Issue published: 30 September 2022

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Catalysts of Cyber Threats on the Example of Visegrad Group Countries

Marek Górka, p. 317–342

Abstract: The article deals with cyber incidents that were recorded in the area of the V4 countries. It is important for the discussed topic to extract certain factors and with their help to characterise the conducted cyberattacks in terms of political motivations. The analysis tries to prove the existence of politically motivated cyberattacks. This, in turn, helps to determine the consequences of such cyber incidents. Moreover, the scale and magnitude of the cyberattack can be information to determine the strategic maturity and cyber capabilities of the adversary. Thus, the incidents that have occurred allow a cyberattack to be characterised in political terms and thus have value as information about ongoing conflicts in cyberspace that either reflect reality or foreshadow actions yet to come in the real world. Cyber operations can also be used as a tool to build a sphere of influence and exert political, economic and military pressure on a particular state.

Keywords: cybersecurity policy, Visegrad Group, cyberattacks

Conceptualisation of Hybrid Interference in the Czech Republic: How to Make it a Practically Researchable Phenomenon?

Miroslav Mareš, Josef Kraus and Jakub Drmola, p. 343–354

Abstract: The text focuses on the definition and reconceptualisation of the concept of hybrid interference, traces the use of the concept in Czech security documents, presents the historical development of the use of the concept and then seeks a practical conceptualisation applicable towards research on the resilience against it. This conceptualisation includes a narrower definition of the concept, which is necessary for the real application, graspability and researchability of resilience in the context of the Czech environment. We arrive at a framework of hybrid interference that we believe to be more practical and useful, mostly due to its higher clarity and precision. Furthermore, we believe that definition of hybrid interference which is agnostic towards sectors, actors and specific tools used during such activities is preferable and more likely to remain universally relevant than those relying on enumeration and itemisation.

Keywords: hybrid interference, definition, security forces, armed forces, asymmetric warfare, conceptualisation, theoretical framework

Determination and Development of Definitions and Concepts of Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Wars: Comparison of Solutions at the Level of the European Union, NATO and Croatia

Robert Mikac, p. 355–374

Abstract: Political, professional and academic circles, as well as the general public, are increasingly using different terms like hybrid threats and hybrid wars in everyday circumstances, describing different phenomena and processes. This trend became more prominent in Europe after the events in Ukraine in 2014, and it has especially been more emphasized since the attack of the Russian regime on Ukraine in 2022. For this reason, the central organisations of the European security architecture – the European Union and NATO, as well as their member states – pay more and more attention to research, conceptualisation and explanation of what different forms of hybrid dangers represent, what their scope is and how to effectively oppose them. This is a necessity because only by adequately addressing the problem and defining key definitions and concepts, the development of appropriate and effective response measures can be achieved. This paper aims to comparatively research and present the development of this area at the level of the European Union and the NATO Alliance, and specifically for Croatia, analyse the use of the relevant terms with a special focus on two terms: hybrid threats and hybrid wars. The first term, because it is the most general and most common hybrid term used, the second because it is the term with the strongest meaning and consequences. The research will represent an addition to the existing body of knowledge and will provide guidelines for the continued development of this field atthe policy and academic levels. Also, the research will be significant for other countries and researchers in order to perceive the current status of the situation in the European Union, the NATO Alliance and Croatia as a member state of both organisations, and to be able to compare the challenges and solutions in their countries.

Keywords: hybrid threats, hybrid war, European Union, NATO, Croatia

Hybrid Threats and Counter‑Hybrid Solutions: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of Croatia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Robert Mikac, Marina Mitrevska and Mirza Smajić, p. 375–395

Abstract: Hybrid threats are not new security challenges, but they are becoming more and more pronounced, primarily due to the situation in Ukraine, where multiple hybrid activities are underway by Russia. As central actors in the European security architecture, the European Union and NATO recognise that both organisations, their member states and other countries in Europe are exposed to various forms of hybrid threats. However, this ability to recognise hybrid threats and especially the development of counter‑hybrid solutions is an open question for some smaller countries. In order to investigate the above, this paper focuses on hybrid threats and counter‑hybrid solutions by analysing the state of affairs in Croatia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our goal is to explore this area and answer the following research questions: What hybrid threats are Croatia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina exposed to? How do they deal with them? What counter‑hybrid solutions are being developed?

Keywords: hybrid threats, counter‑hybrid solutions, Croatia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Role, Expectations and Challenges of High Representativein Bosnia and Herzegovina

Nađa Beglerović, p. 397–432

Abstract: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) longs for stability and development as it continues to be held back by the dysfunctional political system, weak institutions, rampant corruption and ethnonationalist rhetoric. It is caught in a vicious cycle of crises generated by some of its political elite that has hampered BiH’s social, political and economic progress. The international community, including the Office of High Representative (OHR), has taken on the responsibility of safe guarding the rights of three Constituent people and Others, ensuring peace prevails in BiH (OHR 2022). In particular, the OHR was established to drive reforms and institution‑building in BiH but has often been hobbled by inadequate and reluctant political support. Considering the uniqueness of theHigh Representative’s position in BiH, further research is needed on its role, evolution, impact and acceptance. The research applies the role theory to examine the HR role (i.e., conception, performance and recognition). The OHR continues to play an essential role in BiH and cannot be closed until BiH makes significant progress toward state‑building, which includes establishing strong institutions and addressing the democratic deficit, promoting a common national identity and the interethnic trust.

Keywords: Office of High Representative, OHR, High Representative, Bonn Powers, Bosnia and Herzegovina, international community

Nomination of Ministers According to the Areas of Electoral Support for Political Parties in Elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic

Petr Dvořák and Michal Pink, p. 433–460

Abstract: Following identification of the areas of electoral support for the ruling parties since 1996 and subsequent analysis of the selection of ministers by each party, it was found that centre‑right parties nominated more ministers from their areas of electoral support, mainly from Prague and other large cities. On the other hand, left‑wing parties nominated ministers from similar areas to centre‑right parties, even if they did not draw their electoral support from there. The Public Affairs party, which was established in Prague, nominated all its ministers from Prague, despite the fact that for the party it was not an area of electoral support. It is evident that, for the completion of a minister’s mandate, it is not important whether he or she comes from an area of electoral support. Only TOP 09, the Greens and KDU‑ČSL (1998 elections) used the nomination of ministers to maximise votes within electoral regions, which could be identified as areas of electoral support in the previous elections. On the other hand, with ODA and ANO 2011, ministers were used outside the territory of electoral support, which may be related to the improvement of the election result in regions where the party was not so successful.

Keywords: geographic representativeness, government, Czech Republic

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