšič 2011).

Babiš's rise as a businessman was gradual. Based on the work of investigative journalists (Kmenta 2017), however, it is clear that the expansion of his business empire (especially into the areas of chemicals, petrochemicals, agriculture and food) was often borderline illegal and crossed ethical boundaries. This was primarily due to his political connections, especially under the Social Democratic governments from 1998 to 2006. The billionaire also had contacts with ODS politicians. While the rise of regional godfathers linked to ODS meant that Babiš's influence waned in the ensuing years, he was able to maintain some portion of this clout. The 2010 elections were a turning point. They showed a decline in support for both ČSSD and ODS, the two parties with which Babiš was used to cooperating. (In 2006, these parties had together held 155 of the total 200 seats. In 2010, in contrast, they gained only 109 seats.) At the same time, the success of Public Affairs proved it was possible to transform a business entity into a party that could make significant profits through carefully chosen election tactics and rhetoric.

Babiš was one of the richest Czechs in the world in 2011 when he founded the ANO movement, the party whose success would be clear two years later after the fall of the Nečas government. Some have also suggested that thanks to the billionaire's behind-the-scenes influence, he played a role in the police raid that helped topple the government (Kmenta 2017). The post-election negotiations led to a coalition between the Social Democrats, ANO and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). The new government headed by ČSSD chair Sobotka included Babiš as its first deputy prime minister and finance minister. Here the reproduction of elites and capital came full circle: after the fall of Communism, Babiš had reshaped his political capital into economic capital, and in 2013, that economic capital reverted to political capital only on a more massive scale than had been the case before 1989. As I will show, the political capital thus obtained has also allowed for the further multiplication of Babiš's economic capital.

Babiš's entry into government kicked off a period of even stronger connections between politics and private business, this time directly involving those in government positions. Babiš succeeded in placing his own people in several key ministries. Former personnel of Agrofert holding, which connects Babiš's companies and businesses, were installed not only in ministerial posts but in lower positions inside the ministries and associated offices. An excellent example is Richard Brabec, who served as environment minister under the Sobotka government. Brabec had once been the director of one of Babiš's chemical plants. The appointment of this former chemical plant director as environment minister was in itself striking and naturally raised concerns about the likelihood of Brabec

clearing the way for Babiš's chemical business. At the same time, the extensive party patronage that Babiš pursued was in keeping with longstanding trends within Czech politics. Party patronage (i.e. the appointment of party-affiliated persons to public sector positions; Kopecký – Spirova 2011: 905) generally happens for two reasons. The first is the wish to reward loyal allies and party members with a public position and attached profits and decision-making powers. The second is the effort to control and dominate key positions by installing like-minded individuals who will then direct political processes towards goals set by the party (Kopecký – Scherlis 2008). As several studies show (Kopecký 2012; Naxera 2014; Kopecký – Spirova 2011), in the case of the post-Communist Czech Republic, patronage is mainly linked to efforts to control offices and important positions. This is exactly what we find if we follow the trail of Babiš, who planted individuals from his company throughout key institutions.

ANO should be distinguished from other parties that have been colonised by shady corporate interests: Babiš's party is different since it arose directly from the business plan of a political entrepreneur (Klíma 2015: 313). Since the very beginning, the party's aim has been to maximise the profits of its boss, who previously used his links with other parties for this same purpose. These links clearly have a personal dimension: two members of ANO's upper echelons have a history with other parties – Jaroslav Faltýnek is a long-time municipal politician for ČSSD and the aforementioned Richard Brabec used to be a member of ODS. The goal of maximising profits has been achieved. According to *Forbes* magazine, which publishes an annual list of the world's richest people, Babiš had 40 billion Czech crowns in 2013. In 2017, after four years in government, this figure had increased to 88 billion. Among the sources of the profit were a number of governmental incentives stemming in many cases from the Ministry of Finance, which was directly controlled by Babiš, or from other state offices (tax relief, state subsidies, etc.) (Kmenta 2017).

Self-enrichment has not been the only problematic aspect of Babiš's political operations. Journalists have documented several cases in which government authorities under his control sabotaged other entrepreneurs, some of whom were his commercial competitors. (Leaked wiretaps, for example, include statements from financial authorities along the lines of "our guys [i.e. civil servants managed by Babiš's lackeys] have brought *them* [i.e. the entrepreneurs concerned] to heel.") Other aspects of the businessman's venture into politics have been equally disturbing. Secret recordings leaked to the public show that Babiš directly instructed journalists from his media outlets about which politicians they should mention and in what time frame they should do so. Given his efforts to maximise a combination of political, economic and media power, he has been dubbed the "Czech Berlusconi" by some foreign outlets.

A series of highly publicised crises, including leaked recordings that revealed the essence of Babiš's political and business behaviour, led to the deterioration

of relationships within the Sobotka government and particularly the one between Babiš and the Prime Minister himself. Also significant was the discovery that Babiš had avoided paying millions of crowns in tax on the profits from his businesses by taking advantage of a legal loophole. Ironically, consistent tax auditing had been one of Babiš's main political slogans and a principle that underpinned the Ministry of Finance under his leadership. This rhetoric resulted in one of the most controversial steps taken by Sobotka's government – the introduction of a financial instrument known as the "electronic sales record" to allow tax inspections particularly of smaller-scale business owners. Babiš was the creator of this tool.

Amidst this deteriorating relationship, the government experienced a conflict that threatened to turn into a constitutional crisis. As a result, Prime Minister Sobotka announced his intention to resign. President Zeman responded that under the circumstances, he would understand the resignation to apply merely to the Prime Minister and not to the entire government. Zeman added that he would allow the government to continue to operate with the same members apart from a new chair. According to constitutional experts, this behaviour overstepped Czech presidential powers under all standard interpretations of the Constitution. (Zeman's strategy has, in his own words, been one of "creative interpretation of the Constitution," which, in fact, amounts to an attempt to acquire more power than the president is allowed to exercise under the Constituion; Wintr – Antoš – Kysela 2016.) The whole issue points to a larger debate about the nature of the Czech system, which was generally agreed to be parliamentary (see Brunclík – Kubát 2016 b) until the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2013. Based on these elections and the way Zeman has since performed his role – the above-discussed episode with Jiří Rusnok's government is just one of many controversial steps taken by the President (Wintr – Antoš – Kysela 2016) – a growing number of voices have been asking whether the Czech Republic has taken a step towards semi-presidentialism (Brunclík – Kubát 2016 b).

In response to the President's words, Sobotka chose not to submit his resignation since its main goal, i.e. ending the government's engagement with Babiš, would not have been achieved. A subsequent attempt to remove Babiš faced further obstruction from the President, who after a long delay – and again based on "creative interpretation" of the Constitution – refused to dismiss the minister as the government had requested. Zeman's response can be traced to the fact that he and Babiš had managed to become strong political allies in this period. At the same time, it reflected the President's long-time antipathy to Sobotka and other Social Democrats despite his own history with the party. Zeman argued that based on the coalition agreement among the governing parties, the removal of Babiš was not possible. This was, then, a repeat of the situation in the Rusnok government era – at that time, Zeman had claimed that

when it came to governing, the "wishes of the people" were more important than support from the Chamber of Deputies. As we have seen, this is a typical populist rhetorical strategy (Mudde 2007: 23). The President now insisted that the agreement among the governing coalition should take precedence over the Constitution. In both this and the Rusnok matter, Zeman exceeded the limits of the presidential role as set out in the Constitution and provided for in typical parliamentary systems. Zeman did not, however, confine himself to this obstruction: he also undertook an active defence of Babiš, claiming that this was a case of the "less successful envying a successful businessman" and of "corrupt politicians trying to eliminate an anti-corruption warrior." This characterisation was reiterated across the Babiš-dominated media with, for example, the front pages of Babiš's newspapers featuring an image of Babiš with his mouth taped shut to symbolise the efforts of other politicians to silence the ANO leader and block his fight against corruption. In this way, Babiš shifted into the role of a martyr or dissident against the system. Here we find another great paradox: back in 2013, Babiš had succeeded by playing the part of a dissident taking on a corrupt system. This was, however, the same system that had allowed him to become a billionaire. A few years later, he cast himself in the same role though in an even more unlikely context. He was now a dissident fighting against the political system. Never mind that this was the system under which he had served as finance minister and deputy prime minister and which had allowed him to double his assets within just a few years of holding office.

After a relatively long debate, the conflict ended in Babiš's departure from government. ANO remained in the coalition, however, and the position of finance minister was filled by a replacement. The upshot was that Babiš managed to reinforce his image as a dissident oppressed by the system. At the same time, his loss of office allowed him to focus his efforts on the upcoming elections. Surveys suggest that support for Babiš rose steeply in this period while that for ČSSD and Sobotka sharply declined. The period also saw developments within the Social Democratic Party with Sobotka remaining prime minister but then resigning as party chair and leader in the subsequent elections.

Police charges of subsidy fraud have proven to be a critical issue for Babiš, and this controversy lingers to the present day (i.e. February–March 2018). The matter should, however, have been raised at the time of Babiš's entry into politics. The indictment alleges that in 2008 Babiš intentionally placed a company belonging to Agrofert holding outside that holding's structure. The company was a farm named *Čapí hnízdo* (the "Stork's Nest") and it was placed outside the holding in an attempt to obtain a European subsidy reserved for smaller firms. Čapí hnízdo was, thus, disconnected from Agrofert and awarded a subsidy of CZK 50 million in European funds. Over time, the company was restored to Agrofert. When the scandal was exposed in 2016 while Babiš was still finance minister, he repeatedly claimed he did not know who owned the company at

the time the subsidy was awarded. Later, it was revealed that Babiš's own relatives were the hidden and anonymous shareholders. The police, who maintain that the company had secret links with Agrofert even at the time of the grant, eventually charged Babiš, Jaroslav Faltýnek and several other individuals with two crimes – grant fraud and damaging the financial interests of the European Union. In response, Babiš focused on the message that he was a victim of a campaign against him; the other parties, he suggested, were coming after him as he tried to fight corruption. The billionaire again found support from the President, who – ignoring the ongoing investigation – made the highly symbolic gesture of visiting Čapí hnízdo in an attempt to legitimise Babiš's actions. Shortly before the 2017 elections, the Chamber of Deputies approved the criminal prosecution of the MPs Babiš and Faltýnek after a heated debate.

Postscript: Andrej Babiš's government (2017–?)

The 2017 election fundamentally transformed the structure of the Czech party system. Trends seen in previous elections became more marked: there was an increase in new actors and a weakening of "traditional" parties (Havlík – Voda 2016; Maškarinec 2017; Šárovec 2017). In addition, this election was dominated by two open questions: 1) whether individual parties would be willing to cooperate in a government with Babiš and 2) how these parties would address the so-called migration crisis, a problem which did not in fact affect the Czech Republic (the number of foreigners and refugees in the country is negligible) but nonetheless became a major political issue from which many parties benefited. Despite the scandals around Babiš personally and the ongoing police investigation, ANO's victory in the election was overwhelming. Babiš was able to draw on the successes of the previous government (economic growth, low unemployment, etc.) and take credit for them. Despite its achievements in government, ČSSD, the strongest of the former governing parties, suffered an enormous loss of support.

ANO was not only group that was strengthened by anti-corruption rhetoric. Other parties that had adopted anti-corruption and anti-political positions also saw gains (Pasquino 2008: 21). The Pirate Party was the most prominent of these groups. The party is representative of a larger group of pirate parties across Europe (Erlingsson – Persson 2011). Despite its presence for many years on the Czech political scene, the Czech Pirate Party had only had sporadic success in local, regional and Senate elections. Its results in the 2017 parliamentary elections were, thus, unprecedented and reflected a strong turn away from "traditional" political parties and a belief in their corruption. The next greatest beneficiary of the decline of traditional political parties was the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) headed by Tomio Okamura. This party was part of the populist extreme Right (Havlík 2015; Krčál – Naxera 2018), whose elec-

tion programme stressed resistance to migration and the EU and demanded direct democracy and the removal of corrupt politicians. This rhetoric drew again on the principles of political populism; the latter maintain that "innocent people" are threatened not only by the "corrupt elite" but also by other enemies. Populists need to construct the image of a political enemy since a permanent need for political enemies is one of the main features of their ideology (Antal 2017: 16). Of the four parties that individually surpassed 10% of votes, three were protest parties that had promoted themselves with anti-political and anti-corruption rhetoric, and two may be considered populist parties. The validity of Samspon's (2011) thesis that anti-corruption rhetoric is not necessarily innocent was confirmed in the cases of Babiš and several others. Okamura, who had entered parliamentary politics as part of the Dawn of Direct Democracy movement in 2013, was eventually forced to step down because of shady dealings with party funds in his own accounts. Signs of similar issues in the new SPD group were already apparent soon after the 2017 elections.

Graph 3: Results of the 2017 Czech parliamentary elections (results in % of votes)



The first negotiations after the 2017 elections yielded a deal. ANO ran up against the reluctance of other parties to be part of a government ruled by a prime minister who was undergoing criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, the party had no intention of stepping aside or suggesting an alternative candidate to Babiš. The prosecutions of Babiš and Faltýnek had been postponed until after the elections since new consents were required from the newly elected members of the Chamber of Deputies. This time the negotiations about the prosecution of the two MPs were even more complicated. The arguments made by some

politicians went beyond the boundaries of absurdity. They included the claim that allowing the prosecution of the prime minister would harm the Czech Republic (Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Radek Vondráček; aktualne.cz 2017) and a proposal to let Babiš rule for four years and then hand him over (deputy Taťána Malá;info.cz 2018). Ultimately, however, the Chamber agreed to the criminal prosecution.

After President Zeman's re-election, Babiš was put in charge of setting up a government. He was not able, however, to find a coalition partner and therefore introduced a minority cabinet made up of ANO members and non-party representatives. At the beginning of 2018, that government failed to gain the Chamber's confidence and it has ruled in resignation since that time. Nevertheless, it has taken a number of important steps that are linked to Babiš's prosecution. The Minister of Finance has, for example, retroactively withdrawn the EU subsidy that was awarded to Čapí hnízdo. This step has two key consequences: 1) it suggests that the subsidy was actually paid for from the Czech budget and not from European funds and 2) it means that the EU is no longer the injured party in the dispute. In this way, Babiš has dismissed the more serious of the two criminal charges brought against him, i.e. doing damage to the financial interests of the EU. In late February/early March 2018, there was talk of another controversial move by the government in resignation: this was an attempt to dismiss the director of the General Inspectorate of Security Forces (GIBS), an institution meant to investigate offences carried out by police. GIBS has the power to remove individual officers from particular cases. At a time when investigations against the Prime Minister are taking place, this step by the government is highly suspicious. The Babiš government had made a long list of similarly significant political decisions though it lacks the Chamber's confidence.

Even before Andrej Babiš approached the Chamber of Deputies with his request for confidence, President Zeman had assured him that if that motion failed, Babiš would be allowed a second attempt. Since in the event of a third attempt, the speaker of the Chamber who names the prime ministerial candidate will be an ANO delegate, the party's role in the government is all but certain. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Babiš has the support of President Zeman and the election results do not allow for a coalition without ANO. In fact, ANO and parties from the Far Left (KSČM) and the Far Right (SPD) together hold 115 of the total 120 seats. Moreover, these three parties have cooperated consistently since the 2017 elections. This cooperation has major consequences since these parties and President Zeman share a number of ideas about the future of the Czech Republic including possible institutional adjustments (they all agree, for example, on the redundancy of the Senate). Some of these entities also support the weakening of the country's European orientation and greater openness to Russia.

At the same time, these factors have affected individual political appointments – right-wing leader Tomio Okamura, who made statements in early 2018 appearing to deny the Roma Holocaust during the Second World War, is now the deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. With the help of votes from the three parties, Communist deputy Zdeněk Ondráček was appointed head of the parliamentary commission for monitoring GIBS. Ondráček had been a member of the Communist regime's riot police and participated in a violent crackdown on protesters before the regime's collapse. Despite this history, he was placed in charge of monitoring police officers and ensuring they were not violent to citizens. After several days in office, Ondráček was forced to resign as a result of public protests. Finally, Petr Žantovský, a regular contributor to pro-Russia disinformation campaigns, has been appointed to a position at Czech News Agency (ČTK), one of the three state-funded news agencies together with Czech Radio and Czech Television. ANO, SPD, KSČM and the President have all expressed strong criticisms of state media outlets. These are the same media outlets that tend to highlight scandals about these actors. Despite their common ground (and existing cooperation that goes beyond the Chamber of Deputies), Babiš would prefer to avoid a coalition of the three parties.

Conclusion: Is corruption the main driver of Czech politics?

The problems discussed in this study continue to affect the Czech political scene in late February/early March 2018. Despite a number of controversies, there has been no decrease in support for the ANO movement. According to voter surveys carried out by the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, up to 33.5% of voters would have voted for ANO in February 2018 (CVVM 2018). Similar research suggests that Andrej Babiš, Tomio Okamura and Miloš Zeman are among the most trusted politicians. While the Communist Party's results in the 2017 elections were the worst on record since the party's inception in 1921, it remains as close as it has ever been to participating in executive power in the post-Communist era. The shifts that, as we have seen, are changing the shape of the Czech democratic system should be placed in a wider context of the weakening of liberalism and democracy in other countries in Central and Central-Eastern Europe (Dawson – Hanley 2016; Cabada 2017). The normalising of non-democratic elements is also clear from recent events such as President Zeman's attendance at the far right party SPD's convention at the end of 2017. In late February 2018, just before the 70th anniversary of the Communist coup in 1948, Zeman announced his plan to be the first post-Communist president to attend a KSČM congress.

According to Transparency International's annual rankings of perceived corruption, the Czech Republic compares unfavourably to other European countries. Opinion polls about Czech perceptions of corruption typically high-

light the problem of corruption among political leaders rather than minor corruption among police officers or officials (Naxera 2016). There is a common view that politicians evade the law and only pursue their own interests (Klíma 2015: 313). Even so, parties and politicians have survived multiple corruption scandals and enjoyed repeated election success (Roberts 2016: 33). Recent years have, however, seen a shift with the increasing popularity of actors who emphasise the corruption of ruling political parties. According to these actors, corruption affects not only political parties but all areas of politics. Since the 2010 elections, this anti-corruption and anti-political populism has gradually been celebrated in the Czech environment (Pasquino 2008). Nevertheless, when it comes to the individuals raising the anti-corruption flag, Sampson's (2011) thesis that anti-corruption rhetoric is not necessarily innocent has proven accurate. The scandals surrounding Public Affairs officials, Okamura's tunneling of party funds into his private accounts and, in particular, Babiš's activities show that the success of populist anti-corruption rhetoric in elections may not lead to any real anti-corruption measures. On the contrary, it may help create opportunities for corruption that are then exploited by actors operating behind a veil of anti-corruption rhetoric. The success of these actors may be seen as primarily a consequence of the gradual disintegration of the ties between voters and established political parties. Perceptible corruption has contributed to this disintegration. The distrust of traditional actors has led logically to a change in electoral support (Linek 2010: 194–199). This support has been redirected to those who have sufficiently underscored their differences from standard parties.

Corruption has many negative effects not only on the economy but also on the democratic system (Kupka – Mochťak 2015; Naxera 2017). These impacts have been felt for years, indeed decades, in the Czech environment. Still, the actors who have been brought to power thanks to their anti-corruption rhetoric have in many respects only continued these trends. There has simply been a re-direction of resources away from established parties to these new players. Significantly, these are actors whose ideas about the political system contrast starkly with the ideals of liberal democracy. Paradoxically, the perception that corruption damages Czech democracy has, thus, led to the election of actors who clearly contravene current democratic norms.

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The Three Seas Initiative as a Political Challenge for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

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Abstract: *The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) is an informal association that focuses mainly on the economic integration of EU member states through the cooperation of specific sectors. It is meant to strengthen the single market and bonds among countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It also seeks to reduce developmental differences between these countries and the older EU member states. This study explores the background of the TSI, which was jointly conceived by the presidents of Poland and Croatia with the goal of strengthening ties among countries in the area between the Black, Baltic and Adriatic seas. The association brings together 12 states across Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Austria. As well as enhancing their political ties, it aims to develop cross-border cooperation and implement macro-regional projects. The analysis highlights both the diverging interests of the TSI countries and their common predicament. These states are connected by the fact that they stand to lose the most from the two-speed Europe idea that some Western politicians have imposed. They are also at a clear disadvantage when it comes to infrastructure investments. In the past, the European Union has emphasized East–West cooperation and overlooked the North–South communication and energy corridors. The Three Seas Initiative founders are trying to determine the best form of cooperation for the Central and Eastern Europe region.*

Keywords: ***security policy, Three Seas Initiative, Visegrad Group, Central Europe, European integration***

Introduction

In 2016, Croatia and Poland led the creation of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), which brings together 12 European countries from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic seas. These states – Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – are considering undertaking joint projects related to innovation and the development of economic infrastructure (Kauffmann 2017).

When US President Donald Trump visited Poland during the second TSI summit in 2017, a question arose about whether this geopolitical association might be a key reference point in Euro-Atlantic economic and political relations. There has also been a broad discussion about the initiative's capacity to benefit participating countries. In the ongoing debate, many have directly questioned the chances of this political venture's success. There are also doubts about whether the states in this region – which extends from Lithuania to the Balkans and Romania – share a sense of common destiny.

The current *Intermarium* (literally "between seas") project can be understood in various ways. From the points of view of both Russia and the West, these states are located on the edge of the sphere of influence of one side or the other. As such, there is a question about whether they have sufficient skills, diplomatic infrastructure and security strategies to negotiate the complex and often unclear system of international relations.

This article sets out to understand the challenges faced by each of the 12 states engaged in this political project. In particular, it explains and analyses the position of each country with reference to regional cooperation, European integration and domestic policies. This work is done with the aim of determining whether the Three Seas Initiative has the potential to become a political and economic alliance that also develops a common foreign and security policy. This question is especially important at a time when Polish plans to create a new "alliance" are seen as incomprehensible by some European allies. Some are questioning the desire to establish an agreement that remains to some extent outside the European Union, NATO and Visegrad Group.

History and the present

Current political issues are usually bound up with historical events and so in order to understand why some European countries are averse to, and have distanced themselves from, the Three Seas Initiative, we need to consider some history. This historical context can explain what are often complex problems in contemporary international politics. The Three Seas Initiative is the modern embodiment of a proposal known in Poland before World War II as *Międzymorze* (the Intermarium). Introduced by Józef Piłsudski, a Polish leader of the interwar

period, that plan concerned the creation of a confederation to be led by Poland that would link up states in the area of the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas. The cooperation among these countries was supposed to promote the independence of Central Europe and provide a counterbalance to the power of Soviet Russia and Germany. Nevertheless, the project was never implemented, in part because of conflicting national interests. French diplomats torpedoed the plan and Lithuania saw it as a threat to national independence. Czechoslovakia did not want to participate in an alliance with Poland while Hungary and Romania were ready to cooperate with Poland but not with each other (Gera 2017).

Almost 80 years later, the Intermarium idea has resurfaced. The inaugural Three Seas Initiative summit was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in August 2016 (Cabada 2018: 8–9). Today the initiative represents a forum for leaders and high-ranking officials from the 12 participating European countries. In tracing the TSI's origins, it is also worth noting an earlier informal trilateral meeting which took place during the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2014. Croatia was the initiator of that meeting (Kořan – Wiśniewski – Stražay 2017).

The second TSI summit, held in Warsaw on 6 July 2017, was notable for the presence of President Trump, whose speech clearly conveyed America's support for the project. Representatives of the 12 member countries took part. They included the presidents of ten states in Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. The leaders of the Czech Republic and Austria were absent.

The dominant theme of both TSI summits was the need to develop connected infrastructure along the North–South axis where the absence of these networks is clearly affecting energy, economy and security policies. Perfectly encapsulating the problem was the lack of economic and communications connections between Croatian and Romanian seaports (Corneliu-Aurelian 2017).

The second TSI summit also tackled an important question: Could countries from outside the European Union be included in the Intermarium project as observers or in some other role? Supporters of this idea argued that including these states would not only promote economic innovation and strengthen economic relations but also be a stabilising force politically (Corneliu-Aurelian 2017).

Goals and tasks of the Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative was established by EU member states with the goal of better integrating the countries on the North–South axis by connecting infrastructure across the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors. The initiative seeks to overcome the traditional division of Europe into East and West. It should also increase connections inside the EU single market (Wiśniewski 2017: 55–64).

The economic situation of Central and Eastern Europe is the motivation for this alliance. These economic problems are attributed to the fact that most of the region's strategic infrastructure, including road and rail infrastructure, runs along the East–West corridor, a situation partly due to Germany's economic dominance. Communications routes, gas pipelines, railways and highways all extend from East to West, and it is, thus, in the region's interest to establish North–South counterparts.

The project is also said to reflect the current stage of Central and Eastern Europe's economic and technological transformation. Insufficient infrastructure between countries including Poland and Slovakia, and Bulgaria and Romania, points to the need for modernisation (MacDowall 2013). Investing in better communication and international cooperation could serve to level development opportunities across different EU regions. This should, in turn, improve competitiveness (President of the Republic of Poland 2017).

The TSI aims to strengthen cooperation not only at a political but also at a commercial level across the EU single market. Member countries have set themselves the target of diversification, particularly when it comes to gas supplies, in order to improve energy security in the region. This process is directly linked to US diplomatic actions on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) global market. In this context, it should ensure the US's presence in Central and Eastern Europe in line with President Trump's statements.

The initiative's message is, however, not limited to the energy industry: it also applies to other sectors that could benefit from favourable conditions for cooperation and commercial development. It will, for example, create cooperation opportunities for the providers of the telecommunications and digital technologies required for infrastructure projects (Wiśniewski 2017: 55–64).

Poland has linked its economic recovery to the move to improve transport and energy networks on the North–South axis and supplement better developed East–West connections. The development of these main communications routes also accords with a key principle of European policy: the strengthening of EU cohesion. To this end, the construction of two access corridors to Polish ports – the Via Baltica and Via Carpatia routes – should connect the Baltic states with the Balkans (Gniazdowski 2017: 105–108).

Plans are also afoot to improve digital infrastructure in the region, a task that is becoming increasingly urgent. State-of-the-art industry calls for new forms of connection. All these changes are clearly in the interest of Western European enterprises: the region will have increased appeal to major investors coming from both within and outside the EU.

The Three Seas Initiative vs. the European Union?

The relationship between the Three Seas Initiative and the EU is the focus of much discussion. It is difficult to agree with those who claim the initiative is an attempt to break up the EU from the inside. If the goal set for the Three Seas Initiative – development of energy, transport and digital infrastructure – is achieved, then this will enhance European integration. As was stressed in a declaration at the Warsaw summit, the TSI is a flexible presidential forum; it is simply meant to provide political support for more effective cooperation among governments, businesses and non-governmental organisations that are interested in strengthening regional ties (President of the Republic of Poland 2017).

The TSI currently provides a platform for 12 presidencies but it has little impact on the foreign policy of member states. As such, it may be understood as a geopolitical and economic initiative for EU member states (Milewski 2017: 82–93). The founding countries have emphasised that their project does not conflict with the European Union. Rather it seeks to supplement the existing approach to economic and infrastructure development in Central and Eastern Europe, a region where the need for major development stimuli is widely recognised by politicians (Corneliu-Aurelian 2017). The initiative is seen as an important next step to ensure the more dynamic development of selected projects in the EU. It is not an intergovernmental organisation designed to replace or undermine any EU institution but a group seeking to improve bilateral or multilateral sub-regional relations at EU level (Milewski 2017: 82–93).

Politicians from this region have emphasised that it needs to have a stronger voice in the EU: these states, they say, are no longer content to serve as apprentices to Western countries; they have their own ideas that they wish to pursue (Ruszkowski 2017: 115–137). In this context, as Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović notes, the TSI is an informal political forum where Central European countries can pursue their goal of strengthening European ties and economic cooperation by building transport and energy infrastructure and creating digital technologies (Pavlovets 2017). During the Dubrovnik meeting, TSI country representatives made clear the initiative's wish to strengthen the EU single market. There can be no doubt that this dimension of integration is one of the greatest achievements of the European Community. However, there remains a need to upgrade existing infrastructure and invest in new physical connections between member states – including along the North–South axis. This is the guiding goal of the Three Seas Initiative and it can best be seen in the example of the natural gas sector. TSI proponents argue that a well-functioning market – i.e. one that is diversified and flexible in terms of sources/supply routes – will help the European Union resist pressure from external political entities (Kořan –Wiśniewski – Strážay 2017). Nevertheless they point out that the initiative remains a regional declaration whose economic and infrastructural aims are still unrealised.

In sum, it is important to understand the Three Seas Initiative as simply an informal forum that was set up to promote closer cooperation in the energy, transport, business and digital communication sectors. Against this backdrop, it is seeking to strengthen political ties and develop joint macro-regional projects.

The role of the United States in Three Seas Initiative policies

It has been speculated that President Trump's policy towards Russia took shape at his meeting with the representatives of 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw in 2017. The White House has underscored that the US wants to be part of the emerging energy market that will connect countries from the Baltic, Black and Adriatic sea regions with Western Europe. America's participation in the initiative will give it further opportunities to export oil, gas and other raw materials and thus lead to greater revenue and world influence. This, of course, corresponds with the energy policy of the Polish government, which hopes to abandon Russian gas and replace it with American supplies, a move that would also benefit Central Europe. The goal here is to ensure energy security so that no one can "blackmail" the countries in this part of Europe, as Polish President Andrzej Duda has put it (Dongmiao 2017). Poland's plans also include contracts for American arms in order to modernise the Polish army (Kauffmann 2017).

What has brought these countries together in this political and economic initiative is pressure from the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation. Following the annexation of Crimea and Russian military aggression towards Ukraine, states such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania have felt an increasing need to strengthen their strategic partnerships with the United States (Milewski 2017: 82–93).

At the same time, there is less agreement between Poland and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia about the threat posed by their eastern neighbour. These four countries have, however, cooperated effectively on other areas of EU policy such as the migrant crisis. Poland has discussed similar issues with the Balkan states. All this supports the view that Poland could be the keystone in a discrete cooperation arrangement based on very cautious and complex diplomacy. From an economic standpoint, there are extensive similarities among these countries.

Although the Three Seas Initiative only concerns limited safety issues, there are clear links between strengthening the US's role in the natural gas market and the potential for greater energy security in this region. One of the initiative's main goals is the promotion of greater energy independence from Moscow, which has sometimes used gas and oil as political tools. Russia imposes its will on its neighbours in part through its control of energy supplies. Many Eastern European countries are poor in energy resources and thus fear that

they could face a sudden interruption of supplies. The Kremlin has also used its energy pipelines in Eastern Europe to apply "economic blackmail" to the European Union, which depends on Russian energy (Investor's Business Daily 2017). This was made clear during the 2009 Russia–Ukraine conflict, which led to the cessation of gas supplies to Europe and caused a serious crisis. Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the nations in this region, which rely on Russia for most of their energy, want independence from this supplier.

Importantly, the US President's presence in Warsaw also had implications for economic policy, particularly in relation to Germany. Together with the Russian company Gazprom, two German companies, BASF and E.ON, built the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline, which transports gas from Russia to Germany and bypasses Poland and Ukraine. The construction of a second pipeline, Nord Stream 2, is currently being planned. Most of Central and Eastern Europe is concerned that energy supplies across Europe will increasingly depend on Russia (Krupa 2017).

As the site of an LNG terminal, Poland has the potential to supply the region and thus help develop the gas market and improve its competitiveness and security. According to some estimates, this terminal is so large that it could replace up to 80% of Russian gas supplies to Poland. All three Baltic states are also building LNG installations and Croatia plans to launch its own LNG terminal in 2019 (Investor's Business Daily 2017). Moscow, thus, stands to lose its energy monopoly and may even have to surrender some of its interests, which could force the Kremlin to compete from a price standpoint.

In 2017, the first LNG shipment from the US was delivered to Świnoujście, a Polish port on the Baltic coast. This approach could potentially be used for gas supplies to Croatia and other countries south of Poland. Such a solution may well align with the efforts of the Trump administration to export American gas (Gera 2017; cf. Cabada – Waisová 2018: 15–16).

Characteristics of the Three Seas Initiative countries as of 2017

There are, it turns out, important differences among the Three Seas Initiative countries, and these are reflected in the pace of the transformations they underwent in the 1990s. In this respect, the key variable is the extent of each state's involvement in political democratisation and economic liberalisation. Difficulties during the transformation period, including the dramatic events in the Balkans, affected the speed of socio-political and economic evolution. One illustration of this is the differing stances of individual governments on the adoption of the single euro currency and entry into the Schengen area. Geographical location is another important factor that has shaped perspectives on political, economic and military alliances. All these countries belong to the EU and all but Austria are NATO members. As such, they share a general strategy

based on their membership of these organisations. Nevertheless, each one has different perceptions of its relations with other states (Ruszkowski 2015: 9–25).

The TSI states can be divided into five groups based on the above political transformation process, which has largely determined the stage of their accession to European structures. Also significant are the geopolitical forces that have shaped each state's political strategies.

The first group consists of the Baltic states, namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which, given their small and very open economies, are susceptible to external shocks. These economies still depend on the inflow of foreign direct investment to finance production and maintain economic growth. Their relations with Russia may continue to affect trade. These states also have ongoing issues with national minorities, especially the large Russian community which is the dominant population in some regions. There are fears and doubts about this community's loyalty to authorities in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius.

The second group contains Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, i.e. the countries of Visegrad Group, which is the basis for the Three Seas Initiative. These countries are seen as models of political transformation and the Europeanisation of former Eastern bloc countries. Visegrad Group countries are generally considered safe for those coming from abroad, whether as immigrants or tourists. There is a small risk of terrorism from domestic or international entities. At the same time, these countries face major threats because of their use as transit places by drug and human traffickers.

Due to the migrant crisis, anti-migrant sentiments have been running high in the Visegrad countries, increasing the risk of right-wing extremist attacks on migrants and national minorities. Right-wing extremist parties have also been making their presence felt in the public sphere, which may lead to political instability in the long run.

Like Slovakia and Hungary, Poland is a neighbour to Ukraine and has, thus, been exposed to growing regional tensions in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and ongoing military operations in eastern Ukraine. As members of NATO since 1999 (or 2004 in the case of Slovakia) and the EU since 2004, the Visegrad states have come to cooperate more closely with the world's most developed economies and international security organisations. Nevertheless, their military equipment remains obsolete and in need of modernisation.

The third group comprises Bulgaria and Romania, whose membership of NATO since 2004 and the EU since 2007 has led to greater cooperation with international institutions on economic and security policies. At the same time, the location of these states between Europe and Asia means they are attractive transit zones for illegal goods and immigrants entering the EU. A large number of organised crime groups have been noted in these countries though no terrorist groups have been reported. From an economic innovation perspective,

corruption remains a serious problem that undermines the rule of law and state transparency. Bulgaria and Romania also face major challenges around the operation of, and trust in, state protective services such as the police and the modernisation of the army. Cybersecurity and data protection are also key problems, with users exposed to potentially huge losses via modern technology.

Two countries from the Balkan region make up the fourth group of political actors. Croatia has increased its stability and security since joining NATO in 2009 and becoming an EU member in 2013. The country is troubled, however, by persistent tensions caused by the presence of the Serb minority on its territory, which could lead to an outbreak of ethnic violence, especially in the Vukovar region. A border dispute with Slovenia is another unresolved problem.

The second Balkan country in this group is Slovenia. Accession to both the EU and NATO in 2004 has strengthened this state's economic cooperation with EU members. Croatia and Slovenia have each also received EU funds to enhance their cybersecurity capabilities. The Adriatic Basin, however, remains an attractive destination for international drug and weapon traffickers.

The fifth group includes only one state, Austria, which is also the sole Three Seas Initiative member that was not part of the Eastern bloc before 1989. Other distinguishing factors are the fact that it is not a NATO member and has been an EU member since 1995. Since that time, Austria has received significant EU funds which it has invested in rail infrastructure and housing. It is also one of the few Central European countries to set ambitious targets which should further increase its share of renewable energy sources. Austria's energy policy benefits from a well-developed transmission network, which supports low electricity prices. The country is also noteworthy for its geographical location, which makes it an important hub between Central and Western Europe.

Cybersecurity challenges for the Three Seas Initiative as of 2018

As information and communications technology (ICT) has developed, it has played an increasing role in international politics. The new digital era is characterised by the dependence of the state, its citizens and its economy on cybertechnology. As such, the conditions for building an alliance based on ICT networks are of concern to many countries including those in the Three Seas Initiative. Such a project could strengthen both the economies and the cybersecurity of Central and Eastern European countries (*The Digital 3 Seas Initiative: A Call For a Cyber Upgrade of Regional Cooperation* 2018).

As originally conceived, the Three Seas Initiative was meant to focus primarily on the development of energy and transport infrastructure. It is now safe to assume, however, that this political venture will extend in the near future to digital technology including fibre optics, broadcasting stations and the 5G network. The project will, thus, be complemented by work on digital connec-

tivity, which is now a condition for economic development. This will ensure faster, uninterrupted and more secure connections for devices and installations within the Internet of things that could include smart cities, autonomous cars, drones and robots. If supplemented by cybertechnology, optical fibre networks could also help eliminate gaps in the TSI communications infrastructure used to connect with other EU countries. The implementation and success of this project are, thus, important not only for the countries in the region but also for the cohesion of the EU.

At the same time, it must be said that security policies and cybertechnology have limited development potential in the Three Seas Initiative states. This is especially clear when we consider the social context of these countries compared with conditions in the United States, Russia, China and the entire EU.

Table 1: Population and number of Internet users within the Three Seas Initiative states; comparison with selected locations in 2018

	TSI states	EU	Russia	USA	China
Population	111, 575, 906	506,279,458	143,964,709	363,224,006	1,415,045,928
Internet users	83, 620, 538	433,651,012	109,552,842	320,059,368	772,000,000
Internet users in the population (%)	74.9	85.6	76	88.1	54.6
Internet users in TSI states compared to users in other countries/regions (%)	n/a	19.2	76.3	26.1	10.8

Source: Author's own calculations based on the EU report *Power from Statistics: Data, Information and Knowledge — Outlook*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistical-reports/-/KS-FT-18-005 (8 March 2018).

The number of Internet users within a population shows the scale of the digitisation process under way in that society. In this context, the number of Internet users in the Three Seas Initiative states is lower than the equivalent figure for the European Union or countries like the US and China. Of course, this gap reflects not only the level of IT development in a specific society but also the fact that some non-TSI states have a huge number of citizens. Regardless of population size, however, the dominance of cyberspace in everyday life does not only suggest a high degree of innovation and cybertechnology absorption. It also points to a high level of vulnerability to harmful cyber incidents in the public sphere.

In this regard, the data on Internet user numbers has particular significance for the security policies of the Three Seas Initiative countries. A social group based in the virtual world may also be understood as a number of citizens who

are susceptible to social engineering in cyberspace. Information technology plays an important role not only in gathering information, as was seen in the Facebook data crisis caused by Cambridge Analytica, but also in the harnessing of disinformation techniques. For a clear illustration of this phenomenon, we need only look to the use of cyberspace for social engineering during the 2016 US presidential election campaign.

Popular social media can influence public opinion. Since, however, the same information will not meet with the same reaction in all nations, each problem needs to be solved individually. Each state has its own cybersecurity culture and its own political culture. This means there will be different degrees of sensitivity to specific information across both the real world and cyberspace.

In this context, we should bear in mind that the Central and Eastern Europe area is of great importance from the point of view of the influence and operations of global powers. From the perspective of neighbouring Russia, this region represents the external border of the EU and NATO. As a result of Moscow's expansionist policies in both the conventional and digital senses, the TSI states have come under political and economic pressure. The alliance of 12 Central and Eastern European countries may, thus, be seen as an attempt to deepen security cooperation in response to new threats in the region, including hybrid threats, which are becoming increasingly difficult to identify. Among these threats are cyber incidents, which are targeted at specific social groups and critical state infrastructure.

Table 2: Most frequently reported cyber incidents in Three Seas Initiative countries in 2018

55.5%	Computer fraud
12.3%	Offensive and illegal content
10.9%	Malware
5.6%	Hacking attempts
3.3 %	Data gathering
2.8%	Hacking
23%	Attacks on resource availability
2.3%	Data security attacks
4.7%	Other

Source: Author's own calculations based on computer emergency response team (CERT) reports in Three Seas Initiative states.

In fact, cyber threats have become a key aspect of state security policy. Malicious cyberspace campaigns are directed at vital infrastructure and can disrupt economic activities and even national security. They may, thus, pose a real threat to the lives of citizens. On this basis, there is a need to strengthen regional

cybersecurity. This could be done, for example, through educational initiatives, expert exchanges, training, drills and in-depth cooperation between computer emergency response teams.

Reports of cyber incidents show not only the extent of the cyber threats facing each state but the fact that private organisations are struggling with these issues as well. These reports also highlight the wide spectrum of possible cyber threats.

These cyber incidents include what is broadly understood as information manipulation. Such cases may involve hate speech and content about social groups who are seen by their attackers as foreign and hostile. In the Central and Eastern European context, these messages have often expressed negative emotions around the Hungarian diaspora in Romania and Slovakia. A second conflict that has been politically exploited in cyberspace is the one between the Poles and the Ukrainians, whose doubts and lack of trust around one another are said to stem from a tragic history. More recent, there has also been a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes as a result of fears of the wave of refugees coming from Africa and the Middle East. Anti-immigrant campaigns, which have spread widely online and whose authorship has been attributed to Russia, can be assumed to be part of a Kremlin policy that actively targets the Three Seas Initiative states. All these forms of disinformation are attacks on the cohesion of projects implemented in Central and Eastern Europe.

The digital cooperation of the Three Seas Initiative countries faces four main challenges. The first of these is the need to pursue the common interests of these countries while also addressing and achieving EU policy goals. The second relates to the implementation of existing EU projects such as the Digital Single Market, the "Connecting Europe" financial tool, permanent structural defence cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund. The third challenge concerns ensuring the data security of both state and private institutions. Given the region's key role as the eastern flank of NATO, this issue should be a cybersecurity policy priority for TSI states, especially in the face of growing Russian activity.

The fourth and final challenge relates to the development of an international security policy that will use the eastern part of NATO to enhance actions against hybrid threats. This approach is also justified by the fact that Central and Eastern Europe is home to NATO specialist centres in this area. The latter include the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Tallinn, the Counter-Intelligence Centre of Excellence in Krakow and the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga.

For a better understanding of cybersecurity policies in this region, it is worth looking at the data from individual states concerning their defence-related spending. As we will see, these countries each have different security policies and different interpretations of cyber threats, which are reflected in their defence budgets.

Table 3: Population, Internet user numbers and defence spending in Three Seas Initiative countries in 2018

Country	Population	Internet users	Internet users in the population (%)	GDP (USD)	Defence spending as a share of GDP (%)	Defence budget (USD)	Cybersecurity spending as a share of defence budget (%)
Lithuania	2,830,582	2,399,678	84.8	42.8bn	1.96	642m	4.9
Latvia	1,944,565	1,663,739	85.6	27.9bn	2	411m	4.7
Estonia	1,305,755	1,196,521	91.6	23.5bn	2.14	503m	6.0
Poland	38,563,573	28,267,099	73.3	467bn	1.98	9.08bn	5.8
Czech Republic	10,555,130	9,323,428	88.3	194bn	1.11	1.97bn	3.7
Slovakia	5,432,157	4,629,641	85.2	90.3bn	1.20	983m	3.9
Hungary	9,787,905	7,874,733	80.5	117bn	1.08	996m	3.6
Bulgaria	7,045,259	4,213,065	59.8	50.4bn	1.56	678m	4.3
Romania	19,237,513	12,082,186	62.8	187bn	1.93	2.78bn	5.4
Slovenia	2,071,252	1,563,795	75.5	44.1bn	1.01	450m	2.9
Croatia	4,209,815	3,133,485	74.4	49.9bn	1.30	588m	3.7
Austria	8,592,400	7,273,168	84.6	387bn	0.7	2.31bn	2.6

Source: Author's own calculations based on the defence spending of TSI states on cybersecurity research and development. Figures are also drawn from interviews with national cryptology centre and counter-intelligence personnel and security reports from these countries.

As Table 3 shows, there are significant differences among Three Seas Initiative countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Romania when it comes to their defence budgets and cybersecurity outlays. The reasons for this probably relate to the subjective sense of threat, degree of proximity to the Russian Federation and level of anti-Russian feeling in some Central and Eastern European nations compared with the situation in Western European countries (Usakovs – Grybauskaite 2018). Cybertechnology has, thus become a factor which shapes strategic and economic policy ideas. Ironically the challenge here is not only cyber threats but also the dynamic transformation of key aspects of the economy and state management, which the legal and education sectors must keep up with.

Given the dense network of interconnectivity, cyberspace has a crucial part to play in strengthening the economy and developing and implementing state policies. It also shapes how authorities connect with citizens when providing services and how governments approach diplomacy.

The digital transformation of the Central and Eastern European economies is sure to affect the role of cyberspace in international relations. It will also produce new hybrid cross-border security threats. This means that the Three Seas Initiative will need to have a strong digital dimension. Attention to cybersecurity is, thus, indispensable for the development of this project.

Different interests of the Three Seas Initiative states

Internal policies that could supersede foreign policy projects threaten the political cohesion of the Three Seas Initiative countries. Since the TSI involves presidents serving as patrons for sectoral cooperation, there are questions about the possibilities for action in areas that come under the power of governments (Gniazdowski 2017: 105–108). In particular, if two executive officers, i.e. the president and the prime minister, come from opposing ideological camps, then the competition between them could paralyse decision-making and destabilise national policy. A similar phenomenon may occur if elections lead to a change of power and the new president does not feel obliged to continue previous arrangements (Milewski 2017: 82–93). Any political project that focuses on a country's stated goals is, in short, vulnerable to political changes resulting from elections.

In order to answer the question that we posed at the outset, i.e. whether the Three Seas Initiative could potentially achieve its expressed goals, we need to consider the different interests of participating countries. It may indeed turn out that each member has its own strategic interests which conflict with the directions chosen by other states (Milewski 2017).

In this context, differences of interest may exist at two levels. The first concerns the current interests of a given government, that is, economic concerns such as energy transmission. The second level relates to beliefs about the common fate and definition of Europe and long-term threats. Clearly the elites of individual countries may take different positions on a specific international phenomenon or event. One important element in the success of any political venture will be the geographical location of participants since this gives rise to certain natural areas of cooperation. The countries that make up the Three Seas Initiative do not represent a political monolith. Rather, the project involves groups and countries, some of which have very different interests both within the EU and in their relations with non-EU countries (Ruszkowski 2010: 97–110).

In this regard, it is difficult to look past the conflicting ambitions of individual countries in this region. A clear example is Serbia, which was not invited to the Warsaw summit because of its animosities with Croatia. This absence of Serbia, a non-EU member that is not particularly welcomed by its neighbours, has a huge impact on Croatia's potential for connections with Romania and Bulgaria. Similarly, there is little chance of a straight-line link between Romania

and Poland because Ukraine lies between these states. Not all TSI members are willing to cooperate with Ukraine, and this cooperation is difficult owing not only to Ukraine's lack of EU membership but also the ongoing war.

Croatia and Slovenia are locked in a border dispute. The latter is about minor adjustments to a 2.5-mile sea corridor in the Bay of Piran. Nevertheless, in the Balkans, where the wounds of the 1990s are still unhealed, even a dispute of this kind provokes heightened emotions (Kokot 2017: 3). In Croatia, the topic has been widely discussed, and people recall that Slovenia blocked Croatia's EU accession for years on account of this very border issue. The situation has been exacerbated by the 2017 verdict of a Dutch arbitration tribunal, which found in Slovenia's favour. Zagreb has said that it does not intend to recognise the verdict.

The Czechs have been eyeing the Three Seas Initiative suspiciously and note that it brings to mind old ideas of Poland as a great power and offers them no benefits. The Czech government realises that the country's economic growth depends on EU subsidies (Ehlem 2017: 14). The Slovaks have taken the same position and do not want to be associated with this project. Slovakia is a member of the euro currency area, and the European Union is the driving force behind its development. No government in Bratislava will opt to loosen relations with the EU (Ehlem 2017), and not everyone is ready to invest in America as the sole security guarantor. As participants in the monetary union, Slovakia and Slovenia are mainly concerned with participating in integration processes inside the euro currency area. Similarly, the Czechs have prioritised their relations with Germany over those with the US.

Romania is, on the other hand, basing its security policy on US positions. The Romanian government has already agreed to the installation of parts of the US Ballistic Missile Defense System on Romanian territory at Deveselu. It also wants to increase the size of the US deployment to the country. One potential plan is to purchase a US Patriot missile system while at the same time developing cooperation with the German and French arms industries. Romania is also supposed to create a joint land forces brigade with the Czechs, the Germans and the French (Kokot 2017: 3). In the political and economic domains, however, Bucharest's preference is for an alliance with Berlin and Paris, and it has been treating the Three Seas Initiative as supplementary.

Hungary is a different case, and it has been boosting its energy security based on gas supplies from Gazprom and nuclear energy-related cooperation with Russia (Parafianowicz 2017: A2). The Hungarian government has been striving to diversify the country's energy supplies while also concluding new agreements with the Russians. The current contract with Gazprom expires at the end of 2021. Budapest is hoping to force a price decrease from the Russian giant by seeking out other sources. Even so, it continues to support plans for the alternative Black Sea route that Russia wants to build in cooperation with Turkey (Kokot 2017: 3).

Austria has meanwhile been distancing itself from the initiative promoted by Poland. Like the Czech Republic, it did not send a presidential representative to the Three Seas Initiative Warsaw summit. Vienna has no interest in supporting Warsaw's energy proposal. Like Hungary, Austria is a Gazprom customer and it sees Russia as a reliable partner that sells its raw materials at a competitive price. In contrast, Croatia has shown the greatest enthusiasm for the Three Seas Initiative. It has invested in an LNG terminal on Krk island near Rijeka and joined in liquefied gas trading with Poland (Parafianowicz 2017: A2).

Like Austria, Bulgaria has stepped away from the project. It refused to take part in joint fleet operations with Romania and Ukraine, fearing its participation might irritate Russia. Boiko Borisov's government has been trying to manouevre between the West and Russia, which still enjoys great influence in the country, especially when it comes to energy. Bulgarian parliament was even prepared to approve the construction of the South Stream pipeline that would have bypassed Ukraine. The issue was laid to rest, however, after the European Commission intervened and it was revealed that a South Stream construction bill introduced by one Bulgarian MP had been drafted by Gazprom's lawyers.

Following his criticisms of the Kremlin's activities in the Ukrainian Donbas, former Bulgarian president Rosen Plevnijew was not nominated by his party to stand for re-election. When the socialist candidate and former aviation commander Rumen Radev won the election in January 2017, he did not hide his sympathies with Russia. It was soon revealed that Poland would not be repairing Bulgaria's MiG aircraft; that task fell to Russia, whose bid had been more expensive.

The Baltic states have the greatest fears of Russian aggression, and they may prove to be real allies in the Three Seas Initiative. These countries are looking for alternative energy suppliers and would prefer to maintain a strong relationship with the EU. Estonia has been in the euro currency zone since 2011 while Latvia joined in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. The Lithuanians signed on despite the fact that politicians in Vilnius believed this was a premature move economically. Ultimately, however, they went ahead because they saw this as an additional guarantee of security against potential Russian aggression (Kokot 2017: 3).

Conclusion

The importance of the Three Seas Initiative for European countries is still being discussed and these debates will certainly continue for years to come. We may expect that each state will put its own spin on this discussion based on its national interests and foreign policy. Undoubtedly there are many questions about the relations among the states involved in this project. Nevertheless, these countries are connected by a desire to modernise and catch up with more developed regions of the European Union. The Three Seas Initiative will surely not obstruct this goal.

Along with a consistent communications policy, the TSI is in need of funding. Negotiations on the next multi-year EU budget start in 2018. If they unite, the TSI countries may be more successful when fighting for funding for the initiative in Brussels and trying to secure external investors. However, for this project to become a reality, the states that attended the 2017 Warsaw meeting will need to make some difficult decisions and take decisive action. In this regard, three types of political actions are needed. First, the countries in the TSI region must agree on their joint project priorities and lobby for funding for these projects in the EU. Second, the TSI region must set up a business forum that can be a first contact point for external investors; this forum should be promoted in Brussels and Washington. And third, the European Union and its member states must take steps to improve cross-border infrastructure that will enable investment support. Without these three steps, the Three Seas Initiative will have difficulty in attracting the external investment needed to translate visions of infrastructure into actual projects (Jones 2017: A10).

A year after the announcement of cooperation among the leaders of 12 Central European countries in Dubrovnik, a grand idea has been adapted to reflect the more modest reality. Poland, the main architect of the Three Seas Initiative, has had to limit its ambitions. Hopes for the extension of cooperation to non-EU countries, particularly Ukraine and Georgia, have been abandoned. Their membership of the group is opposed by TSI countries which have good relations with Russia and do not intend to change this. At the same time, the Visegrad states have blocked the introduction of non-EU Balkan countries such as Montenegro (Wroński 2017: 3).

One key challenge that may also be the source of many problems at European level is the need for EU member states in the Three Seas Initiative to reconcile their relationships with the major EU players France and Germany. It is hard to imagine that decision-makers in Bucharest, Prague, Bratislava and Sofia will always put relations with Warsaw ahead of those with Paris, Berlin and Brussels. The latter are after all the main drivers of the modernisation of these countries and their consolidation in the EU.

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Human Security: An Analysis of the Dissemination of an Idea in World Politics[1]

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sciendo

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Abstract: *The study considers the dissemination of the idea of human security including the means – trajectories and spaces – by which it has been spread and reproduced in international politics. My aim is to illuminate the agents behind this dissemination, the ways that the concept has been shared and the intellectual and institutional frameworks that have enabled its existence. I conclude that the idea of human security arose from the UN system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme's offices. It was disseminated with the assistance of "human security friends," i.e. Japan, Canada and Norway and several prominent scholars, high-ranking policy-makers and UN officers. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, human security has not found a following worldwide. It was embedded in part of the UN system where it has remained powerful and been reproduced. Outside the UN system, however, even its most active and devoted promoters have abandoned the concept. The number of these supporters has dwindled, the idea has lost its power and the spaces where it is reproduced are limited.*

Keywords: ***human security, dissemination of an idea, United Nations, Canada, Japan.***

Human security (HS) has been widely discussed by scholars as well as policy-makers over the last two decades. Academic analyses include debates about the conceptualisation of HS (Waisová 2003), its relevance for the contemporary world (Paris 2001; Dissent 2007), its measurement and mapping (King – Murray 2002; Owen 2010) and its place in security studies (Gasper 2004; Newman

1 I would like to thank West Bohemian University (grant SGS-2018-011), which supported the research and work on this article.

2010; Krause 2013). Several academic journals devoted to human security issues have sprung into existence[2] and many other journals, while lacking HS in their name, have declared an interest in HS-focused articles.[3] Human security has also generated broad interest in the policy sphere. It has emerged as a priority on Canadian, Norwegian and Japanese foreign policy agendas, found a place in the EU lexicon and become a driving force for a number of UN agencies and bodies. Special HS advisory and policy-making bodies have been established and HS coalitions and platforms have arisen (for more information, see below and Figure 1). Additionally, new university HS research centres and degree programmes have been created (see Appendix 1).

All of this demonstrates that HS has become more than "hot air" (Paris 2001). It is a powerful normative framework, a policy motif and tool, a concept (and some would even claim a paradigm), a means of tackling issues, a set of practices and positions, a strategy, a critical model and a field of knowledge which is even subject to university certification.

The fascination of the academic community and policy-makers with human security has led to lively debates about the concept including questions about how wide or narrow its scope should be, which threats it should include, how it should translate into policy, how that policy should be implemented and the possible motivations and actions of HS friends and opponents. While some of these issues (for example, the question of what precisely is being secured and what constitutes human security as a condition) have been addressed, others remain unexplored. One of the least understood subjects is the development of ideas of human security, or more specifically, how these ideas entered the public policy debate and became part of a policy trend that spread worldwide and was eventually institutionalised in organisations and practices. Did these concepts arise, as the conventional wisdom might suggest, from objective threats and conditions inherent in the harsh contemporary world? Were they socially constructed and used by the North to manipulate and control the South? With a few exceptions (Gasper 2005; Chandler 2008; Matlary 2008; Newman 2010; Krause 2013), these questions have been met by silence. We also lack studies about the deeper impulses behind the adoption of the human security concept and the ways that institutions and scholars have endorsed and perpetuated certain modes of HS thinking and practice. All these questions are particularly important at a time when – after almost three decades in international politics – HS seems to have been marginalised as a strategic narrative and holistic framework (Martin - Owen 2010). Understanding the life cycle of the idea and its particular phases could, thus, be of enormous benefit to scholars and policy-makers.

2 See, e.g., *Journal of Human Security*, *Journal of Human Security Studies*, *Journal of Migration and Human Security*, *Journal of Human Security & Resilience* and *PRAXIS. The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*.

3 One such publication is *Conflict, Security & Development.*

The goal of the present analysis is to identify those responsible for disseminating the human security idea as well as the means – i.e. trajectories and spaces – through which it has been spread and reproduced within international politics. I aim to shed light on the agents behind the concept's dissemination and (re)production along with how it has been shared and the intellectual and institutional frameworks that have enabled its existence. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have noted, whatever their genesis, new norms and ideas require not only a "norm entrepreneur" but also an institutional platform. Answering these questions can help us make sense of why and how HS found a place in the sun and what role it has played in the history of post-Cold War politics. Exploring the life cycle and different faces of this single productive, popular and oft-cited idea can tell us more about the social, political and spatial conditions that have accompanied it. It can also highlight the interplay between the academy and politics and reveal how power shapes ideas and how ideas work in tandem with power.

The structure of this article is as follows: The first section introduces a theoretical and methodological framework for my analysis. As I have indicated, the central questions of this article are: Who was behind the rise of HS as an idea and policy trend? And how was the idea reproduced? The best methodological strategy to address questions of "how" and "who" is genealogy. A genealogical approach is, thus, applied in the second part of this study. This section maps the actors who have disseminated and reproduced the HS concept as well as the trajectories and spaces of this dissemination and reproduction. In this way, I seek to uncover the institutional models and series of critical actions that gave rise to the idea of human security.

Theoretical and methodological points of departure

Two centuries ago, Friedrich Nietzsche (2006/1887) argued that there was no independent reality apart from human activity and he, thus, called for the replacement of science by genealogies – historical-philosophical accounts of how reality comes into being. A century later, genealogy was applied by Michel Foucault (1977), who wished to demonstrate that knowledge and power were inseparable and that there were no universal truths in history. Foucault showed how power and knowledge directly implied one another. Genealogy is a familiar research approach in International Relations (IR) and has been recognised in several publications.[4] IR scholars use genealogy as a critical historical approach to interpret the social and political world. This distinctive historical research method allows them to analyse how agents and structures are constituted within

4 The key texts here are James Der Derian (1987): *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* and Richard M. Price (1997): *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*. Other articles and books have followed in a similar vein.

historically and culturally specific sites. This is done by drawing attention to contingency and the productive power of discourse (Vucetic 2011).

An important issue in this context has been whether genealogy can be applied to questions that do not ask "how" and, in particular, whether it can extend to questions of "who." While Foucault rejected a genealogical approach to these questions, other scholars have demonstrated that such a tactic is entirely appropriate (Vucetic 2011). Since the current study is not concerned with causation, but rather with a power analysis of the dissemination and reproduction of the HS idea and the actors who drove these processes, genealogy would seem to be the correct framework.

This work combines a genealogical approach with ethnographic methods, particularly biographical research and qualitative interviews. These methods are rounded out by analyses of the memoirs of outstanding individuals as well as their correspondence, media interviews and conference records and transcripts. Genealogy and ethnographic methods are a complementary and potentially powerful pairing; they share reflexivity and interpretative scope, enabling micro-analysis while also shedding light on the wider context. These tools can help us scrutinise practices and institutions by following the links between the personal trajectories, values and work cycles of key individuals and institutions and the agendas they adopt. At the same time, they can elucidate social interactions, group, organisational and community behaviour and perceptions, cultural contexts, cultural processes and meanings and subjective meanings (Gille –Riain 2002; Gould 2014; Stubbs 2014).

Dissemination and reproduction of the HS idea: Mapping agents, trajectories and spaces

In order to study the agents, trajectories and spaces involved in disseminating and reproducing the human security idea, this section collects key empirical data and presents it graphically. Figure 1 highlights the historical dynamics surrounding the HS concept. To this end, it maps the institutional models and organisational structures behind the concept's dissemination and reproduction and a cascade of critical actions by institutional actors. This outline is sketched in the form of a mop-headed tree. The tree is an apt metaphor, perfectly representing the fact that the idea has certain roots and is embedded in particular intellectual and empirical soil. This graph makes clear that the idea was conceived at a key moment and it has developed over time. We can observe that the tree trunk has split into branches and some of these branches have stopped developing or even withered and died. Mop-headed trees are known for their bush-like tops. This is especially appropriate for HS, an idea that does not have one lead proponent. The branches represent trajectories of dissemination and spaces of reproduction. Here four key spaces are identified: 1) the UN network,

2) academic and expert communities, 3) the NGO community and 4) state-led action. As the figure illustrates, the changing environment and climate have caused a once flourishing tree to start to die. There are only two branches – the UN system and the academy – where the HS idea continues to be reproduced. How this happened is the subject of the following section, which is organised into four parts based on the trajectories and spaces identified as tree branches.

Figure 1: Map of dissemination agents and channels of the HS idea



Key

ABHS: Advisory Board on Human Security	UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
EU: European Union	UNPBLC: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
HSU: Human Security Unit	UNSC: United Nations Security Council
ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty	UNTFHS: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
R2P: Responsibility to Protect	WB: World Bank
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme	

Source: Author based on Christou 2013; Edström 2011; Martin – Owen 2010; Matlary 2008; Suhrke 1999, 2014; UN 2009; Waisová 2003.

The UN system

The idea of human security emerged from within the United Nations, and UN bodies, agencies and officials have clearly been key agents in its dissemination and reproduction. The concept arose from the ashes of the Cold War during the debate about the new world order. The end of the Cold War gave rise to spatial transformations that eroded state sovereignty and blurred boundaries both within and beyond nations. The 1990s brought genocide, ethnic cleansing, civil wars and mass starvation in different regions. In such a world, humanitarian language was highly relevant and appealing since it was clear that the "military response was not enough to deal with the new threats and challenges" (Solana 2004).[5] Among other things, the HS concept was a response to the loss of meanings previously attached to borders; it emerged amidst new understandings of statehood as the role of states changed from that of protector to predator (Tuathail 2000). The idea was first presented by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 *Human Development Report*. That document defined human security as the freedom of individual human beings from both want and fear. Since 1994, this definition has been at the centre of various debates. There are different positions regarding what should be included with some contending that "wide" definitions are excessive (King – Murray 2002). Nevertheless, the idea of HS (in both its wide and narrower forms) has entered the agenda of many UN bodies and agencies, including the UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO and the Office of the UN Secretary General to name only a few (for more examples, see UN 2009).

Supporters of the concept needed time to communicate the HS agenda across the UN institutional framework. By 1999, however, the idea was backed by

5 A similar argument has been made by Sadako Ogata (n.d), who writes that "human security is a new response to complex threats."

a number of resolutions and it was then institutionalised. HS has been applied to various clusters of issues; particular attention has been paid to women and children in armed conflicts, gender empowerment, post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform and state-building. To carry out the HS agenda, new bodies and positions have been established. These include the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (1999), the UN Commission on Human Security (CHS/2001), the Human Security Unit at the UN Secretariat (2004), the UNESCO Intersectoral Group on Human Security (2006) and the UN Secretary General Special Advisor on Human Security (2007) (UN 2009). As we will see in the next section, the UN University (UNU) has also played a key role in disseminating and reproducing the concept. Working independently or in cooperation with others, UNU has produced research and literature about human security and offered HS education (Szarzynski 2018). There are now dozens of UN and UNU publications, workshops and even summer schools about human security. In the space of a few years, the HS idea has, thus, spread across the UN system and taken on a life of its own within particular spaces. Individual bodies have produced specific HS knowledge and policies tailored to their sphere. Among the leading examples of this are the UN Environment Programme's analyses of climate change and human security;[6] UNESCO's projects on the links between HS, culture and education[7] and UNICEF's work on children and HS. The power of the concept is particularly clear in the case of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). Generously financed by Japan, another friend of HS, this fund has the goal of spreading the HS idea within the UN system and beyond and "promot[ing] HS as a methodology for addressing crisis and insecurity" (HSC n.d.; for a critical analysis of UNTFHS, see Goméz 2012). The fund has collected money to support actors who are promoting and implementing the HS idea, and it has channelled assistance to several HS projects (MFAJ 2010). It is also behind the *Human Security Handbook* (2016), "a guide for practitioners and policy makers who plan to integrate the human security approach into their work" (UNTFHS n.d.).

Closer scrutiny of the dissemination of the HS idea within the UN reveals the vital role of not only institutions but also certain individuals (Martin – Owen 2010). Among these "HS ambassadors" have been Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General; Sadako Ogata, the former High Commissioner for Refugees

6 See, e.g., the Disaster and Conflict Programme (http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/UNEP_conflict_and_disaster_brochure.pdf) and the Nature Opportunities and Human Security Project (https://unemg.org/images/emgdocs/Dialogues/ND5/UNEMG%20-%20Biodiversity%20and%20Human%20Security%20Dialogue_Final1%201.pdf).

7 See, e.g., the UNESCO Human Security Project (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/brasilia/about-this-office/single-view/news/unesco_human_security_project/) and the programme of the UNESCO Chair in Human Security and Regional Development (https://en.unesco.org/unitwin-unesco-chairs-programme).

and chair of the Human Security Commission;[8] Amartya Sen, a development doyen who introduced the concept of development as freedom and chaired the Commission on Human Security and Yukio Takasu, the UN Secretary General Special Advisor on Human Security since 2010. These prominent individuals sincerely believed in the benefits of the HS concept and worked as its intellectual champions, promoters and guarantors. Through their activities in the UN and elsewhere internationally, they put HS on the agenda of various UN bodies, the World Bank and many regional (development) organisations. In their efforts to spread the concept outside the UN system, they also gave public speeches[9] and authored extensive publications (Annan 1998; Ogata – Cels 2003).

In sum, over the last few decades, the UN system has become a space for the co-production of both knowledge and practice about human security. It has also been the main driving force behind the circulation of the HS idea. UN bodies have brought together UN technocrats, NGO representatives and scholars from around the world (CHS 2003). In doing so, they have created a transnational space for experts who produce policy-oriented HS knowledge and share the HS concept beyond the UN system. The UN has become an organisation working at the threshold of change; as such, it has straddled the shifting divide between science in the making and politics in the making. The resulting framework provides a lens through which we can make sense of human experience in a complex world (St Clair 2006). In just a few years, we have seen the establishment of a whole network of HS-engaged bodies, units, commissions, groups and advisory panels and the emergence of many associated visionaries and bureaucrats. The United Nations now houses the most robust and comprehensive system of

8 Sadako Ogata also served as president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a Japanese development assistance body, between 2003 and 2011. This background sheds light on Japan's role as one of the forces behind the human security concept. See also the section of this article on state-led HS action.

9 Major speeches by HS champions include the following: Sadako Ogata: "Human Security: a Refugee Perspective." Keynote speech by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the "Lysoen Process" Group of Governments. Bergen, Norway, 19 May 1999. <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/990519.htm>; "Bridging the G8 Kyushu--Okinawa Summit and the UN Millennium Summit: Enabling People to Live in Security." Keynote speech at the International Symposium on Human Security hosted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tokyo, 28 July 2000;
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Amartya Sen: "Why Human Security." Presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security hosted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tokyo, 28 July 2000;
Yukio Takasu: "Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalised World." Ulan-Bator, Mongolia, 8 May 2000, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html>;
"Toward Effective Cross-Sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World." Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow. Bangkok, Thailand, 19 June 2000, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html>

human security bodies, practices, tools and strategies, all of which reproduce the idea of HS both within and beyond the UN (for more details, see United Nations (2009), which describes a human security-related field mission). Significantly, this is a self-perpetuating system, which relies on the self-justifying use of humanitarian language and notions of "people in need."

The academy

The academic world is a second space where the human security idea has found a home and been spread and reproduced. Scholars and universities are typically understood to be sources of expertise and located outside policy-making circles. This gives them the legitimacy to elevate certain issues. In general, they are understood as producers of expert knowledge and forces behind its circulation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, HS was not the product of an epistemic community in the Haasian-Adlerian sense (Adler – Haas 1992). Rather it was an idea and policy approach which, as we have seen, was explicated in a 1994 UNDP report and in HS research over subsequent years. Within a short time, the academic world was flooded with HS research (Figure 2) and scholars struggled to analyse, understand, theorise, measure, map and criticise HS and debate its disciplinary placement. HS has been discussed as a specific category in border studies (Martin – Owen 2013), a key concept in security studies (Williams 2013), a better way to conceptualise human development (Sen 1999) and a strategic foreign policy instrument (Suhrke 1999). Scholars have also paid attention to human security policy. Publications have, thus, addressed HS's role in a wide range of issues including the 1999 ban on landmines (Adachi 2005); the 2008 ban on cluster munition; steps taken to establish the International Criminal Court in 1998 and 2002 (Rutherford – Brew – Matthew 2003); new approaches to security sector reform and the foreign policy of middle powers.[10] Across a variety of disciplines, the academic community has shown its fascination with the HS concept, which has been seen as a marker of progress in human-oriented policies. This HS optimism has also prompted academic undertakings: new journals and new research teams and groups have been established; new maps and indices of human (in)security have been produced (see, for example, the Failed States Index, the Human Security Index and the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index); old indexes such as the Human Development Index have been revised and new research reports have been written (the *Human Security Reports* are a key example). HS has quickly established itself as a policy-oriented field of study which is supported by some governments (Japan, Canada and Norway

10 There is an almost endless list of research of this kind. Some authors have analysed specific HS initiatives and the role of individual states in these projects. These studies sometimes focus on the place of middle powers in the new world order. Other writers query whether the HS concept has produced a new foreign policy identity for old middle powers in the new era of world politics.

have all offered HS-based research grants) as well as think-tanks and international organisations particularly the UN and the EU (see Figure 1).

A close analysis of the academic dissemination and reproduction of the HS idea highlights the importance of two sites in these processes: policy-oriented research centres and universities. A number of universities in Europe, the United States and Japan have established HS degree programmes (for a sample list, see Appendix 1). The UN University particularly has provided intensive support for HS university education. UNU assisted with the creation of HS degree programmes in countries like Germany, Japan, Costa Rica and Togo, and it helped include HS courses or modules in the educational curricula in several other countries (Szarzynski 2018). These HS degree programmes have mushroomed even as the influence of HS has waned in the policy space. Education is generally understood as an investment in human capital, and in the context of the HS agenda, it has been seen as a way to strengthen human security (Sen 2002). Education is also important for the diffusion of ideas; it has been shown to substantially affect preferences, behaviour and values (Nelles 2006; Ravetz 1996) and may also help or hinder the acceptance of new ideas and norms, which are key for our formation of "cognitive maps" (Axelrod 1976). Individuals educated within the same institution(s) form cohorts or like-minded groups as shared educational experiences give rise to personal networks. Education, thus, helps elites consolidate their power and can influence shared visions of societal development.

The research space is another site where the human security concept has been shared and reproduced. During the second half of the 1990s, an epistemic community emerged which had an overriding conviction about HS's importance and the need for its promotion. Members included the scholars Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, Amartya Sen, Sabine Alkire, Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. Among the milestones in their work were the establishment of two research centres: the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics and the Human Security Research Project at the Liu Institute at the University of British Columbia. In a short time, each of these institutes became a support base for academic advisors who were prominent in HS-related policy-making. Kaldor, Alkire, Martin and many others genuinely believed in the benefits of bringing HS into politics; they were active in policy debates and urged policy-makers to take the HS concept seriously (e.g. Kaldor 2007; LSE n.d.b). They prepared a number of advisory reports for the UN, UNESCO, UNDP and the EU and authored various policy papers, articles and speeches on HS. What linked all this work was its representation of HS as a strategy to face new threats and a tool to strengthen the UN and the EU (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004; Kaldor – Martin – Selchow 2007).

One particularly interesting development in this regard has been the engagement of scholars from the global South in HS research. The inclusion of these

scholars was supported widely within the UN system by way of special grants and invitations to attend workshops and conferences and join expert bodies (Hossain – Abiodun 2015; UNESCO 2018). These measures aimed to increase HS expertise in the UN system through the incorporation of the lived experiences of these scholars. At the same time, they were meant to empower scholars from disadvantaged countries.

Figure 2: Number of academic articles on human security published between 1993 and 2017



Source: Author based on data from EBSOhost and JSTOR. All data was retrieved from EBSCOhost or JSTOR based on a search of academic peer-reviewed journals for all disciplines. The publication period was from 1993 to 2017. Articles appearing in both databases were only counted once. The criterion for inclusion was the presence of the phrase "human security" in the article title, abstract or keywords.

Note: The graph includes 49 articles about HS that were published in 2004. Of these, 21 were one-page responses featured in the following work: "Comments by 21 Authors. What Is 'Human Security?'" Security Dialogue 35(3) (September 2004): 34 –387.

In recent years, both research and publications about HS seem to have been in decline. This is evident from a search of entries in the JSTOR or EBSCOhost databases where the number of HS-related publications has decreased (Figure 2); the same trend was revealed in an earlier study that drew on data from Google Search and Lexis-Nexis to analyse the use of the phrase "human security" (Krause 2013). Other signs may include the closure of relevant university study programmes (this applies, for example, to Simon Fraser University and the University of British Columbia) and the transformation of HS research centres

(in 2017, the LSE's Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit was, thus, renamed the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit). Some study programmes have also been renamed. These developments may reflect changes in world politics in the post-9/11 period. Rather than prolonging seemingly endless debates on the conceptualisation of HS, scholars have shifted their gaze to emerging phenomena such as the security-development nexus and security sector reform.

All in all, we can see that shortly after 1994, scholars and university instructors began to actively share the HS idea, and the academic world was a key site where the concept was reproduced. Scholars published HS-related articles not only in academic journals (Figure 2) but also in newspapers. Many also worked as policy advisors and research-activists who helped policy-makers find the right way to interpret and implement the HS framework. Meanwhile universities reproduced human security discourse through education. Education, a discursive construction of social reality, became important for the fostering and production of HS scholars, bureaucrats and advisors. In their approach to HS, however, these same universities began to steer too close to what Agnew (2007) has called the "religious approach to knowledge in general, that is the creation of like-thinking communities based on [a] transcendental conviction." In the new millennium, "crises of human security" (Martin – Owen 2010) and the declining interest of policy-makers in the idea (including the closure of special grant systems) have naturally affected the research community. Human security has lost its appeal and significance for researchers. Nevertheless the HS framework survives and continues to be reproduced through the education system (see Appendix 1). Education is a long-term undertaking and programmes cannot be changed every year. Human security rhetoric also appeals to open-minded young people with broad interests who are seeking careers in international institutions. This is precisely the group of students that universities wish to attract.

The NGO world

During the 1990s, state borders blurred, a number of governments were weakened and non-state actors – particularly NGOs – began to play a bigger role. This transformation was apparent both in the academy and in the policy-making sector. Academic interest in NGOs rose exponentially, especially in the area of conflict resolution and across global civil society (see, for example, Aall 1996; Abiew – Keating 2004; Paffenholz – Spurk 2006).[11] Policy-makers, and especially those in some intellectual circles, promoted the participation of NGOs in world

11 Also revealing in this context is the *Global Civil Society Handbook*, which was edited by Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor and is currently available through the LSE website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-civil-society/past-programmes/global-civil-society-yearbook. Between 2001 and 2012, the yearbook was published by the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, which became the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in 2017.

diplomacy and particularly humanitarian, development and post-conflict issues (Rutherford – Brew – Matthew 2003).

NGOs had a different role in the dissemination and reproduction of the HS idea to the one played by scholars, teachers and universities. Key non-governmental organisations (for example, Oxfam, Mines Action Canada, Coalition to Ban Landmines, International Alert, Human Rights Watch and Norwegian People's Aid, to give a random sample) did not participate in the debates around HS's conceptualisation and disciplinary placement or its significance in transforming security studies and mapping. Nevertheless, they helped make HS a policy trend. In other words, these NGOs actively attempted to translate the HS idea into practice. They participated extensively in campaigns to ban landmines, cluster munition and the illegal trade in blood diamonds (the Kimberley process). At the same time, they supported the establishment of the International Criminal Court and had wide-reaching roles in programmes to assist child soldiers and women in armed conflict situations and in policies on gender empowerment among other issues. In this way, these NGOs became crucial partners of the UN, EU and states such as Japan, Canada and Norway (for more details, see, for example, Rutherford – Brew – Matthew 2003; Adachi 2005; Cluster Munition Monitor 2010). Within the UN and the EU, NGOs were chosen to be partners in implementing HS initiatives in territories with weak and dysfunctional governments. New platforms bringing together NGOs, states and other internationally engaged actors were established under the banner of human security. These initiatives included the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (2001) (known since 2003 as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts Secretariat), the Confederation for Cooperation of Relief and Development NGOs (2003), the Japan Platform and the Japan NGO Unit (2000).

To sum up, NGOs made wide-ranging efforts to popularise HS as a policy approach and they lobbied policy-makers in its name. For these NGOs, the growing acceptance of the HS idea opened the door to the UN, the EU and countries that were fans of the concept including Canada and Japan. At the same time, these developments brought NGOs closer to like-minded policy-makers and enabled them to access new funds and connect different issues (among the typically linked-up topics were demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration, and global environmental change and security). Nevertheless, for many NGOs, HS was not the fascinating topic or legitimising tool that it was for academics and some international organisations. It was rather a framework that came and went. These NGOs proceeded as usual, carrying out the same activities as they did under humanitarian, development and human rights (or other) banners.

State-led action

A fourth space from which the human security idea has trickled down to different parts of the world and into the realm of world politics has been state foreign policy. The foreign policies of several states have reproduced the concept effectively. Moreover, during the second half of the 1990s, they played the most important role in the rise and reproduction of the HS approach (Waisová 2003). The HS concept, as presented in the 1994 UNDP statement, would most likely have gone unnoticed if several countries had not seized on it and made it a foreign policy priority. Countries which contributed to the concept's dissemination and popularity included Austria, Chile, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Switzerland. Another three countries – Canada, Norway and Japan – played an even more instrumental role. While Ottawa and Oslo were prominent promoters of the HS framework in the second half of the 1990s, Tokyo picked up the baton at the beginning of the new millennium.

For Canada, Norway and Japan (and like-minded countries), HS became the key conceptual tool for addressing the growing incidence of civil conflicts around the world and their human costs. It was also a label that legitimised particular humanitarian initiatives (Chandler 2008; Suhrke 2014). Canada and Norway sponsored and worked intensively on the HS agenda both within and outside the UN system. They used the concept to attain important outcomes through the International Criminal Court including assistance to the victims of war crimes and bans on landmines and cluster munition. They also drew on it to launch several UN resolutions on assistance to women and children in armed conflict situations. In 1999, they jointly initiated the Human Security Network, a group of more than ten countries which aimed to spread the HS idea in the international political sphere (Waisová 2003).

Japan was involved in HS work from the mid-1990s, and the concept became one of its top foreign policy priorities at the end of that decade. Nevertheless the country was not a member of the Human Security Network. Instead it went its own way, channelling its HS interest through UN bodies. Japan was a major sponsor of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and it supported the creation of the Commission on Human Security and appointment of a UN Secretary General Special Advisor on Human Security. It was also the founder and main donor to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. In 2006, Japan instigated and sponsored an informal forum called "Friends of Human Security." The goal of this group of like-minded members was to "discuss the concept of human security from different angles in order to seek a common understanding of human security and explore collaborative efforts" (MFAJ 2016). Although it was never officially stated, Friends of Human Security was meant to replace Human Security Network, which had ceased to be active.

It should be stressed here that the efforts to make HS a top foreign policy in Canada, Norway and Japan were highly personalised. The promoters and driving forces behind the concept's dissemination were Lloyd Axworthy (the Canadian foreign minister between 1996 and 2000), Knut Vollebaek (the Norwegian foreign minister between 1997 and 2000) and Obuchi Keizo (between 1997 and 2000, the Japanese foreign minister and then prime minister). These individuals spread the idea of HS at home and abroad (Bosold – Werthes 2005; Axworthy et al. 2014; Edström 2011). However, in democratic politics, the logic of elections inevitably holds sway, and when these three leaders left their offices, support for the HS agenda waned.

It was also evident that for Ottawa, Oslo as well as Tokyo, HS activities were not just an expression of humanitarianism but a way to gain something more from international politics. For Canada and Norway, HS was the key which opened the door to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (for Canada from 1999 to 2000 and for Norway from 2001 to 2002). At the same time, it provided a path to a stronger "middle-power" image and a way to win new partners and more influence in world politics. Put otherwise, HS was a tool for achieving national strategic priorities (Suhrke 1999, 2014). For Japan, the concept offered a way to become an Asian leader in what might be called the politics of goodness and gain credit as a good world citizen. It also reinforced the country's identity as a civilian power to be contrasted with China, whose influence was rising (Edström 2011).

A critical analysis of the troika of states engaged in HS promotion makes clear that today this activism has lost its force. Canada and Norway abandoned the HS ship shortly into the new millennium and Japan's involvement has fallen off since 2009. When reflecting on the waning popularity of the HS concept, we should also bear in mind international developments since the end of the 1990s. The international political scene has been challenged by a number of major transformations: the financial crisis has weakened donors and the global war on terror has made humanitarian language less appealing. Meanwhile interventionism based on humanitarian arguments has been called into question and the Responsibility-to-Protect doctrine cast aside. Development agencies that were once typical HS promoters are now tangled up in security questions including the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism agenda (Waisová 2010). In this context, as several authors have noted (Martin – Owen 2010; Krause 2013; Suhrke 2014), Canada and Norway have not only lost interest in human security, but erased their trails of HS activity; HS documents and articles have been removed from government websites and bodies formerly responsible for HS policies have been wound up or renamed. While other commentators (MacLean 2009) are less sceptical and argue that HS has been eliminated at a rhetorical level but remains very much present in practice, the rapid decline of both Canadian and Norwegian HS engagement is clear. In

contrast, Japan's HS involvement has not decreased as sharply but its political, organisational and financial support has petered out. Today, even tracing the history of some HS policy initiatives led by erstwhile supporters and Human Security Network "members" can be challenging because of their silence about their former activities.

Overall, it is clear that state-led action played a significant role in spreading the human security concept among world political actors. This action occurred both within and outside the UN framework. Over the last few years, however, HS has lost its privileged position in state-led action: the Human Security Network has ceased to exist and its website and several projects it supported have also disappeared.[12] The troika of HS-promoting states and other members of the Human Security Network such as Austria and the Netherlands have terminated their HS projects and no longer support the idea.[13] Friends of Human Security, the platform supported by Japan, never found the widespread support enjoyed by the Human Security Network. Today, HS survives as a buzzword and policy framework for only a few states. Latvia and Chile have, for example, drawn on the concept to present their social development and democratisation goals; Switzerland applies the HS norm to connect different humanitarian agendas.[14] In general, however, states have abandoned the space once occupied by the human security agenda: none are promoting the idea and there is no interest in reproducing it.

Conclusion

In the second half of the 1990s, a tsunami of human security-related activity swept through the UN system, foreign policy agendas and the NGO community as well as the academic world. HS was seen as a unique and innovative post-Cold War era tool for managing the new security environment. How did HS become such a vital concept? Who promoted it and what methods did they use? How was the idea reproduced in world politics? These are the issues that I have analysed in this article. I have examined the institutional and historical dynamics and driving forces behind the dissemination and reproduction of the HS concept as well as the roles of various agents in these activities. In keeping with the structure of this analysis, this conclusion is presented in two stages:

12 Those projects include the *HS Bulletin*, which was published by the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, and the Human Security Gateway, a database of HS-related research and information.

13 This shift can be seen, for example, from the absence of recent human security projects including publications on the European Training and Research Centre for Human Democracy (ETC Graz) website: http://www.etc-graz.at/typo3/index.php?id=103.

14 For more information, see the Human Security Divison of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs: https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/eda/en/home/fdfa/organisation-fdfa/directorates-divisions/directorate-political-affairs/hsd.html.

first I evaluate the observations concerning each of the spheres addressed and then I consider the interplay between these spaces.

Examining the UN system shows us that the UN was the place where the human security idea was born. It was also the key institutional platform used to promote, disseminate and reproduce the HS concept at global level. Given the UN's complex institutional structure and agenda and its efforts to find effective new instruments to manage post-Cold War humanitarian crises, it was a unique environment for the reproduction of the HS concept. This was an ideal space from which the idea could trickle down into politics. The UN became a space for the co-production of knowledge and practice. After the original innovative potential of HS was exhausted, however, UN bureaucrats were left with only a shadow of their former agenda. Today HS bodies, boards, units, funds and commissions still technically exist, but many of them have vague agendas, and the concept is less effective within the UN system. Instead, it is associated with missions and projects that are rehashed in endless workshops, conferences, summer schools and programmes, and it features in hollow declarations and past resolutions (e.g. declarations on the Responsibility to Protect) which are not used or only applied selectively. Many missions and projects have a title that combines "human security" with other issues, but the phrase could very easily be replaced with "humanitarian," "human rights," "development" or "counter-insurgency" depending on the project goal. As a concept, HS seems to have been hollowed out. Over the last few years, it has become an empty phrase within the UN system and a tool for the self-preservation and self-justification of certain bureaucratic bodies and technical structures.

Analysing the academic world reveals that scholars and universities are not very different from UN staff when it comes to their capacity for critical self-reflection. While academics can incorporate new problems into their research, it may take them a long time to move on from a research project (this has also been my experience in carrying out this study). In fact, the human security concept gave social science scholars unprecedented access to and influence in policy-making circles. Scholars became intellectual sponsors of the concept. This new cadre of consultants, transnational advisors and researcher-activists spoke authoritatively on behalf of the UN, the EU and state supporters of HS and, thus, legitimised their policies. The alliance between scholars and policy-makers rose to a new level when the political establishment provided special funds for the establishment of university HS research units and centres. Several prominent scholars settled into high-level advisory or managerial positions. The peak of this frenzy produced a wave of HS degree programmes at universities. The transnational dissemination of HS as certified knowledge took place through research publications, research grants and policy consultancies along with HS education for those wishing to work "internationally [...] and look for [...] careers in NGOs, government aid organizations, UN organizations and

private consultancy firms that administer and implement development and disaster aid" (Aarhus University n.d.). While a number of non-Western states were resistant to HS ideas and practices (Acharya 2001; UNESCO 2008), the concept attracted scholars from Africa, Asia and other non-Western regions and it featured in their research (see, for example, Acharya 2001; Hossain – Abiodun 2015; UNESCO 2008). Writing on these matters gave these scholars the chance to become part of an international HS epistemic community, obtain research grants from international institutions and join international consultancy, expert and research groups. For the groups and bodies in question, the inclusion of members from high-risk regions that lacked human security was a self-legitimising and self-authorising move. When the interest in HS dissipated in policy circles, both the demand for HS scholarship and the financial resources for HS research and publications declined. Naturally, the academic world reflected changes in world politics, and new problems such as the global war on terror and counter-insurgency rose to the top of the academic agenda.

An assessment of the NGO community's relationship with the human security framework shows that NGOs were only touched by the concept in a limited way. NGOs were involved in some HS-related activities but they did not set out to spread the concept; any such dissemination was just a side effect. Initially, NGOs were not particularly interested in HS. This was partly because of the traditional associations between "security" and state institutions and international security organisations. It was also because debates about HS's conceptualisation went beyond the NGOs' sphere of interest. They had no special need for the HS approach and were content with using terms like "humanitarian," "human rights," "poverty," "underdevelopment" and "empowerment" to frame their activities. Later, the NGO community joined in the advocacy for various human security-based measures such as the ban on landmines. "Human security" was used as a way to identify projects that aimed to help people rather than states. It was also meant to highlight projects that integrated competing agendas for the sake of better coordination and cooperation, whether strategically or in the field.

Turning to state-led action, it is clear that three states – Canada, Japan and Norway – were the driving forces behind the rise and reproduction of the human security concept. Ironically, the territoriality of states made it inevitable that however innovative and attractive the HS idea was, they could not absorb its deterritorialising agenda. Canada, Japan and Norway adopted the concept selectively and in ways that reflected their own foreign policy culture and goals. In all three states, we may conclude that the HS approach was used to help people in need while also pursuing national strategic priorities. Each country had its own version of HS, which it spread and reproduced thorugh particular policy projects. Today, in contrast, human security is not a foreign policy priority for any of these states. Nevertheless, as in the NGO community, HS-based practices have not disappeared entirely from foreign policy. These practices are simply

framed differently – for example, as "human rights," "security-development nexus" or "whole-of-government" initiatives. Martin and Owen (2010) describe this change as the rise of "second generation human security."

As we have seen, two institutional spaces were responsible for the dissemination and reproduction of human security as a concept and policy approach: the United Nations and state foreign policy departments in Canada, Japan and Norway. The academic world reflected all the ups and downs of HS-based practices and served mainly as a space for the circulation and reproduction of HS as knowledge. Scholars spoke authoritatively on behalf of clients like the UN and the EU and universities generated (and continue to produce) elite groups of HS bureaucrats. While it may not have been completely intentional, a mutually beneficial relationship seems to have arisen between UN technocrats and universities. This relationship continues to provide the UN with a particular humanitarian agenda, bodies and personnel; it also gives universities a ready customer for the research and human capital they produce.

When reflecting on the spread of the human security concept, the key role of several distinguished individuals cannot be ignored. Kofi Annan, Lloyd Axworthy, Mary Kaldor, Amartya Sen, Sadako Ogata and Knut Vollebaek each conveyed the HS message in a unique way. As they "travelled" between political positions and international or academic offices, they brought the HS agenda with them. The long-term engagement of these individuals was crucial for the establishment of particular systems of institutional dissemination.

In conclusion, over the last three decades, we have seen a major investment of time, enthusiasm and funds in human security-related infrastructure, projects and institutions. Combined with the significant personal involvement of policy-makers and scholars, this has led to the institutionalisation of a HS industry and the professionalisation of a technocratic managerial elite which maintains HS within the UN system. Despite this trend, the idea of HS is now ailing. It has been replaced by alternative frameworks such as environmental peacebuilding and the security-development nexus. At least for now, these are proving to be more alluring.

Appendix 1: List of universities where HS can be studied within a degree programme (random sample ordered alphabetically by country name)

Country	University	Department(s)	Programme title	Degree
Canada	Royal Roads University	Humanitarian Studies	HS and Peacebuilding	MA
Costa Rica	University for Peace	N/A	HS	MA
Denmark	Aarhus University	Culture and Society; Anthropology; Bioscience (Danish Centre for Food and Agriculture, Danish Centre for Environment and Energy)	HS	MA
Germany	University of Bonn	Jointly organised by the Department of Geography and the UN University in Bonn	Geography of Environmental Risks and HS	M.Sc.
Japan	University of Tokyo, Komaba	Five departments of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (Language and Information Sciences, Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies, Area Studies, Advanced Social and International Studies and Multi-Disciplinary Sciences)	Graduate Programme in HS	MA, PhD
Japan	Tohoku University	Graduate Schools in Agricultural Science, Medicine, International Cultural Studies and Environmental Studies	International Joint Educational Programme in HS	PhD
Japan	Kyoto University	Urban Human Security Engineering Education and Research Center	Integrated Engineering stream: HS and Engineering	MA, PhD summer schools
Spain	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona	Public Law and Legal History Studies (offered in collaboration with Universitat del Mediterraneo di Reggio Calabria and Universidad UMASS Lowell de Boston)	HS and Global Law	PhD
Togo	University of Lomé	Programme supported by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research and the UN University	Climate Change and HS	MA
UK	University of East London	School of Social Sciences	Conflict, Displacement and HS	MA
USA	Tufts University	Fletcher School (Institute of HS)	Certificate in HS	BA, MA, PhD

USA	University of Bridgeport	College of Public and International Affairs	Criminal Justice and HS	BA MA
USA	University of Baltimore	N/A	Global Affairs and HS	MA
USA	University of Pittsburg	Graduate School of Public and International Affairs	International Development with a HS major	MA
USA	Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University	N/A	HS and Resilience	M.S.
USA	University of Massachusetts	McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies	Global Governance and HS	PhD

Source: Author based on individual university websites[15]

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University for Peace (https://www.upeace.org/academic/academic-departments/peace-and-conflict--studies/international-peace-studies);
Aarhus University (http://kandidat.au.dk/en/humansecurity/);
University of Bonn (https://www.uni-bonn.de/studying/international-students/international-degree--programs/natural-sciences-and-mathematics/copy_of_master2019s-program-in-computer-science);
University of Tokyo (http://www.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eng_site/info/academics/grad/programs/hsp/);
Tohoku University (http://www.human-security.tohoku.ac.jp/);
Kyoto University (http://hse.gcoe.kyoto-u.ac.jp/);
University of Barcelona (http://www.uab.cat/web/postgraduate/phds/all-phd-programmes/general--information/human-security-and-global-law-1345467765430.html?param2=1345674114472);
University of Lomé (http://www.wascal.org/graduate-programmes/climate-change-and-human-security/);
University of East London (https://www.uel.ac.uk/postgraduate/ma-conflict-displacement-and-human--security);
Tufts University (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Academic/Courses/Fields-of-Study/Human-Security);
University of Bridgeport (http://www.bridgeport.edu/academics/undergraduate/criminal-justice-and--human-security-b/);
University of Baltimore (http://www.ubalt.edu/cpa/graduate-programs-and-certificates/degree--programs/global-affairs-and-human-security/);
University of Pittsburg (http://www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu/);
Embry-Riddle University (https://erau.edu/degrees/master/human-security-resilience/)
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REVIEW

Havlík, Vlastimil – Hloušek, Vít – Kaniok, Petr. *Europeanised Defiance – Czech Euroscepticism since 2004*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2017. ISBN 978-3-8474-2092-7, 199 pages.

MARTINA MUDRÍKOVÁ[1]

Europeanised Defiance – Czech Euroscepticism since 2004 is a case study of sources, development and changing attitudes in the Euroscepticism adopted by popular and political figures in the Czech Republic. While Euroscepticism has a strong presence in the Czech Republic, it includes a broad range of positions. The authors of this volume introduce the notion of the "Europeanisation of Euroscepticism." Their hypothesis is that since the country's EU accession, the nature of its Euroscepticism has changed. Since 2004, Czech political parties have strengthened their international connections. The Czech critique of European integration has become more pronounced and its focus has extended beyond typical Czech Eurosceptical concerns. As such, this book argues that since EU accession, Czech Euroscepticism has moved closer to the general "mainstream" pattern of Euroscepticism.

This thesis is expanded as follows: In the first two chapters, Havlík, Hloušek, and Kaniok provide an introduction that clarifies key concepts and the main features of their research strategy. They also explain the criteria for their choice of key figures in Czech Euroscepticism. The focus here is on representatives of popular and intellectual Euroscepticism and the major Eurosceptical political parties. The third chapter turns to the historical foundations of Czech Euroscepticism. The famous post-November 1989 call for a "return to Europe" has been replaced by disillusionment over complex pre-accession demands. This situation has made space for different attitudes to the EU among political actors. Before the Czech

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EU accession, the sources of the Eurosceptical narrative were largely domestic and included, for example, the historical legacy of the Sudeten German situation.

The next four chapters explore Euroscepticism in the public sphere and among political actors. The authors use different research strategies to analyse how these entities' Eurosceptical behaviour has become more Europeanised. In the case of popular Euroscepticism, it is clear that after ten years of Czech EU membership, the influences on public attitudes to the EU are the same as those in other member states. Concerning political parties, the analysis includes both longstanding and more recent Eurosceptical groups. Since EU accession, Eurosceptical parties in the Czech Republic have focused increasingly on European integration. The same Europeanising trend is noticeable in the growing cooperation of these parties with their respective partners at EU level. On the other hand, the basic positions of Czech Eurosceptical parties towards the EU have not changed significantly based on their parties' performance at European level. The authors also address prominent Eurosceptical Czech intellectuals. A standard content analysis of their publications shows that adherence to mainstream Euroscepticism has risen considerably. Leading figures in the Czech Eurosceptical debate become Europeanised most often by incorporating Western European issues and authors into their work. A final point of interest is the performance of Eurosceptical Czech ministers in the Council of the EU. The analysis focuses specifically on the frequency and nature of negative voting by the Czech government at the working and ministerial levels of the Council. The main finding is that the Czech government's attitude to the EU has not significantly affected its decision-making in the Council. The Czech Republic is by no means a leading dissenter; rather, Czech ministers follow general behavioural trends in the Council. In this regard, Czech Euroscepticism is primarily a strategic tool for domestic political competition. The last chapter considers the research questions formulated at the beginning of the book. Overall, Europeanisation is confirmed to some degree for all the chosen Eurosceptical Czech actors, with the exception of Eurosceptical ministers within the Council of the EU. The nature of Czech Euroscepticism has evolved somewhat since the country's EU accession. Eurosceptical actors have abandoned nation-specific issues and transformed themselves so that they are closer to the European Eurosceptical mainstream.

A couple of points should be made finally. The idea of Europeanised Euroscepticism may seem slightly paradoxical at first glance. What is important is that the authors have shown that their new conceptual framework is viable for the Czech Republic and worthy of further attention. By its nature, a single case study does not allow for the generalisation of conclusions to other post-communist EU members. On the other hand, confirming the growing Europeanisation of Eurosceptical actors in the Czech Republic may be seen as the first step for a broader analysis of the changing Eurosceptical narrative in post-communist EU member states.

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Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

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