Abstract
This article examines how illiberal leaders’ behaviour towards the judiciary changes when they have a second chance in power. Drawing on Varieties of Democracy indicators for populist rhetoric and constitutional change, we identify several OECD worst performers and focus on two – Poland and Hungary – whose illiberal leaders ascended to power for a second time. For Hungary, we examine PM Orbán’s first time in office, time in opposition and second time in office, when he undertook reforms of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and other courts. For Poland, we examine the Kaczyńskis’ party’s first time in office, opposition and return to power, when it undertook campaigns against a variety of constitutional institutions. We find the first mandate of such leaders is characterised by strong rhetoric and chaos, they consolidate control of their party while out of power, and in their second mandates they are much more effective and extreme in undermining judicial independence and the rule of law. The experiences of Poland and Hungary have important implications for the United States. In his first term, Donald Trump undertook various actions that undermined the judiciary, and his actions while out of office align with those of Orbán and Kaczyński, such that Trump’s second term might well pose a significant threat to the US judiciary.