SPECIAL SECTION: EU Citizenship in Peripheral Regions: Collective Identities and Political Participation in Eastern Central and Western Europe

Introduction to the Special Section ‘EU Citizenship in Peripheral Regions: Collective Identities and Political Participation in Eastern Central and Western Europe’

Lars Vogel, p. 1–8

The Regional Economic Foundations of European Identity

Florian K. Kley, 9–73

Abstract: The question of whether there is increasing social integration among EU citizens in Europe as a spill‑over effect of the ongoing process of system integration, as expected by utilitarian perspectives on integration, has been discussed in many contributions so far. In particular, the question of how the economic strength and development of macro‑units affects European social integration has gained new momentum after the 2004 enlargement, when economically weaker ECE countries became part of the EU. In this contribution, I focus on the impact of regional economic strength and development on European social integration. I analyse the relationship between the economic situation and development of NUTS-1 regions and individual European identity using Eurobarometer data for the years 2004, 2010 and 2015. Using descriptive and multivariate quantitative approaches, I show that regional economic strength is weakly correlated with European identity, although not significant in multivariate models. However, citizens who believe that the EU is an economic advantage are more likely to identify as Europeans and are more prevalent in regions with higher economic growth. I conclude that convincing citizens of the economic benefits of EU membership could result in increased European social integration in the long run.

Keywords: European identity, European integration, regions, economy, attitudes

Contextual Sources of Euroscepticism in Eastern Central and Western Europe: The Role of Peripheral Regions

Linus Paeth and Lars Vogel, p. 75–98

Abstract: This paper examines how regional contextual factors influence Eurosceptic voting in Eastern Central and Western Europe. It employs a theoretical framework of multidimensional regional periphery and relative deprivation to explore how economic, spatial and demographic factors can generate collective feelings of deprivation among regional inhabitants. This relative deprivation is supposed to manifest as political discontent expressed at the EU level, either by attributing responsibility for regional peripherality to the EU or by blaming national institutions, potentially spilling over to the EU level. Based on an integrated dataset encompassing economic, spatial and demographic indicators as well as election data from the European election 2019 for 1169 NUTS 3 regions within the EU, the findings support the hypotheses. Poor economic performance in a region, relative to the national average and historical levels, increases Eurosceptic voting, and the impact of an ageing population is significant. Spatial infrastructure conditions have minimal direct but moderating effects: Eurosceptic parties benefit more from economic underperformance, if the infrastructure is also poorly developed. The paper further shows differences in cue‑taking between Eastern Central Europe and Western Europe suggesting that citizens in Eastern Central Europe consider the EU more often as saviour than as creator of regional deprivation. The paper underscores the importance of regional contextual factors and infrastructural effects, and highlights the need to avoid one‑size‑fits‑all explanations for Euroscepticism in Eastern Central and Western Europe.

Keywords: periphery, Euroscepticism, European Integration, deprivation, cue‑taking, contextual factors, voting behaviour, European elections

‘The Iron Curtain did not dissolve very well’: Reflections on EU Citizenship from CEE peripheralised perspectives

Rebecca Pates, p. 99–115

Abstract: Peripheralisation is determined in socio‑demographic, economic, political and identitarian factors. It is, many say, by definition, characterised by a willingness to migrate, in particular among the younger generations. European citizenship comes with the right to migrate – to relocate, to work and to be treated as equals in many respects to the local citizenry. In this research paper, I explicate the results of twenty interviews in six CEE countries with 7^th‑graders who were asked what they thought of European citizenship. Those who knew what this is give widely divergent answers, but there are two dominant themes running through their perspectives: they do not feel great affection for the EU, and whilst willing to migrate, they do not appreciate the need to do so. Thus, they feel the EU does not live up to its promises to deliver equality for all Europeans. One explanation they give for this is that ‘the Iron Curtain did not dissolve very well’: the burden of history is acutely experienced.

Keywords: European citizenship, peripheralisation, inequality, CEE History

Not in my House: EU-citizenship among East-Central European Citizens: Comparative Analyses

Gert Pickel and Susanne Pickels, p. 117–139

Abstract: The successes of right‑wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a repeated distancing from the European Union, raise the question of whether there is such a thing as European citizenship at all. Citizenship is not understood as formal nationality, but as a sense of belonging. This ties in with the considerations of political cultural research. This article uses representative surveys to address the question: What about European Citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe? The results show that the feeling of belonging to the European Union in Eastern and Central Europe is better than its reputation and not lower than in Western Europe. However, there are differences in the recognition of plurality between the majority (not all) of Eastern European states compared to the majority of Western European states. In particular, the integration of Muslims is more strongly rejected. The same applies to the social acceptance of homosexuality. This partly explains the success of right‑wing populists in Central and Eastern Europe and marks a certain cultural difference, which is primarily directed against a wet model of democracy that is considered too open to plurality. In short: Central and Eastern Europeans also see themselves as Europeans and EU members, but their ideas of a European democracy differ from Western ideas – especially in peripheral regions.

Keywords: citizenship, political culture, Eastern Europe, political community, nationalism

REGULAR ESSAYS

The Emerging New World System and the European Challenge

Attila Ágh, p. 141–167

Abstract: In the early 2020s we live in the transition period between two world systems, the Old World Order (OWO) and the New World Order (NWO), in a deep ‘polycrisis’.Therefore, the term transformation has recently appeared in official EU documents as well as in political science literature. The transition to the NWO has begun with this crisis management and it will produce a radical transformation of the entire global architecture in the 2020s. In its conceptual framework this paper focuses on the contrast between ‘de‑coupling’and ‘de‑risking’, as it has been explained very markedly inthe recent speeches of the president of the European Commission, Ursula van der Leyen (EC 2023a), and the national security adviser, Jake Sullivan (The White House 2023). This contrast symbolises the US policy, concentrating more on cutting or reducing connectivity among the various policy fields, versus the EU policy turning them safe and interdependent. These approaches represent the US and EU attitude in the emerging New World Order, and primarily in their relationships to China.

Keywords: New World Order, polycrisis, complexity management, multilateral securitisation, global and social citizenship

Poland’s Governmental Response to the European Green Deal: Discursive Strategies prior to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

Michał Dulak and Małgorzata Kułakowska, p. 169–191

Abstract: Although Poland’s energy mix is becoming ‘greener’ each year, the country’s energy production is still dominated by coal. This affects several important spheres: financial, socioeconomic and political. Therefore, the aim of the article is to explain Poland’s response to adaptational pressure stemming from the European Green Deal (EGD) by reconstructing discursive strategies related to the topics of decarbonisation and green transformation. We perceive the EGD as a regulatory initiative, whose purpose is to incorporate formal rules and European norms in the domestic discourse and public policies. In order to induce such a change, the European Commission influences the ‘utility calculations’ used by member states. However, at the same time, somemember states need to deal with problems caused by misfits between their energy sector’s capabilities and expectations of the EGD. In Poland’s case, the significant fields of misfits refer to national emission targets, obligations resulting from the EU Emission Trading System and the Fit for 55 reform package. Using discourse analysis, we have reconstructed a governmental narrative on the transformation based on election manifestos, selected ministerial documents and social media posts from the years 2019–2021. As the government aims to present itself as defenders of Polish national interests, climate‑related policies are seen as a threat. There is a clear focus on energy sovereignty and security issues, while challenges related to global warming are absent from the political communication. As the situation at the Belarussian border developed and the danger connected with Russian politics became clearer, the concept of being a defender acquired more meanings.

Keywords: European Green Deal, Poland, discourse analysis, logic of consequence, decarbonisation, green transformation

US-Visegrad Realities in Biden’s World of Democracies

Peter Rada, p. 193–210

Abstract: The ‘liberal world order’ can be considered as an historic exception in the history of ‘realist anarchy’ of international relations. This exception is the result of many factors and it has been significantly influenced by the power of the United States. Thus, the agenda of the world order can be analysed in the context of American foreign policy. The place of Central Europe – and in the Visegrad countries – can be analysed in this frame. This approach elaborates the basis for further inquiries also of the Central European‑American relations but here the goal is to understand the place of the Visegrad countries in the context of the American led liberal world order. The goal of this study is to theorise the world order, and to identify the role of the United States and the place of the Visegrad countries in it. Furthermore, the study tries to draw theoretic conclusions in the light of the ‘Biden doctrine’ – which is theoretically coherent with the liberal characteristic of the order – to the Visegrad‑US relations.

Keywords: world order, theories of international relations, US foreign policy, Visegrad Cooperation