

The Regional Economic Foundations of European Identity

FLORIAN K. KLEY



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Abstract: *The question of whether there is increasing social integration among EU citizens in Europe as a spill-over effect of the ongoing process of system integration, as expected by utilitarian perspectives on integration, has been discussed in many contributions so far. In particular, the question of how the economic strength and development of macro-units affects European social integration has gained new momentum after the 2004 enlargement, when economically weaker ECE countries became part of the EU. In this contribution, I focus on the impact of regional economic strength and development on European social integration. I analyse the relationship between the economic situation and development of NUTS-1 regions and individual European identity using Eurobarometer data for the years 2004, 2010 and 2015. Using descriptive and multivariate quantitative approaches, I show that regional economic strength is weakly correlated with European identity, although not significant in multivariate models. However, citizens who believe that the EU is an economic advantage are more likely to identify as Europeans and are more prevalent in regions with higher economic growth. I conclude that convincing citizens of the economic benefits of EU membership could result in increased European social integration in the long run.*

Keywords: *European identity, European integration, regions, economy, attitudes*

Introduction¹

Both the refugee and the Euro crisis highlighted that a fundamental issue of the EU today is the question of its responsibilities and tasks. The periodi-


¹ This contribution is based on my dissertation submitted to Leipzig University in 2022 and accepted in 2023. Despite some adaptations, most passages are taken verbatim from the dissertation.

cally debates led by the heads of the Member States highlight the problem of different perceptions on what the EU should focus on. Is there a common (financial) responsibility in case of debts? Should the EU force Member States to show solidarity regarding the redistribution of refugees? Should the EU expand the mechanisms of redistribution among territories? While citizens may differ in their expectations in the areas of redistribution, support, or political engagement, undoubtedly, the EU can be regarded as an economic project. With the European Coal and Steel community (1951) resulting in the European Economic Community (1957), economic issues were clearly at the forefront of the predecessors of the EU of today. Furthermore, the most prominent projects of the EU focus on economic cooperation and development. The European Common Market, the free movement of goods, capital, services, and of persons, but also the common currency highlight the importance of the EU as a first and foremost economic project. Hence, the understanding of the EU as an economic institution is closely linked to its heritage, development, and showcase projects.

Unsurprisingly, economic development is also an ever-emphasised objective of the EU. As stated in the preamble of the Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht treaty), '[the representatives of the Member States] RESOLVED to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies [...] DETERMINED to promote economic and social progress for their peoples' (European Union 2012: 15). Although it is undeniable that the European Common Market has gained intensity over the years (Fligstein 2008: 64) and some political actors highlight its positive impact on economic development (Cœuré 2018), economic development can be influenced by many different direct and indirect factors. Looking at the economic disparities and development of EU NUTS-1 regions between 2004 and 2015 in Figure 1, we can see considerable differences between regions in terms of GDP and GDP growth. Since 2004, most regions have witnessed an upswing in their economies. Mediterranean EU regions, especially impacted by the financial crisis, had the lowest economic growth rates.² In contrast, in terms of relative growth, regions in Eastern Central European (ECE) Member States have witnessed the strongest economic increase. While some ECE regions may have reached a level of prosperity comparable to that of other EU regions by 2015, most still have substantial gaps to close.

2 The Mediterranean regions shown are the NUTS-1 regions (administrative units usually smaller than countries) of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. Eastern and Central European regions are in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Northern and Western European regions are located in the remaining EU-27 Member States.

Figure 1: Regional GDP and development (NUTS-1 level, 2004-2015)



Source: Eurostat (2018)s. N = 88. Own calculations and depiction

The economic project at the heart of European system integration and the generally positive economic progress achieved in recent years, particularly in the ECE countries, raise important questions about the relationship between economic circumstances and the progress of European social integration.³ Are more prosperous regions those with a higher degree of European social integration? To what extent did economic growth foster European social integration? Related to the measurement of European social integration used in this study, the self-categorisation or identification (also) as European, the main question of this contribution reads as follows: ***Are citizens in prosperous or economically growing regions more likely to be inclusive Europeans?***

Linking European social integration with the economic situation of citizens and regions is of relevance for several reasons. For one, for the leading actors of the EU, European identity is regarded as a factor 'to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world' (European Union 2012: 16). Anyway, as stated in a more recent document and backed up by empirical research, individual factors such as education and culture are recognized as ways to

³ In what follows, I will refer to the distinction of European integration proposed by Gerhards and Lengfeld (2015) with reference to Lockwood (1964). On the one hand, European system integration concerns the relations between the institutional parts of the Europeanisation process, with the development of the EU, its institutions and legislation as the central topic of interest. European social integration, on the other hand, focuses on the relationships between European actors, which is closely related to the question of the eventual formation of a common European society, where citizens are relevant to each other and show some kind of social cohesion (Delhey 2004: 17).

strengthen this kind of identity (European Commission 2017: 2). However, due to the lack of competences (education) and the complexity of the issue (culture), both issues are difficult for EU actors to access and influence. In contrast, with the EU being an important agent in the field of economic development, policy actors have several possibilities and decisional power to make changes here, especially when it comes to supporting the less developed regions and foster convergence (Cœuré 2018). The EU already pursues its economic development and cohesion objectives by redistributing financial resources between regions through its Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds, European Commission 2015). If the assumption made by scholars such as Haas (1958) could be proven that European social integration would follow European system integration as a spill-over of a utilitarian perspective, extending the current measures and even introduce new ones to strengthen the economic power of the regions may be helpful towards 'creating an ever closing union among the peoples of Europe' (European Union 2012: 16).

The question of this macro-micro relationship may be of great importance for the EU in recent years. Not only because, as we have seen, regions have developed quite differently in recent decades. With the EU's eastern enlargement in 2004 and the accession of economically weak regions, this question is even more relevant. In these regions, the utilitarian expectation of economic prosperity from the EU was far above average in 2004 (GESIS 2012b: 186), making the question of whether or not economic development is followed by European social integration in general all the more important.

Current research on macro factors influencing social integration processes has several shortcomings. First, these analyses are mostly based on observations at the country level only. However, as we know from European identity, disparities in European social integration shares are not confined to national borders, nor are they always homogeneous within countries (Westle 2003: 478f.). Secondly, in many cases, only certain data points are being analysed and the influence of short or long-time developments is mostly neglected. Finally, micro-macro-links are rarely discussed or examined, making the inherent logic of explanation unclear. Overall, a regional perspective on the economic and social integration topic can provide both policy makers and scholars with new insights into how the macroeconomic environment can affect European social integration.

This contribution is structured as followed: In the following section, the theoretical background will be discussed and the outline of empirical research on economic macro-structural determinants on European identity is presented. Subsequently, hypotheses will be formulated for empirical testing. I then present background on the individual level data provided in the Eurobarometer (EB), the question on European identity and the evaluation of the EU for the personal economic situation of a respondent, the macro-structural determinant

in focus, the regional GDP, as well as the methods used in the empirical analysis. After that, the results of the empirical analysis will be discussed to test the corresponding hypotheses. As the findings show, the economic situation of a region correlates slightly, but not significantly, with an inclusive European identity, whereby this form of identification tends to appear more often in richer regions. Although neither the economic development of the regions since the 2004 enlargement of the EU nor since the beginning of the financial crisis correlate with the extent of European identity, both regional developments influence the extent to which the EU is seen by respondents as economically beneficial for themselves. Furthermore, individuals evaluating the EU as economically favourable for them personally are more likely to identify (also) as Europeans. The contribution concludes with a brief discussion of the key findings, the implications for policy makers, and a discussion of the limitations that may be addressed in further research.

Background, Question and Model

Theoretical background

As a theoretical background, I will rely on a utilitarian approach to explain the expected macroeconomic link with the economic situation and development on the regional level. Going back to the work of Haas (1958), he expected people to strengthen their bond, or 'loyalty' (Haas 1958: 14), towards a system if they are positively affected by its outcomes. This form of bonding is a form of 'spill-over', as the satisfaction with the system will also affect the social dimension of integration as Roose described for identity formation (Roose 2005: 294). There are two implications for this to be considered. For one, the targeted outcomes, or the aspired 'ultimate end' (Haas 1958: 14), may differ among citizens. People may have different expectations the institution in question is capable and/or responsible for. Secondly, according to Rose, the spill-over effect is subject to citizens satisfaction (Roose 2005). Satisfaction is not only a question of the desired or expected goal, but also a question of subject evaluation – which can also be independent of objective results.

Let us get back on these implications in more detail for the case of regional economy and European identity formation. First, why should people have economy-related expectations towards the EU? From its historical development and its most prominent projects, the EU may be regarded as an economic project primarily, aiming at improving the economical living conditions of its Member States and citizens. Especially with the European Common Market and the four freedoms of labour, goods, services, and capital, it is affecting citizens' daily lives in the field of economy and labour. For citizens, this may have consequences in higher personal gains such as an increased income or working perspectives

and possibilities for some, but also reduced wages, more adjustment pressure, and increased competition for others. Therefore, the assumption that the EU is, among other things, an economic project for its citizens is not far-fetched.

Regarding the second implication, the question arises on what basis citizens should evaluate the EU in regard to economic success or failure within the region of residence. First, the economic situation of the region of resident is certainly one important factor affecting citizens living conditions. In wealthier regions, more resources can be spent on social issues, cultural projects, infrastructural measures, administration, but also may attract investments from enterprises and business companies more successfully, which promotes job creation and improves the income situation. Individual economic and general living conditions may therefore be fostered by the wealth of the region of residence.

But why would the EU be made responsible for regional economic wealth, decline, or growth? In addition to some direct individual consequences for citizens, EU membership may also have an impact on the macro-structural conditions in which they live. With the ESI Funds, the EU is already redistributing financial resources between European regions, with poorer developed countries and sub-national regions being the profiteers. The money spend is mainly invested in programmes or measures (e.g. for education, job market, or infrastructure). Besides such direct effects of redistribution, EU membership may also be accompanied by indirect side-effects for the regions, such as mass im- or emigration, leading to growth in some but also a possible 'brain drain' in other regions. Additionally, the enlarged EU with the common market offers more alternatives for old and new industries to settle – a set of opportunities some regions may benefit from while others may face disadvantages. As EU politics in form of redistribution are mainly based on the regional level, and the regional units may be more precise in explaining macro-economic affections for the respondents than larger units (e.g. the nation state in bigger countries or even the economic development of the EU as a whole), a connection of the evaluation of one's own economic situation also due to the macro-structural circumstances in which citizens live seems plausible.

Finally, it is an open question whether the EU is perceived by citizens as being responsible for economic prosperity and development. Undoubtedly, other political and non-political actors can be made responsible for the economic situation of a region. Besides the home country with the respective political actors, also global developments may affect economic prosperity such as the stock market or conflicts. Anyway, developments on the European level, especially the European Common Market, may have a strong effect on more than just citizens' lives. They will presumably also be perceived accordingly by large parts of the population due to the media coverage and the debates, for example, on eastward enlargement as well as the funding systems. It can therefore be assumed that the EU is, among others, s an institution to which economic responsibility is

attributed. In terms of identity formation, it seems unlikely that this will take place with the institution itself (e.g. as a European Unionist), since being an EU citizen or not is not a question of individual attitudes, but rather a legal status determined by country membership. However, the EU (and its institutions), as the main political actor representing European policies (Herrmann – Brewer 2004: 2), may promote the formation of a European identity if it is positively evaluated in certain areas, such as the economy.

In summary, the theoretical model predicts that European system integration, in particular the internal market, will be seen as a contributing factor (among others) to the economic situation and development of regions. In addition to national institutions, citizens will evaluate EU institutions on the basis of the economic situation in their regions. A positive evaluation may lead to a stronger connection with the institution and the concept of Europeanisation, resulting in identification as Europeans alongside or instead of their national identity.

State of research

As the theoretical framework suggests, economic benefits in Europe and the possession of an inclusive European identity should be positively correlated. In this section, I will refer to empirical research on this issue in two areas. First, I will discuss empirical-quantitative research on individual-level economic determinants of European identity, focusing on education, employment and occupation. While there is extensive empirical research in this area, research on macroeconomic determinants of European identification, which will be presented in the second part, is rather sparse.

It is expected that citizens who are better off economically, due to their position within the social stratification system, should be more likely to have a positive view of the EU and to develop a sense of identification as Europeans. The empirical evidence so far supports this idea of a spill-over effect, with higher educated more often seeing themselves (also) as Europeans than medium or lower educated (Bergbauer 2018; Borz et al. 2018; Fernández – Eigmüller 2018; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015; Luhmann 2017; Polyakova – Fligstein 2016; van Mol et al. 2015). Similarly, unemployed are in tendency more seldomly identify (also) as Europeans than employed (Fernández – Eigmüller 2018).⁴ There is also a clear divide between those working in white-collar leadership positions in service-oriented industries, and those employed in the industrial sector, whereas the latter are less likely to identify as Europeans (Bergbauer 2018; Fernández – Eigmüller 2018; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015; Polyakova – Fligstein 2016; Verhaegen et al. 2014). In addition, those who consider the economic situation of their household to be favourable are also more likely to

4 Though the effect is not statistically significant in the analysis by Kuhn (2015).

identify themselves as Europeans (Pötzschke – Braun 2019; Verhaegen et al. 2014), just as those who assume that they personally benefit economically from the EU (Borz et al. 2018; Verhaegen et al. 2014). As expected by the utilitarian perspective, a spill-over within some groups that profit more from European system integration in terms of economic process is supposed to have resulted in a higher level of European social integration.

While the empirical evidence at the individual level provides a fairly clear picture of the expected positive correlation, studies based on economic macro-level determinants of European identity formation do not provide such clear results. From its theoretical as well as empirical focus, the study by Weber (2016) is the most similar to my approach. Although Weber's work primarily focuses on questions of migration and European identity formation, in his analysis, he tested for correlations of the regional economic level of NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 regions in 15 EU Member States in multivariate models (Weber 2016: 166; Table 9.1). The findings reveal no statistically relevant correlation with European identity whatsoever. In contrast, in his multivariate analysis of aggregated data on the NUTS-2 level, Landes was able to identify a positive and significant effect for GDP per capita (Landes 2020). According to this, rising regional prosperity is accompanied by a higher proportion of people who see themselves (also) as Europeans. However, this analysis leaves out the control of individual level variables.

As pointed out earlier, macro-related analysis more often takes into account the economic level of whole countries. For the analysis of identities exceeding the national one (European and global), Arts and Halman found a positive effect of GDP on identification and a negative effect for the development of GDP (Arts – Halman 2006). Anyway, as in Weber's analysis, none of the effects is statistically significant. Albeit the analysis by Verhaegen et al. (2014) revealed a weakly significant positive effect of GDP growth on the likelihood of European identity in the first place, this effect was no longer significant once control variables were included in the model. Other studies do not support the thesis of a missing effect. Ceka and Sojka (2016) analysed determinants for different forms of European identity. For the cognitive dimension ('seeing oneself as European'; Ceka – Sojka 2016: 483), the authors identified a negative and statistically significant effect for the GDP level of a country and a statistically insignificant negative effect for GDP growth (Ceka – Sojka 2016: 493). This would imply lower levels of inclusive European identity in wealthier countries, rejecting the utilitarian approach expected above. In contrast, the analysis by Polyakova and Fligstein (2016), focussing on exclusive national formation in contrast to inclusive European identity for 2005 and 2010, reveals other findings. The negative effect of GDP on exclusive national identity formation is statistically significant, yet only for the data from 2010 and only if economic development is taken into account (Polyakova – Fligstein 2016). According to this, inclusive European identity is higher in wealthier countries, an observation

in line with the utilitarian approach but contrasting the other studies presented here. Furthermore, GDP growth has a negative and statistically significant effect on exclusive national identity in models for both years (Polyakova – Fligstein 2016: 76f.), which is also consistent with the basic argument.

Why are the results so different? Several explanations can be made for this ad-hoc: a somewhat different operationalisation of European identity, different conversions of the GDP, different micro- or macro-data bases, or differences in the analysis procedure (e.g. two or three level approaches). Albeit these factors may be of importance for the results, they can hardly explain the large deviations in the results, especially regarding the direction of effects. The different years of analysis and country samples that were examined, on the other hand, could rather help to explain the differences. In addition, in the regression models applied, the set of covariates vary between the studies, and the very broad measurement of the economic situation and development of a country may pose another problem. A more fine-grained measurement of the regional context seems to be more appropriate to represent living conditions and to constitute the basis for the evaluation of the economic environment. Finally, it has to be highlighted that, with the exception of the study from Polyakova and Fligstein (2016), none of the studies have a clear focus on economic conditions themselves. GDP and GDP growth are usually only analysed as control factors and have also been largely neglected in the interpretations and discussions. The research gap on regional economic conditions and European identity is regrettable, not least because the explanatory potential of the regional perspective has already been demonstrated in other areas of research on European social integration.⁵

In conclusion, research on individual level determinants of European identity formation points towards higher shares of Europeans among the better-off citizens (highly educated, employed, more well-off occupational classes in the service-oriented sector) – those potentially profiting from European system integration. Research on the macro level is inconclusive. Some studies suggest a negative correlation between an area's economic level and the percentage of citizens who identify as Europeans, while others show a positive correlation. Additionally, some studies find no correlation at all. Albeit a vast number of factors may explain these different results, it shall be mentioned that results even within the same study may differ (Polyakova – Fligstein 2016).

Theoretical Model and Expectations

Having presented the theoretical background and the state of research, I will now combine both into a theoretical model of the economic macro-factors of European identity formation, taking into account the theoretical mechanism at

5 See, for example, the studies on Euroscepticism by Kuhn (2011) and Schraff (2019).

the individual level. For the macro-micro relationship, the utilitarian approach suggests that those who are satisfied with the results of the work of a political institution are more likely to develop a sense of belonging or identification with it. For EU citizens, the work and results of the EU and its institutions are expected to be evaluated here. Therefore, citizens from prosperous regions may evaluate their EU membership as successful in terms of improving or maintaining their economic well-being, and consequently develop some kind of attachment to it, such as an inclusive European identity. The expected effect may apply to two different economic variables: the level of well-being, but also its development over time. While the former is more commonly used in empirical analyses, the latter may be even more relevant as European system integration has developed strongly in recent decades. As presented above, results of empirical studies implicitly testing these arguments are ambiguous, with some studies supporting and other rejecting these expectations. The first hypotheses of this contribution are therefore:

- H1a* *Citizens in wealthier regions (high GDP) are more likely to be inclusive Europeans.*
- H1b* *Citizens in regions with economic growth (GDP growth) are more likely to be inclusive Europeans.*

Even if the macro-micro relationship described above is empirically confirmed, this does not prove the underlying argument of a spill-over effect. There may be different ways in which citizens assess the economic situation in their region: the economic situation and development may not be associated at all with the EU; any (even positive) development may be seen as being rather hindered by EU policies and regulations; other institutions, especially national and regional ones, may be seen as being mainly responsible for the economic situation. Last but not least, some citizens may not consider the EU as an economic project, but focus on other objects of interest and expectations (e.g. maintaining peace). This may lead to a lack of interest in linking the economic situation and development with the EU project at all. In sum, to properly test the mechanism expected by Haas (1958), it must be clarified whether the EU is evaluated as doing well in terms of the economic situation and the development in the regions. This results in hypotheses 4.2a and 4.2b:

- H2a* *Citizens living in more economic well-of regions, more often consider the EU as beneficial for their personal economic situation.*
- H2a* *Citizens living in regions with economic growth, more often consider the EU as beneficial for their personal economic situation.*

In the argumentation of methodological individualism, and the Macro-Micro-Macro-approach suggested by Coleman (1986), a micro-level effect can be added to the model to explain the initial research interest in a macro-micro effect. In line with the spill-over effect, citizens who evaluate the EU as positive for the economic situation should be more likely to see themselves (also) as Europeans, since the positive evaluation would strengthen the bonding towards the system or, in this case, the European idea embodied by the EU and its institutions. The hypothesis for this correlation reads as:

H3 People thinking that the EU is economically beneficial are more likely to be inclusive Europeans.

Evidence for this thesis can be found in current research, as the evaluation of EU membership correlates positively with holding a European identity. As Sybille Luhmann has shown (Luhmann 2017), respondents who evaluate EU membership as good for their own country or view membership positively at all are more likely to identify themselves as Europeans. Fligstein's research provides support for the idea of a positive correlation between a positive view of the EU as good for one's country and an inclusive European identity, although he does not refer to multivariate models. (Fligstein 2008: 144). Furthermore, in studies using variables that explicitly ask about the personal economic benefit from EU membership, a clear positive correlation could be identified (Borz et al. 2018; Verhaegen et al. 2014). These results stand in line with the thesis that a positive economic evaluation of the EU goes along with a higher likelihood of identifying (also) as European.

To finalise the model, the macro-micro links expected in H1a and H1b should diminish due to the control of the individual explanation approach from H3. The attitudes towards the EU as economically beneficial should function as a mediator on the main macro-micro-link and explain this correlation. The final hypotheses therefore are:

H4a Taking into account the individual evaluation of the EU in terms of the economy, the macro-micro effect for economic wealth on identifying (also) as European (H1a) will disappear.


H4b Taking into account the individual evaluation of the EU in terms of the economy, the macro-micro effect for economic growth on identifying (also) as European (H1b) will disappear.

One or both of these effects persist despite controls, and the other hypotheses still hold, this would imply that other mechanisms may be relevant in explaining the higher proportion of inclusive Europeans in more prosperous or well-

-developed regions. For example, Fligstein argues that the higher levels of European identity formation among the highly educated and other privileged groups result from a more intense number of transnational contacts and experiences among them (Fligstein 2008: 145). Although an explicit investigation of these hypotheses is to my knowledge not yet conducted, a first indication of support for H4b can be found in the study by Verhaegen et al. (2014). In their multivariate models on explaining European identity, they find a weak positive effect on national economic growth, which is ultimately no longer significant in the model in which a variable was added to assess personal economic benefits through the EU (Verhaegen et al. 2014: 308). Although a number of other variables were also added in the extended model, this could nevertheless be a first indication of a mediation effect.

Figure 2 shows the overall model. It should be noted that the final micro-macro transition, which is part of the basic model by Coleman (1986), is not part of the model. I omitted this transition for the sake of simplicity because in this case the macro-phenomenon to be explained is a purely aggregated one (the share of inclusive Europeans within regions). Although this model seems demanding as some hypotheses build on each other, even rejections of some hypotheses may lead to important new insights for the formation (or not formation) of identity in Europe.

Figure 2: Theoretical model for regional economic factors on inclusive European identity



Source: Own depiction

Data and Methods

Data and Variables

For my empirical analyses, I will rely on data from the Standard *Eurobarometer* (EB). The EB is a multinational cross-sectional survey, nowadays comprehending several waves per year, with samples of around 1,000 individuals per country. While the countries surveyed have varied over the years, all EU Member States as well as some non-EU countries are included in the more recent versions. In the 1990s and early 2000s, additional surveys were conducted in non-EU countries, such as the Central and Eastern survey (GESIS 2020b; conducted 1990–1997) or the Candidate Countries survey (GESIS 2020a; conducted 2001–2004). Interviews are conducted face-to-face, and the target population is selected through national multi-stage random sampling procedures. Despite frequent criticism⁶, the EB provides a rich and exhaustive source of data necessary for a comprehensive analysis of macro-level issues on the regional level. The sample consists of the 27 EU Member States, excluding Croatia but including the United Kingdom.

To operationalize European social integration, I will refer to the question of European identity as measured by so-called ‘Moreno question’ (Ciornei – Recchi 2017: 474; Curtice 2017: 3; Karstens 2020: 123; Luhmann 2017: 1368; Recchi 2019: 277). The item and its response categories read as (European Communities 2004: 19; GESIS 2012a: 252; 2012b: 644; 2012c: 738):

In the near future, do you see yourself as...?

1. (NATIONALITY) only
2. (NATIONALITY) and European
3. European and (NATIONALITY)
4. European only

For my analyses, all those who chose one of the first three categories are combined to the group of *inclusive Europeans*. Respondents who have selected category 4 are referred to as *exclusive nationals* (similar to Hooghe – Marks 2004). Cases with missing values (e.g. due to sample splits where the question is missing at all) or escape categories (‘None’ or ‘Refusal’) are excluded. Using European identity is not only a widespread and theoretically well-discussed concept for measuring European social integration in research nowadays (e.g. Bergbauer 2018; Fernández – Eigmüller 2018). There are also numerous links to other concepts of European social integration as it correlates with trust in other EU citizens (Westle – Kleiner 2016), transnational solidarity (Ciornei –

6 See Nissen (2014) and her extensive criticism of the Eurobarometer as a political tool with methodological weaknesses.

Recchi 2017; Verhaegen 2017), or positive attitudes towards European system integration (Hooghe – Marks 2004; Immerfall et al. 2010). Despite criticism on the item itself,⁷ and issues arising due to adaptations made in the EB over the years,⁸ the EB provides a rich source of data available for this operationalisation of European social integration – a necessary precondition for my analytical strategy of researching and explaining regional differences.

For the theoretical model described above it is necessary to operationalize the actual perception of the EU as economically beneficial for the respondent. I am referring to an item that was included in several waves of the EB and which was also used by Verhaegen et al. (2014). The interviewees were presented a list of statements about the EU and asked whether each of them applies to them personally. Respondents were allowed to agree on each statement (multiple answer possibilities) while the answer scale was limited to ‘mentioned’ or ‘not mentioned’. Among the statements, one directly links the EU as economically beneficial to the individual. Question and item read as (European Communities 2004: 3; GESIS 2012a: 69; 2012b: 185; 2012c: 409; 2018: 418):

What does the European Union mean to you personally?

Economic prosperity

For the spatial delimitation, I refer to the *Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques* (NUTS), the administrative system concluded by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (European Parliament – Council of the European Union 2003; Eurostat 2020) to construct a standardized system of regional classification for statistical purpose on different hierarchical levels (European Parliament – Council of the European Union 2003: Article 1). For empirical analyses, this classification is helpful because the regional units have a much lower variance in relation to the population than countries, since the minimum and maximum populations are predetermined.⁹ Although referring to a more fine-grained NUTS level, such as NUTS-2 or NUTS-3, could capture regional differences more accurately, I will use NUTS-1 mainly because of the limitations imposed by the number of cases at the individual level in the EB.

7 Bruter criticises that the item assumes a tension between national and European identity that does not necessarily exist, that it fails to represent the strength of the two identities, that there is no possibility of choosing no identity, and that there may well be translation errors (Bruter 2008: 280f.).

8 This concerns changes in the wording of the question and the response categories, as well as the inclusion of escape categories. However, I consider these differences to be relatively unimportant for the purposes of this analysis.

9 For the NUTS-1 units, a minimum of 3 million and a maximum of 7 million citizens is determined, while the range is 800,000 to 3 million for NUTS-2, and 150,000 to 800,000 for NUTS-3 units (European Parliament – Council of the European Union 2003: Article 3), with an exception for countries with a lower population, in which case ‘the whole Member State shall be one NUTS territorial unit for this level’ (European Parliament – Council of the European Union 2003: Article 3).

The number of cases is fairly constant for each wave, with a sample of about 1,000 respondents in each country.¹⁰ At the regional level, this results in small regional samples in the more populous countries with numerous NUTS-1 regions (e.g. Germany, France, or the United Kingdom), especially for regions with small populations. As such, the NUTS-1 level seems to provide the best balance of regional subdivisions with sufficient sample sizes. To further avoid bias due to small sample sizes and to ensure comparability over time, I excluded NUTS-1 regions with a sample size of less than 30 cases in at least one year in the descriptive analysis. I will refer to the 2013 NUTS revision for all analyses, mainly because of the availability of comparable macro data for different years.

I will operationalize the regional economy by referring to the *Gross Domestic Product* (GDP), which measures the net worth of all goods and services produced within a region (Eurostat 2019a). It is probably the most commonly used indicator for the economy of a macro-unit in studies on European identity (e.g. Arts – Halman 2006; Fligstein et al. 2012; Weber 2016), but also in other analyses on European social integration.¹¹ Since some regions differ in their currency and purchasing power, I will refer to Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) as units, which are a comparable version of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) comparable over macro units, indicating how much of the regional currency is needed to buy a predetermined set of goods (Eurostat 2019b). Data is provided by Eurostat (2018) and given per capita. For regional economic development, I will use the relative change (in %) of GDP in PPS per capita for each region since 2004, the year of the EU's eastern enlargement, and since 2008, taking into account the consequences of the European debt crisis experienced by some regions.

Although the focus is on the above-mentioned macro-level determinants of the economic situation, research has shown that a wide range of individual-level characteristics are important for explaining European identity formation (e.g. Ceka – Sojka 2016; Fernández – Eigmüller 2018; Fligstein 2008; Luhmann 2017; Polyakova – Fligstein 2016; Verhaegen et al. 2014; Weber 2016). Therefore, I will introduce several control variables in the multivariate models: gender, age, citizenship status, educational attainment, occupational status, employment situation, and political self-placement. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains a detailed overview of the question wording for all individual level variables. The Appendix also contains a table on the bivariate distributions of the covariates with respect to the corresponding shares of inclusive Europeans and the evaluation of the EU as economically beneficial (Table A.2). For a simplified comparison, variables in this table are recoded into groups.

10 Exceptions are smaller samples for Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus (about 500 each), and increased samples for Germany (about 1,500) and the United Kingdom (about 1,300).

11 For example, in research on trust in other Europeans (Westle – Kleiner 2016).

For the sake of comparability and clarity, I will limit the analysis to three points in time: 2004, the first year after the EU's eastern enlargement; 2010, the first year with complete survey information available following the onset of the financial crisis in 2008; and 2015, as one of the most recent years with complete data¹² available.¹³ If available, data from two waves in one year were combined. For the descriptive and the multivariate analyses, two different samples are used. In the former, where only the dependent variables – inclusive European identity and the evaluation of the EU as economically beneficial for oneself – and the dependent macro-economic variables are of importance, a bigger sample is used where only cases with missing values among these variables were omitted to keep more information. In contrast, the multivariate sample is reduced as cases were deleted with missing values among one or more of the covariates listed above (listwise deletion). The first sample, used for the descriptive analysis, consists of $m = 102,689$ cases ($m_{2004} = 25,747$, $m_{2010} = 25,391$, and $m_{2015} = 51,551$) on the individual level, within $N = 88$ groups, each group consisting of n between 36 and 2,050 individual cases. The second sample, for the multivariate analysis, has a total of $m = 76,598$ ($m_{2004} = 25,346$, $m_{2010} = 25,389$, and $m_{2015} = 25,863$)¹⁴ individual level cases, $N = 93$ groups, with n between 7 and 1,069 cases per region. In the multivariate analysis I will restrict the main discussion on the most recent year, 2015, but I will discuss results of other time points as a further test of robustness.

Methods

The analysis consists of a descriptive and a multivariate part. First, I will analyse the distribution of the proportion of citizens with an inclusive European identity and their attitude towards the EU as economically beneficial, as well as GDP and its development over time, using aggregated information. Additionally, data will be examined for individual years. For a first test of correlations, bivariate hypothesis tests are used for the macro analysis and t-tests for the comparison of means between different groups on the individual level.¹⁵ As the analysis is conducted mainly on the regional level, I will primarily depict plots for aggre-

12 Unfortunately, for the NUTS-1 classification used throughout this study (version 2013), the most recent and complete data available is for 2015. During the preparation of this study, Eurostat has switched the classification provided to a more recent version, making it impossible to use newer data without losing regions due to missing information. In my opinion, a more comprehensive dataset including nearly all regions and data for all years is more important than referring to a more recent point in time and omitting macro units.

13 Complete data are also available for 2005 and 2014, but limiting the selection simplifies the analysis.

14 Albeit two waves are available for 2015, only one contains all covariates necessary. Therefore, the number of cases in the multivariate sample, where only one wave could be used for analysis, is much smaller.

15 To account for possible alpha-errors due to multiple testing, t-values are corrected by the bonferroni-adjustment.

gated and weighted individual level data and the economic macro indicators including linear trend lines.

In the second part, I will use multivariate modelling techniques and rely on random intercept models to account for the hierarchical structure of the data, with NUTS-1 regions as grouping variable and individuals at the micro level.¹⁶ I prefer this over a fixed-effect approach, without variation in the intercepts over the Level-2 units, because of the general clustering of data within the sample where the question is focused on (regions) (Snijders – Bosker 2012: 46), the testing of explanatory variables on the second level (regional economic conditions) (Snijders – Bosker 2012: 46), as well as the comparably large number of level two units (Snijders – Bosker 2012: 48). As the dependent variables are coded binary, Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models will be applied with a logit function (Snijders – Bosker 2012: 298). For the analysis of European identity, the model is expanded by including a random slope (Snijders – Bosker 2012: 302) for the mediator variable, the individual evaluation of the EU as economically good for oneself. Metric variables (respondents age, economic strength, and economic development on the regional level) are centred by their corresponding grand mean (Enders – Tofighi 2007). The covariance for the random slope and the intercept is unstructured. Although I will rely on average marginal effects (AMEs), which provide a reasonably tangible interpretation of effects in logistic regressions, effect sizes between different models must be compared with caution because explicit tests for differences are not conducted. Yet, the direction of effects and the corresponding p-values may give us first hints on similarities and differences, and a further comparison of *McKelvey and Zavoina's* R^3 between models may also provide some interesting results, although here too I will draw conclusions only with caution.¹⁷ Despite common concerns on applying a multilevel model with relatively few cases on the second level (e.g. Bryan – Jenkins 2016; Stegmueller 2013), as a test of robustness, I will also analyse and discuss hierarchical models with country (or NUTS-0) as group variable, including the corresponding macro factors for countries.

According to hypotheses H4a and H4b, evaluating the EU as economically beneficial for oneself is regarded as a possible mediator for macroeconomic attributes on inclusive European identity. To test this, the *KHB* method suggested by Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2012) is applied. The method helps to decompose the effect of an independent variable x on a dependent variable y into direct and indirect effects caused by a mediating covariate z , taking into

16 I will refrain from a three-level model, with the country level above the regional level, as several countries in the sample are not subdivided into further NUTS-1 regions because they are too small or lack sufficient population.

17 As discussed by Veal and Zimmermann, McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2 'seems most conducive to comparability across different types of empirical models' (Veall – Zimmermann 1996: 2), and therefore comes close to the initial meaning of an R^2 as known from Ordinary Least Square regressions.

account the problem of ‘rescaling’ of coefficients in Generalized Linear Models (Karlson et al. 2012: 288; Mood 2010). As such, the KHB method can help to identify whether and to what extent a total effect (the observed effect without a mediator variable) can be split-up into a direct (the existing effect after controlling for another variable) and the indirect effect (which is the difference between the total and direct effect).

The statistical software used is Stata in version 15.1 (StataCorp 2017), with the commands *melogit* for the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (StataCorp 2019c), *margins* for the post regression predictions (StataCorp 2019b), and *estat icc* for the intraclass correlation coefficient estimation (StataCorp 2019a). With the *fit_meologit_2lev*-ado by Langer (2019) for the Pseudo-R³ (McKelvey & Zavoina), the *khb*-ado for the comparison of coefficients by Kohler, Karlson, and Holm (2011),¹⁸ and the *coefplot*-ado for the depiction of coefficient plots by Jann (2014), three user written Stata-ados are used for the empirical analysis and the depiction furthermore.

Results


Descriptives

Let us start with the first set of hypotheses, which assume a positive correlation between the level of economic prosperity of a region (H1a) respectively the economic development (H1b) and the proportion of citizens who see themselves (also) as Europeans. In the upper panel of Figure 3, three scatterplots show the weighted shares of inclusive Europeans (vertical axis) and the GDP (horizontal axis) for all NUTS-1 regions for each year. Trend lines were added to the depictions to highlight the direction of a possible correlation. Beginning with the plot for 2004, one can initially observe a strong concentration in the centre (between 40% and 60% of regions with inclusive Europeans and a GDP of 20,000 to 40,000 PPS per capita). Despite this accumulation, the overall trend line suggests a positive correlation. Furthermore, the regions situated at the extreme ends of the scales are mainly in line with this positive tendency. The best-off regions also show the highest levels of inclusive European identity and, vice versa, the lowest levels can be found among those with a comparably low GDP. Despite some minor exceptions, it is remarkable that there are no outstanding examples at the extremes contradicting the hypotheses. Comparing the results for 2004 with the other years verifies the stability of this positive trend over time, with the slope of the trend line being steepest for 2010. Furthermore, the correlations are statistically significant on a moderate or high

18 In its current version, the Stata-ado *khb* does not provide the use of the *melogit* command for the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models used here. Instead, the test is performed with a fixed effects logit model with robust clustered standard errors for regions.


level ($p < .05$ in 2004, $p < .001$ for 2010, and $p < .01$ for 2015) and Pearson's correlation coefficients (PCC or Pearson's R) point towards moderate correlations (.27 for 2004, .39 for 2010, and .37 for 2015).

Figure 3: Share of inclusive Europeans, GDP, and development of GDP (NUTS-1 level, 2004, 2010 & 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). N = 88. Weighted. Own calculations and depiction. + $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Figure 4: Share of citizens evaluating the EU as economically beneficial and GDP (NUTS-1 level, 2004, 2010 & 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). N = 88. Weighted. Own calculations and depiction. + $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

To test H1b, the lower panel of Figure 3 is similar constructed as the upper panel, but with the relative economic growth plotted on the horizontal axis. In this case, both plots show the share of inclusive Europeans for each region in 2015, but with different time intervals for the economic development (since 2004 and 2008). It is initially difficult to discern a clear pattern in the plots, as the

regions are widely scattered. Especially among regions with a comparably moderate growth, there is a wide range of regions with different levels of inclusive European identity. Furthermore, regions at the extremes do not show a pattern pointing towards a clear trend whatsoever. Correlations are rather weak (PCC of .13 and .07) and not statistically significant. To make a short conclusion on the first set of hypotheses: the data suggest a positive correlation of economic wealth and share of inclusive Europeans over the regions for all years, which is in line with H1a. In contrast, no correlation can be found for the economic development and inclusive European identity among regions, contradicting H1b.


Let us now focus on the question whether citizens evaluate the EU as economically beneficial for them personally. As stated in the second set of the hypotheses, I expect the share of respondents seeing the EU as economically beneficial to their own life to turn out higher both in wealthier (H2a) as well as in more prosperous regions (H2b). As shown in the upper panel in Figure 4, the total share of respondents agreeing on the statement that the EU means economic prosperity is quite low and even diminishing over time with 25% of the respondents agreeing to this item in 2004 and about 14% in 2010 and 2015 (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). As the plots also show, the variance differs between years: while in some regions more than 60% of respondents agreed on this statement in 2004, the highest levels for 2010 and 2015 are 30% and 33% respectively. For 2004, there is a clear negative correlation, while the trend line for 2010 is practically horizontal, and for 2015, there even seems to be a slight positive correlation. The correlation coefficient is strongest for 2004 (PCC of $-.35$) and highly significant ($p < .001$), while there is no correlation for 2010 (PCC of .00) and only a weak one for 2015 (PCC of .23), whereby the latter are both not significant.

Regarding the correlation between GDP growth and the share of respondents who consider the EU to be economically beneficial for themselves in 2015, the correlation shown in the lower panel of Figure 4 seems to be more in line with the expectations of the model (H2b). In both plots, the trend line is positive, indicating higher approval rates in regions with long-term (left hand plot) or post-crisis (right hand plot) growth in contrast to those with a declining economy. Again, there is a notable variance in the centre of both plots (e.g. in the moderate growth regions). The outliers at the extremes are in line with the general trends. Although the slopes appear to be moderately steep, this may be due to the overall lower level of agreement on the evaluation question. The correlation is moderate for the long-term development (PCC of .40) and slightly weaker for the post-crisis development (PCC of .31), with the first correlation significant at the 1% level and the second only significant at the 5% level. In sum, with regard to the second set of hypotheses on the attitudes towards the EU as being regarded as economically beneficial by the respondents, there is no evidence for a positive correlation regarding the level of wealth as stated in H2a.

In contrast, the distinct trend observed in 2004 even points towards a negative correlation. At least there is some initial evidence for H2b, as citizens in regions with economic growth more often consider the EU as economically beneficial for themselves than those living in regions with economic decline. This positive correlation holds true for both, the long-term but also the post-crisis development. Furthermore, the level of agreement on this item is generally rather low and has furthermore diminished between 2004 and 2010.

Finally, according to H3, I expect citizens regarding the EU as economically beneficial for themselves to be more likely to identify as inclusive Europeans. In Figure 5, the bar charts depict the share of inclusive Europeans among those who agreed on the item that the EU means economic prosperity and those who did not for each year. There are clear differences in all years, with more citizens who agree with the statement seeing themselves (also) as Europeans than those who disagree with it. In addition, there was little change over time, with a difference of 19 PPTs in 2004, 20 PPTs in 2010 and 21 PPTs in 2015. In line with that, T-Tests are highly significant for each year ($p < .001$). Anyway, it is notable to mention that even among those rejecting the statement, at least every second thinks of themselves (also) as European. Albeit the results clearly support H3, the differences could have been much more distinct.

Figure 5: Share of inclusive Europeans by the evaluation of the EU as economically beneficial (2004, 2010 & 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), and 84.3 (European Commission 2016c). $N(2004) = 25,346$, $N(2010) = 25,389$, $N(2015) = 25,863$. Weighted. Own calculations and depiction.

T-Test statistics, + $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Multivariates


In the following, the hypotheses will be tested by applying multivariate methods. The structure of this section will not be in line with the previous one, which was in accordance with the enumeration of the hypotheses. Here, the analysis is put in order with the dependent variable used, starting with H2a and H2b, asking for the correlation of economic attributes of the regions on the individual evaluation of the EU for one's economic situation. Afterwards, the dependent variable switches to the question of inclusive European identity, to test the remaining hypotheses. For reasons of simplicity, I will restrict detailed analysis for the 2015 data, while I will briefly discuss results for the other years.

Starting with the second set of hypotheses from the theoretical model, the question in focus is whether regional economic attributes are correlated with the individual evaluation of the EU as economically beneficial. For the economic level (H2a), the descriptive results were highly ambiguous, with a negative trend for the first year in focus (2004), none for the second (2010), and a slight positive one for the last (2015). For the economic development (H2b), in contrast, there was a positive correlation as expected. In Figure 6, Average Marginal Effects (AMEs), including 95% confidence intervals and information on significance tests, are depicted for the regression models. Each model contains a different set of macro variables, with linear and squared terms for the macro-economic factors, the long- and post-crisis development, and different combinations of both. Individual level control variables are included in the model but not shown here (see Table A.3 in the Appendix).¹⁹ In M1, the GDP is introduced as a linear and a squared term. The value is divided by the factor of 10,000 to make the effect more visible. Even though there is a weak positive correlation for both terms, they are not significant. Hence, the economic wealth of a region does not seem to be correlated with the answer behaviour here. The different economic developments are taken into account in M2 and M3, with the long-term development since 2004 in the second, and the post-crisis development since 2008 in the third model. There are clear positive trends for the linear trends for both developments, accompanied by highly significant effects ($p < .001$). The AME for the long-term development of about .102 in M2 can be interpreted as followed: the share of respondents agreeing with the statement that the EU is economically beneficial increases on average by 10.2% when the regional GDP increases by an additional factor of 1 (or a plus of 100%). The effect is somewhat stronger for the development following the financial crisis in

¹⁹ In short, respondents who are male, younger, better educated, still in education, employed in better paid jobs in the tertiary sector, and have a citizenship other than that of their country of residence are more likely to perceive the EU as economically beneficial than their counterparts. There is also a somewhat linear left-right effect for political self-classification, with left-wingers being less likely to agree with the statement, while moderate and extreme right-wingers are more likely to agree with it.

2008 in M3 (AME of.149). Albeit insignificant throughout, the negative squared terms indicate a weakening of the linear effect in the faster growing regions. The results on economic growth remain basically unchanged when models are expanded by including the economic level (M4 and M5). Minor changes can be found for the model including long-term development (M4), where the linear effect for the economic level now is significant on a low level ($p<.05$), albeit the AME still is comparably weak.

Figure 6: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me and regional economic factors (regression, 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) including 95% confidence interval, own calculations, * $p<.05$ ** $p<.01$ *** $p<.001$. N = 25,863. Several covariates dropped, see Table A.3 in the Appendix for complete results.

A comparison of the AIC and other fit measures (Table A.3 in the Appendix), confirms that the macro-factor variables on the regional level are contributing to improving the fit of the model and therefore are of some importance for the explanation of regional level differences. Furthermore, the country level analysis (Table A.6 in the Appendix) confirms the basic results of the regional level analysis, although the latter provides a slightly better fit, stronger effect sizes, and shows more variance, presumably due to the finer-grained perspective and (some) within-country differences.

To identify differences between years of analysis, predicted probabilities for the three different sample years are presented in the Appendix (Figure A.1). For each model, all individual level covariates and the linear and squared macro factor for the economic variables (arranged horizontally) were added. For the


2004 sample, the proportions of citizens who agreed with the statement were higher in both the economically well-off and, even more so, in the poorer regions than in the regions with moderate economic prosperity. Both, the negative linear and the positive squared terms are highly significant ($p < .001$, see Table A.4 in the Appendix). However, all predictions point to a rejection of H2a, as the view that the EU is economically beneficial is not more common among citizens in wealthier regions. Secondly, for the 2010 sample, the correlation for the development since 2004 is positive, and the linear term is significant ($p < .01$, see Table A.5 in the Appendix). This adds to the evidence in favour of H2b, i.e. that citizens from regions with economic growth are also more likely to perceive the EU as an economically beneficial factor.

Let us now turn to the central topic of interest in this study, namely European identity. According to the hypotheses, it is expected that citizens in wealthier (H1a) and economically growing (H1b) regions should be more likely to identify themselves (also) as Europeans. The descriptive analysis has shown that the proportion of inclusive Europeans tends to be positively correlated with prosperity, but not necessarily with economic development. Figure 7 shows the results of the multivariate analysis on inclusive European identity for 2015. To test for the possible effect of mediation by the variable on perceptions of the EU as economically beneficial (H4a and H4b), two versions are shown for each model: one including the individual-level covariate (bright dots) and one without the variable (dark dots). Again, individual-level covariates included in the models are not shown (see Table A.7 in the Appendix).²⁰ Let us first consider the models without the additional individual-level covariate (dark dots). In M1, linear and squared terms for the economic level were introduced. As shown by the positive effect of the linear term, the proportion of inclusive Europeans within a region appears to be positively correlated with its economic strength. However, just as the squared term, which has an AME close to zero, neither effect is significant. For the development of the economic situation over time (M2 to M5), the effects are also consistently insignificant. Results remain unchanged when the economic level and development variables are combined (M4 and M5). As the variance of the Level-2 intercept reveals (Table A.7 in the Appendix), there is significant variance at the regional level, and this variance is still significant in M4 with the highest Pseudo- R^2 for the fixed effects (.174) and the lowest ICC (.120). Since the lowest AIC is found in M2 (31192.6), this is the most efficient

20 The findings basically confirm results previous studies (Bergbauer 2018; Ceka – Sojka 2016; Fernández – Eigmüller 2018; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015; Luhmann 2017; Polyakova – Fligstein 2016; van Mol et al. 2015; Weber 2016): men, younger respondents, the highly educated, but also those still in education, those working in higher tertiary occupations, and those with a nationality other than their country of residence or multiple nationalities are more likely to identify as Europeans. On the other hand, there are negative effects for the unemployed, the retired and those in manual occupations. Finally, those at the extreme ends of the political spectrum are less likely to (also) identify as European, while effects are positive for the moderate positions.

model in terms of the number of covariates and explanatory power, albeit differences are very small. Overall, the economic macro variables contribute little to explaining European identity formation according to these models, which ultimately contradicts the expectations (H1a and H1b).

Figure 7: Inclusive European identity and regional economic factors (regression 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) including 95% confidence interval, own calculations, * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$. $N = 25,863$. Several covariates dropped, see Table A.7 & Table A.8 in the Appendix. for complete results.

As mentioned before, the models shown as bright dots in Figure 7 include the variable for assessing whether the EU is economically good for oneself as a binary coded variable. Adding this variable will help to clarify whether this individual-level assessment is positively correlated with inclusive European identity (H3), and whether the macro-micro effect is mediated by the individual-level correlation (H4a and H4b). First, the individual-level correlation is highly significant ($p < .001$), supporting the findings from the descriptive results and other studies (Verhaegen et al. 2014). With a robust AME of about .16 across all models, the proportion of inclusive Europeans among those who agree with the statement is, on average, 16 PPTs higher than among those who disagree with it. The improved fit measures when adding the variable, such as the reduced AIC (Table A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix), are also in line with H3 and highlight the overall high correlation on the individual level.

For the macro effects, the differences between the models – with and without the variable for evaluating the EU as economically beneficial – are very small. Accordingly, none of the effects is significant. Thus, despite the clear correlation at the individual level, a mediation as expected cannot be identified. This finding is supported by the analysis using the KHB method (Table A.14 in the Appendix), where the effects are decomposed: While there are some statistically significant changes that even indicate some mediation through the reduction of positive coefficients, none of the main effects themselves are significant. This is true for both the effects of the reduced model (without the additional covariate) and the full model.²¹ In summary, while the individual-level correlation supports the hypothesis (H3), no mediation effect of importance is evident for the 2015 data. Thus, there is no support for neither H4a nor H4b.

To test the robustness of these results for different time points, the predicted probabilities for all years and each different set of macro variables are shown in the Appendix (Figure A.2). Albeit there is a positive tendency for citizens living in wealthier regions to be more likely to identify (also) as Europeans for all years, as stated in H1a, the significance tests do not support this result. For the economic development, there seems to be a curvilinear correlation for the long-term development in general, contradicting the positive correlation expected. Only for the post-crisis development for 2010 there seems to exist such a correlation, albeit the effects are not significant (see Table A.10 & A.11 in the Appendix). As such, citizens living in regions with economic growth are not more likely to identify (also) as Europeans in general, which is in contrast to H1b. Regarding a possible mediation, the graphical representation confirms the findings discussed above, as there are only small differences between the models for each year and set of variables. Compared with the analysis at country level (Table A.12 & Table A.13 in the Appendix), the models at regional level provide a slightly better fit, while the main results are basically the same. Taken together, the results from these approaches confirm the robustness of the findings, as macro factors contribute little to explaining whether citizens see themselves (also) as Europeans, albeit there is a slight positive tendency for the economic situation.

Conclusion

In this contribution, I tried to disentangle the relationship between economic regional macro factors and inclusive European identity. Given that the EU can be seen as primarily an economic construct because of its heritage and key

21 The only exception is the squared effect for the post-crisis development (M6). The effect is negative and significant at a moderate level ($p < .01$) and slightly reduced in the full model with all variables included. However, in this case the mediation is of little importance, as the squared effect is not central to the corresponding hypothesis.

projects, the question of whether a European identity can emerge as a result of regional economic prosperity or growth is an important research topic for those interested in strengthening this form of identity. As already practiced through the ESI Funds (European Commission 2015), the economic situation of regions has been the focus of EU redistributive measures for some time, which makes the question of possible links between economic indicators and European social integration particularly interesting. Based on the spill-over approach by Hass (1958), I derived a theoretical model suggesting that citizens living in prosperous and economically developing regions are more likely to identify themselves (also) as Europeans and to perceive the EU as economically beneficial for them. Since the latter was assumed to correlate positively with inclusive European identity, a mediation effect was expected, in which the correlation at the individual level should weaken the direct macro effect on inclusive European identity.

Descriptive and multivariate analyses for Eurobarometer data from 2004, 2010, and 2015 have produced some interesting findings. Regarding the macro-economic determinants of inclusive European identity, there is some evidence that citizens in richer regions are more likely to identify (also) as Europeans at all points in time. Nevertheless, this trend is rather weak and not significant in multivariate models. What is clear, however, is that the economic development of the regions over the years is not related to the proportion of inclusive Europeans in the regions at all. The situation is somewhat different when it comes to the question of whether citizens consider the EU to be economically beneficial for themselves. While people in poorer regions were more likely to think that the EU was economically beneficial to them in 2004, this correlation was no longer evident for 2010 or 2015. However, there are slight tendencies for citizens in regions with stronger economic growth to agree more often with this statement than among those living in economically stagnating or shrinking regions. The overall percentage of people who consider the EU to be economically beneficial to them is rather low and has decreased between 2004 and 2010. However, citizens who regard the EU as economically beneficial for themselves are significantly more likely to (also) see themselves as Europeans. This correlation does not, as expected, mediate the impact of the macro variables of economic level or regional development on inclusive European identity. Finally, the results are robust when a country rather than a regional approach is used. Comparing these two approaches has shown that the more fine-grained regional perspective provides more variance, which can be attributed to within-country differences.

Let us relate the results to the theoretical framework. Even if the more complex model presented is not fully supported, the general idea of a spill-over effect cannot be completely neglected. As those who rate the EU as positive for their economic situation are more likely to be inclusive Europeans, the idea

that a positive evaluation leads to attachment or even identity formation seems to hold. However, the relationship of macro factors and identity is definitely more complicated than expected. A key role is played by the positive correlation between the level of economic growth and the item on individual evaluation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the EU is perceived by few as a contributor to economic prosperity.

In the light of these findings, what socio-political conclusions can be drawn if actors are to pursue successfully the objective of promoting European identity among the population (European Commission 2017: 2)? The distinction between European identity and economic evaluation provides us with an important starting point here. Since the effect of identity is directly related to the economic evaluation of the EU and the latter is influenced by economic growth, promoting economic development seems to be a possible driver for European social integration, especially in the less prosperous regions where inclusive European identity is somewhat less strong. With only a small minority of citizens believing that the EU is good for them economically, promoting economic growth in the regions can be a strategy to unlock untapped potential. Benoît Cœuré, member of the ECB Executive Board, identified several ways to strengthen economic development and convergence, in particular by boosting the economies of the poorer regions of Eastern and Central Europe, while also recommending the expansion of the single market, the promotion of a capital market, but also facilitating access to cohesion funds by strengthening institutions and simplifying the system (Cœuré 2018). Not only can more support be given to regions, but economic support for certain groups who are less likely to perceive the EU as an economic benefit to them personally, namely the less educated and unskilled workers, can increase this sense of economic gain from EU membership.

An interesting case in point is that of the ECE countries. Despite the above-average economic growth in these countries mentioned in the introduction, Widespread belief in the economic benefits of EU membership has declined significantly over the years to an average level (GESIS 2019: 451). The example of the ECE countries thus illustrates that even high economic growth does not necessarily lead directly to a positive assessment of the EU, even if there is an overall correlation in the data. One conclusion that could be drawn from this is that the assessment of these issues could be based more on information and knowledge. As ESI Funds are quite complicated and difficult to understand, future recasts could not only provide the opportunity to widen the scope of the redistribution system and add new possibilities to make it more accessible to more groups. A more extensive public campaign and further information material could also make the system better known to citizens. For the current period of ESI Funds (2021–2017), the European Commission has already recognised the problem of the complexity of the funding system and has communicated

as an objective to ‘make the rules less complex’ (European Commission 2018). As the debate on the so-called Brexit has shown, the lack of knowledge in this area has so far meant that the economic disadvantages of this system, such as gross capital flows, have been more successfully exploited politically than the positive effects.

This analysis has several limitations. Relying on European identity is not only problematic because the ‘Moreno question’ used only taps the ‘cognitive perspective’ of self-categorisation (Bergbauer 2018: 17; Ceka – Sojka 2016: 483), while leaving out other aspects of identity such as emotional attachment (Bergbauer 2018: 17; Ceka – Sojka 2016: 486). Extending this research to other operationalisations of European social integration, such as European solidarity (e.g. Díez Medrano et al. 2019) or trust (e.g. Delhey 2004, 2007; Westle – Kleiner 2016), may be worthwhile in order to determine the robustness of the results, but also to explore the specificities of each topic. In addition, further research is needed to provide a more detailed explanation of economic satisfaction with the economic aspects of European system integration at the individual level. The item used in this analysis is very simple. Further questions on the assessment of the economic impact of EU membership, in particular on the perceived impact on the economic situation of regions or countries, could be helpful to get a more precise understanding of the issue at hand. Finally, although GDP is the most popular indicator for measuring regional economies, it is only one of many possibilities. For example, redistributive measures based on EU funds could be of interest in future further studies. Improving our knowledge of the regional aspects of European social integration could provide us with new information on where and what kind of social policies can be implemented effectively in the future.

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
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Florian K. Kley is a researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, Germany. He is currently working in the DFG project *Changing middle class: A comparison of Germany and the US at the Chair for Societal Institutions and Social Change of the Institute of Sociology at Leipzig University*. His main research fields are middle-class research, European social integration, and quantitative data analysis. Among his recent publications are ‘European Solidarity in Times of Crisis. Insights from a Thirteen-Country Survey’ (London & New York: Routledge, 2019, with J. Gerhards, H. Lengfeld, Z. S. Ignácz, and M. Priem) and ‘Is There an East–West Divide over European Solidarity? Comparing European Citizens’ Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Solidarity’ (in Lorenz, A. – Anders L. H., eds., *Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics in East Central Europe*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2021, with H. Lengfeld). E-mail: florian.kley@uni-leipzig.de; ORCID: 0000-0001-8617-958X


APPENDIX

Figure A.1: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me and regional economic factors (predictions, 2004, 2010 & 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). Predictions derived from Table A.3 (M1, M2, and M3), Table A.4 (M1), and Table A.5 (M1, M2, and M3). $N(2004) = 25,346$, $N(2010) = 25,389$, $N(2015) = 25,863$. Predictions derived from Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models including other covariates. Own calculations and depiction.

Figure A.2: Inclusive European identity and regional economic factors (predictions, 2004, 2010 & 2015)



Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). Predictions derived from Table A.7 (M1, M2, and M3), Table A.8 (M1, M2, and M3), Table A.9 (M1 and M3), Table A.10 (M1, M2, and M3), and Table A.11 (M1, M2, and M3). N(2004) = 25,346, N(2010) = 25,389, N(2015) = 25,863. Predictions derived from Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models including other covariates. Own calculations and depiction.

Table A.1: Description of variables: Definitions, wording, and recoding

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Definition / Item wording</i>	<i>Values</i>
Inclusive European identity	<i>(In the near future) Do you see yourself as...?</i> 1) (NATIONALITY) only 2) (NATIONALITY) and European 3) European and Nationality 4) European only Grouping: 1) = Exclusive national identity (coded as 0) 2), 3), or 4) = Inclusive European identity (coded as 1)	Exclusive national identity Inclusive European identity
Sex	<i>Gender</i>	Male Female
Age	<i>How old are you?</i> (Open question) ¹	15-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55-64 years 65 years or more
Citizenship	<i>What is your nationality? Please tell me the country(ies) that applies(y).</i> (List of several countries; multiple answers possible) ²	Only Country Country and other Other(s) only
Education	<i>How old were you when you stopped full-time education?</i> (Open question) ²	15 years or less Middle (16-19 years) High (20 years or more) In education
Class	<i>What is your current occupation?</i> (List of several non-active and active employment situations) ² If currently not in occupation: <i>Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last occupation?</i> (List of several occupations) ²	Unskilled manual workers Farmer / Fisherman Owner of a shop Employed at desk / travelling / service job Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor Proprietors / higher management / professionals Service Class Never worked

Employment situation	<i>What is your current occupation?</i> (List of several non-active and active employment situations) ²	Employed Unemployed Houseperson Retired
Political orientation	<i>In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale?</i> (1 = Left, 10 = Right)	Left Moderate left Centre Moderate right Right No answer / missing
(Continuation on next page)		

(Continuation)		
EU is economically good for me personally	<i>What does the EU mean to you personally?</i> (List of several items, including:) <i>Economic prosperity</i> (multiple answers possible)	Not mentioned Mentioned

¹ Answers grouped for bivariate analyses only.
² Answers grouped.
³ Bivariate groups used in descriptive analyses on the macro level and in multivariate models.

Source: European Communities (2004) and GESIS (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2019, 2018).

Table A.2: Cross table of inclusive European identity, perceiving the EU as economically

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>2004</i>
Sex	Male	62%
	Female	55%
Age	15 - 24 years	65%
	25 - 34 years	65%
	35 - 44 years	61%
	45 - 54 years	60%
	55 - 64 years	55%
	65 years or more	45%
Citizenship	Only Country	58%
	Country and other	75%
	Other(s) only	80%
Education	15 years or less	43%
	Middle (16-19 years)	56%
	High (20 years or more)	72%
	In education	72%
Class	Unskilled manual workers	42%
	Skilled manual worker	49%
	Farmer / Fisherman	40%
	Owner of a shop	61%
	Employed at desk / travelling / service job	61%
	Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	67%
	Proprietors / higher management / professionals	72%
	Never worked	64%
Employment situation	Employed	65%
	Unemployed	50%
	Houseperson	51%
	Retired	48%
Political orientation	Left	60%
	Moderate left	66%
	Centre	58%
	Moderate right	59%
	Right	50%
	No answer / missing	52%
EU is economically good for me	Not mentioned	54%
	Mentioned	73%
Total		58%

Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2016c). m2004 = 25,346, m2010 = 25,389, m2015 = 25,863. Weighted. Valid values only. Own calculations and

beneficial, and covariates (relative frequencies, 2004, 2010 & 2015)

	Inclusive European identity			Perceiving the EU as economically beneficial		
	2010	2015	2004	2010	2015	
	57%	65%	28%	16%	16%	
	49%	57%	22%	12%	12%	
	58%	65%	28%	17%	15%	
	57%	64%	27%	16%	15%	
	57%	67%	25%	14%	15%	
	54%	63%	24%	14%	16%	
	52%	61%	25%	12%	13%	
	39%	50%	20%	11%	11%	
	51%	60%	25%	14%	13%	
	79%	75%	23%	12%	23%	
	91%	89%	29%	23%	25%	
	36%	42%	19%	9%	8%	
	48%	57%	24%	13%	12%	
	68%	73%	31%	18%	19%	
	67%	74%	29%	19%	17%	
	39%	38%	17%	11%	8%	
	45%	51%	22%	12%	12%	
	35%	38%	25%	14%	10%	
	54%	66%	24%	15%	13%	
	53%	63%	25%	12%	13%	
	63%	73%	29%	16%	18%	
	68%	76%	28%	18%	22%	
	57%	64%	27%	17%	14%	
	60%	67%	27%	16%	16%	
	43%	54%	23%	10%	11%	
	43%	50%	19%	12%	10%	
	42%	52%	21%	11%	12%	
	50%	64%	24%	11%	13%	
	60%	72%	26%	15%	16%	
	54%	62%	24%	13%	15%	
	55%	61%	29%	17%	16%	
	46%	46%	26%	15%	14%	
	42%	49%	20%	12%	9%	
	50%	58%				
	70%	79%				
	52%	61%	25%	14%	14%	

Commission 2012b), 73.4 (European Commission 2012c), 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), and 84.3 (European Commission 2016c). Depiction.

Table A.3: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me (regression

	M0	M1
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.005)
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Age (squared)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>		
Country and other	0.029 (0.016)	0.029 (0.016)
Other(s) only	0.035** (0.013)	0.033** (0.013)
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>		
Middle (16-19 years)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)
High (20 years or more)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.009)
In education	0.061*** (0.014)	0.061*** (0.014)
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>		
Skilled manual workers	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
Farmer / Fisherman	0.039* (0.019)	0.040* (0.019)
Owner of a shop	0.020 (0.014)	0.020 (0.014)
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.027** (0.010)	0.027** (0.010)
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.053*** (0.010)	0.053*** (0.010)
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.077*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.012)
Never worked	0.016 (0.013)	0.017 (0.013)
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>		
Unemployed	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.009)
Houseperson	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)
Retired	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>		
Left	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)
Moderate left	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Moderate right	0.027*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)
Right	0.026** (0.009)	0.027** (0.009)
No answer / missing	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)
<i>Economic level</i>		
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)		0.006 (0.007)
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)		0.002 (0.003)
<i>Economic development</i>		
Δ GDP since 2004		
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)		
Δ GDP since 2008		
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)		
<i>Variance</i>		
Level-2 Intercept	0.206*** (0.040)	0.201*** (0.039)
Sample		
m (individuals)	25,863	25,863
N (regions)	93	93
ICC	.059	.058
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)		
Fixed & Random Effects	.100	.100
Fixed Effects only	.060	.066
AIC	20629.1	20630

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), H
 ginal Effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

n, regional level macro factors, 2015)

M2	M3	M4	M5
-0.044*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.044*** (0.005)	-0.043*** (0.005)
-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
0.030 (0.016)	0.030 (0.016)	0.030 (0.016)	0.029 (0.016)
0.037** (0.013)	0.036** (0.013)	0.035** (0.013)	0.034** (0.013)
0.028*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)
0.055*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.009)
0.061*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.014)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.014)
0.015 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
0.041* (0.020)	0.042* (0.019)	0.042* (0.020)	0.042* (0.019)
0.022 (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)
0.029** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)
0.056*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.010)	0.055*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.010)
0.080*** (0.012)	0.078*** (0.012)	0.080*** (0.012)	0.078*** (0.012)
0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)
-0.017 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.009)
-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)
0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
-0.038*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)
0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
0.028*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)
0.026** (0.009)	0.026** (0.009)	0.027** (0.009)	0.026** (0.009)
-0.041*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)
		0.015* (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
		-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
0.102*** (0.026)		0.110*** (0.026)	
-0.090 (0.059)		-0.053 (0.060)	
	0.149** (0.047)		0.148** (0.047)
	-0.408 (0.224)		-0.377 (0.226)
0.164*** (0.033)	0.171*** (0.035)	0.155*** (0.032)	0.168*** (0.034)
25,863	25,863	25,863	25,863
93	93	93	93
.047	.049	.045	.049
.101	.101	.101	.101
.073	.072	.081	.077
20617.2	20619.3	20615.4	20620.9

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Mar-

Table A.4: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me (regression

Sex (Ref.: Male)
Age (in 10 years)
Age (squared)
Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)
Country and other
Other(s) only
Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)
Middle (16-19 years)
High (20 years or more)
In education
Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)
Skilled manual workers
Farmer / Fisherman
Owner of a shop
Employed at desk / travelling / service job
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor
Proprietors / higher management / professionals
Never worked
Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)
Unemployed
Houseperson
Retired
Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)
Left
Moderate left
Moderate right
Right
No answer / missing
Economic level
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)
Variance
Level-2 Intercept
Sample
m (individuals)
N (regions)
ICC
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)
Fixed & Random Effects
Fixed Effects only
AIC

Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b). AMEs with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05.

n, regional level macro factors, 2004)

M0		M1	
-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.041***	(0.006)
-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
-0.043	(0.052)	-0.043	(0.053)
0.049**	(0.017)	0.049**	(0.018)
0.018*	(0.008)	0.017*	(0.008)
0.057***	(0.009)	0.058***	(0.009)
0.056***	(0.014)	0.057***	(0.014)
0.027**	(0.010)	0.027**	(0.010)
0.036*	(0.017)	0.036*	(0.018)
0.038*	(0.015)	0.039*	(0.015)
0.058***	(0.010)	0.060***	(0.010)
0.086***	(0.011)	0.088***	(0.011)
0.094***	(0.014)	0.096***	(0.014)
0.067***	(0.013)	0.068***	(0.013)
-0.017	(0.011)	-0.018	(0.011)
-0.029**	(0.011)	-0.028*	(0.011)
-0.022*	(0.009)	-0.024*	(0.009)
-0.049***	(0.011)	-0.049***	(0.011)
-0.009	(0.007)	-0.008	(0.008)
0.042***	(0.008)	0.043***	(0.008)
0.048***	(0.011)	0.048***	(0.011)
-0.066***	(0.008)	-0.068***	(0.008)
		-0.083***	(0.014)
		0.034***	(0.007)
0.478***	(0.078)	0.319***	(0.054)
25,346		25,346	
93		93	
.127		.088	
.138		.137	
.046		.083	
28269.2		28240.9	

ommission 2012b), and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the
05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A.5: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me (regression

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.040***	(0.005)	-0.0
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000	(0.000)	-
Age (squared)	0.000	(0.000)	
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	-0.020	(0.025)	
Other(s) only	0.050***	(0.014)	0.0
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>			
Middle (16-19 years)	0.031***	(0.007)	0.0
High (20 years or more)	0.057***	(0.009)	0.0
In education	0.076***	(0.014)	0.0
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.023*	(0.009)	0
Farmer / Fisherman	0.061***	(0.015)	0.0
Owner of a shop	0.048***	(0.013)	0.0
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.029***	(0.009)	0.0
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.049***	(0.010)	0.0
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.069***	(0.012)	0.0
Never worked	0.031*	(0.012)	0
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.022**	(0.008)	-0.
Houseperson	0.002	(0.010)	
Retired	-0.012	(0.008)	
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.027**	(0.009)	-0.
Moderate left	0.001	(0.006)	
Moderate right	0.021***	(0.006)	0.0
Right	0.032***	(0.008)	0.0
No answer / missing	-0.032***	(0.007)	-0.0
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>			
Level-2 Intercept	0.197***	(0.038)	0.1
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,389		2
N (regions)	93		
ICC	.056		
<i>Pseudo-R² (McKelvey & Zavoina)</i>			
Fixed & Random Effects	.096		
Fixed Effects only	.053		
AIC	20900.5		20

Source: Eurobarometer 73.4 (European Commission 2012c) and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models. Errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

n, regional level macro factors, 2010)

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
40***	(0.005)	-0.041***	(0.005)	-0.040***	(0.005)	-0.041***	(0.005)	-0.040***	(0.005)
0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
-0.019	(0.025)	-0.019	(0.025)	-0.020	(0.025)	-0.019	(0.025)	-0.019	(0.025)
49***	(0.014)	0.052***	(0.015)	0.050***	(0.014)	0.050***	(0.015)	0.049***	(0.014)
31***	(0.008)	0.030***	(0.008)	0.031***	(0.007)	0.030***	(0.008)	0.031***	(0.007)
57***	(0.009)	0.056***	(0.009)	0.057***	(0.009)	0.056***	(0.009)	0.057***	(0.009)
76***	(0.014)	0.076***	(0.014)	0.075***	(0.014)	0.075***	(0.014)	0.076***	(0.014)
0.023*	(0.009)	0.023*	(0.009)	0.023*	(0.009)	0.023*	(0.009)	0.023*	(0.009)
61***	(0.015)	0.061***	(0.016)	0.061***	(0.015)	0.061***	(0.016)	0.061***	(0.016)
49***	(0.013)	0.050***	(0.013)	0.048***	(0.013)	0.050***	(0.013)	0.049***	(0.013)
30***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)	0.029***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)
50***	(0.010)	0.050***	(0.010)	0.049***	(0.010)	0.049***	(0.010)	0.050***	(0.010)
69***	(0.012)	0.070***	(0.012)	0.068***	(0.012)	0.070***	(0.012)	0.069***	(0.012)
0.030*	(0.012)	0.030*	(0.012)	0.030*	(0.012)	0.030*	(0.012)	0.030*	(0.012)
0.023**	(0.009)	-0.023**	(0.009)	-0.022**	(0.008)	-0.022**	(0.009)	-0.022**	(0.009)
0.002	(0.010)	0.003	(0.010)	0.002	(0.010)	0.003	(0.010)	0.002	(0.010)
-0.013	(0.008)	-0.013	(0.008)	-0.012	(0.008)	-0.013	(0.008)	-0.013	(0.008)
0.028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.027**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)
0.001	(0.006)	0.001	(0.006)	0.001	(0.006)	0.001	(0.006)	0.001	(0.006)
0.021***	(0.006)	0.021***	(0.006)	0.021***	(0.006)	0.021***	(0.006)	0.021***	(0.006)
0.032***	(0.008)	0.032***	(0.008)	0.032***	(0.008)	0.032***	(0.008)	0.032***	(0.008)
0.032***	(0.007)	-0.033***	(0.007)	-0.032***	(0.007)	-0.033***	(0.007)	-0.032***	(0.007)
-0.012	(0.008)					0.007	(0.008)	-0.012	(0.008)
0.007	(0.003)					0.001	(0.003)	0.007	(0.003)
		0.122**	(0.047)			0.130*	(0.051)		
		0.124	(0.134)			0.142	(0.134)		
				0.051	(0.136)			0.037	(0.134)
				0.277	(1.459)			-0.168	(1.501)
187***	(0.036)	0.147***	(0.030)	0.196***	(0.038)	0.144***	(0.029)	0.186***	(0.036)
25,389		25,389		25,389		25,389		25,389	
93		93		93		93		93	
.054		.043		.056		.042		.054	
.096		.096		.096		.096		.096	
.056		.065		.053		.067		.055	
900.6		20884.1		20904.2		20886.1		20904.5	

ls (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) with standard er-

Table A.6: Agreement on the statement that EU is economically good for me (regression)

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.044***	(0.005)	-0.044***
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***
Age (squared)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	0.031	(0.016)	0.031
Other(s) only	0.036**	(0.013)	0.035**
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>			
Middle (16-19 years)	0.028***	(0.008)	0.028***
High (20 years or more)	0.056***	(0.009)	0.056***
In education	0.060***	(0.015)	0.060***
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.015	(0.010)	0.015
Farmer / Fisherman	0.045*	(0.020)	0.045*
Owner of a shop	0.020	(0.015)	0.020
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.027**	(0.010)	0.027**
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.055***	(0.011)	0.055***
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.078***	(0.013)	0.077***
Never worked	0.017	(0.014)	0.017
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.017	(0.009)	-0.017
Houseperson	-0.002	(0.012)	-0.002
Retired	0.002	(0.008)	0.002
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.038***	(0.009)	-0.038***
Moderate left	0.002	(0.006)	0.002
Moderate right	0.028***	(0.006)	0.028***
Right	0.026**	(0.009)	0.026**
No answer / missing	-0.041***	(0.007)	-0.041***
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			0.000
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			0.000
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>			
Level-2 Intercept	0.165***	(0.048)	0.164***
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,863		25,863
N (countries)	27		27
ICC	.048		.048
<i>Pseudo-R² (McKelvey & Zavoina)</i>			
Fixed & Random Effects	.096		.096
Fixed Effects only	.060		.060
AIC	20616.6		20620.6

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), HLM with random effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

n, country level macro factors, 2015)

M1	M2		M3		M4		M5	
* (0.005)	-0.044***	(0.005)	-0.044***	(0.005)	-0.044***	(0.005)	-0.044***	(0.005)
* (0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
0 (0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
0 (0.016)	0.031	(0.016)	0.031	(0.016)	0.031	(0.016)	0.031	(0.016)
* (0.013)	0.036**	(0.013)	0.036**	(0.013)	0.036**	(0.013)	0.036**	(0.013)
* (0.008)	0.028***	(0.008)	0.028***	(0.008)	0.028***	(0.008)	0.028***	(0.008)
* (0.009)	0.055***	(0.009)	0.055***	(0.009)	0.055***	(0.009)	0.055***	(0.009)
* (0.015)	0.060***	(0.015)	0.060***	(0.015)	0.060***	(0.015)	0.060***	(0.015)
5 (0.010)	0.015	(0.010)	0.015	(0.010)	0.015	(0.010)	0.015	(0.010)
* (0.020)	0.045*	(0.020)	0.046*	(0.020)	0.046*	(0.020)	0.046*	(0.020)
0 (0.015)	0.021	(0.015)	0.021	(0.015)	0.021	(0.015)	0.021	(0.015)
* (0.010)	0.027**	(0.010)	0.028**	(0.010)	0.028**	(0.010)	0.028**	(0.010)
* (0.011)	0.055***	(0.011)	0.055***	(0.011)	0.055***	(0.011)	0.055***	(0.011)
* (0.013)	0.078***	(0.012)	0.078***	(0.012)	0.078***	(0.012)	0.078***	(0.012)
7 (0.014)	0.017	(0.014)	0.017	(0.014)	0.018	(0.014)	0.018	(0.014)
7 (0.009)	-0.017	(0.009)	-0.017	(0.009)	-0.017	(0.009)	-0.017	(0.009)
2 (0.012)	-0.001	(0.012)	-0.002	(0.012)	-0.002	(0.012)	-0.002	(0.012)
2 (0.008)	0.002	(0.008)	0.002	(0.008)	0.002	(0.008)	0.002	(0.008)
* (0.009)	-0.038***	(0.009)	-0.038***	(0.009)	-0.038***	(0.009)	-0.038***	(0.009)
2 (0.006)	0.003	(0.006)	0.003	(0.006)	0.003	(0.006)	0.003	(0.006)
* (0.006)	0.028***	(0.006)	0.028***	(0.006)	0.028***	(0.006)	0.028***	(0.006)
* (0.009)	0.026**	(0.009)	0.026**	(0.009)	0.026**	(0.009)	0.026**	(0.009)
* (0.007)	-0.041***	(0.007)	-0.041***	(0.007)	-0.041***	(0.007)	-0.041***	(0.007)
4 (0.012)					0.020	(0.014)	0.005	(0.011)
0 (0.003)					-0.004	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.003)
	0.091*	(0.037)			0.105**	(0.038)		
	-0.110	(0.100)			-0.042	(0.108)		
			0.186**	(0.061)			0.186**	(0.061)
			-0.236	(0.266)			-0.245	(0.266)
* (0.048)	0.133***	(0.039)	0.119***	(0.035)	0.122***	(0.036)	0.117***	(0.035)
3	25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863	
7	27		27		27		27	
7	.039		.035		.036		.034	
6	.096		.097		.097		.097	
2	.070		.074		.076		.076	
3	20614.8		20611.9		20616.8		20615.6	

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the national level (NUTS-0), Average Mar-

Table A.7: Inclusive European identity (regression, regional level macro factors, 2015)

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.043***	(0.006)	-0.0
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.0
Age (squared)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.0
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	0.123***	(0.025)	0.3
Other(s) only	0.267***	(0.023)	0.2
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>			
Middle (16-19 years)	0.075***	(0.009)	0.0
High (20 years or more)	0.161***	(0.010)	0.1
In education	0.214***	(0.019)	0.2
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.034**	(0.011)	0.3
Farmer / Fisherman	0.037	(0.022)	0.3
Owner of a shop	0.127***	(0.017)	0.3
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.113***	(0.011)	0.3
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.183***	(0.012)	0.3
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.220***	(0.016)	0.2
Never worked	0.065***	(0.016)	0.0
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.043***	(0.010)	-0.0
Houseperson	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.0
Retired	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.0
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.027*	(0.011)	-0.0
Moderate left	0.021*	(0.008)	0.0
Moderate right	0.022**	(0.009)	0.0
Right	-0.044***	(0.012)	-0.0
No answer / missing	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.0
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>			
Level-2 Intercept	0.494***	(0.083)	0.4
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,863		2
N (regions)	93		2
ICC	.131		2
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)			
Fixed & Random Effects	.199		2
Fixed Effects only	.149		2
AIC	31193.9		3

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), H regional Effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
043***	(0.006)	-0.043***	(0.006)	-0.043***	(0.006)	-0.043***	(0.006)	-0.043***	(0.006)
000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
121***	(0.025)	0.122***	(0.025)	0.123***	(0.025)	0.121***	(0.025)	0.121***	(0.025)
263***	(0.023)	0.266***	(0.023)	0.267***	(0.023)	0.262***	(0.023)	0.263***	(0.023)
074***	(0.009)	0.074***	(0.009)	0.074***	(0.009)	0.073***	(0.009)	0.074***	(0.009)
159***	(0.010)	0.159***	(0.010)	0.161***	(0.010)	0.158***	(0.010)	0.159***	(0.010)
212***	(0.018)	0.212***	(0.019)	0.214***	(0.019)	0.210***	(0.018)	0.212***	(0.018)
034**	(0.011)	0.034**	(0.011)	0.034**	(0.011)	0.033**	(0.011)	0.034**	(0.011)
037	(0.022)	0.037	(0.022)	0.037	(0.022)	0.038	(0.022)	0.037	(0.022)
127***	(0.017)	0.127***	(0.017)	0.128***	(0.017)	0.127***	(0.017)	0.127***	(0.017)
112***	(0.011)	0.113***	(0.011)	0.113***	(0.011)	0.112***	(0.011)	0.112***	(0.011)
181***	(0.012)	0.182***	(0.012)	0.183***	(0.012)	0.180***	(0.012)	0.181***	(0.012)
218***	(0.016)	0.219***	(0.016)	0.220***	(0.016)	0.217***	(0.016)	0.218***	(0.016)
064***	(0.016)	0.065***	(0.016)	0.065***	(0.016)	0.065***	(0.016)	0.064***	(0.016)
043***	(0.010)	-0.043***	(0.010)	-0.043***	(0.010)	-0.043***	(0.010)	-0.043***	(0.010)
-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)
028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)	-0.028**	(0.009)
0.026*	(0.010)	-0.027*	(0.010)	-0.027*	(0.011)	-0.026*	(0.010)	-0.026*	(0.010)
0.020*	(0.008)	0.021*	(0.008)	0.021*	(0.008)	0.021*	(0.008)	0.020*	(0.008)
0.022**	(0.009)	0.022**	(0.009)	0.022**	(0.009)	0.022**	(0.008)	0.022**	(0.009)
043***	(0.012)	-0.044***	(0.012)	-0.044***	(0.012)	-0.043***	(0.012)	-0.043***	(0.012)
095***	(0.008)	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.095***	(0.008)	-0.095***	(0.008)
0.029	(0.017)					0.033	(0.018)	0.030	(0.017)
0.001	(0.006)					-0.001	(0.007)	0.001	(0.007)
		0.091	(0.059)			0.102	(0.059)		
		-0.223	(0.143)			-0.129	(0.146)		
				0.006	(0.115)			0.011	(0.113)
				-0.119	(0.558)			0.101	(0.556)
046***	(0.078)	0.475***	(0.080)	0.493***	(0.083)	0.450***	(0.076)	0.467***	(0.078)
25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863	
93		93		93		93		93	
.124		.126		.130		.120		.124	
.199		.199		.199		.199		.199	
.170		.155		.149		.174		.170	
1192.6		31194.7		31197.9		31193.7		31196.6	

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Mar-

Table A.8: Inclusive European identity including attitude towards EU as economically b

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.04
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.00
Age (squared)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.00
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	0.126***	(0.027)	0.12
Other(s) only	0.283***	(0.024)	0.27
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>	0.077***	(0.009)	0.07
Middle (16-19 years)			
High (20 years or more)	0.165***	(0.011)	0.16
In education	0.222***	(0.020)	0.21
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.034**	(0.012)	0.0
Farmer / Fisherman	0.034	(0.024)	0
Owner of a shop	0.135***	(0.018)	0.13
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.118***	(0.011)	0.11
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.188***	(0.013)	0.18
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.225***	(0.017)	0.22
Never worked	0.067***	(0.017)	0.06
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.044***	(0.011)	-0.04
Houseperson	-0.014	(0.015)	-0
Retired	-0.030**	(0.010)	-0.0
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.023*	(0.011)	-0.
Moderate left	0.022*	(0.009)	0.
Moderate right	0.020*	(0.009)	0.
Right	-0.050***	(0.012)	-0.04
No answer / missing	-0.098***	(0.009)	-0.09
EU is economically good for me (Ref.: No)	0.159***	(0.012)	0.15
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			0
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			0
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>			
Slope (EU is economically good for me)	0.051	(0.034)	0
Level-2 Intercept	0.498***	(0.084)	0.47
<i>Covariance</i>			
Slope (EU is economically good for me) & Level-2 Intercept	-0.035	(0.054)	-0
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,863		25
N (regions)	93		
ICC	.131		
<i>Pseudo-R² (McKelvey & Zavoina)</i>			
Fixed & Random Effects	.217		
Fixed Effects only	.168		
AIC	30881.8		308

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), H
 ginal Effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Beneficial (regression, regional level macro factors, 2015)

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
0***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)
00***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
00***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
4***	(0.026)	0.125***	(0.026)	0.126***	(0.027)	0.123***	(0.026)	0.124***	(0.026)
8***	(0.024)	0.281***	(0.024)	0.283***	(0.024)	0.276***	(0.024)	0.278***	(0.024)
6***	(0.009)	0.076***	(0.009)	0.077***	(0.009)	0.075***	(0.009)	0.076***	(0.009)
3***	(0.011)	0.164***	(0.011)	0.165***	(0.011)	0.162***	(0.011)	0.163***	(0.011)
9***	(0.020)	0.219***	(0.020)	0.222***	(0.020)	0.216***	(0.019)	0.219***	(0.020)
34**	(0.012)	0.034**	(0.012)	0.034**	(0.012)	0.034**	(0.012)	0.034**	(0.012)
0.035	(0.024)	0.035	(0.024)	0.034	(0.024)	0.035	(0.024)	0.034	(0.024)
3***	(0.018)	0.134***	(0.018)	0.135***	(0.018)	0.133***	(0.017)	0.133***	(0.018)
7***	(0.011)	0.117***	(0.011)	0.118***	(0.011)	0.116***	(0.011)	0.117***	(0.011)
5***	(0.013)	0.186***	(0.013)	0.188***	(0.013)	0.184***	(0.013)	0.185***	(0.013)
2***	(0.016)	0.223***	(0.017)	0.225***	(0.017)	0.220***	(0.016)	0.221***	(0.016)
7***	(0.017)	0.067***	(0.017)	0.067***	(0.017)	0.066***	(0.017)	0.067***	(0.017)
4***	(0.011)	-0.044***	(0.011)	-0.044***	(0.011)	-0.043***	(0.011)	-0.044***	(0.011)
0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)
30**	(0.010)	-0.030**	(0.010)	-0.030**	(0.010)	-0.030**	(0.010)	-0.030**	(0.010)
0.023*	(0.011)	-0.023*	(0.011)	-0.023*	(0.011)	-0.023*	(0.011)	-0.023*	(0.011)
0.022*	(0.009)	0.022*	(0.009)	0.022*	(0.009)	0.022*	(0.009)	0.022*	(0.009)
0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.019*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)
9***	(0.012)	-0.050***	(0.012)	-0.050***	(0.012)	-0.049***	(0.012)	-0.049***	(0.012)
6***	(0.008)	-0.097***	(0.009)	-0.098***	(0.009)	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.096***	(0.008)
7***	(0.012)	0.158***	(0.012)	0.159***	(0.012)	0.155***	(0.012)	0.156***	(0.012)
0.030	(0.018)					0.035	(0.019)	0.032	(0.018)
0.001	(0.007)					-0.001	(0.007)	0.000	(0.007)
		0.083	(0.063)			0.094	(0.062)		
		-0.225	(0.162)			-0.105	(0.166)		
				-0.008	(0.122)			0.001	(0.119)
				0.016	(0.620)			0.272	(0.606)
0.050	(0.034)	0.051	(0.034)	0.051	(0.034)	0.050	(0.033)	0.050	(0.033)
72***	(0.080)	0.477***	(0.081)	0.498***	(0.085)	0.459***	(0.079)	0.474***	(0.081)
0.035	(0.050)	-0.012	(0.057)	-0.035	(0.057)	-0.033	(0.054)	-0.041	(0.052)
5,863		25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863	
93		93		93		93		93	
.125		.127		.132		.122		.126	
.217		.217		.217		.217		.217	
.188		.174		.168		.191		.189	
380.8		30883.3		30885.8		30882.6		30884.6	

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Mar-

Table A.9: Inclusive European identity including attitude towards EU as economically b

	MO	
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.044***	(0.006)
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Age (squared)	-0.000**	(0.000)
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>		
Country and other	0.180**	(0.064)
Other(s) only	0.263***	(0.025)
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>		
Middle (16-19 years)	0.071***	(0.009)
High (20 years or more)	0.159***	(0.010)
In education	0.192***	(0.016)
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>		
Skilled manual workers	0.024*	(0.011)
Farmer / Fisherman	0.007	(0.019)
Owner of a shop	0.080***	(0.017)
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.102***	(0.010)
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.155***	(0.012)
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.183***	(0.016)
Never worked	0.073***	(0.014)
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>		
Unemployed	-0.055***	(0.012)
Houseperson	-0.020	(0.012)
Retired	-0.021*	(0.010)
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>		
Left	-0.045***	(0.012)
Moderate left	0.025**	(0.009)
Moderate right	0.018*	(0.009)
Right	-0.035**	(0.013)
No answer / missing	-0.087***	(0.008)
EU is economically good for me (Ref.: No)		
<i>Economic level</i>		
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)		
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)		
<i>Variance</i>		
Slope (EU is economically good for me)		
Level-2 Intercept	0.245***	(0.042)
<i>Covariance</i>		
Slope (EU is economically good for me) & Level-2 Intercept		
<i>Sample</i>		
m (individuals)	25,346	
N (regions)	93	
ICC	.069	
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)		
Fixed & Random Effects	.160	
Fixed Effects only	.124	
AIC	31888.5	

Source: Eurobarometer CC 2004.1 (European Commission 2016a), 61 (European Commission 2012a), 62.0 (European Commission 2012b).
 regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Beneficial (regression, regional level macro factors, 2004)

M1		M2		M3	
-0.044***	(0.006)	-0.039***	(0.006)	-0.038***	(0.006)
-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
-0.000**	(0.000)	-0.000**	(0.000)	-0.000**	(0.000)
0.179**	(0.064)	0.190**	(0.065)	0.189**	(0.065)
0.261***	(0.025)	0.263***	(0.025)	0.261***	(0.025)
		0.071***	(0.009)	0.070***	(0.009)
0.071***	(0.009)				
0.158***	(0.010)	0.155***	(0.010)	0.154***	(0.010)
0.192***	(0.016)	0.189***	(0.016)	0.188***	(0.016)
0.024*	(0.011)	0.019	(0.011)	0.020	(0.011)
0.007	(0.019)	0.001	(0.020)	0.001	(0.020)
0.080***	(0.017)	0.075***	(0.017)	0.075***	(0.017)
0.101***	(0.010)	0.094***	(0.011)	0.094***	(0.011)
0.155***	(0.012)	0.144***	(0.012)	0.144***	(0.012)
0.183***	(0.016)	0.173***	(0.017)	0.172***	(0.017)
0.073***	(0.014)	0.063***	(0.014)	0.063***	(0.014)
-0.055***	(0.012)	-0.054***	(0.012)	-0.054***	(0.012)
-0.020	(0.012)	-0.015	(0.012)	-0.016	(0.012)
-0.021*	(0.010)	-0.017	(0.010)	-0.017	(0.010)
-0.045***	(0.012)	-0.037**	(0.012)	-0.037**	(0.012)
0.025**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)
0.018*	(0.009)	0.011	(0.009)	0.011	(0.009)
-0.035**	(0.013)	-0.048***	(0.013)	-0.047***	(0.013)
-0.087***	(0.008)	-0.080***	(0.009)	-0.079***	(0.009)
		0.172***	(0.010)	0.172***	(0.010)
0.003	(0.015)			0.020	(0.014)
0.012	(0.008)			0.006	(0.008)
0.236***	(0.041)	0.076* (0.035) 0.245*** (0.044)		0.077* (0.035) 0.233*** (0.042)	
		-0.034 (0.030)		-0.033 (0.029)	
25,346		25,346		25,346	
93		93		93	
.067		.069		.066	
.160		.192		.192	
.129		.156		.162	
31888.8		31280.2		31279.5	

ommission 2012b), and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the
05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Table A.10: Inclusive European identity (regression, regional level macro factors, 2010)

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.051***	(0.006)	-0.0
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.0
Age (squared)	-0.000	(0.000)	-
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	0.178***	(0.034)	0.1
Other(s) only	0.292***	(0.027)	0.2
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>			
Middle (16-19 years)	0.073***	(0.009)	0.0
High (20 years or more)	0.181***	(0.011)	0.1
In education	0.242***	(0.018)	0.2
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.018	(0.011)	
Farmer / Fisherman	-0.023	(0.021)	
Owner of a shop	0.080***	(0.017)	0.0
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.074***	(0.011)	0.0
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.135***	(0.013)	0.1
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.163***	(0.016)	0.1
Never worked	0.030	(0.016)	
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.039***	(0.011)	-0.0
Houseperson	0.003	(0.013)	
Retired	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.0
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.0
Moderate left	0.029**	(0.009)	0.0
Moderate right	0.024**	(0.009)	0.0
Right	-0.027*	(0.012)	-0.0
No answer / missing	-0.080***	(0.008)	-0.0
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>	0.371***	(0.064)	0.3
Level-2 Intercept			
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,389		2
N (regions)	93		
ICC	.101		
<i>Pseudo-R² (McKelvey & Zavoina)</i>			
Fixed & Random Effects	.173		
Fixed Effects only	.127		
AIC	31929.3		3

Source: Eurobarometer 73.4 (European Commission 2012c) and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models. Errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
051***	(0.006)	-0.051***	(0.006)	-0.051***	(0.006)	-0.051***	(0.006)	-0.051***	(0.006)
000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
076***	(0.034)	0.177***	(0.034)	0.178***	(0.034)	0.176***	(0.034)	0.176***	(0.034)
88***	(0.027)	0.292***	(0.027)	0.293***	(0.027)	0.288***	(0.027)	0.288***	(0.027)
073***	(0.009)	0.072***	(0.009)	0.073***	(0.009)	0.072***	(0.009)	0.073***	(0.009)
80***	(0.011)	0.180***	(0.011)	0.181***	(0.011)	0.178***	(0.010)	0.180***	(0.011)
40***	(0.018)	0.239***	(0.018)	0.241***	(0.018)	0.237***	(0.018)	0.239***	(0.018)
0.018	(0.011)	0.018	(0.011)	0.018	(0.011)	0.018	(0.011)	0.018	(0.011)
-0.022	(0.021)	-0.022	(0.021)	-0.022	(0.021)	-0.021	(0.021)	-0.022	(0.021)
80***	(0.017)	0.081***	(0.017)	0.081***	(0.017)	0.081***	(0.017)	0.080***	(0.017)
073***	(0.011)	0.073***	(0.011)	0.074***	(0.011)	0.072***	(0.011)	0.073***	(0.011)
134***	(0.012)	0.135***	(0.012)	0.135***	(0.013)	0.134***	(0.012)	0.134***	(0.012)
162***	(0.016)	0.162***	(0.016)	0.163***	(0.016)	0.161***	(0.016)	0.162***	(0.016)
0.030	(0.016)	0.030	(0.016)	0.030	(0.016)	0.031	(0.016)	0.030	(0.016)
038***	(0.011)	-0.039***	(0.011)	-0.039***	(0.011)	-0.039***	(0.011)	-0.038***	(0.011)
0.003	(0.013)	0.004	(0.013)	0.003	(0.013)	0.004	(0.013)	0.003	(0.013)
032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)
0.028*	(0.012)	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.028*	(0.012)
028**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)	0.028**	(0.009)
024**	(0.009)	0.024**	(0.009)	0.024**	(0.009)	0.023**	(0.009)	0.024**	(0.009)
0.027*	(0.012)	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.027*	(0.012)	-0.027*	(0.012)	-0.027*	(0.012)
80***	(0.008)	-0.080***	(0.008)	-0.080***	(0.008)	-0.079***	(0.008)	-0.079***	(0.008)
0.024	(0.018)					0.037*	(0.019)	0.030	(0.018)
0.009	(0.008)					0.003	(0.008)	0.007	(0.008)
		0.358***	(0.102)			0.402***	(0.105)		
		-1.212***	(0.307)			-1.097***	(0.297)		
				0.533	(0.304)			0.488	(0.290)
				-1.741	(3.256)			0.457	(3.247)
40***	(0.059)	0.311***	(0.054)	0.358***	(0.062)	0.284***	(0.049)	0.326***	(0.056)
25,389		25,389		25,389		25,389		25,389	
93		93		93		93		93	
.094		.086		.098		.080		.090	
.174		.173		.173		.174		.174	
.146		.143		.130		.159		.149	
1925.3		31918.2		31930.2		31913.5		31925.7	

ls (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) with standard er-

Table A.11: Inclusive European identity including attitude towards EU as economically b

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.048***	(0.006)	-0.04
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.00
Age (squared)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.00
Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)			
Country and other	0.189***	(0.036)	0.18
Other(s) only	0.300***	(0.029)	0.29
Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)	0.073***	(0.010)	0.07
Middle (16-19 years)			
High (20 years or more)	0.184***	(0.011)	0.18
In education	0.244***	(0.019)	0.24
Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)			
Skilled manual workers	0.017	(0.012)	0.02
Farmer / Fisherman	-0.033	(0.022)	-0.03
Owner of a shop	0.078***	(0.018)	0.07
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.074***	(0.011)	0.07
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.136***	(0.013)	0.13
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.162***	(0.016)	0.16
Never worked	0.028	(0.017)	0.03
Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)			
Unemployed	-0.038***	(0.011)	-0.03
Houseperson	0.004	(0.014)	0.00
Retired	-0.032**	(0.011)	-0.03
Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)			
Left	-0.025*	(0.012)	-0.02
Moderate left	0.031***	(0.009)	0.03
Moderate right	0.022*	(0.009)	0.02
Right	-0.035**	(0.012)	-0.03
No answer / missing	-0.080***	(0.009)	-0.07
EU is economically good for me (Ref.: No)	0.172***	(0.013)	0.17
Economic level			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			0.00
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			0.00
Economic development			
Δ GDP since 2004			0.00
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			0.00
Δ GDP since 2008			0.00
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			0.00
Variance			
Slope (EU is economically good for me)	0.090*	(0.045)	0.09
Level-2 Intercept	0.362***	(0.063)	0.36
Covariance			
Slope (EU is economically good for me) & Level-2 Intercept	0.049	(0.044)	0.05
Sample			
m (individuals)	25,389		25,389
N (regions)	93		93
ICC	.099		.099
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)			
Fixed & Random Effects	.194		.194
Fixed Effects only	.148		.148
AIC	31586		31586

Source: Eurobarometer 73.4 (European Commission 2012c) and Eurostat (2018), Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models. Standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

Beneficial (regression, regional level macro factors, 2010)

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
17***	(0.006)	-0.047***	(0.006)	-0.048***	(0.006)	-0.047***	(0.006)	-0.047***	(0.006)
0***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
6***	(0.035)	0.186***	(0.035)	0.189***	(0.036)	0.184***	(0.035)	0.186***	(0.035)
4***	(0.029)	0.296***	(0.028)	0.300***	(0.029)	0.291***	(0.028)	0.293***	(0.028)
72***	(0.009)	0.071***	(0.009)	0.073***	(0.010)	0.071***	(0.009)	0.072***	(0.009)
2***	(0.011)	0.180***	(0.011)	0.183***	(0.011)	0.178***	(0.011)	0.181***	(0.011)
11***	(0.019)	0.239***	(0.019)	0.243***	(0.019)	0.236***	(0.019)	0.240***	(0.019)
0.017	(0.012)	0.016	(0.012)	0.016	(0.012)	0.016	(0.012)	0.016	(0.012)
0.032	(0.022)	-0.032	(0.022)	-0.033	(0.022)	-0.031	(0.022)	-0.032	(0.022)
77***	(0.018)	0.077***	(0.018)	0.078***	(0.018)	0.077***	(0.018)	0.077***	(0.018)
73***	(0.011)	0.073***	(0.011)	0.074***	(0.011)	0.072***	(0.011)	0.073***	(0.011)
4***	(0.013)	0.134***	(0.013)	0.135***	(0.013)	0.132***	(0.013)	0.134***	(0.013)
0***	(0.016)	0.160***	(0.016)	0.162***	(0.016)	0.158***	(0.016)	0.160***	(0.016)
0.028	(0.017)	0.028	(0.017)	0.028	(0.017)	0.028	(0.016)	0.028	(0.017)
37***	(0.011)	-0.037***	(0.011)	-0.037***	(0.011)	-0.037***	(0.011)	-0.037***	(0.011)
0.004	(0.014)	0.004	(0.013)	0.004	(0.014)	0.004	(0.013)	0.004	(0.014)
0.032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.033**	(0.011)	-0.032**	(0.010)	-0.032**	(0.010)
0.024*	(0.012)	-0.024*	(0.012)	-0.025*	(0.012)	-0.024*	(0.012)	-0.024*	(0.012)
0.00***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)	0.030***	(0.009)
0.022*	(0.009)	0.021*	(0.009)	0.022*	(0.009)	0.021*	(0.009)	0.021*	(0.009)
0.034**	(0.012)	-0.035**	(0.012)	-0.035**	(0.012)	-0.034**	(0.012)	-0.034**	(0.012)
0.09***	(0.009)	-0.079***	(0.009)	-0.080***	(0.009)	-0.078***	(0.009)	-0.079***	(0.009)
0.00***	(0.013)	0.171***	(0.013)	0.171***	(0.013)	0.168***	(0.013)	0.169***	(0.013)
0.021	(0.020)					0.033	(0.020)	0.026	(0.020)
0.010	(0.008)					0.004	(0.008)	0.008	(0.008)
		0.375***	(0.105)			0.406***	(0.108)		
		-1.250***	(0.319)			-1.151***	(0.309)		
				0.566	(0.313)			0.513	(0.301)
				-1.782	(3.376)			0.236	(3.392)
0.090*	(0.045)	0.090*	(0.045)	0.089*	(0.045)	0.090*	(0.045)	0.090*	(0.045)
0.05***	(0.059)	0.303***	(0.053)	0.348***	(0.061)	0.280***	(0.049)	0.321***	(0.056)
0.032	(0.044)	0.045	(0.040)	0.052	(0.044)	0.029	(0.038)	0.031	(0.044)
5,389		25,389		25,389		25,389		25,389	
93		93		93		93		93	
.092		.084		.096		.079		.089	
.194		.194		.194		.194		.194	
.165		.164		.152		.178		.168	
582.9		31574.6		31586.7		31571.2		31583.3	

ols (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the regional level (NUTS-1), Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) with standard er-

Table A.12: Inclusive European identity (regression, country level macro factors, 2015)

	MO		
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.045***	-0.006	-0.001
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	0	-0.001
Age (squared)	-0.000***	0	-0.001
<i>Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)</i>			
Country and other	0.128***	-0.026	0.102
Other(s) only	0.288***	-0.024	0.264
<i>Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)</i>			
Middle (16-19 years)	0.076***	-0.009	0.067
High (20 years or more)	0.164***	-0.011	0.153
In education	0.222***	-0.019	0.203
<i>Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)</i>			
Skilled manual workers	0.036**	-0.011	0.025
Farmer / Fisherman	0.047*	-0.023	0.024
Owner of a shop	0.136***	-0.017	0.119
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.119***	-0.011	0.108
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.193***	-0.013	0.180
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.229***	-0.016	0.213
Never worked	0.065***	-0.016	0.049
<i>Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)</i>			
Unemployed	-0.048***	-0.011	-0.037
Houseperson	-0.014	-0.014	-0.028
Retired	-0.030**	-0.01	-0.020
<i>Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)</i>			
Left	-0.032**	-0.011	-0.021
Moderate left	0.020*	-0.009	0.011
Moderate right	0.023**	-0.009	0.014
Right	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.036
No answer / missing	-0.099***	-0.008	-0.091
<i>Economic level</i>			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)			
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)			
<i>Economic development</i>			
Δ GDP since 2004			
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)			
Δ GDP since 2008			
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)			
<i>Variance</i>			
Level-2 Intercept	0.215***	(0.060)	0.275
<i>Sample</i>			
m (individuals)	25,863		25,863
N (countries)	27		27
ICC	.061		.061
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)			
Fixed & Random Effects	.186		.186
Fixed Effects only	.149		.149
AIC	31281.7		31281.7

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), HLM with random effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
045***	-0.006	-0.045***	-0.006	-0.045***	-0.006	-0.045***	-0.006	-0.045***	-0.006
00***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0
00***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0	-0.000***	0
128***	-0.026	0.128***	-0.026	0.128***	-0.026	0.128***	-0.026	0.128***	-0.026
287***	-0.024	0.287***	-0.024	0.287***	-0.024	0.287***	-0.024	0.286***	-0.024
076***	-0.009	0.076***	-0.009	0.076***	-0.009	0.076***	-0.009	0.076***	-0.009
164***	-0.011	0.164***	-0.011	0.164***	-0.011	0.164***	-0.011	0.164***	-0.011
222***	-0.019	0.221***	-0.019	0.221***	-0.019	0.222***	-0.019	0.221***	-0.019
036**	-0.011	0.036**	-0.011	0.036**	-0.011	0.036**	-0.011	0.036**	-0.011
047*	-0.023	0.047*	-0.023	0.047*	-0.023	0.047*	-0.023	0.047*	-0.023
136***	-0.017	0.136***	-0.017	0.136***	-0.017	0.136***	-0.017	0.136***	-0.017
119***	-0.011	0.119***	-0.011	0.119***	-0.011	0.119***	-0.011	0.119***	-0.011
193***	-0.013	0.192***	-0.013	0.192***	-0.013	0.193***	-0.013	0.192***	-0.013
229***	-0.016	0.229***	-0.016	0.229***	-0.016	0.229***	-0.016	0.229***	-0.016
065***	-0.016	0.065***	-0.016	0.065***	-0.016	0.065***	-0.016	0.065***	-0.016
048***	-0.011	-0.048***	-0.011	-0.048***	-0.011	-0.048***	-0.011	-0.048***	-0.011
014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
030**	-0.01	-0.030**	-0.01	-0.030**	-0.01	-0.030**	-0.01	-0.030**	-0.01
032**	-0.011	-0.032**	-0.011	-0.032**	-0.011	-0.032**	-0.011	-0.032**	-0.011
020*	-0.009	0.020*	-0.009	0.020*	-0.009	0.020*	-0.009	0.020*	-0.009
023**	-0.009	0.023**	-0.009	0.023**	-0.009	0.023**	-0.009	0.023**	-0.009
048***	-0.012	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.048***	-0.012
098***	-0.008	-0.098***	-0.008	-0.098***	-0.008	-0.098***	-0.008	-0.098***	-0.008
0005	-0.023					-0.01	-0.029	0.007	-0.022
0004	-0.007					0.007	-0.007	0.004	-0.006
		0.053	-0.074			0.031	-0.076		
		-0.274	-0.201			-0.265	-0.225		
				0.057	-0.125			0.037	-0.123
				-0.805	-0.558			-0.826	-0.541
02***	(0.057)	0.201***	(0.057)	0.199***	(0.056)	0.192***	(0.054)	0.185***	(0.052)
25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863	
27		27		27		27		27	
.058		.058		.057		.055		.053	
.186		.186		.186		.186		.186	
.155		.156		.154		.157		.160	
31284		31283.9		31283.6		31286.6		31285.7	

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the national level (NUTS-0), Average Mar-

Table A.13: Inclusive European identity including attitude towards EU as economically b

	MO	
Sex (Ref.: Male)	-0.040***	(0.006)
Age (in 10 years)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Age (squared)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Citizenship (Ref.: Only Country)		
Country and other	0.126***	(0.026)
Other(s) only	0.295***	(0.024)
Education (Ref.: 15 years or less)	0.075***	(0.009)
Middle (16-19 years)		
High (20 years or more)	0.162***	(0.011)
In education	0.221***	(0.020)
Class (Ref.: Unskilled manual workers)		
Skilled manual workers	0.035**	(0.012)
Farmer / Fisherman	0.042	(0.024)
Owner of a shop	0.139***	(0.018)
Employed at desk / travelling / service job	0.120***	(0.011)
Employed professionals / middle management / supervisor	0.191***	(0.013)
Proprietors / higher management / professionals	0.225***	(0.017)
Never worked	0.065***	(0.017)
Employment situation (Ref.: Employed)		
Unemployed	-0.047***	(0.011)
Houseperson	-0.014	(0.015)
Retired	-0.031**	(0.010)
Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)		
Left	-0.027*	(0.011)
Moderate left	0.020*	(0.009)
Moderate right	0.020*	(0.009)
Right	-0.054***	(0.012)
No answer / missing	-0.096***	(0.009)
EU is economically good for me (Ref.: No)	0.156***	(0.012)
Economic level		
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000)		0.00
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 10,000, squared)		0.00
Economic development		
Δ GDP since 2004		
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)		
Δ GDP since 2008		
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)		
Variance		
Slope (EU is economically good for me)	0.022	(0.020)
Level-2 Intercept	0.216***	(0.061)
Covariance		
Slope (EU is economically good for me) & Level-2 Intercept	-0.031	(0.026)
Sample		
m (individuals)	25,863	25,863
N (countries)	27	27
ICC	.062	.05
Pseudo-R ² (McKelvey & Zavoina)		
Fixed & Random Effects	.204	.20
Fixed Effects only	.167	.17
AIC	30967.3	30969

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018), H
 ginal Effects (AMEs) with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

beneficial (regression, country level macro factors, 2015)

M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
**	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)	-0.040***	(0.006)
	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
**	(0.026)	0.126***	(0.026)	0.126***	(0.026)	0.126***	(0.026)	0.126***	(0.026)
	(0.024)	0.293***	(0.024)	0.294***	(0.024)	0.293***	(0.024)	0.292***	(0.024)
	(0.009)	0.075***	(0.009)	0.075***	(0.009)	0.075***	(0.009)	0.075***	(0.009)
**	(0.011)	0.162***	(0.011)	0.162***	(0.011)	0.162***	(0.011)	0.162***	(0.011)
	(0.020)	0.220***	(0.020)	0.220***	(0.020)	0.221***	(0.020)	0.220***	(0.020)
**	(0.012)	0.035**	(0.012)	0.035**	(0.012)	0.035**	(0.012)	0.035**	(0.012)
	(0.024)	0.042	(0.024)	0.042	(0.024)	0.042	(0.024)	0.042	(0.024)
	(0.018)	0.138***	(0.018)	0.138***	(0.018)	0.138***	(0.018)	0.138***	(0.018)
**	(0.011)	0.120***	(0.011)	0.120***	(0.011)	0.120***	(0.011)	0.119***	(0.011)
	(0.013)	0.190***	(0.013)	0.190***	(0.013)	0.191***	(0.013)	0.190***	(0.013)
	(0.017)	0.224***	(0.017)	0.224***	(0.017)	0.225***	(0.017)	0.224***	(0.017)
**	(0.017)	0.065***	(0.017)	0.065***	(0.017)	0.065***	(0.017)	0.065***	(0.017)
	(0.011)	-0.047***	(0.011)	-0.047***	(0.011)	-0.047***	(0.011)	-0.047***	(0.011)
	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.014)	-0.014	(0.015)	-0.014	(0.014)
**	(0.010)	-0.031**	(0.010)	-0.031**	(0.010)	-0.031**	(0.010)	-0.031**	(0.010)
	(0.011)	-0.027*	(0.011)	-0.027*	(0.011)	-0.027*	(0.011)	-0.027*	(0.011)
	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)
**	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)	0.020*	(0.009)
	(0.012)	-0.053***	(0.012)	-0.053***	(0.012)	-0.053***	(0.012)	-0.053***	(0.012)
	(0.009)	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.096***	(0.008)	-0.096***	(0.009)	-0.096***	(0.008)
**	(0.011)	0.156***	(0.011)	0.156***	(0.011)	0.157***	(0.011)	0.156***	(0.011)
	(0.023)					-0.011	(0.029)	0.005	(0.022)
	(0.007)					0.007	(0.007)	0.004	(0.006)
		0.035	(0.074)			0.011	(0.076)		
		-0.208	(0.221)			-0.194	(0.246)		
				0.043	(0.127)			0.020	(0.124)
				-0.612	(0.651)			-0.659	(0.628)
21	(0.019)	0.021	(0.019)	0.021	(0.019)	0.021	(0.019)	0.020	(0.019)
	(0.057)	0.201***	(0.057)	0.199***	(0.057)	0.191***	(0.055)	0.185***	(0.053)
0	(0.025)	-0.021	(0.027)	-0.019	(0.028)	-0.021	(0.026)	-0.017	(0.027)
63		25,863		25,863		25,863		25,863	
27		27		27		27		27	
8		.058		.057		.055		.053	
4		.204		.204		.204		.204	
73		.172		.171		.174		.176	
5		30970.4		30970.3		30972.9		30972.4	

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Logit) with Random Intercepts on the national level (NUTS-0), Average Mar-

Table A.14: Decomposition of effects of macro variables due to attitude covariate (2015)

	M1		M2	
Economic level				
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 1,000)				
Reduced	0.086	(0.056)	0.073	(0.063)
Full	0.081	(0.056)	0.070	(0.063)
Diff	0.005**	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)
GDP in PPP (per capita, in 1,000, squared)				
Reduced			0.007	(0.018)
Full			0.007	(0.018)
Diff			0.001	(0.002)
Economic development				
Δ GDP since 2004				
Reduced				
Full				
Diff				
Δ GDP since 2004 (squared)				
Reduced				
Full				
Diff				
Δ GDP since 2008				
Reduced				
Full				
Diff				
Δ GDP since 2008 (squared)				
Reduced				
Full				
Diff				
m (individuals)	25,863		25,863	

Source: Eurobarometer 83.3 (European Commission 2016b), 84.3 (European Commission 2016c), and Eurostat (2018). L with standard errors in parentheses, own calculations, * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.

, KHB-Method)

[illegible]

logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (NUTS-1), including several covariates (not depicted), Logits