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# **POLITICS**

## **in Central Europe**

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# ESSAYS



# Patterns of the Parliamentary Debates: How Deliberative are Turkish Democratic Opening Debates?

ÇIĞDEM GÖRGÜN AKGÜL AND MUSA AKGÜL



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**Abstract:** This study attempts to measure the deliberation quality of the Democratic Opening Debates in the Turkish Parliament through the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). The majority of studies have been conducted on the deliberation quality of relatively homogenised and developed Western societies and on less conflictual or contentious topics. In these countries, democratic culture has been institutionalised. On the contrary, Turkey is a developing country and has been going through an ethnic conflict involving violence for many decades. Thus, this case study aims to make an original contribution to empirical deliberation studies. Researchers have examined the 88-page stenographic records of the Democratic Opening Debates and put forward a DQI score. According to the findings, the controversial debates fulfill only 40% of high-level deliberative discourse ethics. This result demonstrates that the ideal deliberation process does not exist in Turkey even though a convenient atmosphere is created for deliberations by means of official procedures. Ethnic division in the society has a profoundly negative impact on the quality of deliberations.

**Keywords:** *Deliberation, Discourse Ethics, Discourse Quality Index, Turkish Parliament, Democratic Opening, Divided Societies.*

## Introduction

Since the 1990s, when democratic theory took a deliberative turn, there has been a growing interest in deliberative practices in which citizens resolve their differences through dialogue rather than voting (Dryzek, 2002). Decision-making

processes need an approximation of pluralised opinions through deliberation because today's societies get more pluralised and face more complex issues. It forms a holistic mechanism of decision making to handle social issues via deliberative democracy methods. The parties of a debate need to persuade each other by rational arguments. In this respect, deliberative theorists agree that political conduct through communicative means can overcome the fragmentation and stratification that characterise modern life (Habermas 1991; Gutmann and Thompson 1998).

A significant number of empirical studies have tried to summarise the convenient conditions under which the deliberative action can emerge in the context of non-violent political antagonism (O'Flynn 2007; Steiner, 2012; Ugarriza and Caluwaerts, 2014). Researchers assert that participants will be pushed to act respectfully as a result of a convenient institutional design. In this way, they will be able to convince one another through well-justified and consensus-oriented action proposals. These studies show that formal deliberations guided by open rules and for which free participation is provided make a good example of a deliberation that leads deliberators to consensus (Fishkin and Luskin 2005).

The majority of this empirical data about deliberation is gathered from deliberations in the informal public sphere that ensure direct participation of civil society and citizens in discussions about topics of public importance (Felicetti et al. 2016; Stela 2014; Fishkin 1997; Pedrini 2014). However, deliberations that take place in parliaments are not studied as much (Bachtiger and Steenbergen 2004; Lord and Tamvaki 2013; Steiner et al. 2005; Steiner 2012). Many political scientists question whether a real deliberation can occur in parliaments as they are institutions for voting, rather than gathering information and reconciling (Rasch 2011; Bachtiger, 2014). Contrary to this opinion, prominent deliberative theorists argue that parliaments are an important deliberation space to legitimise decisions and unify the public (Habermas 2015). For this reason, Habermas (2005: 389) claims that the parliament deliberation sits at the very centre of deliberative politics.

Accordingly, this study analyses the deliberative quality of the Democratic Opening Debates in the Turkish Parliament (TP), held on 13 November 2009. The case choice aims to provide original contribution to empirical deliberation studies because most of them have been conducted in relatively more homogeneous Western societies where liberal democracies have been institutionalised<sup>1</sup> and on less conflictual or contentious issues that do not include violence (Bachtiger et al. 2008; Lord and Tamvaki 2013; Himmelroos 2020). On the other hand, the Democratic Opening Debates of Turkey took place in a highly controversial and divisive atmosphere. The Democratic Opening indeed

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1 It is claimed that a positive correlation has formed in the light of Western democracies between high development and income level and democracy and that this situation makes high-level deliberation possible in the pluralist structure of the society by reliving social conflict (Azmanova 2011).

caused a serious polarisation among the political elites from the first time it was brought up. Opposition parties accused the government of betraying the homeland and dividing the country.<sup>2</sup> Ethnic dividedness and the accompanying conflict and terror environment that has surrounded Turkey make this research an original case study. In this way, this research will not only demonstrate the quality of deliberation in Turkey, but also test whether deliberative democracy can transform beliefs and behaviours of opposite sides in a violent conflict. Deliberation in the parliamentary context is assessed using the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). The DQI measures the equality of speakers in a debate, the level of justification, orientation towards the common good, respect or disrespect and constructive politics.

This study mainly comprises of four main sections. The first section is about the background of the Democratic Opening project initiated by the Turkish government in order to end the conflict between Turkey and the PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan / Kurdistan Workers' Party*) that has been going on for decades and to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. In this section, Turkish political parties' perspectives on the Opening process will be clarified for readers unfamiliar with the Turkish political party system. The second section will discuss how a high-quality deliberation can be defined by providing a theoretical framework. The authors have focused merely on deliberation tradition and discourse theory in a Habermasian sense. Works of prominent intellectuals, such as Foucault and Laclau, who had views opposing those to Habermas, will be mentioned as well. Then, how the discourse theory of Habermas differs from other discourse theories will be demonstrated and the reason for making a Habermasian discourse analysis will be explained. The third section is the method section, where the analysis units of the DQI will be introduced. Lastly, the research findings will be revealed via categories of the DQI one by one. These findings will be evaluated in terms of Turkish political party/political ideology to understand them better. The authors try to have more generalisable findings in the conclusion to contribute to academic discussions about the deliberation quality in highly polarised societies like Turkey.

## Background

The Turkish state and the PKK started 'secret deliberations' in Oslo (through backchannel communications) in 2005–2006 following a long lasting and bloody conflict. While exact numbers are unknown, various sources state that the conflict between Turkey and the PKK came at the cost of approximately forty

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2 For views of the CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, on the Opening, see: 'Baykal'dan Kürt açılımı açıklaması' (Hürriyet, 24. 08. 2009). For views of the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, see: 'Bahçeli: İhanet Projelerine Katkıda Bulunmamızı Beklemek Akıl Tutulması' (Milliyet, 29. 09. 2009).

thousand people's death, obligatory immigration of millions of people and 400 billion dollars over 30 years before the deliberations (Ünal 2016: 91). The situation was too costly and risky for both Turkey and the PKK, and neither of the parties could tolerate any further military struggle. While Turkey made efforts against it, the organisational structure of the PKK grew stronger. In 2007, the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK) was established by the PKK as a quasi-state structure to build a de facto autonomy in the long-run. Moreover, the PKK wanted to weaken Turkish state authority by continuing its regular terror attacks and targeting civilians, business people and public officials. Yet, the violence was repetitive with no effective results. The PKK was convinced that it would not be able to defeat the Turkish security forces. Even if the PKK was in an advantaged position regarding the Kurdish insurgency in the country, it was far from achieving its target of clearing the southeastern region from the authority of the Turkish state. As a result, both parties involved in the conflict found themselves locked in a state of mutually hurting stalemate (Ünal, 2016). So, something beyond military struggle was needed. Ultimately, the ruling party AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* / Justice and Development Party) came up with a novel way of dealing with the Kurdish question. This situation made the Democratic Opening process viable. Following various democratisation packages, Turkey entered into the process in 2009.

The Democratic Opening process was started with the aim of finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. In this regard, it was important in terms of institutionalising the democracy in the country and assuring its stability. However, the peace process would not lead to a solid resolution agreement between the two sides. The early meetings and deliberations generally revolved around constitutionally acknowledging/securing Kurdish rights. Yet, a sufficient effort towards social transformation and decreasing prejudice between the two sides was not made. Thus, the peace initiative remained fragile against daily domestic politics and regional issues from the very beginning. Then, the process collapsed in the summer of 2015 and armed conflict started again. The conflict is still ongoing today. It hurts the stability of Turkey and threatens its national security. Finally, it directly affects Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbours, such as Iraq and Syria, which have significant Kurdish populations.

A number of questions were raised regarding the process from the first moment it was initiated. Different opinions were put forward. Firstly, the AKP, which had had the parliamentary majority from 2002, was the initiator of the process. It aimed that the Kurdish question, which had until then been reduced merely and simply to 'PKK terror', be discussed with its different dimensions and that these discussions be recognised by the public (Şentürk 2012). The AKP stated that it wished to end the conflict, believing that the Kurdish ethnic nationalist movement did not represent the Kurds. This stance was highly related to the party's emphasis on the religious unity between the Kurds and Turks (Sarıgil

and Fazlıoğlu 2013: 560–561). In this context, the AKP positioned itself as the only actor that could resolve the issue within the scope of ‘the country’s unity, brotherhood law and citizenship law’. The AKP also used the process to criticise previous governments and the opposition party. To illustrate, it criticised the opposition parties with a series of accusations such as ‘abusing the Kurdish question, taking advantage of terror, disorder and chaos; preventing Turkey from becoming a major and strong country’ (Parlak and Öztürk 2015: 93).

When the Democratic Opening was announced, the main opposition party in the parliament was the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi / Republican Peoples’ Party). The CHP was a left-wing party mainly representing the secular and Kemalist voters in Turkey. While the CHP adopted an attitude in favour of resolving the issue, it heavily objected to the AKP undertaking the process single-handedly and to the way the process was managed. Led by Deniz Baykal, the CHP asserted that the process would lead to social separation rather than consolidation. It ruthlessly criticised that the content of the process was not clearly determined, that the process could not be socialised and that the government did not put forward its own concrete recommendations. Baykal even claimed that the Opening was planned by ‘certain foreign powers’ and the AKP was given the responsibility to manage it (CHP Group Meeting, 04. 08. 2009).

The MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* / Nationalist Movement Party), which was the second opposition party in the parliament, gave the harshest reaction to the Opening process. Representing the far-right and ultra-nationalist voters, the MHP denied the existence of a separate Kurdish identity and rigidly framed the Kurdish question over terror and ethnic separatism. It strongly opposed any possibility of deliberations towards the resolution of the Kurdish question. Therefore, the MHP accused the ruling AKP of ethnic separatism and asserted that the AKP was posing a threat to the national unity/security by establishing relations with the PKK (Bacık, 2011). In short, the main policy of the party was to protect the Turkish identity of the country and fight against any development that would undermine this.

Lastly, the pro-Kurdish DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* / Democratic Society Party) supported the deliberations, hoping that the Kurdish question could be resolved. It is known that the party members have organic ties to the PKK. The main position of the party during the Opening process was towards the recognition of Kurdish identity, gaining cultural rights, strengthening the political decentralisation and local administrations. In this context, the DTP stated that the primary interest of the sides was the resolution of the issue in a political / ‘peaceful’ manner.

In the light of this information, it can safely be said that the political parties in the Turkish parliament were highly divided regarding the Opening process. This division in the political sphere also spread over the public sphere. A study conducted by a research company, Metropol, showed that more than half of the

people (51.6%) did not support the Opening Process.<sup>3</sup> Also, a report prepared by KONDA in June 2011 is important to demonstrate the seriousness of the division among the ethnic groups. The report suggests that 57.6% of Turks do not want a Kurdish bride, 53.5% do not want a Kurdish business partner and 47.4% do not want a Kurdish neighbour. In return, 26.4% of Kurds disapproved of a Turkish bride, 24.8% disapproved of a Turkish business partner and 22.1% disapproved of a Turkish neighbour.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, according to the findings of a study conducted in İzmir in 2011, 40% of Turks stated that ‘what comes to their minds regarding Kurds is “ignorant, uneducated, rude, uncultured and backwards”’ while Kurds in return describe ‘Turks’ over nationalist adjectives (Ok 2011).

The Democratic Opening was first brought before the Speaker’s Office of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 3 November 2009 with the ‘motion regarding a general debate at the parliament on the democratic opening’ by then Prime Minister and the leader of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan stated in this motion that he wanted a debate to be set up not only to inform the parliament on the process of Democratic Opening but also to handle all aspects of the opening before the parliament and to call on the parliament’s contribution on the issue (GNAT Minutes, 03. 11. 2009: 742). The general debate request of the Prime Minister was accepted, and it was decided that pre-debates would take place on 10 November 2009. General debates of the Democratic Opening started on 13 November 2009. Speech times were determined to be 60 minutes for the government and political party groups, 30 minutes for the government as the motion owner and 10 minutes for individuals. Debates started at 13:00 and ended at 19:10 (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009).

## Theoretical Framework

As mentioned above, scholars who study deliberative democracy emphasise that it is possible to successfully deal with fragmentation and stratification through political conduct in a communicative way (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Dryzek 1990). However, there is very little consensus as to the proper form of this communication. Further, while discourse quality is significant in deliberation theory, a consensus is yet to be reached regarding what discourse is today. The fundamental contradiction of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is between two influential thinkers – Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas (Stahl 2004).

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3 For detailed information, see: Metropoll: Demokratik Açılım ve Darbe Araştırması: <http://www.metropoll.com.tr/arastirmalar/siyasi-arastirma-9/1597> Accessed: (28. 03. 2021).

4 For detailed information regarding this research, see: [http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011\\_06\\_KONDA\\_Kurt\\_Meselesinde\\_Algi\\_ve\\_Beklentiler.pdf](http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011_06_KONDA_Kurt_Meselesinde_Algi_ve_Beklentiler.pdf), Accessed: (28. 03. 2021).

Foucault defines discourse as ‘ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning’ (Foucault 1972: 49). Foucault puts forward that discourse is never independent from power relations. He thinks that discourse should not be conceived of as the product of an independent, sovereign and creative human mind. On the contrary, discourse is embedded in power and knowledge relations, and it forms out of these relations. This is because being able to use a discourse is the expression of knowledge possession from a specific area. Those who possess this knowledge can achieve dominance and control over those who do not possess it (Foucault 1980).

Laclau and Mouffe were highly influenced by the discourse theory of Foucault, as well. They theorise discourse mainly within the framework of the concept of hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe view the area of hegemony as one where different particularities, such as individualities, subjectivities and identities, coexist. A class is given its identity by its position in a hegemonic formation. In this regard, identity is not fixed or determined; it is completely relational. All objects came into being as discourse objects, and every discourse has a material dimension. Accordingly, there are no subjects, no fixed identities, no absolute interests that can be defined outside of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 2014). Discursive practices are the major tools for building interests and conducting politics. Therefore, according to Laclau and Mouffe, just like Foucault, ideological and political interests can only be established through discourse.

On the other hand, in the theoretical writings of Habermas, the concept of discourse is as central as in Foucault’s writings. *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), the most important work of Habermas, explains what discourse is and its function. According to the ‘communicative action theory’ of Habermas, individuals take part in a deliberation not only to realise their egocentric interests but also they are ready to agree on options for the common good. Thus, individuals can reach a settlement on a common good by making compromises of their own interests thanks to rational arguments. In this framework, the major goal of the individuals interacting with one another is consensus pursuant to their horizon and daily linguistic communication practice. Individuals who interact with this goal try to reach a consensus on a matter through explanations and comments put forward based on tradition and culture (Habermas 1981). Hence, in Habermas, discourse is no longer what people use when they fight for power, but it is a tool for consensus and persuasion. The quality of debate processes plays an important role in deliberation, and the goal is to ensure that debates are rational and ethical via various principles.

Action types are important indicators of the quality of a debate, and Habermas classifies action types into two groups, namely ‘strategic’ and ‘communicative’ action. In ‘strategic action’, the actor is interested in having others do

things as a way of achieving their own goals. This process is shaped by pressure and force. However, in ‘communicative action’, the actor cannot engage in authoritative action while getting others to accept norms. In ‘communicative action’, individuals’ acceptance of norms occurs through argumentation and persuasion. According to Habermas, argumentation is a speech form based on rationalist debate whereby debaters exchange messages on the basis of reciprocal claims and try to justify these claims in a rationalist way. Habermas thinks that if a proposal can be justified, it becomes valid and can be accepted. Individuals should have the tendency to admit their own mistakes when appropriate as well. Participants should be open to other ideas by taking others’ views into account and showing empathy towards them (Habermas 1981: 40–46, 385).

Many deliberative democrats argue that deliberation should be rational by considering the ‘communicative action theory’ of Habermas (Bohman, 1990; Warren, 2007). According to this model, ‘Type 1 Deliberation’, a good deliberation is characterised by several values such as putting forward claims, presenting evidence supporting these claims and assessing factual data against the claims. The primary goal of the model is to create an understanding between the parties and thus reach a settlement. In this sense, Type 1 deliberative democracy model signifies a systematic process.

In ‘Type 2 Deliberation’ model, on the other hand, emotions are more important for a good deliberation rather than rationality (Condit 1993; Fraser 1989; Mansbridge 1999). According to this model, emotions are significant in public deliberation because they reduce the exclusion that is inherent in many rational argumentation models and helps ensure participation. The principle that deliberation should rely on rational argumentation could lead to the exclusion of socially disadvantaged or marginalised groups that have different access to information, power and resources (Young 2001). So, this model of deliberation that relies less on rigid communicative norms is seen as more overarching and legitimate. Yet, its openness regarding limitless communication and being bound by fewer rules about the means of communication might make it more vulnerable to illegitimate claims and attempts to deform the communication. Especially in situations where discourse is marginalised and weakened, the focus on the common good might be replaced by more calculative and strategic aims. When there are fewer rules about communication, the criteria of truthfulness may be overlooked by the parties and it may turn into an attempt to mobilise the other party in accordance with one’s own aim (Rawl 2020; Dryzek, 2002; Bachtiger et al. 2010).

In the light of this information, the Habermasian deliberative democracy model (Type 1 Deliberation) is adopted in this study. It enables us to measure the level of deliberation empirically. A high-quality deliberation is assessed via the principles of free participation, respect towards the opposing group and the counter demand, rational argumentation, tendency for the common good and openness to change one’s view as a result of the strength of a better argument.



## Research Method

There are various techniques to measure the quality of deliberations. For instance, Holzinger tried to examine the level of discourse within the framework of quantitative research method. Examining the debates about waste management in a German settlement, Holzinger distinguished between two aspects of the deliberation process: ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiation’. According to Holzinger (2004), bargaining occurs, unlike negotiation, under conditions in which negotiators try to justify their positions even in situations with no common interest or generalisable reasons among them. Holzinger classified words and word groups one by one to indicate bargaining and negotiation basically by using Speech Act Theory in his method. Gerhards, on the other hand, developed an analysis regarding abortion discourse in two German newspapers. First, Gerhards assessed the representation of the actors in newspaper articles. Second, he measured the level of respect stated towards the other participants in the debate on a scale of five points, with ‘very positive’ and ‘very negative’ being the endpoints of the scale. Third, he measured the level of justification of the claims with a dual indicator (justification versus no justification). Last, he measured the rationality of the discourse quality by focusing on the number of values referred to and reconciliation of these values (Gerhards 1997).

Since there are different approaches to the phenomenon of deliberation, Marco Steenbergen and his colleagues developed the DQI in 2003 as a more global and theory-based scale derived from the ‘communicative action theory’ and ‘discourse ethics’ studies of Habermas to assess the quality of discourse. Yet, the index does not contain all the elements of discourse ethics of Habermas. In the index’s preparation, only measurable principles were chosen. For instance, discourse ethics of Habermas requires that parties not act deceptively while stating their intentions and be authentic (Habermas 1981: 149). However, deciding whether an act of speech is authentic cannot be directly observed. Accordingly, the index contains seven categories that mostly harbour the rational debate criteria of Habermas. These categories of the DQI are: participation, level of justification, content of justification, respect, respect towards the demands of others, respect towards the counterarguments and constructive politics.

The analysis unit of the DQI is speech, public discourse a certain individual presents at a certain point of a debate. In this way, discourse is divided into smaller units of speech. According to the DQI, if a person makes multiple speeches, each one of these speeches is coded differently, even if the codes are the same as those of the former speech. If a person is interrupted, the interruption itself is also counted as a speech. For every speech, including interruptions, relevant and irrelevant parts are separated from each other, and only relevant parts are coded. Relevant speech is a proposal that makes a demand as to what decision should and should be not taken. Irrelevant parts do not contain any

demand. These parts may clarify questions or explanations not related to the debate. Here the importance attached to demands is derived from the fact that they form the heart of a deliberation. In other words, demands stipulate what should and should not happen, and this normative character puts them at the centre of discourse ethics (Steenbergen et al. 2003: 27). If a speech contains relevant parts; demands are noted, and speech is coded for discourse quality. Later, these speeches are coded in accordance with the categories of the DQI.

The first of coding categories is 'participation'. In order to determine to what extent the principle of participation is fulfilled, which pertains to the free participation of the participants and whether the participants face any obstacles, speeches are examined in two such contexts as 'interruption of a speaker' and (whether) 'normal participation is possible'. While assessing the participation, interruptions regarding the end of the legal time spared for a debater and interruptions that come from other people and do not contain a demand are ignored. In order for an interruption to occur, the speaker should state discontent because of being interrupted, or an interruption should happen with an official decision.

Another important category of deliberation quality index is 'level of justification'. Justification constitutes one of the building blocks of the deliberative democracy model. According to Benhabib (2021), debaters would accept counterarguments only when they contain valid reasons, and a coherent cooperation can be ensured as a result only of such debate. So, the debater should present a reasoning why a claim they put forward should be accepted. In this sense, in order to understand to what extent justification is provided in the speaker's messages, they are assessed in four contexts: namely, 'no justification' if the debater makes a claim and does not provide any justification for it; 'inferior justification' if the debater provides a justification, but there is not a relation between the justification presented and the claim; 'qualified justification' if a rational relation can be established between the claim and the justification; and 'sophisticated justification' if the debater can present multiple justifications for the claim.

One of the most significant aspects of deliberative democracy in the Habermasian sense is for the deliberators to melt their own self-interests under the common interest umbrella and make it possible for everyone to settle. In this sense, 'content of justification', another important category when looking at to what extent the common good is taken as a goal, is basically assessed in four contexts: namely, 'explicit statement concerning group interests' if the debater sends messages towards its own group's interests; 'neutral statement' if the debater does not point to the interests of any groups in their messages; 'explicit statement of the common good in utilitarian terms' if the debater aims for the common good and expresses this in utilitarian terms; and 'explicit statement of the common good in terms of the difference principle' if the debater points to the common good in non-utilitarian terms.

Another one of the coding categories is ‘respect’. There are three categories of respect in the DQI. The first one of them is respect towards opposing groups. If the speaker makes only negative statements regarding the opposing group, it is coded as ‘no respect’. If the speaker does not openly make negative or positive statements, it is coded as ‘implicit respect’. If the speaker makes at least one positive remark about the opposing group, it is coded as ‘explicit respect’.

Another category is ‘respect towards the demand of others’. This category uses the same codes as the indicators of the respect towards the opposing group. Yet, respect towards demands is not always coded. It is coded only when a demand is brought up and the speaker supports it.

In the category of ‘respect towards the counterarguments’, coding happens only when there is a counterargument. In order to assess whether there is respect for the counterargument, mainly four codes are used. If there is a counterargument and it is overlooked by the speaker, this situation is marked as ‘counterarguments ignored’. If the speaker acknowledges the counterargument but criticises it with negative sentences, the message is marked as ‘counterarguments included but degraded’. If the speaker makes neither positive nor negative remarks about the counterargument while acknowledging its presence, the message is marked as ‘counterarguments included — neutral’. If the speaker acknowledges the counterargument and makes positive remarks about it, the message is marked as ‘counterarguments included and valued’.

And the last category in coding is ‘constructive politics’. The goal of this category is to measure whether participants come up with policies that will make reconciliation possible. Accordingly, if the participants do not develop any policies that will build up reconciliation and merely impose their own realities, there is no constructive understanding of politics in this case, and the message is marked as ‘positional politics’. If the speakers come up with a reconciliation proposal but this proposal is not related to the issue debated, the messages are marked as ‘alternative proposal’. If the speaker makes a mediating proposal and it fits the existing agenda, there is constructive politics in this case, and the message is marked as ‘mediating proposal’.

In this study, the Democratic Opening Debates brought before the parliamentary counsel on 13 November 2009 are coded within the framework of the categories of the DQI.

## **Coding Procedure**

The Democratic Opening Debates was coded by two coders: Çiğdem Görgün Akgül (Coder 1) and Musa Akgül (Coder 2). Coding took place in two steps. Firstly, researchers examined the 88-page transcription involving the Democratic Opening Debates independently from each other and identified relevant speeches. In the Democratic Opening Debates, both coders identified 60 relevant

speeches, meaning at least one speech involving a demand. There have been no differences of opinion between the coders as to the identification of these speeches. Following the identification, the relevant speeches were re-coded by both coders independently using the DQI tool.

In the second step, the coders came together to compare the codes. In case of disagreement, the coders re-read the speech and discussed discrepancies. At the end of this discussion process, a certain code was decided upon (once each coder deemed that code right). The speeches were assessed according to the DQI indicator, and the researchers presented the gained data in percentages (%) after the results were determined.

## Research Findings

### *The First Criterion: 'Participation'*

In the analysis of the speeches, only instances where speakers were interrupted by other speakers and stated their discomfort were counted as 'interruption of a speaker' as per Steenbergen and his colleagues (2003). Accordingly, eight speeches out of 60 are coded as 'interruption of a speaker'. In this context, interruption rate in all speeches is 13%, which means the speech was interrupted in one out of every seven speeches. This violates debate and speech ethics. The then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's following speech is an example of interrupted speeches in the debates,

*'Dear Chairman, neither me myself nor my group has even slightly interrupted while other leaders were speaking. See, right now here, I unfortunately observe that two opposing groups are constantly rounding on each other... Learn how to listen. In this country, you cannot make any points unless you listen...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 74).

Besides interruptions from other members of the parliament, protests coming from the audience at different parts of the debate made the speech unfeasible. For example, while Ömer Çelik was speaking on behalf of the AKP Group, slogans of 'for the homeland' were shouted from the audience chambers and a flag was unfurled. Chairperson of the parliament had to pause twice since the slogans and protests made the speech unfeasible (GNAT Minutes, 03. 11. 2009: 42, 47). Moreover, during the speech of the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, MPs from the CHP left the parliament, protesting the speeches (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 83).

## ***The Second Criterion: ‘Level of Justification’***

In terms of the level of justification, it is observed that most of the speeches contained at least one or two justifications that clearly stated the reasons for the positions taken.

Fifty-eight percent of the demands voiced by the speakers were based on qualified justification. The speech of Ahmet Türk, who spoke on behalf of the DTP Group, is an example of qualified justification:

*‘Dear members of the parliament, if you claim that we are equal citizens and that we have no issues, please show some empathy. Think for a moment. Would you feel yourself as an equal citizen in this country if someone turned up to say “There is no such language on earth as Turkish” and forcefully taught your child, who does not speak one word of Kurdish, in Kurdish? Can you protect your human dignity if you do not stand up to this injustice? I am sure even the thought of this gives some of you goosebumps. Can you understand what kind of trauma it would cause for one’s language to be denied, banned, ignored in their homeland by their own state? See, we have actually been living through this trauma, even the thought of which gives you goosebumps. We stand up to these policies to at least protect our dignity’* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 15).

In his speech, while Türk demanded that denial policies come to an end and equal citizenship issue be resolved, he justified this demand by calling for empathy over mother tongue.

Twenty-seven percent of the speeches, on the other hand, are coded as sophisticated justification because they contained multiple demands. An example of this is the speech by the Interior Minister Beşir Atalay:

*‘Dear members of the parliament, the Democratic Opening has two interrelated fundamental goals. The first one is to end the terrorism, and the second one is to elevate the standard of our democracy... Let me state right away that the heroic deeds and success of our security forces in the fight against terror is the most important element that secures our unity and solidarity. We will keep giving our security forces all kinds of support from now on, just as until now, in the fight against terror. Dear members of the parliament, one of the raisons d’être for our party, and maybe the most important one, is to close the democratic deficit of Turkey. We indiscriminately see [each one of] our people as dignified beings because humankind is ashraf-i mahlukat, the most dignified of all creatures... Democratization will allow for the enhancement of a political order that our people deserve, in which a sense of belonging as equal and free citizens will develop’* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 5–6).

The percentage of speeches in which there was no justification, but only a demand was made, is 15%, and the speech of Ömer Çelik who spoke on behalf of the AKP Group is an example of this:

*'After he says, "Everything the government does is wrong, in fact the core of what the government does is wrong too". Do we hear anything tangible from him to stop this bloodshed? No, we don't. Merely a wish. And what is that wish? [For us] To tell those on the mountains to lay down arms. Go ahead, you visit Iraq and tell them' (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 49).*

While Çelik demanded from the critics of the Opening process they come up with a tangible proposal as per their criticism, he did not justify this demand. Therefore, it is coded as 'no justification'.

### ***The Third Criterion: 'Content of Justifications'***

When the speeches are assessed in terms of the integrity and comprehensiveness of justifications, it is seen that 53% of them are justified by referring to mutual interests, mutual rights and mutual values. An example of statements highlighting common good is the speech of Hasan Erçelebi, a member of the parliament from İstanbul:

*'We want that the Democratic Opening and the fight against terror be separated. Terror should not be the reason and base of the Democratic Opening. Otherwise, the solution will not be permanent and the Democratic Opening will not work, will not be a solution to the problem. In order to fight against terror, it is necessary to cut off its economic resources, to bar its ammunition paths and ensure border security. Also, security forces should not be demoralized, our martyrs and veterans should not be hurt. The Democratic Opening should extend all over Turkey and be inclusive of the freedom and demands of all our citizens. There is no regional and ethnic democratic opening' (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 86).*

Erçelebi justified his speech over common value/good by demanding a democratic opening that will be inclusive of all parts of Turkey, rather than aim for one specific regional or ethnic group.

Nonetheless, the speakers justified their demands in 31% of their statements by explicitly highlighting the interests of either their own groups or a specific group. The speech by Devlet Bahçeli can be shown as an example:

*'What the government is supposed to do is not to scratch identities, to provoke them, to divide one by 36 and make it one again. Turkish nation is one already; its state is one, its homeland is one, its flag is one and its language is one. What you shall do*

*is not to surrender to terror, but rather annihilate it. Terrorist, as the name implies, is the definition of villains who take up arms and engage in bloody attacks. They are not those who want the former name of Güroymak or innocent people who took to the mountains because they could not seek their rights in legal ways...* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 25).

While Bahçeli demanded in his speech that the unity and solidarity of the homeland be protected, he justified this demand with negative statements towards not only a specific group's interests but also the opposing group.

During the debate, 16% of the speeches that contained a demand are coded as neutral statement. The following statements from Deniz Baykal are an example:

*'...My dear friends, look, what needs to be done in this region is without a doubt to respect everybody's identity, to ensure that all agents of the state show that respect, to ensure that no one will face any pressure due to their ethnic identity, to admit that everybody's ethnic identity is their dignity...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 38).

While Baykal demanded that the state respect identities, he voiced his demand with neutral statements without referring to any groups.

### ***The Fourth Criterion: 'Respect Towards the Groups'***

Seventy percent of the coded speeches involve disrespect towards the other group or the speaker. Devlet Bahçeli's following speech can be shown as an example of no respect for the opposing group category:

*'...In this honorable fight, the back of terror was broken, and it was brought to a point of ending in the year of 2002. The AKP Government, which came to power on 3 November 2002, took over a Turkey where terror reached the zero level. However, within the seven years from then, terror re-escalated, ethnic separatism gained courage and a position as never seen in any other period. The AKP government, which comes before the grand parliament with the PKK opening today, has come to the point of surrendering to the terrorist organization following its ineffectualness and weakness during its seven-year rule. The fight against terror is let go of, and the period of negotiation and ceasefire with terror has been started...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 21).

Bahçeli is accusing the government of escalating the terror and negotiating with terrorists, which is why it is coded as no respect.

There is no positive or negative comment towards the speaker or the opposing group in 25% of the speeches, an example of which is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's following speech:

*'...In this country – I said it just now too – we love and respect all ethnic elements – no matter how many – be it Turk, Kurd, Lazca, Circassian, Georgian, Abkhasian, Romani... As I said, we love for the creator's sake. We have given Turkish Republic citizenship to all of them, and we are [still] doing so...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 79).

Erdoğan does not make any negative remarks about any groups in his speech and uses a general language. Therefore, his speech is coded as 'implicit respect'.

In as little as 5% of the speeches, there was at least one positive comment regarding the opposing group or the speaker. Statements of Deniz Baykal can be shown as an example of this:

*'...I respect the feelings and sensitivities of people who lived through those agonies and would like to stress one more time that it is of utmost importance that they should not be brought into a point a political contention. Certainly – as Mr. Türk pointed out in his speech – quite a few unacceptable, bitter statements and inappropriate comments were made in the past, but we cannot look to future over those memories, they are now forgotten...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 41).

As seen from his statements, this speech of Deniz Baykal shows respect to the opposing speaker explicitly, which is why it is coded as 'explicit respect'.

### ***The Fifth Criterion: 'Respect Towards the Demands of Others'***

This code is coded in situations where speakers make positive/negative comments regarding the agenda. For example, one can look at Hasan Erçelbi's speech in which he explicitly mentions his negative stance towards the opening process:

*'As the DSP, we will not stand by any opening and action that will cause trouble for our people, hint at the slightest possibility of the danger of separation. We will not let our heart get divided into two. This meeting held today results from pressure applied from the outside...'* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 87).

In this speech, it is observed that there is a negative attitude towards the Opening process, which was brought up as a solution to the Kurdish question. For this reason, it is coded in the category of no respect towards the demands of others. No speaker except those who spoke on behalf of the government adopted a positive attitude about the Democratic Opening. So, all speeches coded in the category of 'respect towards the demands of others' are coded as 'no respect'.



## ***The Sixth Criterion: ‘Respect for Counterarguments’***

This criterion is coded if there is a counterargument on the table. Therefore, firstly, it is identified whether there is a counterargument. Secondly, it is identified whether a speaker ignores a counter argument. An example of this is seen in the speech of Ömer Çelik.

*Devlet Bahçeli: ‘Look at the heroes who joined hands in order to bring together a demoralized, desperate, poor nation; who formed a great nation out of daunted, dispirited, demoralized masses. And look at the inclinations of those who try to divide this same great nation by thirty-six. What are we to discuss here today? How we will get divided, how we will get separated, how we will abandon our brothers? On what topic are we supposed to come to terms today: How we will betray our martyrs, how we will hurt our veterans once more, how we will trample on the memories of our soldiers, police officers, and guardians?’ (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 20).*

*Ömer Çelik: ‘...Those who unrightfully blame us for damaging the unitary state structure and opening the door for federation should think of this: The only structure so far in Turkey that resembles federation is state of emergency rule... If this structure; whose administrative rules were different from those of overall Turkey, whose legal measures were different from those of overall Turkey, whose security practices were different, was not a de facto federation. I don’t know what is. Why did those who put up a Turkish-style Berlin wall between us and our brothers in the South-east and East not draw attention to the then-consequences of this structure? Then let’s ask this: Who annihilated this Turkish-style Berlin wall in order to establish national unity and brotherhood? The AKP government did...’ (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 44).*

As seen from the speeches, Ömer Çelik reacts negatively to Devlet Bahçeli’s argument that the Opening process will divide the country. Therefore, the speech is coded as ‘counterarguments included but explicitly degraded’.

Out of 62 speeches during the debates, 32 were assessed in the category of ‘respect for counterarguments’. These 32 speeches developed a negative argument towards counter arguments.

## ***The Seventh Criterion: ‘Constructive Politics’***

This category aims to measure whether participants produced policies that would lead to an agreement. Accordingly, if the speakers do not develop any policies that will build agreement and if they impose only their own facts, it does not count as a constructive understanding of politics and their statements are marked as ‘positional politics’. If the speakers produce a proposal

for agreement but it is irrelevant to the subject, their statements are marked as ‘alternative proposal’. If speakers come up with a mediating proposal and it fits the current agenda, it counts as constructive politics and their statements are marked as ‘mediating proposal’. In the debate examined, only 43% of the speeches are coded as ‘mediating proposal’. The then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech can be shown as an example of mediating proposal:

*‘...We have started a vital process for Turkey. We have taken a brave step to resolve the most chronic issues that pose an obstacle to the growth, development and progress of Turkey. We are utterly sincere. Each one of our 72 million citizens will win in this process. The process will open up much wider horizons for Turkey. I believe Turkey will welcome 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of our Republic, as quite a different Turkey. We have hope, excitement, enthusiasm; we will build future Turkey altogether with love, passion, peace and brotherhood...’* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 85).

On the other hand, it is observed that in such a significant percentage of the speeches as 50%, the groups did not lean towards reconciliation and maintained their positions, not allowing for any reconciliation. Devlet Bahçeli’s speech is an example of this situation:

*‘Those who say that they will go until the end in the wrong path they have entered should know very well that the Nationalist Movement Party is ambitious and determined to prevent Turkey’s future from being thrown into fire no matter what it takes to do so...’* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 29).

As for alternative proposals; 7% of the speeches include topics that do not fit the agenda but can be discussed. Deniz Baykal’s proposal that the government should drop its current opening policy and go for an economic opening instead in an example:

*‘...Here is what needs to be done: if you want to go for an opening, it should not be PKK opening; it should genuinely be Kurdish opening, aimed towards our people of Kurdish descent. What will you see when you look at those people? The need for huge economic and social reforms there is obvious... Quite a big economic program should be implemented in the region’* (GNAT Minutes, 13. 11. 2009: 38).

All seven categories mentioned have been used by the researchers. The results that were obtained were rated from 0 to 10. The maximum point that can be collected is 70. Criteria are as follows: I – participation, II – level of justification, III – content of justification, IV – respect, V – respect toward the demands of others, VI – respect toward counterarguments, VII – constructive politics.

The data's percentage will be determined, and it will accordingly be rated from 0 to 10.

The criterion of participation is rated 9 since uninterrupted speech percentage is 87%. Level of justification, on the other hand, is rated 9 too with 85% of the speech being counted as justified. Content of justification is rated 5 because the percentage of speeches that emphasise common good is 53%. Respect for the groups is rated 1 with explicit respect recorded in 5% of the speeches. Respect for counter arguments is rated 0 since all the speeches contain negative attitude. Respect towards the demands of other is rated 4 since merely 41% of the speeches contain respect for the demands of others. The criterion of constructive policy is rated 4 because in 50% of the speeches the groups maintained their positions, allowing for no reconciliation, while in 43% of the speeches they engaged in a more conciliatory language.

**Table 1:**

Criteria	Maximum Point 10
Participation	9
Level of Justification	9
Content of Justification	5
Respect for the Groups	1
Respect towards the Demands of Others	0
Respect for Counterarguments	0
Constructive Politics	4
Overall Points	28 = 40 %

From 70 potential points, the level of deliberation in Turkish Parliament during the debates over the Democratic Opening was 28. Converting this data into percentage, we get the following result: the debates about the Democratic Opening fulfill only 40% of high-level deliberative discourse ethics (Table 1).

## Reliability Test

Both researchers decided on 360 coding in total. They agreed on 350 of these decisions. The agreements include certain coding and judgements about whether a specific indicator applies. In percentage terms, the coders agreed on 97% of the coding, which is a perfect reliability score.

**Table 2:**

Category	The Ratio of Coding Agreement (RCA)
Participation	100 %
Level of Justification	98 %
Content of Justification	92 %
Respect for the Groups	98 %
Respect towards the Demands of Others	100 %
Respect for Counterarguments	94 %
Constructive Politics	97 %

Table 2 shows reliability statistics for certain coding categories. As for the first category of participation, both coders agreed on all speeches and did the same coding. This way, RCA came out at a perfect rate of 100%. As far as level of justification is concerned, since it includes four codes, each code was put to a separate reliability test. The RCA is 100% for the first two codes, as the coders fully agreed on the speeches that do not contain justification or contain inferior justification. Since the speeches that contain justification contain one or multiple justifications, the coders firstly decided on whether it was qualified or sophisticated justification. Accordingly, the coders fully agreed on qualified justifications, which is why the RCA for this code of the justification level is 100%. On the other hand, the RCA is 94% in sophisticated justification level. As for the overall category of justification level, RCA is 98%, which is accepted as a very good reliability score.

Since three different codes can be given for the content of justification, three separate reliability tests were performed. While coders reached 86% of agreement over the code of explicit statement concerning group interests, the agreement rate for neutral statement is 100%. The coders came to an agreement of 93% over statements towards the common good. When content of justification category is taken into consideration in a general sense, the agreement rate between the coders is 92%, which is statistically meaningful and indicates a good rate of agreement.

Reliability for respect indicator also came out very high. Coders agreed on each other's judgements regarding the speakers' respect for the opposing group at a rate of 98%, which again is a high level of agreement. Results of respect towards demands are better. In this category, the RCA is 100%, which shows a perfect agreement. In the last dimension of respect, which is respect for counterarguments, the coders reached a perfect agreement and RCA = 94%.

The last coding category is constructive politics. Here, the coders fully agree on which speeches are alternative proposal and which speeches are mediating proposal. Additionally, there were only two speeches on which the coders could not agree in terms of positional politics. Therefore, in terms of constructive politics, RCA = 97%, which signifies a good rate of agreement.

## Conclusion

This study has focused on the deliberation aspect of the debates in the parliament about the Democratic Opening, which was an important step in terms of the resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey, and attempted to measure the quality of deliberation through the DQI. According to the major findings from the study:

It is observed that unusual interventions towards the speakers take place. This situation poses an obstacle to free participation, which is one of the most important rules of deliberation. Further, even though the speakers mostly base their demands on rational arguments, it is observed that they frequently base these arguments on group interests. Furthermore, mutual respect was rarely shown during the debates. The deliberators saw the debates as the field of contest they were determined to win. Ultimately, they showed attitudes such as refusing the views, claims and arguments of others, making many critical remarks, attacking others personally, experiencing emotional outburst.

Using the DQI indicator for this research has made it possible to assess the deliberation process in numbers and to show how important these debates are. Discussion and evaluation of the stenographic analysis of the debates about the Democratic Opening enabled us not only to measure the quality of the deliberation but also to reveal the baselines of the debate.

The AKP basically approached the issue within the question of democratisation and human rights. It developed a discourse in which the security-oriented perspective of the state, which turned into the official policy towards the region in the past, was explicitly rejected. The AKP promised that economic and democratic steps would be taken in the region to deal with the issue. In this context, the AKP indicated that mistakes made by the state in the past should be admitted.

The opposing parties CHP and MHP, which objected to the way the AKP interpreted the issue, adopted a different approach by rejecting that there is a Kurdish question in the country and stuck with this attitude until the end of the debate. During the debate, the Turkish nationalist MHP was maintaining its attitude in the 1990s and saw the Kurdish identity merely as a folkloric element. It incorporated the integrity and indivisibility of the country into the political discourse frequently by referring to nationalist justifications in case any rights were to be granted to the Kurdish people. For the MHP, any right to be granted to

Kurds would count as 'negotiation with terrorism'. The CHP, on the other hand, was highlighting the ambiguousness of the content and goal of the Democratic Opening and cornering the government about whether the goal of the opening was 'to change the constitution' or 'to grant amnesty'. Moreover, it criticised the government and tried to suspend the Democratic Opening by saying that enough preparations were not made prior to the process, early deliberations were not complete and the process was not transparent. Lastly, the DTP was labelled by the MHP and some CHP deputies as in 'PKK=DTP'. Especially the nationalist wing of the CHP accused the DTP of carrying out a secret plan to establish a separate state.

On the other hand, the DTP took a completely different approach towards the issue and put its Kurdish identity at the centre of the whole deliberation process. According to the DTP, the assimilationist state policies are the crux of the Kurdish question. The DTP argued that the PKK results from the question and the security-driven policies on the pretext of fighting terrorism just aggravated the problem. Accordingly, it constantly made public statements referring to coming to terms with the past, apologising and making an amnesty law if the Opening was to be successful. The DTP criticised the government for dragging the Opening process out and emphasised that it should carry out the policies swiftly and consistently to resolve the Kurdish question. These policies should be inclusive of diverse identities, languages and cultures.

All in all, in this case study, it is tested whether deliberative democracy can change the attitudes of opposing sides of a violent conflict in a polarised society. Considering the Turkish Democratic Opening Debates, it can be said that conflicting sides may try to firmly maintain their positions regarding the debated topics. Yet, turning towards moderation and consensus building is the key principle of deliberative democracy. Even if the parliament procedures provide the proper conditions for a deliberation to be held among the elite, the historical burden of the conflict can prevent the conflicting groups from forming a democratic dialogue. Further, political systems in divided societies generally carry the solid legacy of elitism in which personal and factional interests are sought after. The elite in these societies may not act in a reconciliatory manner. Their stance would have a more polarising effect and weaken the dialogue process. When the goal of the politicians is merely to take forward their own interests / agenda at the expense of other groups, official procedures cannot impede negative polarisation. Then, deliberations might deepen the divisions. Hence, conflicting sides should not enter deliberations with a rigid point of view. They should not see deliberation as a field of a war in which they are determined to beat the opposing side. Otherwise, the expected goal of the deliberation cannot be realised and peace cannot be attained.

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# Local and Regional Politics at the EU level: who is actually represented in the Committee of the Regions?

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**Abstract:** *One of the main reasons for the establishment of the Committee of the Regions was to provide the subnational level with the representation within the institutional system of the European Union. As the body advising the EU institutions, the Committee can influence the decision-making process. Since it consists of members of the local and regional authorities, one may ask if it does offer the opportunity for the peculiar territorial self-government units to be represented at the EU level. And in the broader terms – what does the relation between the general and particular interests look like in that regard? The article tries to determine if the Committee of the Regions is a suitable place for the individual territorial self-government unit to promote its interests. The findings of the paper are based on the author’s own empirical research conducted among the Polish members of the Committee. The results entitle the author to state that the territorial self-government units are represented in the Committee of the Regions and they have some benefits from being represented within this body.*

**Keywords:** *Committee of the Regions, European Union, subnational level, representation, local government, regional government*

## Introduction

Since the ‘regional awakening’ in the late 1980s, the issue of involvement of the local and regional governments in the European Union’s (hereinafter EU)

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decision-making system is constantly present in the literature. It is often being portrayed as the question of the representation of the subnational level. However, the equation of the interests of the peculiar territorial self-government units and the general interest of the subnational level may not be the only possible point of view. An opposite approach may allow one to ask if the entities representing the subnational level can at the same time represent the individual territorial self-government units – and *vice versa*. The aim of this paper is to answer this question concerning the Committee of the Regions (hereinafter CoR). The following research questions have been formulated with the view to reaching the purpose stated above:

1. Are the peculiar territorial self-government units represented in the CoR?
2. Do the territorial self-government units have any benefits from being represented in the CoR?
3. On what factors depend the effectiveness of the representation of the territorial self-government unit in the CoR?

The article attempts to verify the main hypothesis stating that the territorial self-government units are represented in the CoR and the efficiency of this representation depend on factors connected to these territorial self-government units (like the size of their economies or demography).

With regard to the theoretical framework, the research is based on the concepts of the Europe of/with the Regions and the multi-level governance. They will be used to: (1) determine the role of the CoR as the channel of the representation of the subnational level, and (2) analyse the perspective of individual territorial self-government units.

Concerning the methodological framework, the focus is essentially put on the author's own empirical research that was conducted in March 2021.<sup>2</sup> The research is in the form of a survey which has been sent to all of the Polish members of the CoR of the 2020–2025 term. Thirteen of them (out of twenty-one) have answered the questions. It means that the response rate was 62% – such a result allows us to consider the answers as representative for all of the CoR's members from Poland. Furthermore, it can be assumed that these results can be related to the members of the CoR from other member states as well. It does not seem probable that the Polish members have their own way of functioning, which differs from the other members. The Polish delegation is too small to be able to do that. Moreover, the results of the research seem to be in accordance with the earlier research, conducted among the CoR's members from the other member states.

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<sup>2</sup> The research also concerned the question of the CoR's role in reducing the EU's democratic deficit – the results are presented in Baçal 2022.

## Theoretical Framework

During the first years of the European integration the focus was put entirely on the national governments (Loughin 1996a: 145). That was so despite the fact that this process had an impact on the other levels besides the national one. As this state of affairs lasted, the local and regional governments wanted their role to be recognised (Schakel 2020). They have challenged the state-exclusive approach and called for the 'Europe of the Regions'. This slogan consisted of several ideas, but what they have all had in common was demanding a place for the subnational level at the European decision-making table (Elias 2008). In the most ambitious versions, the regions would completely replace the central states, not only in terms of politics, but also of culture, with a regional identity instead of a national one (Anderson – Goodman 1995: 604). However, since this has not happened, the idea of 'Europe of the Regions' has lost its charm (Hepburn 2008). That was so *inter alia* because it turned out that it is not so easy to speak of the unity of the subnational level as the peculiar local and regional governments have their own interests that may not be compatible with each other (Moore 2008: 524). Nowadays, the scholars are using the term 'Europe with the Regions' (Panara 2019). This new concept is not directed against the national level, but rather seeks to find effective ways for the subnational level to influence the decisions taken at the European level, with the CoR being one of them (Hooghe – Marks 1997).

The 'Europe of the Regions' has defied the states-exclusive approach to the European integration. The multi-level governance went even further, as it has recognised the role of other actors, including the private ones, such as NGOs or private companies (Dickson 2014: 692). According to this perspective, there is no one general decision-making process, but rather a variety of the peculiar procedures (Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2011). Moreover, each of them may consist of different interested parties. This approach is also closely linked to the subnational level – in fact, it has resulted from the analysis of the structural funds policy (Bache – Jones 2000: 2–4). In the multi-level governance system, the involvement of the local and regional authorities at the European level it justified, without challenging the role of the national governments (Stephenson 2013). Hence, the analysed concept is also found useful by the CoR, which has published a white paper on that matter (Official Journal of the European Union 2009). The multi-level governance is being understood there as 'coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States and local and regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies'. These efforts should lead to 'responsibility being shared between the different tiers of government concerned and is underpinned by all sources of democratic legitimacy and the representative nature of the different players involved' (cf. Gal – Brie 2011).

## Committee of the Regions as the channel of the subnational level's representation

Although the most ambitious version of the 'Europe of the Regions' has not been implemented, the general idea of recognising the role of the local and regional governments has influenced the shape of the EU's institutional system. The direct cause for that was the Single European Act, which entered into force in 1987. It caused a major transformation in the structure of the regional funds, but the subnational level's voice was – once again – not heard (Schönlau 2017: 1170). The local and regional governments have intensified their efforts and were able to bring the attention of the decision-makers to their concerns. As a result, in 1988 the European Commission (hereinafter EC) established the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities (Kennedy 1997: 1). It was composed of 21 members (and the same number of alternates) chosen on the recommendation of the Paneuropean associations representing the subnational level. What is worth noting is that in order to be elected, one had to hold a democratic mandate on the local or regional level. As the name suggests, the Council had no binding competences and theoretically it could have been dissolved by the EC at any moment. Hence, regions and municipalities were not satisfied with this option and called for further steps. Especially active in that matter were these territorial self-government units that have the most power within their states' constitutional order (e.g. German, Belgian and Spanish regions).

The coming intergovernmental conference (which resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht) was the occasion to express their ideas. Local and regional decision-makers demanded *inter alia* establishment of the entity permanently representing the subnational level within the EU institutional system (Van Der Knaap 1994: 89–90). In the most ambitious proposals, such an institution would have legislative powers similar to the European Parliament (hereinafter EP) and the Council (Schönlau 2010: 6). This could not have been accepted by the national governments for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the sole existence of such a body would decrease the meaning of the national level. Secondly, it would be highly likely that this body would cooperate mostly with the EC (so the 'coalition' of the subnational and supranational levels would be formed), which would mean further diminishment of the national government within the EU institutional system. Thirdly (and more of a general character), the European decision-making process – complicated enough at that time – would become even more so (Domorenok 2009: 145). What finally came out of this clash of interests had to be some sort of compromise (but one that was more satisfying for the national governments).

The result of this compromise was the establishment of the CoR – advisory body of the EC and the Council (Roht-Arriaza 1997: 448–449), without its own budget or administration unit and the election procedure copied from the Eco-

conomic and Social Committee (hereinafter ESC) – with whom the budget and administration were shared (Caroll 2011: 344). The main task of the CoR was to issue opinions on the matters important to the local and regional governments and provide the European decision-making process with the subnational perspective. Although the four procedures of issuing the opinions were established (obligatory, facultative, accessory, of the CoR's own initiative), in none of them were the views of the CoR binding for the EC or the Council. Such an outcome was rather disappointing for the territorial self-government units that were pressing for a change the most. Moreover, it soon turned out that the CoR could not work as efficiently and speak with one voice as they had wished due to a fact that the CoR consisted of both powerful regions (e.g. German *Länder*) and the municipalities with purely administrative functions at the same time (Christiansen 1997: 64).

The status of the CoR has been evolving over the years and it is worth taking a look at the most significant changes. Most of them were postulated by the CoR itself as well as the local and regional governments, with the support of the supranational institutions (mostly the EC). As a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam's entry into force, the ESC and the CoR were separated and the latter was given the opportunity to also be consulted by the EP (Reilly 1997: 137–138). The Treaty of Nice created an obligation for the members of the CoR to hold a democratic mandate on the local or regional level – the loss of this mandate would immediately lead to the end of the CoR's membership. Such a regulation has strengthened the democratic legitimacy of the CoR; it was, however, mostly confirmation of the already existing state of affairs (Kuligowski 2015: 29). In the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, the CoR was recognised as guardian of the subsidiarity principle and was granted access to the European Court of Justice (Kaniok – Dađová 2013: 125). Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon adapted the regulations from the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe as well as it lengthened the CoR's term from four to five years. To sum up, since its first session in March 1994 the CoR has been through the reforms that have strengthened its position within the EU's institutional system. However, it does not mean that all of the CoR's demands were fulfilled. It still has neither the status of EU institution nor are its opinions binding for the EC, EP or the Council (Petrašević – Duic 2016: 19). Hence, if the Treaties go under review once again, the CoR will probably once again press for a change.

With the status of the advisory body with no binding powers (except the access to the European Court of Justice) comes the limitation of the CoR's influence. It relies mostly on the state of relations with the European decision-making institutions, namely the EC, the EP and the Council (Farrow – McCarthy 1997). If these relations were unsatisfactory, the CoR would find itself and its opinions marginalised and ignored. Therefore, it would not be able to represent the subnational level in an efficient way. Throwing a light on this issue

will be helpful for the further analysis. In that regard, a couple of conclusions can be taken out of the earlier remarks concerning the support (or a lack of it) of the idea of establishment of a body representing the local and regional point of view. Most importantly, the CoR has better relations with the supranational institutions than with the intergovernmental one (Christiansen 1996: 95). It can be a sign that the national governments' concerns over the cooperation of the supranational and subnational levels were valid. Second of all, it is the EC who supports the CoR the most – the CoR is even being described as the 'EC's baby' (Skawiński 2008: 183). That is so, mainly because of the number of interactions. The consultation opportunities come most often from the EC (Trobiani 2016: 18). Moreover, one of the commissioners is usually present during the CoR's plenary sessions. The EC and the CoR have also signed the Cooperation Agreement, regulating their mutual relations. The first agreement was signed in 2001, but the version that is currently in force comes from 2012 (Official Journal of the European Union 2012). According to its regulations, each year the CoR issues an opinion on the EC's annual plan, in which the EC informs the CoR about the issues that will be consulted with the latter. In addition, the EC is obliged to regularly update the CoR on how many of its opinions were taken into account while taking the decisions. The cooperation is beneficial for both sides of this relationship. The EC can strengthen its own legitimacy through working together with the CoR, whose members hold a democratic mandate on the local or regional level (McCarthy 1997: 443). And for the CoR this is a chance to influence the decision-making process.

The second of the supranational institutions – the EP – has been supporting the establishment of the body representing regions and municipalities at the European level as well. However, in the first years of the CoR's functioning, the EP's approach was rather sceptical (Cole 2005: 55), mainly because the EP was afraid of its own position in light of the CoR's 'parliamentary' ambitions (Loughin 1996b: 161). This state of distrust has disappeared over the years and today the relations between the EP and the CoR look vastly different. Proof of that may be the Cooperation Agreement signed in 2014 on the basis of which *inter alia* the opinions of the CoR can be presented by the rapporteurs during the sessions of the EP's committees (Kuligowski 2015: 89). The other important factor in the mutual relations are the political groups, basically the same in the EP and the CoR. They provide another channel of communication (Decoster – Delhomme – Rouselle 2019: 108). Finally, both the EP and the CoR are democratically legitimised, so they can work together to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the whole EU.

As was mentioned above, the Council, the institution representing the national level, has a dissimilar opinion about the CoR. That affects the mutual cooperation (Christiansen – Lintner 2005: 9). National governments would like to represent the local and regional interest as part of the national one.



Otherwise, their position within the EU institutional system may be affected (not in a fundamental way, but still). Therefore, the Council rarely consults the CoR – and when it does, the consulted issue is not of great importance. Moreover, the Council has refused to justify its decisions regarding taking (or not) the CoR's opinions into account (Defoort 2002: 22). The relations between the Council and the CoR are based entirely on the Treaties, as there is no Cooperation Agreement. Members of the Council (but also members of the EP) have little knowledge about the CoR's ongoing activity as Hönnige and Panke (2016: 629) have shown.

Based on the review of the CoR's relations with the EC, EP and the Council, it can be stated that despite a rather weak institutional position within the EU's institutional system, the CoR manages to find some ways to impact the decision-making process, especially when compared to the ESC. On the other hand, this influence cannot be overestimated, since it depends on the good will of the EU institutions. The CoR should also take action to increase awareness of its actions among the key decision-makers. Finally, one has to remember that the CoR gathers together regions with legislative powers and the municipalities with the administrative functions at the same time. For the latter, the CoR may be the sufficient representation. But for the regions it may not be enough. Hence, they try to secure their interest through the other channels, like the Council or the regional offices in Brussels (Rowe – Jeffery 2017: 382).

Actions taken by the CoR in order to represent the subnational level within the EU's institutional system can be divided into three main categories: (1) advisory, (2) monitoring and (3) representative *sensu stricto*. All of these elements of the CoR's functioning will be subjects of the analysis. At this point it is important to notice that all of these categories combined can be described as the representative function *sensu largo*. It means that the CoR tries to promote the interests of the subnational level in as many ways as possible. To increase the chances of influencing the decision-making process, the types of the CoR's activities differ from one another. It may also be useful to clarify the reasons for the CoR's representative actions (and in a broader sense – the involvement of the subnational level at the EU level). Firstly, due to the fact that the CoR's members have to hold the democratic mandate at the local or regional level (and therefore are 'closer to the people'), the CoR claims that it contributes to reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the EU and reducing the democratic deficit (cf. Baçal 2021). Secondly, and for the same reason, the CoR can provide the EU institutions with the expert knowledge on the functioning of the subnational level and its needs, problems, etc (Piattoni 2012).

The advisory function of the CoR has been named *expressis verbis* in the Treaties (art. 13.4 TEU and art. 300.1 TFEU). In that regard, the CoR's task is to issue the opinions on the matters that concern (or may concern) the subnational level (cf. Kuligowski 2019). The opinions (as well as the resolutions) are

addressed to the EC, EP and the Council, of whom the CoR is the advisory body. As was mentioned, there are four procedures of consultations. The first one is the obligatory consultation. Whenever the Treaties (*de facto* TFEU) require it (e.g. by cohesion policy or structural funds), the CoR has to be asked to speak on the matter (Petrašević – Duic 2016: 7). Otherwise, the legislative process will be flawed which means that the passed act can be declared as invalid by the European Court of Justice (*inter alia* on the motion of the CoR). However, it does not mean that the EU institutions depend on the CoR in that case. The CoR is being given one month to issue an opinion and if it fails – or decides to abstain – the legislative process can go into a further phase (Hönnige – Panke 2013: 458). The TFEU also introduces the facultative procedure of consultation, according to which the EC, EP or the Council can consult the CoR whenever they find it necessary. The CoR (or anyone else) cannot force these EU institutions to use this procedure as the decision in that matter depend entirely on their mind. The third procedure – the accessory one – is connected to the ESC. When the latter is being consulted by the EC, EP or the Council, the CoR can also issue an opinion on that occasion if the CoR believes that the consulted issue concerns the interests of the subnational level. It should be noted at this stage that the ESC does not have such competence and therefore cannot issue an opinion just because the CoR is being consulted. Finally, the CoR can issue an opinion on its own initiative. As was mentioned, regardless of the procedure, the CoR's opinions are not binding for the concerned EU institutions and the latter do not have to specify if (and why) they have taken the CoR's opinions into account (Przyborowska-Klimczak 2018: 12). It seems that the advisory activity of the CoR (in the context of this body's representative function) consists of providing the EC, EP or the Council with the subnational level's point of view. Keeping in mind the non-binding character of the CoR's opinions, it has to be stated that their effectiveness depends on their quality (but also on the consistency with the stance of the decision-makers).

The monitoring activities of the CoR are connected to its status of guardian of the subsidiarity principle. The CoR wanted to be granted this status from the beginning of this functioning (Jones 1997: 312). That was so because the subsidiarity principle is a key concept from the subnational level's perspective. However, it is also important for the EU level – this significance is expressed in the art. 5.3 TEU, according to which 'in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level'. Due to the regulations of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, the CoR was empowered in the competence to submit the applications to the European Court of Justice in case of the viola-

tion of the subsidiarity principle. There are two conditions for the use of this procedure: (1) it must concern the legislative act as well as (2) the obligatory procedure of the CoR's consultation. If these are met – and the CoR's application proves the infringement – the Court can declare the violating act invalid. The CoR has not used this power directly yet – but it has managed to impact the proposals of the EC several times by threatening to use it (Nicolosi – Mustert 2020: 286). The CoR is also cooperating with the national parliaments, local and regional governments as well as the non-governmental organisations in monitoring the state of the subsidiarity principle. This field of activity seems to bring the greatest influence opportunities for the CoR, mainly because of the access to the European Court of Justice. However, the CoR cannot use this competence (or threaten to use it) in every case, because it would lead to the loss of its meaning. As a sidenote, it has been brought up in the literature that the CoR should be granted the right to submit the applications to the Court in the name of individual self-territorial units (Górski 2017). This would surely strengthen the role of the CoR, not only as the representative of the subnational level, but also of the individual regions or municipalities.

Finally, there is a representative function *sensu stricto* of the CoR. As is being thought, about 70% of the laws passed on the European level affect the functioning of the local and regional communities (Bauer – Börzel 2010: 254). It was – and still is – a reason for granting the subnational level a place at the decision-making table. The CoR's activity in this field can be divided in two ways: (1) actions aimed at achieving an institutional change and (2) an activity based on the regular contact with the local and regional authorities. Concerning the first type, one has to once again mention the art. 5.3 TEU. It was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht, but the local and regional levels were not included there. Since the beginning of its functioning, the CoR (among others) had been pressing to change that (Seather – Schmidt-Nissen – Lorenz 1997: 105–106) – and finally succeeded. The regulation was changed first in the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe and then in the Treaty of Lisbon. The CoR also proposed incorporating the European Charter of Local Self-Government (of the Council of Europe) into the *acquis communautaire* (Jośkowiak 2008: 114). However, in this case the CoR's efforts have not yet been successful. When it comes to the second type of the CoR's activity, one has to mention the organisation of the European Week of Regions and Cities (annual conference for the subnational level) and many other events as well as holding the consultations through its website (Apostolache 2014: 37).

The CoR calls itself the 'voice of the regions and cities in the EU' and 'the EU's assembly of Regional and Local Representatives' (Committee of the Regions 2022). With such declarations should go actions aimed at representing the subnational level within the EU's institutional system. As the analysis has shown, the CoR has several opportunities to be doing that. Naturally, the ques-

tion of the effectiveness of its activity remains – as the advisory body with almost no binding competences, the CoR has to rely on the state of the rather informal relations with the EC, EP and the Council.

## **Committee of the Regions as the channel of representation of the peculiar self-government units – empirical study**

To this moment, the analysis concerned the role of the CoR as the representative of the subnational level within the EU's institutional system. Hence, the perspective has been more of a universal character. From now on, a new approach will be taken, focusing on the individual self-government unit's point of view. The question that has to be asked at this stage is if the CoR is the right place to promote the particular interest or if its representative function is 'limited' to the general subnational level's representation. Moreover, how the CoR is perceived in that regard by the local and regional authorities. These questions will be answered based on the analysis of the author's own empirical research.

Before presenting the results of the research, one has to explain the (hypothetical at this point) role of the CoR as the place for representation of the individual self-government unit's interest. It can be perceived both in narrow and broad terms. In this first case, the CoR could be treated as the channel of representation similar to, e.g., regional offices in Brussels. Not identical, though. Regional offices belong to the individual self-government unit so theoretically it does not have to consider the interests of other entities in its actions. At the same time, the CoR brings together over three hundred (after Brexit – 329) different perspectives. Therefore, the outcome of the CoR's work must be some sort of compromise. Nevertheless, it seems that even then one can speak of the individual representation of the CoR in some ways – for instance, in the CoR's opinion the uniqueness of a region may be underlined. It has to be remembered as well that the interest of the whole subnational level and the interest of the individual self-government unit may simply overlap (cf. Van Der Knaap 1994: 91). When it comes to the broad terms of representation, it can be assumed that the self-government unit may benefit from being represented in the CoR. This may be so, e.g., through the strengthened negotiation position or the prestige.

The first presented result focuses on the question of how the CoR's members perceive their role. In other words – who do they think they represent? In that regard, the most significant issue is if they represent their territorial self-government units. This is a key to understanding the role of the CoR as the place for the promotion of the individual interests. Results stating that they do not represent their regions or municipalities would impact the way of perceiving the CoR in the analysed matter.

**Table 1: Interests of which entities do you take into account during your activity within the CoR? (multiple choice question)**

Answer	%
Interest of my territorial self-government unit	100.0
Interest of my national political party	30.8
Interest of my political group within the Committee of the Regions	76.9
Interest of the national government of my state	30.8
Interest of my national delegation within the Committee of the Regions	46.2
Interest of the European Union	46.2
Other	15.4

Source: author's own research.

A couple of observations can be made on the basis of the results. First of all, the fact that all of the Polish members of the CoR declared representation of the interest of their territorial self-government units means that they consider the CoR as the channel of representation. It also suggests that – despite the CoR's collective character – there are structural conditions to promoting the agenda of each individual self-government unit. Moreover, if such actions are being taken, the CoR's members must find this body's work efficient and able to influence the decision-making process. The indicated representation may speak for its favourability from the territorial self-government units' point of view. Otherwise, there would be no efforts to take their interest into account during the work of the CoR. The local and (especially) regional units would then concentrate on the other channels of representation. It has to be remembered as well that in order to be elected to the CoR, one has to take efforts to have their name put on the list submitted to the Council, focusing primarily on the position within the associations of the territorial self-government units (Mamadouh 2001: 480–481). Therefore, the CoR's membership cannot be perceived as some kind of a waste of time or punishment, but rather as an opportunity.

Secondly, the interest of the territorial self-government unit is not the only one represented in the CoR. The interest of a political group was also chosen by the majority of respondents, but it is worth looking at all of the other results. On a general note, it seems that it is possible to consider the interest of several entities at the same time (cf. Waśkiewicz 2020: 173–174). Hence, they do not necessarily have to exclude each other. In that regard, the domination the representation of the territorial self-government unit's interest may be explained by the status of 'the voice of the regions and cities in the EU' of the CoR. These results may justify this claim. It might also be connected to the election procedure – since (in most of the member states) it is the associations of the

territorial self-government units who *de facto* decide who will be a member of the CoR (Millan 1997), the CoR's members might not be willing to represent primarily other interests.

Finally, it may be useful to look at the art. 300.4 TFEU which states that the members of the CoR (and the ESC) 'shall be completely independent in the performance of their duties, in the Union's general interest'. Especially the second part of this regulation is interesting. If treated literally, the CoR's members would not be able to represent any other interest than the EU's (Apostolache 2014: 26). However, as the results indicate, either the CoR's members do not act in accordance with the TFEU or this regulation has to be interpreted in another way, in which the interests of the territorial self-government units are part of the broadly understood EU's interest. On a sidenote, this result is also a sign of a low level of Europeanisation (in its *ad personam* version) of the Polish members of the CoR (cf. Ruszkowski 2019).

The previous question concerned the attitude of the Polish members of the CoR. They were also asked the same question, but in the matter of activity of their colleagues from the other member states. The results will be helpful in determining if the model of the representation within the CoR differs depending on the state.

**Table 2: In your opinion, interests of which entities are being taken into account by the CoR's members from the other member states during their activity within the CoR? (multiple choice question)**

Answer	%
Interest of their territorial self-government units	76.9
Interest of their national political party	30.8
Interest of their political group within the Committee of the Regions	84.6
Interest of the national government of their member state	15.4
Interest of their national delegation within the Committee of the Regions	23.1
Interest of the European Union	38.5
Other	7.7

Source: author's own research.

Before starting the proper analysis, one must underline that the results do not reflect the stance of the CoR's members from the other member states, but the perception of their behaviour by the Polish members of the CoR. Therefore, the results may not be strictly in accordance with the actual activity of the CoR's members from the other member states. Nevertheless, since the Polish

members have the chance to observe and work with their colleagues, their impressions in that matter might be some indication of the state of affairs.

The first results that come to mind are the ones regarding the representation of the interests of the territorial self-government units and the political groups within the CoR. The fact that not all of the CoR's members may be considering the interest of their territorial self-government unit shows that the CoR may not be unconditionally perceived as the representation suitable channel. The CoR's members from the other member states may therefore have other opinions of the CoR's effectiveness or reasonableness of promoting a particular agenda within this body. The greatest popularity of the political groups may be explained threefold. Firstly, the CoR's members from the other member states may be much more focused on their own individual position. In that case, their role as the representatives of their self-government units would be marginalised. Secondly, the level of politicisation may be higher than in the Polish example. Thirdly, CoR's members from the other member states may perceive the political groups as more influential than the CoR – especially in the long-term perspective. It has to be remembered that the political groups function in the EP as well, but their influence may be seen in the case of other EU institutions (Martinico 2018: 55). Hence, these members of the CoR may promote their agenda (which might also include the interest of their territorial self-government units) in a way that could not be provided by the CoR itself. In that regard, this body would have a role of an intermediary entity (cf. Hönnige – Kaiser 2003).

The result concerning the interest of the EU suggests two additional conclusions. On the one hand, it proves that the literal interpretation of the art. 300.4 TFEU is incorrect as not all of the CoR's members from the other member states (and in fact – a minority of them) consider the EU's interest during the CoR's work. On the other, it seems that it is Polish members of the CoR who represent the EU's interest more often. This may spark some confusion, because on the first sight one could think that the members of the CoR from the other member states – especially the ones from the 'old Europe' – may be keen on acting for the EU more often. However, the question applied to all of the member states, so this division of the 'old' and 'new' Europe could not be caught. Moreover, according to the Eurobarometer data, Poland is one of the most pro-European member states (cf. Eurobarometer 2022: 69–70). The attitude of the Polish members of the CoR might be a symptom of that fact.

Due to the two next questions, it will be possible to examine the issue of the benefits for the territorial self-government units that are a result of being represented in the CoR. As was mentioned, this is a broader understanding of the CoR's representative function. The first question concerns the profits for the territorial self-government unit in the matter of the relations with territorial self-government units from the other states.

**Table 3: In what ways does your membership in the CoR influence the state of relations between your territorial self-government and the territorial self-government from the other states? (multiple choice question)**

Answer	%
My territorial self-government has signed a partnership agreement with the territorial self-government unit from the other states	15.4
I have taken part in the study visit for the members and alternates of the CoR to other territorial self-government unit	30.8
I have organised the study visit for the members and alternates of the CoR to my territorial self-government unit	15.4
My territorial self-government unit started a cooperation in the specified area with the territorial self-government from the other states	53.8
My territorial self-government unit has adapted some methods of governance used in the territorial self-government units from the other states	46.2
The territorial self-government unit from the other states have adapted some methods of governance used in my territorial self-government unit	15.4
My relationship with the CoR's members from the other states focuses entirely on the CoR's internal work	38.5

Source: author's own research.

As can be seen, being represented in the CoR brings along some benefits for the territorial self-government unit. These benefits may be of different kinds – they may apply directly to the territorial self-government unit (e.g. partnership agreements) or to its representative (e.g. study visit). Even this second case may be profitable for the territorial self-government, as its representative may use the gained experience to govern in a more efficient way. On the basis of these results, another function of the CoR may be recognised – a socialising one. In its direct aspect, it concerns the members of the CoR, who regularly meet, cooperate and exchange views and experiences. It may seem that it has nothing to do with the representative function of the CoR; however, one has to remember that the CoR's members are at the same time the members of the local or regional authorities. Therefore, they can transfer their knowledge gained due to the membership in the CoR to the level of a daily governance (Trobiani 2016: 18). From this perspective, this may be the case of a Europeanisation *ad personam* that leads to the Europeanisation of a territorial self-government unit (cf. Guderjan 2012). To examine this issue in detail, the Europeanisation approaches should be used in the future research.

The analysis of this point must be concluded with the remark of a more technical character related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the CoR's functioning. The beginning of the pandemic in Europe coincided with the start of the new term of the CoR and forced it to switch to an online mode. In such circumstances, it was not possible to organise or take part in any study



visits. That primarily affected the people who had not been the CoR's members during the previous terms. Therefore, the results of this question could have been affected by the pandemic. Nevertheless, even in that situation the signs of cooperation with the other territorial self-government units are clearly visible. This leads to two conclusions. Firstly, the number of people from the Polish delegation who do not have the CoR's membership experience from the previous terms is relatively small. Secondly, it can be assumed that if the pandemic did not happen, the options given in the question would be chosen even more often.

Being represented in the CoR may affect the functioning of the territorial self-government unit in a more indirect way and in the relations with other entities as well. Out of all, the most significant factor might be strengthening the prestige or (in the more concrete scale) the negotiation position. If this turns out to be true, it may be interesting to see to what extent the CoR influences the functioning of the territorial self-government unit in that matter.

**Table 4: In your opinion, does being represented in the CoR strengthen the position of the territorial self-government? (single choice question: yes / no)**

Answer	% of the „yes” answers	% of the „no” answers
In the relations with the other territorial self-government units from the same state	100	0
In the relations with the territorial self-government units from the other EU's member states	100	0
In the relations with the government administration	53.8	46.2
In the relations with the private companies	46.2	53.8
Within the associations of the territorial self-government units (Union of the Polish Rural Municipalities, Union of the Polish Towns, Union of the Polish Cities, Union of the Polish Metropolises, Union of the Polish Counties, Union of the Polish Voivodeships)	100	0

Source: author's own research.

One can notice that having a representation in the CoR does have an impact on the territorial self-government unit. However, it is not unlimited. The strengthening of the position of the territorial self-government unit concerns mostly its relations with entities that are on the same level – other territorial self-government units and their associations. The difference between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers regarding the relations with national government administration and the private companies is too narrow to unambiguously determine the influence of the CoR. Nevertheless, the fact that at least some respondents have answered positively means that there may be some impact in that matter. But

its extent is not as wide as in case of the relations within the subnational level. This might be explained by the character of the CoR – a body called upon to be the voice of the regions and municipalities in the EU and composed of the members of the local and regional decision-makers. Therefore, it may not be a surprise that it is the subnational level that pays the most attention to the fact that some territorial self-government units are being represented in the CoR.

This issue should also be analysed from another perspective, concentrating on the elements of the territorial self-government unit's functioning that are affected by having a representation in the CoR as well as the relevance of this representation. First of all, it can be assumed that since the CoR is part of the EU's institutional system, this 'effect of the CoR' is most visible when it comes to the European activity of the territorial self-government unit. Naturally, one cannot exclude the possibility that the CoR's membership influences other fields of activity, but the European affairs have much more potential to do that than some fully internal matters. Secondly, it seems that being represented in the CoR should not be perceived as the crucial factor leading to the strengthening of the territorial self-government unit's position. On the other hand, it cannot be simply ignored, as it may commit – among many other factors – to the positive outcome, especially regarding the European activity (Warleigh 1997: 104).

The last of the analysed questions brings a reverse perspective. It focuses not on what gains are there for the territorial self-government unit represented in the CoR, but on the (hypothetical at this point) profits for the CoR's member representing the concrete territorial self-government unit. However, this issue will have the significance for the territorial self-government unit as well, as it will show what factors are important in the matter of efficient promotion of one's agenda within the CoR.

**Table 5: In your opinion, what are the most important things regarding the position of the CoR's members? (multiple choice question)**

Answer	%
Factual knowledge of the individual members	61.5
The ability to compromise	46.2
Economic potential of the represented territorial self-government unit	15.4
Demographic potential of the represented territorial self-government unit	7.7
Economic and demographic potential of the member state, which the represented territorial self-government unit is part of	15.4
Political group membership	76.9

Source: author's own research.

The elements listed above can be divided into two major categories. The first group contain the factors that relate to the territorial self-government unit – for instance, the economic potential. The second one consists of the components associated with the CoR's members, *inter alia* their knowledge. As can be seen, only this second category is perceived as relevant when it comes to the position within the CoR. This leads to the conclusion stating that although the territorial self-government unit benefits from being represented in the CoR, it itself does not strengthen the position of its representative within the CoR. From this point of view, the territorial self-government unit can be seen as the passive side of the representation relation, mostly unable to help its representative to increase their significance. This may be the positive conclusion especially for the territorial self-government units that do not have such big economic or demographic potential. If these results reflect the reality, the CoR's member from the smaller territorial self-government unit that belongs to the most powerful political group within this body shall have a stronger position than a member representing a much stronger territorial self-government unit (economically, demographically) who does not belong to any of the political groups (Karski 2013: 213) or belongs to the group with a marginal role within the CoR.

These results may also explain why so many of the respondents declared that they consider the interests of their political group during their activity in the CoR. It may simply pay off as the political group membership is considered the most important factor. Hence, the members of the CoR might be following the scheme that has been anticipated in the analysis of a results of a second question. However, it has to be stated that the CoR's members' perception does not seem to be in accordance with the actual state of affairs. As the other research shows, the political groups within the CoR are not that influential, especially when compared to the national delegations (Büttner 2020: 21–33).

## Analysis of the results

Each of the results of the survey can be analysed separately and give some insights about the CoR's functioning. However, when put together, they allow one to take a look at a bigger picture which means that the research questions stated at the beginning of the paper can now be addressed.

The first questions tried to determine if the territorial self-government units are represented in the CoR. The results lead to a positive answer. All of the Polish members have declared that they consider the interest of their territorial self-government units during their activity within the CoR. Moreover, the majority of the CoR's members from the other member states seems (in the opinion of the Polish members) to do the same. Although there was no unanimity in this last case, one can see a clear majority. It means that representing a territorial self-government in the CoR should be seen as a rule, not an exception. This ena-

bles one to make three conclusions. Firstly, despite the fact that the CoR cannot be put in the category of the most powerful elements of the EU's institutional system, it is perceived as the body with enough influence to take some efforts to promote the agenda of the territorial self-government unit there. On a sidenote, such an opinion, especially in case of the smaller territorial self-government units (municipalities for instance) may result from the possibility of being the only option for the European activity on a bigger scale, as it is not possible for them to, e.g., afford the permanent office in Brussels. Secondly, the CoR's task to represent the subnational level within the EU decision-making process does not mean that it cannot be a channel of representation for an individual self-government unit. However, it does not depend entirely on the sole character of the CoR, but rather on the fact that the general interests of the subnational level and the interests of the particular territorial self-government unit seem to usually be in accordance with each other (Borghi 2006: 449–450). Furthermore, since the CoR's members allegedly consider the interests of the political groups more often than their territorial self-government units, it might be an indication that in the event of a conflict between general and particular interests, it is the first one that prevails. Nevertheless, the results do not allow us to state this unambiguously as further research is needed. Thirdly, members of the CoR do not treat their territorial self-government units as only the formal cause of their activity on the EU level. If that were the case, the CoR's members would be interested only in their personal influence or prestige. The actual state of affairs might have something to do with the democratic mandate held by each member on the local or regional level. It serves not only to strengthen the legitimacy of the CoR, but also to secure the representation of the territorial self-government unit – even if the activity within the CoR is not a priority factor by the local or regional elections, some citizens may be interested in their representative actions on the EU level (cf. Sjögren 2011).

The second question concerned the hypothesised benefits for the territorial self-government units resulting from being represented in the CoR. As the results show, the CoR's membership does bring along some gains. First of all, the sole fact of being represented in the CoR can be seen as the profit. It means the chance to promote the agenda of the territorial self-government unit within the body, which advises the most significant EU institutions (the EC, EP and Council). An indirect gain of that situation may be the opportunity to influence the decision-making process (Neshkova 2010). Surely, one should not overestimate the CoR's potential in that matter. However, even if the CoR's contribution is marginal, it is better to have such an opportunity than to not have any at all. In the most negative scenario (for instance, in the case of the most powerful regions) the CoR is one of the many channels of representation on the EU level (Brunazzo – Domorenok 2008: 440–441). Moreover, being represented in the CoR may also have some impact on the direct relations between the territorial

self-government unit and the EU institutions (mainly the EC). That might be so because of, e.g., more knowledge about the current legislative process or an image of the territorial self-government unit committing to the EU work. However, this aspect should be analysed more closely in the further research. Secondly, the benefits for the territorial self-government unit can also be seen on the other levels, especially on the subnational one. The main profit in that regard is the improvement of the state of relations with the other territorial self-government units, for instance through the partnership agreement, cooperation in the concrete area or an exchange of experiences. All of these possibilities can be transferred into economic gain. In addition to that, the negotiation position of the territorial self-government unit represented in the CoR seems to be strengthened due to that fact, both in unilateral and multilateral formats. The 'effect of the CoR' might be noticeable first and foremost on the EU level, but – as the results show – that is not its unconditional limitation.

Finally, the third question focused on the ways to secure effective representation of the territorial self-governments within the CoR. The most significant thing in that context is if this efficiency depends on the qualities of the territorial self-government unit. If proven positive, it would lead to a rule according to which the greater economic and/or demographic potential means more influence within the CoR. Such a situation would be especially beneficial for the big regions (as the name 'Committee of the Regions' might suggest). However, the analysis of the results of the last question indicates that this assumption is not reflected in reality. It is not the character of the territorial self-government unit that has an impact on the successful promotion of one's interests. The political group membership is perceived as the most valuable factor in that regard. Such an assessment may result from the fact that the political groups play an important role in the procedure of selecting the rapporteurs of the CoR's opinions and provide the informal channels of communication with the EU's institutions. As was mentioned, this situation is especially profitable for the smaller territorial self-government units as they can compensate for their structural weaknesses with the political group membership of their representative. However, this may turn the other way around as the already strong regions may become even more powerful (within the CoR) through having a representative that is a member of a significant political group. Moreover, this factor can be characterised as semi-structural – it is hard to imagine that some member of the CoR changes political group affiliation just to increase the influence of their territorial self-government unit, especially since it would probably mean a change of the national party. Nevertheless, on the favour of the smaller territorial self-government units in that matter may speak to the fact that the bigger ones are much more keen on using other channels of representation at the EU level, especially the regional offices in Brussels.

## Conclusion

The governance system of the EU can be characterised not only by the variety of levels taking part in the decision-making process, but also by the variety of actors operating on each level. The CoR is not an exception there. Although at the end it speaks with one voice (e.g. by adopting an opinion), the sound of this voice depends on the representatives of the individual territorial self-government units. Hence, it offers the chance to look after one's particular interests. It may be 'just' one of the many opportunities (as the multi-level system would suggest), but even in that case it seems to be worth taking the effort. However, it does not mean that the general view of the subnational level is abandoned. What distinguishes the CoR from the other channels of representation of the local and regional governments at the EU level is its dual nature. It provides the forum for the interaction between the interest of the peculiar self-government units and the interest of the subnational level (van der Pol 2016: 35). They may not always comply with each other – but they usually do, as the results show. In the long-term perspective such a state of affairs seems to be beneficial for all the involved sides, enabling them to move closer to the implementation of the 'Europe with the Regions' idea.

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# Hungarian Nationalism and Hungarian Pan-Turanism until the Beginning of the Second World War

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**Abstract:** *After the Napoleonic Wars in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the development and spread of nationalism in Europe began to accelerate. The development of the national consciousness of the peoples living under the domination of the empires in Europe damaged the legitimacy of the empires in Europe and started to threaten the existence of the empires in Europe. These nationalist movements especially affected the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsardom, and these regions became areas of nationalist conflict.<sup>1</sup>*

*The word 'Turan', which is used to describe the Central Asian lands where Turkish tribes live, gained its ideological meaning in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. 'Turanism', which started to gain its ideological meaning in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Hungary, which can be defined as an Asian country in the middle of Europe, has become an ideology identified with Hungarians, Hungarian nationalism and the Hungarian awakening. 'Hungarian Turanism', which has undergone many changes in its ideological depiction, was born and strengthened from the search for national identity among economic and social problems in Hungary, which is considered an 'insecure' society in Europe due to the threats of Slavic and Germanic elements. Hungarian nationalism and Hungarian identity, which were shaped in an ethnocultural context, evolved from a liberal/political basis to an ethnocultural and pan-nationalist practice. Especially at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the 'Hungarian Turanism' ideology, which started to strengthen with the Hungarian elites and intellectuals focusing on Hungarian national interests, culture and expansionist policies against external threats, led to the emergence of a new nationalism movement, Pan-Turanism.*

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1 Nationalist conflicts were formed on three bases. The first was conflicts between peoples and empires. The second was conflicts between empires. The third was the conflicts between the peoples who want independence and the states on which these peoples were dependent.

*Hungarian nationalism and 'Hungarian Turanism' ideology, which started to develop and transform on different grounds, especially after the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, became stronger in the interwar period after the First World War and became an important part of the fascist Hungarian parties supported by Nazi Germany during the Second World War.*

**Keywords:** *Hungarian Nationalism, Turanism, Hungarian Turanism, Pan-Turanism.*

## Introduction

Nationalism,<sup>2</sup> which first emerged as a modern ideology after the French Revolution of 1789,<sup>3</sup> began to spread and gain power in Europe after the French Revolution, especially during the Napoleonic Wars. Although it is impossible to make a common definition of nationalism covering all nations, the emergence of nationalism and the expansion process as a political movement can be classified. Accordingly, the emergence of nation-states, with the influence of the mental and institutional structure of nationalism that spread to Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, created the first wave of nationalism. This process can also be defined as 'civic and territorial nationalism', in which the liberating feature of nationalism comes to the fore and communities become nations. Nationalism, which became politicised as a result of the necessity of establishing a central state, especially as a result of the civil wars in Europe in this period,<sup>4</sup> started to gain strength with the popularity of individualism against absolute authoritarianism in 17<sup>th</sup> century France (Kohn 1960: 124–125). The period, which prioritised the historical backgrounds of the nations and in which the elements of origin, language, history and culture gained weight, created the second wave of nationalism. This period is when separatist and ethnocultural

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2 This date for the birth of nationalism is related to the presence of nationalism in the political arena. So much so that the nationalist movements that emerged in different regions showed significant differences regarding different identity ideas, geographical designs and historiography. This situation makes it impossible to define nationalism covering all nations in terms of its definition and typologies.

3 The most important reason why the French Revolution could affect the political system of Europe is the rise of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, the alliance between the bourgeois class and the secular intellectuals against the church, and the fact that these factors created a new political system because the rise of the bourgeoisie and capitalism has forced change from below and strengthened the borders of existing states (Gellner 1983: 1). Especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when nationalism began to reduce the power of religion in society and politics and glorified national differences and national individualism against the universalism of the past, the content of the concept of the state gave a new legitimacy and provided an opportunity for nations to establish their own states by taking the initiative against the state formation of each nation (Kedourie, 1993).

4 The term politicised nationalism was used to distinguish the literary nationalism found in Europe during the Renaissance period from the nationalism that emerged after it.

nationalism developed, especially when different identities living in empires started to become politicised. The second wave of nationalism led to the birth of a new nationalist movement. This new movement, called pan-nationalist movements, formed the characteristic of this period as a movement aiming to unite the peoples claimed to have geographical, religious, racial or linguistic commonality (Kazemzadeh 1968: 365). With the emphasis on the temporality of the national community, this movement, which is based on the dominance of geography, also led to the emergence of the myths of collapse, rebirth and the golden age (Smith 1986: 192; Smith 1991: 126). In addition, liberalism, which accompanied the first-period nationalist movements<sup>5</sup> (Kohn 1960: 189–191), left its place to the themes of conservatism such as organic society and authoritarianism in this period.

As for the theoretical framework of nationalism, three dominant theories play a dominant role. The first of these is ‘primordialism’, which describes nations as ‘mega families’ with ethnic ties (Connor 1992: 48; Watson 1977: 1) and claims that nations existed before the age of nations (Calhoun 1997: 31). The second is the ‘modernist’ approach, which sees nations as a tool of modernism, accepts that nations are culturally constructed (Gellner 1983: 1–12), states that nations are identities invented by the state in a certain geography, and is positioned directly opposite to ‘primordialism’ (Breuilly 1994: 8–15). The third is ‘ethno-symbolism’, which states that national identities are based on ethnic and historical extensions and explains the cultural reflexes and behaviours of nations with an emphasis on origin (Armstrong, 1982).

On the other hand, nationalism, which developed by showing different social and political characteristics in different regions,<sup>6</sup> was used in the transition from a feudal society to a capitalist nation type in Western Europe and was used by intellectuals in the process of building the nation-state in Eastern Europe. In other words, nationalism experienced a socio-political process towards nation formation from below in Western Europe, while it was developed in Eastern Europe before the formation of modern states and was used while following the nation-state model built by Western Europe. For example, German nationalism, which developed differently from the nationalism that developed in Western Europe – especially France and England – developed on a basis that gave importance to culture and the spirit of the people (*Volksgeist*) (Hayes 2016). German nationalism, which developed in a similar way to Eastern-type nationalism, is of great importance with this feature. Similar to Eastern European countries, Germany, which was able to establish its national unity later than Western Eu-

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5 The central and nationalist process has aligned Western European societies with secular political developments, and liberalism has formed the core of this structure.

6 Nationalism as an ideology has three main aims no matter in which region it is developed. These are the creation of the national economy, the creation of a common culture and national identity and the integration of political movements by building modern political organisations.

ropean countries, became a country where the revolution was experienced from top to bottom due to the weakness of the bourgeoisie in the country and the key role played by the German intellectuals.<sup>7</sup> There are also similar goals that the German-type nationalism and the Western European elites and bourgeois try to achieve. So much so that the German intellectuals, who tried to unite the Germans around the nationalistic sentiment and a national state, did not make alliances with traditional nobles and clergy. At this point, it can be said that German nationalism developed by being influenced by Kant's political nationalism and Herder's organic solidarity/common cultural understanding (Kedourie 1993).

Although non-Western nationalism has shown ideological opposition to the West, it is a model based on the West. At this point, the general characteristics of non-Western nationalism are built on factors such as differentiation, nostalgia and historical heritage. Thus, the ideas of Central and Eastern European nationalists were born of myths and dreams about the future<sup>8</sup> (Kohn 1960: 331). At this point, two types of nationalism, Western European nationalism, and Eastern European nationalism can be distinguished in terms of their origins and basic characteristics.

#### Western European Nationalism:

- Has emerged as a result of existing political and social factors.
- Influenced by the idea of the Enlightenment.
- Individual freedom and rationalism played important roles.
- Has strengthened in the social and political arena as the discourse of the rising bourgeoisie.

#### Eastern European Nationalism:

- Has developed in backward societies which stuck in the past.
- Has developed its legitimacy through national and cultural factors as it is in struggles with existing states.
- Enlightenment thought was not as accepted as it was in Western Europe.
- Contrary to Enlightenment thought, the importance given to religion and the state has increased.
- Gave importance to national unity and power.

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7 The biggest obstacle to the development of German nationalism was undoubtedly the lack of a strong bourgeoisie that could replace the landlords and principalities. For this reason, German intellectuals, romanticism, folk spirit and language factors played important roles in the development of German nationalism (Hans 1955: 34–35).

8 The close relationship established with the past and the idea of an ideal homeland that can be established in the future (Kohn 1960: 331).

- In Eastern Europe, nationalism was used to fight for freedom against a foreign sovereign, if the nation is independent, nationalism was used to spread beyond existing borders.
- Reflected the demands of the traditional nobility and intellectuals (Snyder 1968: 55; Özkırmılı 2000: 42).

Regardless of the form, nationalism gains power as long as it can make its cause legitimate to the society it appeals to. So much so that the persuasiveness of nationalist discourse and its ability to exist in society constitute the most important issues of nationalism.

## **Pan-Nationalism and the Formation of Pan-Movements in Hungary**

The concept of ‘new nationalism’, explained by Louis Snyder (1968), includes some pan movements as an ideology that emerged in historically undeveloped countries. At this point, pan movements have the idea of uniting societies with common ethnic and cultural ties rather than creating a society determined by values. According to the new nationalism, the nation cannot be reduced to political organisation and the nation cannot be limited by the state organisation; on the contrary, the political organisation is adjusted according to the nation. The borders of the state are defined in accordance with the national elements and the borders of the homeland are determined by this reality. In other words, the state is the product of an ideal.

Pan movements, which are broadly divided into three as pan-nationalist, pan-religious and pan-continental according to the elements on which they rise, have a structure that shows different characteristics according to the region in which they developed (Kohn 1948: 544). So much so that the pan-nationalist movements that developed on the European continent developed in Western Europe and Eastern Europe over different characteristics. Western European nationalism and pan movements in Western Europe developed depending on rational, civic, progressive, political and liberal values, while Eastern European nationalism and pan movements in Eastern Europe developed depending on romantic, cultural, reactionary, ethnic and authoritarian values.

Aiming to unite all peoples who share the same geography, language, race or religion, and derived from the ancient Greek word ‘pan’, meaning the ‘whole of something’ (Kazemzadeh 1968: 365), pan-movements constitute a broad variant of an existing nationalism (Snyder 1990: 200). These large-scale pan movements are quite compatible with Hans Kohn’s (1960: 331) distinction between eastern and western nationalisms. At this point, romantic and culture-oriented pan-nationalism is conceptualised according to eastern nationalism. Pan-Slavism, which aimed to unite all Slavic peoples under the rule of Russia in the 1870s, was

the first example of a pan-nationalist movement (Kurat 1952: 241). The political consequences of Pan-Slavism, which fostered a 'cultural renaissance' among the Slavic peoples, began to appear in Russian public opinion and Slavic minorities in Eastern and Central Europe after the 1853–1856 Crimean War. Pan-Slavism, which started to be seen as a 'saviour' especially after the Russian Tsarism lost this war, also played an important role during the struggle for hegemonic power in the Balkans and Eastern Europe between the Russian Tsardom, the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As of this period, Russian politicians and intellectuals began to express their thoughts of seizing the lands inhabited by the Slavs in order to strengthen the Slavic identity (Kohn 1953: 160).

Pan-Germanism, which started to develop in German lands in the years when Pan-Slavic thought began to develop in Eastern Europe, was shaped by the term 'Volk', which especially characterised German nationalism, under the leadership of Fichte. Pan-Germanism, whose main goal was to unite all the scattered Germanic states and to establish an ideal German union, gained the support of liberal actors due to its revolutionary qualities (Kohn 1948: 547). Especially after the French Revolution, the political and religious unrest among the German youth motivated the German youth to resist the traditional order. This resistance has formed the aggressive character of many nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, and the resistance shown against older generations has inspired many renewal movements (Kedourie 1993).

The years after the 1870s was the period when nationalist movements began in Hungarian society. So much so that, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, nationalism among Hungarian intellectuals in Hungary, especially against the Vienna administration, turned into Pan-Turanism through the work of Turkologists such as Vámbéry from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Great Britain Foreign Office 1919). Pan-Turanism, which emerged in this period, is a political movement that aims to ensure the unity of all Ural-Altai elements in Asia and Europe and to unite all Turan<sup>9</sup> races under the same flag and state. Despite this, the emergence of Pan-Turanism has been interpreted in different ways by many researchers.

Since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the term 'Turan', which defines both the Hungarians' 'ideal of a distant homeland' and the unity of the Ural-Altai and Fin-Hungarian peoples (Kowalczyk 2017: 51), can also be interpreted as the orientation of Hungarian culture to Central Asia. The most important criteria that form the basis of Hungarian Pan-Turanism are the longing for historical geography (to the period of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom), which is the reflection of the combination of race, language and culture, the emphasis on the golden age, and the thoughts of resurrection and constant questioning of

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9 At this point, Turan has been interpreted in different ways by various researchers. A term synonymous with Tatars according to Richardson, Mongolia and Manchuria region according to Hulme, nomadic Asian element according to Müller, the Ural-Altai world according to Fraser and kinship between certain peoples according to Castren.



Hungary's tendency to the west, its convergence and adaptation<sup>10</sup> (Ungvary 2012). The aim of the Hungarians, who turned to their distant past to overcome (pre-Christian) their differences and loneliness in the lands they lived in, to establish a geopolitical union covering the Ural-Altai peoples, language family and cultures<sup>11</sup> (Landau 1995: 80), led to the emergence of 'Hungarian Turanism' as a political movement (Duran – Orhun 2019: 558). 'Turanism', which developed as one of the Pan-nationalist ideologies in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>12</sup> was formed against the developing Pan-German and Pan-Slavic movements in neighbouring nations. Turanism, which developed as a kind of national,<sup>13</sup> cultural, identity and linguistic defence reaction/ideology/organisation on the ground of liberation and re-establishment against the assimilation policies imposed on the Hungarians, especially after the occupation of Hungary by the Habsburgs, developed and gained strength in the Hungarian lands (Winternitz 1985: 146). Because of these features, Pan-Turanism became the centre of both the ontological security concept and strategic tendencies of Hungarian nationalism. 'Hungarian Turanism', which gained strength as a national, cultural, identity and linguistic defence reaction/ideology, became a romantic, conservative and nationalist orientation for political independence at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and became an even stronger ideology on Hungarian soil.

At this point, pan-movements place themselves in the new nationalist approach. For this reason, Hungarian Turanism, one of the pan-movements in Europe, emerged in the context of romantic and Eastern European type nationalism, which is called new nationalism.

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10 The most important reason why the longing for the past and the tendency to the west, convergence and adaptation were constantly questioned is that the Hungarian lands, which is an important crossroads, have been invaded many times (especially by the Habsburgs and Slavs) and differ from other European nations in terms of language and culture. In addition, the Hungarians, who became isolated for these reasons, have undergone great changes under the influence of German, Slavic, Polish and Russian nations.

11 In the researches, it is mentioned that there are 27 Turan communities/nations. These are: Azeri, Avar, Bashkir, Bulgarian, Balkar, Buryat, Chuvash, Gagauz, Japanese, Kabardino, Karachay, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Kazakh Madjar, Kyrgyz, Qiniq, Mongolian, Nogai, Uzbek, Uzbek Madjar, Tatar, Turk, Tuva, Turkmen, Uyghur, Yakut and Hungarian communities/nations (Kadioğlu 2014: 4).

12 Pan-ideologies have the aim of uniting societies with common ethnic and cultural ties.

13 National feelings, which have become increasingly widespread since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, formed the basis of the nationalist ideologies that developed in Central Europe. In this period, when the nationalist ideas between Eastern Europe and Western Europe began to diverge, Western European nationalism, which transitioned from a feudal structure to a capitalist nation-state, diverged from Eastern Europe, which tried to use nationalism to create a nation-state. In other words, while Western Europe went through a socio-political process during the nation-state formation, Eastern Europe tried to develop the ideology of nationalism before forming a nation-state. For this reason, Eastern Europe had to follow the nation-state model that Western Europe laid the foundations for (Oğuz 2005: 1–2).

## A Brief History of the Hungarians and the Birth of Hungarian Nationalism

Although the Europeans, who see the Huns as the ancestors of the Hungarians, call the Hungarians ‘Hungar’<sup>14</sup> and Hungary as ‘Hungary’, the Hungarians call themselves ‘Magyar’ and their country ‘Magyarország’. Hungarians who came to Europe (to the Carpathian Basin) from Asia<sup>15</sup> in the 9<sup>th</sup> century and settled in their present lands ‘*Honfoglalás*’; were surrounded by Germans, Slavs and other European nations. Hungarians who were surrounded by Christian European tribes, were influenced by European tribes culturally and religiously, and they accepted Christianity in 1000 under the rule of Prince Istvan (Prince Vajk before converting to Christianity) and began to be ruled as a kingdom. After accepting Christianity under the leadership of Istvan, the Hungarians had the largest land in their history (Macartney 1953: 59). The lands owned by the Hungarians in this period are the lands targeted under the ‘golden age’ discourse even today (Magocsi and Pop 2002: 170). Although they were glorified by other European nations as the defender of Christianity in the east during the Istvan period, the Hungarians could not fully adopt the European culture.

Hungary, which was ruled as a kingdom until the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, came under the control of the Ottoman Empire from this date on. Hungary, which was under the control of the Ottoman Empire until the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz and the 1718 Treaty of Passarowitz, came under the control of the Habsburg Empire as a result of these treaties (Turan 2012: 28–30). After the Hungarians became a part of the Habsburg Empire, the anti-imperialism that started in the Hungarian society became an important factor of the Hungarian national awakening. So much so that, due to the pressure and population policies of the Habsburg King Leopold I against the Hungarian people, the Hungarian Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi started an uprising against the Habsburg Empire in 1703 with the support of the French Kingdom.<sup>16</sup> The Hungarian uprising, which started in 1703 under the leadership of Rákóczi, and the period

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14 The word ‘*Hungar*’ is defined as the name of the Hungarian contingent (Nemeth 1930).

15 The claim of Hungarians to be a community of Asian origin can be examined on three bases. These are the origin, linguistic and geographical bases. The most striking claim about the origins of the Hungarians was made by the famous Hungarian Turkologist Ármín Vámbéry. So much so that, according to Vámbéry, the roots of Hungarian history go back to the Central Asia-Altai Mountains (Vámbéry 1887). It has also been suggested that Hungarians are related to many peoples belonging to the Ural-Altai language family (Kowalczyk 2017 52). Especially at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were debates about whether Hungarian was included in the Finno-Ugric language group or the Ural-Altai language group. However, this discussion ended with the acceptance of the thesis that Hungarian was included in the Finno-Ugric language group. The geographical basis for the Hungarians to be an Asiatic state has emerged with modern Turkology studies. So much so that as a result of these researches, the Ural region was fixed as the centre of Hungarian migration.

16 Rákóczi’s statement ‘It is God’s will to teach the Habsburg Empire that the Hungarian people will not be enslaved’ revealed the main reason for this uprising (Molnar 2001: 136).

between 1711–1825 are considered to be the dates when the Hungarian national awakening began and strengthened (Cartledge 2011: 125).

After the death of Louis XIV in 1715, the Habsburg Empire, which managed to keep up with the changing power balances in Europe, changed the structure of the empire as a 'dual structure' with pragmatic sanctions after suppressing the Hungarian uprising in 1711 and managed to keep Hungary within the empire (Molnar 2001: 166). The 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution laid the foundations of many political, economic and social transformations in Europe and inspired national independence movements against monarchies in multinational empires in Europe. In this context, the year 1848 was a period when the winds of revolution blew all over Europe, especially in France (Rapport 2010). In Hungary, one of the nations affected by this revolutionary wind that developed in Europe, the Hungarian Revolution, an independence movement against the monarchy, started between 1848–1849 with an emphasis on individualism, rationality and popular sovereignty, in the light of liberal ideas that laid the foundations of Hungarian nationalism<sup>17</sup> (Waterbury 2010: 28). However, Hungarian peasants, who made up the majority of the Hungarian people in this period, were far from the ideas of freedom and independence. So much so that, during the Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815, although Napoleon tried to revolt the Hungarians against Austria, the Hungarians said: 'France is far away. No more Rákóczi and Thököly. Hungarians have learned to run their own problems in line with their own interests'. For this reason, the Hungarians remained loyal to the Habsburg Empire (Molnar 2001: 163).

In this context, the Hungarian national movement, which the intellectual elite tried to develop on the basis of secular and national values, succeeded in mobilising the people, especially in line with language and culture. Especially Ferenc Kazinczy's 'triple language classification',<sup>18</sup> which played an important role in the massification and nationalisation of the Hungarian language, ignited the wick of the Hungarian national awakening. So much so that Kazinczy's classification laid the foundations for the cultural differences of the Hungarian people to turn into a political separation. Other important factors of the Hungarian national independence movement are undoubtedly the liberalisation of the Hungarian Constitution and the reform movements initiated by the Hungarian people with the aim of getting rid of medieval thought and having a say in the political will.

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17 Hungarian poet János Batsányi announced the footsteps of the Hungarian revolution in February 1793 with these words: 'Revolution is inevitable in our land' (Molnar 2001: 159).

18 For Kazinczy, Latin was the language of the church, law and politics. German was the language of the monarchy. Hungarian was the language of the Hungarian people and the Hungarian elite (Molnar 2001: 165).

So much so that the reform demands initiated by Lajos Kossuth and liberal/nationalist movements<sup>19</sup> in the 1830s played an important role in the politicisation of Hungarian ethnicity by adopting the libertarian discourse of the French Revolution (Molnar 2001: 177–179). Undoubtedly, the most important achievement of these reform demands was the acceptance of Hungarian as an official language on the Hungarian side of the empire in 1836 (Molnar 2001: 180). As a result of meeting the reform demands of the Hungarians, the legal regulations that went down in history as the '31<sup>st</sup> of April Law' were arranged. As a result of these arrangements, it was decided to abolish the feudal lords, to remove the church from politics, to re-incorporate the lands taken from Hungary, especially Transylvania, into the Hungarian border, to ensure legal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms and to establish a prime ministerial unit within the Hungarian national government (Rapport 2010).

These arrangements brought Hungary one step closer to its goal of independence and Lajos Kossuth, one of the leaders of the independence movement, called the Hungarian people to national resistance in 1848.<sup>20</sup> Despite all these efforts, the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 could not reach the desired goals and the revolution was suppressed by the monarchy (Taylor 1948: 84). So much so that with the new constitution made on 4 March 1849, the monarchy turned into a central empire consisting of five regions, and dualism was re-established in 1866. On 29 May 1867 the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was proclaimed, with the Hungarian crowning of Franz Joseph I of Austria (Taylor 1948: 124; Güngörmüş 2010: 58). After this development, Hungarian lands were not affected by the separatist movements that developed in the Balkans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the Hungarian prime minister at the time, Tisza István, stayed away from the environment of war and conflict for the inner peace of Hungary. However, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 brought the Empire back into the atmosphere of war and Franz Ferdinand wanted to switch to a 'trialist' state system by including the lands inhabited by the Slavic minorities into the monarchy. Trying to stay away from war after these developments, Hungary had to enter the war against its will as the monarchy brought the empire into a war atmosphere<sup>21</sup> (Güngörmüş 2010: 62).

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19 Liberal/nationalist movements that supported the reform demands initiated under the leadership of Kossuth united in 1847 under the leadership of Kossuth and formed 'the Opposition Party (*Ellenzéki Párt*)'. After this transformation, the optimal distribution of public services, the establishment of equal voting rights and the legal guarantee of freedoms such as freedom of the press began to take place in the program of the *Ellenzéki Párt*. The *Ellenzéki Párt* also struggled with the monarchy for the establishment of the Hungarian national government, the abolition of feudal loyalties, the re-incorporation of Transylvania into the borders of Hungary and the expansion of the state's borders to 'all lands of the Kingdom of St. Stephen', including Transylvania and Croatia (Molnar 2001: 210; Taylor 1976: 60).

20 On 5 July 1848, Kossuth said in the Hungarian Parliament: 'Gentlemen, our country is in danger. Stand tall. I bow before the greatness of this nation. I'm telling you, there is such an effort that I feel the patriotism to my bones while I swear. They will not be able to defeat Hungary' (Çiloğlu 2019: 34).

21 Another reason for Hungary to enter the war was Hungary's concern about the annexation of the Transylvania region by Romania.

The formation of the ethno-cultural characteristics of Hungarian nationalism came to the fore on two grounds. The first of these was the idea that the Hungarians, an Asian community in Europe, had different cultural and sociological structures. The second was the feeling of insecurity that Hungarians felt towards other communities living around them. Undoubtedly, the events experienced had a great influence on the formation of this feeling of insecurity and its attainment of political consciousness. The most important of these events was undoubtedly the support of the Slav minorities and the Russian Tsardom against the Hungarians to the Habsburg monarchy during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. This situation led to the determination of the Slavic communities as unreliable 'others' in the political consciousness of the Hungarians and the formation of a reactionary attitude against the idea of Pan-Slavism (Sunar – Yolcu 2012: 157). At this point, Hungarians had formed a strong identity awareness based on ethno-culturalism against the idea of Pan-Slavism (Waterbury 2010: 32). Another factor that created the sense of insecurity among the Hungarians was the threat of Germany and Pan-Germanism, which tried to increase its influence in Central and Eastern Europe with the idea of 'Mitteleuropa' (Sunar –Yolcu 2012: 156).

Undoubtedly, another reason for the formation of the distrusted the 'other' idea in the Hungarian political consciousness was the Treaty of Trianon, which was signed on 4 June 1920 after the First World War. So much so that Hungary faced the threat of surrendering the south of its lands to the Serbs, Transylvania to Romania and the Slovak lands to the Czechs, with the Armistice of Belgrade, signed with the Entente Powers on 13 November 1918. With the establishment of the Hungarian Council Republic on 21 March 1919, Hungary defended its rights in line with the Wilson Principles. Despite this, the Treaty of Trianon, which was signed, caused the almost complete destruction of Hungary. Hungary, which lost 70% of its territory and 60% of its population as a result of the Treaty of Trianon (Waterbury 2010: 30–31), had to give land to Romania in the east, Italy and Yugoslavia in the south, and Czechoslovakia and Poland in the north (Sunar – Yolcu 2012: 165).

The Treaty of Trianon had three major effects on the Hungarians. The first of these effects was the image of collapse, which reinforced the idea of political loneliness and insecurity for the Hungarians in Europe with the fragmentation of the Hungarian lands. The second effect was the establishment of the perception of the unreliable other, which has been firmly embedded in the Hungarian identity. The third effect was the emergence of ethnic and irredentist nationalism as a result of the Hungarians coming under the domination of other countries.<sup>22</sup>

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22 After the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian minorities, who broke away from the homeland, tried to create political awareness in the regions they were in. These political awareness's have focused on providing international support and legitimacy in the context of the right to self-determination and keeping the motivation of attachment to the homeland alive (Waterbury 2010: 35–36).

At this point, it can be said that the Treaty of Trianon caused the birth of irredentist and revisionist nationalism in Hungary because the Hungarians felt unfairly tried, convicted and humiliated after the Treaty of Trianon (Waterbury 2010: 32). On the other hand, Hungarian revisionism was not affected by the aggressive revisionist policies of the period as much as the Germans and Italians. The Hungarians, who broke away from the homeland after the Treaty of Trianon, continued to raise political awareness in regions that they lived in.

## History of Hungarian Turanism

The term Turanism is derived from the Persian word ‘Turan’, used to describe nomadic and anti-Iranian tribes living in Central Asia and the lands north of today’s Iran.<sup>23</sup> Although Hungarians, who were surrounded by Germans and Slavs after they came to their homeland in Europe, tried to reduce their feelings of exclusion and loneliness by accepting Christianity in 1000, cultural differences did not disappear. The Hungarians, who did not want to be culturally assimilated after the adoption of Christianity, started the struggle to keep Hungary alive against the Germanic and Slavic nations in the region they lived in since the Middle Ages. Firstly, Hungarians, who tried to create a national identity for their state, considered the Huns and Attila as their ancestors and investigated the Hun-Hungarian partnerships. Especially the ‘*Gesta Hungarorum*’ in the 13<sup>th</sup> century (Önen 2005: 51) and the ‘*Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum*’ written by Mark Kalti in the 14<sup>th</sup> century led the Hungarians to search for their own past (Korkut 2017: 74). The desire of the Hungarians to research their own past continued in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries, and many Hungarian clergies went to Central Asia.

Especially after the end of the Ottoman Empire’s dominance in the region, the Hungarians, who came under the control of the Habsburgs in 1686, started to unite under the idea of ‘Orientalism’ by starting a strong nationalist movement – even though they were a privileged group within the empire – focused on the Hungarian culture, language and history against the Habsburg administration<sup>24</sup> (Breuilly 1994: 412–413). In this period, Hungarians, who had to face the ‘Germanisation’ policies implemented by the Habsburgs and the Romanian and Slovak immigrants sent to Budapest in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, then struggled against the Slavic threat that became stronger in the region. Particularly, during the Hungarians’ 1848–1849 independence struggle, the joint action of the Habsburgs, Slavs, Russians and Austrians against the Hungarians and the

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23 Geographically, it is not clear exactly which region the term Turan describes, but probably this region defines an area between the Caspian Sea and the Tian Shan (Önen 2005: 35).

24 Hungarians established the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1827 in order to put their culture, language and history-oriented movements on a scientific basis. This institution has naturally become the academic centre of these subjects.

Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism movements<sup>25</sup> that were strengthened in the region created and developed the thoughts of 'loneliness and third-class nation in Europe'<sup>26</sup> in the Hungarian society. The threats faced by the Hungarians in Europe, the idea of loneliness and the formation of national self-consciousness pushed the Hungarians to seek their own roots (Özkırımlı 2015; Kessler 1967: 9–13; Kaymaz 1975: 439).

The concept of Turan, which started to be used after the Hungarians settled in Europe, started to gain popularity in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when world politics turned to Central Asia. For this reason, the term Turan was first conceptualised in Hungarian literature as a geographical term by Ferenc Pulszky in 1839, as a race and language family in the book *'The Classification of Turanian Language'*, written by the German Turkologist Max Müller in 1854,<sup>27</sup> and as an anthropological concept by Géza Nagy (Duran – Orhun 2019: 558).

Since the 1850s, with the increasing interest in linguistic studies and Hungarian scientists on this subject, the Turan hypothesis has become scientifically

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25 Hungary, which established an autonomous government as a result of the restructuring of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a dual monarchy in 1867, had lands inhabited by Slavic minorities (Breuilly 1994: 429). Especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as the cultural and political assets of the Slavic minorities supported by Russia, which tried to accelerate the modernisation process, gained strength in Hungary, the Hungarians realised that not only the Pan-Germanic movements but also the Pan-Slavic movements posed a serious threat to the Hungarian culture and politics (Kessler 1967: 37–39). For this reason, in this period, Hungary started a strong assimilation policy against the Slavic minorities within itself (undoubtedly, the Austrian government had a role in this policy of the Hungarians. In fact, this policy aimed to stop Russia's expansionist policies by using Slavic minorities), but because this policy was severely criticised by France and England, Hungary got closer to Germany. However, this alliance came to an end as a result of the Hungarians' mistreatment of the German minority and the German-Austrian alliance was formed. The resulting political and economic conditions caused Hungarian nationalists to turn their faces to the east. The main purpose of this policy was to get closer to Germany against the rising Pan-Slavic threat. As a result, Hungary's eastward-turning policies resulted in the strengthening of the relations between Turanism and Hungarian nationalists (Özdoğan 2002: 63–64).

26 Hungarians' thoughts of loneliness and third-class nation in Europe, have developed especially with the negative attitudes of the European nations against the Hungarians for a long time. For example, in medieval sources, the Hungarians were depicted as an 'Asian race', 'barbarians', 'a foreign group' and a 'nation excluded from the Indo-European language family' (Sinor 1966: 21). Also, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Germans portrayed the Hungarians as 'a community that should be sent back to Asia'. In the Paris Peace Conference, on the other hand, Hungarians were depicted as 'a cruel and rude Turan tribe' and as 'a nation that disrupted the traditional and deep-rooted order of Europe, like the Turks'. These views and discourses of Western European countries about Hungarians played an important role in the formation of nationalism and Turanism ideas that developed in Hungarians (Borsody 1988: 26–27). On the other hand, in 1896, the French Turkologist Leon Cahun interpreted the Asian nomads, which had been known as 'backward' civilizations until then, as 'societies with their own special histories' in his book *'Introduction a l'histoire l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des Origines a 1405'*. This interpretation of Cahun played an important role in the increase of Turanist feelings in Hungary (Akbaba 2017: 542).

27 Müller, who divided the world languages into three as Indo-European/Aryan, Semitic and Eurasian (Turan/Ural-Altai) in his book, revealed the origin of Turanism (Korkut 2017:74). Müller stated that the Ural-Altai language family is a part of the agglutinative Central Asian language and was used by 'warrior and nomadic tribes' and stated the Hungarians as a nation that fit this linguistic and cultural structure (Winternitz 1985: 145). Although this idea was later refuted by other studies and emphasised that the term is only a geographical term, it formed an important basis for ongoing studies.

important in Hungary. The term Turan, which has been discussed through linguistic research since this date, was developed by Pál Hunfalvy, who wanted to establish this subject on scientific grounds, founded the Hungarian Ethnographic Society<sup>28</sup> in 1889 and believed that the Hungarian language includes elements from both Ural-Altai and Finno-Ugrian language families (Winternitz 1985: 149). Then, in 1895, Géza Nagy (Ármin Vámbéry's student) used the term both as a synonym for the Ural-Altai language family and as an anthropological concept to describe Central Asian nomads such as the Huns, Tatars, Turks, Kyrgyz – and even Koreans and Japanese<sup>29</sup> (Laszlo 2010: 10; Kessler 1967: 68–71). Apart from these researches, undoubtedly, the most important regional studies were those conducted in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Sándor Kőrösi Csoma and Ármin Vámbéry.<sup>30</sup> Csoma's studies on the homeland of the Hungarians increased the interest of the Hungarians in their past homeland. On the other hand, Vámbéry's studies<sup>31</sup> have concluded that the Hungarian language and race are related to the Turks (Vámbéry 1882; Vámbéry 1895). As a result, the orientalist studies of both Csoma and Vámbéry and the aim of the term Turan to establish political unity among all Turanian peoples on an ethno-cultural basis contributed significantly to the strengthening and spread of the 'Turan' movement and Hungarian nationalism in Hungary.

As a result of the orientalist studies of Csoma and Vámbéry, the idea of Turan<sup>32</sup> was adopted and accepted as a geographical, historical and ethno-cultural concept by the Hungarian elite who supported a new national ideology.

28 Although the society initially supported the Finn-Ugrian school against the Ural-Altai school, it started to support the Ural-Altai school after 1890 (Kessler 1967: 67). As a defender of the Ural-Altai school, the society started to publish the journal '*Keleti Szemle*' (Oriental Review) in 1900 and played an important role in the international promotion of this school.

29 There are important Byzantine, Arab and Iranian sources emphasising that the Hungarians are a people of Asian-Turkish origin. Undoubtedly the most important of these examples are the inscription '*ΓΕΩΒΙΤΖΑΚ ΠΙΣΤΟΤ ΚΡΑΛΗΚ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΚ*' (*Geovitzas, faithful King of the Land of the Turks*) on the Holy Crown of Hungary and the Greek Orthodox Church naming the Hungarian Orthodox Church as 'Metropolitanate of Tourkia' (Baan 1999: 46).

30 The orientalist studies of Hungarians during this period were divided into academic and political studies. Studies that focused on the Ural-Altai thesis academically, focused on Turanism politically. Academic studies have formed the basis of political research on Turanism.

31 Ármin Vámbéry's work named '*A Magyarok Eredete*' (The Origin of the Hungarians), published in 1882 stated that the Hungarian language, physiology and anthropology showed features closer to the Turks (Kessler 1967: 67–68). The most important feature of this study was the introduction of Turan as an ethnographic term to the Hungarian public and Hungarian academy. However, this evaluation led to an academic war between Hungarian Turkology and the Finno-Ugrian school '*Ugor-Török Haboru*' (Ugor-Turkish War) (Hubbes 2011: 5). One of the most important representatives of the Finno-Ugrian school, Jozsef Budenz's work '*Magyar-Ugor Összehasonlito*' (Hungarian-Ugrian Comparison), published in 1881, revealed the similarities between the Hungarian language and the Finno-Ugrian languages. However, as a result of the Ural-Altai thought being more effective politically, it was concluded that the Hungarian language is a 'Turani' language formed by a mixture of Turkish-Ugrian languages (Great Britain Naval Intelligence Division 2017; Winternitz 1985: 152).

32 The term Turanism was defined both positively and negatively, especially in Hungary at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For example, Árpád Zempléni (1865–1919) in



In this period, the highly educated Hungarian upper classes, who were the spokesmen of the Hungarian national identity, did not ignore their eastern roots, and wanted to maintain their secular, modern and culturally traditional influence, supported the idea of Turan,<sup>33</sup> which they saw as an ideology against the western orientation (Kessler 1967: 17–18). For this reason, ‘*Turani Tarsasag*’<sup>34</sup> (Turan Society), which was founded in 1910<sup>35</sup> by a group of Hungarian elites, scientists and politicians, began to gain political and academic power in Hungary (Kessler 1967; Ablonczy 2005; Kincses 1991: 30; Önen 2003: 29–32). This society, which managed to survive until 1944, managed to be effective in the spread and strengthening of Turanism in Hungary as a defensive nationalist, economic expansionist and anti-liberal<sup>36</sup> ideology focused on political independence in Hungary, with the support of the Hungarian upper classes and official institutions<sup>37</sup> (Kövecsi-Olah 2012: 70–71; Önen, 2015; Önen 2003: 31–32). In addition, the journal named ‘*Turan*’, which the society started to publish in 1913, made economic, cultural, social and linguistic studies until 1944 (Oba 1995: 130), when the society was closed and made the real goals of Hungarian Turanism understandable (Önen 2015: 65; Korkut 2017: 75). The economic and financial structures of Asian countries, which is one of the most important is-

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1917 and the Hungarian general dictionary Révai Nagy Lexikona (Volume XVIII, 1925) in 1925 stated that ‘Turanism is an effort and a kind of self-defence for the cultural, economic and political rapprochement and cooperation of the Ural, Altai, Finnish and Mongolian peoples’. On the other hand, Gyula Germanus (1884–1979), Zoltán Szász and Miklós Kállay (1887–1967) stated that ‘Turanism is an imaginary kinship, a product of imagination without a scientific basis, and a non-new idea-longing used to gain political interests’ (Szász 1916; Laszlo 2010).

- 33 The aim of Turanism, which received serious support in Hungary since the 1890s, was to secure the national rights of the Hungarians and to turn the Hungarians’ face to the east politically and culturally. According to this situation, it was possible to talk about the three-way benefits of Turan for the Hungarians. These were, firstly, the Hungarians’ preservation of their national unity, secondly, the liberation of Hungary from the oppression of the Viennese government, and finally, the restoration of the historical role as the representative of the Turan world in Europe (Kessler 1967: 12–13).
- 34 The most important aims of the society were: ‘Geographical, historical, sociological, linguistic, archaeological and anthropological investigation of the roots of the Hungarians and their connections with the Ural-Altai peoples, in accordance with the Hungarian national interests and study, dissemination, promotion and development of the national culture and economy of the Ural-Altai peoples (Balkans, Ottoman and Middle East)’ (Cholnoky 1940: 14; Kessler 1967: 29; Ablonczy 2005: 90).
- 35 ‘*Turáni Dalok*’ (Turani Songs), published by Árpád Zempléni, who was known as ‘the Prophet of Hungarian Turanism’ in 1910, became the handbook of Hungarian Turanists at that time and had a great impact (Tanay 2018). This work of Zempléni stated that ‘Hungarians’ real brothers and sisters are in the East’, as an expression of Hungarians’ disillusionment with Europe (Önen 2003: 28). ‘*Turáni Dalok*’ and Zempléni mobilised the Hungarian Turanists and led the establishment of the ‘*Turani Tarsasag*’ (Turan Society).
- 36 In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there was a rapidly urbanising and developing bourgeois class in Hungary. However, the aristocratic class, the spokespersons of Hungarian nationalism, did not allow the liberal elements of the developing bourgeois class to be included in the cultural and political arena and wanted to preserve and maintain their own political and cultural influences. The most appropriate thought for the opposition of the Hungarian aristocratic class to the bourgeois-liberal wave was Turanism.
- 37 For this reason, the nationalist movements that developed in Hungary did not consist of unfounded populist movements, but of an elitist movement seeking a new ideology.

sues that the magazine especially focuses on (Paikert 1913), played an important role in the development of economic and financial Turanism, and this situation emerged clearly before and during the First World War<sup>38</sup>.

The idea of Turanism was used to raise the awareness of Hungarian people belonging to the Turan race against the Pan-Germanic, Pan-Slavic and Pan-Orthodox movements that developed in the region (Korkut 2017: 77), as well as for Hungary's economic interests. So much so that, after the revolution in Russia, the thought of Turan became much more useful for Hungary politically and the word Turan gained geographical, linguistic and ethnic meanings. However, Hungary's loss of territory as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, which it had to sign after losing the First World War, created a great disappointment both for the Hungarian Turanists, who had expansionist goals and for the Hungarian Turanism.

## Hungarian Turan in Inter-War Period

After the start of the First World War, the Hungarians began to seek alliances and common interests between the Ottomans and Bulgaria.<sup>39</sup> The deepening Hungarian-Turkish-Bulgarian-Japanese solidarity against common rivals – the Slavs and to the Russians – the thoughts that the Turanist expansion would take place with the support of the Russian Turks – Crimean Tatars, Kazan Tatars and Azeris – and that the defence policy that developed in connection with Hungary's loneliness in Europe would come to an end, made Hungarian Turanism gain popularity in Hungary with romantic and expansionist tendencies (Kessler 1967). Hungarian Turanists thought that they could achieve victory with their allies (German Empire-Austria-Hungarian Empire-Ottoman Empire and Kingdom of Bulgaria) at the end of the war,<sup>40</sup> realise the Turan ideal, increase

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38 In 1916, while the First World War was going on, *'Magyar Keleti Kulturközpont'* (Hungarian Eastern Cultural Center) was added to the name of *'Turani Társaság'* (Turan Society) and with the support of important Hungarian scientists, it started to publish in English, German, French and Turkish languages (Kowalczyk 2017: 53; Oba 1995: 13). This change was made both for the promotion of Hungarian Turanism, which gained popularity in the First World War, to a wider audience, and for the society to establish the institutional framework of its research in Asia (Demirkan 2020: 48). On the other hand, in this period, the thoughts against Hungarian Turanism and Hungarian Turan societies became widespread in Hungary. People such as Zoltán Szász, Julius Németh and the journals *'Nyugat'* (West) and *'Magyar Szemle'* (Hungarian Review) represented an important opposition to the Hungarian Turanism and Hungarian Turan societies that developed in Hungary. Opponents and journals criticising Hungarian Turanism as 'a belief in imaginary ethnic relations', 'unrealistic and scientifically unfounded', criticised Turanian societies as 'places that damaged Turanism and produced rousing', and Hungarian society as 'a constant anti-European' (Dow 2002: 31–35).

39 The potential of solidarity between Hungarians, Turks and Bulgarians during the war was recognised by the allies. The Allies evaluated this rapprochement as 'a solid bloc stretching from the Middle Danube to Mesopotamia', 'a union with extraordinary political potential' and 'a strong move against the common enemy Russia' (Stoddard 1917: 21).

40 The fact that Hungarian Turanists participated in the First World War alongside the German Empire of Aryan origin, to which they were ideologically opposed to, shows that Hungarian Turanism contains

their economic interests in Southeast Europe, and end the Pan-Slavic threat in the region by rising to the position of the leader of all Turan nations/race. However, the loss of the war was the beginning of change for Hungarian Turanism, Hungarian Turanists and Turan Societies.

Changes in Hungarian Turanism, Hungarian Turanists and Turanian Societies had two main turning points. The first turning point of change was experienced in 1922 with the emergence of Italian fascism. The Turanists' acceptance of Mussolini as the leader of a bloodless coup and their admiration for his resistance against socialism and anarchy enabled the Hungarian Turanists to gain power during the Horthy period (Demirkan 2000: 58; Szendrei 2010: 29). The second turning point of the change is that Turanism, which was introduced by Vámbéry in Hungary, took a different shape in Hungary during and after the war. Differentiating from Vámbéry's narrative, Turan became a nationalist movement that started to target the Jewish community, which these structures housed, as a precaution taken against both the communist structuring that came to power after the war – Pan-Slavic and Russian hostilities of the Turanists began to evolve into anti-communism in this period – and the developing bourgeois class (Szabo 2003).

After the war, the first step of the change in Hungarian Turanism, Hungarian Turanists and Turan Societies was seen in the first '*Turan*' magazine issue of 1918. The defeat in the war caused the Hungarians to change their understanding of Turanism, and it was written that Turan, which had previously been attributed to linguistic and political meanings, was only a term associated with geography and economic interests (Önen 2003: 42–46). According to this definition, Hungarian Turanism was not only a result of the alienation of Hungarians from other European countries but an instrumental ideology as a result of Hungarians and Turanians seeking economic interests. However, the Hungarian Turanists, who believed that Turanism had a hidden political agenda, managed to keep the Turan ideology in Hungarian politics, with some changes, until the beginning of the Second World War, despite the defeat in the First World War (Oğuz 2005: 107).

The communist terror experienced in Hungary in 1919 after the First World War caused turmoil and chaos in the society, seriously damaged the power of Béla Kun and did not make it possible to support any idea or ideology in the country. After the end of Béla Kun's rule, under the rule of Miklós Horthy, who became the head of Hungary, Turan thought and societies started to gain power again and three main Turan societies/groups were formed. These were: '*Kőrösi Csoma Tarsaság*'<sup>41</sup> (Kőrösi Csoma Society), an academic group founded under

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various contradictions. However, on the other hand, this situation can also be interpreted as a policy emphasising the priority of Hungarian citizens.

41 Teleki argued that 'Turan is a geographical and ethno-cultural structure and there is no scientific evidence for the common origin of the Turan peoples'. For this reason, Teleki considered the political Turan as

the leadership of Count Teleki, '*Magyarországi Turan Szövetség*' (Hungarian Turan Association), which was founded with the participation of nine Turanist societies under the leadership of Jenő Cholnoky and showed radical features, and '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society), which was reactivated under the leadership of Gyula Pekár<sup>42</sup>.

These Turanist societies, which developed between the two wars, were influential in Hungary with different views, despite the difficult conditions in Hungary after the war. Especially in this period, due to the financial difficulties in Hungary, Turanist societies started to need the donations of their members to survive. For example, '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society), which started to operate again under the leadership of Pekár, was obliged to Pekár and Pekár's connections, although it received support from the Hungarian government. This obligation of the society to Pekár caused the society to become a personal organisation of Pekár until his death in 1937<sup>43</sup> (Kessler 1967). On the other hand, the radical '*Magyarországi Turan Szövetség*' (Hungarian Turan Association), founded by members who left the '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society) group, focused less on academic studies and worked to make political Turanism a popular ideology in Hungary. However, in the interwar period, '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society) played a much more important role in Hungarian politics until 1937 with the support of Hungary's political elite.

In the interwar period, other Turanian societies were established in Hungary apart from the main societies. These groups, which were not as influential as '*Magyarországi Turan Szövetség*' (Hungarian Turan Association) and '*Turani Tarsaság*'<sup>44</sup> (Turán Society), were generally much more radical and neo-pagan (like '*Turani Egyistenhivok*' (Turán Monotheists) Turanist groups than the two main societies (some even inspired by German National Socialism (Turmezei, 1935)) (Kessler 1967). The biggest reason why these groups – especially neo-pagan Turanist groups – were not successful is that they could not get the support of

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a concept far from scientific reality (Demirkan 2020: 44–45). However, these studies have been useful for the Turanian thought, which was popularised in Hungary, quickly became politicised and based on ideas such as common origin, myths, destiny, race and romance (although it doesn't need scientific evidence (Schmidt 1925) (Turda 2010: 33–39).

42 Despite the different groups that formed, Hungarian Turanists operated under the roof of two main societies. These groups were the radical '*Magyarországi Turan Szövetség*' (Hungarian Turan Association) led by Cholnoky and the '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society) founded in 1910. Showing radical features in the interwar period, '*Turan Szövetség*' (Turán Association) focused on anti-aristocratic, anti-capitalist, anti-bureaucratic, anti-modernist, anti-Western and anti-European, racist, anti-Pan-Germanic and anti-Pan-Slavic ideas. Despite *Turan Szövetség's* radicalism, although the two societies did collaborate from time to time, *Turani Tarsaság* played a more active role thanks to the political elites who supported it and the Turán magazine, which started to be published again (Kowalczyk 2017: 54–55).

43 Gyula Pekár's death in 1937 temporarily interrupted the work of the society.

44 '*Turani Tarsaság*' (Turán Society) criticised the Horthy regime in the interwar period and its successor, '*Nyilaskeresztes Part – Hungarista Mozgalom*' (Arrow Cross Party), headed by Ferenc Szálasi, for being pro-German/Pro-Aryan (Turmezei 1935).

the Horthy regime, which was founded on Christian values. ‘*Turani Tarsasag*’ (Turan Society), which started to gain strength again under the leadership of Hungarian Turanists and Jenő Cholnoky, who thought that the Second World War could be a potential source of revision against the Treaty of Trianon, gained the support of Hungarian citizens (Kessler 1967).

Talking about the unity of Turan in the 1930s and undertaking the task of being a bridge between the peoples of Asia and Europe, the Turanists attributed a racist meaning to Turan, considering the potential for an alliance between Bulgaria, and Japan and other Turan nations. In this way, Turan thought differed from the anti-Pan-Slavic and anti-Pan-Germanic thought on which it was founded, and took on an anti-Semitic, anti-Aryan form, and became a thought meant to ‘unite of all Turanian peoples’. Turanism became a discourse of the Hungarian radical right, especially in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and started to gain strength in the interwar period. With the influence of Hungarian Turanists being influenced by Mussolini’s actions in Italy, the fascist thought, totalitarian government support, racism and anti-communism that developed among the Hungarian Turanists became the structures that formed the basis of the Turanian thought (Demirkan 2020: 60). Hungarian Turanists, who started to seek ways to cooperate with Turkish nationalists under the influence of these ideas (Çolak 2011: 94), advocated strategic rapprochement with Japan after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the Germany-Japan alliance.

However, the heavy defeat at the end of the Second World War again disappointed the Hungarian Turanists. After the German supporter Ferenc Szálasi’s rule in Hungary, Hungary became a communist country because of the occupation by the Soviet Union. This has resulted in the withdrawal, banning and marginalisation of all Turanian activities in Hungary and all Turanian activities (publications, organisations and societies) have become almost completely dysfunctional by 1989.

## Conclusion

Hungarians, who have a very different structure from their neighbours in Europe in terms of both language and culture, have tried to adapt to European culture, but they have not been very successful in providing cultural and political adaptation. For this reason, Hungarian Turanism, which developed in a cultural and linguistic focus, should be accepted as a unique ideology in the context of its relations with European and non-Christian peoples. Hungarian Turanism, which developed as a defence in Hungary, and was influenced by Pan ideologies in Europe, has turned into a search for identity and a political and economic re-existence in this direction.

Although the 1848 Revolution initiated by the Hungarians against the Habsburgs failed, it laid an important foundation for the development of Hungarian

ethnic identity. Especially in this process, Russia's support of the Habsburgs led to the creation of the 'other' picture in the Hungarian identity and the Hungarian identity to have an ethno-cultural structure. The Treaty of Trianon, which was another breaking point of Hungarian nationalism, caused the Hungarians to develop a feeling of alienation and loneliness in Europe. So much so, that Hungary lost most of its territory and its population because of the Treaty of Trianon, causing 'irredentism' and 'pan-nationalist' ideas to play a dominant role in Hungarian nationalism. For this reason, Hungarian Turanism, which manifests itself as an expression of geographical imagination, emerged as the strategic expansion of the Hungarians, who were isolated in Europe and felt the threat of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.

Although the influence of Hungarian Turanism decreased with revisionist movements after the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary was included in the Second World War on the side of the Germans in line with the Hungarian political goals that developed in the inter-war period. In Hungary, which was occupied by the Soviet Union after the loss of the war, nationalism changed shape and turned into a struggle for 'establishment' and 'liberation'. At this point, although the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet Union in 1956 ended in failure, this struggle can be considered as an extremely important event for Hungarian nationalism.

It seems that the idea of Turanism, which has survived the political conditions Hungary has been through for a long time, is not just a fantasy revealed by wars (Schmidt, 1925). It is an active thought with a social base and mass culture, which should not be taken lightly in Hungary.

So much so that Hungarian nationalism, which started to develop again after the democratisation movements in Hungary, had an important role in the re-development of Hungarian Turanism and its inclusion in Hungarian politics, especially between 2003–2018, under the leadership of Jobbik and certain groups. On the other hand, the Mi Hazánk party, founded by radical-minded members who left the party after Jobbik changed its policies and became a more liberal and European supporter party in 2018, defends radical views in Hungary today. At this point, modern Hungarian Turanism, represented by the Hungarian radical right, is becoming more popular in the crisis environment of the West with its opposition to the European Union, NATO, globalisation and liberalism. Moreover, Hungarian nationalism, which developed in a political environment where the effects of the Treaty of Trianon signed after the First World War became entrenched, also provides a suitable environment for the development of Hungarian Turanism.

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# When Ideology Matters More – Science and Vaccine Scepticism in Light of Political Ideologies and Partisanship during the Third COVID-19 Wave in Hungary<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** *As for the mitigation of the negative consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and the related crisis, governments should inter alia facilitate the willingness to vaccinate. However, related discussions became politicised, especially in countries with an extremely high level of partisan polarisation in opinions and media discourses, like in Hungary, which is the selected case of our study. As previous research about the United States shows, general trust in science is also influenced by the ideological alignment of individuals – people with conservative identification are more likely to question scientific results and recommendations, considering global warming, or the characteristics of the pandemic and the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. In our study we examine two main questions: first, whether the ideological orientation and partisan alignment of Hungarian citizens influence their general trust in science, and second, whether the same factors influence their opinion on scientists' ability to develop effective vaccines against the coronavirus. Furthermore, we also investigate whether media consumption habits might influence these interrelations. According to the results of the representative online survey, the more conservative someone in Hungary identifies, the more likely they will be sceptical in terms of both questions. However, support of government or opposition parties does not determine whether they believe in the ability of scientists to develop effective vaccines, and it is influenced by their media consumption habits. We showed that (1) opposition supporters are much more different along their preferred media source than government supporters, (2) television watchers are of the same opinion independent of their party preference and (3) social media consumers*

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*are generally more likely to reject scientific results. The phenomenon that supporters of the conservative government and of the alliance of opposition parties are different in terms of their media consumption is a surprising finding in the polarised Hungarian context. We provide two main explanations for this. First, it is most probably the consequence of the government's intensive campaign that encouraged vaccination. Second, the government used the issue of vaccination as a source of legitimacy regarding the effectiveness of their crisis management.*

**Keywords: science scepticism, vaccine scepticism, public opinion, political ideology, partisan polarisation**

## Introduction

Our study aims to contribute to the international literature on scientific scepticism from a specific perspective. Since 2020, the pandemic that has shaken the world has brought the issue of scientific scepticism to the fore, which may have been primarily reflected in the structure of opinion on vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the science and anti-vaccine attitudes are not independent of a country's political situation and regime. In our study, we have therefore chosen a country that is a model country for political polarisation literature, Hungary. We believe that Hungarian trends can indicate how polarisation affects attitudes towards anti-science and, in particular, anti-vaccination.

The exogenous shock of the coronavirus pandemic crisis had a particular impact not only on political systems, but also on the perception of vaccines as the primary crisis management tool. The contingency that characterises politics in crises was particularly fraught with uncertainty since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, and governments were required to take crucial decisions and immediate actions in order to reach herd immunity by increasing vaccination rates in societies as quickly as possible. A further consequence of the exogenous shock is that the legitimacy of political institutions and the preservation of trust are paramount, while their lack can deepen the crisis further. The level of institutional trust determines not only the perceptions about the effectiveness of COVID-19 measures, but about the general management of pandemic crisis as well (Lieberoth et. al. 2021). To avoid further political crisis, political actors should reduce contingency and uncertainty and maintain a trustful environment (Körösényi et al. 2017: 18). This can be a particular challenge in extremely polarised countries like Hungary (Patkós 2019), which will be discussed as the case of our analysis in this study.

There are many methodological approaches to measuring partisanship and polarisation, and accordingly there is not a complete scientific consensus on

their measurability. However, there is a consensus that Hungary is one of the most polarised democracies in Europe in terms of partisan polarisation (Körösi 2012; Palonen 2009; Patkós 2019). According to Veronika Patkós's extensive works on partisan polarisation, several types of polarisation can be distinguished: legislative, political, emotional, ideological and relational polarisation (Patkós 2015: 30). If we consider ideological polarisation, the most commonly applied measure is the left-right alignment of citizens. András Körösi concluded that in Hungary, since the regime change, the liberal-conservative scale is the most frequently used conceptual framework besides the former left-right measures – our study will be analysed on the basis of the latter (Körösi 2012: 3). One important characteristic of polarisation is that the position of the supported party on certain public policy issues significantly determines the opinion of its voters. The concept of partisan polarisation, as formulated by Veronika Patkós, goes back to party identity theory and does not consider voters' public policy preferences as a given, but considers party affiliation as the fundamental determinant of any position or opinion, i.e., it also explains public policy preferences – such as the judgement of a vaccine – by party identity (Patkós 2015: 31). Consequently, if vaccines are considered as the primary crisis management tool against the coronavirus pandemic, trust in scientific results and the ability of science to develop effective vaccines are crucial to handling the coronavirus crisis, and thus, partisan positions might be decisive.

Therefore, to understand related attitudes in more detail, trust in science during the coronavirus crisis should be scrutinised more carefully in terms of partisanship and ideology, and the Hungarian case can provide informative and valuable lessons in this regard. However, these aspects are not exclusive in terms of the assessment of anti-covid vaccines. The critical role of trust in science in terms of compliance attitudes with COVID-19 measures was already explored in several papers (see e.g. Plohl – Musil, 2021), but the role of ideological and partisan polarisation still remained under-discovered. More generally, the example of the United States has been used to report several results that go beyond the critical or pro-science stance that is typical for Republicans and Democrats in general (Bauer et al. 2000; Gauchat 2012). However, previous research highlights science scepticism of conservatives in particular (Latkin et al. 2021; McCright et al. 2013; Mooney 2012; Lewandowsky et al. 2013), and this is confirmed by the climate change and crisis-related scepticism as well, which have been on the rise in recent years. While acceptance of the scientific consensus aligns with the personal beliefs of Democrats (and higher educated people), conservatives and Republicans are less receptive to scientific discourse and evidence on global warming (Dunlap – McCright 2016). The Republican think-tank world also produced a significant amount of knowledge on this issue, with 92 percent of climate scepticism books published between 1972 and 2005 (Jacques et al. 2008). This clearly demonstrates the responsibility of political

groups and surrounding intellectuals in attitudes towards scientific activities and developments.

Beyond general science – and climate change scepticism, US Republicans show significantly less concern about the coronavirus pandemic compared to Democrats (Conway et al. 2021); moreover, Republicans consider government measures less necessary (Cakanlar et al. 2020). Cakanlar and his colleagues also pointed out that behind these considerations there are political, rather than empirical, reasons. Namely, conservative people are not threatened more by the health or economic consequences of the coronavirus than liberals are. Other researchers also highlighted the importance of media coverage of the coronavirus and showed that Republicans create significantly more posts that downplay the seriousness of the coronavirus or suggest conspiracy theories behind the current state of the world (Calvillo et al. 2020, Havey 2020). However, some research reject the media's polarising effect on the opinions on the coronavirus (see e.g. Meyers 2021). Therefore, differences in opinions most probably root deeper than in differences in sources and content of daily news consumption.

However, as emphasised above, most related research examined the US population, and we have less knowledge on other partisan countries, especially from the European context. Furthermore, as in most policy issues in polarised countries, media consumption habits play an important role in citizens' opinion. Namely, the type of media from which people get most politics-related information seriously influences their positions on certain topics. This is mostly due to the polarised media system of Hungary, which has been established since 2010 (Bajomi-Lázár 2013). Consequently, media channels mostly reflect the standpoint of either the governing or the opposition parties, and since most citizens' media consumption remains in their 'opinion bubble', media effects are highly relevant in these cases.

The purpose of our study is to explore the interrelations between ideological alignments, partisan positions and media consumption habits of individuals, and how much they trust science in general and accept scientific recommendations in relation to handling the COVID-19 pandemic in the Hungarian context. Thus, we examine the following questions:

- RQ1. Do ideological and partisan polarisation persist among Hungarian respondents on a specific issue like COVID-19 vaccination?
- RQ2. Are supporters of the Hungarian governing right-wing party Fidesz also characterised by the science scepticism of conservative citizens in the extremely polarised United States?
- RQ3. How do media consumption habits influence the above interrelations?

To answer our research questions, we present the theoretical considerations behind the relationship between trust in science, ideology and partisanship, and introduce the results of an online survey analysis conducted in Hungary.



## Science scepticism, ideology and partisanship

Trust in institutions and scientific results is a key factor in judging the effectiveness of vaccines, but, as a previous study in this regard showed, good perception of crisis management can also be associated with low vaccine tolerance (Figureiredo – Larson, 2021). General science scepticism and the related cultural influences clearly affect individual perceptions on the role of science in managing the coronavirus crisis, since vaccine discussions are also embedded in broader political and social discourses. In this respect, communication and media content on social and political polarisation play a particularly important role. Research on the coronavirus outbreak in Brazil has shown that supporters of the virus-sceptic president Jair Bolsonaro are not only less informed about the virus, but also more likely to accept conspiracy theories about it (Gramacho et al. 2021). Furthermore, some populist governments are more likely to relativise the consequences of the pandemic, namely, they tend to exaggerate the effects of the threats of the coronavirus to ensure their indispensable role in crisis management. A further aim is to represent the ‘offended’ people in their communication, opposed by elite groups, such as experts, pharmacies or supranational organisations, like the World Health Organization (WHO). The constant changes in the WHO’s publicly communicated position regarding how much various measures can prevent someone from being infected (e.g. the effectiveness of surgical masks or keeping distance) also caused serious confusion and hindered governments to carry out consistent policies against the spread of the coronavirus.

As a result, the followers of populist governments may not take health measurements seriously, which can strengthen science scepticism further (Bayerlein et al. 2021). Jonathan Kennedy has already shown in a study before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis that the institutional critique of populist parties – which is manifested in both political and scientific communities – has an impact on their vaccine hesitancy (Kennedy 2019).

Perceptions about the coronavirus measures are distorted by the high degree of affective polarisation in the United States, to the extent that they are judged solely in terms of support and rejection of the Trump administration (Druckman et al. 2020). Partisan differences in opinions have increased as the virus has spread in the United States, and this has been reflected in vaccination rates as well. Donald Trump’s scepticism about the coronavirus was associated with a decreasing willingness to vaccinate among his supporters, compared to Biden’s supporters (Kates et al. 2021).

Considered as another textbook example of extreme partisan polarisation, Hungary appears to demonstrate a similar case to that of the United States: late March 2020 survey results showed supporters of the governing Fidesz-KDNP, as opposed to other electoral groups to perceive the health care system as prepared to deal with the coronavirus epidemic, and to believe the government’s pandem-

ic information policy to be adequate. The extent of the government-opposition polarisation is illustrated by the fact that only one in twenty opposition voters agreed with the related statements on the latter issue (IDEA Institute 2020a).

The polarisation in the perception of different types of vaccines increased dramatically in the summer of 2021 in Hungary. The epidemic and its management had been constantly politicised, and the issue's political discussion had evolved in line with expectations, including the question of the health system's preparedness, the government's management of the crisis in the early stages of the epidemic, and the assessment of the Eastern and Western vaccines as well. While government supporters demonstrated much higher tolerance of Eastern vaccines, opposition supporters remained extremely critical of them. Seemingly, the politics of an 'Eastern opening' of the governing party, which has been characterising the values and policies of the Orbán governments in the last 12 years, was represented in vaccine diplomacy and related public attitudes as well. Strong diplomatic and economic relationship with countries like Russia and China has been an important and transparent aim of the Hungarian prime minister since 2010.

During the second wave of the epidemic in Hungary in December 2020, the proportion of people unwilling to be vaccinated (48 %) was also significant compared to the global vaccine refusal rates (IDEA Institute 2020b). This was particularly significant given that, despite Hungary's regionally high vaccination willingness at that time (The Wellcome Global Monitor 2018), 20 % of the population is characterised by a general scepticism and anti-vaccination attitude (Political Capital 2018).<sup>2</sup>

The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) has regularly published the KSH Weekly Monitor since the end of November 2020, which also asked about COVID-19 vaccinations.<sup>3</sup> According to the report of 21 December 2020, only one in six to one in seven of those surveyed were sure that they would be vaccinated. A more meaningful increase in confidence in vaccination and recognition of the need for vaccination can be seen as a consequence of the third surge in the epidemic, which was accompanied by extremely high mortality rates. This was compounded by the lack of direct experience and feedback on the vaccine, which was still in the test phase at the time (Nardi – Troiano 2021). Hungarian people's vaccination attitudes may have been strongly influenced by the fact that the government was the only one in the EU to diversify its procurement of experimental vaccines: in addition to 24 million doses of Western vaccines, it ordered 7 million doses of Eastern (Chinese and Russian) products, which were

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2 Source: Euronews, 26/03/2020. See: <https://hu.euronews.com/2020/03/26/idea-a-magyarok-tobbsege-szerint-az-egeszsegugy-nem-kap-eleg-tamogatast-a-jarvany-megfekez>.

3 Source: KSH Weekly Monitor. See: <https://www.ksh.hu/heti-monitor/covid.html>.

not formally adopted by the European Union until the completion of this study. Hungary was second in the EU after Malta to reach 50% vaccination coverage (Our World in Data 2021), but the rate of vaccination coverage growth slowed down significantly in the aftermath, ending up in the middle among EU countries by early September 2021 (Mathieu et al. 2021).

## Data, variables and methodology

Our research questions are analysed by using survey data via self-completed online questionnaires. There were two rounds of data collection, the first between 20 and 25 April 2021 and the second between 20 and 25 May 2021.<sup>4</sup> This was the period of the third coronavirus wave, when the vaccination process accelerated in Hungary, and the government's political communication focused on convincing people to get vaccinated. The online sample was collected by IDEA Institute from users of the entire Hungarian web and social media through CAWI surveys, and the N=3410 sample is representative of Hungarian society in terms of gender, age and region. Besides these population rates, sample weighting considered factors such as the respondents' web and Facebook usage, the time spent on social media platforms and how actively they use these social network sites. The margin of error is  $\pm 2.2$  percentage points. Our hypotheses on general science scepticism and specific scepticism about science's ability to develop effective vaccines were tested using logistic regression models, media consumption habits are included as additional interaction terms.

The questionnaire operationalises our research questions on general scientific scepticism with the following statement: 'Most of the time scientific results appear to be just a cover, and researches seem to serve political and economic interests.' Trust in the ability of scientists to handle the coronavirus with effective vaccines is measured by the statement: 'Scientists worldwide are doing their utmost to properly understand the nature of the coronavirus and to develop effective vaccines against it.'<sup>5</sup> Respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the above statements were assigned an index of 1, while those disagreeing or strongly disagreeing received a 0 index. With regard to the interpretation of estimations, it should be noted that sceptical attitudes mean agreement with the first statement and disagreement with the second statement. Correlation between the two variables is  $r=-0,479$ , meaning that general distrust in science can indeed determine vaccine scepticism.

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4 For the analysis we integrated these two survey rounds and analyse them together, since public opinions, even on COVID-19 related issues, do not change significantly within one month. However, this way the high number of cases will result in a strong reliability of regression results.

5 While the formulation of the first question relies on recent studies about climate change attitudes and the politicisation of sciences (see e.g. Yan et al. 2021; Bolsen – Druckman, 2015), the question about scholars' ability to develop effective vaccines was formulated to be answered as least automatic as possible, relying on the first question, and thus, to uphold the external validity of these survey questions.

Media consumption habits are measured by the question: ‘From which sources do you mostly get information about the coronavirus?’ Respondents were able to mark television, online news portals or social media as the most important source of information. In order to arrive at comparable logistic regression models, we included the same set of control variables in every case. These control variables are the following: respondents’ political preferences and attitudes, and important sociodemographic characteristics. The most important explanatory variables of our research are the respondents’ ideological orientation on a liberal-conservative scale from 1 to 5, and their party preference, where, based on the polarised political situation in Hungary, we compared government supporters with supporters of the alliance of opposition parties. In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, we considered the respondent’s gender, size of settlement, level of education, age and their expected financial situation in relation to the coronavirus crisis. The latter was constructed as a factor variable consisting of five scales that measure the various perceived financial threats that individuals have to face because of the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

## Results

We ran every possible combination of the interaction between party preference and various media channels, but only highlighted those in our study, where the interaction terms provided significant results (see Appendix 1–3.). The estimations between ideology, party preference and the two types of science scepticism are consistent in every model and thus provide satisfying answers to our first two research questions. The logistic regression models meet the necessary criteria, meaning that the R square indexes provide satisfying and acceptable results (Peng et al. 2002).

Generally it is shown that the respondents’ ideological orientation significantly influences both their general trust in science and their specific trust in the ability of scientists to develop an effective anti-Covid vaccine. As the estimations of our featured independent variable shows, the more conservative the respondents, the more likely they are to be sceptical about science in general and the less likely they trust scientists’ efforts to develop effective vaccines against the coronavirus disease. In contrast, pro-Fidesz stances have a significant effect only on general attitudes towards science, showing that Fidesz supporters are less likely to be sceptical with science in general. Thus, the high degree of partisan polarisation, which is otherwise present in Hungarian society in various issues, cannot be observed in relation with confidence in scientists to develop effective vaccines, namely, partisan alignment and trust in coronavirus vaccines are independent.

**Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables in our regression models**


	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Dependent variables				
Scientists worldwide are doing their utmost to properly understand the nature of the coronavirus and to develop effective vaccines against it (1: agree, 0: does not agree)	0,00	1,00	0,11	0,31
Most of the time scientific results appear to be just a cover, and researches seem to serve political and economic interests (1: agree, 0: does not agree)	0,00	1,00	0,40	0,49
Political ideology and party preference				
Would you consider yourself rather a liberal (1) or a conservative (5) person?	1,00	5,00	3,00	1,15
Would you vote for Fidesz (1) or the Opposition Alliance (0)?	0,00	1,00	0,44	0,50
<i>Most typical type of media where they gather information and news about the coronavirus? 0: not indicated, 1: indicated</i>				
Television	0,00	1,00	0,51	0,50
Online	0,00	1,00	0,64	0,48
Social media	0,00	1,00	0,60	0,49
<i>How did the coronavirus influence your financial situation? (-1: got worse, 0: did not change or it does not exist, 1: got better)</i>				
Income	-1,00	1,00	-0,30	0,62
Savings	-1,00	1,00	-0,24	0,62
Paying bills	-1,00	1,00	-0,25	0,51
Loan repayment	-1,00	1,00	-0,17	0,49
Financial support for family members	-1,00	1,00	-0,30	0,59
Socio-demography				
Size of settlement	0,00	100,00	44,45	35,82
Education	0,00	20,00	12,32	2,66
Male (1) Female (0)	0,00	1,00	0,47	0,50
Age	17	89	47,89	16,06

Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

There is also a significant correlation between coronavirus information sources and trust in science. However, while information from online news portals significantly decreased the likelihood of distrust in science both in general and increased trust in science in relation to the coronavirus, information from social media does not have an influence on it. Respondents who learn about the coronavirus primarily from television are significantly more likely to trust scientists' ability to treat the virus effectively. This is presumably due to the aforementioned predominance of pro-government views in television content (Bajomi 2013) primarily aimed at maximising the rate of vaccinated people within Hungarian society.


To get answers to our third research question, we included several interaction terms in our logistic regression models. The interactions measure the joint correlation of ideology and media consumption habits (whether the respondent gains information about the coronavirus primarily from television, online news portals or social media) related to science scepticism. The following three figures illustrate the margins plot of the significant interactions.

**Figure 1: Party preference & Television on scepticism about scientists' ability to improve effective vaccines**




Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

**Figure 2: Party preference & Online news portals on general science scepticism**



Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

**Figure 3: Party preference & Social media on general science scepticism**



Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

What these interaction terms show is that while government supporters share the same opinions on issues independent of the source of information, opposition voters are different in these terms. We see that opposition voters who gain coronavirus relevant information mostly from television are significantly more likely to believe that scientists are able to improve effective vaccines. Moreover, these people's opinion does not differ significantly from the government supporters' stances. On the other hand, those opposition supporters who read online news portals primarily are less likely to claim that scientific results are usually just a hoax. Last, opposition supporters who read covid related news in social media are significantly more likely to believe that science is a hoax compared to government supporters. This is most likely due to the fact that 'fake news' and science sceptical stances are mostly found on social media channels, and, as previous research already showed, people who most often read social media newsfeeds are most likely to be influenced by this information (Kreko 2020).

Previous research results are confirmed by the fact that the level of education has a particularly significant role in the respondents' trust in science: the higher the respondent's educational level, the less likely they are to be sceptical about science in general and its ability to develop effective vaccines in particular. In addition, people facing financial difficulties are more likely to trust scientists in improving effective COVID-19 vaccines, whereas older respondents are more likely to demonstrate general science scepticism. However, age does not determine trust in science's ability to develop effective vaccines.

In conclusion, we can state that the logistic regression analysis provided answers to our research questions: although conservative people tend to demonstrate significantly more scepticism concerning scientific activities in general and COVID-19 vaccines in particular, individual partisan positions on these questions are modified by their media consumption habits. Therefore, although the ideological position of Fidesz supporters would suggest lower trust in science in relation with COVID-19 as well, the government's clear position about the importance of vaccination mitigated the role of political ideology in opinions about how science is capable of managing the unknown epidemic and economic situation caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

## Conclusions

In our study, we wanted to contribute to scientific scepticism literature. We investigated how anti-science and anti-vaccine attitudes have developed due to the pandemic in Hungary. This country is considered a model country in the international scientific literature on political polarisation. In particular, we investigated how ideological polarisation influenced attitudes towards science and vaccination during the pandemic.



As we emphasised at the beginning of our study, the exogenous shock of the coronavirus epidemic has had a global impact on political systems as well as on opinions and attitudes. In a country as polarised as Hungary, the government's most important task was to endogenise the effect of the exogenous shock, to reduce contingency and uncertainty, and maintain an environment of trust (Körösényi et al. 2020). This especially applies to trust in science and scientific results, which determines civil compliance with scientific guidelines. Increased trust and cooperation contributes to a more effective mitigation of negative pandemic consequences. Although the Hungarian government initially did not acknowledge the real consequences of the coronavirus, they soon took the lead and became the primary administrator in this issue. Since the end of 2020, their legitimacy is based on the success of vaccination, which they communicate extensively. Relying on their overwhelming presence in media ownership, the communication could effectively persuade at least the governing party's supporters.

However, in the extremely polarised Hungarian political environment, it is not evident that Hungarian respondents have followed the strong governmental will and intentions regarding COVID-19 vaccination. Indeed, if Fidesz supporters are characterised by a similar science scepticism to that of self-proclaimed conservatives in the US (Lewandowsky et al. 2013), this may also be reflected in attitudes towards vaccines. Reservations about science may spill over into vaccine refusal, leading to lower vaccination coverage and even a loss of legitimacy for the governing right-wing party.

However, our results show a much more complex picture. There is a divergence of opinions between general science scepticism and coronavirus vaccine-specific scepticism. While science scepticism among Fidesz and conservative voters is very similar to that of Republican voters in the US, meaning that they tend to reject scientific advances, the structure of opinions related to the COVID-19 vaccines is more subtle. The statement that 'Scientists worldwide are doing their utmost to properly understand the nature of the coronavirus and to develop effective vaccines against it' is independent of party preferences, i.e., statistically similar proportions of both government and opposition supporters accept it. Furthermore, we also showed that media consumption habits might modify this interrelation. We believe that our results about the interaction effect between television, online news portals, social media and party preference can provide an important aspect for future research, namely, that party preference alone might not suggest or determine policy positions of individuals, but media consumption habits should be considered as well.

While Fidesz as a right-wing governing party has communicated clear messages about science in general during the coronavirus pandemic, the management of the crisis has become a central element of their policy. The position and actions of the government were easily decoded by their supporters: vaccination

not only saves lives, but it also saves the economy, which in turn helps to sustain individual existences. As a result, science scepticism and anti-vaccine attitudes demonstrate a certain variance: party preference does not influence attitudes towards vaccines at all, and the views of anti-science conservatives became more nuanced. This assumption is supported by the fact that information sources with different political influence play a significant role in the tendencies of anti-science and anti-vaccine attitudes, too.

Although our analysis provided important insights regarding the potential impact of political ideology and partisan positions on people's confidence in science in general and the management of the coronavirus pandemic in particular, it is important to note that the recent year may have brought new trends in opinion, as the rate of vaccinated people has increased in Hungary and worldwide. Therefore, further efforts are required to analyse this issue in other polarised countries and in subsequent periods in order to deepen our knowledge about science- and vaccine scepticism in polarised societies.

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## Appendix 1

DV: Scientists are able to improve effective vaccines	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf	Interval]	Sig
Liberal-conservative	-.38	.162	-2.34	.019	-.698	-.062	**
News portals	1.004	.304	3,3	.001	.408	1,6	***
Social media	-.428	.3	-1.43	.153	-1.015	.159	
Financial circumstances	.667	.175	3.80	0	.323	1.011	***
Size of residence	-.004	.004	-0.95	.34	-.012	.004	
Education	-.036	.061	-0.59	.554	-.155	.083	
Male	-.231	.293	-0.79	.43	-.805	.343	
Age	.014	.01	1.42	.156	-.005	.034	
Fidesz vs. Opposition	1.013	.565	1.79	.073	-.095	2.121	*
Television	1.627	.465	3.50	0	.716	2.537	***
Fidesz x television	-1.909	.647	-2.95	.003	-3.177	-.641	***
Constant	2.656	.997	2.67	.008	.703	4.61	***

Mean dependent var	0.920	SD dependent var	0.272
Pseudo r-squared	0.113	Number of obs	821
Chi-square	48.450	Prob > chi2	0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	403.176	Bayesian crit. (BIC)	459.702

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ .

Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

## Appendix 2

<b>DV: Scientists are able to improve effective vaccines</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>St.Err.</b>	<b>t-value</b>	<b>p-value</b>	<b>[95% Conf</b>	<b>Interval]</b>	<b>Sig</b>
Liberal-conservative	.275	.096	2.87	.004	.087	.463	***
News portals	-.766	.21	-3.65	0	-1.179	-.354	***
Television	-.419	.204	-2.06	.04	-.819	-.019	**
Financial circumstances	-.144	.109	-1.32	.187	-.358	.07	
Size of residence	-.006	.003	-2.11	.035	-.012	0	**
Education	-.19	.038	-4.98	0	-.265	-.115	***
Male	-.025	.201	-0.12	.902	-.419	.37	
Age	.006	.007	0.84	.402	-.007	.018	
Fidesz vs. Opposition	-1.724	.355	-4.85	0	-2.421	-1.027	***
Social media	.41	.253	1.63	.104	-.085	.906	
Fidesz x social media	-.871	.406	-2.15	.032	-1.666	-.077	**
<i>Constant</i>	<i>2.183</i>	<i>.627</i>	<i>3.48</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>.954</i>	<i>3.411</i>	<i>***</i>

Mean dependent var	0.372	SD dependent var	0.484
Pseudo r-squared	0.194	Number of obs	705
Chi-square	161.274	Prob > chi2	0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	695.534	Bayesian crit. (BIC)	750.232

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ .

Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.

### Appendix 3

<b>DV: Scientists are able to improve effective vaccines</b>	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>St.Err.</b>	<b>t-value</b>	<b>p-value</b>	<b>[95% Conf</b>	<b>Interval]</b>	<b>Sig</b>
Liberal-conservative	.259	.095	2.72	.007	.072	.445	***
Social media	.078	.201	0.39	.699	-.316	.471	
Television	-.422	.205	-2.06	.04	-.825	-.02	**
Financial circumstances	-.147	.11	-1.34	.181	-.363	.068	
Size of residence	-.006	.003	-2.19	.029	-.012	-.001	**
Education	-.2	.039	-5.16	0	-.275	-.124	***
Male	-.048	.202	-0.24	.813	-.445	.349	
Age	.006	.007	0.84	.401	-.007	.019	
Fidesz vs. Opposition	-2.839	.399	-7.12	0	-3.621	-2.057	***
News portals	-1.224	.28	-4.38	0	-1.772	-.676	***
Fidesz x news portals	1.079	.423	2.55	.011	.25	1.908	**
Constant	2.896	.665	4.35	0	1.592	2.04	***

Mean dependent var	0.372	SD dependent var	0.484
Pseudo r-squared	0.196	Number of obs	705
Chi-square	163.255	Prob > chi2	0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	693.552	Bayesian crit. (BIC)	748.250

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ .

Source: IDEA Institute, April-May 2021. Authors' own compilation.





# (Im)Perfect Descriptive Representation: Slovenia in the Spotlight

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**Abstract:** *The failure to ensure descriptive representation is one of the challenges facing democracy. In the literature, it is suggested that, among others, imperfect descriptive representation is connected to insufficient legitimacy as well as low trust in political institutions. This paper analyses the link between descriptive representation and both people's satisfaction with the way democracy is working in practice and trust in political institutions in Slovenia which, despite 30 years of democratic rule, are characterised by persistent low trust and satisfaction levels.*

*Considering longitudinal public opinion data and a database on the composition of the Slovenian parliament (eight terms) in terms of gender, age groups and education, we find that also in Slovenia especially women, the young, the elderly and those with a basic education are underrepresented, with this being reflected in trust in the parliament and people's perception of the way in which democracy is working. Still, the fact such underrepresentation has continued for some time (regardless of certain changes) means these findings are only part of the explanation.*

**Key words:** *representation, parliament, trust, democracy, Slovenia*

## Introduction: Mirror thyself

Modern representative democracies must deal with a range of challenges and criticisms (Crouch 2004; Keane 2009; Krause – Merkel 2018), like the decline in participation and trust (Foa – Mounk 2016; Krause – Merkel 2018), low and falling levels of satisfaction with the democracy and the realisation of democracy in practice (Brusis 2016). Around the world, democracies have gone into reverse (Plattner 2015; Bermeo 2016; Lührmann – Lindberg 2019; Diamond

2021). International research indices such as Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and Varieties of Democracy all support this trend. In Central and Eastern Europe, new illiberal forms of representative democracies are emerging – if they can even be described as democracies at all (Greskovits 2015; Ágh 2016; Krastev 2016; Lorenz – Anders eds. 2021).

Departing from the line of research of Newton – Norris (1999), Mishler – Rose (2001) and Eder et al. (2017), several factors are proposed to explain the declines seen in turnout, public trust in political institutions, representative democracy and satisfaction with how democracy is working. Two approaches currently dominate discussion of them. The first approach questions the political system's performance. Economic crisis, inequality (Krieckhaus et al. 2013; Cordero – Simón 2016; Quaranta – Martini 2017) and pervasive corruption (Anderson – Tverdova 2003) have nourished the above trends. However, dissatisfaction with corruption and the economy's performance cannot fully account for the drop observed in participation (Karp – Milazzo 2015). Here, Merkel (2014) even argues that the biggest problem democratic theory faces is not the broader pattern of lower turnout in itself, but the social selectivity of the electoral processes and their outcomes. The second approach looks at the properties and consequences of elections.

It is the latter in which we are considering in this article. While you can vote for a party that wins, does your representative truly represent you? With representation being the dominant form of modern democracies (Keane 2009), the question is whether these challenges and criticism relate to representation itself: are representative democracies representative?

On the individual level, representation describes the relationship between citizens and an elected representative or, on the organisational level, a representative body or institution (Deschouwer et al. 2014). The key principle underlying representation has survived over the centuries: those representing the people should reflect the people's will and do so in the representative institution (Pitkin 1967). Yet, representatives do not always reflect the electorate's composition with respect to sharing characteristics with the electorate, as is expected with descriptive representation. Several scholars (e.g. Philips 1995; Norris – Franklin 1997; Celis – Erzeel 2013) contend the failure to assure descriptive representation is concerned with issues of legitimacy and, as Philips (1995) argues, responsiveness and leadership style (Lawless 2015).

Most will immediately recognise this discussion from decades of research into gendered differences in representation (Lawless 2015), the debate on the underrepresentation of African-Americans' participation in US politics (Spence – McClerking 2010; Casellas – Wallace 2015) and the elected elite's higher education and reproduction of itself (Ilonszki – Edinger 2007; Kountouri 2018). In continuation of Phillips' (1995) argument above and Mansbridge's (1999) observation that descriptive representation develops a bond between representa-

tives and the represented, the general thrust of this debate is that descriptive representation matters for identity, inclusion, trust and political outcomes. Correspondingly, many have suggested and assessed quotas and other affirmative actions as part of reforming recruitment processes and institutions to bring about greater representation in politics and the labour market (Lovenduski – Norris eds. 1993; Krook 2006a; Paxton – Hughes 2015).

The fact that Slovenia is an example of a country featuring low trust in parliament and low satisfaction with the way its democracy is working (see Figure 1) raises the question of whether social selectivity in representation contributes to this outcome. In particular, it is because Slovenians are inclined towards egalitarianism and small social and economic differences (Vehovar 1991; Malnar 2012) and, in contrast with other countries which became democratic during the 1990s, that economic and social inequality remain low, especially when measured by the Gini coefficient.

Therefore, a longitudinal study of the hitherto overlooked case of Slovenia that compares actual descriptive representation in the parliament with public trust and satisfaction adds to the discussion on the state and development of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

The theoretical section below departs from the different forms of representation and turns to descriptive representation to argue for its relationship with trust and satisfaction. We then discuss the longitudinal case study's appropriateness. The analysis contrasts the development of descriptive representation and trust and satisfaction, pointing to the permanence of unequal representation and trust in institutions and satisfaction with the way the democracy is working. The analysis also considers the issues of 'spikes', namely, the impact of sudden changes on descriptive representation. In the conclusion, we stress how descriptive representation matters for trust in the institutions and satisfaction with the democracy and provides avenues for future research.

## **Theory: In the mirror we trust**

In 1967, Pitkin contended, 'that representation is today a significant and widely used concept need hardly be argued' and 'in modern times almost everyone wants to be governed by representatives' (1967: 2). Associated with democracy, liberty and justice, scholars have used 'representation' and 'democracy' interchangeably even though the concept and practice of representation does not always lead to democracy and not all forms of representation are democratic (Pitkin 1967; Deschouwer et al. 2014). This is easily understood if we think of the 'people's representatives' in the former communist regimes or, today, where representatives are elected to rubberstamp the decisions of parliaments in autocracies.

To understand how representation as a concept is linked to democracy, we need to discuss its various forms and connect them to trust and dissatisfaction.

## Forms of representation

Conceptually, there are several forms of representation. In a review of the literature, Celis et al. (2008: 100) show that most modern theoretical and empirical studies of representation begin with Pitkin's seminal work *The Concept of Representation* (1967) where she identifies four types of representation: formalistic, substantive, symbolic and descriptive, with especially the last three forms being closely linked.

First, formalistic representation focuses on the institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation. The key question is the institutional position held by a representative. With respect to formalistic representation, two diametrically opposed views can be found, one dealing with authorisation, the other with accountability. In a nutshell, formalistic representation concerns the procedures from which power is acquired. Second, substantive representation is about the activity of a representative (*acting for*). The question here is whether a representative is acting for someone or according to the (policy) preferences of the individuals represented (Pitkin 1967); that is, if the purpose of representation and power is applied to meeting the goals of the representative's constituency. Third, symbolic representation refers to the symbolic meaning a representative holds for those being represented. The main focus are beliefs and the ways a representative *stand for* the represented. In Pitkin's (1967) typology, descriptive representation also relates to her idea of *standing for* the represented. Yet, here, Pitkin argues (1967: 61), that in political terms descriptive representation is less about what the representative body does and more how it is composed. True representation therefore requires that this body's composition accurately corresponds to the profile of the whole nation, or that it mirrors the nation. Representation depends on a given representative's characteristics, he *is* or *is like*, on being something rather than doing something (Pitkin 1967: 61). On the national level, this likeness is described in terms of similarities between the representatives and the represented concerning socio-economic characteristics or, for example, ethnicity in the population or different social subgroups. With representation being along the lines of '*being something*' rather than '*doing something*', an important question is whether equality and fairness are ensured by inclusion in the representative body (Kissau et al. 2012).

Descriptive representation 'measures' the under(over)representation of social subgroups and, demonstrated below, who these subgroups are has changed over time. The core claim made about descriptive representation is, however, more important for democratic theory. Of the four forms of representation, descriptive representation is the only one to depart from the proposition that social subgroups' representation is unequal and that this inequality matters. Just how the social selectivity of electoral processes and their outcomes matters is discussed in the following.

## Imperfect descriptive representation

Early studies of descriptive representation focused on social class (e.g. Norris – Lovenduski 1995; Cowley 2013), only to shift toward gender (e.g. Lovenduski – Norris eds. 1993; Norris ed. 1997; Krook 2006a; Celis – Erzeel 2013) and, particularly in the American context, ethnic and racial minorities (e.g. Mansbridge 1999). Only more recently has age drawn attention (e.g. Kissau et al. 2012; Joshi 2013).

The proposition here is that descriptive representation ‘enables’ symbolic representation, with both, in turn, being linked to substantive representation. Decades of research in the field show that in certain circumstances ethnicity, gender and social-economic subgroups encompass differences from others regarding what they stand for and the policies they promote (Ilonszki – Edinger 2007; Haider-Markel 2007; Casellas – Wallace 2015; Lawless 2015).

The feminist scholar Phillips’ idea (1995) of the ‘politics of presence’ is that descriptive representation is important for substantive representation. Since then, other scholars have argued (e.g. Philips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Celis – Erzeel 2013) that trust in representative institutions, but also satisfaction with democracy, is connected at least in part with the characteristics of representation, notably the lack or imperfectness of descriptive representation. Mansbridge (1999: 641–650) finds that descriptive representation increases *de facto* legitimacy and stresses that develops bonds of trust between representatives and the represented. Cowley (2014: 573) states that when people see someone ‘like them’ involved in politics this then leads to higher levels of trust, faith in the political system or engagement and satisfaction with it.

With respect to representation, scholars show that descriptive representation may be used as both a dependent and an independent variable. Although Esaiason – Holmberg (1996: 6, 19) establish an intrinsic value in mirroring studies, they maintain that representation should serve as an independent variable for further analysis, for example, of the behaviour of elected representatives.

Inequality in descriptive representation starts a chain reaction. What you are is what you stand for, and what you stand for becomes whom you act for. Still, the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation appears so evident that it is often an implicit or explicit assumption that adequate substantive representation requires more proportional descriptive representation (Saalfeld – Bischof 2013: 306). However, a unilinear relationship cannot necessarily be expected (Campbell et al. 2010; Saalfeld – Bischof 2013). In Dahlerup’s (1988) discussion, a link between descriptive and substantive representation will only appear once a ‘critical mass’ has been reached. Dahlerup (1988) states that only when women constitute a ‘large minority’, usually set at 30% (Childs – Krook 2006), they have a substantial impact on setting the agenda and policymaking.

While Childs – Krook (2006) argue that the relationship between the size of representation and change is not straightforward since small groups of female representatives might work more effectively, we contend that only when the number of female representatives is above a certain threshold you can mirror thyself as it is also more likely that a larger group will represent the diversity of political preferences among women.

Sustained trust on a higher level is, however, questionable. Trust may indeed rise but, if the group in question does not find that its new representatives are responsive and responsible in the delivery of substantive representation, trust and satisfaction may drop to new lows. We propose that this is a ‘spike’ and more likely given earlier broad changes, i.e. in parties, institutions and descriptive representation, which have led to high, but unresolved, hopes.

### ***Trust in political institutions and satisfaction with the workings of democracy***

As noted in the introduction, there are generally two clusters of thought with respect to the decline in public trust in political institutions and the level of satisfaction with how democracy is working. Here we examine whether the likely persistent failure to ensure descriptive representation can account for the differences seen in trust in the parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Although Rosanvallon (2008) finds distrust in institutions to be a permanent feature, the thrust of the literature contends that in such circumstances modern democracies become vulnerable, calling for initiatives to reverse the decline in trust (Mishler – Rose 1997; Kaase 1999; Levi – Stoker 2000; Zmerli et al. 2007). Still, thus far there is no evidence of an increase in trust, as different public opinion surveys (e.g. European Social Survey, Eurobarometer, different national longitudinal polls) all reveal big, even growing negative public sentiment toward the main political representative institutions over the last decade(s).

It is apparent that some scholars believe that the public’s trust in the political institutions of representative democracy along with its satisfaction with how the democracy is functioning relate to the characteristics of descriptive representation. Yet, as identified for instance by Nye et al. eds. (1997), Newton – Norris (1999), Mishler – Rose (2001), Eder et al. eds. (2017), there are several other factors affecting trust in political institutions and the level of satisfaction with the functioning of a given democracy. A new vocabulary has emerged about different explanatory clusters, for example: social-psychological, cultural, institutional performance, economic and institutional.

Increasing use of surveys and repeated batteries of questions have led scholars to suggest different forms of trust. These span from generalised interpersonal trust across various institutions to satisfaction with the democracy’s function-

ing (e.g. Kaase et al. 1999; Sztompka 1999). However, Linde – Ekman (2003) warn that at least data on satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy is a reflection of how the system is working in practice and not an indicator of support for (the principles of) democracy. In line with this observation, the way forward is primarily to search for ways to make a certain democracy more representative (Alonso et al. eds. 2011).

Researchers in Slovenia have also considered social-psychological, cultural, institutional performance, economic and institutional clusters of factors to empirically explain the level and trends of public trust in political institutions, especially in the parliament, i.e. *Državni zbor*, and citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (e.g. Kaase et al. 1999; Fink-Hafner et al. 2002; Deželan et al. 2007). Some studies detect longitudinal changes in the parliamentary elite (Fink Hafner et al. 2017: 61), but there is a lack of empirical study connecting the level and trends of citizens' trust and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy with the descriptive representation's imperfectness in terms of gender, age and education.

## **Research strategy and methodology: Linking the longitudinal development of differences**

Research into descriptive representation has for instance applied survey data, linking variations in descriptive groups with partisan attitudes to legislators and representation (Casellas – Wallace 2015), multivariate analysis linking groups with policy outcomes (Haider-Markel 2007), datasets tracking size in group variation across the political system (Spence – McClerking 2010) and experiments on distributive decisions (Mendelberg et al. 2014).

Use of these methods (with variations across and within countries) has propelled the debate forward. In this article, we suggest that a longitudinal study of Slovenia tracking developments over time adds to the debate. With a number of contextual factors being constant, a longitudinal study offers insight into a case where the public has experienced several economic and political crises. Moreover, a longitudinal study also considers the generation effects. The effects of Inglehart's lifelong contributions to the study of changing cultural values provide the micro-foundations for modernisation and post-modernisation theory, i.e. the silent revolution, and the persistence of differences in values between generations (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart – Welzel 2010; Norris – Inglehart 2019).

Against this backdrop, we monitor and systematically track variations in descriptive representation in Slovenia with trust in parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy by calculating whether the mean differences are statistically significant. Following the literature, we consider three independent variables gender, age and education.

The data consist of: a) surveys conducted as part of the Slovenian Public Opinion (<https://www.cjm.si/gradiva/>) and the European Social Survey (<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>) – the first available survey after each election,<sup>1</sup> b) national census data from Eurostat, and c) the Centre for Political Science Research's database on Slovenian parliamentary elections (Kustec Lipicer et al. 2019).

We open the analysis by briefly examining the correlation between trust and satisfaction with the democracy in the country. While the two correlate across time, an important variation exists. This strengthens the argument that both are useful for gauging variation in democracy and testing the effect of descriptive variation. The use of both may not only yield important insights about the effect but also amount to a stronger test of the theory.

## **Analysis: Entrenched differences?**

I can't get no satisfaction: The trajectory of trust and satisfaction in Slovenia

Despite Slovenia being a country with continuous low levels of both trust in the parliament and satisfaction with the way the democracy is working (Figure 1), according to the longitudinal Slovenian Public Opinion Survey the majority of Slovenians believe that democracy is the best form of government (also see Johannsen – Krašovec 2017).

As the longitudinal data in Figure 1 show, the level of satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy has throughout the years been higher than trust in the parliament. The figure also reveals that the values for these two indicators do not necessarily move in the same direction. Although there are long-lasting low levels of trust and satisfaction, one can still identify certain low and high spikes. The question is whether changes in descriptive representation can account not only for the trend but also for the spikes.

## **Gender: Change and continuity – a critical mass?**


Despite insufficient studies on the relationship between descriptive representation in terms of gender, age and education on one hand and trust in the parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy on the other, it is worth mentioning that several research studies in Slovenia have considered female descriptive representation, concentrating on institutional, party, economic and cultural factors which (can) influence it (e.g. Antić Gaber 1998; Fink-Hafner – Krašovec 2000; Krašovec – Fink-Hafner 2004; Antić Gaber ed. 2011).

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1 The data concerning both satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and trust in parliament are sometimes reported by the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey on different scales (1–4 vs. 0–10). To ensure the comparability of data from different years, we present all results on the 1–4 scale using a linear transformation where necessary (e.g. Colman et al. 1997). In addition, for some years the survey omits the question about satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy. We substituted these data with the values regarding a similar question included, namely, satisfaction with the state of democracy.



**Figure 1: Trust in the parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy, scale 1–4, means, (1992–2018)**



Sources: Slovenian Public Opinion and European Social Survey (1992–2018); authors' own calculations.

Female representation (Table 1) was quite stable between 1992 and 2008, but jumped at the 2011 election only to drop once again in 2018. This spike is probably due to two factors. First, the introduction of a gender quota for candidate lists in 2006. For the 2008 parliamentary elections, this quota was set at 25%, and at 35% for later elections. Paxton – Hughes (2015) find that quotas work and lead to greater equalness over time, yet it seems this conclusion is only partly supported by the Slovenian data. The effect of gender quotas is limited in that parties can list their female candidates in sub-constituencies where the chance of being elected a priori are low while fielding male candidates in the more secure sub-constituencies (Fink-Hafner – Krašovec 2000; Gaber Antić ed. 2011). However, the electoral success of the newly formed parties in 2011 and 2014 also contributed to the change, i.e. the spike, in female representation since both electorally very successful parties (List of Zoran Janković – Positive Slovenia in 2011 and Party of Miro Cerar in 2014) were established only a few months before the elections and had to find their candidates quickly and meet the gender quota, but as Fink-Hafner et al. (2017: 71) show, these new parties were not in a position to determine (based on previous elections) in advance in which sub-constituencies they had better chances of winning seats. Taking these developments into account, the result was that approximately one-third

of the representatives in 2011 and 2014 were women. These spikes, however, did not last long. It appears that not even one-third constitutes, to use Dahlerup's (1988) term, a 'critical mass', i.e. a sufficiently 'large minority' to sustain a path towards.

**Table 1: Population and MPs by gender (1992–2018) in %**

Year	Population		Elected MPs		Over/underrepresentation	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1992	48.53	51.47	86.67	13.33	1.78	0.26
1996	48.64	51.36	92.39	7.61	1.90	0.15
2000	48.84	51.16	86.81	13.19	1.78	0.26
2004	48.93	51.07	87.91	12.09	1.80	0.24
2008	49.07	50.93	86.81	13.19	1.77	0.26
2011	49.49	50.51	68.13	31.87	1.38	0.63
2014	49.53	50.47	64.44	35.56	1.30	0.70
2018	49.69	50.31	75.56	24.44	1.52	0.49

*Note: Over- and underrepresentation calculated as the share (in %) of Elected members of Parliament divided by the share of the population (in %). For example, the overrepresentation of men in 1992 is  $86.67/48.53=1.78$ .*

Sources: Eurostat ([http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo\\_pjan&lang=en](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en)) Population on 1 January (year); Kustec Lipicer et al. (2019).

Although not statistically significant for all years Table 2 reveals that women continuously show less trust in the parliament than men. Yet, despite the jump in representation after 2011 and 2014, the difference does not narrow. Quite the opposite: women exhibit the highest levels of trust in the very years when they were most underrepresented (in 2004 and 2008). A similar pattern is observed with respect to satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy.

These data suggest that the descriptive representation of women is not (importantly) related to trust in the parliament and satisfaction with how the democracy is working. It is hence possible that some other factors are involved. The first is that it is usually impossible to see the immediate consequence of institutional changes for society's behaviour, but obviously only after some time lag. Second, despite many data showing an egalitarian culture with considerable collective awareness (Jogan 2013) and the gender equality index ranking Slovenia quite high, it is clear that tendency of redomestication after the socialist period has strengthened again (Jogan 2013: 6).

Third, the question is the causal relations between awareness, quotas, mobilisation, descriptive representation and norm change. While quotas might increase

descriptive representation, Vijayarasa (2020) argues it is necessary for political parties to value and invest in female representation and, moreover, civil society organisations, not simply women’s rights organisations, must support the values of equal representation. Chauchard (2014) states that descriptive representation influences norms. Norris – Inglehart (2001) conclude that while egalitarian values in post-industrial societies affect female representation, that it is not a sufficient explanation. Krook (2006b; 2007) adds that changes are partly the result of transnational diffusion. This corresponds with Storer – Rodriguez’s (2020) finding that SoMe hashtag# debates increase mobilisation and Halady – Rao’s (2010) finding, in relation to the climate debate, that awareness does change behaviour. However, the literature is not conclusive with respect to causal chains.

**Table 2: Satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy and trust in the parliament by gender (means comparison, scale 1–4) (1992–2018)**

Year	Gender	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy		Trust in parliament	
		Mean	Std. deviation	Mean	Std. deviation
1993	Male	2.23	0.68	1.94	0.70
	Female	2.16	0.70	1.95	0.68
1997	Male	2.24	0.84	1.84*	0.73
	Female	2.18	0.79	1.74*	0.70
2000	Male	2.53	0.72	2.04	0.80
	Female	2.51	0.73	1.97	0.75
2004	Male	2.37	0.66	2.30*	0.73
	Female	2.35	0.65	2.18*	0.69
2008	Male	2.47*	0.68	2.38*	0.72
	Female	2.39*	0.64	2.27*	0.69
2012	Male	1.96	0.68	1.70*	0.70
	Female	1.91	0.64	1.61*	0.64
2014	Male	1.91	0.71	1.87	0.76
	Female	1.83	0.62	1.79	0.67
2018	Male	2.32	0.74	2.11	0.71
	Female	2.26	0.71	2.04	0.73

Note: \*  $p < .05$ . The independent samples t-test was used to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the mean for men and women on satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and between the mean for men and women on trust in parliament.

Sources: Slovenian Public Opinion and European Social Survey (1992–2018); authors’ own calculations.

## Age: The middle-aged in charge

While only a few recent studies have focused on age, particularly the young (e.g. Kissau et al. 2012; Joshi 2013), the questions and even concerns about the low political participation of younger people in institutional politics, especially at elections, are not new (e.g. Blais 2000; Wattenberg 2020).

Still, even more alarming than low participation at elections is the share of young people declaring they would never stand as a candidate, ranging between 40% and 60% in EU countries (Deželan 2015: 27). In the first place, such abstention lowers the representation of the young cohort, and, in the second place, the pool of political talent is reduced as the young become older. Young Slovenians do not differ from other Europeans: They answer in the same way or are even less willing to participate than their counterparts in Europe, and are generally not inclined to participate in parties (Lavrič et al. 2021), which, also in Slovenia, are the main vehicles for entering institutional politics.

**Table 3: Population and MPs by age (1992–2018) in %**

Year	Population			Elected MPs			Over/underrepresentation		
	18–30	31–55	56+	18–30	31–55	56+	18–30	31–55	56+
1992	25.88	46.44	27.68	6.67	84.44	8.89	0.26	1.82	0.32
1996	25.02	46.26	28.72	0.00	84.7	15.22	0.00	1.83	0.53
2000	24.13	46.32	29.55	4.40	72.53	23.08	0.18	1.57	0.78
2004	23.32	46.51	30.17	2.20	76.92	20.88	0.09	1.65	0.69
2008	21.80	45.79	32.41	3.30	69.23	27.47	0.15	1.51	0.85
2011	20.42	45.32	34.25	2.20	70.33	27.47	0.11	1.55	0.80
2014	18.63	44.90	36.46	5.56	68.89	25.56	0.30	1.53	0.70
2018	17.58	44.61	37.81	4.40	67.80	27.80	0.25	1.52	0.74

Sources: Eurostat ([http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo\\_pjan&lang=en](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en)) Population on 1 January (year); Kustec Lipicer et al. (2019).

Not surprisingly then, the data in Table 3 show the 18–30 year cohort is consistently and massively underrepresented, while the middle-aged population is by far and the only group to be overrepresented. This is confirmed by data from Fink-Hafner et al. (2017: 70) showing how Slovenia’s parliamentary elite is gradually ageing. In 1992, their average age in years was 43, rising to 50 in 2008 and dropping again slightly to 48 in 2018. This pattern is also observed in other post-socialist countries. Thus, the middle-aged are consistently overrepresented although the extent to which the young and elderly population is

underrepresented has changed over time. Even the electorally successful new political parties did not manage to change the representation of young people in the parliament to the extent that they did field female candidates, with the partial exception of the Party of Youth (*Stranka mladih Slovenije*) in 2000 and the Left (*Levica*), which entered parliament in 2014 and 2018 and succeeded to mobilise younger people to some extent (Fink-Hafner 2020a; Krašovec – Broder 2020), who also participate less at elections. On the other hand, the elderly population has been continually better represented than younger people, probably also because since the mid-1990s the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (*Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije*) has claimed to represent pensioners. This party is usually described as a single-issue party and has been continually present in the parliament since the mid-1990s; even more, it has also participated in almost all governments.

Dalton (in Hooghe 2004: 334) noted that analyses in the 1950s indicated that older people were significantly more distrustful, while in more recent studies this relationship is turned around because younger age cohorts are now clearly more distrustful than older respondents. It seems in Slovenia a different trend can be observed. Even though the young continue to be strongly underrepresented, their trust in the parliament recently rose to become the highest among the three age groups. Still, this is a very low level and the differences seen in trust between age groups are not very large (see Table 4). Figuratively speaking, trust in parliament among the young was U-shaped after 1993, bottoming out at the turn of the millennium to reach its highest level in 2008 – in times of improving or very good economic circumstances. The subsequent massive drop in 2012 may be ascribed to the European sovereign debt crisis that extended the effect of the financial crisis. As stated in the introduction, one train of thought argues that crisis, i.e., here the European sovereign debt crisis and the effect of the financial crisis, do have a causal effect upon trust and satisfaction with the way the democracy is working. Here we find support for this argument in that all three age groups reveal a similar pattern.

Nevertheless, a paradox appears with respect to satisfaction with the way the democracy is functioning. While the young are the most underrepresented group, they are also the most satisfied. The elderly generation is the least satisfied. This slope cannot be explained by descriptive representation. The young orient themselves to issues other than political ones and the elderly, particularly the 56+ generation, who held high hopes in the early 1990s when the democratic transition started and have become disillusioned with politics. As Krašovec – Johannsen (2016) discuss, the Slovenian electorate has consistently held relatively stable values and hopes, but as the state has been unable to fulfil them, they have searched for and formed new political parties. The increasing turnover and entrance of new political parties – also personalistic and populist – are evidence of this.

**Table 4: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and trust in the parliament by age (means comparison, scale 1–4) (1992–2018)**

Year	Age	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy		Trust in parliament	
		Mean	Std. deviation	Mean	Std. deviation
1993	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.21	0.64	1.83 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.68
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.12 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.70	1.93 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.65
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.32 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.71	2.12 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.76
1997	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.36 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.77	1.71 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.66
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.11 <sup>*a-b, b-c</sup>	0.79	1.80	0.71
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.24 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.88	1.85 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.77
2000	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.51	0.72	1.76 <sup>*a-b, a-c</sup>	0.70
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.51	0.71	2.02 <sup>*a-b, b-c</sup>	0.75
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.55	0.75	2.18 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.83
2004	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.46 <sup>*a-b, a-c</sup>	0.63	2.23	0.67
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.32 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.67	2.25	0.75
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.34 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.65	2.23	0.71
2008	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.44	0.66	2.33	0.69
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.41	0.66	2.29	0.66
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.44	0.66	2.36	0.76
2012	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.06 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.67	1.64	0.66
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	1.96 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.64	1.59 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.62
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	1.85 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.66	1.72 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.71
2014	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	1.89	0.63	1.84	0.65
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	1.88	0.67	1.81	0.73
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	1.83	0.67	1.81	0.72
2018	18–30 <sup>a</sup>	2.40 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.69	2.18 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.68
	31–55 <sup>b</sup>	2.29	0.74	2.02 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.72
	56+ <sup>c</sup>	2.20 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.72	2.06	0.72

Note: \*  $p < .05$ . Analysis of variance with post hoc tests was used to determine differences between groups labeled <sup>a</sup> (18–30), <sup>b</sup> (31–55), and <sup>c</sup> (56+). For example, <sup>\*a-c b-c</sup> means that statistically significant differences were found between groups <sup>a</sup> and <sup>c</sup> and between groups <sup>b</sup> and <sup>c</sup>.

Sources: Slovenian Public Opinion and European Social Survey (1992–2018); authors' own calculations.

With respect to age groups, descriptive representation collides with theories of political socialisation. On one hand, descriptive representation will, from the point of inequality, argue that it is not surprising that the middle group is over-represented since it possesses the resources to participate in and win elections (Verba et al. 1995). Yet, theories of political socialisation also argue that values are formed in youth and to a large extent continue as one ages (see Hyman 1959; Abendschön ed. 2013). Hence, those who were aged 25 in 1993 turned 36 in 2004. If we, knowing that this is only a rough gauge, compare the trust of those aged 18–30 in 1993 with that of individuals aged 31–55 in 2004, the level is higher for the latter group, indicating that descriptive representation does matter. If we instead compare with 2014, when our 25-year-olds had turned 45, the means (1.83 and 1.81, respectively) are almost the same, showing that socialisation is important. Thus, the analysis leans support to both arguments in political socialisation.

The present data cannot settle the issue. The dynamic character of age invites competing explanations related to outcome, socialisation and descriptive representation. Here, it is sufficient to note that the young may have learned an important lesson about democracy when several coeval representatives were elected in 2014. This success may help to change patrimonial norms in society and contribute to greater inclusion.

## **No workers in the previous ‘workers’ paradise’? The educracy**

While talking about representation, hardly anyone can avoid the question of representatives’ education. This topic is typically also addressed in a broader issue of elite theory where two authors (Pareto and Mosca) are often connected to it. Having (different kinds of) power and possessing (different kinds of) qualities have, generally speaking, been two major attributes of elites. (Higher) education has also been closely connected to them.

These power inequalities speak to the core of descriptive representation and, accordingly, one may expect the educated to be overrepresented. Many research studies also reveal that higher education is strongly connected to greater engagement in political participation (Verba et al. 1995; Franklin 2004).

Table 5 also reveals the huge overrepresentation of the highly educated in Slovenia. In 2000, representatives with a tertiary education were over seven times overrepresented compared to their share in the general population. Still, this pattern is not unique in post-socialist Europe (see Semenova et al. eds. 2014) or in established democracies (Esaiasson – Holmberg 1996; Best – Cotta eds. 2000). However, the overrepresentation of the highly educated is continually decreasing, mainly due to the general rise in education. This does not imply that the share of representatives with a basic or less of an education is increasing. On the contrary, the traditional working class is not and has never been represented in independent Slovenia. Aside from the puzzle that

**Table 5: Population and MPs by education, 15 years of age or older (1992–2016) in %**

Year	Population			Elected MPs			Over/underrepresentation		
	Basic or less	Upper secondary	Tertiary	Basic or less	Upper secondary	Tertiary	Basic or less	Upper secondary	Tertiary
1992	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.11	17.78	81.11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1996	37.30	52.11	10.59	0.00	19.57	80.43	0.00	0.38	7.59
2000	32.18	55.36	12.46	0.00	19.78	80.22	0.00	0.36	6.44
2004	27.88	57.13	14.99	0.00	18.68	81.32	0.00	0.33	5.42
2008	24.10	57.68	18.22	0.00	21.98	78.02	0.00	0.38	4.28
2011	21.59	57.61	20.81	0.00	12.09	87.91	0.00	0.21	4.22
2014	19.93	55.89	24.18	0.00	14.44	85.56	0.00	0.26	3.54
2018	17.67	55.10	27.23	0.00	20.00	80.00	0.00	0.36	2.94

Sources: Eurostat ([http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa\\_pgaed&lang=en](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_pgaed&lang=en)); Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS; available from 1996); Kustec Lipicer et al. (2019).

this could be true in what was previously a socialist country, a broader question is whether the underrepresentation gives or can give rise to populist appeals. Indeed, Slovenia has seen different forms of populism or populist sentiments within different parties for 30 years and some of these parties have managed to cross the parliamentary threshold (Krašovec 2012; Lovec ed. 2019; Fink-Hafner 2020b), yet the differences with respect to trust in the parliament among the three subgroups in terms of education are mainly small (see Table 6).

However, with respect to trust in the parliament those with a tertiary education have since 1997 had greater trust in the parliament than voters with a basic education. Although one education group is highly overrepresented in the parliament, while the differences in trust and satisfaction among the three groups are rather small, it is obvious that the descriptive representation argument cannot offer the only or correct answer, but that the elitist theory might perhaps be more useful here.

Ross (2006) raises the classical question if the democracy is better for the poor, who mostly have only basic education, but find that it is the middleclass that benefits the most from democratic processes. When we find a similar pattern to the above in trust with respect to satisfaction with the way in which democracy function it begs the question if the outcome of democratic processes is more beneficial to the better educated. When those with tertiary education are consistently, except from 1993, more satisfied than those with basic and upper secondary education, a likely proposition in Slovenia, similar to that of Ross, is that democracy benefits the educated.



**Table 6: Satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy and trust in the parliament by education (means comparison, scale 1–4) (1992–2018)**

Year	Education	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy		Trust in parliament	
		Mean	Std. deviation	Mean	Std. deviation
1993	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.23	0.74	2.03 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.72
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.19	0.67	1.88 <sup>*a-b</sup>	0.68
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.11	0.66	2.01	0.64
1997	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.19	0.85	1.77	0.74
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.20	0.79	1.78	0.71
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.31	0.85	1.89	0.70
2000	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.48	0.76	2.02	0.81
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.53	0.71	1.97	0.77
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.57	0.67	2.10	0.74
2004	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.38	0.68	2.12 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.72
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.32 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.65	2.22 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.71
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.48 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.62	2.51 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.64
2008	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.46	0.67	2.26 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.73
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.39	0.67	2.26 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.68
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.47	0.59	2.53 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.66
2012	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	1.88	0.66	1.67	0.72
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	1.92	0.63	1.61	0.63
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	1.99	0.70	1.73	0.67
2014	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	1.87 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.70	1.78 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.72
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	1.80 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.64	1.75 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.68
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.02 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.67	2.06 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.74
2018	Basic or less <sup>a</sup>	2.28 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.77	1.97 <sup>*a-c</sup>	0.76
	Upper secondary <sup>b</sup>	2.21 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.73	2.01 <sup>*b-c</sup>	0.71
	Tertiary <sup>c</sup>	2.44 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.72	2.26 <sup>*a-c, b-c</sup>	0.67

Note: \*  $p < .05$ . Analysis of variance with post hoc tests was used to determine differences between groups labeled <sup>a</sup> (Basic or less), <sup>b</sup> (Upper secondary), and <sup>c</sup> (Tertiary). For example, <sup>\*a-c, b-c</sup> means that statistically significant differences were found between groups <sup>a</sup> and <sup>c</sup> and between groups <sup>b</sup> and <sup>c</sup>.

Sources: Slovenian Public Opinion and European Social Survey (1992–2018); authors' own calculations.

## **Conclusion: Trajectories of descriptive representation in modern democracies**

While modern parliaments have different roles, their representative role is still among the most important ones. Many theoretical discussions on representation assume or argue that representatives reflect the population also with regard to the composition of parliaments, i.e. their composition accurately corresponds to that of the whole nation. As asserted by many researchers, descriptive underrepresentation, in its relative proportion within the population, of social groups in parliament may trigger feelings of alienation, exclusion and an illegitimate political system; namely, a democracy that is lacking in both support and trust.

Data in Slovenia show that, as a group, Slovenian MPs poorly reflect the Slovenian population in relation to gender, age and education. Women, the young, the elderly and those with a basic education are all underrepresented – and across all years of the democratic period in Slovenia, despite their underrepresentation not being frozen on the same level. When this is compared to aggregated surveys on trust in parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy swings are to be expected from one legislative period to another. And certain of these results are visible. This indicates that there is some, but not necessarily a direct and strong, relationship between trust, satisfaction and the descriptive representation of particular social groups. Representation gaps are confirmed as being able to partly explain levels of both trust in parliaments and satisfaction with how democracy is working. Therefore, in comparative perspective, Slovenia is not a deviant case.

These results can help address several questions. One of these is the question of awareness and mobilisation. Awareness of gender issues combined with quotas and other institutional rules has in many countries led to an increasing share of female representatives in the parliament, the boardroom and in the media. Another question is: ‘Who is to be blamed?’ for the poor descriptive representation of specific social groups – voters and their electoral choices, or political parties, which during the candidate-selection processes (can) strongly influence the supply side at elections. Thinking about a more radical view, someone could even raise a question if the elections is indeed a good (the best) vehicle to achieve descriptive representation.

To reach a better understanding and explanation of trust in parliament and satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy, including the observed spikes, we recommend to employ a matrix of different approaches from electoral studies, theories of representation and political socialisation pinpointed as important in the literature and include cross-comparative and time sensitive cases. The perspective of descriptive representation we have employed improves our understanding, provides information about the (im)perfect descriptive

representation in Slovenia but are not sufficient to clarify the strength of different processes and theories.

Irrespective of this, equality in representation is perhaps a good normative goal, yet a goal that is very difficult to reach, and even when in parliaments the huge over/underrepresentation of various social sub-groups has been diminishing, this has had little immediate impact on trust in the parliament and satisfaction with the democracy among these newly 'empowered' social sub-groups.

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# Impacts of Renewable Energy on CO<sub>2</sub> Emission: Evidence from the Visegrad Group Countries

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**Abstract:** *EU policies aim to develop renewable energy share in both production and consumption of total energy and increase the efforts to mitigate climate change. As relatively new EU members, the Visegrad countries aimed to adopt these targets. Therefore, climate change mitigation and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction are important issues in Visegrad countries. In this paper, we examine the renewable energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions relationship in the Visegrad countries. We use the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) model to estimate the long-run relationship between the variables using annual data from the period of 2000–2018. The variables used are CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, GDP per capita, renewable energy consumption and urban population. The results show that there is cointegration among the variables. The estimated FMOLS model shows that GDP and population increase CO<sub>2</sub> consumption, and renewable energy consumption decreases CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Results show that renewable energy consumption has a decreasing effect on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.*

**Keywords:** *Visegrad Group (V4), Panel Cointegration, Renewable energy, Carbon dioxide emissions*

## Introduction

The four transition countries from Central Europe – Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia – founded the Visegrad Group (V4) to increase cooperation among them. The main aim of the group was to cooperate with accession to the European Union. After becoming a member of the EU, the group's new goal is to achieve EU requirements. The EU has many requirements, and some of them are in terms of energy and climate change. Furthermore, the aim of the

foundation of the EU was related to energy consumption, which started in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris. Following the Treaty of Paris, there were many treaties to design the EU energy policy, which are the Euratom Treaty of Rome (1958), the Maastricht Treaty (1988), the Energy Charter Treaty (1994) and the Lisbon Treaty (2007) (Wach et al. 2021). To investigate renewable energy, climate change, SDGs and greenhouse gases emissions (GHGs) have to first be argued. The main source of the GHGs is energy consumption and it is known that the main source of energy consumption is economic activities. The starting point of enormous energy consumption in production dates back to the industrial revolution.

The V4 has three policies for the EU integration; the first one is the support for EU enlargement in the eastern and southeastern directions, the second one is support for the European Neighbourhood Policy's eastern dimension and the third one is a shared vision of regional energy policy (Cabada – Waisová, 2018). In these concepts, the V4 has some security issues, some of which are related to energy security. These countries were dependent on the USSR and they tried to overcome their dependency; nowadays, after independence, their concern is that the USSR will recover and get its strength again (Ušiak 2018). That's why the countries always have security challenges. Because of energy and the environment, the environment emerged as a political concern in 1960 and in the Kroměříž Declaration in 2004 one of the declarations of the V4 is the issue of energy security (Cabada – Waisová 2018; Waisová 2018; Waisová 2020). Based on this environmental concern, the V4 countries' goal was environmentally friendly sustainable planning, whereas because of the integration into the capitalist system they had sharp economic growth and increased energy consumption. Increasing energy consumption which is caused by transforming the economy was the barrier to environmental concerns. Furthermore, the economic growth and growing energy needs increased energy security concerns. The V4 has various forms of energy security: safeguarding economic competition, mitigating Russia's pressure policy using its gas and oil supplies, the diversification of energy transmission routes and cooperation with Ukraine to help its transformation (Górka 2018). To provide energy security, one of the V4 initiatives is to create a network among the group countries through the North-South Corridor and a link between Hungary and Slovakia has already been established (Ušiak 2018). Also, the Czech Republic and the V4 have strengthened EU energy security while the energy crisis broke out between Russia and the EU at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. On Hungary's side, we see great interest in energy security, they have a strategy adopted in 2010 entitled Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and beyond (Bauerová 2018). They planned to construct a pipeline through Slovakia-Hungary, Romania-Hungary and from Croatia to Hungary.

The use of fossil fuels in many sectors is the primary source of these GHGs emissions. The governments have policies and precautions to mitigate climate

change. One of the precautions is transforming fossil energy sources into renewable energy sources. Renewable energy is a cleaner energy source and it will reduce carbon emissions. Due to this feature of renewable energy, it is expected to have a relationship between renewable energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between renewable energy consumption (REC) and the CO<sub>2</sub> relationship for the Visegrad countries which are relatively new members of the EU and transition countries which faced a capitalist system after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Before the empirical application, the structure of the renewable energy of the V4 countries and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are discussed. The empirical application starts with the panel unit root test. Based on the unit root test results, the existence of cointegration is determined and the FMOLS model is used to estimate cointegrated regression. The main goal of the V4 group was the accession to the EU and NATO, hence they have been members of the European Union since 2004. Convergence of the Visegrad countries to the EU is the new aim of the countries after becoming an EU member country. This convergence occurs in different areas such as the economy, education, and energy policy. Moreover, after Brexit<sup>1</sup> the V4 countries became more important in the EU (Brusenbauch Meislova 2019; Göllner 2018). Additionally, between 1995–2015, the V4 experienced rapid economic development, but inversely their energy consumption declined while the energy intensity increased with a considerably constant population, which is considered as decoupling by Szlavik and Sebestyén Szep (2007). The developments stated below are some of the reasons to have growing literature about the V4 group.

To investigate the relationship, the rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the structure of the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and renewable energy in Visegrad countries is investigated. The third section is the empirical application section. First, in the empirical application section, previous empirical literature is presented, then the econometric methodology is applied by given information about the techniques, and last, the results are given. In the last section, the paper is summarised and the concluded comments are given.

## CO<sub>2</sub> Emission and Renewable Energy in Visegrad Countries

Industry 1.0 is the period that used steam power and mechanisation from 1760 to sometime between 1820–1840; Industry 2.0 is the period that used mass production and development of machine tools from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century into the early 20<sup>th</sup> century; Industry 3.0 is the period that uses automation and computers, starting from the 1970s and Industry 4.0 started in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and uses the Internet of things (IoT), cloud computing, big data, simulation, augmented reality and artificial intelligence (Vinitha et al., 2020). The history

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1 In 2016 majority of the British electorate decided to leave from EU.

of the industrial revolution is based on energy, mechanisation, production and computer technologies, and all of these developments need energy. The main development which caused the industrial revolution is power produced by the steam engine (Wrigley 2013). After the industrial revolution, the requirement for energy in production started to increase. Following these developments, developing industry related to increasing energy consumption, which generates greenhouse gases emissions.

The average temperature on earth has increased by 0.7 °C over the last 100 years and it must be under 2 °C as an annual average (Uğurlu, 2019a, 2022). Reducing greenhouse gases emissions is considered vital for human life. Climate change mitigation is one of the main aims of governments. Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which has 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This agenda is firmly anchored in the European Treaties, and the European Union aims to decrease the share of greenhouse gases emissions, and one of the ways to decrease it is to increase the share of renewable energy sources, and the way to do that is linked to SDGs (Uğurlu 2019b). The SDG7 aims to access cheap, clean, reliable, technologically advanced and sustainable energy by 2030 (Kacperska et al. 2021). In 2016, the European Commission presented the 'Clean Energy for all Europeans' package which is aligned with the 2030 targets (Capros et al., 2018). The package aims to decrease GHG emissions and increase renewable energy use and energy efficiency. In 2018, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II), which is part of the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package, entered into force (Lowitzsch et al. 2020).


The finding of the effects of greenhouse gases on nature dates back to 1824 with the research of Joseph Fourier. Fleming (1999) states that there are three distinct sources of heating: solar radiation, temperature and heat from the interior of the Earth (Fourier 1824). After this research, there were some other studies on the topic but the main event is the carbon market of the United Nations Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Chichilnisky 2010). The aim of the protocol was to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) in the period from 2008 to 2012 to the 1990 level. Since the protocol, GHG emissions, climate change and climate change mitigation have been widely investigated topics in research, also it is one of the vital concerns of the world.

One of the effects of climate change is GHGs and air pollution caused by them all over the world. However, the air pollution of the V4 is sourced from several main sources and can be split into two categories; the first is the natural origin and the second is anthropogenic. Anthropogenic origin sources are industry, waste management, agriculture, burning fossil fuels during electricity generation and heat, and transport and households (Dzikuć et al. 2021). Moreover Skjærseth (2018) noted that the average volume of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions increased in Poland and Slovakia and decreased in Hungary and Czechia.

Renewable energy use and its relation between CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are widely investigated research topics, but it is newly investigated in the V4 countries as we will present in the next section. Renewable energy use and decreasing emissions are the goals of the EU. The UN (2015) declares 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets in order to provide sustainability, climate change, poverty, etc. The goals are no poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industrial innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land, peace, justice and strong institutions and partnerships for the goals. As a member of the EU, climate change mitigation and renewable energy use are the goals of the V4 group.

Figure 1 shows CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (kilo tons) on the left and per capita (metrics ton per capita) on the right. Because the emissions are affected by the population per capita emissions are presented to eliminate the population effect. For that reason, while Polish CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are very high compared to the other Visegrad countries, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita values are not, and the highest values are in Czechia. Although based on the amount of emissions of the countries the order from highest to lowest is: Poland, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia; based on the per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the countries the order is Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

**Figure 1: CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in Visegrad Countries**




Source: Drawn by the author based on (World Bank, 2022) WDI database.

The V4 countries adopted their legal regulations to environmental impacts. In 1980 Poland approved the Law on Environmental Protection and Management. In 1992 Czechoslovakia passed legislation establishing Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) systems and in 1994, after the split of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia established EIA systems. In 1993 EIA was established in Hungary (Gałaś et al. 2015). Each of the Visegrad countries' energy

markets was dominated by one energy source: hard coal in Poland and the Czech Republic, nuclear energy in Slovakia and Hungary. Visegrad countries aim to integrate with the EU energy sector. Although these countries should convert to a green energy policy, the existing market was dependent on Russian energy sources and fully carbonised with a centralised energy market (Chodkowska-Miszczuk et al. 2017).

Figure 2 shows coal consumption and production of Visegrad countries. Because of the big differences in the volume of consumption, Czechia and Poland's values are presented on the left axis and Hungary and Slovakia's values are presented on the right axis. At first glance, it is very easy to see the differences between the countries according to the highest values of the axes. The left axis's highest value is 3.5 exajoules and the right axis is 0.40 exajoules. Hungary has the highest consumption values and it is far from the other three countries' lines. The common thing for all the countries is decreasing trends consistent with the EU clean energy strategies. Coal production data of Slovakia doesn't exist, which is consistent with the fact that the country's energy market is dominated by nuclear energy. Similar to coal consumption, the differences in coal production is big, thus in the graph we numbered two axes; the right axis shows Hungary data and the axis ranges between 0–0.24.


**Figure 2: Coal Consumption and Coal Production of V4**



Source Drawn by the author based on BP(2021) Exajoules

The nuclear energy generation of Czechia has very high values compared to Hungary and Slovakia. From 1990 to 2000 the values of nuclear energy generation of the countries are very close, but after 2001 the differentiation started, and after 2007 while Slovakia and Hungary generation values moved together, Czechia doesn't converge with the two countries. Czechia continues to use nuclear power and until 2014 it increases in Figure 3. In summary, Figure 3 shows that nuclear energy is a very important energy source for Czechia and considering the increasing population and growing economy/production it has decreasing importance for Slovakia and Hungary.

**Figure 3: Nuclear Energy Generation of V4**




Source Drawn by the author based on BP(2021) Terawatt-hours.

Each Visegrad country has a different energy structure. Czechia was the fourth-biggest net electricity exporter in the EU in 2018, and as for share of the energy sources, nuclear energy is 35%, coal is 53% and renewable energy is 12%. In Slovakia nearly 55% of energy production is supplied by nuclear power stations, the share of conventional power stations is 21%, the share of hydroelectric stations is 14% and the share of other renewable sources is 8.9% (Sulich – Sołoducho-Pelc 2021). Poland is one of the natural gas producers with amounts of 3.8 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2019, also natural gas is a primary energy source for Hungary and their production amount is 2 billion m<sup>3</sup> per year (Kochanek 2021). In Czechia solid fossil fuels share was 63% in 1990, in 2018 it decreased to 35% (Rokicki – Perkowski 2020).

Renewable energy sources are wind energy, solar energy, hydro energy, bioenergy geothermal energy and marine energy (Roy – Das, 2018; Uğurlu, 2019b). Each source has advantages and disadvantages based on environment and economics according to their cost and benefits. One of the costs is the cost of power generation. Štreimikienė (2021) presents average external costs of power generation in Visegrad countries in 2010–2020 (Figure 4). The target of Czechia is to reach 25% renewable energy in total energy consumption, and it was 6.7% in 2020 and 9.4% in 2014 (Čeryová et al., 2018). Although in this paper we focus on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, choosing renewable energy sources (RES) use also provides a reduction in the other air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx) (Godawska – Wyrobek 2021). The external costs of the power generation sources are different in each country. In terms of their value; oil has the highest cost in all countries except Czechia, and the second-highest cost is waste in all the countries. (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Average External Costs of Power Generation (EURct/kWh)**



Source: Drawn by the author based on (Štreimikienė, 2021) p. 93, Table 2.

Moreover Štreimikienė (2021) gives data on the amount of support of the countries to renewable energy sources in EURct/kWh. The author shows that Czechia has a high level of support for renewable energy compared to the other V4 countries. The main supported renewable energy of Czechia is solar energy and it is 4–8 times higher than other renewable energy sources.

**Table 1: Average Public Support to Renewables in 2012–2017 (EURct/kWh)**

Solar	Hydro	Wind	Biomass	Biogas
<b>Czechia</b>				
44.825	6.2625	7.1875	8.725	11.3
<b>Poland</b>				
11.11786	5.608929	5.741071	5.960714	–
<b>Hungary</b>				
6.15	3.85	7.825	7.75	10.65

Sources: Calculated by the author, from taking the arithmetic mean of the years of (Štreimikienė, 2021).

Under the Renewable Energy Directive (EUR, 2001), the EU targeted to increase the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2020. The share



of renewable energy in total energy consumption for V4 countries in 2020 are 13%, 13%, 14% and 15% for Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland respectively (Wach et al. 2021). Table 2 shows the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in total energy production. From 2014 to 2018 Czechia has nearly 15% renewable energy use in total energy production and reaches 16 in 2019. The shares range from 11–12 for Poland and Slovakia until 2019, and in 2019 for Slovakia it reaches approximately 17. Lastly, Hungary's data starts in 2014 at 14.5, and decreased each year until it is 12.5 in 2018, with an additional 0.1 in 2019, when it is 12.6. With a rough calculation, the last 6 years the V4's RES share in total energy production is 15%.

**Table 2: The Share of RES in Total Energy Production in Visegrad Countries (%)**

	2004	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Target 2020
<b>Czechia</b>	6.8	15.1	15.1	14.9	14.8	15.1	16.2	13
<b>Hungary</b>	4.4	14.5	14.4	14.3	13.5	12.5	12.6	13
<b>Poland</b>	6.9	11.6	11.9	11.4	11.1	11.5	12.2	15
<b>Slovakia</b>	6.4	11.7	12.9	12	11.5	11.9	16.9	14

Source: Table 1 in (Dzikuć et al., 2021).

## Empirical Application

### *Previous Empirical Literature*

In the empirical section, our goal is to see the relationship between renewable energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Visegrad countries. There is a huge literature on energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and income of the countries regarding CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The relation between income and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is the topic which is related to the environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). In this section, we focus on only renewable energy papers and mainly we focus on the papers which use data of the V4.

Table 3 presents some of the most recent studies on the renewable energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions relationship. The variables used in the papers and their main findings by focusing on the result of CO<sub>2</sub> and REC can be found in the table. The articles related to renewable energy consumption in the Visegrad Group are presented below.

Brodny and Tutak (2021) investigate sustainable energy security of the V4. The authors use entropy-weight and TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution) methodology using 14 indicators of the V4 for the annual data of the period of 2008–2018. The indicators are TPES per

capita, tons of oil equivalent (TOE) per capita, transformation and distribution losses, energy import dependency, energy mix diversification index, imports of natural gas by the main supplier, GDP per capita, energy intensity, energy productivity, electricity prices for non-household consumers, RES (renewable energy sources) share in gross final energy consumption, the intensity of energy and population unable to keep home adequately warm by poverty status. The indicator RES is the reason for our interest in this paper. The result of the paper about the RES is that to increase production in economic activities, use of renewable energy in electricity generation, heating and cooling and transport should be increased in the V4.

Štreimikienė (2021) state that there is a 100% renewables use scenario in the EU and based on the scenario and to decrease external costs in terms of atmospheric pollution of energy production, the V4 should allocate their energy sources weighing the renewable energy sources. The author compares the external cost of atmospheric pollutants and dynamics of external costs of power generation in Visegrad countries using descriptive analysis. Lastly, the same methodology is used for the evolution of public support to renewables in Visegrad countries. The author concludes that because of the external cost of power generation the share of renewables in power generation has increased since 2004.

Książopolski and Maśloch (2021) use the time delay approach to investigate renewable energy sources in the V4 for the years between 2004 and 2019. The paper concludes that the adoption of the RES quantity targets mobilises countries and their RES share increased in the investigated years. Wach et al. (2021) focus on Europeanisation processes of Visegrad countries from 2005 to 2018. They deal with EU28 countries and use different methods such as the Hellwig method and k-means clustering. The results show that based on the Hellwig method among the V4 countries, Hungary has the highest ranking of climate and energy targets until 2016 but, in 2017–2018 the Czech Republic and Slovakia took over Hungary's position. The main result of the paper is in the studied period, there were no notable changes in the classification of EU nations in terms of their achievement of EU climate and energy targets. The concluded result for the V4 countries is Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia were close to meeting the set targets in the 2005–2018 period.

Godawska and Wyrobek (2021) examine the influence of environmental policy stringency on renewable energy production in the V4 countries. The authors use the Panel Pooled Mean Group Autoregressive Distributive Lag model for the period of 1993–2012. The variables used are the contribution of renewable energy to total primary energy supply and contribution of renewable energy to total primary energy supply as dependent variables, and environmental policy stringency index, environmental taxes stringency, emission standards stringency, government subsidies for renewable energy technologies stringency, GDP per

capita growth, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (metric tons per capita) and Gini index as independent variables. Contrary to our paper, Godawska and Wyrobek (2021) investigate GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> and some other variables' effect on renewable energy, while in our paper the renewable energy and GDP effect on CO<sub>2</sub> is investigated. They find that there is cointegration among the variables, hence the long-run and short-run models are estimated. The results show that a more stringent environmental policy has a positive impact on renewable energy production.

**Table 3: Summary of Literature of Renewable Energy CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Nexus**

Authors	Period	Variables	Country/ Territory	Methodology	Main Conclusion
(Al-Mulali et al.,2015)	1990–2013	CO <sub>2</sub> , GDP, TD, UR, DC, ECRW, ECH, ECNU, ECS, ECW	23 selected European countries	Panel cointegration test	REC has a negative effect on CO <sub>2</sub>
(Charfeddine – Kahia 2019)	1980–2015	GDP, CO <sub>2</sub> , REC, GFCF, LF, FD	24 countries of MENA	Panel VAR model and panel cointegration tests	REC ⇒ CO <sub>2</sub>
(Apergis – Payne 2010)	1984–2007	GDP, REC, CO <sub>2</sub> , NEC	19 Developed and developing countries	Panel cointegration	CO <sub>2</sub> ⇔ REC
(Salim – Rafiq 2012)	1980–2006	REC, GDP, CO <sub>2</sub> , OIL	6 major emerging countries	Westerlund panel cointegration test,	REC ⇔ CO <sub>2</sub>
(Pata 2018)	1974–2014	CO <sub>2</sub> , GDP, REC, GDP <sup>2</sup> , FD, UR, HEC, AEC	Turkey	ARDL bounds test, FMOLS,	
(Adewuyi – Awodumi 2017)	1980–2010	GDP, CO <sub>2</sub> , REC, HC, FD, UR, Td, PC	West African countries	Three-stage least squares (3SLS)	REC ⇔ CO <sub>2</sub>
(Shafiei – Salim 2014)	1980–2011	CO <sub>2</sub> , REC, NREC, GDP, P, UR	OECD countries	ECM Causality	REC ⇔ CO <sub>2</sub>
(Menyah – Wolde-Rufael 2010)	1960–2007	CO <sub>2</sub> , REC, NEC, GDP	USA	Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality test	CO <sub>2</sub> ⇒ REC
(Wolde-Rufael 2006)	1997–2007	CO <sub>2</sub> , GDP, NREC, RE, EM	REC 27 European Countries	Cointegration, and Granger causality test	CO <sub>2</sub> ⇔ REC
(Sebri – Ben-Salha 2014)	1971–2010	RGDP, REC, CO <sub>2</sub> , OPEN	BRICS	ARDL bounds test approach to cointegration and VECM	CO <sub>2</sub> ⇒ REC
(Lin – Moubarak 2014)	1977–2011	EC, GDP, Lib, CO <sub>2</sub>	China	ARDL, ECM-Granger causality	REC ⇔ CO <sub>2</sub>

Authors	Period	Variables	Country/ Territory	Methodology	Main Conclusion
(Uğurlu 2019a)	2000-2014	GDP, CO <sub>2</sub> ,REC	Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi, Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates	Panel Cointegration	REC has a negative significant relationship with CO <sub>2</sub>
(Radmehr et al. 2021)	1995- 2014	PGDP, CO <sub>2</sub> , GFCF, LF, REC, NREC	European Union (EU)	Generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS)	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions are negatively and significantly associated with REC
(Godawska – Wyrobe, 2021)	1993–2012	RE_P, RE_S,EPS, TAX, STAN, SUBS, GDP, CO <sub>2</sub> , GINI	European Union and the Visegrad Group Countries	Panel ARDL/PMG model	renewable energy production is positively influenced by the policy stringency

Source: Authors' tabulation. Notes: CO<sub>2</sub>: CO<sub>2</sub>emissions, GDP: Gross Domestic Product , PGDP: Per Capita Gross Domestic Product ,TD: trade openness, DC: domestic credit to private sector ECRW: namely combustible renewables and waste generation ECH: hydroelectric generation, ECNU: nuclear generation, ECS: solar generation, ECW: wind-powered generation, REC: Renewable energy consumption; LF: Labor force; GFCF: Capital stock, FD: Financial development, HC: Human capital, AEC: Alternative energy consumption, UR: Urbanization; FD: Financial development, HEC: Hydroelectricity consumption, EM: Employment; PC: Physical capital; NREC: Non-renewable energy consumption; NEC: Nuclear energy consumption; RE\_P: contribution of renewable energy to total primary energy supply in thous, RE\_S contribution of renewable energy to total primary energy supply in %, EPS: environmental policy stringency index, TAX: environmental taxes stringency, STAND: emission standards stringency, SUBS: government subsidies for renewable energy technologies stringency, GINI: Gini index, Lib:LIBOR.

## Data

The empirical application aims to test the long-run relationship among variables and if there is an estimating long-run model among the variables. We use the annual data of Visegrad countries between 1996 and 2018. The variables used are CO<sub>2</sub>, GDP, REC and URB, which show CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (metric tons per capita), GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$), renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption) and urban population (% of the total population) respectively. The source of the data is the World Development Indicators database.

In the modelling step, we use logarithmic forms of the variables. The model estimated can be formulated as follows

$$LCO2_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 LGDP_{it} + \beta_2 LREC_{it} + \beta_3 LPOP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the used variables. The difference between maximum and minimum values of the logarithmic variables is low, the standard deviation of the data is also low.

**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables**

	LCO2	LGDP	LREC	LPOP
Mean	1.981664	9.435004	2.229949	4.1586
Median	1.993542	9.432225	2.276294	4.1457
Maximum	2.493652	9.887637	2.843903	4.3039
Minimum	1.415365	8.903377	1.315684	3.9839
Std. Dev.	0.299570	0.242152	0.362403	0.1131
Observations	76	76	76	76

## Results

Before the model is estimated, the stationarity of the variables must be determined. Panel unit root tests are split into two categories: first-generation panel unit root tests and second generation panel unit root tests. The decision to select the first-generation versus second-generation cross-sectional dependence test is used. The test is proposed by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006); the authors show that cross countries tend to have strong interdependencies. If there is a cross-sectional dependence a second-generation test must be selected. In Table 5 we summarise different cross-sectional dependence test results that are (Breusch – Pagan 1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM), (Pesaran 2004) LM and CD test and (Baltagi et al. 2012) bias-corrected test.

Except for the Pesaran CD test, with the rest of the cross-sectional dependence tests we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence and we conclude that there is no cross-sectional dependence and we must use one of the first generation panel unit root tests. Only the Pesaran CD test null hypothesis is rejected but at a 10% significance level which is low significance.

**Table 5: Cross-sectional Dependence Tests Results**

Test	Statistic	d.f.	Prob.
Breusch-Pagan LM	10.52774	6	0.1041
Pesaran scaled LM	1.307046		0.1912
Bias-corrected scaled LM	1.195935		0.2317
Pesaran CD	1.848377		0.0645

Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) is employed in this study. The LLC (Levin et al. 2002) test assumes that there is a general panel unit root process with the null hypothesis of a common unit root in the panel versus the alternative of stationarity. The results in Table 6 show that a differenced LURB variable null hypothesis is rejected at a 1% significance in a model without a constant and trend and at a 10% level significance at a model with constant. For the other variables their difference level null hypothesis is rejected in all models. We conclude that all the variables are stationary in the first difference. Therefore because all the variables are in the same order integrated there may be a cointegration among these variables

**Table 6: Unit Root Test Results**

Variable	Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC)		
	None	Constant	Trend
LCO2	-1.1274	-0.1716	-0.3191
LGDP	11.057	-0.7149	0.0510
LREC	3.2158	-1.2948	-0.3653
LURB	0.89285	-3.0984	-0.24125 0.95672
$\Delta\Delta$ LCO2	-7.63771***	-6.02672***	-5.0508***
$\Delta\Delta$ LGDP	-2.72371***	-4.43111***	-3.9286***
$\Delta\Delta$ LREC	-5.2045***	-5.8747***	-3.0832***
$\Delta\Delta$ LURB	-1.84832***	-1.38488*	-1.24801

Source: Automatic selection based on the Schwarz is used to choose the optimal lag length.. \*\*\* shows the rejection of the null hypothesis of the LLC test.

We use the Pedroni test (Pedroni 1999) and the Kao test (Kao 1999) is employed in this study as a cointegration test. Table 7 shows the Pedroni and Kao cointegration test. The results show that four statistics out of seven statistics of the Pedroni test reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Also, the Kao cointegration test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Hence we can estimate the long-run model for the variables.

**Table 7: Cointegration Test Results**

Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test		
	Statistic	Prob.
Panel v-Statistic	1.249964	0.1057
Panel rho-Statistic	0.131332	0.5522
Panel PP-Statistic	-1.56093*	0.0593
Panel ADF-Statistic	-3.2690***	0.0005
Group rho-Statistic	1.1185	0.8683
Group PP-Statistic	-3.9844***	0.0000
Group ADF-Statistic	-4.5979***	0.0000
Kao Panel Cointegration Test		
ADF	Statistic	Prob.
	-4.0638***	0.0000
Residual variance	0.001101	
HAC variance	0.000721	

Automatic selection based on the Schwarz is used to choose the optimal lag length. Lag length is 3 for Pedroni and 4 for Kao. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively.

We use the fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) method to estimate the long-run relationship. FMOLS is proposed by Pedroni (2001) which generates consistent estimates in small samples and does not suffer from large-size distortions in the presence of endogeneity and heterogeneous dynamics.

**Table 8: FMOLS Estimation Results**

Dependent Variable: LCO <sub>2</sub>		
Variable	Coefficient	
LGDP	0.3612***	0.0000
LREC	-0.3611***	0.0000
LURB	1.0617***	0.0000

\*\*\* denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. The pooled model was selected in the estimation step.

The results of the panel-FMOLS are reported in Table 8. All the coefficients are significant at a 1% significance level. According to results in the Visegrad countries, GDP has a positive effect on CO<sub>2</sub> and renewable energy consumption has

a negative effect. Also, urbanisation has a positive effect on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The direction of the coefficients is consistent with the expectations. It is expected and aimed for the countries that renewable energy consumption decreases air pollution such as CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Also, urbanisation increases CO<sub>2</sub> emissions because of increasing economic activities. Moreover, GDP increases the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The GDP is one of the measurements of production, and production is the main energy-consuming activity,

## Conclusion

After the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the countries which agreed to reduce greenhouse gases emission have used many strategies or policies. The United Nations defined SDGs and the EU adapted them to their requirements. Therefore the EU committed to increasing the use of renewable energy sources, decreasing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and some other requirements related to sustainable economic development. In this paper, we focus on the Visegrad countries. These countries were under socialist central planning and their energy markets were dominated by one energy source. One of the aims of the group is to be a member of the EU and after they achieve that goal their new aim is to converge to the EU countries in different fields. One of the fields is sustainable energy and climate change mitigation. Based on the SDGs, they have to increase the proportion of renewable energy sources in the total production of energy and decrease the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as one of the GHGs.

In this paper, first the structure of the energy markets of the Visegrad countries is given. The data of energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were presented and the movement of the data is argued. Data showed that each country had focused on one energy source to produce but in the last years diversification of the source started. Moreover, the countries defined targets for renewable energy share in total energy, and they aimed to increase the share of renewable energy.

After depicting the status quo of the countries, in the empirical part of the paper, the relationship between CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and renewable energy consumption was estimated. In the estimation step, we used the population, GDP, renewable energy consumption and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the Visegrad countries from 2000 to 2018. In the estimation methodology the FMOLS model is used to see the long-run relationships. The unit root test showed that the variables are same order integrated, thus we tested the cointegration of the variables. In the following step, after the cointegration was validated, we estimated the FMOLS model. The model results showed that an increase in the GDP and population increase CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and an increase in renewable energy use decreases CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The results of the model are consistent with the expectations. In conclusion, in the 2000–2018 period increasing renewable energy consumption decreased the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Visegrad countries.



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### ***Presentation of the paper***

Each issue the *Politics in Central Europe* focuses on one main topic or theme. This theme is indicated in advance, at the latest in the previous issue. Besides essays focused on the current issue, essays with other themes are welcomed too.

Essays should be written in English (preferably British English).

Essays should not normally exceed 12,000 words in length.

When submitting the essay, please also attach:

- an abstract of 150–200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
- a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
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All essays are checked by a referee; they undergo a double-blind peer review. At least two external referees review manuscripts. *Politics in Central Europe* reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form, without requesting an external review.

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Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

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Authors are urged to write as concisely as possible, but not at the expense of clarity. Descriptive or explanatory passages, necessary for information but which tend to break up the flow of text, should appear in footnotes. For footnotes please use Arabic numbers. Footnotes should be placed on the same page as the text reference, with the same number in the essay.

Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994–1998; or the 1990s.

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In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

Since Bull (1977) has shown that. This is in results attained later (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), are states the.

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## **List of References**

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

### **BOOKS:**

#### **Single author books:**

Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia*, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

#### **Two or more authors:**

Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid. Understanding International Development Cooperation*, Zed Books, Mellempfolkeligt Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

### **EDITED VOLUMES:**

Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1993): *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Clarendon Press.

### **CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:**

George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, in Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics*. Sixth Edition, 70–76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

### **JOURNAL ARTICLES:**

#### **Printed journals:**

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5–54.

#### **Online editions of journals:**

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632> (15 August 2002).

## **NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:**

### **Printed editions:**

Excerpts From the Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

### **Online editions:**

Cooper, Robert (2002): Why We Still Need Empires, *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html> (2 November 2003).

## **RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:**

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

## **Illustrations and tables**

Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced. Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

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*POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE* welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of *Politics in Central Europe* was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

*POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE* encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

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- If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review
- Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified
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